Form No:HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET
IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT,
MULTAN BENCH, MULTAN

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Crl. Misc. No.1229-M of 2011

Riaz Hussain Versus The State, etc.

S.No. of order/ Date of order/ Order with signature of Judge, and that of
proceeding Proceeding parties of counsel, where necessary.

27.10.2020 Mr. Muhammad Usman Sharif Khosa and Dr. Malik M.

Hafeez, Advocates for the petitioner.
Mr. Muhammad Abdul Wadood, Addl. Prosecutor General for
the state.
Mr. Muhammad Javed Khan and Fakhar Bashir Sial, Research
Officers of Lahore High Court.

By means of instant application under section 561-A

Cr.P.C. the petitioner has questioned the vires of order dated
24.11.2011 passed by respondent No.3/Addl. Sessions Judge,
D.G Khan, dismissing a criminal revision petition filed by
him against the order dated 17.10.2011 passed by respondent
No.2/Magistrate Section-30, D.G. Khan, whereby he ordered
the petitioner to pay back/return the amount of Daman
Rs.90,000/-, deposited by the convict and received by him
being an injured witness in pursuance of the judgment dated
29.06.2011.

2. The shorn of unnecessary factual details of the matter,

suffice it to state that on 11.07.2003 at about 2.30/3.00 p.m.,
while armed with deadly weapons, respondent No.5
alongwith his co-accused, in furtherance of their common
intention, caused injuries on the bodies of Ghulam Haider,
Faiz Muhammad PWs, consequently, on the complaint of the
petitioner, a criminal case vide FIR No.106, dated
11.07.2003, offence under sections 324, 342, 427, 337-A(v),
337-A(i), 337-F(iii), 337-F(i), 34 PPC, was registered at
Police Station Kot Mubarik, District Dera Ghazi Khan
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 2

against the culprits. The investigation was encapsulated into

a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898. On the conclusion of a thorough trial,
respondent No.5 alongwith his co-accused Manzoor and
Shamla were convicted and sentenced vide its judgment
dated 29.06.2011, passed by learned trial Court as under:-
“Accused Manzoor
(Under Section 337-L(i) PPC)
Rigorous Imprisonment for two years and is liable to pay
Daman Rs.50,000/- to legal heirs of Ghulam Haider deceased
injured and in case of non-payment of Daman, he shall
further undergo simple imprisonment till the payment of
Daman.
(Under Section 337-A(i) PPC)
To pay Daman Rs.30,000/- to legal heirs of Ghulam Haider
injured and in default thereof to further undergo simple
imprisonment till the payment of Daman.
(Under Section 337-L(2) PPC)
To pay Daman Rs.20,000/- to legal heirs of injured Ghulam
Haider and in case of non-payment of Daman, he shall
further undergo simple imprisonment till the payment of
Daman.

Accused Shamla
(Under Section 337-A(i) PPC)
To pay daman Rs.30,000/- to injured Riaz Ahmad and in
default, he shall undergo for simple imprisonment till the
payment of Daman.
Accused Yasin
(Under Section 337-A(i), 337-L(2) and 337-F(v) PPC)
To pay daman total Rs.90,000/- to injured Riaz Ahmad and
in default, he shall undergo for simple imprisonment till the
payment of Daman.
All the Daman shall be paid in lump sum. The convict
Manzoor was given benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C, if any.”

It will be important to note that on pronouncement of

judgment, respondent No.5 Ghulam Yasin and his co-convict
Shamla after depositing the amount of Daman Rs.90,000/-
and Rs.30,000/-, respectively, with the learned trial Court
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 3

vide challan No.200 dated 29.6.2011, secured their release.

The amount of Daman, after it was ordered to be released by
the Trial Court, was received by the petitioner, on
05.07.2011. Respondent No.5 and his other co-convict
Manzoor Hussain challenged the aforesaid judgment of their
conviction by filing an appeal under Section 408 Cr.P.C on
02.07.2011 before the learned lower Appellate Court.
Shamla, the co-convict, however did not prefer appeal
against his conviction and sentence. While extending the
benefit of doubt, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, D.G
Khan, seized of the matter, proceeded to acquit respondent
No.5 and his co-appellant of the charge, vide its judgment
dated 23.08.2011. Thereafter, respondent No.5, after his
acquittal, moved a miscellaneous application before the
learned trial Court with the prayer that “the Daman amount,
he deposited in pursuance of the judgment of his conviction
and sentence, which since has been released to the
petitioner by the court, may be ordered to be returned to
him. The learned Illaqa Magistrate, D.G Khan, ordered the
petitioner to reimburse the amount of Daman, vide its order
dated 17.10.2011, which, in its verbatim is reproduced as
under:-

‫"کونسل ہمراہ الزام علیہ ڈیفالٹر ریاض احمد بحراست پولیس امروز پیش ہوئ‬
‫ہے۔‬

‫ روپے واپس نہیں‬90000/‫حسب حکم عدالت ریاض احمد مضروب وصول شدہ رقم مبلغ ۔‬
‫کی۔ اور اب ادا کرنے سے انکاری ہے۔ لہٰ ذا ڈیفالٹر ریاض احمد داخل جوڈیشل حواالت‬
‫ روپے‬90000/‫ پیش ہووے۔ تاہم اگر ضمانت نامہ مالیتی مبلغ ۔‬22 -11-10 ‫ہوکر بتقرر‬
"‫معہ ایک ضامن داخل کرے تو ضمانت پر رہائی پائے۔‬

After submitting bail bonds in terms of above order,

the petitioner was released from custody. Thenceforth, he
challenged the aforesaid order by filing a criminal revision
petition, which was dismissed vide judgment dated
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 4

24.11.2011 by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, D.G Khan.

Hence this criminal miscellaneous petition.
3. Arguments heard. Record perused.
4. At the very outset, it may be observed that the
Criminal Courts are established for dispensation of justice,
under the law. Likewise the Special Courts or the Tribunals
are also established in order to try certain offences under the
provisions of their respective statutes. The proceedings
before courts are regulated by the statutory provisions.
Broadly speaking the trial can be divided into two kinds (1)
Summary trial (2) regular trial. For holding both kinds of
trial, different procedures have been provided by law.
Regular trial can be held under the law by more than one
class of Court i.e. Court of Sessions and that of Magistrate.
Holding a person, accused of an offence, [under general,
local or special law], guilty of the charge for committing an
offence either on pleading or making of confession of his
guilt or on the conclusion of a thorough trial by a Court is
known as conviction in the legal parlance. Concomitantly,
the conviction is followed by imposition/awarding of the
punishment prescribed under the relevant law for such
offence or offences by a trial Court. It may be relevant to
point out that while enacting “The Punjab Sentencing Act
2019(XXXIV of 2019)”, the Provincial Legislature has
enumerated various factors, which may be considered to
improve consistency while sentencing by the courts.
According to Section 53 PPC, an offender, upon having been
found guilty of the charge may be imposed upon any one or
more, out of the following punishments i.e. Qisas, Diyat,
Arsh, Daman, Death either as Qisas or Ta'zir, Imprisonment
for life, (Imprisonment is of two descriptions, namely:-- (i)
Rigorous, i.e., with hard labour (ii) Simple), Forfeiture of
property and Fine by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 5

the Hudood Laws, the punishment of whipping and flogging

was also permissible. Furthermore, Chapter XVI PPC, deals
with the offences affecting human body, Section 299(b)
PPC provides that “arsh" means the compensation specified
in that Chapter to be paid to the victim or his heirs.
Similarly under clause (d) of the ibid Section, “Daman”
has been defined as the compensation determined by the
Court to be paid by the offender to the victim for causing
hurt not liable to arsh. Likewise under clause (e) of the
same provision, definition of “Diyat” has also been given, as
the compensation specified in Section 323 [value of Diyat]
payable to the legal heirs of the victim. It may also be
beneficial to state that the term “Ta’zir” under clause (i) has
been defined as a punishment other than Qisas, Diyat, Arsh
or Daman.
5. In the above noted background, the reading of the
provisions of Sections 337-Y PPC, 382-A, 404, 412 and 426
Cr. P.C in their befitting chronology seems to be necessary.
For ready reference Section 337-Y PPC is reproduced as
under:-
Value of daman. (1) The value of daman may be
determined by the Court keeping in view:
(a) the expenses incurred on the treatment of
the victim;
(b) loss or disability caused in the functioning
or power of any organ; and
(c) the compensation for the anguish suffered by
the victim.
[(1a) The daman may be made payable in lump
sum or in installments spread over a period of
five years from the date of the final judgment;]
[(2) Where a convict fails to pay daman or any
part thereof within the period specified in sub-
section (1a), the convict may be kept in jail and
dealt with in the same manner as if sentenced to
simple imprisonment until daman is paid in full
or may be released on bail if he furnishes security
or surety equivalent to the amount of daman to
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 6

the satisfaction of the court or may be released on

parole as may be prescribed in the rules.]
Sub-section 1 of the above narrated Provision points
out the factors which may be considered while determining
the value of daman. Perusal of subsection (1a) of the above
provision further indicates that the daman can either be paid
in lump sum or in installments, spread over a period of five
years from the date of final judgment by a convict. The term
decision or judgment appears to be interchangeable because
of their implication and effect. The Black’s Law Dictionary
9th edition defines the term final judgment as under:-
“A court’s last action that settles the rights of the
parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except
for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attorney’s
fees) and enforcement of the judgment.

Earlier in the case reported as “Abid Hussain and

another Vs. Chairman, Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal and others”
(PLD 2002 Lahore 482), it was held by this Court that
“After the final judgment by the Court (presumably the
trial Court) the convict is to be allowed a period not
exceeding three years to pay Diyat or Arsh either in
lumpsum or in installments.” The said judgment was
challenged before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan vide
case reported as “Government of Punjab, Lahore Vs. Abid
Hussain and others”(PLD 2007 Supreme Court 315),
however, the same was not only upheld but the apex Court
issued the directions to the Federal Government for framing
the rules for payment of diyat, arsh and daman, resultantly,
Federal Government framed the rules namely “The Diyat,
Arsh and Daman Fund Rules, 2007, which hereinafter
shall be called the “Rules 2007”. Rule 11 being relevant is
reproduced as under:-
11. Release of convict on parole. Where a convict
has served out the substantive sentence of
imprisonment and makes payment of diyat, arsh or
daman, he may be released on such terms and
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 7

conditions as may be determined by the Court for

payment of remaining amount. The Court may pass an
order for detention of the convict if he fails to fulfill
the terms and conditions of release.
6. It is important to point out that the period of 03 years
prescribed for the payment of diyat, arsh and daman, by the
above referred judgment of this Court, had later-on been
extended up to 05 years through an amendment i.e. Pakistan
Penal Code (amendment) Act, 2010 (Act XV of 2010
dated 22.06.2010). It is further observed that the moment, an
order under Section 337-Y PPC permitting the convict to pay
the requisite amount either in installments or in lumpsum by
the Court, is passed, by implications, the convict is barred
from challenging his conviction by way of appeal as no-body
can be allowed to approbate and reprobate in the same
breath, rather he would be bound by his previous stance.
Reliance is placed upon case reported as “Mst. Ubaida
versus Makhdoom Abrar Ahmad and 2 others”(1986 P Cr. L
J 539), “Sakhawat Ali versus The State”(1999 P Cr. L J
450), “Faiz Muhammad versus A. Rauf and others” (1999
P Cr. L J 864), “The State versus Muhammad Umar alias
Chotoo” (2003 P Cr. L J 216) and “Attaullah versus Abdur
Razaq and another” (P L D 2002 Supreme Court 534).
Furthermore, under Section 412 Cr.P.C, except on the
ground of its legality, no appeal is maintainable against a
judgment of conviction, passed upon pleading guilty of the
charge, by a convict. The seeking of a permission by a
convict to pay Diyat, Arsh or Daman, while invoking the
power of a court, which has passed the final judgment, in-
fact amounts to accepting his conviction and sentence,
foregoing his right of appeal. Upon passing an order by a
court under Section 337-Y(1a) PPC, allowing prayer of the
convict, the judgement of conviction attains finality. The
criminal Court after passing a final judgment becomes
functus officio. Such court has been vested with the power
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 8

under Section 337-Y PPC read with Rule 11 of Rules 2007 to

pass an order for giving effect to its own judgment.
7. A criminal Court may afford an opportunity of hearing
to a victim or heirs of victim as the case may be, while
passing the order on the request of a convict for payment of
amount in installments to eliminate any possibility of
maneuver, pretention or misrepresentation regarding
financial status of an unscrupulous convict. Furthermore,
Section 337-Y(2) PPC read with rule 11 of Rules 2007,
manifest that in case a convict fails to pay daman or any part
thereof within the period specified in sub-section (1a), the
convict may be kept in jail and dealt with in the same manner
as if he has been sentenced to simple imprisonment until
daman is paid in full or he may be released on bail upon
furnishing his security or surety equivalent to the amount
of daman to the satisfaction of the court or may be
released on parole as prescribed in the rules.
8. In addition to above, it is a fundamental right of every
person, accused of an offence under Article 10-A of the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 to
have a fair trial to be held by a properly and legally
constituted Court or Tribunal. The appeal is a statutory right
of an aggrieved individual or authority and same cannot be
exercised on any analogy unless expressly conferred upon
under some law. The provision of Section 404 Cr.P.C is an
embodiment of this concept which reads as follows:-
“No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a
criminal court except as provided for by this code or
by any other law for the time being in force”.

9. For what has been discussed above, in the given

circumstances, the question of maintainability of an appeal
by a convict, yet can be looked into from another angle.
After passing the sentence, the convict has to be taken into
custody for execution of his sentence in terms of Section 383
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 9

Cr.P.C, unless execution of his sentence is postponed in

terms of Section 382-A Cr.P.C. For ready reference, Section
382-A Cr.P.C. is reproduced as under:-
[382-A. Postponement of execution of sentence
of imprisonment under Section 476 or for a period of
less than one year. Notwithstanding anything
contained in Section 383 or 391, where the accused:

(a) is awarded any sentence of imprisonment

under Section 476, or
(b) is sentenced in cases other than those
provided for in Section 381, to imprisonment
whether with or without fine or whipping for
a period of less than one year.
the sentence shall not, if the accused furnishes bail
to the satisfaction of the Court for his appearance
at such time and place as the Court may direct, be
executed, until the expiry of the period prescribed
for making an appeal against such sentence, or, if
an appeal is made within that time, until the
sentence of imprisonment is confirmed by the
appellate Court, but the sentence shall be executed
as soon as practicable after the expiry of the
period prescribed for making an appeal, or, in
case of an appeal as soon as practicable after the
receipt of order of the appellate Court confirming
the sentence].”
Section 382-A Cr.P.C makes it clear that a convict
who is awarded a sentence of imprisonment less than one
year, upon furnishing his bail bonds to the satisfaction of the
trial Court for his appearance as the Court may direct, his
sentence of imprisonment shall be postponed and shall not be
executed until the expiry of period for making an appeal
against such conviction and sentence and if an appeal is
made within that time, until the sentence of imprisonment is
confirmed by the appellate Court. The submission of bail
bonds by a convict for the postponement of his sentence
enabling him to file an appeal, in-fact amounts to
surrendering before the Court. The august Supreme Court of
Pakistan has authoritatively held in the case reported as
Muhammad Adnan alias Dana Vs. The State and others”
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 10

(2015 SCMR 1570) that without surrender, appeal against

the conviction is not maintainable. Let’s have a close look at
the provision of Section 426 Cr.P.C having nexus with the
issue under determination, which is reproduced hereunder in
its verbatim:-
Section 426 Cr.P.C Suspension of sentence
pending appeal: Release of appellant on
bail. (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted
person, the Appellate Court may, for
reasons to be recorded by it in writing order
that the execution of the sentence or order
appealed against be suspended and, also, if
he is in confinement, that he be released on
bail or on his own bond.
[1-A] Omitted by Ordi. LIV of 2001, PLD
2002 Cent. St. 973, w.e.f. 10.10.2001.
[1-A] ………
(a) ………
(b) ………
(c) ………

(2) The power conferred by this section

on an appellate Court may be exercised also
by the High Court in the case of any appeal
by a convicted person to a Court
subordinate thereto.
[2-A) [Subject to the Provisions of section
382-A,] when any person other than a
person accused of a non-bailable offence is
sentenced to imprisonment by a Court, and
an appeal lies from that sentence, the court
may, if the convicted person satisfies the
Court that he intends to present an appeal,
order that he be released on bail for a
period sufficient in the opinion of the court
to enable him to present the appeal and
obtain the orders of the Appellate Court
under sub-section (1) and the sentence of
imprisonment shall, so long as he is so
released on bail, be deemed to be
suspended.
(2-B) Where a High Court is satisfied that a
convicted person has been granted special
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
against any sentence which it has imposed
or maintained, it may if it so thinks fit order
that pending the appeal the sentence or
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 11

order appealed against be suspended, and

also, if said person is in confinement, that he
be released on bail.
(3) When the appellant is ultimately
sentenced to imprisonment, or
[Imprisonment for Life], time during which
he is so released shall be excluded in
computing the term for which he is so
sentenced.
The provision of Section 426 Cr.P.C. clearly deals
with a situation where the case of a convict is not covered by
Section 382-A Cr.P.C. and the convict thus being in custody,
pending his appeal, can be released on bail by way of
suspension of his sentence. The above discussion leads this
court to conclude that a convict either can file an appeal
against his conviction and sentence being on bail under
Section 382-A Cr.P.C or he can seek his release on bail
under Section 426 Cr.P.C during the pendency of his appeal,
while being under custody. It is, therefore, held that unless
convict is either on bail by way of postponement of his
sentence in terms of Section 382-A Cr.P.C. or he is confined
in terms of the provisions of Chapter XXVIII Cr.P.C.(of
execution), no appeal against the judgment of conviction can
be entertained. Further, in absence of any express provision
of law, it is not lawful for a Court to allow the convict to
deposit such amount of “Diyat, Arsh and Daman” under
protest for his release except as required under Section 337-
Y(1a) PPC and any departure therefrom would amount to act
without lawful authority, thus not sustained in the law.
10. So far as the argument of learned Prosecutor assisted
by learned counsel for the complainant that after passing the
judgment of acquittal of respondent No.5, since the petitioner
had not challenged it by resorting to available remedy of
appeal under Section 417(2)(A) Cr.P.C. and as such,
acquittal judgment has attained finality, therefore, this court
cannot examine the question of maintainability of appeal
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 12

filed by respondent No.5 at this stage. I am afraid that in

view of revisional jurisdiction, vested with this court, under
Section 439 Cr.P.C. above noted argument of learned
Prosecutor has no legs to stand. For ready reference, Section
439 Cr.P.C is reproduced as under:-
439. High Court's powers of revision.(1) In the
case of any proceeding the record of which has
been called for by itself, [....] or which otherwise
comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its
discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on
a Court of Appeal by sections 423, 426, 427 and
428 or on a Court by section 338, and may
enhance the sentence; and, when the Judges
composing the Court of Revision are equally
divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in
manner provided by section 429.
(2) No order under this section shall be made to
the prejudice of the accused unless he has had an
opportunity of being heard either personally or by
pleader in his own defense.
(3) Where the sentence dealt with under this
section has been passed by Magistrate [....], the
Court shall not inflict a greater punishment for the
offence which, in the opinion of such Court, the
accused has committed, than might have been
inflicted for such offence by Magistrate of the first
class.
[(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to
authorize a High Court:
(a) to convert a finding of acquittal into one of
conviction; or
(b) to entertain any proceedings in revision with
respect to an order made by the Sessions Judge
under section 439-A.]
(5) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no
appeal is brought, no proceedings by way of
revision shall be entertained at the instance of the
party who could have appealed.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
section, any convicted person to whom an
opportunity has been given under sub-section (2)
of showing cause why his sentence should not be
enhanced, shall, in showing cause, be entitled also
to show cause against his conviction.”

11. It is pertinent to mention here that during hearing of

instant application, vide order dated 12.10.2020, the record
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 13

of learned appellate court had been requisitioned and after

perusal thereof, the above noted factual and legal defects
have been found in existence. It has been ruled by the august
Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as “Dr. Waqar
Hussain Vs. The State” (2000 SCMR 735) that:-
“The intention of the law to confer suo motu
powers of revision on the High Court is to ensure
that the Courts subordinate to it act strictly within
the legal bounds and do not transgress their
jurisdiction and the findings, sentence or orders,
recorded or passed by them are just and legal, but,
nevertheless, in order to avoid any impression of
arbitrariness in the exercise of this power the order
of initiating suo motu proceedings by the High
Court should mention the ostensible error or
irregularity in the orders or proceedings of the
subordinate Courts. This would help the parties in
knowing the reasons for such an action. So far as
the power of the High Court under section 439,
Cr.P.C. are concerned, it may be stated that it is
not a power only but a duty whenever facts for its
jurisdiction are brought to the notice of the Court,
or otherwise come to its knowledge because the
revisional jurisdiction is in the nature of corrective
jurisdiction. To see what types of orders the High
Court can pass under section 439, Cr.P.C., the case
of Emperor v. Varjivandas alias Kalidas Bhaidas
(ILR 1903 (Bombay) Vol.XXVII, page 84) may be
cited wherein it was observed as under:-----
"the fact that this particular power which
is conferred by section 423 on Courts in
the exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction, is excluded in express terms
in section 439 seems clearly to point to
the conclusion that all the other powers
not expressly excluded may be exercised
by the High Court as a Court of
Revision."
The following observations of this Court in
Mushtaq Ahmad v. The State (PLD 1966 SC 126, at
page 128) may also be advantageously quoted:--
" ....Under section 439 of the Criminal
Procedure Code the High Court has a
power to interfere upon information in
whatever way received, as the section
clearly says that it may do so in any case
in which it has itself called for the record
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 14

or which has been reported for orders or

'which otherwise comes to its
knowledge'. These are words of wide
import. In the present case the record of
the case was placed before the learned
Judge in the course of his inspection and
the facts of the case thus came to his
knowledge. Under this section the High
Court has also the right to exercise its
power on its own initiative and there can
be no warrant for the proposition that the
High Court is debarred from examining
the record suo Motu."
Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia and another v. State
of Bombay (PLD 1958 SC (Ind.) 293, at page 303) is
another authority on this proposition. It was held
therein:--
......We have, therefore, to look into
section 423 to find out not the cases in
which the High Court can interfere but
only the nature of the power that it can
exercise in a case, in its revisional
jurisdiction, that is to say, we have to
incorporate only the several powers
contained in section 423, into section 439
except the power to convert a finding of
acquittal into one of conviction".
The case of Khatija v. The State and another
(PLD 1978 Karachi 348, at page 356) may also be
cited where it was held that:--
" ....Both under section 439 and under
section 561-A (a) of the Criminal
Procedure Code this Court can act suo
motu and it is not necessary that it should
have the application of any person before
itself."
12. Epitome of above discussion is that respondent No.5
upon pronouncement of conviction and awarding the
punishment of “Daman” by the learned Judicial Magistrate
Section 30, D.G Khan, immediately deposited the amount of
Rs.90,000/- and secured his release. Admittedly, his
punishment was not postponed in the manners contemplated
by Section 382-A Cr.P.C, rather it stood executed, therefore,
the appeal filed by respondent No.5 was incompetent. The
learned lower appellate Court had failed to examine the
Crl. Misc.No.1229-M of 2011. 15

aspect of maintainability of appeal, despite the fact that the

Court was bound to examine the question of maintainability
before passing any order thereon. I have no hesitation in my
mind to hold that order of acquittal is of no consequences
being patently illegal, without jurisdiction and thus cannot
sustain in the eye of law, consequently, while exercising
inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C, which enables
the High Court to make an order which is deemed
appropriate for giving effect to any order passed under Code
of Criminal Procedure or prevent abuse of process of any
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, the judgment
of acquittal dated 23.08.2011 passed by lower appellate
Court, the order dated 17.10.2011 passed by learned
Magistrate Section-30, directing the petitioner to reimburse
the amount of “ Daman” and the order of Revisional Court
dated 24.11.2011 are set aside being patently illegal and this
petition is allowed for giving effect to the order dated
29.06.2011 of learned Magistrate Section-30, D.G Khan
whereby respondent No.5 was allowed to deposit the amount
of “Daman” imposed upon him.

(Anwaarul Haq Pannun)

Judge
APPROVED FOR REPORTING.

Judge
*Siddique*