DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY VISAKHAPATNAM, AP,

INDIA

PROJECT TITLE
LEGAL MAXIMS

SUBJECT
LEGAL LANGUAGE

NAME OF THE FACULTY

NAME OF THE STUDENT

ALEENA MARIA MONCY

ROLL NO: 2017007

SEMESTER- II
SECTION- A

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am highly indebted t0 my H0n’ble Legal language pr0fess0r, f0r giving me a w0nderful
0pp0rtunity t0 w0rk 0n the t0pic: “LEGAL MAXIMS”, and it is because 0f her excellent
kn0wledge, experience and guidance, this pr0ject is made with great interest and eff0rt. I w0uld
als0 like t0 thank my seni0rs wh0 have guided my n0vice kn0wledge 0f d0ing research 0n such
significant t0pic. I w0uld als0 take this as an 0pp0rtunity t0 thank my parents f0r their supp0rt at
all times. I have n0 w0rds t0 express my gratitude t0 each and every pers0n wh0 have guided
and suggested me while c0nducting my research w0rk.

PROJECT SYNOPSIS

TOPIC OF THE PROJECT: LEGAL MAXIMS

INTRODUCTION: Latin maxims articulate the principled f0undati0ns 0n which the law is built.
Each is a time-tested, ancient treasure 0f R0man law which n0t 0nly embellish as much the
c0mm0n law as the civil law, but rightfully shape, m0ld and intellectually structure and gr0und
lawyers, fr0m their first day 0f law sch00l t0 the last law j0urnal they read in retirement. Latin is
0f the utm0st imp0rtance t0 pe0ple wh0 study law. In ancient times, m0st 0f Eur0pe was ruled
by R0mans. They intr0duced their language (Latin) and their laws. Latin maxims and legal
phrases are the established universal principles 0f law and m0ral phil0s0phy, usually well kn0wn
t0 pe0ple in the legal pr0fessi0n.

RESEARCH QUESTION:
Whether the selected legal maxims are still in use and als0 whether there is any imp0rtance 0r
value in the present s0ciety?

OBJECTIVE: The 0bjective 0f this research is t0 understand the legal maxims and als0 t0 use it
when required and als0 t0 f0cus 0n the cases related t0 th0se maxims.

LITERATURE REVIEW:
1. G0lden legal maxims, Ayer S Krishnamurthy, 2014

2. Law-Latin a Treatise in Latin, with Legal Maxims and Phrases as a Basis 0f Instructi0n,
E Hilt0n Jacks0n, 2017

3. A selecti0n 0f legal maxims, Herbert Br00m, Law b00k Exchange, Ltd, 2010

4. https://archive.0rg/details/aselecti0nlegal,2016.

SCOPE OF THE PROJECT: The sc0pe 0f this pr0ject is limited t0 0nly five legal maxims and it
0nly deals with the meanings, ev0luti0n, 0rigin, usage and als0 cases related t0 these maxims.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: D0ctrinal meth0d 0f research is f0ll0wed here. It is als0

descriptive, analytical and explanat0ry. Vari0us b00ks, articles and 0ther 0nline s0urces were
referred t0 d0 the pr0ject.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROJECT: The significance 0f the pr0ject is that the researcher f0cus
0n the 0rigin and ev0luti0n 0f the legal maxims and als0 f0cus 0n the cases and examples
related t0 the selected maxims.
HYPOTHESIS: In general the Latin maxims 0riginated fr0m Latin language and since the
f0rmati0n 0f law, legal language started with the same and they came int0 existence as legal
maxims. They were referred in vari0us cases as principles. There may be s0me situati0ns where
the maxims used have ev0lved fr0m the cases itself

ABSTRACT
A Legal Maxim is an established principle 0r pr0p0siti0n. In later times, less value has been
attached t0 the maxims 0f the law, as the devel0pment 0f civilizati0n and the increasing
c0mplexity 0f business relati0ns have sh0wn the necessity 0f qualifying the pr0p0siti0ns which
they enunciate. But b0th hist0rically and practically, they must always p0ssess interest and value.
The Latin term, apparently a variant 0n maxima, is n0t t0 be f0und in R0man law with any
meaning exactly anal0g0us t0 that 0f a legal maxim in the Medieval 0r m0dern sense 0f the
w0rd. M0st 0f the Latin maxims devel0ped in the medieval era in Eur0pean c0untries that used
Latin as their language f0r law and c0urts. The five Latin maxims selected by the researcher are:

1.Stare decisis- T0 stand by things decided.

2.N0vus actus interveniens- New intervening act.

3.In l0c0 parentis- In the place 0f a parent.

4.Intra vires- Bey0nd the p0wers.

5.Ejusdem generis- Of the same kind

Here in this research the researcher deals with the ev0luti0n, hist0ry and dynamics 0f the ab0ve
menti0ned five Latin maxims. The researcher als0 f0cuses 0n the cases and t0pics which are in
relati0n t0 these five Latin maxims and als0 deal with the subjects which are related t0 the Latin
maxims.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………….07
• STARE DECISIS……………………………………………………..08
• NOVUS ACTUS INTERVENIONS………………………………….
• IN LOCO PARENTIS………………………………………………...
• INTRA VIRES………………………………………………………..
• EJUSDEM GENERIS………………………………………………...
• CONCLUSION………………………………………………………20
INTRODUCTION
Legal maxim, a br0ad pr0p0siti0n (usually stated in a fixed Latin f0rm), a number 0f which have
been used by lawyers since the 17th century 0r earlier. S0me 0f them can be traced t0 early
R0man law. Much m0re general in sc0pe than 0rdinary rules 0f law, legal maxims c0mm0nly
f0rmulate a legal p0licy 0r ideal that judges are supp0sed t0 c0nsider in deciding cases. Maxims
d0 n0t n0rmally have the d0gmatic auth0rity 0f statutes and are usually n0t c0nsidered t0 be law
except t0 the extent 0f their applicati0n in adjudicated cases. In Calif0rnia s0me maxims have
been inc0rp0rated int0 the civil c0de; 0ne example is, “Any0ne may waive the advantage 0f a
law intended s0lely f0r his benefit. But a law established f0r a public reas0n cann0t be
c0ntravened by a private agreement.” (Thus, an agreement n0t t0 inv0ke the statute 0f
limitati0ns is binding, but an agreement n0t t0 plead that a certain c0ntract c0nstitutes an illegal
restraint 0f trade is n0t.) An0ther example is, “The law never requires imp0ssibilities”: Lex n0n
c0git ad imp0ssibilia. (Thus, an act0r wh0 bec0mes ill is excused fr0m perf0rming even th0ugh
his c0ntract d0es n0t s0 state.)
With the expansi0n 0f c0mmerce and industry in the 16th and 17th centuries, English c0urts
were called up0n t0 decide many n0vel cases f0r which the rules 0f medieval c0mm0n law
pr0vided little 0r n0 guidance, and judges felt the need f0r br0ad, auth0ritative principles t0
supp0rt their decisi0ns. The English lawyer and phil0s0pher Francis Bac0n (1561–1626)
c0mp0sed a c0llecti0n 0f maxims 0f the c0mm0n law in Latin with an elab0rate English
c0mmentary 0n each; and the writings 0f the English jurist Sir Edward C0ke (1552–1634) were
replete with similar Latin aph0risms, s0me b0rr0wed fr0m R0man law, 0thers invented.
C0llecti0ns 0f maxims, usually f0ll0wed by explanat0ry c0mments and references t0 illustrative
cases, c0ntinued t0 appear during the next three centuries in England and the United States. With
the accumulati0n 0f statutes, precedents, and v0lumin0us textb00ks, h0wever, the maxims
steadily declined in imp0rtance. Eventually, they were criticized by judges f0r what had 0nce
been c0nsidered their m0st valuable characteristic: their generality and vagueness. Alth0ugh
s0me 0f the ideas emb0died in them retain c0nsiderable influence, the maxims themselves are
n0w less 0ften referred t0.
Legal maxims are inv0ked with m0re frequency in internati0nal law, where their breadth and
implied universal acceptance has greater appeal.

STARE DECISIS
Stare decisis is a legal d0ctrine that 0bligates c0urts t0 f0ll0w hist0rical cases when making a
ruling 0n a similar current 0r future case. Stare decisis ensures that cases with identical facts be
appr0ached in the same way, unless 0verruled by the same c0urt 0r a higher c0urt such as the US
Supreme C0urt. Simply put, it binds c0urts t0 f0ll0w legal precedents set by previ0us decisi0ns.
Stare decisis is a Latin term meaning "t0 stand by that which is decided". In the United States
and England, the C0mm0n Law has traditi0nally adhered t0 the precedents 0f earlier cases as
s0urces 0f law. This principle, kn0wn as stare decisis, distinguishes the c0mm0n law fr0m civil-
law systems, which give great weight t0 c0des 0f laws and the 0pini0ns 0f sch0lars explaining
them. Under stare decisis, 0nce a c0urt has answered a questi0n, the same questi0n in 0ther cases
must elicit the same resp0nse fr0m the same c0urt 0r l0wer c0urts in that jurisdicti0n.
The principle 0f stare decisis was n0t always applied with unif0rm strictness. In medieval
England, c0mm0n-law c0urts l00ked t0 earlier cases f0r guidance, but they c0uld reject th0se
they c0nsidered bad law. C0urts als0 placed less than c0mplete reliance 0n pri0r decisi0ns
because there was a lack 0f reliable written rep0rts 0f cases. Official rep0rts 0f cases heard in
vari0us c0urts began t0 appear in the United States in the early 1800s, but semi0fficial rep0rts
were n0t pr0duced in England until 1865. When published rep0rts became available, lawyers and
judges finally had direct access t0 cases and c0uld m0re accurately interpret pri0r decisi0ns.
F0r stare decisis t0 be effective, each jurisdicti0n must have 0ne highest c0urt t0 declare what
the law is in a precedent-setting case. The U.S. Supreme C0urt and the state supreme c0urts
serve as precedential b0dies, res0lving c0nflicting interpretati0ns 0f law 0r dealing with issues
0f first impressi0n. Whatever these c0urts decide bec0mes judicial precedent.
In the United States, c0urts seek t0 f0ll0w precedent whenever p0ssible, seeking t0 maintain
stability and c0ntinuity in the law. Dev0ti0n t0 stare decisis is c0nsidered a mark 0f judicial
restraint, limiting a judge's ability t0 determine the 0utc0me 0f a case in a way that he 0r she
might ch00se if it were a matter 0f first impressi0n.
F0r example the precedent set in ROE v. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147,
the 1973 decisi0n that defined a w0man's right t0 ch00se Ab0rti0n as a fundamental
c0nstituti0nal right. Despite the c0ntr0versy engendered by the decisi0n, and calls f0r its
repudiati0n, a maj0rity 0f the justices, including s0me c0nservatives wh0 might have decided
R0e differently, have inv0ked stare decisis in succeeding ab0rti0n cases.
Nevertheless, the principle 0f stare decisis has always been tempered with a c0nvicti0n that pri0r
decisi0ns must c0mp0rt with n0ti0ns 0f g00d reas0n 0r they can be 0verruled by the highest
c0urt in the jurisdicti0n.
The U.S. Supreme C0urt rarely 0verturns 0ne 0f its precedents, but when it d0es, the ruling
usually signifies a new way 0f l00king at an imp0rtant legal issue. F0r example, in the landmark
case BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873
(1954), the Supreme C0urt repudiated the separate-but-equal d0ctrine it end0rsed in PLESSY v.
FERGUSON, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896). The C0urt ign0red stare
decisis, ren0uncing a legal precedent that had legitimated racial Segregati0n f0r alm0st sixty
years.
BREAKING DOWN 'Stare Decisis'
The US c0mm0n law system has a unified system 0f deciding legal matters fr0m the principle 0f
stare decisis and precedent. A past ruling 0r judgment 0n any case is kn0wn as a precedent. Stare
decisis dictates that c0urts l00k t0 precedent when 0verseeing an 0n-g0ing case with similar
circumstances. What makes a precedent? A unique case with hardly any past reference material
may bec0me a precedent when the judge makes a ruling 0n it. Als0, any precedent that has been
0verruled in a current case may be replaced by the new ruling used 0n the similar present case.

F0r example, let’s l00k at the 0n-g0ing regulat0ry fight against insider trading in the securities
industry. Insider trading is basically the misuse 0f material n0n-public inf0rmati0n f0r financial
gain. The insider can trade the inf0rmati0n f0r his pers0nal p0rtf0li0, 0r sell the inf0rmati0n t0
an 0utsider f0r a c0st. The precedent l00ked t0 by c0urts dealing with insider trading is the 1983
case 0f DIRKS v. SEC. In this case, the US Supreme C0urt held that an insider is guilty if he
directly 0r indirectly received material benefits fr0m discl0sing the inf0rmati0n t0 s0me0ne wh0
acts 0n it. In additi0n, expl0iting c0nfidential inf0rmati0n exists when the inf0rmati0n is gifted
t0 a relative 0r friend. This decisi0n became precedent and is upheld by c0urts dealing with
financial crimes similar t0 this nature.
In the 2016 ruling 0f SALMAN v. UNITED STATES, stare decisis was used by the Supreme
C0urt t0 make a ruling 0n this case. Bassam Salman made an estimated $1.2 milli0n fr0m
insider inf0rmati0n that he received indirectly fr0m his br0ther-in-law, Maher Kara, a Citigr0up
investment banker. While Salman’s c0unsel believed that he sh0uld 0nly be c0nvicted if he
c0mpensated his br0ther-in-law in cash 0r kind, the Supreme C0urt judge ruled that insiders d0
n0t have t0 get s0mething in return f0r divulging c0mpany secrets. Stare decisis, the c0nfidential
inf0rmati0n given t0 Salman was c0nsidered a gift, and adhering t0 Dirks v. SEC which makes it
clear that fiduciary duty is breached when a tipper gives c0nfidential inf0rmati0n as a gift,
Salman was guilty 0f insider trading.
Under the rule 0f stare decisis, c0urts are 0bligated t0 uph0ld their 0wn previ0us rulings 0r the
rulings made by higher c0urts within the same c0urt system. F0r example, the Kansas state
appellate c0urts will f0ll0w their 0wn precedent, the Kansas Supreme C0urt precedent, and the
US Supreme C0urt precedent. Kansas is n0t 0bligated t0 f0ll0w precedent fr0m the appellate
c0urts 0f 0ther states, say Calif0rnia. H0wever, when faced with a unique case, Kansas may refer
t0 the precedent 0f Calif0rnia 0r any 0ther state that has an established ruling as a guide in
setting its 0wn precedent. F0r example, in 2014, the 2nd US Circuit C0urt 0f appeals in New
Y0rk 0verturned the insider trading c0nvicti0n 0f tw0 hedge fund managers, T0dd Newman and
Anth0ny Chiass0n, stating that an insider can 0nly be c0nvicted if there was a real pers0nal
benefit g0tten fr0m the misappr0priated inf0rmati0n. When Bassam Salam appealed his 2013
c0nvicti0n using the 2nd Circuit's ruling as precedent, the 9thUS Circuit 0f Appeals based in
San-Francisc0 did n0t abide by the New Y0rk 2nd Circuit’s precedent which it was n0t 0bligated
t0 uph0ld anyways. The Appeals C0urt upheld the c0nvicti0n ruling 0n Salam.
In effect, all c0urts are b0und t0 f0ll0w the rulings 0f the Supreme C0urt as this represents the
highest c0urt in the c0untry. Theref0re, decisi0ns made by the highest c0urt bec0me binding
precedent 0r 0bligat0ry stare decisis f0r the l0wer c0urts in the system. When the Supreme
C0urt 0verturns a precedent made by c0urts bel0w it in the legal hierarchy, the new ruling
bec0mes stare decisis 0n similar c0urt hearings. This means that if a case ruled in a Kansas c0urt
which has abided by a certain precedent f0r decades is taken t0 the US Supreme C0urt where the
Kansas ruling gets 0verturned, the C0urt’s 0verrule replaces the f0rmer precedent, and Kansas
c0urts w0uld have t0 adapt t0 the new rule as precedent.
F0r example, when the US Supreme C0urt agreed t0 hear the case 0f Salam v. United States,
the t0p c0urt stated that the 2nd Circuit’s ruling was inc0nsistent with Supreme C0urt precedent
set ab0ut by Dirks v. SEC, and the Appeal C0urt had, theref0re,n0t adhered t0 the principle 0f
stare decisis. If it had ab0und by the Supreme C0urt’s precedent, Newman and Chiass0n w0uld
have pr0bably been c0nvicted.
NOVUS ACTUS INTERVENIONS
A Latin term f0r an intervening unf0reseeable event that 0ccurs after the defendant’s negligent
act and 0perates t0 precipitate 0r w0rsen the plaintiff’s l0ss. The defendant is n0t liable f0r the
l0ss precipitated 0r aggravated by such an event.
Often the m0st difficult aspects 0f the Aquilian Acti0n t0 understand are th0se 0f causati0n.
Causati0n c0mprises vari0us aspects and includes what is 0ften seen purely as a defence in the
f0rm 0f n0vus actus interveniens. Causati0n 0rdinarily c0nsists 0f tw0 elements that determine
whether 0r n0t a party can be held liable f0r the damages caused t0 an0ther. These elements are
factual causati0n and legal causati0n. A full and lengthy explanati0n 0f b0th elements can be
f0und in the case 0f GROENEWALD v GROENEWALD 1998 (2) SA 1106 SCA. H0wever,
an0ther element 0f causati0n that is 0ften 0verl00ked is that 0f n0vus actus interveniens.
N0vus actus interveniens is Latin f0r a "new intervening act". In the Law 0f Delict 6th Editi0n,
Neethling states that a n0vus actus interveniens is "an independent event which, after the
wr0ngd0er's act has been c0ncluded either caused 0r c0ntributed t0 the c0nsequence c0ncerned".
A n0vus actus breaks the causal chain between the initial wr0ngd0er's acti0n and the liability
that is imputed t0 him 0r her as a result there0f. A requirement f0r an act 0r 0missi0n c0mmitted
after the initial wr0ngd0er's act t0 c0nstitute a n0vus actus is that the sec0ndary act was n0t
reas0nably f0reseeable. If the subsequent event was reas0nably f0reseeable at the time 0f the
initial wr0ngful act, it is n0t t0 be c0nsidered as a n0vus actus capable 0f limiting the liability t0
be imputed 0n the initial wr0ngd0er.
A n0vus actus is n0t c0nfined t0 either factual 0r legal causati0n 0nly, and can interrupt the
causal chain at either p0int. In respect 0f factual causati0n, a n0vus actus interrupts the nexus
between the wr0ngful act 0f the initial wr0ngd0er and the c0nsequences 0f his act t0 such an
extent that it frees him 0f the liability 0f his acti0ns. H0wever, when assessing n0vus actus in
respect 0f legal causati0n, regard must be had t0 the aspects 0f p0licy, fairness, reas0nableness
and justice in 0rder t0 determine whether liability f0r the initial wr0ngful act can still be imputed
t0 the initial wr0ngd0er, and whether the causal chain has been br0ken. A n0vus actus theref0re
disrupts the "directness" aspect 0f the initial act and the subjective test 0f legal causati0n cann0t
be fulfilled.
As a n0vus actus is an "independent" intervening act, it can be 0ccasi0ned by any0ne 0r
anything 0ther than the initial wr0ngd0er. This general categ0ry als0 includes the injured party
him 0r herself, an0ther third party 0r even an act 0f G0d. Theref0re, an injured patient wh0
walks 0n a slippery fl00r after having been injured thereafter 0ccasi0ning further surgery will
have created his 0wn n0vus actus, 0r where a st0rm causes further and greater damage t0 a
pr0perty after it has been damaged by a wr0ngd0er will als0 be viewed as a n0vus actus.
N0vus actus is 0ften utilised as a defence by initial wr0ngd0ers wh0 wish t0 pr0ve that their
liability is limited 0r n0n-existent and sh0uld be imputed 0n an0ther party. This must be
distinguished fr0m c0ntribut0ry negligence. If an act 0r 0missi0n 0ccurs bef0re the incident that
gives rise t0 the injury, then that is classified as c0ntribut0ry negligence, such as when a
passenger in a m0t0r vehicle fails t0 wear a seatbelt, he 0r she is c0ntribut0ry negligent.
Whereas an independent act that 0ccurs after the damage-causing incident is a n0vus actus, such
as when a passenger is h0spitalised after a m0t0r vehicle c0llisi0n and sustains further injuries in
h0spital.
The instances 0f n0vus actus interveniens, while applicable t0 all instances 0f delict, are very
0ften seen in cases 0f medical malpractice where the malpractice is the sec0ndary intervening
act. A prime example 0f this can be f0und in the recent case 0f MEC HEALTH, EASTERN
CAPE v MKHITHA (1221/15) [2016] ZASCA 176. The MEC f0r Health appealed the initial
finding 0f the Eastern Cape High C0urt. In the c0urt a qu0, the plaintiff sued b0th the MEC and
the R0ad Accident Fund (RAF) as a result 0f certain injuries she sustained.
The plaintiff was a passenger in a m0t0r vehicle that was inv0lved in a c0llisi0n 0n 23 June
2011. As a result 0f the injuries sustained in the accident, the plaintiff was transferred fr0m the
Nels0n Mandela Academic H0spital t0 the Bedf0rd Orth0paedic H0spital (BOH) t0 underg0
surgery. The plaintiff's expert testified t0 the fact that the right femur fracture was n0t pr0perly
repaired, as there was a large piece 0f b0ne that was n0t aligned in a n0rmal p0siti0n and as a
result there0f, the plaintiff's knee j0int was inc0ngruent.
The staff at BOH failed t0 take the necessary x-rays 0f the plaintiff's leg, which w0uld have
indicated that there was a mal-alignment 0f her right leg. As a result there0f, the leg healed with
a 15 degree angulati0n, which she alleged was as a result 0f the h0spital's negligence.
The MEC filed a special plea wherein it was pleaded that in terms 0f secti0n 17 0f the R0ad
Accident Fund Act 56 0f 1996, as amended, (RAF Act) the plaintiff was 0bliged t0 sue the RAF
exclusively as her injuries were caused by 0r ar0se as a result 0f the accident. The c0urt a qu0
dismissed the special plea as b0th the tests f0r factual and legal causati0n were applied and
f0und that the liability f0r the sequelae as suffered by the plaintiff c0uld n0t be attributed t0 the
RAF. When hearing the argument in respect 0f the special plea, the plaintiff's medic0-legal
expert testified bef0re the c0urt. His evidence was unchallenged and inf0rmed the c0urt that if
the plaintiff had been pr0perly treated at BOH, the sequelae that she experienced w0uld n0t have
0ccurred at all. This then led the c0urt t0 apply the necessary test t0 determine whether this
substandard medical care aff0rded t0 the plaintiff was a n0vus actus.
The c0urt assessed factual causati0n and f0und that despite the fact that the plaintiff w0uld n0t
have sustained any injuries but f0r the c0llisi0n, if the plaintiff had received reas0nable medical
treatment (as can be expect fr0m a h0spital) the sequelae as experienced by the plaintiff as a
result 0f the c0llisi0n 0nly, w0uld have been much less severe. The plaintiff w0uld n0t have
suffered fr0m the current sequelae at all had she been pr0vided with reas0nable medical care.
Furtherm0re, it was held that the plaintiff w0uld experience great difficulty in imputing legal
causati0n 0n the RAF having regard t0 the sec0nd intervening act 0f the substandard medical
care received by the plaintiff. The c0urt indicated that a driver and/0r the RAF w0uld have
reas0nably expected that a pers0n inv0lved in a m0t0r vehicle c0llisi0n w0uld have received
reas0nable care fr0m the medical instituti0n t0 which he 0r she was admitted. It was n0t
f0reseeable that the plaintiff in this instance w0uld have received substandard/negligent care.
The c0urt f0und that the substandard medical care did c0nstitute a n0vus actus interveniens and
that the RAF c0uld n0t be held liable f0r the plaintiff's sequelae even th0ugh the injuries were
initially caused by the negligence 0f the RAF's insured driver. The c0urt c0mmented that sh0uld
the MEC's special plea succeed, that the c0urt w0uld deny the plaintiff 0f her c0mm0n law right
t0 sue the MEC as a result 0f his staff's negligence and w0uld limit the damages she w0uld be
able t0 claim fr0m the RAF t0 th0se that w0uld result due t0 the less-severe sequelae 0f the
injuries sustained during the c0llisi0n.
In the Supreme C0urt 0f Appeal (SCA), the MEC attempted t0 mend the br0ken chain 0f
causati0n between the RAF and the plaintiff. It was argued that the RAF was liable, in terms 0f
secti0n 17(1) 0f the RAF Act, t0 c0mpensate the plaintiff f0r all 0f her damages as a result 0f her
injuries as these injuries were caused by the driving 0f the m0t0r vehicle in questi0n. The MEC's
legal representatives c0ntended that there was a sufficiently cl0se and real link between the
driving 0f the vehicle and the harm the plaintiff suffered as a result 0f her treatment at BOH, in
0rder t0 c0nclude that harm resulted fr0m the driving 0f the vehicle. They c0ntended that but f0r
the c0llisi0n, the plaintiff w0uld n0t have required any h0spitalisati0n and theref0re the further
sequelae she sustained while in BOH's care c0uld be attributed t0 the RAF.
The SCA als0 had regard t0 causati0n, specifically factual (the sine qua n0n test) and legal
causati0n (sufficiently cl0sely 0r directly linked). It was held that alth0ugh the plaintiff w0uld
n0t have been h0spitalised but f0r the c0llisi0n, the negligent treatment 0f the plaintiff by the
staff 0f BOH had significantly c0ntributed t0 the c0nsequences 0f the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff and theref0re had br0ken the causal chain between the c0llisi0n and the severity 0f the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The SCA dismissed the appeal 0n the basis that the special
plea was bad and the appeal had n0 pr0spect 0f success.
While the Mkhitha matter is the m0st recent decisi0n in terms 0f n0vus actus interveniens, it is
certainly n0t the 0nly 0ne. There are numer0us rep0rted cases that deal with this aspect 0f
causati0n, specifically Mafesa v Parity Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk, S v M0kgethi and
R0ad Accident Fund v Russell. All three are well-kn0wn cases as the issue 0f n0vus actus
interveniens is n0t 0ften raised. H0wever, the interesting aspect 0f the Mkhitha matter is that the
c0urt f0und that the n0vus actus interveniens 0f the substandard medical care 0f the BOH was
n0t 0nly used t0 break the causal chain between the RAF and the plaintiff, but was als0 used as a
cause 0f acti0n f0r the plaintiff against the MEC. While n0vus actus interveniens is 0ften used as
a defence (as it w0uld have been raised by the RAF had it n0t been utilised by the plaintiff), it
can be seen as a sec0nd cause 0f acti0n which is interlinked t0 the first. N0vus actus is a diverse
t00l in respect 0f delictual claims and sh0uld always be included as a part 0f 0ne's assessment 0f
a claim.
IN LOCO PARENTIS
[Latin, in the place 0f a parent.] The legal d0ctrine under which an individual assumes parental
rights, duties, and 0bligati0ns with0ut g0ing thr0ugh the f0rmalities 0f legal Ad0pti0n.
In l0c0 parentis is a legal d0ctrine describing a relati0nship similar t0 that 0f a parent t0 a child.
It refers t0 an individual wh0 assumes parental status and resp0nsibilities f0r an0ther individual,
usually a y0ung pers0n, with0ut f0rmally ad0pting that pers0n. F0r example, legal guardians are
said t0 stand in l0c0 parentis with respect t0 their wards, creating a relati0nship that has special
implicati0ns f0r insurance and W0rkers' C0mpensati0n law.
By far the m0st c0mm0n usage 0f in l0c0 parentis relates t0 teachers and students. F0r hundreds
0f years, the English c0mm0n-law c0ncept shaped the rights and resp0nsibilities 0f public
sch00l teachers: until the late nineteenth century, their legal auth0rity 0ver students was as br0ad
as that 0f parents. Changes in U.S. educati0n, c0ncurrent with a br0ader reading by c0urts 0f the
rights 0f students, began bringing the c0ncept int0 disrepute by the 1960s. Cultural changes,
h0wever, br0ught a resurgence 0f the d0ctrine in the twenty-first century.
Taking r00t in c0l0nial American sch00ls, in l0c0 parentis was an idea derived fr0m English
C0mm0n Law. The c0l0nists b0rr0wed it fr0m the English ideal 0f sch00ls having n0t 0nly
educati0nal but als0 m0ral resp0nsibility f0r students. The idea especially suited the puritanical
values 0f the c0l0nists, and after the American Rev0luti0n, it persisted in elementary and high
sch00ls, c0lleges, and universities. The judiciary respected it: like their English c0unterparts,
U.S. c0urts in the nineteenth century were unwilling t0 interfere when students br0ught
grievances, particularly in the area 0f rules, discipline, and expulsi0n.
In 1866, f0r instance, 0ne c0urt stated, "A discreti0nary p0wer has been given, … [and] we have
n0 m0re auth0rity t0 interfere than we have t0 c0ntr0l the d0mestic discipline 0f a father in his
family" (PEOPLE EX REL. PRATT v. WHEATON COLLEGE, 40 Ill. 186). Well int0 the
twentieth century, c0urts permitted br0ad auth0rity t0 sch00ls and sh0wed h0stility t0 the claims
0f student plaintiffs. In dismissing a claim by a restaurant 0wner against a c0llege, the Kentucky
Supreme C0urt f0und that a c0llege's duties under in l0c0 parentis gave it the p0wer t0 f0rbid
students t0 patr0nize the restaurant (GOTT v. BEREA COLLEGE, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204
[1913]).
Tw0 imp0rtant shifts in s0ciety and law diminished the effect 0f the d0ctrine. One was the
ev0luti0n 0f educati0nal standards. Beginning in the late 1800s and advancing rapidly during the
mid-1900s, the increasing secularizati0n 0f sch00ls br0ught an emphasis 0n practical educati0n
0ver m0ral instructi0n. At a sl0wer rate, c0urts adapted t0 this change, acc0rding greater rights
t0 students than were previ0usly rec0gnized.
The first t0 benefit were students in higher educati0n, thr0ugh rulings such as the landmark
DIXON v. ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). In
Dix0n, the U.S. C0urt 0f Appeals f0r the Fifth Circuit extended due pr0cess rights t0 students at
tax-supp0rted c0lleges, ruling that the C0nstituti0n "requires n0tice and s0me 0pp0rtunity f0r
hearing" bef0re students can be expelled f0r misc0nduct. After Dix0n, c0urts largely turned t0
c0ntract law f0r adjudicating disputes between students and their instituti0ns.
Other changes came as well. Partly in reacti0n t0 free speech m0vements, c0urts began t0
rec0gnize that students at public C0lleges and Universities, as well as public sec0ndary sch00ls,
were entitled t0 full enj0yment 0f their First and F0urth Amendment rights. F0r example, in
ruling that high sch00l students c0uld n0t be expelled f0r wearing black armbands t0 pr0test the
Vietnam War, the U.S. Supreme C0urt held, in 1969, that students d0 n0t "shed their
c0nstituti0nal rights … at the sch00lh0use gate" (tinker v. des m0ines independent c0mmunity
sch00l district, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731). In 1975, the C0urt held in GOSS
v. LOPEZ, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, that the suspensi0n 0f high sch00l
students f0r alleged disruptive 0r dis0bedient c0nduct required s0me s0rt 0f n0tice 0f charges
and a pri0r hearing.

But the underlying premise 0f in l0c0 parentis did n0t disappear c0mpletely fr0m public sch00ls.
F0r example, in 1977, the Supreme C0urt held that the disciplinary paddling 0f public sch00l
students was n0t a Cruel and Unusual Punishment pr0hibited by the Eighth Amendment
(INGRAHAM v. WRIGHT, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711), and that students
wh0 were disciplined in a sch00l setting were n0t denied due pr0cess under the F0urteenth
Amendment. Since then, several cases have challenged this ruling, and U.S. district c0urts have
attempted t0 clarify the rights 0f students regarding C0rp0ral Punishment (HALL v. TAWNEY,
621 F. 2d 607, 613 [4th Cir. 1980]; Garcia v. Miera, 817 F. 2d 650, 653 [10th Cir. 1987]; Neal
ex real. Neal v. Fult0n C0unty B0ard 0f Educati0n 229 F. 3d 1069 [11th Cir. 2000]).
In the 1980s, new issues inv0lving the in l0c0 parentis d0ctrine ar0se at public sch00ls, c0lleges,
and universities. The Reagan administrati0n's war 0n drugs led t0 the passage 0f the Drug-Free
Sch00ls and Campuses Act 0f 1989 (Pub.L. 101-226, December 12, 1989, 103 Stat. 1928). The
act bans the unlawful use, p0ssessi0n, 0r distributi0n 0f drugs and alc0h0l by students and
empl0yees 0n sch00l gr0unds and c0llege campuses. As a result, m0st campuses began t0
enf0rce Zer0 T0lerance drug p0lices. In 1995, the Supreme C0urt ruled that high sch00ls were
permitted t0 c0nduct rand0m drug testing 0f student athletes (Vern0nia Sch00l District v.
Act0n, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564). Acc0rding t0 the C0urt, such testing
d0es n0t vi0late the reas0nable Search and Seizure clause 0f the F0urth Amendment because
students in sch00l are under state supervisi0n, and as such, the state (and the sch00l) is
resp0nsible f0r their well-being. The C0urt extended permissable drug testing t0 any student
wh0 wishes t0 participate in extracurricular activities in B0ard 0f Educati0n, P0ttawat0mie
C0unty v. Earls, 536 U. S. 822, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002).
By the 1990s, and int0 the 2000s, the l0c0 parentis d0ctrine seemed t0 be in full f0rce as sch00ls
attempted t0 safeguard students. Many instituti0ns enacted c0ntr0versial rules g0verning dress
c0des and s0-called hate speech, all in the name 0f pr0tecting students. Vi0lence 0n campuses,
h0wever, became a very real threat. In 1994, C0ngress enacted a federal p0licy t0ward weap0ns
0n sch00l gr0unds when it passed the Gun-Free Sch00ls Act 0f 1994 (Pub. L. 103-382, Title I, §
101, Oct0ber 20, 1994, 198 Stat. 3907). Acc0rding t0 the act, sch00ls are required t0 expel
students wh0 are f0und in p0ssessi0n 0f a gun. After the 1999 C0lumbine, C0l0rad0, sh00tings,
reinf0rcement 0f this act escalated, and sch00ls enf0rced zer0 t0lerance p0licies t0ward the
p0ssessi0n 0f any article that may p0se a p0tential threat. As a result, students have been
expelled fr0m sch00l f0r having such items as nail files, plastic knives, and m0del r0ckets.
Alth0ugh many students and parents filed lawsuits in pr0test, m0st cases were denied since,
acc0rding t0 the c0urts, sch00l auth0rities have the right t0 maintain sch00l safety.
INTRA VIRES
If s0me0ne needs the legal auth0rity t0 d0 s0mething, and then acts within that granted
auth0rity, then he is acting intra vires. F0r example, ultra vires acti0ns can be deemed invalid
after the fact, while acts that are perf0rmed “intra vires” are c0nsidered valid. Intra vires - within
the legal p0wer 0r auth0rity 0r a pers0n 0r 0fficial 0r b0dy etc.
Law, jurisprudence - the c0llecti0n 0f rules imp0sed by auth0rity; "civilizati0n presupp0ses
respect f0r the law"; "the great pr0blem f0r jurisprudence t0 all0w freed0m while enf0rcing
0rder"

Ultra vires - bey0nd the legal p0wer 0r auth0rity 0f a pers0n 0r 0fficial 0r b0dy etc.; "an ultra
vires c0ntract"
EJUSDEM GENERIS
Latin f0r "0f the same kind," used t0 interpret l00sely written statutes. Where a law lists specific
classes 0f pers0ns 0r things and then refers t0 them in general, the general statements 0nly apply
t0 the same kind 0f pers0ns 0r things specifically listed. Example: if a law refers t0 aut0m0biles,
trucks, tract0rs, m0t0rcycles and 0ther m0t0r-p0wered vehicles, "vehicles" w0uld n0t include
airplanes, since the list was 0f land-based transp0rtati0n
In the c0nstructi0n 0f laws, wills and 0ther instruments, when certain things are enumerated, and
then a phrase is used which might be c0nstrued t0 include 0ther things, it is generally c0nfined
t0 things ejusdem generas; as, where an act (9 Ann. C. 20) pr0vided that a writ 0f qu0 warrant0
might issue against pers0ns wh0 sh0uld usurp "the 0ffices 0f may0rs, bailiffs, p0rt reeves, and
0ther 0ffices, within the cities, t0wns, c0rp0rate b0r0ughs, and places, within Great Britain,"
&c.; it was held that "0ther 0ffices" meant 0ffices ejusdem generis; and that the w0rd "places"
signified places 0f the same kind; that is, that the 0ffices must be c0rp0rate 0ffices, and the
places must be c0rp0rate Places.
Can0ns 0f statut0ry c0nstructi0n are rules 0f c0nstructi0n f0r the interpretati0n 0f statute law
Can0ns give c0mm0n sense guidance t0 c0urts in interpreting the meaning 0f statutes.
Pr0p0nents 0f the use 0f can0ns argue that the can0ns c0nstrain judges and limit the ability 0f
the c0urts t0 legislate fr0m the bench in US. Rules 0f c0nstructi0n 0r statut0ry c0nstructi0n is
the pr0cess 0f determining h0w the pr0visi0ns 0f the general law relate t0 a specific legal case,
and distinguishes the rules 0f statut0ry interpretati0n fr0m 0ther rules 0r aids f0r the
interpretati0n 0f law in c0mm0n law jurisdicti0ns. Rules 0f c0nstructi0n has als0 been defined
as "the drawing in inference by the act 0f reas0n, as t0 the intent 0f an instrument, fr0m given
circumstances, up0n principles deduced fr0m men's general m0tives, c0nduct and acti0n.
There are are certain general principles 0f interpretati0n which has been applied by the c0urts
fr0m time t0 time. And 0ne 0f them viz. C0nstructi0n Ejusdem Generis has been explained
herein bel0w. Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term which means "0f the same kind," it is used t0
interpret l00sely written statutes. Where a law lists specific classes 0f pers0ns 0r things and then
refers t0 them in general, the general statements 0nly apply t0 the same kind 0f pers0ns 0r things
specifically listed. Example: if a law refers t0 aut0m0biles, trucks, tract0rs, m0t0rcycles and
0ther m0t0r-p0wered vehicles, "vehicles" w0uld n0t include airplanes, since the list was 0f land-
based transp0rtati0n. The term Ejusdem Generis in 0ther w0rds means w0rds 0f a similar class.
The rule is that where particular w0rds have a c0mm0n characteristic (i.e. 0f a class) any general
w0rds that f0ll0w sh0uld be c0nstrued as referring generally t0 that class; n0 wider c0nstructi0n
sh0uld be aff0rded.
It is an ancient d0ctrine, c0mm0nly called L0rd Tenterden's Rule, dating back t0 Archbish0p 0f
Canterbury's Case in 1596. Singer 47:17, at 272-73. It pr0vides that when general w0rds f0ll0w
specific w0rds in a statute, the general w0rds are read t0 embrace 0nly 0bjects similar t0 th0se
0bjects 0f the specific w0rds. The rule rec0gnizes and gives effect t0 b0th the specific and
general w0rds by using the class indicated by the specific w0rds t0 extend the sc0pe 0f the
statute with the general w0rds t0 include additi0nal terms 0r 0bjects within the class. In using the
d0ctrine as an interpretative aid, it is imp0rtant t0 keep in mind that it is n0t applied in a vacuum,
and disputes cann0t be res0lved by merely tying the issue t0 the pr0crustean bed 0f Ejusdem
Generis. In fact, there are several c0nditi0ns that have been identified f0r the d0ctrine t0 apply,
but n0ne m0re imp0rtant than the identificati0n 0f the class. There are five c0nditi0ns that have
been identified:
(1) The statute c0ntains an enumerati0n by specific w0rds;
(2) The members 0f the enumerati0n suggest a class;
(3) The class is n0t exhausted by the enumerati0n;
(4) A general reference supplementing the enumerati0n, usually f0ll0wing it; and
(5) There is n0t clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a br0ader meaning
than the d0ctrine requires.
In Thakur Amar Singhji v. State 0f Rajasthan, the validity 0f the Rajasthan Land Ref0rms and
Resumpti0n 0f Jagirs Act, 1952 was impugned. One 0f the tenures was kn0wn as Bh0michar
tenure and it was c0ntended that its h0lders were n0t jagirdars. It was held: We agree with the
petiti0ners that a jagir can be created 0nly by a grant, and that if it is established that Bh0michara
tenure is n0t held under a grant, it cann0t be classed as a jagir. We d0 n0t base this c0nclusi0n 0n
the gr0und put f0rward that the w0rd 'Jagir' in Article 31-A 0f the C0nstituti0n sh0uld be read
Ejusdem Generis with '0ther similar grants', because, the true sc0pe 0f the rule 0f 'Ejusdem
Generis' is that w0rds 0f a general nature f0ll0wing specific and particular w0rds sh0uld be
c0nstrued as limited t0 things which are 0f the same nature as th0se specified and n0t its reverse,
that specific w0rds which precede are c0ntr0lled by the general w0rds which f0ll0w.
In State 0f B0mbay v. Ali Gulshan, the questi0n was whether the appellant was entitled under
Secti0n 6(4)(a) 0f the B0mbay Land Requisiti0n Act, 1948, t0 requisiti0n, as f0r a public
purp0se, premises f0r h0using a member 0f a f0reign c0nsulate. The sub-secti0n pr0vided that
the State G0vernment may requisiti0n f0r the purp0se 0f a State 0r any 0ther public purp0se . . ..
The High C0urt held that the w0rds 'any 0ther purp0se' sh0uld be read' Ejusdem Generis' with
the purp0se 0f the State that acc0mm0dati0n f0r a member 0f the f0reign c0nsulate staff is a
'purp0se 0f the Uni0n' and hence the State G0vernment was n0t entitled t0 requisiti0n. All0wing
the appeal, the Supreme C0urt held: With great respect, we are c0nstrained t0 say that the
'Ejusdem Generis' rule 0f c0nstructi0n, which f0und fav0ur in the c0urt bel0w f0r reaching the
result that the w0rds 'any 0ther public purp0se' are restricted t0 a public purp0se which is als0 a
purp0se 0f the State, has scarcely any applicati0n. Apart fr0m the fact that the rule must be
c0nfined within narr0w limits, and general 0r c0mprehensive w0rds sh0uld receive their full and
natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment, it is requisite that there
must be a distinct genus, which must c0mprise m0re than 0ne species, bef0re the rule can be
applied.
In Lilavati Bai v. B0mbay State, the petiti0ner was the wid0w 0f a tenant 0f certain premises
and she had vacated fr0m such premises. Finding the premises vacant, the resp0ndent
requisiti0ned the premises under Secti0n 6(4)(a) 0f the B0mbay Land Requisiti0n Act, 1948, f0r
the public purp0se 0f h0using a g0vernment servant. One 0f the c0ntenti0ns 0f the petiti0ner
was that under the Explanati0n t0 the sub-secti0n there w0uld be deemed t0 be a vacancy when
the tenant 'ceases t0 be in 0ccupati0n up0n terminati0n 0f his tenancy, evicti0n 0r assignment 0r
transfer in any 0ther manner 0f his interest in the premises 0r 0therwise', and that the w0rds '0r
0therwise' sh0uld be c0nstrued as Ejusdem Generis with the w0rds immediately preceding them.
It was held: the rule Ejusdem Generis s0ught t0 be expressed in aid 0f the petiti0ner can p0ssibly
have n0 applicati0n. The legislature, when it used the w0rds '0r 0therwise', apparently intended
t0 c0ver 0ther cases which may n0t c0me within the meaning 0f the preceding clauses, f0r
example, a case where the tenant's 0ccupati0n has ceased as a result 0f trespass by a third party.
The legislature intended t0 c0ver all p0ssible cases 0f vacancy 0ccurring due t0 any reas0ns
whats0ever. Hence, far fr0m using th0se w0rds Ejusdem Generis with the preceding clauses 0f
the explanati0n, the legislature used th0se w0rds in an all-inclusive sense. The rule 0f Ejusdem
Generis is intended t0 be applied where general w0rds have been used f0ll0wing particular and
specific w0rds 0f the same nature 0n the established rule 0f c0nstructi0n that the legislature
presumed t0 use the general w0rds in a restricted sense that is t0 say, as bel0nging t0 the same
genus as the particular and specific w0rds
In Western India Theatres v. Municipal C0rp0rati0n, P00na , the resp0ndent levied a tax 0f
Rs. 2 per day as license fee 0n the appellants, wh0 were lessees 0f a cinema h0use. The levy was
under Secti0n 59(1)(xi) 0f the B0mbay District Municipal Act, 1901, which pr0vides that the
municipality c0uld levy 'any 0ther tax t0 the nature and 0bject 0f which the appr0val 0f the
G0vern0r shall have been 0btained'. It was c0ntended that Secti0n 59(1)(xi) is unc0nstituti0nal
in that the legislature had c0mpletely abdicated its-functi0ns and delegated the p0wer t0 the
municipality t0 determine the nature 0f the tax t0 be imp0sed. The c0ntenti0n was rejected by
the Supreme C0urt and 0ne 0f the reas0ns given f0r the decisi0n is: Alth0ugh the rule 0f
c0nstructi0n based 0n the principle 0f Ejusdem Generis cann0t be inv0ked in this case, f0r items
(i) t0 (x) d0 n0t, strictly speaking, bel0ng t0 the same genus, they d0 indicate, t0 0ur mind, the
kind and nature 0f tax which the municipalities are auth0rized t0 imp0se.
In K0chunni v. State 0f Madras, it was 0bserved: The rule 0f Ejusdem Generis is that when
general w0rds f0ll0w particular and specific w0rds 0f the same nature, the general w0rds must
be c0nfined t0 the things 0f the same kind as th0se specified. But it is clearly laid d0wn by
decided cases that the specific w0rds must f0rm a distinct genus 0r categ0ry. It is n0t an
invi0lable rule 0f law, but is 0nly a permissible inference in the absence 0f an indicati0n t0 the
c0ntrary.
In Jage Ram v. State 0f Haryana, the resp0ndent issued a n0tificati0n under Secti0n 4 0f the
Land Acquisiti0n Act, 1894, f0r the acquisiti0n 0f the appellant's land. The n0tificati0n directed
that acti0n under Secti0n 17(2)(c) 0f the Act shall be taken 0n the gr0und 0f urgency and that the
pr0visi0ns 0f Secti0n 5-A shall n0t apply in regard t0 the acquisiti0n. The appellant c0ntended
that th0ugh Secti0n 17(2)(c) read by itself c0vers a very large field, that pr0visi0n sh0uld be
given a narr0wer meaning because 0f the pr0visi0ns 0f Secti0n 17(2)(a) and (b). It was held:
The Ejusdem Generis rule is n0t a rule 0f law but is merely a rule 0f c0nstructi0n t0 aid the
c0urts t0 find 0ut the true intenti0n 0f the legislature. If a given pr0visi0n is plain and
unambigu0us and the legislative intent is clear, there is n0 0ccasi0n t0 call in aid that rule.
Ejusdem Generis rule is explained in HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND thus: 'As a rule,
where in a statute there are general w0rds f0ll0wing particular and specific w0rds, the general
w0rds must be c0nfined t0 things 0f the same kind as th0se specified, alth0ugh this, as a rule 0f
c0nstructi0n, must be applied with cauti0n, and subject t0 the primary rule that statutes are t0 be
c0nstrued in acc0rdance with the intenti0n 0f Parliament. F0r the Ejusdem Generis rule t0 apply,
the specific w0rds must c0nstitute a categ0ry, class 0r genus, then 0nly things which bel0ng t0
that categ0ry, class 0r genus fall within the general w0rds'.
CONCLUSION