Theories of Culture,

Theories of Cultural Production

DAVID HE,SMONDHALGH Media and cultural econonllcs 40

Co'-nmunlcation studies 42

The Cultural Industries Critical political economy approacnes

Which Politlcal economY?
44
45
Contradiction 45
cultural industries
3rd Edition The speciÍic conditions oÍ 46
ancl consumption
Tensions between production 46
Symbol creators 4tl
Information and entertainment
social relations oÍ
Historical variations in ihe 47
cultural Produciion
and
Sociology oÍ culture ancl organisational 47
management studies 48
studies
Radicat media sociologylmedia 50
The ProLrlem of texts 5l
limitations oÍ cultural studies
Some achievements and
to rnedia industries and
Cultural studies approaches çÁ

meclia Production CÉ
culture produces industry
lnclustry produces culture'
studies oÍ media
'Production studies': the cultural 55
industries aPProach 56
Digital oPtimism
SAGE Publications Ltda Creative industries analYsis
57
trQ

Los Angeles, London, New York Cultural economy 5B

The aPProach taken here
2At3
1.
t\
a
How have researchers approached the cr.lltural industries? which research
the least. The equation of human well-being with the optimising of econornic
traditi.ns provide the most useful tools for addressing the central themes
satisfacüons, an underlying assumption that many media and cultural econom-
of this- book - explaining and_ assessing patterns of cãange/continuity in
ics wÍiters too often implicitly inherit from neoclassical economics, provides a
the cultural industries since the rate 1d7as? The search ir"fo. upprou.h",
that address the Íundamental issues outlined in the second section of iimited basis on which to proceed in assessing the cultural induskies.
Introduction ('14rhy do the curtural industries matter?'). we need, in
the In spite of this, it would be a serious mistake to think that economic
other concepts are irrelevant or useless to the present analysis of cultural pro-
wo1ds, perspectives that are sensitive to the potentiar power
of the cultural duction. And economics should not be equated with the neoclassical para-
industries, as makers of texts, as systems forthe *rrrág"*"at and
ing of creative work, and as agenti of change. we arsoleed
market- digm. There are numerous heterodox varieties and, as in any discipline,
a combination there are more and less sophisticated applications of the analysis.l A cru-
of approaches that are abre to provide anarisrs oÍ the two prrt,
ài tt,u t"r* cíal issue in the context oÍ this book is whether 01'not and, if so, in what
'the cultural industries': the'culture'part and the,industriásipãrt.
rtr bugi. ways and with what implications, analysts recognise the specificity of the
with two traditions of analysis that piomise, at first sight, to Àake valuable
contributions to such an analysis, but are in fact cornpíomised úy realm of culture, symbols and informaiion, as opposed to other forms of
of attention to issues of power.
L - -- - r their
- lack activity in society. Some early culturai economists (such as Mark Blaug,
William Baumol and William Bowen) recognised the distinctive nature of
media, culture and the arts and incorporated this into their analysis, Such
work has influenced the way in which otheÍ more critical traditions of analy-
MEDIA AND CULTURAL ECONOMICS sis have understood the distinctive natuÍe of the cultural industries (notably
Miêge, 1989, and Garnham, 1990 - see below). The breakdown of distinc-
Cultural economics is the branch of economics devoted specific4rly
to cul- tive features in the Introduction drew on such work and used economic
ture and to the arts, whiie media economics employs eànomic concepts, such as the distinction between private and public goods, the
concepts
to anaiyse the media. Both have been relativery marginar within relationship between production and reproduction costs, and the creation
the field
of economics as a whore" However, in recent yáars, tãey have experienced of artificial scarcity. 2
something of a boom,^esgegally media (see, Íor The problem is that many economists who are concemed to analyse the dis-
Doyle,
2002; Hoskins et al., 2004). Thismay partly be exprained by "*r*t'",
""onorrü., the fáct that the tinctive natute of media and cultural products often fail to recognise the impli-
inÍluence of the 'dismal science' of elonomics on government caüons of these characteristics and the iimitations of the fundamental economic
policy has been
profound, as we shall see in Chapter 4. conçgs qsfu-rBimhg--üe-il-app6. e
since-it developed in its modem form in the late nineteenth
century, eco- Th-ese lirnitations fully.3 The key point concerns the way in which economics
nomics has been dominated by particurar conceptions of its
assumpúons ur.rd as a discipline has played a pivotal role in generating forms of public policy.
goals that have come to be known as 'neocrassiêur', to In its most invidious Íorms, mainstream economics has helped lo Íuel a nea-
airtirrg,riúinàrr.t r.o*
the 'classical' economics of the eighteenth cenfury, Neocraísicar
ecanomics
liberal approach to culture, which plays an important part in the story oÍ
claimed to offer a scientific basis foithe study of ecánomic change and continüity told in this book (see especially Chapter 3).
aÍfairs and cut itself
off from the roots of the discipline in moral philosophy, rt pr"r""iJ
capital-
ism as a network of markets, regurated by raiionar sôu-interást
whose organi-
zation and outcornes courd be modeilecr mathematica-ily' (Murdoc(
z0r1; B). Winseck Q011,:25-6) rightly poinis to the inÍluence oÍ the Austrian historian Joseph
This dominant form oí economics is not concerned uíh à"ú;rúGhumân Schumpeter on economics, and, indirectly, on various approaches to the cultural and
needs and rights, nor with intervening in questions oÍ information technology indushies. Schumpeterian analysis is by no means neoclassi-
social justice. Ifistead, it
focuses on how human-wants might b'e *ort cal, and recognises the'creative deskuction' in capitalism. But it assumes the impos-
,"tirá;à. É;Ã *rougt
"ffi"iu.,try
its language,and procedures *e often very speciarist sibility of managing the 'creative destruction' oÍ capitalism, and therefore can fit well
and esoteric,.,eoctasri"a
economics claims to be a practical sociar sôience, aimed with strands oÍ neo-liberaiism.
at undersianding how Later media and cultural economists have continued to recognise the distinctive nature
and under what conditions markets best f,nction. It equates
the we[-being of of cultural productiorL for example, Caves (2000, 2005), Doyle (2002 11-15) and Picard
people with their abitity to maximise their satisfactions.
it provides methods for (2002: e-l8).
carcuratlng how such satisfaction might be maximised, Good critiques are provided by the following, in ascending order of technical diÍficuliy:
u.rd this shows its roots
ix utilitaÍianism - the phíosophy of Írappiness maximisaüon Grant and Wood (2004: 56-61); Çandy (1992); Garnham (2000:45-54); Baker (2002).
(see Moscq 1996;
47-8). Given our concerrs, ai outlineóin the Introduction, None of these writers is an economisí but all use good economic concepts to criticise
with the way that
public and gveryday liÍe are aÍfected by the products of bad economics. While some economists recognise the limitations of neoclassical mod-
the cultural injuskies,
such a bracketing of questions conceming pt*u, arrd justice els of ralional actors pursuillg utility maximisatiory many media and cultural econom-
i. tirJtirg, to ,uy ics textbooks remain more or less untouched by that recognition.

à
 Underpinning the neoliberal approach to culture is the idea, derived
from neoclassical theory, that 'free', unregulated competition will pro-
duce efficient markets. Neo-liberalism takes this a stage further by assum-
ing that the production of efficient markets should be the primary goal
of public policy. In some cases, this has involved downplaying or maÍ-
ginalising the specificity of media ând culture and arguing that economic
models can be used to analyse cultural goods (such as televisiory books,
newspapers) in the same way as other goods. As one major media econo-
mist, Ronald Coase (1974:389) put it, there is'no fundamental distinction'
between'the market for goods and the market for ideas'. Perhaps the most
famous expression of such a view was made by Mark Fowler, After being
appointed by the ultraconservative US president Ronald Reagan to run the
Federal Communications Commission in L981, Fowler observed that tel-
evision was'just another appliance ... a toaster with pictures' (cited, for
example, by Baker, 20A2: 3) - provocatively implying that there was no
difference between television and a toaster, they were both simply eco-
nomic goods to be bought and sold.
Only the most extreme neo-classical economists would deny that the
symbol-laden nature oÍ'cultural goods offers a distinctive set oÍ problems for
economics, and for regulation. But even economic analysis that recognises
the specificity of media and culture, and some of the limitations oÍ iraditional
forms of economic analysis, tends to downplay the severity of the problems
of cultural markets. The work of Richard Caves (2000, 2005) would be an
example of this in my view. Another example would be the way in which
the economic concept of 'market tailure' has been used to justify continued
public intervention in broadcasting markets, but potentially at the cost of
relegating non-economic goals, such as democratic and civic participation,
to secondary, residual features of market systems (see Hardy, 2004 for criti-
cisrn of the use of this concept of market Íailure).
Economic concepts, thery provide an important lens through which to
view culture and the cultural industries, but the nature of economics as an
academic discipline and as a form of policy intervention means that it needs
careful handling.a
COMMUNICATION STUDIES
From the 1930s onwards, researchers began to investigate mass communica-
tion media using sociological methods. By the 1950s in the USA, there was
4 Terry Flew (2009) thinks that I and other writers such as Des Freedman (2008) are set-
ting up a skaw figure in assessing mainstream economics in this way, but I disagree.
See Jackson (2009) for a powerful cÍitique of the failure of orthodox and much hetero-
dox economics to incorporate the concept of culture adequately into expianations of
economic life.
an established discipline of communication studies. The subiect continues to
,Íuive today and has spread to Europe and eisewhere. It has tended to neglect
cultural production, and downplay questions of power and social justice.
For màny years, the dominant concern of this field was the'ef{ects' of
media messages on audiences, with a tendenry to conceive of those effects
as limited and difficult to prove (see Lowery and DeFleur, 1995). This tradi-
:tion was strongly inÍluenced by behaviourism, the belief that socie§ is best
ilrnderstood by observation of the outward behaviour oÍ individuals, rather
rthan by eÍforts to understand (in psychology or philosophy) mental proc-
lesses and events or (in sociology) issues oÍ social power and status. In this
i,,,tradition of research, analysis oÍ cultural consumpiion was cut off from any
eonsideration of cultural production and organisation. This mainstream of
communication studies reinvented itself in the L970s and 1980s vía a func-
tionalist focus on what people got out of the media (see Currarç 2002: 135).
, A sophisticated sociological variant of this 'iiberal functionaiism' (Curran,
: 2002:134-6) saw the media primarily as agencies of social integration and
emphasized ritual and continuity (Dayan andKatz,1992).
The politics underlying this mainstream tendency in communications
research tend to be liberal'and pluralist. By'liberal', I do not mean economi-
çally liberal, as in the term'neo-liberalism' - which emphasises the virtues
ôf unregulated markets. Nor do I use this term in the way it is sometimes
used in North America, to mean something like'ieftist', in contrast with'con-
servative'. Rather, I mean a form of politics that emphasises the freedom and
autonomy of individuals over other conceptions of the good; liberals in this
sense can be egalitarian or libertarian, leftist or conservative. By'pluralism' I
mean a view of society that takes power to be highly dispersed, and believes
governments can, with relative ease, counteract inequalities of power. Other
lraditions of thought place greater emphasis on collectivities, conflicts and
concentrations of power than does liberal-pluralism (see Marsh, 20A2, Íor a
useful critique of this form oÍ political thought). Partly as a result of this
underlying politics, communicalion studies failed Íor many decades to offer
any systematic account of how the cultural industries relate to more general
economic, potitical and sociocultural processes.s
It needs to be recognised tl'rat some communication studies that might
broadly be characterised as 'liberal-pluralist' has been much more concetned
with the issues oÍ power and social justice in relation to cultural production,
which are the fundamentai concerns of this book. For example, an important
tradition has examined the way that the impact of the media has transÍormed
political communication. This emphasised the dangers for modern societies
of the way that democratic processes were being affected by the broadcast
5 Some more critical accounts came from communication researchers who positioned
themselves against these dominant tenctencies in the discipline, aligning themselves
instead with approaches coming from other fields, such as sociology and politics. One
particularly importar-rt set of approaches will be addressed in the next section.
4
!
 and press media. |ay Blumler and Michael Gurevitch (1gg1), for
example, institutions might be dismissive or hostile. More surprising perhaps is the
have written con'incingry about a 'crisis of civic communiáation,
and the animosity of many elsewhere to the left oÍ them. (From now on, I shall use
difficulties of sustaining participatory citizenship in a society *À"r.
people will gain their knowledge of politics froÀ hlevisíon.
*ort 'political economy'as shorthand to refer to'criticai political economy'; this is
bther writers common in analysis of cultural industries).
in this tradition have aitemptedlo develop normative models to assess
how One common misunderstanding among some analysts is to see political
well (and how badly)-the^media perform in fostering a"*o..u.y
1rr.t u, economy approaches as a version of orthodox cultural and media economics.
Christians et a1.,2009; Mceuail, tiozl.tnework of thãEuromediá
liesearctr In fact, poiitical economies explicitly aim at challenging the lack oÍ an ade-
Grq"q ggZ Mceuail and Siune,
{::g, for_ example, Euromedia,l l99g; Trappel quate ethicai perspective in the neoclassical paradigm discussed in the ear-
a1., 2010) and its indivídual associates (such as
,et the prolific |eiemy Tunstall) . lier section on economics. Peter Golding and Graham Murdock (2005: 61-6)
has provided helpful information aboui changes in media
poriry and cu1- ' distinguish political econolny approaches to the media from mainstream
tural-industry organisations. There has been inireasing dialogue
*ith oth", economics approaches in four respects:
approaches, such as curfurar studies (see berow), in sãphistiLted
anaryses
of p.ublic engagement u"Í^tl" uses by children and yá,lng
media (see Livirgstone, 201a, for exámple). Througúout ?r,lr"'**au
people of n"w r Political economy approaches to the media are holistic, seeing the econ-
or omy as inteuelated with political, social and cultural life, rather than as
communication studies and_ sociologica[ work, therã t a
crucial .á*".,,, a separate domain.
from an,ultimately liberal-pluralist
folitícal perspective, with how the cul-
tural industries afÍect demoiratic pró.urr"u u.,a pil1i" túu.
. They are historical , paytng close attention to long-term changes in the
role of state, corporations and the media in culture.
. They are 'centrally concerned with the balance between capitalist
enterprise and public intervention' (p. 6l).
CRITICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROAGHES o Finally, 'and perhaps most importantly', they go'beyond technical issues
of efÉiciency to engage with basic moral questions of justice, equity and
Political. econorny approaches have more to offer than *the public good' (p. 61).
culturar and media
economics and liberal-pluralist communication studies
in terms of analys_
ing power in relation to cultural production. political
""o"o*y
term for an entire tradition of ecônomic analysis at odds
i, , gà.,".ul Golding and Murdock s is a significant deÍiniüon of political econorny
with mainitream approaches and they certainly clarify the difference between such approaches
economics, in that it places much greater emphasis on
ethical and normative and cultural and media economics, but two further features will help to
reflecting the roots oÍ the disciplinà in moral philosophn
l*::tioT,
'political e:ongm)'/ has.been.craimed noi only by those
it,u tur* delineate the distinctiveness of this analytical tradition even more clearly.
on tr.,ã loriti.ur rurt
who are critical of the sidelining of questior,, tf po-". ur.,a r
sfream economics. There are strong conservative traditions,
.o#i.iir, *rirr- Political economy approaches see the fact that culfure is produced and
too. Therefore consumed under capitalism as a fuadamental issue in explaining inequaü-
some writers use the term critical political economy
to distinguish their per_ ties of power, prestige and profit. This emphasis in political economy work
spective from the work of classicar poritical economists
such á Adam smith on capitalism and its negative effects should make it clear that, while you
and David Ricardo and their later heirs.6
don t have to be a Marxist to work here, it helps.
criticai political economy approaches to culture (or media r A major area of contribution from political economy approaches tb the
or communica-
tions - the terms are often usãà indiscriminately in labeiling
tn* traãiiionl study of the cultural industries has been to put on to the inteliectual
developed in rhe lare 1960s among academic sáciorogists
uia p"iiiiã r.i agenda debates about the extent to which the cultural industries serve
entists concerned about what theyiaw as the dubiouJrole
of turs".à;rorr_ the interests of the wealthy and powerful. As a result, a cenkal theme
tions and states in curtural produótion. Critical politicar
economííro*ít,* in political economy approaches has been the ownership and control
to culture are often misunderstood, simprifieá or dismissed.
É"Jul.u ,rr.r, of the cultural industries (see Chapters 2 and 6). Does ownership of the
approaches are so heavily *itical of màia and cultural
their allies in governmen't, ".ip"rrtàÀ ,"a cultural industries by the wealthy and powerful ultimately, through
it is no surprise that many who work in rnedia their confrol of cultural industry organisations, lead to the circulation of
texts that serve the interests of these wealthy and powerful owners and
their governmental and business allies? This has been such an impor-
6 see Mosco (19g6: 22-69) for a creiailed and informative
analysis o{ poriticar economy tant debate that some writers, teachers and students tend, wrongly, to
approaches in generai, as a background to unclerstandi.g
communication.
priiti""i
criiicar ."*ã^y.r equate political economy approaches with the view that cultural indus-
fry organisations do indeed serve the interests of their owners in this
a
way when, in fact, many political economy writers are concerned pre-
cisely with addressing the diíficulties and complexities surrounding
this issue.
WHICH POLITICAL ECONOMY?
It shouid be clear that the focus within political economy approaches on
ethical and political issues in relation to culture means that they wili have
key contributions to make to this study, given the concerns outlined in the
Introduction. Flowever, certain versions of the political economy oÍ culture
provide much more scope for understanding what drives ehange/continu-
ify in the cuitural industries than others. At this point, we need to delineate
political economy moÍe carefully. This will also help us to corlnter some sim-
plifications and misunderstandings surrounding the term.
Proponents and opponents of a political economy of culture often por-
tray the field as a single, unified approach. Vincent Mosco (1996:82-134)has
provided a detailed accouÍrt oÍ the differences between the kinds of political
economy work developed in three geographical and political setiings: North
America, Europe and 'The Third World' - that is, developing countries in
Asia, Latin America and Africa. I shall deal with important work from this
last bloc, on cultural dependency and media imperialism, in Chapter 8. Here,
though, I want to build on Mosco's useful division by discussing the tensions
between two particular strands of North American and European political
economy approaches.
r A tradition within North American political economy work exempli-
fied by the work of Herbert Schiller, Noam Chomsky, Edward Herman
and Robert McChesney. This Schiller-McChesney kadition has been
extremely important in cataloguing and documenting the growth in
wealth and power of the cultural industries and their links with politi
cai and business allies.
o The cultural industries approach, initiated in Europe by Bernard
Miêge (1989; see also Miêge, 2000, for a more recent statement) and
Nicholas Garnham (1,990), among others, and continued by other
European writers and writers based in other continents (Aksoy and
Robins, 1992; Bolafio eÍ al., 2004; Bouquillon and Combês, 200[
Bustamante, 2004; Driv et and Gillespie, 1993; Ry an, 1992; Straw, 199A;
Toynbee,2000r.'z
7 This division leaves out many impotant contributions to critical political economy
work, such as those of James Curran, Michael Curtiry Peter Golding, Armand Mat-
telart, Eileen Meehary Vincent Mosco, Graham Murdock, Thomas Streeter and Janet
Wasko. The best work oÍ these wdters, cited at numerous points in this boo§ shares
many of the major strengths of the cultural industries approactç while also pursuing
distinctive a6;endas.
In the Introduction, I referred to the work of Bernard Miêge, who helped to
popularise the plural term'cultural industries' (as opposed to Adorno and
i{orkheimer's singular'The Culture Industry') as an example of an approach
that allowed for complexity, contestation and ambivalence in the study of
culture.sAs my praise for Miêge and Garnham's work there suggests, I think
that the cuitural industries appÍoach has more to offer in terms of assessing
and explaining change/continuity in the cultural industries than the Schiller-
McChesney tradition. In my view, the cultural industries approach is better
át dealing with the following elements, each of which I address below:
r Contradiction.
: o The specific conditions oÍ cultural industríes.
r Tensions between production and consumption"
r Symbol creators.
o Information and enteÍtainment.
r Historical vaÍiations in the soclal relations of cultural production.
Brief explanations of each now follow.
Cqltradiction
The Schiller-McChesney tuadition emphasises strategic uses of power. There
is no doubt that such strategic uses oÍ power by businesses are common and it
is wrong to dismiss the approach of Schiller and others as 'conspiracy theory'
(an accusation sometimes levelled at political economy approaches in gen-
eral). But in emphasising concerted strategy, this tradition underestimates
the contradictions in the system. The cultural industries approach's empha-
sis on problems and conlradictions, on the partial and incomplete process of
commodi-fying culture, provides a more accurate picture of cultural produc-
üon. It ailows for contradicÍion raithin industrial, commercial cultwal pro-
ductiorç rather than assuming a polarity betueen corporations and non-profit
'alternative' producers, as in the Schiller-McChesney traclition.
The spee iÍic conditions oÍ cultural industries
The cultural industries approach's greater ability to deal with contradiction
stems from another important advantage: its abili§ to combine an interest
in relations between general economy and cultural industries (which is a
key concern in the Schiller-McChesney tradition) with an analysis of what
8 Some teachers and students tend to equate the cultural pessimlsm of Adomo and
Horkheimer ancl some of their Frankfurt Schooi colleagues with political economy/
defining one by the other. However, as we saw in the Introduction, Miêge founds his
particuiar approach on a critique of Aclorno and Horkheimer. For rnany in the Schiller-
McChesney traclition, the theoretical concerns o{ the Frankfurt School seem to be more
or less irrelevant.
7
distinguishes industrial cultural production Írom other forms of industrial
production (which isn t). It was work within the cultural industries approach
that provided the breakdown of the specific conditions of cuitural produc-
tion laid out in the Introduction.
Tensions between production and consurnption
Althoilgh, as its name suggests, the cultural industries approach focuses on
the supply side - on cultural production and circulation and their social and
political contexts - it does not ignore the activity of audiences and users,
rrhich is a charge that is often levelled at political economy approaches and
certain versions of media sociology. Instead, the cuitural industries approach
sees the business of cultural production as complex, ambivalent and contested
largely because of certain problems derived from the way audiences behave.
Production and consumption are not seen a$ separate entities, but as diÍferent
moments in a singie process. The connections and tensions between produc-
tion and consumption are discussed only rareiy in the Schilier-McChesney
tradition.
Symbol creators
The processes of concentration, conglomeration and integration catalogued
by the Schiller-McChesney tradition are significant (see Chapter 6 for further
discussion), but key researchers rarely comment on how such issues of mar-
ket structure aÍfect the organisation of cultural production and the making of
texts on an ordinary, everyday leveI. The cultural industries âpproach puts
symbol creators - the personnel responsible for ihe creative input in texts,
such as writers, directors, producers, performers - in the picture, whereas
they are often absent in the Schiller-McChesney tradition. The cultural
industries approach has emphasised the conditions facing cultural workers
as a result of these processes.e Its attention to this important issue makes the
cultural industries approach better equipped than the Schiller-McChesney
tradition to assess the degree to which cultural production is organised in a
socially just manner (see Chapter 2).
lnformation and entêrtainment
In the Schiller-McChesney haditioo as in liberal-piuralist communication
studies, the primary concern is with inÍormation media. The cultural indushies
9 Miêge (1989), Garnham (1990) and Ryan (1992) were Íor many yeaÍs unusual in pay-
ing serious attention to this issue. In the late 1990s, culturai studies writers, such as
McRobbie (1998) and Ross (1998), began to address these questions. In the 2000s, there
was a'turn to cultural work' in the social sciences and humanities (see Banks,2007; and
Chapter 7, below).
approach has been more successful in the difficult task of addressing both
inÍormation and entertainment.
á
Historical variations in the social relations
of cultural Production
, Finally, both approaches are concerned very much with history (see, for
, example, McChesney, 1993) but the cultural industries approach is often
limore sensitive than the Schiller-McChesney kadition to historical variations
lin the social relations of cultural production and consumption - a concern
that some of its writers derive from Raymond Williams's interventions ia the
hístorical sociology of culture (see Chapter 2).
SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE AND
ORGANISATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT
STUDIES
On the basis of my comments above, and in the Introduction to this book, it
should be clear by now that I find political economy approaches to culture
useful, especially the cultural industries approach. However, even within the
cultural indusfries approactç which is much more interested in the organi-
sational dynamics of cultural production than the Schiller-McChesney tradi-
tiorL there has been a lack of empirical attention to what happens in cultural
indushy organisations. A certain tradition of work in the sociology of culture
(primarily based in the USA, and drawing on Weberian and interactionist tra-
ditions of analysis), the 'production oÍ culture' perspective, has made impor-
tant contributions in this respect. Recent years have seen a notable growth in
the intertwined academic fields of management, business and organisational
studies and some researchers in these fields have paid attention to cultural
industries (see, for example, Lampel et a1.,2006). Cultural industries research
in these burgeoning disciplines has inherited this interest in organisations.
Some of this work can provide a valuable complement to political economy
work on the cultural industries. One of the most useful contributions of the
production of culture perspective was to enrich our notions of symbolic crea-
tivity. lnstead of understanding culture as the product of supremely talented
individuals, writers such as Howard Becker (1982) and Richard Peterson
(1976) helped to make it clear that creative cultural and artistic work is the
product of coliaboration and a complex division of labour. Particularly use-
ful in the present context is the work of Peterson and Berger (1971), Í{lusch
(1990U972)) and DiMaggio (1977) on the distinctive characteristics of the cul-
tural industries. There is important concordance with work in the cultural
induslries approach on the distinctive strategies of companies that produce
texts. Hirsch's work, for example, informed my outline oÍ the distinctive
I
features of the cultural industries in the Introduction. Also valuable are
detailed studies of particular industries, such as Coser et al.'s (1982) study
of book publishing.
The work of these sociologists in the USA, developed in parallel to that of
the French cultural industries writers already mentioned, was groundbreak-
ing, but it is oniy when it is synthesised into a more comprehensive vision
of how cultural production and consumptior-r fit into wider economic, politi-
cal and cultural contexts that an analysis of speciÍic conditions of cultural
production really produces its explanatory pay-off. The cultural industries
are treated implicitly by some of the US organisational sociologists and their
management studies heirs as isolated systems, cut off from political and soci-
ocultural con{lict. Issues of power and domination are sidelined. The condi-
tions of creative workers are hardly registered, other than the admittedly
important fact that they are granted more autonomy than workers in other
industries. The world oÍ the rip-off, the shady deal, the disparity between
the glass skyscrapers of the multinational entertainment corporations and
the struggle young artists and musicians endure to stay afloat financially
is scarcely considered. As with communication studies, I think that these
probiems derive from the political perspectives underlying the work of these
writers. There is undoubtedly a democratising impulse at work. The aim is
to demystify creativi§ and to understand and question hierarchies oÍ taste
and value. Sociologists such as Howard Becker show an admirable interest in
the resourcefulness of cultural producers in their everyday lives. However,
while this is a valuable counter to easy, glib assumptions about our pow-
erlessness in the face of giant cultural industry corporations, much of the
sociology of culfure and management studies seems, at times, insufficiently
concerned with questions of power. As Paul Hirsch (199011972];643) put it
in an article that has been highly inÍluential in subsequent management and
organisational studies, his organisational approach'seldom enquires into
the functions performed by the organization for the social system but asks,
rather, as a temporary partisan, how the goals of the organization may be
constrained by society'.1o Acting as tempoÍary partisans of media organisa-
tions would be a form oÍ Íalse objectivity for political economists,
RADICAL MEDIA SOCIOLOGY/MEDIA STUDIES
So, iÍ the concerns of political economy with 'macro' questions of power need
complementing by other approaches more attuned to the 'micro' leve1 of what
happens in the worlds of cultural production - both'inside' culture-produc-
ing organisations and outside - we need to look elsewhere. Research that is
more attuned to issues of power at the'micro' level than those considered so
10 See Hirsch (2000) for his reflections on how irúluential this piece has been.
far can be found in radical media sociology and media studies, and also in
cultural studies approaches (I shall come back to the iatter approach shortly).
I mear'radical' here in the sense that these approaches see pernicious forms
of power and lnequality as being rooted in the very slructuÍe of contempo-
rary societies rather than resulting from correctable aberrations, as in liberal-
pluralist perspectives. From the early 1970s onwards, radical media sociology
in the USA and the emergent discipline of media studies in Europe provided
i: approaches that were complementary to the political economy work develop-
ing in parallel with them.
' Some of the most significant work in the USA grew out of a Weberian
sociological tradition and concentrated on how news prograrnmes did not so
much report reality as reflect the imperatives of news organisations (see, for
example, Gans,1979;Tuchman, 1978). According to this perspective, journal-
ists worked autonomously, but their work was structured by bureaucratic
requirements and routines. These routiles were seen as producing texts that
failed to address existing power relations adequately. The thrust of such
work was echoed in important Bdtish studies of news (such as Schlesinger,
L978). Studies of entertainment were rarer, but, at their best, provided real
insight into cultural industry dynamics. Todd Gitlin's booklnside Prime Time
(1983), for example, showed, via interviews with television execuüves and
reconstructions of the histories of these organisations, how the commercial
imperatives of the networks led to conservatism in the texts produced.
One major conkibution from radical sociology to analysing cultural pro-
duction was that of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). His
work is usefui to analysis of the cultural industries for a nurnber of reasons,
including his account of the development of the tensions between creativity
and commerce noted in the Introduction. In TheRules of Art (1996), Bourdieu
showed how, in the nineteenth century, the idea developed that painters and
itriters should be autonomous of political power and commercial impera-
tives. According to Bourdieu, this gradually created a particular structure of
cultural production - one divided between large-scale production, Íor pri-
marily short-term coÍunercial products, and 'restricted' or small-scale pro-
duction, where artistic success was the main goal (and where, for businesses,
the hope was that artistic success would lead to long-termfinancial rewards).
Bourdieu hardly dealt with popular culture at all and failed to show how the
rise,of the cultural industries aÍfected the structure of the Íield of cultural
production in the twentieth century, but his work has provided the Íullest
analysis available of the complex relations between creativity and coÍnmeÍce
in cultural production.ll
Radical sociological work, such as that of Gitlin and Bourdieu, is, to some
extent compatible with political economy approaches to culture. FIowever,
political economies attempt an overall understanding of the place of cultural
Ll There is no space here to assess Bourdieu's work on cultural production adequately.
See Hesmondhalgh (2006a) for futher discussion.
production within contemporary capitalism and empirical studies oÍ cul-
tural industry organisations have not been central to this tradition. The great
benefit of such radical sociology is that, at its best, it links dynamics of power
in the cultural industries with questions of meaning - questions regarding
the kinds of texts that are produced by cuitural industry organisations. The
next section considers this question of texts and meanings in more detail.
THE PROBLEM OF TEXTS
Up until now I have been explaining why we need to find approaches to
the cultural industries that adequately deal with questions oÍ power in rela-
tion to cultural industry organisations. In the Introduction, I outlined a view
of the cultural induskies that placed a central emphasls on the particular
products that they create, products that have an especially strong potential
to influence our knowledge and understanding oÍ the world. For example,
do the products of the cultural industries serve the interests of powerful
groups in societies, alrd thereÍore help to entrench existing inequalities?
What approaches ar.rd theories might help us best to understand this aspect
of the cultural industries? Liberal-pluralist communication studies has, for
the most part, operated with a deficient view of texts. There is a branch of
the discipline that analyses cultural outcomes using the methods of quantita-
tive content analysis. The aim is to produce an objective, veriÍiable measure
of meaníng (Hesmondhalgh, 2006b). As ]ohn Fiske (1990: 137) points ou!
'this can be a useful check to the more subjective, selective way in which we
normally receive messages'. There is, however, an understanding oÍ cultural
content as a me;eage or set of messages in the eÍfects research that dominated
the discipline for many years. A considerably more complex notion oÍ mean-
ing needs to be put into operation, one which recognises palysemy - that
is, the ability of texts to be interpreted in a number of ways. We also need
to take into account the aesthetic experiences brought about by texts - their
capacity to engage or bore, please or alienate. To think about meaning, aes-
thetic experience and emotion means addressing questions oÍ form as well as
content. By 'form', I mean how texts look and sound, their stylistic properties
as well as the stories they tell and the assertions they make. (In practice, form
and content are never really separate as the one always affects the other.)
While liberal-pluralist communication studies has generally had a limited
understanding of texts as 'contení or 'message', the production of culture
perspective, with some exceptions (see Peterson, 1997), ignored the issue of
textual meaning. Richard A. Petersory for example, in outlining the produc-
tion of culture perspective, was frank in admitting the approach's lack of
interest in the form and content of cultural artefacts, but he claimed that an
interest in production can complement such concerns (7976: L0). This sug-
gests that the study of production has no effect on the study of texts - that
the two are sepaÍate, autonomous domains of analysis. The challenge of the
cultural industries, though (if my claims in the Iniroduction are correct) is
to consider these reiationships rather than ignore them. we need to think,
for example, about how historical transformations in the way that culture is
Droducedrand consumed relate to changes in texts.
' There is a lack of attention to textual analysis and meaning among writers
'dru*nto political economy approaches to culture. For all its strengths, the
,.,work oÍ Miêge barely mentions questions of textual meaning and pleasure,
::Many of the essays in GarnhanÍs Capitalism and Communication (1990) attack
the tándency within media studies to'privilege the texí and'focus on ques-
-tions oÍ repÍesentation and ideology' (p. 1).t'In the Schilier-McChesney tra-
'ditior,, the underlying assumption is that most texts produced by the cultural
índustries are conÍormist and conservative, but little systematic evidence is
"marshalled to suppoÍt this assumption (for a problematic exception/ see the
lpropaganda model' oÍ Herman and Chomsky, 1988)' Indeed, the assump-
tion is larely made explicit, Texts, and the experiences, values, meanings and
'pleasures
they afford their audiences, are an issue addressed much rnore by
the set of approaches that I consider next.
§onne AcHTEVEMENTS AND
LIMITATIONS OF CULTURAL STUDIES
Cultural studies is a diverse and fragmented field of study, but at its core is
the attempt to examine and rethink culture by coneidering its relaüonship
to social power. In the past, there was some hostility towards this interdis-
ciplinary field from many of the approaches discussed above. In turry some
cultural studies writers were very negative about the above approaches,
including political economy and radical media sociology. Yet cultural stud-
ies approaches, at their best, have much to offer in terms of aiding our under-
standing of meaning and cultural value. This can help fiil gaps left by other
approaches to the cultural industries - especially when it comes to questions
oÍ culture, creativity and texts, which are obviously central to the cultural
indushies. I begin by discussing some of the main contributions that cultural
studies has made to understandings of culture and power, as well as some of
the limitations of approaches that have sometimes (often inaccurateiy) been
labeled as'cultural studies'. I then turn to discuss some recent approaches to
media production and media industries that have claimed to draw on cul-
turai studies.
First, cultural studies has argued convincingly that ordinary, everyday cul-
ture needs to be taken seÍiously. This has meant questigning hierarchical
ways of understanding culture to be found in public debate and in the more
established humanities and social science disciplines. Cultural studies resists
12 Garnlram's Emancipation, the Media ancl Modemity (2000) addressed the study of texts
and symbolic forms in much greater detail than did his work in the 1980s and 1990s.
 this focus on consecrated,'high culture' texts. This has resulted in some ana-
lysts associated with cultural studies celebrating popular cuiture in an uncrit-
ical way (see below). However many others chose not to do so, and it may be
that the term'cultural studies' should not have been applied to such uncriiical
researchers: they were more like naive sociologists oicuttural commentators.
Cultural stuclies at its best has insisted that we need to think broadly about all
the different elements in a culture in relation to each other rather than decide
irr advance which parts need to be analysed and which do not. This broader
concepüon oÍ culture has an international dimension as well. As culfural
studies becarne internationalised in the 1980s and 1990s, writers who were
originally from outside the Euro-American cosmopolitan heartlands, includ-
ing diasporic intellectuals such as Edward said (199a) and,Gayahi spivak
(1988), addressed the concept of culture in ways that recognised the complex
legary of colonialism. Because oÍ this, the best cultural ãtudies approuãhus
can be seen as a considerable improvement on the often dismissivá attitude
to popular and non-western culture to be found in some political economy
and liberal-pluralist communication research. The best cultural studies work
has achieved an in-depth, serious consideration of a much widêr range of
cultural experience thara had been recognised in other traditions or wiiting
about culture. other anthropological and sociologicar approaches (includin[
the empirical sociology of culture) had this demãcratising impurse, but cul-
tural sfudies deals more fully with questions of symbolic po*"r.
second, cultural sfudies has provided considerable refinement of what
we might mean by that diÍficult term ,culture,, In particular, it has put for_
ward powerful criticisms of essentialist notions of culture that see ihe cul-
of a particular place and/or people as 'one, shared culture, (Ha11,1994:
111:
323), as a boundecl, fixed thing rather than as a complex rpu"" *huru *urry
different influences combine and conflict. Again, work by writers outside
the Euro-American metropoiitan cenke and migrants from Íormer colonies
to such centres has been vital in developing thiã understanding, such chal-
lenges to traditional ways of thinking abouúurture have impoúnt implica-
tions in what follows. Through its richer understanding oi the concópt of
culture, cultural studies has greatly advanced thinking aÍout texts. politlcat
economy writers and their allies in media studies and radical media sociol-
ogy have been much concerned with the question of whose interests might
be served by the texts produced by the cuúural industries. Cultural studies,
however, has extended this conception of interests beyond economic and
political ones to include a strong sense of the politics involved in issues of
recognition and identity. It has pointed out how certain texts and representa-
tional practices, while seemingly progressive, (further) serve to exclude and
marginalise the relatively powerless.
Third, cultural studies has raised vital political questions about repre-
sentation, about'who is speaking?,, and about whã has the authority to
make pronouncements on culture. Importantiy, these questior* u.u oit"r,
applied with equal vigour to ihose who seek tocriticise capitalism, parriar-
chy, heterosexism, white supremacy, imperialism and so ory as to those who
defend them. Throughout much cultural studies writing, there is a relentless
probing gí authority in culture. Anthropologists working in cultural stud-
ies, for example, have scrutinised the apparent objectivity of the traditional
ethnographer who observes the culture of indigenous, 'primitive' peoples
from a relatively privileged position (see CliÍford, 1988). In some respects,
this echoes the questioning of positivism and objectivism in the 'interpreta-
tive turn' in social thought since the 1960s. At its worst, it involves a nalve
constructivism and suspicion of anyone's right to say anything at al1 about
any less powerful social group. Other fields of enquiry, such as black stud-
ies, queer studies and women's studies, have brought new voices into cul-
tural studies and raised serious and important questións about the politics
of speaking Írom one particular subject position (for examplq white, private
. school-educated, male) about the cultural practices of others.
Fourth, cultural studies has forefronted issues of subiectivify, identity,
discourse and pleasure in relation to culture. It has enórmousÍy enriched
our understanding of how judgements of cultural value might relate to the
politics of social identity, especially class, gender, ethnicity and sexuality.
This is not just a matter of saying that taste is a product of social background
(which is the approach that the empirical sociology of culture has tended to
take). Rather, cultural studies explores the complex ways in which systems
of aesthetic value feed into cultural power. Whose voices are heard within
a culture and whose voices are marginalised? !\4rich (and whose) forrns of
pleasure are sanctioned and which (whose) are felt to be facile, banal or even
dangerous? These are questions about discourse, about the way that mean-
ings and texts circulate in society. They also concern subjectivity and identity
and the often irrational and unconscious processes by which we become who
we aÍe. These questions - sidelined in many of the approaches to the cul-
tural industries discussed above - have been investigated with great vigour
by cultural studies writers, who have pointed out that the most disrniised
and reviled fornls of culture are still those consumed by relatively power-
less groups in society. Feminist work on such forms as soaps (Ceiaghty,
1991) and women's magazines (Hermes,1995)was significant in ihis respect.
There was a strong interest in understanding the experiences and interpre-
tations of audience members; active audiences, including the study of fans
and fandom, became a cenlral theme in one type oÍ culiural studies.l3
Cultural studies, at its best, offers potentially valuable tools for the analysis
of culture inrelationto social power. Nevertheless, some analysisof media and
popular culture, which has either claimed to be taking a cultural studies
perspective or has been labeled in this way by others, has developed highly
problematicconceptionsofculture,and ofcuituralproduction.Inanalysingttre
richpoliticalpotentialof popularculture, and the ability of 'ordinary people'to
engage with the media on terms outside the control of the cultural induskies,
13 This was sometimes closer to the interests of mainstream communication sfudies than
some authors seemed to realise.
 some analysts, in the L980s/L99As heyday of postmodemist cultural theory,
undoubtedly risked lapsing into an uncritical celebration of contemporary
popular culture (such as Fiske, 1987; see also McGuigary 1992, Íor a critique
of such 'uncritical populism'). This was hardly the sarne kind of cultural
studies as that pracfised by writers such as Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall
and Edward Said.
The legacy of such populist analysis can be found in various writing on
the media and popular culture today. The intention is often a good one -
to complicate simplistic dismissals of commercial culture, whether from
audiences, journalists, or other researchers. Such commercial culture may,
the neo-populists suggest, be considerably more fruitful, empowering and
enriching than its critics make out. Some of the research at least makes an
eÍÍort to talk to audiences about their experiences of, for example, reality
television (Hill, 2005). But other contributions risk massively overstating the
democratization of the media that was made possible by the expansion of
the cultural industries and by associated developments ia information tech-
nology. ]ohn Hartiey, for example, has written provocatively about a pro-
cess of 'democratainmení in the proliferation of media and ihe increasing
presence of 'ordinary' peopie in their products (see Hartley, 1999: Chapter
12). As Graeme Turner (2010: 16) has noted, the democratic part of Hartley's
neologism is'an occasional and accidental consequence of the "entertain-
ment" part and its least systemic component'.la Perhaps the main legacy of
postmodernist culfural populism is to be found in a more recent generation
of cultural sfudies wÍiters who celebrate the emancipatory effects of digital
technologies (for example Jenkins, 2006). These cultural studies writers are
part of a powerful movement oÍ digital optimism, along with researchers
from other disciplines, such as management and business studies (Shirky,
2008),law (Benkler, 2006) and sociology (Casiells, 2008).
CULTURAL STUDIES APPROACHES TO MEDIA
INDUSTRIES AND MEDIA PRODUGTION
In spite of its potential contributions to understanding culture, the application
of cultural studies approaches to cultural indushies or even to cultural pro-
duction was relatively spatse until the 2000s, Recently, however, a number
of new approaches have emerged, with a variety of difÍerent relationships to
cultural studies, and a mix of potential contributions and drawbacks.
14 Graeme Tut'ner may himself be described as a cultural studies researcher, and fus excel-
lent critique of'the demotic turn' in research on media and popular culture (furner,
2010) suggesis that some of the best critiques of uncritical cultural populism may come
from those who have engaged most fully with culhral studies debates, from within.
tndystry produces culture. culture
produces industrY
i'1, Onu older strand of research ably stressed reciprocal relationships between
i cultural industries and broader curlents of culture within a society. Keith
,Negus (1999) developed a perspective that claimed that while it was frue that
larr industry produces culture' it was also the case that'culture produces an
.industry' (p. 14).'u For example, this perspective assumed/ in Simon Frith's
.words (2000:27), that
i:r. popular music isrlt the effect of a popular music indushy; rather,
the music ixdustry is an asPect of popular music culture ."
[T]he music industry cannot be treated as being somehow apart
, from the sociology of everyday liÍe - its activities are cultulally
determined.
A cultural studies approach oÍ this kind, thery mighi involve examining how
p:evailing patterns of culturai behaviour and power are reflected in the cul-
iural industries themselves. The perspective is a sociological one, and there is
i .gome overlap here with the sociology of culture work discussed earlier, such
i:r4s that of Howard Becker. But there is more emphasis than in sociology of
culture on questions of power and inequality, especialiy ethnicity and gen-
der. For example, Negus, nhís (1992,1999) siudies of the recording indus§
, in the UK and USA, showed how prevailing concepts of gender and'race' in
i: society at large affected the operations of recording-industry companies, and
therefore shaped what recordings were made available to the buying public,
and how they were marketed,
'
'Production studies': the cultural studies of mêdia
industries approach
A major development in recent media industries research has been the
arrival of a new generation of research that is consistent with this'culture
produces indusky' approach, but which builds on it using other theories
and takes it in new directions. It has already produced some rich studies
(see, for example, Caldwell, 2008; Havens,2A06; Mayer et a1., 2009), Some
indication of thg approach is provided by the introduction to Mayer, Baaks
i and Caldwell's ihtroduction to their collection of essays on 'cultural studies
, of media industries'. Production studies - by which they mean the cultural
studies approach that they aÍe advocating -'borrow theoretical insights
Írom the social sciences and humanities, but, perhaps most importantly,
;, they take the lived realities of people involved in media production as the
15 Negus is using the term'culture' here in its broader anthropological sense' See my dis-
cussion oÍ definitions in the Inkoduction Íor some of the problems associated with this
interpretation oÍ the term.
,\0

subjects for theorizing production as culture' (p. 4). According to Mayer,
Banks and Caldwell, the empirical data gathered by such studies include
routines and rituals, and also the politicai and economic forces that shape
roles and technologies, as well as the distribution ofresources according to
cuitural and demographic differences. Yet the research questions all this
boils down to are rather narrower, and fundamentally concern representa-
tion:'How do media producers represent themselves given the paradoxical
importance of media in society? How do we, as researchers, then represent
those varied and contested representations?' (p.4) These questions ofrepre-
sentâtion are important, and have been a central issue in cultural studies, as
mentioned above (see }{all, 1997). The Íocus on representation is nhat dis-
tinguishes this new cultural studies of media industries approaeh from soci-
ological approaches more generally. But to make representation the main
object of inquiry in the way that Mayer, Banks and Caldwell suggest they
want to do may ultimately seÍve to marginalise the'lived realities' that the
authors claim are also central to their approach. Moreover, like Caldweli's
otherwise extremeiy impressive study oÍ the narratives and rituals of film
and television workers in Los Angeles (2008), this account of cultural stud-
ies of production leaves us wondering how we are ultimately supposed to
eualunte what is being observed.
I should make ciear that my point is not aimed against ethno gl:aphy or soci-
ological fieldwork. This is emphatically not an aÍgument for privileging the
macro over the micro. The present book has primarily macro aims, grven that it
tries to cover hístorical change in the cultural industries. But macr.o and micro
need to be integrated in sfudies of the cultural industries. L:r other rcseaÍch I
have observed and interviewed workers, and I draw on ethnographic reseaÍch
by others at various points in this book. The issue is how a parículff reseaÍú
project - such as cultural studies of media industries - might articulate theory
and evidence, the micro and the macro, the empiricai and the normative.l6
These are difficult questions, and it may be that the cultural studies of media
industries approach will develop answers to them in the fufure. This is, after
all, a new (and welcome) addition to analysis of cultural industries and cul-
tural production.
Digital optimism
Another very different strand of cultural studies research on produc-
tion inherits the emphasis on audience activity in 1980s and 1990s com-
munication and cultural studies and applies it to the digitalising media of
the early twenty first ceniury. The most able exponent of this approach is
Henry Jenkins, whose earlier work examined the activities of fans. In his
book, Conaergence Culture, ]enkins analysed a wide range of practices made
16 The easy answer to this is to invoke the idea of 'middle range theory'. See Alford (1998)
for an explanation of why this is inadequate.
:i ir
fll
; possible by new digital technologies and which are 'enabling new forms of
participation and collaboration' (2006 : 256).
' In this respect, Jenkins is one of a number of intelligent digital optimists
who celebrate the democratising possibilities of digital technologies. As indi-
cated earlier, this digital optimism now extends way beyond cultural studies.
The populists and optimists have been joined by a powerful army of journal-
ists, authors, bloggers and acadernics from other disciplines, all of whom
fiave inherited the countercultural belief that computers have the potential to
j,:liberate knowledge and creativity. This makes digital optimism a formidable
:lê'utturat force (see Chapter 2 and especially Chapter 9, where I shall discuss
ii this at much greater length),
rêreative industries analysis
; In the 1990s, culturai studies in Australia took a particuiar turn. Researchers
'' influenced by the French historian Michel Foucault began to apply critical
to policymaking in ihe field of cuiture. The approach derived from
-;; ânalysis
Foucaulís analysis of wl'rat distinguished modern forms of govemment from
l. previous forms. There was a particular interest in the way in which concepts
ii and phenomena such as citizenship and therapy, seemingly benign, were
bound up in distinctively modern forms of power. The approach claimed to
offer a distinctive model of power, which saw it as more dispersed and less
:, Concentrated than did Marxist iheory. The leading exponent of this approach
;,, in cultural studies was Tony Bennett, who, to gl*ve iust one exampiá of his
,t'eseaÍch, analysed the historical development oÍ museums in Foucauldian
, terms.l7 Unusually for cultural studies, this approach was pragmatic in thai
it sought dialogue with policymakers, and was explicitly committed to pro-
i grammes of reform.
:' In the early 2000s, followers of this approach (though not Bennett) ttlrned
their attention to new forms of government policy which sought to expand
the role of the cultural industries. These policies were often rebranded 'cre-
ative indusfuies' Íor reasons that we shall explore in Chapter 5. This new
generation of quasi-Foucauldian researchers (by this I mean that they were
influenced by the French historian Michel Foucault but in a strange and
rather uneven way) combined postmodemist cultural populism with the
concepts and language oÍ digital optimism(see Hartley, 2005). This school
has tended to pay considerably more attention to pragmatism and policy
than to the critique of modern Íorms of power associated with Foucault and
many of his fo[owers. The result has been a distinctive and controversial
form of cultural studies analysis which has contributed to the increasing
popularity of the term'creative industries', as discussed in Chapter 5. (See
also Hesmondhalgh, 2007 : 148-9, 2009a),
17 See Bennett (1998) for a malor collection of essays and McGuigan (1996) for a critique oÍ
this kind of approach as applied to culturai policy.
Àt
 Cultural economy
Finally, an interesting cultural studies perspective on economic life known as
'cultural economy' (Amin and ThdÍt,2004, du Gay and pryke,2002) is some-
times understood as all analysis of the cultural industries, but, in fact, most
of the researchers who employ this term have broader ambitions than ihis.
Their aim is to apply post-structuralist cultural studies insights to production
and to economic life in geperal; Foucault was an influence here too, Cultural
economy, in this sense, sees the realm of economic practice - in all its vari-
ous forms, such as markets and economic and organisational relations - as
formatted and framed by economic discourses (du Gay and Pryke, 20A2:2),
and makes this the starting point for analysis rather than piacing it as a sup-
plement to existing economic or political-economic analysis. This certainiy
does not preclude analysis of the cultural industries and some work has been
published under this banner, but there has been rather too llttle of such work
to constitute a distinctive approach to the cultural industries (as opposed to
an approach to production or the economy in general). However, cultural
economy raises issues about how to ground critique of developments in
the cultural industries. The cultural economy approach encourages us
to question the easy dichotomies that some pótitióit economists aná soci-
ologists of culture draw between the realm of culfure and the increasing
encroachment of economics on that realm, However, the deconstruction of
such binary oppositions can neglect important political and ethical questions
with regard to relations between culture and commerce. For example, are
there potentially harmful effects to commodification? A1l societies i"rerve
some aspects of the world - nature, personhood or culture, for example -
from comrnodi"fication. What aspects of culture might contemporary soci-
eties shelter from exchange and private ownership and on what grounds?
(These issues are fruitfully pursued, for example, by ]ohn Frow, l99Z , hirr.-
self a cultural studies analyst. I return to them in relation to cultural produc-
tion in Chapter 2.)
THE APPROACH TAKEN HERE
In the respects discussed above, and others too cultural sfudies has made an
enoÍmous though at times problematic confribution to our understanding of
culture and power, aÍrd more recently to studies of cultural production, In
the 1980s and 1990s, cultural studies was attacked not only by conservatives
ryho questioned its emphasis on respect for cultural difference, but also by
liberals and radicals. In fact, some of the strongest attacks on cultural sfud-
ies came from fellow leftists in political economy and radical media sociology
who often accused it of a secret complicity with conservatism (see,for exam-
ple, Gitlin, 1998; Miller and Philo, 2000 and others). Culturai studies gave
as good as it got and, agairç the main targets were often potential allies on
the political leÍt. The result was a series of polemics, which helped to create a
perception, at least in the research fields of media, communication and cultural
átudies, that critical analysis was evenly divided between two camps - politi-
cal economy and cultural stuclies. This idea was reproduced not oniy in pub-
lished books and articles but aiso in countless everyday references in seminar
room§/ conference bars and so on, along the iines of 'political economy does
X, cultural studies does Y'. Even when some writers claimed that they want to
move beyond the split, they then proceeded to attack, from a position strongly
identified with one camp, a câricatffed version oÍ the other, thus maintaining
' the myth (such as Grossberg, 1995).
,' In the two previous editions of this book, I took issue with this polarisa-
' tiort as a way of explaining my own synthesis of approaches to culture and
power. My claim was that political economy veÍsue cultural studies was
: neither an accurate nor useíul way to chatacterise approaches to the media
and popular culture. The opposition simplified a whole web of disagree-
ments and conflicts between the various diÍferent approaches to culture that
we might take down to just two players. Contrary to some nalVe mispercep-
tions, political economy is not the same thing as'studies oÍ production' and
cultural studies does not consist of 'empirical studies of audiences' or'stud-
ies of texts'. All this should be apparent Írom the above discusslons. In fact,
the issue was never really cultural studies versus political economy - as iÍ the
field of enquiry was divided neatly between two approaches. The real goal of
discussions about theory and method in relation to media and popuiar cul-
ture, I pointed oui, should be to understand the potential contributions and
limitations of the key approaches, and to synthesise the best aspects of them.
Discussions organised around simple dichotomies such as political economy
vlrsus cultural studies were never likely to achieve this goal.
Thankfully this crude opposiüon now appears to have faded. Its prominence
in the 1980s and 1990s perhaps reflected the tensioru between two diÍferent
kinds of leftist politics, one based primarily on issues of social idenfity, such as
gerder, ethnic§ and sexuality, the other on economics, internationalist politics
and the redistribution of resources (the latter sometimes portrayed as Marxist
when it could just as easily be social-democratic).18 For some, this concem with
social identity was a retreat from the project of building coalitions to resist the
economic and political Íorces that bring about oppression in the fust place.
We now live in diÍferent times, where many analysts recognise the cenfral
importance of geopolitical and financial power (issues almost entirely neglected
by the best-known versions of cultural studies) and social idenüty. The fading
of the dichotomy may also reflect that people interested in the study of the
media and popular culture might now divide their sense of the field more by
topic than by (often caricatured) theoreticai approach: political communication,
media industries, media and gender/sexuality, intemational communicatiorç
joumalism, internet studies, television studies, film studies, and so on.
1B See Hall (1992) for an account of cuitural studies that portrays it as a reaction by the left
against certain forms oÍ Marxism, especially those influenced by Stalinism.
t\L
 The political economy versus cultural studies dichotomy was discussed
in some detail in the previous two editions, but I have cut this here, and any
readers who may be interested are referred to either of those previous edi-
tions (Hesmondhalgh, 2002, 2OA\.Instead, I deal more briefly with some
iongstanding tensions and dílemmas arising from di{ferences in approach
to culture and the cultural induskies. I try to dispel one or two persistent
corúusions relevant to analysis of cultural industries, and indicate my own
theoretical and methodological approach in this book.
o Anaiysts have often identiÍied a number of moments or processes that
are particularly relevant to the study of media and popular culture. The
most often used terms are: productiorL audiences, texts.(sometimes
the terms 'representation' or 'content' are used instead), and policy/
regulation. Nearly everyone emphasises the significance of seeing these
momeÍrts or processes in relation to each other (see du Gay et a1.,1997 on
'the circuit of culture' - reproduced and discussed in Hesmondhalgh,
2002: 43), even iÍ they believe that ceriain moments or processes have
more causal effect on media in general (see Toynbee, 2008). Nearly
everyone recognises that the best way of understanding the media and
popular culture is to address all these different moments and processes,
even iÍ analysts choose to focus on a particular one or two.
e Studies of cultural, media and creative industries tend to focus on
dynamics of production and the way in which government policy and
reguiation might shape production. Some focus on these dynamics in
relation to texts as well. This is the approach taken in the present book.
r The cultural industries have a dual role - as 'economic' systems of pro-
duction and 'cultural'producers of texts. Production is proÍoundly culturat
and texts are determined by economic Íactors (among others). If we want
to criticise the forms of culture produced by the cultural industries and the
ways that theyproduce them, thenweneed to take accountof both thepol-
itrcs of redistribution, Íocused on issues of political economy, and the politics
oÍ recognition, focused on questions of cultural identity (Fraser,1997).
r Some theoretical and methodological dilemmas can't easily be recon-
ciled, however. A significant split between diÍferent types of research
concerns epistemology - the understandings oÍ how we gain knowl-
edge that underlie off attempt to seek understanding - and method.
Put crudely, some analysts, including political economy writers, tend
in questions of epistemology towards reaiism: the 'assumption that
there is a material world external to our cognitive processes which pos-
sesses specific properties ultimately accessible to our understandingl
(Garnham, 1990:3). This view is oucially linked to the view that we can
achieve objective knowledge of that independent reality. Cultural stud-
ies writers take a variety of more constructivist and subjectivist epis-
temological paths, in some cases aiming to gain greater objectivity by
recognition of the effect of the observer on the observed (see Couldry,
2000: 12-14, on feminist epistemology), while in other cases, there is
a radical scepticism about truth claims. This is especially true in post-
structuralist and postmodemist approaches. The approach in the pre-
sent book is built on a critical realist perspective (see Hesmondhalgh
and Toynbee, 2008; SaYer, 2000).
r Alother diÍficult theoretical problem concems explanation and the
problem of economic reductionism - the attribution of complex culturai
events and processes, such as the form of the Hollywood film industry or
the nature oÍ television soap operas or the development of television as
a medium of communication, to a single political-economic cause, such
as the interese of the social class that controls the means of production
oÍ the requiÍement within capitalism Íot owners and executives to make
profits. There are indeed such economically reductionist accounts, which
fail to do justice to the complex interplay of factors involved in culture,
but the fact that some political-economic accounts are reductionist is no
aÍgument againsi political-economic analysis per se. An important con-
cept has been iletermination, generally used in the Marxist tradition to
refer to the process by which objective conditions might fix causally what
happens. There are dubious Marxist accounts of determination, which
portray forces as leading inevitably to something happening; and there
are more useful accounts that examine how certain conditions might
set limits and exert pressures on events and processes (see Williams,
. 1977: 83-9, Íor an exposition of this distinction). A good analysis will
i set processes of economic determinafion alongside other processes and
pressures in culture and think about how they interact. Debates about
economic determination and reductionism have produced the most sig-
nificant tensions between politicai economy and other approaches. Afl
eclectic methodology, allied to a radical social-democratic recognition
of the existence of structures oÍ power, inequality and injusüce, might
provide the possibiiity of building on the aiready greater convergence
between diÍferent critical approaches. The more pragmatic option advo-
cated here involves identifying particular moments where economic fac-
tors aÍe strongly determinant and moments where other factors, such as
those listed above, need to be stressed more. This, as we shall see, will
be a crucial aspect of Chapter 3, which sets about explaining change and
continuity in the cultural industries.
In this chapter, I have concentrated on identifying the achievements and pin-
pointing ihe limitations of the main approaches relevant to study of the cul-
tural industries. I have done so by considering how these approaches might
best help us to understand úe issues identified in the Introduction as cen-
tral to the book as a whole: the relationships between cuiture/creativity and
power, and between change and continuity. I also outlined my approach,
which might be summarised as a sociological version of political economy,
heavily inÍormed by certain aspects of eultural studies and media studies.
l\h
 Peter Golding and Graham Murdock have provided a series of vital
RECOMMENDED AND FURTHEH RÊADINGlg contributions to analysis of the media and culture, both individually and
The approach outlined in this chapter relies on an understanding of the together. These go back to essays published in the 1970s (Murdock and
importance of the relationships between culture, society and democracy that cúaing, 1974,197n and an overview of the changing communications fielci
has been articulated in diÍferent ways by a number of writers. There is only in1977 (Murdock and Golding, 1977).1n199L, they published a substantially
space to mention some of them here. new version ('Culture, communications and political economy') of their
Raymond Williams remains a key inspiration for anyone concerned about L977 essay, which they then revised three times, in1996,2000 and 2005 (see
the relationships between culture, society and power. His early work such as ,Golding and Murdock, 2005). Changes in the agenda of the critical political
Culture and Society (1958) and The Long Reaolution (1961) is most often cited, :economy tradition can be traced across these contributions.
but I often suggest starting with the late essays, such as Towards 2000 (1983)
:' Although my preference is clearly for the 'culturai industries' variants oÍ
and lMat I Came to Say {1989). Paul Jones's Raymond Wílliarns's Sociology of political economy, the Schiller-McChesney school (or, as Winseck (20111 21-3)
Culture (2004) is a good though formidable overview. iras it, the'monopoly capital and digitai capitalism'schools) has a great deal
]ames Curran has synthesised approaches from political economy/ com- to offer the analysis of cultural industries. Examples include McChesney's
munication studies and sociology of culture, while also being attentive to ,book on The Political Economy of Media (2008).
cultural studies. His books Media and Power (2002) and Media and Demouacy
I A good texibook sympathetic to the new cultural studies of media indus-
(2011) collect some notable interventions. The collection Curran edited with tries is Timothy Havens and Amanda Lotz's Understanding Media Industries
the ]ate Michael Gurevitclu called Mass Media and Society in its first four edi- (2011). ]enrrifer Holt and Alisa Perren's Media Industries: History, Theory
tions and retitled The Media and Society for its Sth edition (2010) is, in my and Method (2009) and Vicki Mayer, Mirarrda J. Banks and John Thornton
view, the best introductory collection of serious writing about the media. 'Caldwell's Production Studies (2009) are good collections. The Íocus of all
C. Edwin Baker was a legal scholar, highly inÍluenced by the political econ- 'these books is very much on television and film.
omy approach, who wrote a brilliant series of books on key issues related to For general introductions to the study of medi4 see Gillespie (2006) on
the cultural industries and their roie in contemporary societies: Adaertising au{iences, Gillespie and Toynbee (2006) on Analysing Media Texts, and
qnd a Democratic Press (1994), Media, Markets and Demouacy (2A0\, and, Media He§mondhalgh (2006b) on media production.
Cancentration and D emo cracy (2007).
Amongst the most rewarding contemporary cultural studies writers on
questions relevant to the cultural industries are Graeme Turner (such as
Understanding Celebrity,Zl04, and Ordínary People and the Media,2010); Anfuew
Ross (No Collar,Z}l3; NiceWorklf You Can Get 1t,2009); and Angela McRobbie
(The Aftermath of Feminism,2008, but see also early and important essays on
cultural labour, such as McRobbie, 2002). The best introduction to cultural
studies I know is still Nick Couldry's lnside Culture (2000). Don Robotham's
Culture, Society and Econorny (2005) offers a kenchant critique of how cultural
studies and social theory have failed to analyse economic power.
A very good recent collection of work in the political economy tradition is
Dwayne Winseck and Dal Yong Jirls The Palitical Economies of Media (2011).
This has an excellent introductory essay by Winseck (2011). |anet Wasko,
Graham Murdock and Helena Sousa's The Handbook of Political Economy of
Communications (2A1\ contains a number of good pieces, A good book-length
overview of the political economy approach is Vincent Mosco's The Political
Economy of Carumunication {lst edition, 1996), though I found the (2009) sec-
ond edition's treatment of more recent developments a little disappointing.

19 Full bibliographical details of works suggested in the Selected and Further Reading
section that foilows each main chapter can be found in the References at the end of the
book.

/rq
 o c(í
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Twentieth Century;
The Key Features o
6
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The place of cultural production in economies §
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A question oÍ commodification 68
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Business ownership and structure
Organisation, management and creative autonomy
Creativily and commerce relations
71 §
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The quality oÍ cultural work
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lnternationalisation and domination by the USA

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Texts, social justice and the serving of interests B9 õ
.:§)
This chapter begins the story of how the cultural industries have changed by
§
o
ô
tuEu ããããE, EÊ, ÊgEÊE Êã= frã
analysing how the cultural industries developed in the twentieth ceniLry. Ít o
pB
lays out a number of key features of the cultural indusfries between the end .§P
of the first worlcl war and the 1970s.
Laying out these key features provides a framework that will allow for the
E§
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gÊã ÊtE ÊãÊ*ec
gÊ€ ÊÊ#
assessment of changes and continuities in the cultural industries in the rest
E E -o
of the book, for the discussion of each aspect generates two types of question
to be answered in Part Three. E rE
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The first concerns the extent of change. Do changes in the major aspects
o.\ õ E ÉsUsE É õEá §
of cultural production in the period that mainry .or,."..á or (roao
oawards) represent fundamental alterations or aró they merely rrifu."
htro
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changes, underpinned by continuity?
The second type_ oÍ question concerns the eaaluation of change and con- e*§§ H; SEçSg ãõ cEE À e
F
tinuity in these different aspects.

Àh
f\e.tue-stions relating to each aspect are then addressed in Chapters 6-10. o Corporate professionaí
Table2.'1, provides a summary.
Finally, from the early fwerrtieth century, but expanding enormously aÍter 195Ç
there was a new phase that Williams calls'corporate professional'. The com-
missioning of works became professionalised and more organised. Increasurg
THE PLACE OF CULTURAL PHODUGTION IN numbos oÍ people also became direct employees of culturai companies, on
retiainers and conffacts. Aionpide older actiüties, such as writing books, per-
ECONOMIES AND SOCIETIES :, forming music and acting out plays, new media technologies appeared - most
The first task is to consider the changing prace oÍ commerciar
cultural pro-
ductio. in economies and societies. úir**il enable us to establish á ro,rgn ;,. . and altered the older ty'pes of culíral activity, other times they produced
periodisation and some cruciai terr'rs._My concern here * ; mtirely new ones (sudr as the drama serial or the situation comedy). Alongside
is with the longer-
term history of culturar production. unàerstanding this wirl
i . , direct sales, advertising became an important new means of making morrey for
think about recent changes and continuities carefully"u"d pr;;;ü,
aii"*"",
- t" creative work and aninceasingly imporhnt culfural Íorm in itselÍ.

I soga starting point for -thinking about long-term historicai ihange in

cultural production is provided term'corporate professional' refers to social relations between symbol crea-
by úymond 1dluur,., in his book cirture.
Adapting-willíams {19s1:3g-s6),-*e .* identify three eras in i.tors on the one hand, and pakons or businesses on the other, but the key point
the áever- Íor the argument of this book is that it can be used to describe an era of cultural
oprelt of cultural production in.Europe (which have pararlels else-where),
each of tirem named after the main i.,production. This involves a new social and economic sigrrificance for commer-
forà oi sociar reratiàns r"1*""" ':cial cultural production in modem societies Írom the early twentieth centuly
creators and wider society prevailing at the time. "y*r"r
onwards, ând in a moment I shall discuss ihis cruciai point further. It also serves,
. Patronage and artisanal as a term that can help us to periodise change across the other aspects
The term '-pLtglug*' refers to a variety oí systems prevalent addressed in this chapter ard PaÍt Three (those summarised in Table 2.1),
in the West
trom the Middle Ages until the nineteenth century. poets, painters, ,
I wish Williams hadn t used the term 'corporate' in this context. To the
musicians and others wourd, for exampre, be'retaúed, by modern ear, it sounds as ihough the chief issue is the rise of large private
aristocrats ,companies. Important as large companies are in cultural production from
or the Churchor protected and supportãd by them. S".t",,yrt"m,
dominant until the earry nineteenth century ând can still be íound
*"r" Ithe early twentieth century onwards, Williams, in fact, intends the term in an
today. tilder sense: 'a number of people ilr a uniÍied group'. To avoid such conÍu-
An'artisan' is a skilled worker or craftsperson who works rurj"ry
sion,I want to use a modiÍied term - complex professional - to label this Íorm
his or her own direction. such workerr, io tt'tuir crassic form,íJulà ""ao
sel
goods directly to purchasers. These also still exist today (see {ând stage or era) of cuitural production. I prefer the word 'complex' because
il2.1). !i ône of the most crucial features of this era was the increasing complexity oÍ
t Market professional the division of labour involved in making texts.
From the early nineteenth century onwards, however, 'artistic
works,
were increasingly offered for sare and bought in order to re
owaea.
Symbolic creativity, in other words, increa"singly came to
ised as a market. Under this system, *o." ur-rã more
Ue Çru
work was ãolcl
Box 2.1 Understanding transitions
not directly to the public but indirectly, via intermediaries. The complex proÍessional form dominated cultural production from the 1950s
These were
either distributors, such as bookseleis, or 'productive intermediaries, onwards, but market professional and even patronage-based forms of cultural
(Williams, 1981:48), such as publishers. Th-is made for production contínued to exist alongside the features of this dominant form,
a much more
complex division oÍ rabour i'cuiturar production than beÍore, together with non-market or less marketised forms of cultural institution such as
even iÍ
lnany symbol creators still worked as àrHsans _ that is, largety unãer §tate and public service broadcasting companies. We can think of the cultural
their own direction. By the late nineteenth century and tLáughout industries from the 1950s onwards as being composed of three diffêrênt forms,
t-he early twentieth ceniury, both distributive each corresponding to terms developed by Williams (1977:121-7) to refer to the
and productive i'tã.*"-
diaries were becoming much more highly capitalised than historical variabilily of any period under examination in an 'epochal'analysis -
before as
leisure time and disposabre income m industriaiised coun- that is, analysis of the characteristics of a particular time.
"*!uoa"a,a form
t":.*sfu1 sy,àbol ueators achieved
,1r::: .
of professional
mdependence' (Wílliams, 1991: 4g) and, increasingly, werápaid in the
form of royaities.

ItP

(Continued)
o fhe camplex professional formwaslhe dominantway in which production
.
was organised, which is why it gives its name to the whole era.
Patronage and market professional íorme, dominant in previous eras, con-
tinued to exist in resrdualforms. Sponsorship of artists is one important and
growing contemporanj'example. lmporlantly, though, artisanal relations also
exist in residue. This situation is produced b,y, and in turn reinforces, thê cre-
ative autonomy ceded to cultural workers, as discussêd in the Introduction
and later in this chapter.
r State and public service broadcasting had emerged in the 1920s'and 1930s
and continued to expand across thê world with the spread oÍ têlêvislon in
the 1 960s. it can be seen as an emergent Íorm within the early stages of the
complex professional era.
I thereÍore usê the term'complex professional'as a heuristic device to describe
the whole era of cultural produclion Írom the 1950s onwards, but, in fact, it
reÍêrs to a mix of diÍferênt forms.
So, we have established, using a periodisation based on Wiiliams, that,
beginning in the early twentieth century, but expanding and accelerating
as the century progresses, cultural production gained a new economic and
social significance. One of the questions we need to ask, then, in consider-
ing change and continuity in cultural production since the 1"980s, is whether
cultural production has become even more significant. One way to tackle
this broader issue is to ask to what extent have the cultutal industries
become increasingly important in national economies and global busi-
ness? In Chapter6,Iput forward the view that they have, slowly and stead-
ily, become more important, but not to the extent that many commentators
claim (see p ages 216 -221).
A OUESTION OF COMMODIFICATION
How might we eaaluate the changing social significance of the cultural
industries? This is a vast terain, but one way of apprehending it is to
step back and ask what major changes have taken place in cultural pro-
duction over the last four or five centuries. Writers from a wide variety
of perspectives - economists, Marxist political economists and some cul-
tural studies writers - would want to emphasise industrialisation and
commodification. As Lacroix and Tremblay (1997) note, these terms are
used 'so often that authors often do not even bother to define them' (p.
68). Industrialisation involves signiÍicant capital investment, mechanised
uction and the division of labour, but commodification involttes trans-
ín.mi.s obiects and services into comtnodities. Thís commodification is
ir rorã"n"ompassing process than industrialization' (p. 69) and does not
hlcessarity eníail the úse of industrial production techniques. The two
-ut"
intertwined but,I emphasise co113{i!:l'l
firo.urr"t -9: }lt-t:
y because, as Lacroix and Tremblay say, it is a moÍe encompâssing
:ss than industrialisation, but also because such an emphasis can help
throw further light on the complexities and ambivalences of cultural
lduction under capitalism, as discussed in the Introduction and my §ur-
y of approaches in ChaPter 1.
'í{hat -does it mean to transform something into a commodity? At its
basic level, it involves producing things not only Íor use but also for
.1 With the development of capitalism, this ínvolved exchange
li't *uit"tt increasingly extended over iime and space, with money as the
lnedium allowing for such extended exchange. This was crucially linked to
§.'ystems of consumption and production. Production Íor extended exchange
iÊquired the investment of capital and paying wages Íor labour. When com-
ities were boughç this involved private and exclusive ownership rathet
collective access, When feudalism gave way to capitalism, many things
láecame commodified - land and labour among them. ]ohn Frow (1997:
f43-4) notes that even if we rightly resist the teleologicai notion of capitalism
necessarily involving endless commodification (for there has been some
ification, too, such as the sentimentalisation of love and the abo-
of slavery), capitalism can nevertheless be understood as a system
volving a continual, iÍ uneverL extension of commodiÍication.
The problem is how to judge commodification - and this is central to how
: judge capitalism itself, This is a big question and one that sorne writers
ve, therefôre, considered offlimits, but it still needs to be asked. Some
ists, and other writers, too, in criticising capitalism, have made sim-
ic and someLimes romantic assumptions, opposing the commodities of
i'papitalism to visions of a past or future society based on non-commodities.
i Óther writers, including Marx himselÍ, have provided a much more complex
!' 'analysis,2 seeing commodification as ambivalent, as enabling and produc-
r tive.but also limiting and destructive. Various writers, including Frow (1997:
102-217), have engaged with anthropological perspectives that show how
other principles for the exchange of goods, such as gift exchange (famously
analysed by the French social theorist Marcel Mauss), might be compro-
. mised by hidden motives. Commodification produces massive proliferations
It carç of course, be used to mean basic goods, such as copper, oil and so or; but that is
not the way in which I am using the term here.
It is a mistake to think thât Marx was simply'againsí commodification. Marx was
concerned with a number of aspects of modern commodities - most notably the way iI
which the immense collection of commodities that surround us conceal the labour that
goes into them.
,ü
 of goods, but there aÍe rnany problems associated with this proliÍeration.
To take just two here, on the consumption side, there is ihe problem that
commodification spreads a notion of ownership and property as the right
to exclude others, leading to huge inequaiities, the promotion oÍ private,
individual interest and a threat to collective action for the common good; on
the production side, there is the problem that labour goes unrecognised and
is systematically under-rewarded. (Frorv's orientationtowards cultural stud-
ies is evident in his emphasis on the former rather than on the latter problem.
I believe both are important.)
lVhat of the commodification of culture? This has been a long and highly
uneven process. It is entangled with indushialisation, but commodification
preceded the iarge-scale industrialisation of culture that beganin earnest in
the twentieth century. To put this another way, industrialisation intensified
and extended the commodification oÍ culture. Agu*, we need to understard
this not as a fall from grace from a non-commodified state of culture, but as
fundamentally ambivalent, as enabling and constraining. This is, not least,
because the commodiÍication of culture is highly complex, happening in diÍ-
Íerent stages and taking multiple forms.3 To give an example adapting |ohn
Frow (1997:139), we can distinguish three ways and stages in which printed
texts have been commodified:
c The commodification of the material object ('the book') - iaking place as
early as the fifteenth century.
n The commodification of the inÍormation contained within the mate-
rial object as'the worK in copyright law - from the eighteenth century
onwards.
r The comrnodification of access to printed text information via electronic
databases and so on - in the iate twentieth century.
Each of these forms and stages of commodification has different implica-
tions. There has been a massive profusion of books as a result of their com-
modification - a proliÍeration intensified by industrialisation. Copyright
underpins the ownership of cultural commodities (and, therefore, the cul-
tural industries as a whole: see Chapter 5) and the protection oÍ works by
copyright law has aided this proliferation, but at a cost of placing consider-
able restrictions on the use of such information. Arguably, such restrictions
become more serious in the third stage identified here and inequalities of
access become more marked also. As Frow stresses, there is serious conÍlict
between commercial institutions that attempt to make cultural works their
private properfy and common ownership of, or access to, cultural goods.
3 This is why a number of political economy writers have sought to distinguish between
the diÍferent 'logics' involved in different forms of cultural commodity (Flichy, 1980;
Lacroix and Tremblay,1997; Miêge, 1989). See aiso Dan Schiller (1994) for a useful dis-
cussion of the long-term history of commodification of in-fonnation and culfure.
is a cultural version of the'consumption-side' problem with commodi-
referred to above. Equally, however - and not so stressed by Frow -
iiúe is a cultural version of the production-side problem: the cultutal
iÍúour that is necessary to produce the vast numbers of cultural commodities
to wealthier consurlers goes unrecognised (and this cultural work
addressed below).
'If the exchange oÍ commodities over extended time and space leads to the
otíems identified above, then to draw attention to commodiÍication raises
about the line of demarcation between \^/hat can be sold and what
All societies will attempt to withdraw certain domains from market rela-
examples include religior; personal liÉe, the political sphere and art, The
of market relations into cultuÍe and the increasing presence oÍ com-
ion in the cultural sphere cannot be crudely dismissed as a problem
itself. It would be even moÍe problematic, however, to neglect the negafive
for cultural production and consumption of fruther commodiÍi-
These issues are absolutely central to the current debates raging about
emancipatory possibilities of the intemet. Digital networks make possible
sharing and coilaboration, enabling new forms of commons, but
are also subject to a process of digitai enclosure (Murdoc§ 2011).
r',Commodification, theo can be seen as a long-term and ambivalent pro-
We can understand the compiex professional era âs a new stage in
commodification and industrialisation of culture. If this is so, then the
uestion we need to ask about the period since 1980 is as follows: what are
implications of the further commodification of culture? This question
addressed in Chapter 6 (see pages 221-225), but because copyright is
vital to the process of commodiÍication of culture, the groundwork for
ing this question is laid in Chapter 5, where I consider changes in
right law.
BUSINESS OWNERSHIP AND STRUCTURE
One oÍ the most striking and significant features oÍ the complex profes-
sional era was the increasing pÍesence of large corporations in the busi-
ness oÍ cultural production. The biggest of these companies, such as RCA
(Radio Corporation of America) in the USA, were hu ge congloÍnerutes.a They
, dwarfed the publishing companies and newspaper empires that had formed
ii:the largest companies oÍ the market professional era. In film, recording, radio
i',r and television, significant oligopolies had emerged before the middle of the
century. The most famous oligopoly was made up of the eight vertically
integrated Hollywood studios (see Box 2.2). Rather less famous was the oli-
gopoly that dominated the recording industry - the British companies Decca
', 4 For example, including its non-media interests, RCA was the thirry-ninth biggest com-
pany in the LISA in1972 (Murdock and Golding 1977:27-B)'
 and EMI, plus Columbia and RCA in the usA, joined by warner Brothers
and Dutch consumer erectronics giant philips in íhe post-áecond ' over Williams's'corporate proÍessional'. Small companies multi-
worid war The widespread existence of small companies in the cultural industries
period. Many of these companieJ were veriically i"t"grrt"d,1;;
p*àu.irlg some of the distinctive features oÍ cultural production discussed in the
record players and developing new recording and
t""ir_rtfoglur. Even while the scale oÍ reproduction and circulation of .cultural
In radio and television, the us networks, cB-s and ituyUu"t
NIiC, were doÀinant,
There. was aLso sig'nificant cross-media ownership
grew during the complex ploÍessional period, the conception of cultural
in the early years of the could still take piace on a relatively small scaie.6 As small companies
complex professionar era, with firm studios such as rucrvr
(úÉrá-ê"ra*y"_ , more and more importance was attached to them as sites of crea-
Mayer) having significantmusic industry interests and
"one ncA running its own independence, reflecting anxieties about the negative effects of big, bureau-
record company and its NBC network. of the most .ri"dp.ri", organisations on society and cultural production. Commentary about
".t"ili"
im'olved internationar news agencies (Boyd-Barratt, 19g0),
with anixtraor- culture was booming in the mid-century as, for example,Ítlmandiazz,
dinary domination of three Anglo-American agencies:
Press and United Press/UpA, plus the French AFp.s
Reuters, Associated even rock, criticism began to burgeon as notable cuitural forms in their
Bu.*uJh trslayer of vertica,lly-integrated giants, most .righf By the late 1960s,mN'ty young pop and rock critics equated the cor-
. lar.ge companies were with comrnercial control and saw the independents as representative
T*-1y99 mairrly in one form of cdlural pioduction. a dy .f.ráj" .r__ i. a hucksterish enlrepreneurialism (for exarnple, Cohn, 1989[19691] or more in
the 1960s as congromeration spread throughout the cultural
industries. This h with trends developed in iocal settings (such as, Gillett, 1971). We shall
y,as part:f a mole generar trend in businels as a whoie. Neii Frigstein (1990: to the issue of whether or not independents really do offer some kind oí
Chapter 8) provides evidence of the sharecr trend towards
industries Írom the 1940s onwards. of the it00 biggest
air"*ifão"" m rrr Íaltemative'to the conglomerates in Chapters 7 and1l.
companies in the usA in
1939, 77 concenkated 70 per cent or moreof theüiusinesr',"
By 1979, o'úy 23 corporaÉons concentrated in
; ri,,gü ;àustry.
one indushy in this wãy. \Arhereas
none of the top 99 companies in 1939 produced across
different induskies that
Box2.2 The Hollywood oligopoly across the
Dore no relation to each oiher, by "1929 more than
a quarter were Íolrowing this
complex proÍessional era
strategy (these figures are from Frigstein, 1990: z6i).
rvhat is r".r", Higrt"i" Eight companies dominated Hollywood during its 'classical'period (1925-1 950).
shows that this shift in strategy was ãdopted u."or,
-to ,ir i.,d.rstries and driv'en by The major studios owned and controlled many parts oÍ the value chain. They
the need for senior managers be u*ur, to be achieving growth. ran production facilities, made the Íilms, had creative and technical personnel
conglomeration first hit the cultural industries in irie
tgoOs, as part of this signed to contracts, owned distÍibution networks and owned the cinemas where
trend towards diversificaüon. In some cases, it took
the Íorm of industriar the films were shown. A 'Big Five'both distributed Íilms and owned their own
and financial and business corporations buying
up and investing in media cinemas, while the'Little Three'had their own distribution arms, but no cinsmas.
interests. Box 2.2 summarises Ãow
affected the film indus- A series of rulings by the US Supreme Court, aimed at breaking the Big Five's
try.during the complex professional"onglom"ration
..ã. t , the 1960s and 1,970s, conglom_ oligopoly, Íorced the studios to get rid of their cinemas from the late 1940s
eration mainly took the form of large, general conglomeiar"r,'*irf.r"ii,"i,
onwards, weakening their power. The studios increasingly subcontracted to
businesses based on interests as divõrsús oil,
funerars and {inanciar ser- independent film production companies from the 1950s onwards in an attempt
vices, buying up film production studios and 'iibraries'
of old ritms. rn oil to lower costs, control risk and outmanoeuvre television by producing new and
industries, conglomeraiion was based on projected,.oru.rg"..àr; ",
à,",a;ryr_ spectacular gênres. They also acted as national and international distributors
ergies', although these terms were not invented
untir laterlFo, .r""rpr!, i" and retained great power. All eventually became divisions of large conglomer-
tne-*t-l!o-+ big us consumer electronics and
manufacturing companies, such ates (see Chapter 6). As their namês recur throughout this book, here is a brief
as IBM (International Business Maúines),
RCA, Xerox, GE (Generar Erectric) guide to the latêr history of these important cultural induslry corporations.
GTfl.lought up book publishers, ánticipating converger,..
,u"d.
book publishing and
bui*"".
-"
(Tunstall ana'N{u.flr,, tSSS,'t0i_Sl,-
"omprturs
Hoy"".O ownership and structure in the complex proÍessional period
are
not onJy about the rise of vertically integraied
!
congiomeirt.r,
my earlier point, is one of the ruásoos Ior r.,y pr"?*"rr."
*á
ifuJio ,ã,u,u
forthe term,complex 6 Making up stories and songs, for example, is an acitivity that can be caried out Pretty
much anywhere. Feature films might be irnpossible to make without access to consider-
able capital, bu! in economic tffms at least, anyone can write a soipt. Even inscription
5 The first two are still responsibre for most of (putting a magazine design on to disk or making the master copy o{ a recording, for
the worrd's news images (see patersory example) and reproduction (running off copies of magazines or CDs) can be relatively
2011).
cheap, especially perhaps in the age of digitalisation.

À1
 (Continued) above features of ownership and company structure in the complex pro-
I period raise the following question: to what extent have changes in
The Big Five and integration led to recognisably new and distinct forms
,ôf oívnership and structure since 1980? We shall see in Chapter 6 (see pages
r Paramount, bought by oil conglomerate
Gulf & Western in .1g67, now part of that the size and scope of cultural industry corporations expanded
the Viacom media conglomerate. 'íel-ZOl1
from the 1980s onwards.
r 20th century Fox perÍormed disastrousry
in the 1g60s and 1g7os, became r,tOnce again, however, we need to ask how might we eoaluate this expan-
part oÍ a private corporation and
was then sord (as Fox) to Rupert úrro*r.',,, ? The role oÍ culfural industry corporations in society has been a key theme
News Corporation in .lgg5.
ipolitical economy, especially in the Schiller-McChesney tradition. There are
' warner Brothers was taken over by the generar
congromeraie Kinney Nationar iríking examples oÍ the exercise of interests via cultural industry ow-nership by
§ervices (a business based on frn"rrf
Oià.ior") in .1969 and merged with moguls - that is, individuals with overall conffol of a company (see page
Time in 1990 to form what was for
a wnirc tne world,s largest media group,
though it has been forcêd to shrink in
- but it can be argued convincingly ihai they are exceptions, Moguls are
the wake of ríme warner,s di§astrous prevalent in the cultural industries than in most other types of industry, but
merger with AOL in 2000*200.Í,
úrere most companies are govemed by a number of diÍferent shareholders.
' Loew's/Merro'Gordwyn-Mayer * MGM - was ju§Í one subsidiary oÍ
the most çould be argted, therefore, that control is spread over maÍry owners and this
successful film corporatioT^o] th" classic
Hoilywood era. h particular interests from being served. This, though misses the point. It
countress times from the 1g60s to "h;r;"J;;;;;
the 2000s, merging with uA to become not the interests of particular individuals that are at stake but the interests of fhe
MGMiUA in 1991, but was not involved
in the making oÍ films, The librar- class to which they tend to belong - wealthy and powerftrl onmers of capi-
ies and names of MsM and UA
were Oougttily Sony (with cable opêrâtor with strong ties to other powerful and influential institutions and individuals.
Comcast) in2eO4.
This wider argument has been disputed. Many commentators on ownership
r Badio-Keith-Orpheum (RKO) was broken
up by Howard Hughes in í 9S4. and control in general (and not just of the cultural industries) have argued
since the nineteenth century's'managerial revolutiorí, control has been
The Litile Three i:delegated to managers, who represent a diÍferent social class and do not have
r Universal was taken ov3r bf MCA
in the early 1950s (along with paramount,s
guch an interest in maintaining power relations (see Scott ,1995, for a survey of
ÍiÍm library and Decca Records) debates). Companies thus become a mixture of fragmented class inter-
anO nfCÀ-ünirersal prospered in
sion age to become the biggest film the televi- And yet once again the idea that owners and senior executives repre-
studio. Ii was tat<en over by Japanese diÍferent social classes is wide of the mark, Senior managers will often be
consumêr electronics company Matsushita
in 1gg6, by Seagram í,,r f fisi pau.r'r from backgrounds as wealthy and privileged as those oÍ their owners.
Vivendi in 2OOO, remaining witÁ
tnem wtren f.f Aõiougt'rt other assets
atêd with the name Uníversal in 2000.
""j
associ- might represent a di{ferent strâtum of the dominant classes, but, grven
r Columbia struggled in the 1950s
and 1960s and was then acquired by
they, too, are wealthy and privileged, they may well share the interests
Coca- ':and political inclinations of the owners responsible Íor their appointments.
Cola in 1981 and Sony in i 9g8. tt continued
control, but has revived as part of
to struggle under conglomerate ,: We should be in no doubt about the continued exertion of control by own-
the Sony empire in the 2OOOs. 'ers and executives. In a notable article, Graham Murdock drew on debates
. ' united Ailists was acquired by TransaÁericà
corporation, ,murtiserv-
a in the sociology of business enterprises to clarify a distinction between two
ice' organisation involved in insurance
anJrinãn.irr services, in 1967 and types of controi in organisations: 'allocative' and 'operational' (all quotations
merged with MGM in t9B1 (see MGM
above). from Murd ock, 1982: 122) :
Disney was not part oÍ the crassic
' Horywoãd origopory. rt had no distribu-
tion wing, but had its pictures distributei
UV úãro, tater, RKO. When
br?f.n up, Disney set up its own Otsrilution RKO Allocatiae control consists of the 'power to define the overall goals and
Irl
back of its revitarisation as a creative
wing, Buena Vista, On the scope' of the enterprise and to'determine the general way it deploys its
and commerciar force in the 1g.,s, productive resources'. This includes decisions on whether or not and
it grew to become one of the rargest
curturar irá*,rv congromerates in where to expand, the development of financial policy (including share
world. the
issues) and the distribution of profitg but, crucially, it also includes'the
Mainty Gomery (19S6), supptemenred formulation of overall policy and strategy'.
?.o:::.""t
(1997), and later updates Írom
by Guback (1985) and Date
Operational control 'works at a lower level and is confined to decisions
various internet souLes.
rii about the efÍective use of resources already allocated and the imple-
mentation of policies aiready decided upon at the allocative level'.
:ij
4p
ii
d/
 Does this mean, however, that wealthy ancr powerful owners and .senior
íium of capitalism as a whole - principally, whether or not the
advan-
executives of cultural indushy companies ,re àbl" to pursue their the production o{ greater,uTo"T.tt
ies (such as dynamic growth
interests and :t
via the cultural industries? To answer this means cansidering what their
interests are. we can speak of three different types of potentiaiinterest wealth) oÍ economiúystems based on such actions outweigh the disad-
rges (the systematic underpaying of most workers, oligopoly,
for massive
owners and executives. These are interests in tirã success of: Here, of course, questions about business
itv, sociâl fragmentation).7
r hip urra struclure overiap with the questions raised above about the
their own business;
r companies like their own;
of the cultural industries in society. Examination of actual businesses
r more clearly locate agency - that is, who makes things change and how',
business as a whole.
is, however, a third type oÍ potential interest that owners and
rtives might pursue. Other things being equal, all businesses will
The first interest is in maximising the profits, revenues, market
share, share to wânt ãonditions in which businesses as a whole can thrive: politi-
price, and so on of m"ir o*l parficular ãompany (or companies
- many diÍec_ and economic stabilify and lively demand. This means that businesses
tors will serve on the boards of a number of companies;. tn this they think
first íespect, ; for example, make huge donations to political candidates
cornpanies obviously puÍsue their or,rm interests. Áir"i"á for proíit these general business environment goals. They will
maximisa. iltuty to
lioo all businesses will.try to ensuÍe that expenditur" o1-, ,tuir pay anà oth"r "ãhi"r"
se reform and the strúggle Íor greater equality if they perceive that
costs is well below the.level of revenues generated. within
trris'systeoç some developments might threaten their business interests. Here, the ques-
companies will offer higher levels of paland provide better
conditions than oÍ wheiher or not and how they pursue such interests in the generai
others. some industries will a-lso have bãtter working conditions
than others. nditions Íor profitmaking becomes extremeiy controversial. The ability
As we have seen, there are specific conditions rurroridr,g the
business of cur- cUltural industry corporations to give an account of such issues makes
tural productiory whereby workers have been given greaú creative
autonomy role the subject of special debate. Do cultural industry companies pro-
than is the case in other sectors. However, thã systJra of
capitalist accumula- texts that systematically suPport the interests of businesses? Do they
tion depends on exploitaüon. As Miêge (19g9) pointed out, cuitwai indush-y back progróssive reÍorm and try to prevent the forms of social conflict
companies subsidise costs by means of pooh of reservoir labour
and the use It are often necessary to bring it aboui? These questions ale addressed
of casualised cultural work. ôther sfrategies include moving *ork
or"Àurs to Chapter 11 and previewed later in this chapter. Fot now, however, this
countries where levels of pay are much lõwer (as is the case Ior
most animation or;io, of interests will serve to inform a further evaluative question
productions - see Lent,1998).
t I address directly in Chapter 6, when I survey the growth of cultural
The second type of interest that owners and executives
ar.e likely to pur- ustry corporations since the 1980s. The question is this: What are the
sue is t'hai of companies like their own, obviousry, such.o*puri"rio*put"
bf thô growttr in size and power of cultural industry corporations
yltl"tl-qtrer, except when they are invoived in cartel arrangements, usu_ cultural production and wider society?
ally foúiddenby law. Evel withing sysrem of mutual competitiorç
though,
companies will aÍfiliate to form trade bodies, iobbying
gro.rpr u,.,d áiliur,."r.
There is a deeply rooted tendency in advanced .uprtãrõr"
fàr o[gopolies oÍ
largg companies to form in nearíy all industries. ,ih"r" oligopo[ãs'aru ]ORGANISATION, MANAGEMENT AND
pu._
ticulariy effective at forming lobbying groups, campaignúg
against what
CREATIVE AUTONOMY
they see as-obfrusive government t"egüruiron ;d regulaiion ]
fact.intended to protect workers *ã .or,ru*"rs. s"uch corporate
,r,".rci, of it, in FIow did cuitural labour come to be organised and managed during the
robtyir.rg complex professional era? Bill Ryan (1992), {ollowing the culturaf industries
an important feature of cultural policymaking
l:*:." lsee Ct",apters +'ana
5)' oligopolies also come.to embody a set of conventions for approactroutlined in the Introduction and Chapter 1, has provided a useful
understanding way of approaching this question. In the market professional era, the creative
how best to organise business. Non-profit enterprises and smaler
commeÍ- stage of making cútural products used to be carried out primarily by indi-
cial companies, including.those aiming at ioweiprofit margins
a,a innora- viduals, but in ihe era of the complex professional form of cultural produc-
tive working practices, will tend to búxcluded àr margina-lised,
They may tiorç it came to be carried out by a 'proiect team' (Ryuru 1992:124-34)' Within
even come to appear naive.or incompetent because
of thã greater wealih and
prominence of companies in the oligopoly.
That companies pursue the intereãts of ôwners and executives
in these two 7 There are also problems concerning how to imagine and/or bring about alternative
ways seems to me to be undeniable. The controversies surrounding
such a systems, but such probiems need tJbe actively considered, rather than used to imply
system of self-interested production are mainly ones regarding
th"e wider that criticism should not be mounted.

1i\
DI/
 this team,.variorrs people will perform the functions listed berow,
Adapting Ot\nzrs and executioes whohave the power to hire and fue personnei and set
. discussioru I will give examples rrom five'par-
Il:l^:1"1,1{9:q.i frutt
tlcular culturar industries - books, film, magazines, recording and the general direction of company poliry, but who will have a limited roie
television. in tlie conception and development of particular texts, except in rarecases,
: Primar! creafiae personner such as musicians, screenwriters and such as in the film industry where 'executive producers' may be credited.
magazine joumalists and authors_ (symbol creators). This
directors, llnskilled and semi-skilled labour is made up of a vast body oÍ unskilled
includes yh"4 personnel who have come to be rácogniseJ
category also workers who are also involved in the creation, circulaüon and reproduc-
creafive role, such as sound mixers who, as Íecord produãers,
Jtaí;g, üon of products.e So it could likewise be said, therU to include assembly
have become line woikers involved in maintaining the machines that reproduce the
gqeallSif imnortant in the music indushy (see Keaty, :f/g}ftg74)). countless millions of DVDs that are sold each year. Much of this work
t Technical zuorkers are-expected to perform â iechnicaíly
orientateã set of has been poorly paid and is contracted overseas.
tasks eÍficiently, such as sound eirgineers, camera operators,
copy edi_
tors, floor managers, typesetters, pãge designers. Some
of these jãís are notes oÍr this breakdown of Íunctions. First, I say 'functions' because
deemed to be crafts,.as they. requireãpecial"skills ,"a
ing themidentify collectivery with each other in terms of the
*.rt"r,
plif"r*_ are roles as well as occupational groupings - one per§on may perform
w'ork they than one o{ these roles in any project' For example, the same person
do' creativity is invorved here, but not the conception of ideas
that wilr be both a creative manager and responsible for marketing. This is
be the basis of the finished text - or, at reast, tt-,ri i, uo-"tt-,1.,g-rin"
r3ti91al-e for designating some workers as ,technical,
in" esfecially the case in small companies oÍ temporary projects on the margins
tive' (which is more prestigious).
rather tlian,crea_ of a cultural industry. on the other hand, the breakdown also reflects occu-
c Crea-tiae ffianagers actãs brõkers or mediators
.pational groupings âs, in many cases, a pelson will carry out that Íunction (as
between, on the one hand, a publisher, for example) for an entire career.
the interests of owners and executives, who have to be primarily 'second,
inter- these Íunctions are, more often than not, organised hierarchically,
ested in profit (or, at the very least, prestige), ancl those
personnel, who will want to achieve slccess'and/clr
.f á";il;" .in terms of pay and status, in something like the following way: owners and
build their repu-
tation by producing original, innovative andf or accompiisheJ iêxecutives,ireative managers, marketers, then most primary creative per-
Key examples are artists and repertoire (A&R) p"rro*"i in
*oãr. "i.l,sonnel,craft technical workers and semi-skilied and unskilled labour (see
ing industry, commissio.ing eãitors in'the boãks industry,
tne record_ iiT. rtull, 2001: 14). But this hierarchical ordering is by no means fixed. 'Star'
editors of Creative persOnnel and even creative managers can eam more even than fat
magazines, and producers in the film industry. I find
nyán,s .or.r."p, Cat execs. Craft technical workers can earn more than creative personnel,
of the 'creative manager' much crearer than úêge's term ,editer",
à, Í,depending on unionisation.
DiMaggio's'broker' (1972) Íor moÍe or less the same role. To
conÍusiorL 'editeur' is translated as ,producer, in Miêge (11g7).
add to the i,, itrird, tÍris is a heuristic way of dividing up the functions in the cultural
The most ,industries. llowever, the way in which work is conceived in particular indus-
confusing term of a[ is 'culturar intermediaries' (sãe à"río"ãrrutgh,
tries and on particular projects can itself be a product of stafus inequalities. For
2aa6a; 2007: 66-7, Íor an explanation of probrems
in the way this teim example, the very designalion of some staÍf as'technical' and others as 'crea'
has been used and, thgreforà of why I avoid it here).
t tive, is ltself, in *uny caies, dou.n to decisions about whose workreally counts.
Marketing personnel in the curfural induskies aim, along
with creative man- Box 2.3 adapts Ryan's (1992) analysis of the stages in making and circu-
agers, to match the work of primary creative purro*I
to audiences. They lating texts ana the division of labour within each stage- The stages.them-
sometimes create symbors to pubricise and pràrnote
dglt, to
culturar work. Itr;;;
,;;.-
selvei are not unique to the cultural industries - many induslries involve the
t"r-r, classify them sáparately - noi just because their work i; conception of an iàea, its execution and reproduction of an obje,ct, followed
ondary', in that it relies on a separate act of creativity, but
also because tlrey by its circulation - but what happens within each stage, and the r-elations
act in the interesb of owners and executives and
óiten i"io-.oúi.t bãtween the stages, reflects the distinctiveness of the cultural industries'
with creafive personnel Creative managers often mediate
"o*ubetween mar-
one key Íeafure is that the project ieams involved in creation and concep-
keteT and creafive personner - even if r"t is the executives, goar of profit tion aró given a large degree of autonomy. At the time that the cultural
maximisafion that is u_ltimately behind the marketers, action#

I The division of rabour within the advertising and marketing
the categories here, including primary creativã personner
incrustries involves alr
(advertising,creatives,) and
creative managers, but also marketers who wiil try to matcÀ
marr",*[ á ,r.."
right audience. "r"rrrg",
li g SLuro., Zukin quotes a story told by the eminent cultural commentator Daniel Bell
i' about a circus employee whose job it was to Íollow the elephant and clear up after it.
When asked, she said that her iob was in 'the entertainment business' (Zi<n, 1995:
"12). Zukinalso remarks that toàay the same woman might say that she works in the
cultural industries.

J,,$,
 I

indttstries were develophC *1" early-

3 other máusuiás.and mid_twentieth century, such lhe ,rotioo of ereative autonomy is absolutely crucial for an understand-
creative autonomy war rarã in i']
so, one of the definins fea_ tly1gol the cultural industries in the late twentieth c€ntury. It shows that
tures o[ the complex professional uru
or ."tiurrr p-ãr.rlà^ i, ta,r,jÍrrn ,thã
degree of autonomv, which has
o"er., .a.rieJ ã;;. i, ;;;;;àãg ' metaphor of the traditional factory production line - often used in cri-
artists, authors ,ná aornporurs were ;rrl,#n"r" ticues of industrial cultural production - eniirely misses the point (see also
ll, seen as w
orbusinessi*p"'ui*ã'tiu.o*,.'*o,iiu;iiil'iils,,ffi .: Nàgur,
1992:46). Because of the history of attitudes towards symbo-lic-crea-
i;l a"complete autonomy, however,
as it is;";.iJ out under the
,:#x""*ãll tivity discussed in the Introduction, factory-style production is widely felt to
,i oi creative managers. It is not unique supervision be inimical to the kinds of creativity necessary to make profits. Even in the
to tr," .rrtrrur .ãr.uiãr"ríã'i'*u,
not so even in-earlier periods oÍ strict
,"uylorirt Hollywood studio system, which developed at the beginning of the com-
over work, but such
autonomy is of huge significance in "or,trol
cultuíal froduction. .plex'proÍessional era and exerted very tight control over the conception and
.ã*".útion oÍ films compared with the control over these stages in other cul-
tural industries, there was still considerable autonomy for screenwriters and
Box 2.3 .Stages,oÍ cultural production l-d,irectors within certain Íormats and genres.
; .: Crucially, companies in the business of cultural production exert much
rvoÍe: These stages do not necessariry
forow on Írom one another, as in i,-.,,stricter control over the other stages of making texts aÍter the creation stage
popurar image oÍ a factory production the (see Box 2.3) - that is, reproduction and circulation.il The reproduciion stage
rine. rnstead they overrap, interact,
and
sometimês conflict. .'was heavily induskial, often reliant on technically complex electronic sys-
, tems and strictly controlled, especially in terms of when master copies of
Creation r films, books, records and so on were scheduled to be copied and released or

t Conception * design, reaiisation, interpretation; the writing

when a programme was scheduled to be broadcast. Now important elernents
and treâtments, composition of screenplays of circulation have become digitalised. Increasingly, it is possible to down-
and improvisatiãn át songu and so ,: load music and fiims online, or through mobile devices via radio waves- This
on.
' Execution- pedormance in recordÍng
stuaios ano terevision sets, as we,
as ., sfill requires a massive technological ir.tfrastructure, however, and release
on film.
o Transcription on to a r,!,u,
y:lr?:_ invotving ediring (Íitm, books and maga-
r:, schedules are still tight§ controlled by senior management so that they can

zines) and mixing {music, film).io ,,' be co-ordinated with marketing and publicity.
. Reproduction and duntlca,tfn_ in ,:: This combination of loose control of creative input and tighter control
the form oÍ printing, copying CDs of reproduction and circulation constitutes the distinctive organisational
master recording, and making from a t:r
muttipte .optes oia titm-tro* á
is no equivarent in terêvisionJ; or ;g;i* i;;; . form of culfural producÍion during the complex professional era. The Íorm
the oi"s"Àinaíon of digitar Íires. developed in the early twentieth century persisted and became much more
now takes the form that the audience The text
*itf e*periei"". widespread. I have reíerred to this organisational Íorm in the present tense
Circulation throughout the discussion above, but the key issue for the argument oÍ this
book is to what extent have the dynamics of this distinctive organisational
t Marketing - incruding âdvertising
and packaging (each of which has form changed since the late 7970s?
procêsses of conception and its own
reproduction;, Àutãtso aspêcts
p, Iace arongsidê
that might take
concêption or between *'" iãr..riptron
the main text, such as market research. and reproduction of Creativity and commerce rêlations
itrj
rl:i,i o Pubricity - invorving trying to
ensure that other organisations provide Once agairy this question is tied to a moÍe expiicitly evaluative set of ques-
ql ity for the commodity. pubric-
tions. IÍ I am right in focusing attention on the role of the cultwal industries
: ';:';i;li:-tr:,,Xíl,i::#:,:irthebroadcastinsoraterevision prosrarnme) âs systems for the management of symbolic creativify (see Introduction),
then a key issue here will be the relationship between symbol creators and
ilr
rll Source:Adapted from Ryan (i9g2). cultural industry organisations. This focus is not intended to devalue the
tri
lÍi
,l

tl
10 Ryan incrudes this in the reproduction 11 This siage is often referred to as'distributioí (see Garnham's seminal discussion" 1990:
stage, but while these tasks might
taken by skilled, technical prôfessionals, be under_ 161-2), but I prefer 'circulatiorl. 'Distribution' reÍers to getting products to audiences'
*r"! íiliàrr* ue carried out under the super_ ,Circulation. includes this distribution aspect, but also includes the equally problematic
vision of creativu p".ro,-"i, *
tlrt, i, u uiir-ffii oiii" .r"utirru ,tug". .

and important issue of marketing and publicity.

ll
1i
J\
 l

lives of those workers deemed to be 'technicai, workers. As noted above,

of all concemed. Altematively, texts can sink without traee as these
some such workers have considerable creative input, but are designated
'technical' for reasons of status. Nor is it intended to demean and matketers prioritise other projects.
ers who- objectively have no creative input into final proriucts.
tlro.e'wo.t_ ,:':HeI; we encounter a contradiction. Flowever mystifying and corúusing
the polarised view oÍ creativity veÍsus cofiunerce can be, it has
The decision some positive
to put the spotlight on-creativity derivãs from the recognition that symbor joumalists)
ã.ff*ôtr. It allows people who want to work creatively (this includes
creators are crucial to determimng the final outcomes ,rra get from
tnuy have a cen_ ioargue {o. *oró ü*", space and resources than they might otherwise
kai place in fantasies and beliefs about what 'good work' mijni rnvotve in not can
modern capitalism (see Stahl, lheir-commercial paymasters. l4lhether this results in better work or
1006,
for arrp"rü dirr".tation ofi this topic). be judged in particular cases, but the goal of producing workthat is auton-
we saw in the Introduction that tensions iefween comÍnerce and creativity
rs of the demands of profit accumulation helps to produce richer and more
are a fundamentai Íeature of the cuitural industries. The influences
of the roman- communication. This is not to celebrate or romanticise symbol creators
tic movement and modemism have been profound and hetpea
estabrish a wide-
lout simply to grant them due recognition. So, a
number of quesüons concem-
spread üew in the West that symbolic creativity can on§, flourish
if it is as far fulgthe organization and management of cultural production follow from this:
away from coÍrmerce as possible. This view is'embodieâ in prevailing
myths
about great artists. we often think of the greatest symbol
u, ãflrã" uui.rg :: . How have relationships between creativity and commerce changed?
yy.:qT"d, faving little or no commãrcia] .r..u* in"r"uto'r,
their lifetime (such aã 1. r Linked to this, how have the distincfive organisationai features of the
van or being
Ç9eh) !{ven to despair by the superficiality of the coniÀerciar culturai industries in the complex professional era of cultural produc-
world they came to inhabit (Kurt Cobain, ior exampre). This polarisation,].r"u- I tion changed, or stayed the same?
tivify and cofiunerce can conÍuse and mystify our understanding of the
and popular culture. In eyeryfay conveisatián, various texts,
media ' o What changes have there been in the extent to which creative workers
ers,
purfo*_
ffies,
writers and so on are often judged on the basis of assumptiois about
:. within the cultural industries determine how their work will be edited,
o-r not the symbol creators had commercial intentions.
whether :., promoted, circulated? (This is a question about the extent to which crea-
orteru tne arsumption is tive autonomy has been expanded or diminished).
that those creators who reject commercial imperatives most entirety
ar" ti" uest. l
This, though, is an overry porarised view of ihe relationship
rr"r*á* .."ãurity These issues are addressed in Chapter 7,
and commerce. AII creators have to find an audience and, in the
modem world,
no one can do tfus without t].r; help of technol0gicar mediation
and/or the sup-
port of large organisations. Moreóver, we can'iassume that the
input oicrea- THE QUALITY OF CULTURAL WORK
tive managers.(as menfioned earrier, the professionars who mediate
between the
interests of culturat industry companies and those of symbol
tive in terms of textuar outcomes. Take, for example, ír.t* tu"a""Ç
;r,.*) ;;gr- ,Clearly, the distinctive organisational form of the culturai industries has con-
oí ãurur" siderable implications for the conditions under which symbolic creativity is
push.symbol creâtors in the direcüon-of genre for:rnatâng
in order carried out. But how has such creative work been rewarded in the cornplex
to tacrrrtatel"
IT1,9,,".._:
Tarketing and pubricity for a particurar audience. This is"r{t neces- professional era? In order to address this questiory we need to consider the
a b.ad thing in aÍld of itself. can be a productive constraint, alrowrng
;arily .Genre cultural labour market.
for creativity and imagination within a certain sàt oÍ boundaries and enhanced All human beings are symbol creators at least some of the time. Billions oÍ
understanding between audiences and producers; think, for
example_ ài the us sing, dance or write every day (and iÍ you think I canlt write, you should
variefy of ways in which the writers, musicians, aÍrangers and
sound mixer/ hear me play the piano). Professional creativity has been merely the tip of
producers of the Dehoit record label Tamla Motown niade
creafive use of the the iceberg, but, like many iceberg tips, it is the bit that is most visible. As
three minutes available for vinyl singles in the 1960s.
the media came to dominate symbol-making in the twentieth century (see
Yet it remains the case that the rerationship between creativity
and commerce Hesmondhalgh, 2006b), more and more people have aspired to work in the
is a matter of negotiatiory confrict and struggle. However ,"*íai"g
thu, fi"a supposed glamour of the cultural industries. One feature of cultural work in
their w311c nearly all symbor cÍeators seeil at some point to
expãrienáe the the complex professional era is that many more people seem to have wanted
constraints imposed on them in the name of profit accumulatioJ
u, ,t to work professionally in the cultural industries thanhave succeeded in doing
do 'creafive, "rrrut
oppre,ssive and/or disrespectful. Many are forced to
7.nd/ 9r work so. Few make it and surprisingly littte attention has been paid in research to
nfdly experience as cróafive at a[. íÁtrhaís more, the fate of rhe sym- how people do so, and what stops others from getting in.
*r-,.!11
bol creator's work is in the hands of various other workers,
especially creative Nevertheless, some do make it. As with most forms of work, it has tended
managers/ marketers and senior executives, This can function
we[, ár.o*r", to be older, whiter, able-bodied people who have done best and earned most.
as marketing can ensure the widespread dissemination
of creative work, to trre As elsewhere, men generally earn more than women (Tunstall, 2001). What

C,L\
 may be most distinctive to the
curtural industries, however, is parficurar
rype oÍ split berween.waged a ,Ior thos" relativeiy few creative workers who do succeed in having their
u".J *ãrt.,r" ,ir" rsi5:óí0
waged work became th_e nãrm
* "";;;;;. úr"y
period,
* ,rr"
àr,ks released on to the market, and for the cultural industry companies
cutturat indusrries worked "aü".?ài"1rir.iri.àrr,ràr.
d;;;. iâts inctua"a, undertake the circuiation oÍ such works, copyright 1aw is vital, as we
"" see in Chapter 7. Outside the few cultural workers who manage to
r workers tn craft/technicar occupations, igain saiaÍied employment, many have to try to eke a living out of occasional
selves into relaiivety ror"j
who increasingry formed them-
áíJá' í"í"r, ívork, and inÍrequent royalty Payments.
r symbot *eatoÍs in what ír;;;i rá11 oÍ this shouid make it clear, I hope, ihat the emphasis on the relative
(r,i^;l:,14) calts the ,professionalising,
occupafions, such as journutiun
ur",à Lf,uertising; ve autonomy of symbol creators in the complex professional period
t creatiae manager,s, d not be taken to mean that I think modern symbol creators have had
;uho yere :,J-Or"?.:r"nalising to some degree, so,
for example, being,an iwonderful liÍe, idling about in recording studios and on film sets while
eaito. in u fufriàn,"g cornpany
understood to invôlve a partrcutaiuut was incrãasingiy else toils and/or watches the clock. On the contrary, I know that
oiprocedures with a,certain
prestige atached (see Côser
ut a,., tÇSí1. -: ---.-.1 sociar creative workers make very little money. Great sacrifices have to be
to achieve even the limited and provisionai autonomy that is avail-
Many symbol creators, however, ble. The question we need to confront, then, when thinking about the extent
worked on a.casual or contract_by-contract
basis
- in marlv cases nyilq gá, r/";i;;àitiu, i1d change and continuiry in the cultural industries, is to what extent have
we can tum to Bernard J: rro_ previous iobs.
rãí ,-;;#" of rhe rabour ilthe cultural labout market and systems of reward for cultural workers
lare§"
tive persorurel in the complex marler for crea- changed since the late 1970s? This question about the extent of change is,
(1989: BZ-3) argued tr.rt li.or"rrior-,*Jrrà or prü-.ii"". M*g"
.r"rã"ã';;;;ri"r, the "rttrrui 'as will be witnessed throughout the book, tied to an evaluative questiorl
beharf of cuirurãr induSfv costs oÍ conceprion on iwhich is have the rewards and working conditions of creative workers -
companies by bu;;s wiring
to for30 the benefits
of secure working condititns
;ril;;íü;r and indeed, othet workers in the cultural industries - improved during
when they cases, eaming retarivelv litte
d o. Crearive tabour wt
*l i, árr;;;:.];i*" j nn,ug",
íhin ii"^.r., ü, i'this time? Chapter 7 examines some of the evidence regarding these issues.
i:ü:fff,1X#U',: " " p".;;;;;,"i,, *.r,, ;,A á" i;à,I,,*r,i.n
of under-employed"r
biggest reservoir or r"::Y::i's ir s8ã Ç$.' " *"
*ffi ;;;;;;;#,ü,*",,"JI?:i:{J;,,."í.:rf "t"À; :INTE R N ATI ONALISATI ON
activities. Wages ,.u álro r."p,
J.*, ry
f
:ffi :,H[*:Jf }:;: :AND DOMINATION BY THE USA
ness of creative professionars ir.,".;1aa u"rih;;iity urii,,ilr,rg_
i" inaurt.iu, to áansÍer across ;,fnternational movement oí cultural texts ancl cultural workers goes back
"ih;;r'rt;'.ui
urto another field (such ur,o"rnutiri,
*L" *ign, want to pubrish books or rihany centuries. The first global media corporations, however, date from the
pop musicians who may.wirr"r ro .oÀp"r*"nirtr.r.orur;.
: Íiineteenth century, in the form of the British and French imperial news
agen-
The resurt, in the comple"
which mosf crearive *àrt".r
pr;;Ài;í;üu'*l, n*, been a labour market , cies (Reuters and Havas) which 'in the 1870s established a world cartel in
in
of the *eative work they "*ããiffi ffi#;*ployed - ar leasr in rerms fast news by ocean cable' (Tunstall,1994:14). Tunstall also provides other
actually
not be seen as a naturar p',*á"*í*,
*r"tirã" - or underpaid. This shourd examples oÍ internationalisation, including:
cultural condifions. Thesã.condifir"r iitr""ll*r, of specific economic and
to come together
;;ki" the fa,ure of creative workers . cultural forms -the spread oÍ the claily entertainment newspaper from
to defend
exploitation: this is in oart
thei;il.;;;;;;;]ir,rt r.r.i., forms of low pay and the USA, where it was introduced by moguls such as Hearst and
because ry*Uoi..ráiors.are Pulitzer, into Europe and across ihe world;
ing with each other for recognition permanentiy àompet_
exceptions are di-fficult-to-.Àt"r
,ía ,"*rrÀ*1rrfiUg" 19g9: gl).rt-J1_re o cultural technologies - such as the sound film, which spread across the
p*r"rri*"ifr,ilcls, main
such as actors, unions. world in the 1930s;
t cultural industries - inparticular, ihe 'speedy capture of the world movie
market by the young Hollywood' Írom\914 to the 1930s.
12 Elsewhere, Miêge, or
fus trarslator, uses the term ,tan-k,.
,, *iltirg from a mainsrream economics
S:::gg*1, o As Tunstall notes, these waves oÍ internationaiisation in the twentieth cen-
ffi ::n j:'rT*:§,ff;i-"",."';..;'"*;;;:'il,í,"if ff ffi ;i:',ü':?',f j'.",:,11# tury mainly emanated from the USA.
superstars.Miêge,s,".J:rJ;T,'r"g;Tr:';r"Tf Therefore the decades preceding the complex professional era of cultural
ard other Iists righr down
a z, ir'r"i"irg i"""i"
"#:[:"ffi
#iirr,*,
:Lt;ft*[i.i;:
that Caves fairs ro acÍdress.
production had already seen considerable arnounts of international traffic in
cultural goods. This grew in the post-Second World War period. Alongside
f\4
d'
 deveropmentr * rollyrication and transport, it red
oÍ transnational flows.of texts, genr.es, tecúologies to much higher Ievels to measure, but these factors are often crucial' For example, cultural
and capital. Tyfus can be
seery for exampre, in the phenoá"nar
,p.ead oÍ Anglo-Amórican rock o.,ods mak" a signiÍicant conffibution to the diversity oÍ a particular space,
and pop music curture ácross much of music
therarorrd"i. tr," rsãô. u;i rszor, E. it tt',ut of a nat-ion or region. Not having an effective domestic film, televi-
including even the starinist states of n"rt*r, .sion or recording industry is likely, other things being equal, to reduce that
in the usA developed ahead of *rat oimàst Th";"ú;iriorLorr*y
n,r.op".
oiher countries and the usA,s :,,diversity.
system was dominanr internarionally in the ti+ We nãed to move beyond the narrow vision of neo-liberalism and Íocus on
ticurar' most countries drew heaviry
earry years ;ilil#;, In par" :.the social and cultural implications of international movements
oÍ cuitural
sion boom years of
* üs progrrmming during the terevi- especially power and identity. So Chapter 8 asks the following ques-
(very r"* úã aãu.lop.ã'tJ""irr"on'ryr."*, iqoods,
before the late 1950s)',the-1960s
Terevisjon frilr the usA reached their peak in i,ãons. To what exient does the increasingly global reach of the largest firms
the late ,960s and then 'in.the "ór;; iÍean an exclusion of voices ftom cultural markets? what opportunities
ai around us$rbo *it_
lion a year - meaninq-a rear decrine
"^rlil'riió""ràmained
aguiirt influtio"' gr"rüii, róíí,'ru1.ln are there for cultural producers from outside the'core' areas of cultural
film, domination bvihe Usa *r, ã*?*orãr*prurrive. production to gain access to new global networks of cultural production
the USA accountei for over lo p"r."^i In 1925, films from and consumPtion?
Australia, New Zealana and Árgur",;*;;r"d
àif,i* r"u"r,r", in the UK, Canada,
over Z0 per cent in France,
Brazil and scandinavia (]arvie, .,óztzio.ú* ctomination remained robust
throughout_the com plex-prof"rri"n.rt
f"íioJ." DOMINANT TECHNOLOGIES
Nevertheless, as Tunstall (199a:.6-2i
notes, there were other international
cultural flows, The dominant technology at the dawn of the compiex professional era of
roo. These rnctudeg úd:"úd*g no**oi-t.,i.**ir|,i, p"*
ticular regions, often d.odrinat"a uy u r".6ãr,a'media cultural production was print publishing. But new media technologies in
Egypt in the Arab worrd or swede'n irnperiarist,, such as succession supplemented newspapers, periodicals, sheet music and books,
i"-ã3rij,r^ria, arrd Britain reaped the all beginning in Europe ancl North AmericarL and then fanning out to the
|"":fio of empire, even after rtr o*" *"r,iáio
tural flows írorn
decline. There were aiso cul_
rest of the wôrld: cinema from the 1890s, the gramophone and records from
Latin America u"a airür"tt the
industrial countries, especially i" usa and other advanced the 1910s, radio from th e 192As, and television from the 1950s. All these tech-
-rri. r"Jãàrr.", rr,u l gg,s and 1gg0s saw
intensified global culturat traáe ana,iná;;;;;.rr"*ic, nologies can be seen as contributing to a highly asymmetrical set oÍ relations
contact across the erohe - the phenomenon political and cultural between relatively small numbers of producers, on the one hand, and audi-
áigrobarisation. These issues are
discussed in Chaoier g, wheie ences sometimes numbering millions on the other (Thompson, 1995).
,fr"?àli.*_* questions
what extenr hu,u intu.*u;;i.il*",i7iol"'5.ourrr"d are addressed. To The fervent debate that greeted each of these new technologies has been
speak or a new era in currurar p.oao.ú* sufficientry for us to echoed in the introduction of the internet since the mid-1990s. We should
has the UsÀ retained its interriatio*ia"#"r"."1
uiàii;;?ilãü;*il"^il.*"* not forget that earlier technologies, notably radio, were greeted âs po_ten-
We see in Chapter thal.the tia[y dãmocr at:u;ing. But the claims regarding the emancipatory possibili-
SO f"*, hau" err"ompassed
I 1ir,
intensifieation of the internationalirutior.r'oi.,rtturar a further ües of the internet and digitai networks far outstrip those that accompanied
texts' but how should we evaruate industry businesses and ir earlier innovations. Such claims partly depended on utopian hopes Íor the
tt ir irrie.r,utionarisation? The neo-liberal
view is that'free trade' in curtu.rt convergence of telecommunications, computers and media. Chapter 9 pro-
gooã. *ilr'ü beneficial for alr. This
ally based on the neo-ciassical is usu_ vides the longer-term history oÍ digitalisation, convergence and the inter-
oÍ_the theory of comparatiae
l, adaantage' This hords that'every".;";;";;;; net, and Chapters 9 and 10 address questions concerning changes associated
lilr *,i"" À.t;ã otr specialising in goods in
which it has a-comparativ" aaríantage;;il;*g with these developments. one concerns the extent of change. To what extent
others in which it possesses no such-advanru*";irrorr.i;, some of these goods for have digitalisaüon and the internet transformed cultural production and
rl
Econornists aim to show throrài- ffi;
*i""ir a"'*ur,ã*a suppry curves íhat
,ffir,"àrrl. consumption? The other, related, questions are more evaluative, Many pro-
protectionist measures such as-tariffs when ponents of the internet and other digital technologies claim that they are
,"a qo*à, are introduced, then there opening up access to the means of cultural production and circulation in
is a net economic loss f,

tli,
currurarr",,",i,-ffi
nalities'
ül}il,:ilHf#:Iil*':fl
- thar is, .oãtr oí turuÀi; h"t;;ri* iito u..orrt::::J""':atTl1
a-positive, democratising way, and that barriers between production and
consumption are being eroded. Instead of the few-to-many quasi-mediated
parties' (Hoskins et by either of the interaction of the analogue age, some foresee a Ílatter, peer-to-peer, many-
ar,2004:290)
in u" u"ã"à*r. fransaction. In the
economy/ externalities might incrude seneral to-many form of communication emerging in the age of digital networks.
ment and so on' These arJoften
environmenr;i;;;g;; ;"il;r_ Chaptei 9 evaluates such claims. Is access really opening up? Are barriers
sidelineã bf ãconomists because they
are between producers and consumers really breaking down?

^\ú
clJ
 TEXTUAL CHANGE
of magazines available in the USA and Eutope catering for every
ffit
ffilllÍr.;rr
The comprex professionar period
bers of mediaied tex.ts to
saw the circr:lation oí urrprecedented of interest imaginable, from needlework to the mercenary soldier busi-
num_
#lii: i i unpre""d";r",r ;;;bers of peoprà.
This was accom- ness, fro* gay porn to religious affairs. No doubt many of these magazines
panied by grear anxiety urort to their.readers'.lives, butis there real,diversi§
thar emerged from dóates
;;; tr*rà w" canidenrify a number of issues ;add pleasure and interest
lwhen it comes to the expression oí viewpoints about how we might under-
ffifl, t"lr-lã"*âirj"a
thecurturãrindustr;es.n"i"1."ir.,ãã1"*;:jH#,lil.,i::§f,:::f,ij
Hhli r; stand the world? Sim-ilarly, are audiences exposed to a wide range of voices
*",ã_Ji, r" ãi,.,,,,ua, of aÍe we increasingly encouraged to stay tuned only to those channels of
;m:;*ffiLi"jrl,o,"J,,,ái"_i,àr.àÍ,$.,t, r,uu"
êommunication that we have already decided we are interested in? These
r 'questions suggest the very real difficulties involved in providing any objec-
ffi diversity and choice; ttirr"
um"m-"nt of what constitutes diversity in the cultural industries. This
flil,
c quality; -,is a great problem because much writing that is critical of the present for-
flJrr r sociar justice - in particurar whether ,:ination of the cultural industries assumes the assent of readers regarding
r

or not the inierests

and powerfut are ierved ,
of Íhe wearthy
11;;i,
il,ir 1rr.,. q"".úi;;i"r*; il;ãã;:ri, iithese questions. Nevertheless, one question remains on the agenda: to what
Here' ques{ions about the extent ,r extent are the texts produced by the cultural industries
growing mole or
ilü
of change are especially entangred less diverse? I return to this issue in Chapter 1L.
lii'l questions of eaaluation,so with t,
rlr I I shall t *, *f-rã,rit'og",t...
iii'1
Li'i.i ,

Ghoice, diversity, multiplicity QualitY

ii,', The issue of diversifv ha§ Since the industrialisation of culture, and probably long beÍore, it has become
ltil been particurarly important
lit
gopoly, concenrrafion rna in discussions of oii_ ,common to hear claims that the quality of our culture is in decline. In the
Íi[]i .ongtãil;;;#;rrh
i'i ll rio.'ui u.". rvrui,.,u-íàã u"o,.,omi"-,
hr, *sú;;1."*srl;1,:ff*':i**X"t:"r:ã complex proÍessional period, a huge amount of cultural commentary was
fll to oversupprv producrs. in-',rr. devoted to such ideas (see, for example, Bloom, 1987; MacDonald, 1963i see
lil
*iJãüBiit* **r.*, (Horering,s Law _ see
Hotelling' i92g' Liberar-prrrrrtri""ir*Li.ltion âlso Ross, 1989, Íor a brilliant overview of this terrain), The most recent ver-
l,iiil have rried to show úaÍ càncenfrau"" rt ar"s schorars and others sion of this approach has it that the faster, more frenetic way in which we
i"àãr i.iomogenisaüon
rii;
.l air*riü,í"i*i,i_,.o,t uai-.tory.rrfãand standardi_
sation, or ar least reduced read, watch and listen to texts has led to a decline in the quality oÍ our cul-
*r''*J au.."u,-gi,,"..i,r iJ .[*,'i [*tirrp*, tural experiences and the actual texts themselves. According to such views,
iitr
;:l,if :rTJii,flln 1*l J,l'à,y o,r_ the cultural industries can 'get away with' investing less energy, tirne and
ill
l"il"k:*r,"*s,*.;iTilTx1::"'íí:t*"ffi
,:Ti:,,11,fí*íai*r";j::rj; Íesources in high standards because we are too distracted to appreciate qual-
parricular rimes - be belg{cjar ity anyway. Closely related to this is the view that overall quality is declin-
fr r"iir"àrr'r'ry.T, R.*,*a corins
Muroni (1996: 58) put iu 'rist<y and c}risrina ing because of the drive to make a proÍit, As I will show in Chapter 11, such
new]r"âir'*ii"r,
,equire venrure capital and
tll mafker power in order t""í-t.r', arguments are extremely difficult to prove..This is not simply because judge-
p.Járã). er
Ienging, authoritative reporting
fo ""* fãi, *ã*y tothey arso point out, chal-
need. ments oÍ quality are subjective. The real problem is that many of those who
back it up. argue for overall decline in a particular industry offer very little substantial
**if i;:l;A lã'ji::f ;;j+ ;.óil'*'
"f p,oru,,io,,ar eia h a s seen argument (in the form oÍ an explicit reference to aesthetic criteria) to back
a
l up their case. Nevertheless, the question remains an interesting one: has the
i
}sr,,1";i,='..,.ril;:Í:*,,,"x.1'ffi'fl
ucts and nearrv evervone
theãe,Lt;;;;id
in
:f
"?f can ;::g:*:,fjjf
receive more radil and
lil: overall quality oÍ texts declined?

::i""".:üi'á1-:Tillf:l"ou' b"ro'u, Hãi".",i*" p?T:uly speak or a rack or

*,r,''É.i,,:"i;-#;;:*i1q:Tr-,üiiiJyili"Z.:"rr,i;,,;n,ff;S:*H Texts, social justice and the serving oÍ interests
number of voices and
-
saying anything different
;ilihei;iot these voi"e.s ure-a-cüatty
diuTrsity: Here we return to the question raised earlier in the discussion of the interests
from á*', of cultural industry corporations. To what extent do companies serve the
"ii-t"r.iiinrl r, , cruciar point. There are
interests oÍ their owners?

runs through Adorno and t companies promoting their own interests as companies aia texls In one obvi-
'n â;[#l",ument Horkheimer,s analysis of ,[the]
Culture ous sense, culturai industry companies clearly serve their own interests
via texts. Since the market professional period, whatever the rnixture

$I
 of motiva

Íf ,.r::i,Í,;,;fi :ti,:,f; ;T::?

"[jiíf,§i:#:]%:*"ri:i""ff
r,, in ;";'
í/i!,ti,i' I;,,:, ::: :
;r, :
of cutt u rat in dus
t n1 c o m Da h,
o
r |ournalism.
Social fragmentation and market segrnentation.

;T:uj;gi!ií::!í!íj:::;,f{::!,!;::,;"tií:íÍ:ii?;'"?;t;:;
-i"-]' Lorporations
i',The overall.question guiding the discussion in that chapter, then, is do the
result of corporations. t::]lg, and rhe interesrs of themselves and the
"."-.,íi115",of .other ri.;"
r",.u"u"Àãii,;yii,#Í,*"1:?:::::1,:lüü;,;;:'.1,.T"'"i1y:r,*n" wealthy ll1::11:-: :":reasinsly^serve
powerful in sociãty?
rate products t"rj *^ ,]11".'" rs sometimer ri*piv"À".1,;:u^T'"t to rein-
wav in *r,,.r, .,pi,i,íillli,i,tnese corpo-
rr^, , ,"-qqD(Iy 11ode3
is evidenceà i^""rilllffiT,TT: companies r.r,.,^,..,-.'I''' The main
a r im es,
r
ü ;.j ::_:.j,.? lll r.s ac ti vi rí es. ü;;r,l,rTl,If;::: _{", r,
*r,"ru.,"s"iíí";,,".;,.?lillf
My claim in this c'apter has been that the cornprex professional
sented a new era in cultural production, b";#;g
form repre-
t c o mp a.n i c s p, ;T";:19".r,,",*",ii;,;::r,,;rd* cenlu_ry onwards and co,sotictating rrom
Érom the early iwentleth
;f,;;á%b .; lil::ffi:X";,,il,
* i,lili "wttoJh broadcartin g, ná],;i;ll,
ir'i' ii! ,t,trtsts
bu.:::::s:s ,rÍs;rirr),r.:;i,""rrTolirrljiii is right,.then one way of dífferentiã,i"g r""ã;u"i;l ;;;;;#;o;;r'iri*
crass that ozon* t ",:")Ç.*
,_llnT:::".ll*,!"í^"{ía?"ades,via .LI:::T,"J*e1080(soth,,.""ã""i,y
i:":iü"::;;,;:":;#,.ffi ;j:ffi r #íT§:i".#l"rrT,l_:n:";"lf
can be recognised) * ._-u1I the followinj-q""rrior,r.
the p".ioa ,iTJI
,"#.X:$"J:,T.r*t":ii:llffi lH:T;,i,l:;l j:,uti,wh.,* r":i the emergence of a completeli new era of Has
iíf
d v erri sins,,
a
r; ffi ü, oJ i'A u,y, g ;.ãã,';#:r::::f;
1?90
Alternatively, do the changes ."pr^er"nt'rniits
cultural production?
withlnthe
rnessages slstemaÍi^^r-. Jl;' 'rearly so^' r,.ã
" 'qI ciear tf,rt
sional era? These questionúepresent u ,.rir*.iu.t
complex profes-
of the centrar question oÍ
vertisins
Nu meio s i;;1,
ness,
u;J:il|:ipryIt ihe cons
b usiness
. ".,;;; :::-: onowever.
"""_"jl
-vrrrrÍcrIt, iÊ l*}§:llr:ed
Introduction,,",i,
r1.the
"rlrp,",
broader questions into more *r,uguubiu-ones,
has broken down these
but mrr.r rl"^']-I'a'q..selnsh summarised in Tabre 2.L.
rT","'. *". I"r ghi
*^:-I
ber 1l
"*:t^r":began
of changes
1r"',1,
ro take prr." i, if;" "-ptr*
chanse, and how a num-
FilH:Hfi'iHi*;Htrl":,x'nTfta,u#:1i;,"ff
environmenr í,$ onwards. lffi;
";á,n'àffi""í":'il#[:
;i::::rtoration in
ii*:rt..1i;'"jfipl;*Ím[,;*í#i?!fi
',
u,.àr.ug;!
:ril',11",,,'#
of busino* uIe
and discoura.*fff^t-ft 'u'rterests RECOMMENDED AND FURTHER READING
ror,rhe",,*? j'lr,5llf-l*""I",.-".;:l'f, J,'#'Xl;t.'.'"::l#*jillilí
to suppoÍr ,r,uí" There is a huge amount of media
undoubredry t;
ü]ill::' po#"ri,;i::grfTffii ies of periods and moments i"
history, a.d there aÍe many historicar stud-
frãàr.ilor", _ Íar too many
".,tt,r.*
here. I focus here on srudies trrripiã.ã to discuss
Clearly, the textual
pro I"itLrài p.ra*r,* à"ã'ín"""1'ur.r,
industries in svstemaric long-terr;
ú;rü';rspective, as I have tried to
t'Ht*i**T"#:*,:,{{i"#í*".=,*",;:':l'ff ,1:..11
tu: chafter. o' rt:i:.::àã"*
:l"and uittxlzi"'tti'rild rhe approach in Raymond
williams's Curture (1981)
i,l:f *':{i.,'HH parricularly herpfur. Janer wolff's ihe
and Aest,etics and the sociology
ang cnpital ftom culturà
çooz1
socia, production of Art (19g3[ig81])
lart çàsál"are briiriant works of historicar
sociology. Theodor Adorno (êe'In,,oàuctiárir"a
a contemporary Cerman
writer Friedrich Kittrer (opticat Media,

ru* rof headings, --"*i justice and

the serving of
toricai critical rheories relevant to u.r
The emphasis in fason Toynbee's t
cal ambivalence oÍ svrnból making
zatl-[2áozp p*uàã p!ãii"ilà'*'r,,r_
,.,a"rriu"úà
t,kíig prp';t'ar Music(2000)
,
""r.iràip"ãJ".ri.".
on the historí-
f,r, ts"*iã"_aior irúluence on my think-
ing in this book. peier arrrc urjÀ;;
: É'iT:ffi :f;i:ffi :,:?i,;n d cornmerciarism !;ü;r,;'irrirt'íiir'àõ'riiir,i*r,,
(ihird edition ,2009) is fhe best singre-voruÃã.urto.y
rerevant
to the culturar
industries' Michaer Bailey's Narrakng
urài, ii)tnry (2008) co'ects research
that follows Iames Cu*an,,
central to an understanding of"*r*piu
i. ;;üg Í.,iÀtoricat ,rrrã".rtárràrg
the power ;i;;;1, i"rri,r,i"*
Jr;ô;;;.",

s(
isãqg+ɧãêg§
âE rg g F FÉ §;ãê
sE;33 ã 1Àõíá*

*g§*âÊF$§ã§g
r€ â-3 r§'rH sE §ã
ã$ÊEF$âg$i§§

§âTãH$§$ãʧ
§9*üq órã rà É
§i§ §e+ã;â'§ E

§ã*§í§g§lEf
 At the core of the issue, when all the conflicting definitions are put to
one sicle,
grew up alongside print media
i, àigituürution.1 The'old, electuonic media that
to 1950 - photography, phonography (sound recorcl-
irr-rir? p"r'l"a frorn 1850
;*;dr;,,* radio, television - r'eliàd on analogue systems' rather than
""tui'.'ly one example, the main compo-
ãffiA or-r"r..t, analogue broadcasting, to take
nát, of communicatircn and culturaiexpression - words' images' muslc and
transiateà into a continuous body of informa-
Digita!isatlmn and the Internet other: sounds and so o11 - were
tion, raclio vr'aves, that would in son're way reproduce the form or appeaÍance
image, or whatever' Tlre radio waves woulcl then
oi ttre o.ig*al performance,
radio or televisioi receivets (television was broadcast by radio
be decoclãd by
to the original act of
ln otúer words, the taclio \4/aves were analogous
"ã"uti.
cornmunicatiorr-.tlreyresembleclorcorrespondedtoit:,Loudsoundsproduce
media'and digitalisation: beyoncl the hype
'1,'lelor

The digital optimists and their key claims

310
úit tignult Érom a micropho.t" and quiel sourrds produce smali signals" as
A more sophisticated digital optimism? Benkler,
313 à,ãpflL Lax (2008: 105) puts it' kr media such as photography' cinema and
;á;,"",r]uàgy of the image to be captured would be imprinted in negative
Jenkins and Castells 31'7 foln on film aníthen be 'deõded' in the developing process. In phonography,
converted
Criticjsrrrs oí digital optimrsm * anci lltree dilemmas eaa th" rorr.r.1 *uves produced by musical instruments or the voice were
record or on to magnetic
1. Digital cJivides: inequalities in access, skills and activity oáJ into a signal, ,vhichlvas .nded into the grooves oÍ a
tape, to üe decoded at some later point by a record or tape playgr,
2. Control oÍ circulation and concentrations of attention aca 'The stor-
3. Commercialisation, surveiliance and,free labour' vital innovation associated with the developtnent of digital electtonic
age ar"rd transmission was that the major components of cullural expression -
ulords, images, rnusic and so o, - became convertible inti: bi,ary cocle (elaborate

,NEW MEDIA' ,"q"u*", ãf ,".o, ancl ones) that could then be read ancl stored by cornput-
AhID NIGITALISATION: Thi, was vital, because it made conrmunication more transportable and
".r.
rnanipulable than before. Perhaps most irnportantly of all, it also
made different
BEYOND THE HYPE Box 9'i discusses some of the eariy ways in
medià potentially intercomrectáble.
àomputerisation and digitalisation affected the cuitural industries.
Digitalisatic»r and the internet could never be a minol part of any book about which
change and continuity in the cultulal industries. No othLr area of debate about
cultural produchion has seen such rernarkable claims for h.ar-rsÍormation. ,Ihis
makes it all the more important that such claitrs are assessed carefuliy and Box 9.1 Early forms oÍ digitalisation in cultural
r soberly. After all, mary parties have an interest in overstating the
impâct of production
new corunlrlication technologies. For journalists and academics, sensàtional
reports of a transformed future can draw attention from reaclers, editors Digitalisationhadbeguntohaveeffectsonthewaysbusinesseswererunfrom
fundi.g bodies. For companies, the introduction ancl disse,rination of new
and th;1g60s onwards, but this happened principally as a result oÍ the etÍects

technologies could provide new market opportunities. For politicians ancl
poii-
cl,makers, predicling and supporting tr:ansformatio, *uy ápp"u, progressive.
The ten.'new media'illush'ates hou, much confusion thà-hypá abãut t"ch-
,ological tralsformation can cause. The phrase is very often uied to reÍer to
technologies that are really quite old, sucir as the use ói coaxial cable and
sat-
ellite broadcar,fuc l" television. Both of these'new' tecltrologies have been
around since tlre t960s. Technologies such as e-mail, tlúd-genãration rnobile
telephony and internet telephony are sornetimes referred tã as ,new media,.
Bui they are primarily based on perso'r-to-person or person-to-group corrunu-
nication, so can hardly be thought of in any meaningfur way as ire<tià at
all - at
least fur tire sense in which the term is usuairy emploled, to inean,few
to nrany,,
'mass'media communication. 'y* media;is apptâa to pretiy
much a,ything
that happens o* the intemet a.cl the r,veb, lvith càrúusing.o.,r"qr,"r.,."r.'
otmainframeorminicomputers.Peopleinadvancedindustrialcountrieshad
growingcontactwithairlinereservationSystems,electronicdatabasesandso
would
ãn ouring this period. These were systems in which rêmote terminals
belinkedbyphonelinestocêntralmainframecomputers.TheeffectsoÍsuch
gathering' as nêws
systems on the cultural industries were first Íelt in news
agenciessuchasReutersbegantoprovideelectronicfinancialdataandnews
sãrvices to news organisations (§ee Tunstall and Machin, 1999: 80)'
It was only in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, that digitalisation
whole'
siarted to have a more subslantial impact on the cultural industries as a
(Continued)
1 See Lister et al. (2003: 13-35) Í«rr a fuller definition iuvolviug the follorving elements:
di gitality, interactivit)] hvpertextuality, dispersal arrd virtuality'

t
Z
m' (Cantinued)
ownership of personal computers spread in the 1980s thê computer game
TIi ln many cases, the most immediate impact of digitarisation was on technorogies increasingly became a domestic cultural artefact - albeit a very sophisticated,
I of cultural production. with the developrnent of the personal computer profitabie and controversial one. ln the section on digital games (the collective
inlhe
1980s (see chapter 3) this digitarisation oÍ production spread name for whai used to be called video and computer games, plus other games,
i: through ail oi
the major culturar industries, with signiÍicant eífects on the working jractices such as online games) in Chapter 10, I look at how such games developed into
li
of photographers, film animators, radio producers, television a cultural industry in their own right. As we shall see, although it was based on
1, editorsãnd so on.
!i This dissemination oÍ digitar technologies was often accompanied digital technologies, this industry obeyed many of the principles a§sociated with
,l
by claims
that they enabled a democratisation of production, by making the meanl older Íorms of cultural business.
of pro-
duction more accessibre to less powerÍur and weil-resourced institutions,
such
as independents and alternative organisations, and even amateurs,
by reducing
costs and by making it possible to produce on personal computers. ," ' The arrival of the internet and world wide web as technoiogies available
As with later developments, music was in the forefront of such deveropments to significant numbers of people in the 1990s and 2000s obviously intensi-
because oÍ irs low cost ând low'bandwidth'(it takes up less compurer fied the digitalisation of cultural production. It also intensified claims about
spacê than
visual format$. ln the music industries, musicar instruments the benefits that digitalisation might bring. Some of these claims concerned
and, in some cases,
recording studios were increasingry moving over to digitar efficiency. Vttrile digitalisation and the internet represent remarkable human
mêthods in the earry
1 980s, because they had the advantages
of ress interference, more accurate repro- achievements and make certain processes easier and mole convenient, we
duction, and greater manipurabirity. There were intense controversies should not read the development of digital technologies as unambivalent
and debates
over whether or not thêse new technologies made music-making progress towards a more efÍicient communications world. It takes an enor-
less creative and
less collaborative than traditional methods by making possible mous amount of resources and energy for organisations to make computers
it for individuals to
mix sounds themserves, drawing on the sounds stored and/or generated and microprocessors and for consumers to learn software ProgÍams. If such
by com-
puters (Théberge, 1997). As prices fell, digital technologies systems ultimately save time and money, it is only because enotmous and
,r.h u, samplers, se_
quencerc and MlDl (a standard digital inter{ace) were
then ofÍered to thê consumer
oÍten unnoticed amounts of money are spent elsewhere, such as on research
market and markêtêd on the basis of their convenience and quality. and development, and in building up the banks oÍ computers in sehools, col-
These têch-
nologies made it possibre to produce recordings without having leges and workplaces where computer use is still concentrated.
to hire expensive
recording studios. Especiaily in genres that praced ress emphasL
on sound quarity,
In any case, the primary eoncern of this book is not with such issues of
and that in some cases cêr€brated'ro-fi'sound on thê basis
of its emotionar power,
efficiency and proÍit. In line with the discussion in Part One, my concern in
authenticity or accessibirity, the 'bedroom studio' became a rear possibirity. this and the next chapter is with whether or not digitalisation and the inter-
The erec-
tronic dance music boom of the rate 1ggos and earry 'rgg0s, net have brought about a fundamental shiÍt in the cultural industries, both in
for instancejwas partry
Íuelled by {his development. (The drug ecstasy or MDMA
also helped.)
terms of power and in terms of the contribution of cultural production and
ln addition, digitarisation and miniaturisatíon had profound effects consumption to culture, society and democracy.
on pub-
ljshing, and especially magazine publishing, as desktop publishing
software
(software that courd be used to produce and
design documents, magazines
and other pubrications on a personar computer) and other
digitar techÃrogies
THE DIGITAL OPTIMISTS AND THEIR
became cheaper and more widery avairabre from the earry
1gBOs onwards.i KEY CLAIMS
Digitar music technorogies, desktop pubrishing and other
forms of digital
cultural technology had substantiar impacts on existing curturar
industries, but
In order to assess these developments, it is necessary to understand that the
the availability of reratively cheap and compact microprocessors
Írom the rate
internet and web inherited an association of inÍormation technology with indi-
1970s onwards arso began to spawn nêwcurturar forms.
The earriest new form vidual freedom, autonomy ancl decenkalisation (see Flichy, 1999; Streeter,
of any substance was the video game. This was initialy a parr 2011; Tumer, 2006). The academic and counterculturai computing cultures
oÍ the amuse-
ment arcade and pub/bar entertainment business in most
countries, but as that developed the iniemet and web involved many people who were suÍ-
ficiently reflective to want to produce an account of the exciting developments
oÍ which they felt themselves to be a part. Drawing on a longstanding asso-
ciation of knowledge with human emancipatiory they saw the computer as a
2 Tl:': no space to address these deveropments in detail here,
but see the first edition means of liberation. In the 1960s and 1970s, it became increasingly clear that
of this ':book, pp.202-1.2, for a discussion.
computers could soon be combined with telecommunications networks (this

I
<-
7
Hlll

wide web have

guard when assessing claims that the internet and the world
lrJ
is the most basic sense of the term convergmce). For some of those excited by
il
the potential of the computer to enhance human liJe, knowledge and com- -
democratised culture.
up many issues' In
'lil merce/ these emergent digital networks represented new utopian possibilities. Res"urch on digitalisation and the internet has thrown
for an evaluative analysis
From the 1980s onwards, a set oÍ intellectuals associated with these comput- thr; .h;;;t ilo"ris on those with special relevance
in the cujtural industries. At the heart of the issue
ing cultures began to produce accouÍrts of these cultures that rvere extremely ,i"fru"g. and continuity
irúluential in disseminating a utopian notion of digital nefworks as liberating.3 are two"sets of claims, and the second is derived
from the first:
The Íact that this took off in the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, is highly
significant. For it meant that the internet and worid wide web developed at .Digltâlisationandtheinternetallowforsubstantiallygreaterlevels
a time when neo-liberalism and marketisation were sweeping the world and of ?ontrol and/or creativity andf or participation
on the part of non-
affecting prevailing understandings of cultural production and consumption orofessional'users' and/or audiences'
(see Chapters 4 and 5). At the same time, inÍormation sociefy and knowl- . ã;;;;;-"i it,ir, tt",. power of industrial, professional and institution-
edge economy discourse helped drive the growth of the cultural industries. alisedculturalproductioniseroding,andamoredemocraticandvig-
over the
orous system of communication haã either arrived, or iust
Proponents of inÍormation society views welcomed these new developments is
wholeheartedly. Governments and businesses embraced the idea that the horizon,
internet would combine prosperity with participation, business savr.y with
bottom-up control. ManyotherclaimshavebeenmadeconcerningtheeffectsoÍdigitalisation
the idea that the bound-
This meant that the internet and world wide web were framed as democ- and the internet on the cultural industries, sucÀ ar
ratising, Iife-erúancing forces in culture and communicatiorL but at a time ary between producers and consurners is breaking 1:*":,T-1^111'^1T1t:^1r
when neoJiberalism, marketisation and commodification inhibited the reali- mádiu content' aÍe no\4/ integral to culturalproducuon'
sation of their emancipatory potential. We should not underestimate the com- ^r'td'uier-generated
But I think that for now these claims are best mãated as subordinate to the
plexity of this contradiction. Previous chapters in this book have outlined the two key claims listed above.
ambivalences surrounding the further conrmodification of culture that has rh"s,efundamentalclaimsaretheproductofapotentmixofthe^informa-
taken place over the iast few decades. Without doubt, markets under capital- ti;;;;iy and knowledgu discourse oÍ th" tgoos and [970s' and
ism tend to combine forces involving competition and co-operatioru centrali- ,ri"*, of úormation
".oto*y
techiology as empowering and liberating' As the-com'
by long-distance telephony
$ation and decentralisation (Fuchs, 2008). Over time, many technologies, from municative possibilities oÍ coriiuters coilne-cted
carpentry to medical testing, become cheaper and more available for greater late 1980s and ôarly L990s' a new wave oÍ
became increasingly apparent in the
numbers of people, But at the same tirne, there are also powerfui tendencies teganlo write oÍ a new eÍa of media' based on interactivity
i".hrro-propt
in capitalism and in capitalist markets towards inequality. In general, tirere "ts extremely widely-read and influential commenta-
,átf*, tÀ#passivit!. One
is a tendency for structural inequalities of class, gender, ethnicify and so on ,ãi-r.," i,.,'rssS út,tt,. monolithic u*pirur 1995: 58)' This dissolving
oÍ mass media are
claim was
to be exacerbated unless resolute political and governmental action is taken lnto un array of cottage industries' (Negroponte' and
to counter them. Even thery this may pÍove fruitless in the face of powerful ãilõ'1" tfr" mãat. of the greatesl wave of media consolidation
business interests. In cultural markets more specifically, as I stressed in part in history, but tháuthor was widelv hailed as a digital sage,
"H.h
.o'r1gto*uátion
thut predicted changeq
One of this book, certain recurring Íeatures of the cultural industries will give
;;ôhecies, ofteí based on the assumptior,to {udge crucial political
rise to concentrations of power, based particularly on the central importance were already happeninf uitorvua many writãrs
of circulation (the process of getting cultural products to audiences) and the
d;i";. F;."iá*pt"line vitai issue of how to regulãte the media and
cultural indusúies tor ih" good of culture, society Ãd
drive to capture human creativity for the needs of commerce. du*ot'ucy rarely
So, because utopian understandings of the internet and web are buried forces.of
arose Íor the digital 'Í."t1.':
tion and the personal.o-p,it". would take care of everythingf:"rt:fffi:
deep in the cuiture, and are often reproduced unconsciously by journal- "1iir-.'pt,Àitts:the,decentraiising
the u>rr t
ists, academics, enkepreneurs, enthusiasts, and millions of ordinary users iOil, e*021. Here the inliuence of neo-liberalism' which in
influenced by these prevailing discourses, we need to be especially on our besun to pervade ribJ;ffi;;'át' ã"Jln" r''1ql]I i:i9i:1':'"T"t:'J;;
digital ultra-optimi* *uã orten based
ffíXã#,fiffi"ã|ir;'duali-sms r'on'

exrraordinarily simplistic ,Íla im tã"ti";t;;;" *n"|t

-
3 Examples include the work of Howard Rheingold (1992), Nicholas Negroponte (1995),
and Wired magazine. The values shaping the development and understanding oÍ the
intemet have been superbly analysed and critiqued in historically-informed accounts
overly simplfr
by Vincent Mosco (2004), Fred Turner (2006) and Thomas Streeter (2011). 4 Distinctions can be helpful and are often vital. c{ualisms can

g
 There has been a notable tendency, for example, to draw
a strong line
between'old media' and,new *udiu,, portrayàg the former u,
passivity, and the latter as based on (inter)aciivit*y. Negroponte,s
bur"a o.
work is
Box 9.2 Web 2.0
a classic and influential case. Later insta.ces abóund:"Axe1 ln the now-famous words oÍ a figure closely associatêd with the ierm:
nruns 1zo0a:
13-1!)-, Íor example, divides the history of culture into 'the
maúr1* age,
and 'the iaformation age,. In the lattei, access to the means Web 2.0 is thê network as platform, spanning all connected devices; Web
oi frJr"i'g
and distributing inÍormation is 'widely available,, arrd co,som"'r, 2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages
lu"o-u
cultural producers and distributors,.bypassing,traditional, orguiirutlo* of that platform: delivering software as a continually updated service that
via peer-to-peer and'many to many, (iâther ttan,one to Àffi-.ã*_o_ gets better the morê people use it, consuming and remixing data from
nication systems, leading to a new ior* o, modei known u, .p/oá,r*g",, multiple sourcesr including individual users, while providing their own data
u
mixture of production and use. and services in a form that allows remixing by others, creating network
Realising that such craims are rooted in older discourses etfects through an 'architecture oÍ participation', and going beyond the
- herps to show
that analysts may we, be projecting a set of desires a,a page metaphor of Web 1 .0 to deliver rich user experiences (O'Reilly, 2005).
areamsã á tecn-
nologies, rather than anaryiing wnit is actually happening.
rr.,"r" ap
courses, like the more recent vérsions, blur the rorr-,i*iu,
E.t*u"n "ià".
prÇr.,".y The concept was developed as an attempt to describe the evolving world
and anaiysis. To take one example, Alvin Toffler, u ro.*"r p*"ãri", wide web in the early 2000s. lt was applied to open-source soÍtware such as
i,,ino ir-,
the 1970s and 1980s was one of the most influentiar u"a Linux, but was more usually exemplified by phenomena such as blogging, the
íia"ry .àa *"-
lysts of corpoÍate and culturaj.clrnge in the English language video file-sharing site YouTube, and the online encyclopedia Wikipedia. For
írrrrryy"u^
th: (Toffler, 1e80). TÉe idea #as St itt"sív ,i.i_ advocales of the term, Web 2.0 had many attractions: it'manages a freeing of data . . '
i^C-".:"T:g l:nn'prosumer/
rar ro some of the more recent rhetoric: production and
consump[rán had permits the building of virtual applications .. . is about §haring code, conlênt, ideas ' . .
been separated in the era of mass produciiory but is about communication and hcilitating community '.. is built upon trusf (Milleç
-economy, with u tr*riuorito *,,"*
irúormation-based,'post-Fordist, Lusinesses would bring about 2005). lt challenged'outdated attitudês towards the rights oÍ the user, customer
the increasing integration of consumers i.to thu p.*.r,
.i
order to achieve customisation and individualisation. There frãã"â_"
ir., choice and empowerment'(Miller, 2005).Web 2.0 quickly became a maÍketing buz-
uré **v echoes zword with many companies, and the hype soon spread to certain academics. Ritzer
of this kind of craim abour the erosion of boundarie,
úil;;Jà",io',
and consumption in recent discussions of digitar cornmunicatioi
and Jurgenson (2010), for example, argue that Web 2'0 Íacilitates a much more
tecÀoto- intensified version of Toffler's'prosumption' (see above), one which generally em'
gies. Concepts such as'user-generated conteit,,,.o_".urtiorr7;;' powers consumerc and is characterised by the end oÍ scarcity and an economy oÍ
abounded in the 2000s. web-z.o conünues to be taken d;:r**, abundance. As we shall see, there are reasons to be sceptical about the degree to
seriously ur'ur-, id"u
(g9e Bo1 9.2). But it remains impossible to conceive coherentry át which technologies lumped together under the heading 'Web 2.0' can be univercally
life without a distinctioa betweôn production r"a.or,rrÃ!ir,í" ".orro*i. seen as empowering - and this includes the realm oÍ cultural production.
two should obviously be seen u, irtur.or-ucted, overlapii.g
irr."gi *r,"
the relations between them can change over time.
áir."iü r"a
Capitalism generates, and dependã upon, waves oÍ technorogical
. innova-
tion. so inevitabry we see innovations ihut uilo*
claims of trásrormation
ro De repackaged every so often, especially in fierds
such as information
A more sophisticated digÍtal optimism?
technology where innovations have'been dnked to
rhetorics of riberation. Benkler, Jenkins and Castells
The arrival of the internet as a consumer technology
in the 1990s was There has undoubtedly been a real shiÍt towards a greater deg-ree of inter-
F'"lu^q !y a parricularly
late 1990s dot.com
striking surge in such rhetoiú. rii","rp"ái""r tn" activity in inÍormation technology and there are significant emancipatory
boom - whiãfr, *ãe so many other booms, turneí out potentials in these technologies. Coleman and Bluml$ (2009: Chapter 5), for
to be a bubble. This one sprcracularly popp"a as
the ceni,riy Ãàãa. e, ãxample, discuss a number of ways in which the internet provides 'particular
the IT sector recovered in the. financ iât) pi operty
/ tecrnorogy /marketing
rhe gurus ctaimed tha't r;hnotogical devãíát;;;*r,
opportunities for citizens to interactbeyond, around and across insütutionally-
3:l:llT 1000s, cóntrotted communication channels', examples of what they call 'e-democracy
"L.:i.,]r,"q*l: dreams of the inÍormation so-ciety techno^prophets.
31,1,.1
-u1."1 ror exampte, the 2000s claim that ,\Neb
Írom below' (p.117). These include ihe BBCs iCan e-democary projecü net-
2.0, would achievt dàmoc_ mums, a grassroots information network; and the use of the internet to build
ratisation where the ancient and rusty ord versions
of the 1990s web had the Stop the War coalition in the UK. The techno-prophetic rhetoric is not
failed (see Box 9.2).
completely empfy. This suggests that, for our speciÍic task here, which is to

\
:iil
assess the impacts of digitalisation and the internet on the cultural industries
i the lines betlt een diÍferent forms of media and communication were blurring,
(rather than coleman and Blumler's aim of examining its effects on
demo_
cratic participation), we need to 1ook at the more sopÉisticated and careful
versions of digital optimism.
A now classic version of the optimistic view that digital technologies
were
transforming culture and communication for the betLr is yochai Eenkler,s
boakTheWealth of Netzaorks, published .*2A06. [r Benkler,s words,
A series oí changes in- the technologies, economic organization,
and social practices of production ... has created neõ opportu_
nities for how we make and exchange irúormation, knowiedge,
and culture, . . . [N]ewty emerging practices have seen reha;k_
-software
abie success in areas as diverse ai deveroprnent and
investigative reporting, avant-garde video and àultiplayer
online games. Together, they hint at the emergence of à nlw
information environment, one in which individlrars are free to
take a more active role than was possible in the industrial inÍor-
mafion economy of the twentieth century. (Benkler, 2006: Z)
Benkler delineates the emancipatory possibirities of this new autonomy
for
individuals:
This new freedom holds great practical promise: as a dimension
of individual freedom; as a plãfform foi better democratic par_
ticipation; medium to foster a more criticar and self-reflecive
as a
culture; and, in an_ increasingly inÍormation_dependent gloúai
econolny/ as a mechanism to achieve improvements in h-uman
development everywhere (Benkler, 2006: i),
Benkler offers a serious and scholarry anaiysis of the possibility
that we are
moving to a new 'irúormation network economy' *á n. is cráar
that there
are serious impediments to the emancipatory pãssibilities
of such a transi-
tion. However, these impediments *ririy.o*irt in business interests
hying
to hold on to their privileges by reshicting flows of information
through intellectual propeÍty. From Benklãr's perspective, urtimatery
anJ."r*."
we can
all be winners in the new era of what he caris ir,e networled publiJsptrere,,
iÍ businesses and govemments realise that the new networked informatiorí
economy needs to be based on free flows oÍ information and
a greater role Íor
'nonp-roprietary production,. But advanced versions oÍ
the politicàl ;.;;;*y
of culture §,uggest that conrradictions may be too deepry ,àot"Jl"
forms oÍ cultural production for such winlwin scenarios io be "ãpitàrr"
truty ,"uilràut".
Another relatively sophisticated but probremaüc version of digith
. optimism
vis-à-vis communicarion has been pràvided by Henry
lenkini i" tii, ioot
convergence cwlture (2006).-we saw in Chapter 4 that'cánverge*u;Lá*"
part oÍ poliry discourse in the 1980s and 199ôs. At íts heart wu,
íh" r,oüor, thut
so that wires, cables and airwaves might carry many diÍferent kinds of mes-
sages, and cultural forms (such as televisiorL radio or the written word) might
be conveyed in many different physical ways (Pool, 1983). Some were pessi-
misüc about such convergence and envisaged that this process would allow a
consolidation of corporate power. Jenkins is a fervent optimist and emphasises
the way that such convergence enables participation and collaboration.
There is something very compelling about the way in which Jenkins mar-
vels at peopie's abiliües to share knowledge in playful and mischievous ways.
He provides enlightening and entertaining case studies of the ways in which
audiences use digital technoiogies - for example, the charmingDaily Prophet, a
web-based, imagrnary school newspaper for Hogwarts.s He is also concerned
with the creative experiences that people might have of media and this makes
his book much richer than the dreary doom-mongering of some radical crifics.
Whaís more, ]enkins is quite careful to acknowledge some of the poten-
iial limitations oÍ his position. There is the sense of a dialogue with scepti-
cal opponents. The problem is that he does not really address the potential
objections and limitations he raises. He frequently refers to the entrenched
power of media corporations (p. 11) - but throughout his book he sirongly
implies that such power is seriously challenged by new developments. He
acknowiedges that small numbers of rather privileged peopie are involved
in the activities he describes (p.X) - but in a move typical of digital optimists
he claims that the early adapters provide the best guide to how media will be
kansformed in the future.6 He says that he is not trying to predict the future
(p. 257) - but his book is full oÍ predictions. He recognises that participation
and collaboration can be'bad news' as well as creative {p.17) - but then pro-
vides case studies that are overwhelmingly positive. The following passage
nicely encapsulates some of the evasiveness in Jenkins' accountl
IÍ old consumers were assumed to be passive, the new consum-
ers are active. If old consumers were predictable and stayed
where you told them to stay, then new consumers are migra-
tory, showing a declining loyalty to networks or media. If old
consumers were isolated individuals, the new consumers are
more socially connected, If the work of media consumers was
once silent and invisible, the new consumers are now noisy and
public. (2006: 18-19)
In case you're one of the three people in the world who have never heard of ii, Hog-
warts is úe school in the Harry Potterbooks and films.
The fact that many early ac{opters are young is a sigllificalrt context for such claims. The
bizarre idea that young people will canJ, on behaving in the same way as they grow
older is a coúunon assumption in studies o{ the media; see for example some of the
claims in the 'digital natives' clebates (see Benneti et al 2007). It's not unusual to hear
ideas such as'TV is dying - my students don't watch it'.
6
-/

The conditional ifs here allow ]enkins to distance himself

from these claims, selfhood: how these forms of communication might, for example, both draw
as though he himself may or may not be making them.
But ne ;s-mar.ing on and in turn feed a Írervy of narcissistic self-realisation (Hearrç 2008). Self-
them, really: the old co-nsumers aie porrrayed as
iassive, or.al""l, isolated generation and self-selection seem to be equated with freedom.
and silent, and users of the new technologies aru
active, rebellious/ corununar and"o.,.ru.g"r,t
u,
admúbly noisy. À[;errkirrsi" ""pruá"rrtua
case stud-
ies emphasise creativity and control on the pari
Ultimately, his analysis.stronglyimplies that the uses
of audiences and users. CRITICISMS OF DIGITAL OPTIMISM . AND
of new 1*ul,ty aigtut;
communication technologies enhance human liÍe,
without posiúing the THREE DILEMMAS
discussion within an adequate account of human
needs, of which communi-
cation is only one. A number of writers have challenged such opümistic accounts of digitalisa-
A thiÍd and final verlign of sophisticated digital optimism tion, and the impact of the internet and web (along with mobile communica-
is provided by tion technologies), and the central claims associated with them from a wide
Manuel Castelis' rn 1996 casteils published Jr"*rrkublu
t"il"'gy of books range of perspectives. Here I Íocus on three major sets of criticism that are
that carefully delineated importaát ways in which economi"s"âná
,oci"- most closely related to the primary Íocus of this book on questions of cultural
ties were evolving. I drew on his valuabie account
in part one of this book. production:
However, Castells - based at the time at university
of CaliÍornia Berkeley,
withi, a short drive of silicon va[ey, wor]d cenhó
of post-countercurtural
digital optimism - overstaterd the dlgÍee to which the industrial 1 Critics have claimed that the ability o{ greater levels of participation and
aee had interactivity to contribute beneficially to culture, democracy and society
given way to the 'information age'. Hi's anarysis of
the meJã íur'..iii.ir"a are limited by unequal access to the intemet and web. Some have said
for.overstating
the degree to wúch the supposedly riberating .upu.iirn.
or that we need to consider different types of inequality that might hinder
digital nefworks had already been reariseáL the'media,
th?y* Iittle engagement wíth the continuing importance oftn"purii.uiu., nu
television and
the beneficial aspects of the internet and web, besides access/ such as
rad,o broadcasting. perhaps in response to somà the very diÍferent levels of skill that people might have. Access to the
of the criticisms of that internet has undoubtedly grown, and this has allowed some internet
earlier worÇ castelis has more recently offered an
account of the network optimists to ciaim that such problems are outdated, or that they will
society that places networks of communication at
the very centre of analysis be soon. (Other internet optimists seem not to believe that questions of
and also provides a very detailed anarysis of the contemporary
communica- unequal access matter, but I won't address that position here.)
tions environment. In the network society, this consists
oÍ both the ,mass 2 Rather than the democratisation, interactivity and decentralisation
media' and a new set of interactive, horizántar networks
... buirt around the claimed by digital utopians, critics have argued that there âre new
Internet and wireless communication' (200g: 4). These
*utu po"riúi" *t ut dynamics of centralisation of poweÍ associated with the internet,
castells calls 'mass self-communication'. It is_mass communicatiorL
Castells, because it can potentially reach a global
says alongside the continuing existence of concentrations of poweÍ in 'old
audience. rr",u oJJu*á*pru media'which the intemet has not actually done much to shiÍt.
he gives is posting a viáeo on youTube. Büt onry
a tiny fractionàivá"i"r" 3 Critics believe that the internet has spawned an intensiÍication of
postings anything-remotely approaching a gloLar audience. It
lchievg is serÊ commercialism in the sphere of culture and communication, partiy
communication because'the productiôn of the mess-age
is self-generated, the because, in their view, it has been slow to develop a set of conventions
d.efinition of the potential recãiver(s) is serf-directea
áa tne ruLieval of ,pu- for the separation of the realms of information and knowledge from
cific messages or content is self-seiected' (200g: s5).
An this,
in a formulation that somewhat echoes ilenkrer,'decisivery Castelrs states, commerce, and partly because the interactive properties of digital net-
r.,.."ãrur',tnu works enable an unprecedented degree of informaüon to be capfured
autonomy of communicating subjects vis-à-vis communicatián
corporations, about users, which opens up new forms of commerce, which in turn
as the users become senderã aná receivers
of messages, fp. +1. gãÀààain, raise questions about power and surveillance. Some critics say that the
then, there is a rigid division into an old media
burua õn purriuity, oUuái?rr.u participation and interacüvity in web-based activities (such as open-
u"d:::::"qations of power, and new, emancipatory digital
possibilities based on new possibilities of controt.
.o*mr.ri.ufio, source software, blogging, putting clips on YouTube, and even post-
nut rítrile cu"t"iirãog- ing messages on social networking sites) in reality constitute a form of
nises that some forms of 'Je1f-generated production'
are prout"muti. - r," unpaid labour. This is linked to the point about surveillance, in that
uses the term'electronic autisri' to descrite
brogging ut or.," poiri ti. oal - such activity often generates value Íor businesses, because information
remarkably unw,ling to consider how such individualisfic
f3 lems
or communication
forrns about users'preferences and activities can be easily stored and sold on
might be constrained by problematic forms of moJ"r.,
to other parties.

G
§#i These criticisms sive
ffifl irr;;.;
the, interner's :':"^t^"-:y*.sets of questions or issues concerning
fril'
*"h;il;,"ãii,.H,T.T{:Xll!ü;i#?,:*HLH*ã,,,A;*:
.6*;;:J;:l11LITl,,h" (Continued)
!iti! esses idenrified by crirics
:l mrsht valiãif r
. Compuier software - microprocessors, operating systems,
;iHI";:f "ãrs,ái;[pr*':;;k*sil;J,:iiL:11"Jilfr ât*"i",[T1
,i,
i:l:' . Service providers - connecting the above to consumêrs,
.:t.
rl
h
.. 'hg following chapter, I then go on to examine the eÍfects o Portals, search engines and principal sites - providing the gateways to the
rlon and the internet on four r"purãtu of digitarisa_ content oÍ lhe world wide web for internêt users.
ii inaus-t ilr, *uri., tuiãulr;;,
pers and book pubrishing. ,it"*"p"_
t; The ii""r r".u* àiihrt,.hupt",
il,i games as a cultural indushy Lessig (2001) sees these elemênts in terms of three layers:hardware, soÍtware,
JI
founded o" áigiãi ,""hrrologies.
"*r*i.,"rãigitut
(
,Jí
and content.
u.

t: Because oÍ this variety oÍ uses and elements, it's not really possible to talk
oÍ an'internet industry', rather a set of industries, which are integrally related to
I Box 9.3 The internet: difÍerent uses, othêr induslries (information technology and telecommunications - see Noam,
li varied elements
ii we need to differentiate the wals 2009, and the discussion in the lntroduction to the present volume). We can see
in which the internet has
can be seen as all of the following " "" " come to be usêd. rt a wide range oÍ diíferent companies, with specialisms at diÍÍerênt levels, and in
r ianO ,oày, different uses.
e A means by which commercial
transaction§ take prace;
Each of thêse elements also represents a different level at which siate
extension of private networked in this respect it is an and market control may or may not be exerted, providing new challenges
r A medium for individual,ana "o*pr,"r. "Vri"rn.. for policy. lt is with the Íinal level, namely content and access to it, that we
and eocrar networking "Ààrr_gãü""ãm*rnt"ation, especially via
e-mair are most concerned here, given our interests in the relations between cul-
grown' we have arguabry
í"'i""Jsocial networking sites ture and industry, creativity and commerce - but the hardware and software
seen",rr".
the rise or a-new kínd oÍ
have
which caste,s (zooa) pràbrematicarry communication levels or layers cannot be ignored, As Matthew Hindman (2009) points out,
- -mass
J;i:Ji:Tly,i,::il"r,
cárrl',i..? selí'communication'(see
r'vvtett rquvqrry Çalls
page 320). ' all these elements work together in an integrated whole, and so while some
o A means for storing and finding may have features of considerable opennêss, the system is only as open as
inÍormation; in this respect,
capacities of newspapers, it extends the its widest point. For Hindman, the'link structure'of the internet is particularly
networked electionic databases, libraries, and
evên museums, to archive.and significant in shaping its democratising possibilities. Hyperlinks, Íundamental
Aisseminate t<no*f"Og"
o A means for providinq and
experiencirs à;rüir*ent (tike to the web, creatê'another, higher layer oí lnternet architecture, what we
sion, but,always on,, ãnU radio or teievi_ might call the search layer, which encompasses the various means by which
like print, but always there).
users Íind and sort online content' (Hindman, 2009: 40). The implications of
It ís the extraordinary ,"rl"ll_:j-?rrroses this are explored in the discussion of control of circulation and concentration
that they can be put to
the internet and web so important rhat makes of internet attention, below.
and yet ro à#L,irt to comprehend.
aspêct§ impinge on the curturar All these
inor.tri"r ,r o"iiião in *,i,
and rhê,mass setf-communicarion, book. The rast two
are especia,y significant. yet
_rJ,"il;;;;;t nerworking technolosies
in assessinu ;J* ;fü,,*ry
these functions to be the internet aiÍows
FerÍormed, riti'pi"inr"rn", curtural industries.
we also need to differêntiate "o*pur"ã 1. Digital divides: inequalities in access,
bêtween ,r," o,ffárã,n áements involved
bling all these different usês
and purposes:
in ena- skills and activity
First, the question of the degree to which the emancipatory potential of the
' computer hardware
- pc microprocessor§
and routers internet in relation to cultural production and consumption is limited by
telephone systems and rhe,nr"Io"rlr;ãiür*' - and infrastructure;
information.i uqv^uuiles oÍ wres Ii
and connections that cârry inequalities in access. A term that has been widely used in policy circles
to describe such inequalities is 'the digital divide'. Some conservatives
claim that there is no problem and those not connected to the internet
generally don't want to be. This is to ignore the centrality of commu-
, for an i[uminating anarysis nication and knowledge to democracy. As Graham Murdock and Peter
i1;31"1_1t;-
inrormarion ç0i.1) oÍ h
is actuarry ca*ied,r_.,il;T;;**,;,;.J, l,T?i.i1,fi.r,?:?"i::"#:: Golding (2004:245) put it, in the era of the internet,'to be disconnected is
to be disenfranchised'.

+
ffit;
There has been massive inequaliÇ in access to the internet.
flfl
Of course the 'computer addict' during long periods of absence on the part of her mother,
most striking inequality is between advanced industrial countries
and ,devel- a lone parent. This did not lead to the development of skills that substan-
til oping' countries (see beiow). But there are also massive inequalities
within tially helped Rebecca in her liÍe. Instead, disillusioned with school, she used
the'developed' countries ihemselves. At the rreight oÍ the Íirs't rouná
rili
ital utopian hype, Raphaer (2001: 203) quoted fifures rh"*i"gi;;i"iuuur,
of dig_ her time on the computer to communicate with Íriends - a potentially valu-
l internet connection for brack and Latino househáds in the usÃ
or abie activity in itself of course - and to avoid reading required books by
. in igss_zooo 'relying on the book notes readily available online' (Press and Williams,
ll
i were, in each case, about 1g per cent less than for ,all homes,
and this gap 201,0:174).
had widened, not diminished, over the previous fwo years (these
Such inequalities in motivation and skill have significant repercus-
ir'
statistics
il,
were drawn from the usA's National reiecommunications and
InÍormation sions for the claims made by digital optimists, that digitalisation and the
Administration data).
Proponents of cultural (and digital) markets claimed in internet allow for substantially greater levels of control andfor creativ'
response that, ity and/ or participation on the part oÍ non-professional 'users'. Hargittai
as technology spread and markets=grew, costs
wourd dowrç encour- and Walejko (2008) conducted research on the extent to which young
aging even those with the lowest incomes to gain access"ome
to the technol_
ogy' Access to the internet has indeed broadeãed, but huge adults create video, music, writing and artistic photography, and share
r*q"utiti"t their creations on-line. Their findings suggest that far Íewer people are
in access by class remained. For example, between tgss aÃd 200á,
home engaging in the distribution of content than the'here comes everybody'
access to the internet increased in the bK from 10 per
cent of all house- rhetoric of the digital optimists suggests. What's more, education and
holds to 46 per cent. yet among the wealthiest 10 pei cent, g5
access,.butamong the poorest 1b per cent, the figure wastípui.."t
per cent had gender continue to play a key role in shaping who is involved in such
of National statistics data, repoited by Golding and Muráock, 1àffi.u 'participatory culture' :
200'5: zg).
Furthermore, as Golding and MurdocÉ point oüt, these figures
strouta Ue Consistent with existing literature, creative activity is related to
read in the context of continuing increasing wearth und inãome
inequality a person's socioeconomic status as measured by parental school-
generally in the 2000s.
As home i,ternet access has spread, at reast in some ing. T1"re novel act of sharing online, however, is considerably
countries, research different by gender with men much more likely to engage in it,
has increasingly drawn to the importance of skills as a persisting
feature of digital ?l*rl?i (2008: 239)
lnStualig Digirar rechnoiogies have a t""J"".'y ã f* i.
a constant state of flux and so distinctions arã maintained,
as skiíled users There is of course a further digitat divide beyond that existing within individ-
move on to new uses. There is a great deal of difference between,
on the one . ual countries: an international divide between industrialised and so-called
hand, using broadband to accesi in-formation, post messages
and creating developing countries. HaÍez (2007:106-9) summarises a series of reports that
blogs, and, on the other, checking an email account and
a weather web_ suggest the international digital divide at the begiruring oÍ the twenty-first
site every Í9w days. Many computers with internet access
are bought (or century was not only deeply entrenched, but was also becoming worse. More
even provided by policymakers in an effort to narrow
the digital divide), recent statistics suggest that the situation is not improving' Table 9.1 demon-
lu, r::l need-to be replaced.as systems move on, Also, ownãrs *uf U.t
the skilis, conÍidence or motivatiôn to make use oí them strates the massive inequalities in access to the internet, between countries
and
Golding, 2004). It is easy fo-r people who work with comput"r,livrurdocí. classified as developed and developing, and illustrates how little the gap has
o, *f,ã i,urru narrowed. Note how the gap between'developed' and'developing' coun-
grown up with them to underestimate how much needs
io be learnt in order tries has not significantiy reduced, even though the number of internet users
to caÍry out even basic functions. The digitar divide, therç
is u *r.t -o"u in both countries has of course increased. Observe also how the'world aver-
matter-than just whether or not"it is possible to'g"t
:olpl"l
internet.Inequalities go much deeper than this suggests.
u""e* tã tn" age' remains much closer to that of 'developing countries' - because most of
CTass, gender and
age continue to be factors which strongrydetermiãã the world's population lives in such countries.
which kind"s oípeopre Table 9.2 gives some indication oÍ how such inequalities work spatially
gain which advantages.from the po.r"iÉintiu, of internet
and sometimes in surprising *uyr. Although it is sometimes "o*^Àiãutior,, and regionally. These figures relate to household use, which is fundamental
assumed that to claims that users can become active participants in cultural production
younger people have good internet skilh, ãnd therefore
*uy uurànt *o." outside work.
than_older generations, this is by no means always
the case. Andr"u pr"r, The internet, based as it is on principles of open access, undoubtedly offers
and Bruce Williams, reporting án earlier longtitldinal ,urur..h
recount the story of Rebecca, iyoung workinf_class woman
fy-n .rr, hope for many countries where there is a dearth of accessible informatio&
who became a either through authoritarian control or a lack of resources or both (Hafez,

{
 Table 9.1 lnternet use in developed and developing countries, 2000-ZO1O 2007: 115). And digital networks have played some role, even if it is often
exaggerated in media coverage, in bringing together movements aimecl at
progressir.e reform in 'developing' countries. Philip IJoward (2010), for
ãxanrple, outlines the exciting deveiopmeuts in Iran ín2A09, when tens of
thousànds of people used rnobile phones and digital networks to bypass the
60 government,s irüormation stranglei'rold, as they protested against President
o
c Àhminejad's election r,,ictorY, whicl'r many felt was rigged. The internet
.E so
l,(ú allowecl an alliance oÍ local activists with international cyber-activists,
who assisted Iranians by setting up proxy servers to aid anonyrnity, and
Ê+o by offering advice on ltovt to launch'clenia1 of service' attacks on Sovelrn-
o
ô
-30 ment servãrs. Yet Howard notes that'it is not clear that the internationai
cyber-aciivists had more than a syrnbolic effect on the infrastructure of the
q)
ô-
20
Iranian government' (2010: 9). He points out ihat the role of blogs, Facebook
10
and Twitter was 'an easy peg for coverage by Western news agencies'
when internatiorlal media had few reporters on the ground. Twitter was
T"'.=--
'an important communications tooi during the heated days oÍ protest', but
2001 2002 2008 2009 2010 actual numbers of usets remains highiy uncertain: 'an unknown number of
the new accounts created in those days belonged to external supporters who
-§- Developed -{:F World -^- De\,êtoping identified themselves as belng in Tehran' (p 9). Use was overwhelmingly
concentrated in the capital, Tehran'
The dêvelopsd/developíng country classííications aÍe basêd on the uN M49, see: http://ffi.itt.int/lTu-D/icy
def initionskegions/index. html Far more significant irr the protests in Iran, and later protests in'Iunisia,
Egypt and Syria in 2011 ('The Arab Spring'), was another piece of technol-
Source: ITU World Tslecommunicâtior/lCT lndicators database
tn" mobile phone or ceil phone - in most cases ullconnected to the
"[y,
internet, but used simply for SMS and calling. For some teason this has been
the objeci of considerably less wonder than the internet and social network-
ing si[es, even though it has had a somewhat greater irnpact than the inter-
Table 9.2 Proportion of households with internet access, by region, 2010
,-r"t or-t co*t'tunication around the world, at ieast so Íar. Ling and Donner
(2009: 8) estimate, using ínternational survey data, that about two billion
80.0
people acquired their Íirst telephone during the fitst decade of the twenty
70.0 hrsi cent.rry. Most of them were i1 the developing world: 58 per cent oÍ
the world's rnobile pirones are in these countries. A key factor behind this
60.0
growth is simply that building cellular towers is cheaper than laying cables,
50.0 ãspecialty acràss long distances between communities. This is not a solu-
tión to tire international digital divide, however, as oniy a small propor-
o/" 40.0
tion of mobile phones are reiíably and effectively connected to the internet
in developing iountries, and in any case concentration oÍ access is much
30.0
higher in developed counlries.
20.0

10.0
2. Control of circulation and concentrations oÍ
0.0
Europe The
Europe Amerjcas CIS-
attention
the Amerjcas Aíab States Asia & AÍrica
Pâcific The idea thai the internet (or the web, or web 2.0) evades or seriously dimin-
*Commonwoalth
oÍ lndependênt States ishes control because of its decentralised nature is a key feature of optimistic
Rêglon§ are based on the ITU BDT Bêgions, sêei http://ww.itu.inVlTU-D/icudeíinitíons/regions/index.html
writing about the phenomenon. Lr the words of Manuei Casteils (1996:352),
Source: ITU World Teiecommunication/lCT lndicators database ,the arihitecture of this network technology is such that it is very difficuit to

Cl
 censor or control it'. For clay shirky, the coliective action enabled by 9.3 Market share oÍ the 4 main search engine companies
digi_ Table
talisation and the internet_'challenges existing institutions, by erodág
tÉe Europe North America Asia
ii institutional monopoly on large-scale co-ordinátion,
ili eA}S: 14i). 79.18%
There is no uniÍied'irrternet industry, or,web industry, Google 82.35% 94.81"k 73.200/§
lsee ihe discussion
of Noam, 2009, n the Introduction). illevertheless, the"wàb can be thought Yâhoo 6.6gok 1.570/" 9.01% 9.84/"
of as having separate elements of creatiory reproduction and circulation Bing 3.79o/o 2.33"/o 9.09% 2.16"/"
(ln5luding-Tarketing.and promotion) in the same way that ,old, cultural Baidu 5.120/" 0.00"/o 0.00% 12.23/"
industries like television and film do, There are plenty of symbol creators
and enorrnous amounts of inÍormation and entertáinmónt in cyberspace, Sourcêt Netmarketshare. 2011. Search engine market sharê October 2011. http:/Ávw,netmarkêtsharo,com/
but search-€ngine-market-sharê,aspx?qpÍid=4&qpcustomd=0
which sites get visited and which don't? This depends on thJ equivalent of
circulation in the online world.
Supposedly, we can go anywhere we choose on the web by clicking on
whichever icons and sections of text we choose. For some consârvative pro-
ponents oÍ the internet (Gilder, 1gg4), this supposed interactivity was Introna and Nissenbaum's analysis preceded the rise of paid search (or
what 'sponsored search'), whereby content providers would pay to have their
distinguished the online experience from orÍÍine cultural forms such as
evision - ihe individual consumer could rule in cyberspace. The problem
tel_ pages included or ranked highly in search engine listings. A later com-
is mentator noted that Introna and Nissenbaum 'could not have anticipated
that where we go will,to a significant degree, bá determined by our
exist- the prominence that paid search has in today's search engine marketplace'
ing knowledge and inclinations. So how do we know where to go?
Early users - the amateur enthusiasts - got over this probleriby spend- (Zimmer, 2005-2006). However, given the dominance of Google (which lists
ing enormous amounts of time on the inhrãet. As the iniernet became its sponsored links separately), a more pressing issue is the way in which
rro"e Google's PageRank includes some sites and excludes others (anything listed
widespread, and uses of it became more routinised, a number of new cul_
tural forms appeared that aim to guide users through the web. In the 1990s, lower than 20 is of course effectively exciuded). Many claim that PageRank is
it the most effective system available because oí its largely, though not entirely,
was assumed that the main gateways to the web wóuld be portal
sites, many automated nature. The keywords in the anchor text of external links are a key
of them associated with^intemet service providers (tsrs). This *u.'pr.try
what gave the company American Onftne (AOL) sucl, greát po*". ir-, ttiu determinant of rankings.
lutu It is certainly the case that search engines have become most people's fust
1990s: it was valued very highly on the stock markets"because
such portals ports of cail for finding out inÍormation about many difÍerent things and this
:"9 jSP: seemed-to represent tÀe future of communication in a digiàl age.
But by-the early 2000s,it was becoming apparent that the mam giewày Íepresents a remarkable centralisation of in{ormation. What's more, seatch is
to dominated globally by just three companies.
the welr would in fact be constituted úy iiar"lr engines.It is imlossibre
to The rankings of the leading engines, it has been argaed, have a sfrong
assess claims about the decentralised nature of thã web
withou't reference self-reinforcing effect - highly ranked sites increase their popularity because
to search engines.
Lucas Introna and Helen Nissenbaum (2000) provided a valuable they are ranked highly. This leads to what Matthew Hindman (2009:55) calls
eady 'googlearchy: the rule of the most heavily linked'. Numbers of links determine
explanation of some major probrems with searcú Êngines. rr.r"y rt
o.,"Jtr,ut site visibility, leading to a selÍ-perpetuating domination of niches. Hindman
the backlink method (so caled because it uses a count of backrinks
how many links to the web page appeaÍ over the entire web) used
- that is, (2009) anatyses the consequences of this by providing a statistical analysis
by many of US political blogs and websites, which shows the remarkable domination
search engines meant that less well-known autonomous
sites were much less of the most popular sites in each of a number of key categories of political
likely to be visited and,_ hence, indexed by the search engine than the
ones debate: abortioo the death penalty, gun control, the president, Congress, and
with greater numbers of hits. The pageRank method - thJmain means used
bf C3gS]q to-formits pages - was, thãy said, even worse, because it weighed general politics. These communities, Hindman shows, function as'winner-
very highly links from pages that themselves had lots of backlinks, take-all networks'.8 The same dynamics are apparent in the various political
à""urch spaces he examined: in overall web traffic, visits to news and media sites,
engmes are reluctant to reveal úeir ranking criteria and
one of the reasons political web traÍfic, and even sub-communities taking a particular side in a
]hey pve for this is that such opeÍrness *oãrd further ,cheating,
by search optimisers, paid to achieve ".r.orrrage
higi rankings Íor bus!
:rqo" crucial
nesses and other institutions, But at reast this wourd
terp to mãte-peopre
more realistic about the limitations of the notion of the web as
infiniteli open B See the Introduction for a discussion of how recurring features of the cultural indus-
and decentred.
tries produce winner-take-all markets in cultural production.

N0
 debate.e Hornrever, there is a diÍÍerence here from the hit-driven dynamics of
some industries. Flindman also shows that a host of tiny websites gain most
of the remaining visitors, and between the big hitters and the microãites there
lies a'missing middle'. Nevertheless, audiences Íor political lvebsites are, he
concludes, more concentrated on the top 10 or 20 outlets than ,oid media,
outiets such as newspapeÍs and magazines. Yet, as Introna and Nissenbaum
noted, few web users aÍe awaÍe of the issues involved in search rankings and
many freat search engines as near-objective sources of information, m,rõh like
a library catalogue.
Hindma,,'s aÍgument has potentially serious impiicaúons for the ,long taif
_
thesis developed by joumalist chris Anderson: the idea that media and tú cul-
tural indusfuies are moving away from a model, where the hits generate most
oÍ the attention and profit, towards one where millions of nichJmarkeis add
up to a market that matches or exceeds that of the hits. This is a typical piece of
digital ultra-optimism, as one wouid expect from the ediior-in-cyrct iÍ wired,
the house magazine of silicon valley digital utopianism: the little guy wins as a
result of digital networks (see orlowski, 2009). But Hindman s reiearch shows
that 'for news and media sites as well as political sites, it is simpiy not hue
that the smaliest outlets, taken together, get most of the traffic. Not éven ciose'
rss)' similarly, economist will Page ancl digital analysr Eric Garland (2Q09)
'(r.
have shown, in a rigorous analysis of music sales across a nurnber of 'pratforms',
that most music that is available digitally gets no purchases at all. It ls hue that
there is a huge amount of choice available, but consumers are simply not buying
it. This is true not only of physical aibums and singles, but also of digitat trácts.
Even in 't1lega1' peer-to-peer consumption, most music remains untouched.
In Page and Garland's terms there is a long tail of available fuacks, but it is
extremely skinny. If anything, the reliance on hits is becoming more enfoenched.
The same is true oí the live music sector - relaüvely thrivúg compared with
purchases of recordings at the time of their research. lrage and Garland dorft
speculate on explanations o,f why the long tail of availablà digital recordings is
not being purchased, but I shall: consumers probably don't knáw that the trãcks
are there. Page and Garland refer to other studies that show a similar focus on a
number of big hits in other emerging forms of digital distribution, such as
1nal]
Netflix. Circulation remains the cenkal locus of power in the cuitural industries.
3. Commercialisation, surveillance and ,frêe labour,
The emphasis on participation is rooted in countercultural notions that
rejected corunerce in favour of human flourishing. fhere was a strong
emphasis in many intemet and web user communitieã on the 'free circulatíon
9 Political websites also follow a power Iaw distributioru where ,the size of an obser-
vation is inversely and exponentially proportional to íts frequency'
@. a\. such dis-
iributions result in 'starkly inegalitarian outcomes'. A series or stuails by computer
scientists has shown that such power law distributions characterise both inboulá and
outbound hyperlinks.
of irúormation' (Flichy, 1999:36) and 'the rejection of . , . undeclared commer-
cial interests' (Castells, 1996: 354).
So how have such interesting and positive aspects of digital networks
among the relatively privileged social groups with access to the internet
fared dnring the 2000s? Since 1994, when 'business "discovered" the Neí
(Sassery 1998: 177), the way in which the intemet has developed has dam-
aged its potential as a challenge to the forms of communication prevalent in
other cultural industries. In particular, the internet and world wide web have
become commercialised. Adverüsing encroaches on nearly all aspects of web
communicatioo appearing as banner headings and pop-up advertisements,
the automatic start-up pages on web browsers, portals and search engines
(including concealed Íorms, such as the paid search discussed in the previous
section) and, of couÍse, websites themselves. Signing on to services and buy-
ing products can still bring about a flood of unwanted e-mail messages. Spam
remains a huge irritant. Much web content is permeated by advertising to the
extent that it is sometimes difficuit to tell where advertisements end and ihe
content begins. As Sparks (2004) points out, there are few conventions Íor
the separation of commercial and non-commercial content on the web.
Oniine advertising expenditure boomed in the 2000s. This happened in the
1990s, but was interrupted by the dot.com crash, From 2003 onwards, online
adverüsing in the USA resumed íts inexorable climb, often growing at dou'
ble-digit rates. Evaru (2009) cites figures indicating that US online advertising
increased from $8.L billion in 2000 to $21.2 billion tr12007, and from 3.2 percent
of all advertising to 8.8 per cent over the same time period. In Westem Europe,
as advertising expenditure recovered Érom calamitous falls in 2009, online
advertising grew by 16 pet cent, against 7 per cent for all other media (S*een
DlgesÍ, November 20L1). Search advertising (as opposed to'display' adverüs-
ing on other websites) has been an area of particular growth in the late 2000s.
It is still too early to be sure what mix of advertising and other mechanisrns
will fund the cultural induskies in the digitalising environment. Purchasing
and subscribing bring problems for business and for culture, but so does adver-
iisir,g. Forms of communication that come to rely on advertising as their main
source of income tend to become beholden to their advertisers (see Curran,
2011:153-67, on the history of advertising in newspapers). As C. Edwin Baker
(2002: see especially 24-30) argues, this can have various deleterious effects on
content. These are diÍficult to predict in advance and need to be assessed case
by case, but in general, says Baker, advertising favours content that is increas-
ingly connected io marketable products and services and tends to militate
against that which is useful to, or valued by, the poorer elements in society'lo
The fact is, however, that the internet and web under capitalism are
headed inexorably in the direction oí commerce. Influential commentators
10 Advertising on other companies' websites is just part of web commercialism. As Dan
Sci-riller (1999: 132) points out, corporate websites must also be seen as a category of
web advertising ancl bíllions of dollars have been spent on them.
\§
on the internet, such as Manuel Castells, have taken the view that the lib- selling inJormation about users raises important and difficult questions
eratory nature of the medium will survive its commercialisation because abouípower and surveíi1ance. Is allowing companies to capture inf_ormation
of the inherent properties of the technology. Castells (1996: 35{) was cer- *U""t Ir a worthwhile price for the convãniences and pleasures aÍforded by
search engines and social networking sites? or does such information
tain that commercialisation was changing the medium, but he believed that cap-
that conceive of people's
'while its most heroic tones and its countercultural ideology fade away ... trr" ,"pr""runt a worrying step in the way societies
behaviàur, habits and viuutf Thit goes beyond the question of privacy'
the technological features and social codes that developed from the orígi- and
nal free use of the network have framed its utilisation'. In such passages, tf,u *uy in which peopie might deÍãnd themselves from intrusion,
to touch
Castells edges close to technological reductionism. Technologies do have on questions about social and cultural power'
lasting Íeatures, based on the social codes and discourses surrounding fàte the example of Google. Google, as I explained i" try Introduction
their development/ it is true, but these features can be reshaped by power- to this book, is not a culturãl industry company, or a media company
in
ful users and interpreters. Patrice Flichy provided a corrective to Castells' Ãr*, remotely approaching the se-nse in which those terms have tradi-
assumptions. Asking whether or not the democratic features of the internet tio'r*iÇ"U""" ur"â -'itto,rgtt iús aheady having a vast impact on the cul-
were a product of the technical characteristics of networks (1999: 39), Flichy tural iádustries. It is a seaich engine company, run by software mgrneers'
replied'It seems not, for other models of data processing networks do exist. *tl.n ftut expanded into some õthe. ut"ut (see Auletta,2010:YouTube 16)' It does
IBM and other manufacturers have developed centralised networks for it distributes and. circulates content through and
pioa"o
businesses, where the role of each actor is clearly defined: some input data, "ii "i"tent,
GoogleBooks, which make little or no money in,themselves. The vast major-
others consult it'. At around the same time, Saskia Sassen (1998,20A0: §) tty revenues have come from advertising: for example,gT per cent of its
drew attention to the'enormous growth of private digital networks'. She "?it, rerrenues in 2008 (Auletta, 2010: 15). There are two main planks to
$át biilion
pro-
claimed that: Google's advertising business (I draw here on the helpful explanation
vided by Auletta, 2010: 6-8):
the leading Internet software desígn Íocus in the àst few years
has been on firewalled [that is, protected from access by outsid- rAdWords-thisallowspotentialadvertiserstobidtoplacesmalitext
ers] intranets íor fums and fuewalled tururels for firm-to-fum ads next to the results for key search words. Google achieves-price_dis-
transactions. Both of these represent, in some sense, private crimination by setting a minimum bid per keyword (see Lee'2}ll'for a
appropriations of a'public' space. (2000: 20) detailed discussion of how this works)'
. AdSense - this automated programme matches advertisers to the right
The social uses of the technology, in other words, outweigh what might web destinations. Advertisãtt á,e charged only when the user clicks
on
appeff to be fixed features of the'technical architecture' an ad, based on a defined'cost per click''
There is another dimension to commercialism in the digital er4 which
derives from how the interactive properties of digital networks enable an of cookies
These technologies would be impossible without Google's use
unprecedented degree of inÍormation to be captured about users. The cap- allow Google to track the
(software files iáft on users' browsers). Cookies
ture of inÍormation is essential to the economics of the new hybrid cultural web they visit and-f91ho1Jonq' and
àearch questions users ask, which pages
products created by the information technology industries, from search .,,t,ut tnLy buy. When Google purchased ÓoubleClick in 2007 (see Chapter 6),
engines to social networking sites.11 This has intensified with the develop-
tús gav" tf,em control orui thu digitat platform that allows sites to sell online
ment of third-generation mobile phones, which allow Íor the even more oÍ
ads,ánd advertisers and ad ug"n:i.r tô buy them. DoubleClick s database
efficient capture of a much wider range of data. As we have already seen, allofred them to do this. Combining DoubleClick
inÍormation about users
many of these new forms of interactive technology, o{ten classified as 'Web being
and Google's Íesources provides unprecedented power. other things
2.0', have been interpreted by digital optimists as empowering ordinary
equal, thã information gets better ar"td .i.h", the more activity that Google
people. But the profound reliance of such technologies on capturing and
fàcks. Market dominaice thus reinforces itself through what ecortomists
call ,network effects': in telecommunications and inÍormation technology
netwõrks, the advantages accflle exponentially to nodes that achieve market
engine
11 Fuchs Qa11": B-9) provides a iist of some of the technologies that extend and intensify dominance. In additioi, information provided by a dominant search
than thaiof less dominant partner, because oÍ
consumer surveillance with the help of the intern€t: 'cookies, data mining, collabora- i, n1or" likely to be accurate a
greate, amount of data reaped by the dominant company' so advertisers
tive filtering, ambient inteiligence, clickstream analysis, spyware, web crawiers, log file ihe
analysis'. are likely to turn to Google.
 Similarly, Facebook gains most of its revenue by providing inÍormation
it can glean about itsusers to third parties. Because people procluce a great
deal of irúormation about themselves on Facebook, including indications of
their habits, tastes and practices, Facebook (in association with its advertis,
ing partner, Microsoft, who in 2008 outbid Google for the right to become
Facebook's main marketing collaborator), offers advertisers the potential to
target advertising closely to customers.
Such targeting, with its promise to advertisers that there will be minimal
waste, is the basis of massive transformations in advertising - and in the
marketing industry of which adveriising is just a part. Joseph Turow (2012)
has written about these transformations, and some oÍ their potentially dam-
aging social and cultural consequences: , as a kind of informal training for the Íuture game development workforce.
Every day most if not ail Americans who use the internet
along with hundreds of millions oÍ other users from all over
the planet, are being quietly peeked at, poked, analyzed and
tagged as they move through the online world. Governments
undoubtedly conduct a good deal of snooping, more in some
parts of the wodd than in others. But in North America,
Europe, and many other places companies that work for mar-
keters have taken the lead in secretly slicing and dicing the
actions and backgrounds of huge populations on a virtually
minute-by-minute basis. Their goal is to find out how to acti-
vate individuals'buying impulses so they can sell us stuff more
efficiently than ever before. But their work has broader sqcial
and cultural consequences as well. It is destroying traditional
publishing ethics by forcing media outlets to adapt their edi-
torial content to advertisers' public-relations needs and slice-
and-dice demands, And it is performing a highly controversial
form of social profiling and discrimination by customizing our
media content on the basis of marketing reputations we don't
even know we have. (Turow, 2012:2)
Turow sees the activities of marketers as fundamentally damaging to cul-
tural production and founded upon an unethical way of understanding the
behaviour and values of ordinary people. He also shows how measures to
protect consumers from the worst aspects of this system through regulation
are not currently adequate. The protocols by which we sign up to have our
data used are lacking in transparency. The wording of agreements is incom-
prehensible to many users.
For some researchers, working in Marxlan traditions, the way in which
digital businesses draw upon the activities of ordinary internet and social
network site users is best understood as a kind of exploitation. In a semi-
nal essay, Tiziana Terranova wrote about the phenomenon of 'free labour',
which she described as 'an important, yet unacknowledged, source of
value in advanced capitalist societies' (Terranova, 2004:73).12 Free labour
was, she wrote,'simultaneously voluntarily given and unwanted, enjoyed
and exploited' and on the internet included 'building web sites, modify-
ing soÍtware packages, reading and participating in mailing lists and build-
ing virtuai spaces' (p. Zq).Others have applied similar perspectives to
other forms such as television and games. Greig De Peuter and Nick Dyer-
Witheford (2005) have explained how, from the 1990s onwards,'authoring
tools' have been increasingly packaged with computer games, helping to
foster a vibrant participatory culture of game'modding', or modification.
They argue that the work of such modders is a kind of Íree labour, a 'space-
defying' process of exploitation of 'collective intelligence' which also serves
Mark Andrejevic, reacting against celebratory accounts of 'active audiences'
in media studies, has written powerfully about 'the ways in which crea-
tive activity and exploiiation coexist and interpenetrate one another within
the context oÍ the emerging online economy' (2008: 25). Andrejevic (2008)
argued that online viewer activity serves television producers in two ways:
by providing feedback, which saves the producers from having to under-
take expensive market research, and by, in efÍect, publicising ielevision pro-
gÍammes, which saves marketing costs. Andrejevic critiques the equation of
participation and activity with real democratisation and shared control, and
claims that regimes oÍ surveillance and imperatives of profit-making hugely
compromise the pleasures and progressive elements oÍ online participa-
tion. Andrejevic has also applied these perspectives to YouTube. FIe sees
the work of users as exploited by Web 2.0 businesses. Web 2.0 style tech-
nologies, says Andrejevic (2009), gain their popularify by offering users an
escape from alienation by offering'a modicum of control over the product
oÍ their creative activity in return for the work they do in building up online
community and sociality upon privately controlled network inÍrastructures'
@. aL\ and allowing themselves to be monitored. For Andrejevic, there is an
important distinction to be made between'user-cteated content' and 'user"
generated data' (p. 418). It is the latter and not the former that is extracted
under conditions of private ownership and turned into a commodity. All
this suggests to Andrejevic a generalisation of the forms of subjection tra-
ditionally associated with women, Time spent building social relations in
aÍfective labour is boih autonomous and subject to exploitaüon, he writesi
so is the kind of immaterial labour involved in social neiworking sites such
as YouTube. There are echoes here of older debates concerning the way in
which media industries turn audiences into commodities by selling their
attention to adverlisers (see Box 9.4).
12 Terranova's essay was originally published in 2000, but was reprinted in only a slightly
revised form as part of her bookNetwork Cttltures in2004.
p
 Box 9.4 Do (digital) audiences work for the concêpt oÍ the audience commodity in ordêr to assess its potêntial relevance to
cultural industries? cultural production and consumption in the age of digitalisation and the internet.
Rathêr than seeing audiences as working for media industries, Goran Bolin,
ln 1977, the influential Marxist political economy analyst Dalas smythe wrote
drawing on Meehan (2000), suggêsts that it is more Íruitfui to see statistical
an essay about how othêr Marxists, including political economists oÍ com-
representations of audiences as raw material that is shaped into a commodity
munication, had failed to analyse the functions that the media and related
by market research agencies and departments and sold as a commodity:'lt is
industries such as markêting and pR served for capitalism and capitalists.
not thê viêwers who work, but the rather thê statisticians'(Bolin, 2009: 357).13
This, he said, was a'blindspot, in Western traditions of Marxism (though he
Micky Lee (201 1)builds on the earlier responsê oÍ Richard Maxwell (1991)
had surprisingly little to say about what non-western Marxism would ofÍer).
to debatês about the audience commodity. Lee argues that Google's vertically-
Polilical economists such as Graham Murdock (197g) responded by criticising
integrated, non-competitive structure has created a peculiar market in informa-
smythe's perspective for its economic reductionism. one aspect oÍ smythe,s
tion, rooted in a strange commodity Íetishism where advertisers bid blindly for
piece was, however, widely taken up in later debates by other researchers,
keywords, without really understanding Google's system. For Lee, the audience
and has recently been revived as the naturê of advertlsing has been changed
commodity debate, if not Smythe's original Íormulation, provides a potentially
by the onset of digital nêtworks. smythê, followed by other writers (sucías
valuable way in which to understand and critique the changing naturê of advêr-
Jhally and Livant, 1986), argued that, when they paid for advertising from
tising in ihe online world. Finally, Brett Caraway (201 1) has provided a critique
cultural industries, advertisers were buying'the services of audiences with
predictable specifications who will pay attention in predictable numbers
ofSmythe,scontribution,anditsécho:ffiformulationssuchasthosêof
and Andrejevic. 9araway writes Írom a Marxist perspective, but one concerned with
at particular times to particular means of communication, (smythe 19lr:5).
agency, contradiction and strugglê. He points out the problems of assuming that
People, thên, had been turnêd into audÍences and commodities. Moreover
-
and this is where the link to more recent debates on,Íree labour,is particularly
audiences are providing services, and perÍorming work, without their knowing
that they are doing so. He suggests that Smythe overestimates lhe accuÍacy of
appareni - these services were, Smythe claimed, a kind of work: 'The work
audience measurement techniques and that later contributors who analyse the
which audience members perform for the advertiser to whom they have been
use of surveillance to ensure audience work underestimate the ways in which
sold is to learn to buy particurar "brands" of consumer goods, and to spend
people question or bypass surveillance techniques. Pjftfgygls al*ttre-mgd.ia,
their income accordingly. ln short, they work to create demand for advertised
goods, which is the purpose of the monopoly capitalist adveÍtisers, (1g27: y3.l_q!eryL!§i_?n9_999jq!.ll9lygrIilg,qL!s-s es me.rely s.:Íre*eJune.U.need tp p,ay
6). I
pgepl-e_qcln"
Írsn lhe,s,e_ p_g-qy9"!i. i,ii tr.:\ rr'
Media audiences, in other words, work on behalf of advertisers, thereby serv- l: ry"l9-'-"_tg=g§:l!gA1_o.l!lgly-s9.-v-91!Je§'th?!
Bather than labour, lhe egol-o-11!c transactlolr iltyp_lv_e_4-.Lgçl'YqttjShgjs-àetkr
ing capitalism as a whole. This (somehow) Ieads to a situation in which, for
i: understood as rent.-lt's possible that, in creating the contenl for sites based
all but the very rich and the very poor (the latter have no disposable income), t\ 5n1-sq-r:gãrierãtpãiontent, that people are involved in a form of work, but we
there is not really any such thing as'free time'or'leisure,. Ali our non-working it
should be careful not to assume that this work is completely controlled, as is
time, except for sleeping, must be spent trying to figure out what we are going
implied in many analyses.
to consume (1911: 14). Media products were just a ,free lunch,, a cheap way
Smythe's account is crude, reductionist and functionalist, totally underesti-
iff
of buving people off for the services they rendered. smythe atso stateá thai,
mating the contradiction and struggle in conlemporary societies. The underly-
1íl iÍ Eurooean readers felt sceptical about such claims, it was because thêy had
ing but underdeveloped normative position is that all the iime we spend under
been.relatively protected from the version oÍ'monopory capitarism,that wãs by
111
capitalism contributes to a vast negative machine called capitalism, that noth-
lgthen in operation in North America.
f ing escapes this system. Much oÍ the discussion his intervention has gener-
A number of latêr writers have discussed smythe's contribution, which was
atêd has barely transcended these origins. Yet it has somehow also spawned a
generally seen as potentially productive, but also extremely problematic
and potentially helpful and stimulating debate about how to understand the chang-
limited in thê way that it was originally presenled. This has become known as
ing relationships between cultural industries, technology companiês and audi-
the'audience commodity'debate, and sometimes called the ,blindspot debate,
ences in a critical way.
(see Lee, 201 1) - though this risks conÍusing the specitic idea of the
audience
commodity with the broader claims that smythe was making about Marxism.
ln
recent years, because search engines and social networking sites seem par-
ticularly to bê based on the tracking of audiences, and on Íree or unpaid labour,
13 It would be an empirical mistake, Bolin argues, to see these statistics as rePÍesentatlve
various writers have sought to clarify some oÍ the confusions surrounding
the of reality. They are notoriously slippery and inaccurate. He believes that Smythe, Jhally
and Livant, and Andreievic all make this mistake.

t{\
In a recent essay on Lrser-generated content (Hesmondhalgh, 2010b) I tried to morerobustgovefnmentregulation.Howevef,itiscommodificationthatis
show that Andrejevic's analysis seems actually to be dependent on questions the basis oÍ this critique, not'free' or unpaid labour'
of freedom and ideology rather than on a coherent notion of exploitation per
se. I also tried to emphasise the importance of finding a critique of activities
covered by the term'free labour' that would continue to highly value various
The claims of the digital optimists about the impact
of digitalisation and
forms of activity that are carried out without payment in modern societies.
Otherwise, I argue in that essay, there is a danger that a critique of com- th.irturrru,oncultu"ralproductionandconsumptionneedtobetreated
modification of social activity might end up implying that all unpaid social *iift gi"r, caution. They ate found'ed on a-particular discourse about the electronics
activity that contributes to the profits of an industry is exploited labour. An ;;:õ;iú effects of comPuteÍs, which the IT and consumer
deal àf interest in promoting. Digitalisation and the
exarnple I gave was of voluuteer football/soccer coaches, who unwittingly industries have a great
and I have tried to register
contribute to the profits of the footbali/soccer industry by providing a pool i.,ternet have of.õr.r" brought vaÍious bãnefits
* ãritiquing some oÍ the excessively pessimistic
of football talent that the clubs can then draw on. At the very least we need some of these in part by
accounts offered in response to tire dlgital optimists'
However' claims that
to balance the social gains made by the provision of such'frce labour' against
Lhev have resulted in êntirely ,ru* uúur-rg"ments
for cultffal productiory
the harms it causes. Part of the problem here is the way that ideas such as
years' need to be reiected'
'free labour' are taken up in casual academic discourse. I have frequently iàíi *rirr."*ã.tuút" r"g,íutity over rãcent
capitalist modernlry,con-
heard in recent years at conferences and in academic conversations a crude Recurring features of cultural produttion undeÍ
even as they interact with tel-
version oÍ the 'free labour' thesis - and it is usually only a matter of time il;;À"" present in the cultu;al industries,
before such ideas pass into the public sphere.la Terranova and Andrejevic do u.o**r.rútions, IT and consumer electronics in new ways' Inequality'
concentrations of power, and the negative eÍfects
of unregulated coÍuner-
not offer such a crude critique, and it is not thefu fault if their ideas have been
still remain in the cultural údustries of the twenty-first century'
simptified by others. But even their critiques of digital optimism need to be cialism
by their access to new and
grounded in a more careful conceptualisation of the problems surrounding priviieged individuals feel empowered
the use of inÍormation by Web 2.0 companies. In this respect Jakobsson and
"r""lf
exciting creative possibilities.
Stiernstecit (2010) provide â vâluable contribution. They connect such activ-
ity to the idea that, in social networking sites, the very quality of social rela-
tions as such - the sense of community and social trust necessary for social
interaction - is commodiÍied. This is because they show how such social- RECOMMENDED AND FURTHER READING
ity is incorporated into the legal structures deterrnining cultural property. effects-of digitali-
Google and Facebook are involved in the appropriation of cultural material, The best critique of excessive claims for the emancipatory
sation and the internet that I have yet encountet"d
it Mutthnw Hindman's
in ways which are every bit as open to legal challenge as the activities of
so-called pirate sites, but the juridical frameworks of the USA and the EU of the internet
have, in a series of rulings, protected these large corPorations as they make lent expression or *ru :?:,:X::\:""§:Y,
""i"utáUi"p1*íuf
participation: Éi"ptl"tt Cot"man and f ay f.lyJer The
use of the activities of users. This suggests that in at least one vital respect democratic l .lnternet "'';i
and De,nocratic citizensiiiláüói. i" ,ptt" of my-criticai ;;#
remarks
users are not 'empowered' ilr quite the way that the digital optimists suggest' Í?:::;itê
Through the exkemely opaque and conÍusing ways in which terms and con- r&i;:;{,:i:"::{::."yi#Tilri},H::"ffi H,;:lli:*ã,'i::;:ffi
n ('ü àl;;;' ;;1;;;1i9
in atin g and in tell i gent' Bt o si s n -;
politicsfilur'g
ditions are presented, they have no intellectual prope*y rights whatsoever. are irr u m t
inJ $
ár',a Cnoiu* KÀiabany, is a?ne studly of the internet.and
instead, the problems of user data capture are presented in terms of privacy,
an extremely amorphous concept that allows companies to claim that users ón ,"u..h engines, Hindman s chapter on Google. it 9^o^:11 "lÍ.j:
ãir, í"úf'tyríathan's The Google-izàli!." of Eaerything (2011)'-A
can be protected via self-regulation on the part oÍ the IT industry, rather than 'search Engine Socieíy (2008), and Elisabeth Clt
tluiuuuir', t"f Yu"
(2011) politicrl ..o.,ornf tf-tá development of search
^..*ít
)nrcrnri and Society (2008), by Christian Fuchs'-provicles
a crrtlcar
14 The most coÍilnon version of this crude version of the free labour thesis concems tiíá aititrlisatúo ,riág u*ide range of social theorY' Ken
uu,y
Facebook use - the implication is that such unpaid labour is exploitative, and we should ""
à oo gledliôro; is lively and informaiive,
tlgYett itt *"?:i,8^".:11;
consider not using Facebook. For sophisticatecl critiques of Facebook along 'free labour'
iã?;;;à;;â-or tn"íoad as we [knew] ií ian be a little wea
lines, but one which may still be vuLnerable to the criticisrns of t1-re 'free labour' thesis readable account of.h<
i;r;*'; The Daitv vo" çioizi * a hlghly
I make elsewhere (Hesmondhalgh, 2010b), see Cohen (2008) and Heam (2008) - the
latter is discussed in more detail in Chapter 11 below. n"r transforáed the advertisinf industry in worrying
"ài
chapter ends with recommendations of books and other sources that
dear
with the effect of the internet on other individual cultural industries.

ONLINE READING ,B %ry

All the online material referenced berow can be accessed free of charge at:
h[f //lwry,s,agepub.co.uly'heemondhatgh
simply click on the'sample Materials,Iab to find the links to each
The lmpact of the lnternet
article.
A series of excellent articres by José van Dijck (see for exampre zoos-u"a
2012) on social networking, user-generated content and other
and Digitalisation on Existing
issues suggest
that
hg forthcoming book on sociai networks will be _.ff *ortn **ãLg.
Brett_Caraway's article on the audience commodity
Cultural Industries
1C*u*uy, iOfg i, u
hugely welcome intervention in an often conÍusing aebate. Micíy
Lee;í am_
cre on Google advertising is also insightÍul (Lee, ãorr;. e,
indicáted abà,,e,
I find Iakobsson and stiemstedt's lzoro; articte a nátpru contribution to
debates about piracy. The music industry in crisis: distinguishing hype
from reality 341
, Ç^:uyuy,
Brett
(2011) ,Audience
labor in the new media environment: 343
File-sharing
A Marxian revisiting oÍ the audience commodity,, Media, êiii; g
S ociety, 33(5) : 69-708. Legitimate digital distribution 343
r Jakobsson, Peter and stiernsted! Fredrik (2010) 'pirates of silicon Television: meaningful consumêr control? 348
Valley: state of exception.and dispossession in Web 2.0,, Newspapers, periodicals and books 356
First Monday,
15 (7), av ailable at http.:
/. / www. fiis tmonday. or g/ htbin . g_ri,u,p í^ íhe digital games industry 358
ojsl indel.php / fm / aficte / v iew ZZ99 ZSZí
f 7 1
/ /
r t e1,
\tick1-(?.011) 'Google ads and the blindspot debate,, Medih, Culture
ü Saciety, 33p): aB-a47.
r van Dijlk
{of (ZOOI)'U1e_s like you? Theorizing agency in user_generared This chapter builds on the previous one by examining further the question
conten{, Media, Culture ü SocietV)Zt$): +t-SS. of whether the claims of the digital optimists regardirrg increasing control by
r van Dijck, José (2012) 'Facebook as'a tool for producing
sociaritv and users and audiences has helped to bring about a de-concentration of power
connectivity', Teleaision ü N«o Media,L}(2)t 160_176. in the cultural industries. It does so by examining the impact of the internet
and web across four industries: music, television, newspapers and book pub-
lishing. The final section of the chapter examines digital games as a cultural
industry that has emerged Írom digital technologies over the last 20 years.

THE MUSIC INDUSTRY IN CHISIS:

DISTINGUISHING HYPE FROM REALITY
The major challenge that digitalisation presented to the recording industry
was the relative accuracy and ease with which digital recordings could be
copied. As we saw in the Introductiorç making a profit in the cultural indus-
h'ies depends on, among other factors, the production of artificial scatcity.
Digitalisation makes the copying of any inÍormation easy, and so it radi-
cally threatens that scarcity. Furthermore, music takes up less disk space
and bandwidth than other nou-print media and can be experienced via

No
computer without too much discomÍort (unlike print); this is why the
r".oi.lirrg industry was the first cultural industry to face head-on the threat
posed by dlgitalisation. In the Íirst decade of the twenty first century, rev-
ànues frãm sales of recorded music dropped substantially,l
In aii cultural industries, the spread of the personal computer and the
internet has made digitalisation a major issue. A number of inter-related
technological innovatiãns made digitalisation a pressing issue Íor the record-
ing induJtry, before other cultural industries (see Bakker, 2005):
o The development oÍ the MP3 compression standard in the early 1990s,
and then thã hter development oÍ other, related compression standards
which allowed vast amounts of digital audio inÍormation'to-be com-
pressed into manageable files,
. th" spread of flal rate, high bandwidth connections, such as ISDN
ASDL and cable, and the fact that even where such connections were
not available domestically in the late 1990s and early 2000s, they were
available at workPlaces, places oÍ study and so on.
o The introducfion of muliimedia computer§ with increased storage
capacity, soundcards, CD playets and speakers.
o The development of usually free and relatively easy-to-use software
that could ?ip' CDs into MP3 files and also find and download MP3
files from distant networked computers.
These technologies were driven by the telecommunications and computer
software sectorJ. The conflict between the cultural industries and these other
industries echoes earlier battles with the consumer electronics sdctor - Íor
example, over video ca§§ette recorders (VCRs) and audio cassette lecorders/
and whether they represented a threat to the intellectual property of cultural
industry corporations. l{hile the cultural industries would have liked seri-
ous resirictions to be placed on the facilitation of copying on computers, the
might of the USA's software and telecommunications industries was always
going to make such measures urúikely' The main weapon that the recording
industry exerted in response was lobbying power.
So, as a result, in the 2000s, the record companies that dominated the
music business faced two major issues. The first of these concerned file-
sharing over peer-to-peer (P2P) netwotks, centrally involving issues of
property and so-called piracy. The second was how to find a way not only
.to distribute recordings digitalty rather than in the form of hard copies
(vinyl records, audio cassettes, compact discs), but also to make money out
of doing so.
1 Global recordecl music sales peaked in 1999 at 26.9 billion US dollars, and had fallen to
17 billion us dollars in 2009, according to IFPI (International Federation of the Phono-
graphic Industry).
File-sharing
By 2000, users were sharing music files over peer-to-peer networks - the most
famous and widely used of which was Napster. Napster was soon closed
down by a lawsuit brought by various record companies in the USA, but was
supplanted by other peeÍ-to-peer file-sharing networks (e.g., Grokster and
Kizaa) that, in efÍect, merely provided software that allowed networks oÍ
users to search each other's computers for musical files and therefore made
prosecution more diÍficult.
The major record companies and the trade associations that represented
them were quick to take action against the file-sharing threat. After success-
fully closing down Napster (though this name was later taken by a legal
downloading site), they pursued litigation against the second-generation
file-sharing companies operating such services and began lawsuits against
dowrúoadàrs of music. The Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) prosecuted many thousands of individuals and other trade associa'
tions followed suit across much of the worid' 'Illegal' file-sharing however
continued to grow and the file-sharing software companies and websites con-
iinued to defõnd themselves successfully against the considerable resources
of the cultural industries. But the joint strategy of pursuing individual users
and software distributors deterred many anrl illegal fite-sharing sites gener-
ally remained the pteserve of a committed niche of users (see Bakker, 2005).
' Legitimate' digital distribution
For most ordinary users in the new millenium, the main way of purchasing
music was still by buying CDs in record shops. Gradually more and mole
people shifted to buying ÔDs ontine, often avoiding purchasing iul fy*buy:
log ?ro* off-shore pio,r"id".r. Foliowing the introduction of Apple's i.T'unes
in"2003, and other áigital retailers, a lar[e, and larger minorityóÍ consuter:
boughí digital files áther online or viã mobile pÉones. During this periqd
of trãnsitiãn, record companies and established retailers (in most coqntfiég;':
these were separate from the recording industry) struggled tq adjlst to'dig"'
ital distributiàn and purchase. A majãr sticking poin"t"was that the tecÇrd
companies wanted to find a way to prevent.trátâ*urc from simply repro'
tirne"
ducing infinite copies oÍ digital files áf muric. An enormous amountof
and effort was spent on i'hu development of digital ilShts yayagery4t!
(DRM) systems. ihis posed maior chãIengur, pur'íly as iresult:1*t-EJÊ1: "
à*ong the various haidware, software and telecommunications coqtfg,§§:§j:i
invohád, and aiso generated enormous bad publicity for the record'!,!ffa+:'
nies, because they were made to look slow u"a
and ag +.!118h
"rrtuípo*lve
-ridti"gdecade' IÕrül
of the
ifruf *ur" restriãting the flow of culture, By the enà
forms of protection (ro, u*àrripfu, the lulli'Êêi:.
ever, more moderate
'L-:q,$#$L- "
of devices that a fi1e could be played on) were commonplace'
music downloading services úd proliÍerated, and many consumet*Y,Éí:
such as bBoluy
becoming used to á,-tit purchasing or streaming via sites
"
 (which used a mixture of subscription and advertising
revenue, some of created alliances, oÍ were ailowed by regulators to merge. The record compa-
which was thenpassed on to recorá companies and
artists). nies sought to redefine themselves'as creators and exploiters of intellectual
Consurners who were sufficiently energetic and,/
or tecúica,y competent propeÍty tighÍs' Qv4usic and Copyright, 1 September 2A0\. The high Íeturns
could bypass protection,systems eâsily e"nough, fiuu"r,rr",
kets where there was wide.spread pubricity about
ptorig"ã-i., ,,*- and lo$, costs of music pubiishing, and the constantly expanding opportu-
on-line music, as most con- nities for rights exploitation, made copyright more and more central to the
sumers went through a period of uncertáinty
and bewiiderment about the music business. This led to intensive and oÍten successful efforts by record
consumption of music,.especially in the largest,
mosi ,developed, markets companies and their trade associations to lobby governments in favour of
rifllfi.ant grówth ín som"e markers as econtmies grew).
ff**,*::1I-1
l hls ied rnvestors, and the analysts who advised extended copyright terms and stronger copyright enforcement, as \,ve saw
them, to turn away from the in Chapter 5. These measures diminished the public domain and Íavoured
recording industry, reading to falling share prices.
The decline in sales and private, corporate inteÍests, even if a substantial minority of consumers were
-revenues was reraHvely slow. But thú didn'i matter,
because the pàrception able to bypass such reskictions by using digital networks to share files.
was that the recording industry was doomed, and
perceptior", *utí".r, g""ut The music business never consisted entirely of the sale of commodities
deal in the world of Éinancial ápeculation. Àppre's
r-Tunes sold on.ly a rera- such as CDs to consumers by record companies. It always involved other
tively small amount of music compared *itÀàflr".
seemed phenomenal - growth froà zero wilr
r"àiúrr,Çü#ero*tt ways of exploiting its copyrights, such as charging to allow recordings to be
ofte; ,;;;;;;;krài"1'wr.,r, played, or songs to be performed, in public places, or on the world's prolif-
really mattered was thai it seemed to represent
the future. erating radio and teievision channels. These'secondary' uses of music have
These-developments red to a_huge arnount expanded consistently over the iast few decades. The multinational record
oÍ coverage of the decrine - or companies also benefited from growth in emerging rnarkets. The 2000s
even death - of the music indusfo (see Barfe,
2008; Mann, 2000). A widely were undoubtedly an extremely challenging time for the major record com-
read book on the impact of digitádation on
music was typical in its por- panies. But we know that the cultural industries are a high-risk business,
behemoths, ,*
trayal of the music majors as flàt-footed bureaucratic
try shuggling to maintain control and remain rerevant,, while celeúating
i.a,_,r_ where market domination is often tenuous. The history oÍ the recording
the nimble entrepreneurs of web-basea *,rri. industry has seen a number of crises, notably in the 1930s and late 1970s (see
lalagrlrrru 2001: 1_2). Many
commentators, often drawing on the countercuriural Hesrnondhalgh, 2009b).
discoursesdir.írr"a i" So did popuiar music culture benefit from the introduction of digital dis-
the previous chapter, hoped-that a more deÃàcratic
set of production rera- tribution technologies in the 2000s? There are various ways to consider this
tions would emerge from the mess, where artists
might rÉ urrl" io murr.ut question:
and sell their products directry to audie.nces
via the web without the need
for multinationai entertainment corporations. so to
introduction of digitar technologies'Ied to s;ch
whaf extent has the . The quality of the texts on ofÍer.
what extent have these developnients empowered
democratisation? And to r At the level of media consumption: for example, the choice, control,
consumeÍs, cru"tãrr rrrA diversify and quality of experiences for audiences.
small companies at the expense of the bii
companies? To what extent did
oligopoly of internatiônal conglome"ãt"r io.t r At the level oÍ production: whether, as many claimed, or at least strongly
fhe t" u, aigir"rir;ãr'*u, implied, digitalisation and the internet enabled a demoeratisation of the
introduced? Certainly, there was riertical
disintegration, as=manufacturing music industry.
and, clishibution opeiations were sold off
to thi.a parties, but this shourd
not be read as a sign of a democratising'disintermediation,
intermediaries between creators and.úsu*err. - the removal of The first of these is tl're most diÍficult to address. Debates about texts are the
The major corp.rrtú, ,riff subject of Chapter 11 of this book, but a few words are in order here. Many
retained crucial control over the marketing
and promotion that will largely decry the lack of creativify and innovation in contemporary popular music,
determine what music most consumuru guito
hear and know about. Indeed, and some have related this to the crisis in the recording industry. For exam-
such marketing became increasingry utiruà in order t" p*ár." uro*-
buster hits. A para[el here is withihe ""it ple, the rise of a particular kind of pop music associated with TV talent shows
iil";G emphasis in the film indus_ was oÍten attributed in the 2000s to a desperate quest for multi-media 'syn-
try on massive publicify-to generate big revenu"es
on opening weekends, as ergy' on the part of record companies. But the idea of a previous golden age of
discussed in Chapter z. ueãnwhrle, uJth"
.riri, hit the recording industry music has been a familiar lament down the decades. Nostalgia seems strongly
in the early 2000s, the sizes of recora .o*p*y-rosters
were drasticary cut - bound up with people's perceptions of musical history. The 1970s are now
especially non-Engrish rosters in the overseas'divisions
of the murtinational considered a golden period Íor rock and papby many in Europe and North
corporations (Music and copyright,23
June 2004), andthere was further con- Americ4 but at the time, many audiences bemoaned the steriliry and self-
solidation of an already trigtrl/concennuruitírin"ss,
Áujo*
as struggli,.rg indulgence of these gerues.
 It seems clear, though, that at the level of consumption reratively privi- journalists gave considerable coverage to breakthroughs by acts who used
leged audiences with a moderate interest in popular music,
and wit( access web technologies such as webcams to publicise their work. The Sheffield
to the internet and other.digital technologies, benefited from the digital
band Arctic Monkeys became hugely successful in 2005-2006, selling hun-
revolution' By the end of the Íirst decade oíthe twenty-first centuÇ,
it had dreds of thousands of copies of their debut alb-um in the week of its release in
become possible, at a relatively low cost:
the UK. Their success was widely atkibuted to the internet, and in particular
o to MySpace, the social networking site that was widely predicted at the time
to gain access to vast repertoires via streaming websites such
as spotify, to represent the future of Web 2.0 activities. But while the band had a website
r to purchase tracks quickly and convenienily via Amazon, Applds where their tracks could be downloaded, they pointed out in interviews that
i-Tunes website, or other sitesi
c they had never even heard of MySpace at the time of the success oÍ their first
to purchase a massive range of CDs, easily and con'eniently via
the single. Their success owed much more to their repeated exposure on tradi-
web (and at a fraction of what these CDs had cost 10 years práiousty);
tional media, notably radio.
vinyl remained readily available via specialist retailers. , A few monthslater, The Sunday Times (5 March, 2006) reported on another
case of how the music industry was being transformed by the web:
In additiorç there was also an exprosion of heipfur and enjoyable
ancilrary
information about music and musicians.
After the runaway success of ihe Arctic Monkeys, who built up
. their international Íollowing on the internet Írom their base in
It_became possible t9 easily and quickly, the lyrics for a huge range Sheffield, Sandi Thom, a 24-year-old Scot, is using the web to
of songs via intemet fin{,
iyrics sites ladmittealy mar.rLd by the wo?st krnd entertain nightly audiences put at more than 60,000 .. . Seating at
of pop-up ads).
. the venue undemeath her home in a Victorian terraced house in
It also became easier to rina rairty reliable and insightful discussion
of a Tooting, south London, consists of six stools bought from Ikea
very wirle ralge of musicians via sites such as A[üusic and wikipedia,
for about É3 each. Thom uses a webcam to record a nightly per'
an<Í an increasingly digitalised and diverse music press.
formance before broadcasting it on the net later in the evening'
Many mour:ned the passing of the ord music press, but the internet
' a proliferation of sites, and their coverage úas much better
saw In the past eight days she has entertained more than 250,000 fans
archived worldwide. By contrast, her live audiences usually total about
fhal the print versions. This new internet-music press r+,as arso increas- 200 when she plays in clubs around Britain. The blossoming
ingly international. while obviously under pressure from public
rera- success of Thom's web tour illustrates how a new generation of
tions and marketing departments, and dependent upon r.rpulá1uUor.,
unknown singers and bands are connecting with fans directly
the standard of music commentary was impressiveiy rugh
aàross a wide through the internetbeÍore achieving convenüonal chart success'
range of genres (see Lobato and Fretcher, âorz;, as"wití many
internet
forms, however, it relied on unpaid professional labour.
o Or, as the Times puÍit (22May,2006):
Myspace,Facebook and rwitter madá it easy to find out about
musicians,
acfivities (tours, new recordings, media appearances, side projecis).
Thom is a bona fide example of how people power is changing
These.features suggest a gr"ater degtee of choice and control pop ... Be{ore the webcasts, Thom had recorded an album, but
for consumers, only a small Scottish label funded by a fisherman was willing to
of abilirylo have experiences across different ,ptat_
ffIjlg.1f1afr feSree
torms' or technologies, as media fragmented or multiplied (Napoli, release it. Now her debut single, I Wish I Was a Punk Rocker, out
2011). yet next week, is a radio staple and her face is plastered on billboards.
there- were negative dimensions to ãuch consumption
as *ar, i"""r"i"g tlr"
problems discussed in the previous chapter: the úy in
which these acüiities The truth was rather more complex. Following initial interest via the web,
were tracked and monitored; concenhaúons of powár that
still determined the Thom's success in {act came from widespread coverage in the mainstream
flow of information to consumers; and inequaliiies of access to
trri"potuiúr,y media, enabled by the use of a public relations company. Tens of thousands
rich diet of sounds and secondary texts.
This meant that claims about a democratisation of production of musicians would also use the same technologies, and remain in utter
and cir- obscurity. The problem, as ever, remained one of circulation: how to iet
culation often went too far. For example, it was tediousty
2000s to hear that musicians *"." rro* abre to become
i'thu
"o*mo.,lrlu *r" people know of the existence and desirability of the product? And how, in
,í.."rrfrt the business school jargon, to achieve 'product diÍÍerentiatior{? Most peo-
web', without any assistance from ,the music industry,. prers
urrà úroJcart ple stili became aware of musical recordings via radio, televisiorL and other

f,^
 'old' media. And the surest way to gain access to such olcl media was via a Table 1 0^ 1 Average hours of television viewing per day in the UK, 2001-2010
contract with a vertically integrated major record compâny, which had the 20a7 2006 2005
resources, and occasionally the expertise, to target appropriate consumers.
3.75 3.74 3.63 3.65 3.71 3.73 3.54
To achieve such confracts, musicians still need to work with artist manag-
ers to establish skills and a nascent reputation. Digital technologies allow Sourcg: Broadcasters'Audience Rêsearch Bureau, 201 1

this to happen more readily, but they must be used skilÍully - and only a
limited number of acts will have access to such skills. And orúy certain artist
1.970 hgure represented 46.5 per cent of such time, the 2009 figure repre-
managers and musicians will also have the requisite knowledge to go about
sents 42.1 per cent. In 2009, some 15 years aÍter commercial internet service
building up a reputation by playing live, in the right venues. There have
providers made the internet wideiy availabie, Americans on average spent
been many clairns about the positive eÍÍects of digitaiisation and the internet
755 hours per year on the internet (17.9 per cent of the total for major leisure
in producing a much greater degree oÍ demand for'niche' products, notably
activities), massively less than they did on television. This may be likeiy to
the'long tail'thesis (Andersorç 2006; Napoli,2011) discussed in the,previous
change, but the point is that it has not happened yet and the only thing we
chapter. But as we saw in Chapter 7, such demand, if it really exists, does not
can be sure of is what has happened, and not what will happen in the future,
seem to have significantly enhanced the ability of would-be creative workers
interesting though it may be to speculate on that.z
- the tens of thousands of talented musicians who aspire to make a living out Figures claiming that the internet has replaced television should be
of music, for example - to gain a good quality of working liÍe.
treated with scepticism. For example, in March 2006, a number of newspa-
In summary, at least in North America and Europe, it was undoubtedly true
_ pers reported that Britons were spending more time on the internet than
that the recording industry, and the music publishing industry to which it is
watchirig television. The Guardian' s Media Section (8 March, 2006) reported
closely linked, went through a maior period of crisis and transition in the first
thai'the average Briton' was spending 164 minutes online every day, com-
decade of the twenfy-first century. Recording companies were lambasted for
pared with 148 minutes watching television. But these figures were based on
their lack of innovation, while new entrants from the hightechnology sector,
interviews in which people are asked to report their own estimates. People
notably Apple, were lauded for offering new means oi disu.ibution - even
nearly always under-report their televísion viewing. Figures based on the
while charging remarkably high prices for downloads to be played on devices
more reiiable (but still by no means inÍallible) method of using elecfronic
that had vast mark-ups, The recording industry still revôlvéd around the
technology to detect watching show that viewing figures for television have
searú for talent, and new forms of technology helped change how that talent
actually increased over the last Íew years. Table 10.1, for example, gives fig-
developed, and could be made known to audiences. variouJtechnologies had
ures collected by the Broadcasters'Audience Resealch Bureau in the UK (the
been involved in such transformations since the development of a recognisably
increase in 2010 may reflect a more accurate measuring system).
modern music indusky in the nineteenth century. The power remainãa in ttre
There have been many references to'post-networK or'post-broadcast' tel-
hands of a few institutional enfities, but the idenüty oíthose institutions had
evision (Lotz,2007; Tumer and Tay, 2009). While the audience share oÍ the
changed, to include more high-tech companies ,rãh u. Amazon and Apple
major networks has fallen significantly in the United States, elsewhere the
alongside a dwindling set of multinational entertainment conglomerates.
picture is different. Even in the UK, where News International poured huge
amounts of money into challenging the Íour 'terrestrial' channels through its
BSkyB operations, and where the goveÍnment devoted a massive regulatory
TELEVISION: MEANINGFUL CONSUMER project to ensuring that all ielevision was digital by 2012, the audience share
CONTROL? of the four main channels has not changed hugely. In 2010, over 70 per cent
of television watching is oÍ channels run by the four main broadcasters.
The world's most significant cuitural industry, in terms of time spent and Crucially, the revenues oÍ television industries grew rapidly during the
revenue earned, is still television, Even in the early 1990s, futurologists were 2000s, even as internet hype predicted the imminent demise of television as a
declaring the death of television (Gilder, 1994), and. such prophecies have medium. We saw this demonstrated in Table 8.1 when discussing the growth
continued ever since. This has failed to happen. rn19z0, at a time when tel- of television across the world. This growth was interrupted by the decline
evision was generally considered to be at its peak of influence and reach, of advertising revenue in the wake of global recession from 2008 onwards,
Americans spent an average af L,226 hours peiweek watching W . By 20A9,
this figure had increased to 1,774hours, an increase of some 42!e, Err"r,
as a proportion of major leisure time activities (which have greatly"".ri.
increased
in number) time spent watching television has hardly decjined'at all. The 2 Ali the figures in this paragraph are from Vogel (2011: 10).
 Table 10,2 Audience share by terrestrial channel, 2001-201 O Table í 0.3 Hours per week spent watching television by 'platform', USA 2010
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 ?004 2003 2002 2001 zto11 12to17 18to24 25ta34 35to49 50to65
BBC 32.9ô 32.62 33.54 34.01 34.46 95,21 36.65 38.28 38.50 38.í3
On Tradltional TV 24i52 22:24 24:17 28:08 32:58 41:04 46:16
tTv 22.86 23.13 23.23 23.21 23.12 24jg 24.14 24.66 24.87 26.96
WatchingTimeshifted 01:50 01:29 01:30 02:57 03:07 O2:42 01:42
c4 11.18 11.24 11.57 11.71 12.09 í1,00 .10.48 10.36
10.81 10.34 TV
Five 5.91 6.12 6.08 S.S9 A.eZ 6.40 6.5T 6,46 6.29 5.75 Using the lnternet on a 00:30 01:25 04:02 06:03 05:50 04:58 02:38
Computêr
Source: Broadca6t"r., OrO,"na
Watching Video on 00:07 00:21 00:45 00:50 00:35 00:23 00:12
lntêrnet
Moblle Subscribêrs NA 00:20 00:17 00: 12 00:05 00:01 <0:01
but the continuing growth of paid-for television across much of the world is Watching Vidêo on a
predicted to lead to further increases in revenue. Mobile Phone
The internet, then, is not replacing television and other cultural Íorms; Sourcsr Nialsên, The Üoss Platíorm Report:5.
it is
supplemenling them, as o{ten happens when new meclia technologies
are inko-
duced and disseminated. Nor isihe intemet swauowing ap televilion. krstead, Italy and Spain are much lower, and are not expected to rise above 10 per cent
the internet and television arc hybridising in complicatld ways. again, for many yeaÍs to corne (ScreenDigest,luly 2011).
this is
familiar from past technological develop-ments: for exampre,'tr,u.iãà
oÍ t.t"ui
sion i, the 1950s and 1960s and its effecti on cinema. Television
may decrine in
the longer term, but this is not happening just yet, and it is too
earti to predict
what forms its mutations are góing to takã. In ráct, because of the hrige
Box 10.1 YouTube: a nêw hybrid cultural Íorm
iricrease
in television consumption in less ãeveroped countries, the 1990s saõ YouTube has enabled a nêw type of screen viewing and an unprecedented mix-
a consid-
erable increase in the ownership of televisions (see trNESCo, 1999)
and this ture of content. lts remarkable rise in the 2000s was greeted as a prime exam-
continued into the twenty-first century (CIA World Factboo§ 2003).' ple of Web 2.0 participatory culture. Even more sophisticated analysts echoed
There is no doubt that television chànged significantly i" á" rirsi
decade of YouTube's own rhetoric in strongly emphasising its reliance on'community'ele-
the twenty-first century. some changer *"r" [ri**ily internet-driverç such ments. For example, legal scholar and intellectual property activist Lawrence
as the rise.of new ways vjewing teievision content via the computer. The Lessig (2008: 194-6) saw it as an example oÍ a new hybrid economy, based on
.of
most notable case here is of course youTube (see Box 10.1). some changes a community where people inteíact on terms'which are commerce free, though
relate to developments in digital television that are separate from the motivations lor interacting may or may not tie into commerce' (p' 186).
the impact
of the internet nojably the continuing proliÍeration of ánu"""t, As William Urrichio (2009) notes, interactivity on YouTube is limited in Web 2.0
rrr*àiy.orr,-
tries, and the further erosion of the aúdience share of major network"í., terms: you can upload, but not download. As in other sites based on so-callêd
,o*"
counfries - which has been much more significant in some countries user-generated content, the vast majori§ oÍ users do not produce video (van
than in
others. one emergent phenomenon is the r=ise oÍ'non-rinear Dijck, 2009). What's more, as Siva Vaidhyanathan notes, in discussing some trou-
television watch-
ing-, where fime-shiÍting is made possibre by w on demand bling removals of content from its site by YouTube, the site has no mechanism to
services such as
the BBC's i-Player and its equivalànts. Theú are availabre
via digitar ú or., establish community norms regarding its contênt. The lack of such standards,
computers via the internet, by mobile phone, or on tablets writes Vaidhyanathan (201 1:36-9), encourages flame wars and'flag wars'where-
such as the i-pad.
some proclamations of the'death of television' or the ,end of by'competing political activists flag the other sides' videos as inappropriate'.
television, rely
on a. perception that youngeÍ vjewgq are particularly prone to
watching teí_ A huge aínount oÍ material is created by amateurs, much oÍ it watched by
evision-through computers and mobile devices and using timeshirtinj very small numbers of people. Much of it is also produced by a variety oÍ small-
te'ct o-
scale pioducers, oÍten with aspirations to become proÍessional cultural producers
foqey,Hery too though rhere are reasons to be cautiour.-Th" Nuilr*rifi*r",
in T1bl9 L0.3 suggest that in fact the heaviest watchers of video o" or to break through to wider audiences. Such production is often mistaken for
trr" ú-t?*ut
are in the 25-34 age group. younger viewers watch more 'amateu/ production. Much of the most-watched content is produced by maior
video on mobire
phones than other users but they still watch very little. The cultural-industry institutions. OÍ YouTube's list of its ten most'watched videos of
other means of
video.are, as yet, very small compared with watching on traditional all time in November 201 1, only two were'user-generated': 'Charlie bit my Íinged
:,ut.Fg
relevlsl.n tor alr age gÍoups. Even in the usA, where nonJine; rv and 'Parto in un letto', a clip of friends jokily enacting a live birth. The othêrs were
viewing is
the proportion.of such viewing rose above 10 per cent only-in
39t^t 37nr1u"t, (Continued)
2010. The figures for other major market, ,.r.i u, those
of GJr;""y, F;u*",

Ir\
 (Continued) meaningful control and autonomy for consumers is another matter. Many of
these features are pleasurable or convenient. But terms such as'autonomy'
mainry music videos * two were by Eminem have signiÍicant politicai connotations far beyond relatively trivial consumer
and three by Justin Bieber. The shar-
ing of crips from terevision §hows, especiafly features, such as being able to use a íemote control device so that you can
comedy, is extremery popular. rn the
2000s, this fundamentar reriance on videó prooucác watch a particular player during a footbali game, oÍ choose from three or
by the curturar industries
resulted in bat es between Google (owne," youTube four acts performing on different stages at a televised music Íestival. To what
0f Írom late zoôo à.raro.r
and copyright horders, notabry viacom. This extent do these really involve the exertion of control over the circulation oÍ
Íamousry led to videos oÍ toddrers
dancing to copyright recordings being removed experiences, ideas and knowledge in modern societies? Only in cases where
trom váuruue untir the courts had
done their business. But the resurtingiettrement people are actualiy producing and circulating their or,rrn content could such
is good for the curturar industries.
You]ub9 makes litile money for Goãgle, a claim validly be made. And yet, as we saw in the case of YouTube, and as
anA proulães a massive grassroots pro-
motional forum for the products of thê culturai
industries. |ose van Diik (2009) discusses in an important contributioru user-generated
YguTube is not onry a promotionar forum content that is genuinely produced by amateurs receives very little exposure,
for the curturar industries. ,tt is.arso a
cruciar part of new ways in which peopre Nor should we underestimate the amount of work that has had to be done to
use email, mobire teteprrony ana sociai
networking sites to share content. rt is a persuade people that interactive gadgets and the like are meaningfully desirable.
wondedur resource and a remarkabre feat
of software engineering' rt has changed
the way peopre share and recommend James Curran (2071: 99-110) has tracked how the British media keated a number
curture. But it doê§ not Íeprêsent a democratisaiion of different'new media' technologies in the 1980s and 1990s, including cable tele-
oi curturar production based
on community in anything rike the way that visiory loca1 community televisiorç the intemet and interactive digital television.
some commentators have craimed.
On the latter, Curran provides a number of quotations from British broadsheets
in the 1990s, including arnong many other examples, the now-familiar rhetoric
that it would lead to a'fundamental shift in power from the TV director to the
as wifhthglgnsumption of music, suchphenomena corlsurner in the home' (Sunday Times, 30 Aprt11995, quoted by Curran, 2011:
invorve aproliferation of the 101). Yet he also provides evidence showing just how reluctant üewers have
ways in which terevision can be experienced.
They have also given rise, superfi_
been to take up this offer, and how slow the long'predicted interactive technol-
:ifll{ ?'least, to a greateÍ aegree àr uuai*"u.onnol over the consumption of
television' viewers can choos*e ogy has been to arrive (101-2). The exaggerated claims of joumalists, according
-u.r, *o." ,uJily whur. and when tô watch
television' There is no doubt that ttr"ru to his analysis, were the result of misinÍormation on the part of the business inter-
.t",*gã *u, corectivery, threatening to ests proposing these new technologies: principally developers of interactive TV
the adverthing revenue which sustains
broadcasting. This is partry
because the viewing rt:*:*I-,:]::" ""*riáirr such as BSkyB, British Telecom, but also politicians suppofting the idea of the
to the sheer amount of leisure competition """ rli"g-es
has decrined, ówing 'information sociefy', finance industry consultants and experb whose reputa-
racàa uy fulevision in most countries.
Television prosammes.l.:o* tions depend on seeming úead of the game, and public§-hungry academics
g"ty ,*"ty *#nua ry ã ruãrr-pr"p-ã.1i"" ,r (105-6). Box 10.2 outlines some of the factors behind the rise of digital television.
a particular national poputation; the
main J*."ptiorrs are TV talent shows ancl
major sporting events. The biggest hit
shows geíerate fewer viewers. Interactive
digita-l television technologie.]i*r,
skip adverts. But as we
* ú o"?ãÀr"a services, allow viewers to
actually been increasing' :?w 1n
Chapter g
C;ú" g.1), television revenues have Box 10.2 The rise of digital television
This t',ur r"àu..u[r" oitherise of pay
ple are prepared to pav much *or" teievision - peo- Hernán Galperin (2004:2ü-52) idenliÍied three main factors behind the rise oÍ
for.àrt*t iian they ever did before.
The extent and naíure of audience digital television:
co;;rl; the new television environ-
ment are often overstate{, In his.intelligent
àrrerviuw of changes in how o The perceived need on the pat1 oÍ regulators in the USA to salvage the aíling
media industries (primarily terevision
Philip Napoli craims that tnár" nur"
i"ã'ãaioy understand audiences, consumer electronics industry during the downturn of the '1980s High -
t"u'do
of media audiences in recent years: audience
,iui* evorutions in the nature definition television (HDTV) was perceived at the time as the new Írontier in
fragmentation and audience consumeÍ electronics and a consortium led by the Japanese public service
autonomy. By the latter term, Napoli
ir.ur*rr,g to his view thua;-;;gu
of feahres of the new ,"uaiu ,on_
broadcaster was leading the way. Digital was seen as a way Íor Íirms in the
(interactivity,
mobility,
"irrío*ãrli
demand functionar*v' and'increased
;ü;i,i.\- user-generated content,) all
USA and Europe to countêr this, but spillover effects into related industries
'enhance the extenr tá which audi.".; (telecommunications and computers) were also hoped for.
h;;; Jo.,irol ouu, rhe process of media
consumption' (Napoli, 2011: g). The degree (Continued)
to which ,u.n ?u..t,
"onriirr"

rt}

(Continued)
r lnÍormation society policy - The Clinton administration,s notion of
National lnformation lnÍrastructure (Nll) was a key development in informa-
tion society thinking. This saw'dígital video, as a major driver of access to
this Nll. While the USA feared Japan, the EU Íeared domination by the USA
and imitaied its initialives, most notably in the Bangemann Reporl of 19g4
(Cornmission of the European Communities, 1994).
r Speclrum shortage - As we saw in Chapter 4, the notion that spectrum
shortage was no longer such an issue as it had been provided legitimation for
marketisation, but with the rise of mobile telephony in the 1990s (with lhird-
generation systems seên as a key basis for expansion in high-tech industries)
spectrum shortage was becoming a key issue. Analogue broadcasting was
seen as a'spectrum hog'and digital as the solution. Unexpectedly, spectrum
auctions for mobile telephony generatêd bíllions of dollars for governments,
accelerating the international push towards digital.
The result of these various developments was that, by the end oÍ the 1gg0s,
thê transítion to digital televisibn was a top priority Íor policymakers in the USA
and the EU. The motivations were fundamentally economic. There is no doubt
that the results have been beneficial for businesses in the consurnêr electron-
ics, telecommunications and cultural industries. Sales oÍ televísions boomed in
the 2000s, as flat-box sets and high-definition television went mainstrêam, But
the social and cultural consequences are much more uncertain, as dlscussed
elsewhere in this section.
so what have been, and are likeiy to be, the main effects of digital terevision
on the cultural industries in terms of production and circulatión?
First, the introduction of digitat television has involved - to a degree
unprecedented in any other medium - the kinds oÍ strategic aIiÀnce
discussed in Chapter 6. Complex networks of companies húe worked
together because a number of difficult and expensive technologies need to
be combined to produce a workable system. The most crucial ãf thuse urn
conditionai access systems, which involve encrypting the transmitted pro-
gramme€ and then developing decoding software for set-top black boies.
This technology also involves systems for installing boxes ànd (if neces-
sary) satellite dishes and_others for sending out decoding cards, subscrip-
tion bills and advance information about programming. Ãaa in the cost àf
subsidising installation in order to gain a critical mass ôf subscribers capa-
ble of attracting advertisers and the huge resources necessâry for research,
development, expertise and infrastructure make it ciear why alliances of
enoÍmous telecoms, cable, computer and cultural industry corporations
dominate the television industry today in many countries more than
ever before.
Second, huge amounts of content are needed to fill the hundreds of new
a channels. This has favoured a number of groups:
. Those who hold the rights to existing catalogues of audiovisual mate-
ria1. This conÍirms the increasing importance of ownership of copyright,
appârent over many years (see Chapter 5 of this book).
. Éóllywood film companies, the USA's TV networks, and those at the
centre of the all-powerful content creation business in the USA.
r New independent producers - the largest of which have become sig-
nificant industry players and iobbyists in some countries, notably the
UK. Some of these make vast amounts of money from the international
sales of programming ideas and formats. This has made them attractive
to venture capitalists and other investors' The larger'independents' are
now thoroughly linked to financial capital.
. The'creative talent' at the top of the celebrity scale, including sports
people, and the talent agencies and managers who represent them. This
*idunr still further the enormous inequalities, noted by Miêge (1989)
and others, between the underused pool of creative talent and a vastly
overpaid Íew (see Chapter 7). By the 1990s, such stars were increasingly
operàting as businesses in their own right, with significant independent
production companies based around them.
Third, in spite of the increasing importance of conient and the increasing
rewards foi it, circulation remains central to the industrial dynamics of tel-
evision in the digital age. Those who run the clistribution systerns for digital
television have ilarge say in which channels are adopted. Although regula-
tors have attempted to ensure that producers and 'publishers' (that is, the tel-
evision channeli that make the programmes or commission them from other
producers) are not discriminatà aiainst, there is no doubt that distributors'
use their competitive advantage to favour their own programming, for exam-
ple in the design of electronic programme guides.
All this means that the commercialisation of television has taken an impor-
tant step forward. Public service broadcasters are moÍe beleaguered than eveí/
fightinf to maintain their legitimary as they are attacked by newspapers that
aie often owned by compar-ries with a sfrong interest in the television market.
Conditional accesi systàms have led to charging mechanisms that provide
flew avenues for commodification. Those sections of the public with relatively
high levels of disposable incorne seem to have accepted that it is worth pay-
in[ a lot more for something that is not that much better - if at all - than
what existed before. For all the rhetoric about choice and interactivity,much
of it derived from digrtal utopianism, digital television ultimately remains
the centralised, top-down medium that developed in the era of analogue
broadcasting.
l,,b

NEWSPAPERS, PEHIODICALS AND BOOKS
Meanwhile, alongside recorded music and televisiory other industries are
being affected b/ related but somewhat different transÍormations. I shall
addõss three'piint-based' cultural industries here. As with the recording
industry my foôus will be on what happened between 2000 and 2012, rather
than onspóculating about what might occur in the future'
tn newspapers, ãnd to a lesser extent periociicals (such as magazines),
plunging udr".tiring revenues have had a profound impact. Local newspa-
p"rr íu.I" been highTy reliant on classified advertising (low-cost ads usually
ptuced by individ"uaís). In the 2000s, websites such as eBay and Craigslist
t".u*u increasingly popular alternatives to newspapel classiÍieds. At the
same time, the iniieásing availability of news via the web, easily accessi-
ble and frequenily updatãd, began to erode the readership of newspapers'
Another factor was ãhanging liÍestyles. Younger professionals - a _highly
desirable demographic grórp tor advertisers - were less predisposed_to the
daily ritual of rãaamg irru*tpup"t than their older peers' As Colin Sparks
(2004: 311) pointed o-rt, thu internet erodes advantages based on physical
ptu"". Núrpapers (and broadcasting organisations too) could achieve dom-
irrull.u within à particular city, region oÍ nation, but all online newspapefs,
radio stations and so on are, in principle, available everywhere, at any time.
The economic problems in Eurõpe and North America from 2008 onwards
compounded the diÍficulties caused by internet technologies to newspapers.
TÉe closure oÍ iarge numbers of American newspapers in the light of such
decline gave impetui to discussions about a crisis in journalism (McChesney
and NicÉoh,20i0 - see Chapter 11). Most newspapers and periodicals in the
2000s made their content frãety available on the web, subsidising their web
operations through hard-copy advertising and sales, some onJine advertis-
ing, and an increasing use of add-on operations (selling goods and services
,rl"h u, holidays, gr*t, music ând books). The costs were written off as an
uncertain future investmenf and/or a§ a way of building the publication s
brand. The only maior exceptions for most of the 2000s wele business publi-
cations (The Fiintciâl Times, The Wall Street lournal) and product review pub-
lications (such as lNhich? in the uK and consumer Reports in the usA) which
were able to charge subscriptions fot their potentiaily valuable inÍormation'
This began to chaige at the end of the decade. ln 2010, News krtemational
started Io put up 'walls' around the content of a wider range of its newspa-
pers, beyond rw wou street Journal. The New York Times introduced a 'soft
paywalÍ in2011, based on voluntary registration, and with some consider-
ãbie initial success. The success of the i-Pad led some commentators to hope
that the transition to digital editions might be eased. slovakia inhoduced an
innovative scheme where citizens would pay a small fee for access to a con-
sortium of nine major news producers. It is, however, still too soon to be clear
about the future oínewspapers and magazines in the era of digitaiisation.
As with television and newspapers, there have been many predictions
about the death of the printed book. Ebooks have existed since the early
1gg0s. In the late 1990s a1ld early 2000s, a number of consultants predicted a
massive market share for ebooks in very little time. But this did not transpire;
sales of ebooks remained tiny, defying the projections of the analysts. The
far
time in many countries was the decline of the
bigger transÍormation at that
inããpendent bookshop, already threatened by the rise of giant retail chains
and supermarket book retailing in the 1980s and 1990s (see Rorming and
Slaata, àOff; utta the rise oÍ Amazon as an IT retail giant'3
The real digital revolution in the book industry, in iohn B. Thompson's
(2005, 2010) vúw, has been in the produclionprocess,with operating sy§tems,
àontent management, sales and marketing, and content delivery all radically
reconÍigured.but the digital prophets have been saying that a new_ genera-
tion oÍ ãbook readers wiil now bring about the delayed digitai revolution in
product.In 2006 andz0a7, respectively, sony launched its ebook reader and
h*azonlaurrched its Kindle. These used non-reflective screens and'ink'that
better approximated actual print. The Kindle had dropped substantially in
price by dOf O, and this 1ed to a surge in the purchasing and Íree downloading
àf as new owners splurged to provide content Íor their devices. So
"boákr,
does this mark the beginning oÍ ihe end of printed books? Thompson (2010:
331-3) puis forward inumber of reasons Íor the very slow and erratic pro-
gress of the ebook revolution:
o The reading devices have tended to be clunky, (Even with the new era
of improveã ebook readers, poiis continue to show that a vast majority
of readers prefer the printed book; see, for example, The Guardian,21,
July 2010:'Better read than dead'')
. fháre has been a bewildering array of formats and as a result consum-
ers have feared obsolescence and a lack of usability across different
devices.
e There exists great uncertainty on the part of publishers about rights
ownershiP.
. Ebooks still cost a great deal to produce, but consumers have reacted
badly to being char[ed a price only just below that of the physical object,
the book _ *Ãi.h iúti[ cherished by hundreds of millions of people.
Many commentatoÍs asserted or assumed that events ín the music industry
*oría pto"ide a model for what was going to happen h cle"1 digitalis' CDs
ing cultural industries. According to thii viõw, the decline of sales of
But Thompson summarises some of the reasons
pi"uuged declines for books.
;;;-tã;" sceptics in the book publishing industry feel that'music is a poor '
3*-rr." * increasing domination of book retailing to diversify *,:,1ji*
"rd
of products, thereby becoining the 'Walmart of the web'
El'-it[f!:ií,
.(The
il#áu;;;'tt;;;,ri^*?i,', l',," remained low as it has sought to
;ôü).
competition with Apple to provicie'cloucl computing'for users'
 . Many consumers want to listen to songs rather than albums, ând are
happy to skip tracks - this is not true of the book.
o Even with e-ink technology, reading a book on screen remains a substan-
tially worse experience for most readers than reading a printed book.
r Carrying lots of music on a mobile device such as an i-pod is clearly an
advantage. Other than academics and some professionals who travei a
lot, most people don't need to carry around lots of books and publica-
tions - 'one book will do'. (p. 319).
Thompson (2010: 318) wisely remarks that although digitatisation is in the
process of transforming the book industry, it is too soon yet to be certain
about what form these transformations will take. If only moie comrnentators
were so circumspect.
THE DIGITAL GAMES INDUSTRY
Finally, I now turn to digital games, which are interesting because, among
other reasons,,they,represent a new cultural industry that emerged from digi
italisation, rather than a cultural industry that digitalisation affected. ThJy
therefore raise interesting questions about the n€wness of new media. Arê
they substantially different from'pre-digitaf indushies? How distinctive is
this new cultural industry, based on digital technology? I4trhat might it tell us
about digitalisation as a technological development in the cultural industries?
As,it developed in the 1990s and 2000s, the games indush"y came to be
,based
on a number of sectors: the producers of games machinei or consores;
games developers; the companies that publicised and distributed those
gamee (namely, controlling their circulation); and retailers. The console
games industry, unlike all other cultural industries, was dominated by three
Japanese corporations - Nintendo, sony, and sega. This domination derived
from the fact that the games industry had been centred on hardware/soft-
ware synergíes.to a greater degree than any other cultural industry in recent
times. The small companies commissioned to develop games havebeen very
much reliant on events ia the console/hardware secioi. The hardware com-
panies, in turn, were reliant on games development for their profits as the
hardware (consoles) sold at relativeiy small piofit margins, wher"as gu*"s
had a very high mark-up (Caves,2000: 215),a
_
In its 'software' (that is, games) development and publishing sectors,
the digital games industry conformed to patterns estatüshed iri the cul-
iural indusfries more generally. In its organisational form, the industry has
4 when sega's Dreamcast console failed to match sales oÍ sony's playstation 2 in 1999-
2000, sega withdrew from console production. Microsoft weie alreády set to enter the
market in 2001, with their X-box. They soon established themselveá as a new third
power in console production and games commissioning.
followed the publishing logic (or'editorial model') of commodify produc-
tion identiÍied by Miêge (1987) as characteristic of the production of books,
records and fiims. In this model of cultural production:
o texts are sold on an individuai basis to be owned;
r a publisher/producer organises production;
I man! small- or medium-sized companies cluster around oligopoiistic
firms;
r creative personnel are remunerated in the Íorm of copyright payments,
Miêge contrasts this'publishing logic' with a number of other'logics' of pro-
duction - mairly , the flow loglc associated with broadcastíng, where, instead
of individual commodities for sale, the emphasis is on the provision of an
uninterrupted flow of entertainment (an idea Miêge borrows from Flichy,
1980) and the production of written information - that is, principally the
press, includin g magazlne publishing.
The 'software' part of the computer games industry, then, according to this
analysis, is organised like books, music and films. Since 2001, Sony, Nintendo
and Mioosoft have been the oligopoly controlling the console and hand-
held devices sectors at the core of the industry, but with significant interests
in publishing; US-based Electronic Arts is a fourth powerful publishex but
with no stake in hardware. Some of these companies have designed games
in-house, but these are mainly commissioned by the large corporations from
specialist companies. There is a premium on inside knowledge oÍ what fan
subcultures are looking for and large corporations gain access to this knowl'
edge by entering into transactions with small companies made up of enthu-
siasts. In this respect also there are important parallels with other industries,
notably music (see Chapter 7 on this aspect of the music indusfry)'
For many years/ games were condemned or worried over as simple, vio-
lent fare for the young. In this respect too games conform to a familiar pat-
tern - many other new cultural forms have been treated in the same way.'
It was apparent by the 1990s, though, that the digital games industry was
going to last. Although the competition Íor market share between the vari-
ous formats has been fierce, the corporations and their software associates
have competed for an ever-expanding cake as games devotees have contin-
ued to buy games in their twenties and thirties and the next generation of
boys and girls has joined the audience. This has also led to formidable crea'
tiv§ and innovation. Sueen Digest (October 1999) attributed the success of
the games industry in the 1990s lo'a far Sreater depth of quality product
than the filmed entertainment market', A number of writers have noted the
increasing sophistication and quality of games, There is also a considerable
variety of genres. Poole (2000: 35-58) listed the Íollowing:
r Shoot-em-ups
. Racing
r Platform
f
 . Fighting
. suateg;y
'. SPorts
Role play
. Puzzles
Henry Jenkins (2000) noted the possibility that a new generation of games
would iegitirnate digital games as a new popular art form, just as the films oÍ
the late 1910s and 1920s legitimated the then infant cinema. There is certainly
now a wide range of intelligent critical commentary available.
Some misinterpreted the growth of the games indusíy as meaning that
games were replacing music, film, books or television (or any other industry
as it experienced any sort of period of crisis, especially if youth audiences are
diminishing). It is certainly hue that the digital games industry achieved high
rates of growth in the early fwenty-first century (see Kerr, 2006: 50) whereas, as
we saw above, revenues from recorded music stagnated or declined. However,
Apfua Kerr (2006:51,-2) showed the ciaims that games were outstripping other
industries were often based on dubious data. For example, the sales of hard-
ware (consoles, hand-held deyices) were included aiongside games soffware.
This would be like including the figures for sales of DVD players and recorders
in the figures íor film. These figures were then compared to the box office fig-
ures for film alone, thus ignoring'secondary'film markets such as DVD sales
and rentai. When sales oÍ games (as opposed to devices such as consoles) were
compared with revenues from cinema box ofhces and DVD sales and rentals, it
. commúnications technology in history, but its exciting and progressive uses
was apparent that the games industry was very big and fast-growing, but not
yet in the same league as television or even film. This remains the case in 2012.
By the time of the launch of 'seventh generation' consoles trr 2006-2007
(Nintendo's Wii, Microsofís X-Box 360, and Sony's PlayStation 3) the video
games industry had achieved asigniÍicantdegree of business maturity, Randy
Nichols (forthcoming) provides an account of the state of the global games
industry in the late 2000s. By this stage, debates about the effects on yorng
people of playing games had receded, as video games became integrated intó
everyday life in developed countries. Audiences had become older; the aver-
age player age in the USA had risen from 29 in 2O04 to 35 in 201-0. Women
and girls were players and purchasers to an increasing extent - estimates
cited by Nichols vary between 20 per cent and 40 per cent depending on ter-
ritory, player age, and games geffe. The oligopoly of Microsoft, Nintendo,
Sony and Electronic Arts dominated software publishing. Development and
marketing budgets soared, as the industry increasingty relied on hits that
were launched with a huge fanÍare, such as Calt of Duty: ModernWarfare 3,
which was published across all three major consoles in November 2011.
At the beginning oÍ the second decade of the twenty-first century, the games
industry looks set to be marked by significant changes. The increasing poputar-
ity of games played on digital and mobile devices (such as iphones) t àa gi*,un
power to new entrants such as the Finnish company Rovio and the Californian
company Zynga, who make products for (mainly) Apple devices and Facebook,
respecüvely. Meanwhile, Nintendo and Sony have struggled. But will games
such as Angry Birds, developed by Rovio, just be temporary fads?
As long as leisure time and expenditure on it expand, new cultural indus-
tries and forms such as digital games can be accommodated without neces-
sarily destroying or even substantially erodingpreviously existing industries.
Andsynergies can be found as well - games based on films, films based on
games? music publicised vla games, games publicised via music, and so on,
Íhe digital games industry, the& is a significant new entrant in the cultural
industiies sóctor and digital games are an interesting and signiÍicant cultural
form. But they do not represent a major shift in the prevaiiing skuctures and
organisational forms oÍ the cultural industries generally'
The introduction of aigital techror*r* ** the cultural industr"ies was
ultimateiy the product of post-war developments in the computel and con-
sumer elàctronics industries. No development in the period since 1980 has
been accompanied by such wild claims as has digitalisation (see Feidman,
lggg, Íor arrexample of a Panglossian treatment of digital media). The last
two chapters have shown that the term 'digitalisation' makes little sense
unless iíis discussed in the context oÍ specific applications, particular dlgital
technologies. Computer games aÍe lreated as dangerous, but have_produced
exciting innovations. The intemet has been hailed as the most democratic
are in danger of being submerged by commercialism and recenfralisatíon.
Digitai television has been inhoduced on the grounds oÍ choice and interac-
tivity, but offers little real progre§s for consumers, giventhe,massive_costs
involved, and the huge benefits for businesses in a Ían8e of industries. It also
involves a much more thorough commodiÍication of broadcasting'
The internet and the web, combined with mobile communication and digital
forms of broadcasting, have, to a limited extent, altered existing social relations
oÍ production and consumption. They have produced huge amounts of small-
scale culturai activity. They have enabled new ways for peopie to communicate
with each other, and to find irúormation easily and quickly. They have pro-
vided mechanisms to enhance political activism. The internet is {ull of material
that is arcane, bizare,witÍy and profane, as well as inept, mundane and banal'
These many minor forms óÍ subversion, insubordination and scepticism dorít
cancel out the enormous concenkations of power in the cultural industries, but
they might be thought of as representing a disturbance. The problem is that this
disíurbince of exisáng relations of cultural production and consumption has
happened mairüy witún a very specific secfiãn of the world's population' The
raáüal potential of the intemefhas been iargely, but by no means entir"ly:."*
tain"d by its partial incorporation into a lar"ge, profiúrientated set of cultural
industries. Surveiliance remairts a significant concem'
The technologies discussed in the"last two chapters have all had significant
effects on culturai industries, but not even the internet and digital television
t-t§D
ril ,
'i,. :,: .: li.
'.
-i
li ha'e yet hacl sucrz animpact that_we can speak of â new era
in cultural pro-
't :. .1., -
,
i

Books
d,ction. New irrd,stries, such as digitar terÉvisiorr, ISps and .-"ili;;;r*.r,
all carry. very_str"ong inheritances from previous ways of organising
Albert creco's llrc Bool, Pttblishirrg lndttstry 12nd edition, 2005) anci his
procluction. l'he characteristics of the conrplex professional
book witlr Clara E. Rodriguez and Robert M. \{harton on Tlrc C:ulíure and
"Llt,r.ur
ãru or" Iiitt ir.,tu.t Commerce of Publishing in lhe 21st Century (2007) are rich in inforrnation.
in. the.era .f digitarisation - even clown to tire continuinf à"*mrii"" Tohn
B. Thompson's Merchnnts ty Culture:'Ihe Publislring B.usi.ness in the Tu,inty-
teievision. "i First Cetilury (2010) is one of the best books on an individual curtural indus-
try io be published in recent years. His preceding book, Books in the Diçital
Age (2005), which focuses on academic publishing, is also very good. A c"las_
RECOMMENDED AND FURTHER READING sic still rn,orth reacling is Coser, Kadushin and Powell's Books (1982).

Music Games
A more cletailed version of r,,y analysis of music digitalisation Steven Poole's Trigger Happy (2000) provides an entertaining and informa-
in this cirap-
ter can be found in Hesmondhatgii (zoolt;. sim.n Frith tive joumalistic treatment of digital games. Kiine, Dyer-Witheford and de
and Lee Marshalr,s
collection Music and is excellent c,n the ,gfr,, Peuter's Digital Play (2003) is a sophisticated and readable Marxist study of
-Copyriplt!'iZOO+)
Musicologist Joanna Demers,ã
irr"*, tlre ganres inclustry. Aphra Ken"s Digital Games (2006) has a usefui chapter
inteliectual
StuqL Tlis Music (2006) i, u gooa ;;;.iy
"Burkart nr*
"f Ton., on the games industry.
1:roperty affects musicar *eativity. patrick á.1 A collection that examines the irnpact of the internet on the cultural indus-
Mccourt's Digitar rv4usic wars (2006) provides-a forceful poriticar
uoor,.,rr-,y
account. B,rkart's nrore recent Ma sic ind cybertiberties porbl tries is Tlze Internet and thc ltrLass Media, edited by Lucy Kung, Robert Picard
ist opposition to the actions of copyright hólders.
air.*r". u.tir,_ and Ruth Towse (2008).
Greg'Kot,á Rippecr: How the
wired Generation'fransfortned Misíc
1ãool; is a readaõre nirtory
of what happerred to the.music industry, heavily focuseâlorr,-,áíirti"
on rock u,-rá ,.up.'tr-,"
It is critical of the recording inilustry, úut is impiicitry ,n"riti.oi'.i ONLINE READING
industlics. I
All the online material referenced below can be accessed free of charge at:
Television
http.//www.sagepub.co.ukfresmondhalgh
Hernán Galperir-r's New "r'ereaision, ord poritics (2004)
is the clefinitive study Snnply click on the'Sample Materials' tab to find the links to each article.
oi']::tion to digiral rerevision in rrre uK and usA. The i,troductior.r
:f lh:
to Toby Miller's Tereaision sttLdics: The Bnsics (20i0)
Various contributors to a special issrre of the Arutals of thc Anmicnn Academy
passio,ut"rfur.gr", tnut of Politicnl and Social Science (volume 625, September 2009), editecl by Eliiru
television is nor dead, even dying. TetiuisionÀfter tV q"ãit"ffilyr_ Katz and Paddy Scannell, discuss 'the end of television as we know it: its
spigel and Jan olssorl":g^lgfwas a gtoico,ection
_2004) oiessays o. turu,rilrio., i, impact on the world (so far)'. A good article by Ronning and Slaatta (2011)
traxsition' The title of Graeme Turnãr and Jinna Tay's Tebí,ision studies After analyses changes in the book industry.
TV (2009) deliberatery recarls it, and analysás rece.t
changes across a range of
intemational contexts. Jea, Burgess and
(2009) is^:]r
Joshua c.""r'r lnort io"u ior',ra* c Katz, Elihu and Scarrnell, Paddy (eds.) (2009'), Annnls o.f the Anrcrican
]ntellige.t ad tarairceci piece of cligitar optim isr,.; Trte youT ube Acndeuty of Political and Sociril Sc.icnce , 625(1).
tjealer (lo9o)teditcd by peile snickars ancr patricik
\ronderau, is a usefur cor-
' Ronning, Llelge and Siaatta, Tore (2011) 'Malketers, publishers, edi-
lecr1011. rt mclucles all essay by Mark
A^drejevic, who has made a major co,_ tors: Trencls in international publishurg', Medin, Cilh.u'e ü Society,33(7):
tribution to critical analysis oi televisio. u, í go", i.creasingly
digitai 11.09-1120.
Newspapers
ivlchesnly and Victor pickard's coilccrion, wirt thc l.nsr
f3berlw
t'tp,se. t ttrn.uuÍ Írte Ligrrrs (20i1), provides a
Rerort,
.eaily r.aruable ,rrg" oi p"r-
spectives, frorn joumalists, academics and cornmentators,
on the .riri, lr.,
American journalism ancl might be done about it. Another g"àa-.rr-
-what
lection, Nezo Medin, ord News, caitãd by Natalie Fenton
(20r1), íJJresses
tire effects of digitalisation on news and ciemocracy
Chapter 1.t.
- an issue discussed in

,3
iJ