Concept and Object of Law of Limitation

The whole purpose of the Limitation Act is to apply to persons who have good causes of action
which they could, if so disposed, enforce, and to deprive them of the power of enforcing them
after they have lain for a number of years respectively and omitted to enforce them. They are
thus deprived of their remedy which they have omitted to use.

A law of limitation limits the time after which a suit or other proceeding cannot be maintained
in a Court of Justice. Periods of limitation are prescribed by statute with the consequence that
an action begun after the period of limitation has expired is not maintainable.

To understand the object of law of limitation the landmark case of Nav Rattanmal v. State of
Rajasthan (1961) , serves as a great example. The Supreme Court observed that a law of
limitation is a statute of repose, peace and justice. It is a matter of repose because it
extinguishes the demands of the State and quiets title

It seeks to obtain a peace and security by raising a presumption that a right not exercised for a
long time is non-existent. It is intended to do justice inasmuch as it takes into consideration
ground reality that the right of parties should not be in state of constant doubt, dispute or
uncertainty.

The law of limitation is based on two well-known maxims:

(i) Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium - The interest of the State requires that there
should be an end to litigation.
(ii) Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt – The law assists the vigilant and
not one who sleeps over his rights.

The law of limitation, being a procedural law, merely bars the remedy. It does not destroy
primary or substantive right accrued in favour of a party. The judicial remedy available for
enforcement of such right is barred, but the substantive right survives and continues to be
available if there are other ways for enforcing it.
Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to ensure
that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly as held by the
Supreme Court in the case S. Ganesharaju v. Narasamma (2013).

Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act, 1963 defines “period of limitation” as the time prescribed
by the Schedule I to institute any suit, appeal or application, and “prescribed period” as the
period of limitation determined as per the provisions of the Act. It is follows:

i. 3 years-time-period for a suit relating to accounts, contracts, suits relating to movable

property, recovery of a lawsuit under a contract, etc.
ii. 12 years-time-period for suits relating to possession of the immovable property, and 30
years-time-period for suits relating to the mortgaged property.
iii. One year for suit relating to torts (3 years for compensation in certain cases). 30 to 90
days in case of appeals under the Civil Procedure Code and Criminal Procedure Code.

The general rule laid down in Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 declares that every suit,
appeal or application filed after the period of limitation shall be dismissed. However, there are
certain exceptions prescribed under S.4-24 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

EXTENSION AND SUSPENSION OF LIMITATION

Expiry of Prescribed Period [S.4]

S.4 deals with expiry of prescribed period when court is closed. It states where the period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is
closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the
Court reopens.

The underlying principles are of this section are:—

(i) Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibilia —(The law does not compel a man to do what he cannot
possibly perform).

(ii) Actus curiae neminem gravabit - (An act of court shall not prejudice anyone).
This section enables a party to legal proceedings to initiate the same on the next day if the
previous day happened to be the last day and on that day the Court remained closed for any
part of the day as held by Mad HC in Pattanswami v Amirtha Jothi, (1997).

The section does not extend the period prescribed for the presentation of any suit or appeal or
application but it only provides that where the period prescribed expires on a particular day
when the Court is closed, notwithstanding that fact that application may be made on the day
the Court reopens. Thus, section 4 of the Limitation Act does not extend the period of limitation.
It provides for the contingency when the prescribed period expires on a holiday and the only
contingency contemplated is “when the Court is closed”.

The expression “when the Court is closed” refers to the Court in which the suit, revision/appeal
ought to have been made. Where the limitation period for filing an application or suit expires
on the day when the Court is closed, the petitioner/plaintiff would be entitled to file
application/suit on the opening day.

It is settled law that section 4 does not extend the period of limitation but saves limitation if
the suit or appeal or application is filed on the day of the reopening of the court—in cases
where the limitation expired on a day when the court was closed. The section does not require
any further change as held in the case of Maqbul Ahmad v Onkar Pratap Narain Singh
(1935, PC).

Extension of Prescribed Period [S.5]

In cases of Appeals and Applications, the Limitation Act under S.5 provides for extension of
time and condonation of delay in filing appeals and applications.

The ordinary meaning of “condonation” is an implied pardon of an offense by treating the

offender as if it had not been committed. However, in law it means that the offence of ignoring
the law of period, is impliedly disregarded and the matter shall process as if no offence has
been committed.

The only condition prescribed under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is that the appellant or
applicant, satisfies the court that he had a sufficient cause for not filing appeal or making the
application within the time frame provided by the respective statute. The Court may after
hearing such sufficient cause, condone the delay and hear the case on merits. Therefore, this
section lays down one statutory principle, namely that if the act is not done within the period
of limitation, it shall be deemed as barred by limitation, unless the delay is satisfactorily
explained.

The court has to keep in view two conflicting considerations in mind before hearing the plea
under this section as held in the case of Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao (2002, SC), that are
as follows:

1. As far as possible, the court would try to decide every cause on merits rather than
throwing it away on technical grounds of delay without entering into real issues in the
case.

2. The court must also consider an important aspect that non-filing of appeal or application
has created a valuable right in favour of the opposite party which cannot be defeated or
interfered with lightly.

Doctrine of Sufficient Cause under Section 5

The condition for condonation of delay is the presence of a sufficient cause which prevented
the party from doing the act in question within prescribed time. Section 5 of the Limitation Act
insists on the presence of “sufficient cause” for the delay and, therefore, the party seeking
condonation of delay must show that in fact there was a sufficient cause for the delay as held
in the case of Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields (1962, SC).

The party seeking condonation of delay must place before the Court the relevant facts on the
basis of which the Court may infer whether there was sufficient cause for delay. If the party
fails to show sufficient cause and relies merely on the general principles, the Court may not
condone the delay for want of sufficient justification.

The expression “sufficient cause” has not been expressly defined in the Act. It is, however,
very wide, comprehensive and elastic in nature. It is also construed liberally by the courts as to
advance the cause of justice as held by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Howrah
Municipality (1972). The question whether there was "sufficient cause" in not preferring an
appeal or application depends upon the facts and circumstances of each cause, and no rule of
universal application can be laid down as held in the case of.

However, the court should use this discretionary power in a judicious manner. The Supreme
Court in Baswaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer (2013) held observed that sufficient cause
cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, in-action, or want of bona fides is attributable to
the party om delay. Though, the limitation harshly affects rights of a party, but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when prescribed by a statute.

It is not sufficient for the party claiming indulgence from the Court to prove existence of
sufficient cause for delay but also he has to show reasonable diligence in prosecuting the
proceedings.

Principles laid down by the SC

In Collector (LA) v. Katiji (1987), the Supreme Court laid down the following principles, while
dealing with an appeal or application not preferred within the period of limitation:

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the
very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is
condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after
hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should
be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be
applied in a rational, common-sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable
negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting
to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.
 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise
injustice on technical grounds, but because it is capable of removing injustice and is
expected to do so.

Discretionary Power Of The Court

Section 5 does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain
limit. The number of days of delay does not matter, the court has to look whether the aggrieved
party is able to reasonably justify the time of delay. Sometimes the delay of shortest range may
be unpardonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of
very long period can be condoned where the explanation thereof is satisfactory as held by the
Supreme Court in the case of N Balakrishnan v M Krishna Murthy (1998).

An order made by the court under section 5 of the Limitation Act condoning the delay without
assigning any reasons and particularly without recording the satisfaction of the Court as to the
sufficient cause cannot be said to be in accordance with law. Such an order is liable to be set
aside.

Discretion is conferred on the Court before which an application for condoning delay is made
and if the Court officer keeping in view relevant principles exercises its discretion granting
relief, unless it is shown to be manifestly unjust or perverse, the Supreme Court would be
loathed to interfere with it as held in the case of VTV Rangacharyulu v Sriram Gnaneswar
(1976).

The second consideration is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is
given to the Court to condone delay. In other words, even though sufficient cause for
condonation of delay is shown, nevertheless, the Court has still to exercise its discretion
whether it should condone delay or not having regard to the past conduct of the party seeking
condonation.

LEGAL DISABILITY [S.6]

Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1963 provides that no limitation will apply to a case in which
person seeing was disqualified at the time when the cause of action arose provided the suit is
brought within 3 years of the time when the disqualification cease. Section 6 of the said Act
gives minors or lunatics an extended period for filing a suit or application.

Limitation begins to run from the date of accrual of cause of action but section 6 of the
Limitation Act is one of the exceptions to this general rule. Under these exceptional
circumstances, the period of limitation does not run from the date of accrual of the cause of
action but runs from the subsequent date, for example, the date on which disabilities ceases.

Scope

1. It is applicable only to suits or application for execution of decrees.

2. It is not applicable to the cases for which a period of limitation is not prescribed by
other Acts.

3. It is not applied to minors entitled to prefer an appeal.

Ingredients for application of the section are.—

(a) The applicant entitled to sue or apply should be under disability.

(b) The disability should be minority, insanity or idiocy.

(c) The proceeding should be either a suit or an application for execution of decree.

(d) The limitation for such a period should have been prescribed in the third column of the
schedule to this Act.

(e) The applicant should be one entitled to sue or apply at the time from which the period
prescribed to be reckoned.

(f) At the time for which the period is to be reckoned, disability should have existed.

Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Limitation Act must be read together. Section 8 imposes a limitation
on concessions provided under sections 6 and 7 to a person under a disability to a maximum
of three years after the cessation of the disability.
Illustrations

(a) The right to sue for the hire of a boat accrues to A during his minority, He attains
majority four years after such accruer. He may institute his suit at any time within three years
from the date of his attaining majority.

(b) right to sue accrues to Z during his minority. After accruer but while Z is still a minor, he
becomes insane. Time runs against Z from the date when his insanity and minority cease.

(c) right to sue accrues to X during his minority. X dies before attaining majority, and is
succeeded by Y, his minor son. Time runs against Y from the date of his attaining majority.”

This section applies to suits to be brought by minors or persons under disability and not to suits
against them; suits against persons under disability must be instituted within the ordinary
period. Further, this section applies only to suits and applications for execution of decrees. It
makes no reference to appeal. Hence, a minor or insane appellant cannot claim the benefit of
this section as held.

Execution of Decree Holder-Limitation

Where decree-holder dies leaving behind minor son, limitation begins to run from the date of
decree. The execution petition filed by son after three years from the date of decree was held
barred by limitation though filed within three years of attaining majority.

The legal position under section 6 is that where the decree-holder happens to be a minor, he is
entitled to apply for execution within three years after attaining majority. But where a decree
is passed in favour of minor’s father, the limitation starts from the date of decree and even if
the decree-holder dies leaving behind him the minor, the limitation continues to run from the
date of decree and as such the execution petition filed by the minor beyond the period of
limitation from the date of the decree, but within three years after attaining majority becomes
barred by the limitation, since nothing stops the limitation when once it begins to run as held
in the case of Kammili Venkataratnam v Kammili Krishna Murthy (1977, AP).