Province of North Cotabato vs GRP a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a

Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law; 
Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain 
G.R. No. 1833591,  b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
October 14, 2008  MOA; 
Decision:  c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation
CARPIO MORALES, J.:  Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this DOMAINS)[;] 
controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so
involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; 
long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a
delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds 6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato,
within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon,
do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro
the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Homeland is a justiciable question; and 
Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively. 
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid
Facts:  commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Held: 
(GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace
negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely,
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. 
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or
materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power
who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that
signing the same.  the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government. 
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the
concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount
in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the
the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v.
Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.  Macapagal-Arroyo. 
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-
Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave
right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate
copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d)
signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 
MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon.
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to
unconstitutional.  carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the
government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-
Issues:  AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar
or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. 
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic 
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit
of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court
(MOA); and  found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register
of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of
is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of
with the finalization of the draft;  the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-list
nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it
adjudication;  does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly
affects the lives of the public at large. 
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave
excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-à-vis abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;  process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic
Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed
4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and
matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
(1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under refusal to perform the duty enjoined. 
Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] 
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying
Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;  them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
Philippines would be BINDING itself 
independence.  around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over
which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the and sovereignty.
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to
law and the Constitution. b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and
that we may term it as our “internal waters”, but the bottom line is
that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and
UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance
Merlin Magallona vs Secretary of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right
of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its
Eduardo Ermita sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised
in accordance with customary international law without risking
May 10, 2014 retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the
655 SCRA 476 – Political Law – National Territory – RA 9522 is
Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our
Constitutional
maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime
archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted – the law is zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of
also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This
with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area
of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS –
1984. that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the
archipelago.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA
9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the
national territory of the Philippines hence the law is Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.
unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as
NOTES: 
follows:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris
maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:
and other ancillary treaties – this also resulted to the exclusion of
our claim over Sabah; a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where
we exercise sovereignty
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine
waters as “archipelagic” waters which, in international law, opens b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines;
our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal, immigration,
vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining and sanitation laws (CFIS).
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the
country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and non-
violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
living resources in the exclusive economic zone
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf –
as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a “regime of
this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are
tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or
UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The
treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition,
enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What
controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the
international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with
the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it
increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046),
we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines.
The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na.
mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive
economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to
586,210 sq. na. mi.  (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights. Lawyers League for Better Philippines vs Aquino

Anent their particular contentions: Legal Standing; De Jure Government

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the  
provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
 
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of
the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES VS.
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea AQUINO
G.R. No. 73748 73972             May 22, 1986
 
Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano,
petitioner
vs.
President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant
judgment; they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in
fact and law a de jure government.  Moreover, the community
of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government.

 
 
 
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel
were taking power.
 
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the
basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating
that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise
of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
 
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because
it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
 
Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.

2. Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.

 
Discussions:

 In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party

must show that he personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favourable action.
 The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy
of the provisional It was the people that made the judgement
and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court
held its legitimacy.

 
 
 
 
People v. Perfecto (Case Digest)
Rulings:

1. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions
state no cause of action. The holding that petitioners did not
have standing followed from the finding that they did not
have a cause of action.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people are the judge. And the people have made the
 MissIdea  Uncategorized  July 10, 2014 1 Minute
People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine
Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the documents
regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil
companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day
following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion –
edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an
article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was
alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code –
provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the
Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code

(SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish

Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect
Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the
Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings
nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the
change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to
American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had
been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256
of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of
the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory,
the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated.’Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer
in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore,
respondent was acquitted.
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MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION, 114 SCRA

77

Posted by kaye lee on 7:44 AM

Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77

Facts:    

On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion

rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of an
appeal.
On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to
Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of lots was not
signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective
counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola.
The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.
One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184,
which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot 1184 A
– E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31,
1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of Title No,
2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March
6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion
and his wife.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon
conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot 1184-
E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc.
Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was
the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the
stockholder of the corporation.
In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no
legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent.
Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the
Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of
Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of
Commerce, appears to have been abrogated because
whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws
of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless
they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.
Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3
of RA 3019, citing that the public officers cannot partake in
any business in connection with this office, or intervened or
take part in his official capacity. The Judge and his wife had
withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and
sold their respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears
that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different
branches of the Court of First Instance from the time of the
drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on
March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967.
The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes against Canon 25.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts

unbecoming a Judge" for violating the following provisions:
Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1
& 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also
known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D.

Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion.

Issue: 

Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the

mentioned provisions.

Ruling: 

No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned

provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge" but
was reminded to be more discreet in his private and
business activities. People of the Philippines vs Loreta
Gozo

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon who
November 9, 2011
earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the
Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon
after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June  53 SCRA 476 – Political Law – Sovereignty
8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was
October and November, 1963. The said property was no
located inside the US Naval Reservation which is
longer the subject of litigation.
within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City.
Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s
Office and some neighbors, she demolished the
house standing thereon without acquiring the
necessary permits and then later on erected another
house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s
Office for violating a municipal order which requires
her to secure permits for any demolition and/or
construction within the City. She was convicted in
violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed
and countered that the City of Olongapo has no
administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because
it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable
within the US Naval Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of
the Philippine territory or divested itself completely
of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein.
Under the terms of the treaty, the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not
exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The
Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional
rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as
the United States Military authorities for reasons of
their own decline to make use of (Military Bases
Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its
sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo
does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot
located within the US Naval Base