RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

1
People vs Opida
GR No. L-46272
June 13, 1986

Doctrine:
Due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. 1 Bolstering
this requirement, we have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just. 2 The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process.
This guaranty was not observed in this case.

Facts:
On July 31, 1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian Galvan,
stoned and hit him with beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed him to death. The
actual knife-wielder was identified as Mario del Mundo. Nonetheless, Alberto Opida and
Virgilio Marcelo were charged with murder as conspirators and, after trial, sentenced to
death.
The basis of their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two prosecution
witnesses, neither of whom positively said that the accused were at the scene of the
crime, their extrajudicial confessions, which were secured without the assistance of
counsel, and corroboration of the alleged conspiracy under the theory of interlocking
confession.

Issue:
Whether the appellants were tried by an impartial judge.

Held:
No. Convictions are based not on the mere appearance of the accused but on his
actual commission of crime to be ascertained with the pure objectivity of the true judge
who must uphold the law for all without favor or malice and always with justice. The
accused are admittedly notorious criminals who were probably even proud of their
membership in a gang even as they flaunted their tattoos as a badge of notoriety.
Nevertheless, they were entitled to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and
had a right not to be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
2. People vs Angus
GR 178778
DOCTRINE
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – The following are the requisites for circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to support conviction: (a) there is more than one (1)
circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, is the one (1) who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify
a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must
be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.
ARTICLE 246, RPC - Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.
The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.
An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused’s
innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence
of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. And, if the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one (1) of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction. That which is favorable to the accused should be considered. After all, mas
vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente. Courts
should be guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten (10) men who
might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one (1) innocent man for a
crime he did not commit.
FACTS
Appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. was charged in an Information. Upon arraignment,
appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following facts at the pre-trial, to wit:
That the accused and the victim were legally married and That the incident happened on
January 10, 2002, at the Lanisi Patrol Base, Lanisi, Claveria, Misamis Oriental.
Angus was found guilty of crime of Parricide.
Appellant interposed an appeal to this Court. Pursuant to People v. Mateo, which modified
Rules 122, 124 and 125 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, insofar
as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was
referred to the CA for intermediate review.
The CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the RTC. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the accused is entitled to be presumed innocent until otherwise proven.
RULING
YES. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to
overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence
required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on the strength of its own evidence and
must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet its
burden of proof, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf.
In such cases the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.
The evidence in this case shows that Betty arrived at the camp at around 7:00 o’clock in
the evening of January 9, 2002. Witnesses heard Betty and the appellant arguing over
the latter’s illicit relationship with another woman. The following day, appellant went out
of his bunker at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning. He had breakfast at the mess area
with his companions, but went back to his bunker at around 8:00 o’clock to ask his wife
to join them for breakfast. When he returned, he told his men that his wife could not join
them for breakfast because she was still asleep. At around 10:00 a.m., appellant returned
to his bunker followed by Malaran who saw the dead body of the victim.
The Court is not satisfied that the circumstantial evidence in this case constitutes an
unbroken chain which leads to the conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others,
is guilty of killing his wife. The trial court relied on the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio
who heard the appellant and his wife arguing about the latter’s illicit relationship with
another woman, which supposedly proves motive for him to commit the crime. However,
granting that appellant and Betty had an argument on the night before her death, it would
be too much to presume that such an argument would drive appellant to kill his wife.
Clearly, the motive is not convincing. If at all, the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio
merely show a suspicion of appellant’s responsibility for the crime. Needless to state,
however, suspicion no matter how strong can not sway judgment. In the absence of any
other evidence reasonably linking appellant to the crime, evidence of motive is not
sufficient to convict him.

People v Sunga
People v Sunga
G.R. No. 126029
March 27, 2003

FACTS:

That on or about June 29, 1994 in the afternoon Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio
Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice
by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN,
a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her against
her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said rape and to enable them to
conceal the commission of the crime, the herein accused in furtherance of the conspiracy
together with LOCIL CUI, a minor, acting with discernment and who cooperated in the
execution of the offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, taking advantage of their superior number and strength, with intent to kill,
treacherously attack, assault, and use personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by
repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on her head, thereby inflicting upon her mortal
wounds and multiple fractures on her skull which were the direct cause of her death
shortly thereafter.

On October 18, 1994 a motion to discharge accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a state witness,
averring therein that the legal requisites for her discharge had been complied with, and
submitting her sworn statement which detailed how her co-accused carried out the
crime.

Her version of the facts is as follows:

"At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle bearing the marking "Ryan-
Ryan" from the Social Security System (SSS) Office in Puerto Princesa City. Already on
board the tricycle was a lesbian who had a birthmark on the right side of the face and who
invited Locil for a joy ride.13 Upon instruction of the lesbian, the tricycle driver, whom she
did not know but whom she later identified and who answered to the name Rey Sunga
(Sunga), repaired to the Mendoza Park.

At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan, the victim, who was
dressed in a PINS uniform. The lesbian, together with Jocelyn, then joined Locil aboard
the tricycle which was already driven by Inocencio Pascua (Pascua) vice Sunga who had
in the meantime left. Still aboard the tricycle, the four of them proceeded to and reached
Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City and on reaching a forested area, Jocelyn was met
by Sunga who held her and by Ramil Lansang (Lansang) who wrapped his arm around
her waist as they dragged her to a nearby "buho" clumps. There, Jocelyn was made to
lie down. Her skirt was raised and her panty was taken off by Lansang. As she lay face
up with both her hands held by Sunga and Pascua, Lansang stripped naked, placed
himself on top of Jocelyn, inserted his penis into her vagina and "seemed to be
pumping."

After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn as Lansang and
one who was not known to Locil and whom the latter described as one who has "chinky"
or "narrow eyes," later identified to be Pascua, kept Jocelyn pinned down by her hands.

Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all along struggled
against her malefactors.

After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed weapon, stabbed the abdomen
of the motionless Jocelyn, drawing her to rise to a sitting position and clutch her abdomen.
Sunga then passed on the bladed weapon to Lansang who smashed Jocelyn's head with
an irregularly shaped stone, causing her to fall to the ground lifeless. Locil, who witnessed
everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and led back into the tricycle where they
awaited Lansang, Sunga and Pascua to ride with them. All five thereafter headed back to
Puerto Princesa City proper, leaving Jocelyn's body behind.

When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she heard the voice of
someone from inside the tricycle warning her to keep mum about the incident, otherwise
something would also happen to her. Locil then repaired to her boarding house. Until she
was arrested following the discovery on July 12, 1994 of Jocelyn's corpse, she did not
report the incident to anyone."

Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi.

Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for robbery with homicide,
denied having anything to do with the rape and killing of Jocelyn. He branded as false the
testimony of Locil whom he claimed is a prostitute and a pimp and was always seen
loitering at Mendoza Park. Through a sworn statement, he averred that: He, Octa and
Jun returned to Irawan, took Jocelyn's corpse and dumped it at a coffee plantation in
Jacana Road; and that he did not take part in the rape or killing of Jocelyn but merely
joined the group due to Lansang's promise to give him P500.00.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC: By decision of March 7, 1996, the trial court
convicted Sunga and Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and
sentenced each to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as principal in the crime of
Rape. While the others are acquitted and Locil is discharged as state witness.

Automatic review by SC.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a state witness is
in accordance with law; and

(2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt

(3) Is Sunga's sworn statement admissible as evidence?

HELD:

The accused were acquitted.

(1) NO.

Requisites: 1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state
witness; - YES

2. his testimony is absolutely necessary; - YES

Based on Locil's sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what happened to
Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable.

3. No other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed except his testimony; - YES

4. His testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points; - NO

a. As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails to corroborate Locil's testimony. The
declarations of other witnesses can in no way enhance the veracity of the essential,
material aspects of Locil's account for they relate --- not to the crime itself but to events
THEREAFTER.

An exhaustive review of the transcript of stenographic notes of Locil's testimony reveals,

however, that the manner by which she related it was punctuated with marks of
tentativeness, uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately failed to
take note of in its decision on review.

b. To recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994 she boarded a tricycle bearing a
lesbian who invited her for a joyride, proceeded to the Mendoza Park and picked up
Jocelyn, whom she was not acquainted with, then brought by the same tricycle to Irawan
where the latter was raped and brutally murdered. In other words, she wanted to convey
that she was deliberately brought by appellants with them on June 29, 1994 to the place
where they were to carry out, which they did, their abominable acts against Jocelyn. This
strikes this Court as improbable if not bizarre.

5. He does not appear to be the most guilty; and. - YES

6. He has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. - -YES

But -- Who can trust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in
a boarding house albeit she has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries
an alias name to evade being traced by her mother and aunt?

(2) NO, see items 1 and 2.

In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as well as of denial
by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely when the prosecution's case is weak
that the defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal
liability.

In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants' alibi, the prosecution still has the
onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused and cannot rely on the
weakness of the defense evidence. The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden,
appellants' presumed innocence remains and must thus be acquitted.

NO.
Appellant Sunga’s two extrajudicial confessions, which strictly speaking were admissions
for they referred to statements of fact which did not directly involve an acknowledgement
of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he was charged, could
have lent corroborative support to Locil’s testimony, having likewise given details of how
the crime took place. Contrary, however, to the trial court’s ruling, this Court finds Sunga’s
admissions to be inadmissible in evidence not only against him but also against his co-
accused appellants.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

A person under investigation for the
commission of an offense is guaranteed the following rights by the Constitution: (1) the
right to remain silent; (2) the right to have competent and independent counsel of his own
choice, and to be provided with one if he cannot afford the services of counsel; and (3)
the right to be informed of these rights. 74

The right to counsel was denied. Sunga
during his execution of Exhibit "A" — admission before the police on the ground that the
counsel who assisted him, Atty. Agustin Rocamora, was the City Legal Officer of Puerto
Princesa.

From the testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty. Rocamora (Sunga's
counse during custodial investigation) did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights
and options prior to giving his (Sunga's) admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without
more, merely acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from Sunga.

Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may

appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an
independent counsel must be struck down as inadmissible. Even if the confession
contains a grain of truth or even if it had been voluntarily given, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible.

The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or
the mere propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient
and decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.

The waiver by Sunga of his right to counsel as contained in his sworn statement-Exhibit
"I" was not a valid waiver for, on its face, it was executed not in the presence of counsel,
contrary to the express requirement of the Constitution. 84

Sunga having had no
counsel when he made his admission before the NBI and his waiver of the right to have
one being invalid, his statement-Exhibit "I" is inadmissible.

RATIO:
(1) The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state witness may
suffice to convict his co-accused if it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward
manner and is full of details which by their nature could not have been the result of
deliberate afterthought; otherwise, it needs corroboration the presence or lack of which
may ultimately decide the cause of the prosecution and the fate of the accused.

(2) The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-
conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and
without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed
or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially
corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances
and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest.

a. Was Locil's testimony corroborated in its material points by the prosecution's other
evidence? - NO

b. If in the affirmative, was the corroborative evidence unimpeachable testimony and

strong circumstances to such an extent that Locil's trustworthiness becomes manifest? -
NO

In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be at least two proven

circumstances which in complete sequence lead to no other logical conclusion than that
of the guilt of the accused. [This was not present in this case]

NOTES:

(1) Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself
to elicit incriminating statements.
4. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

Facts:

Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An
Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.

On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through
any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means
thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:

1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness

2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions

3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code.

Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations

against petitioner.

Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,

reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable
cause but was denied.

Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the
arrest of the accused.

Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that
the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which
it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

2. Whether the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder leads to its violation of the right of the accused to due
process.

3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it

is within the power of Congress to classify it as such.

RULE:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms sovague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.

The over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of a possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. This rationale does NOT
apply to penal statutes.

HELD:

1. NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the employment
of general terms or the failure to define the terms used therein. The validity of a law is
sustained, so long as that law provides some comprehensible guide as to what would
render those subject to the said law liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on
the void-for-vagueness doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely
consist of imprecise language.

2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to
be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Thus he is entitled to an acquittal unless
the State succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the accused withproof beyond
reasonable doubt. The contention that Sec. 4 of RA 7080 does away with proof of each
and every component of the crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each and
every criminal act done, it is enough that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the crime as a whole.

3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The legislative
declaration in RA No. 7659 (which has been declared as constitutionally valid in a
previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.

DISPOSITIVE:

Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to declare the
law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

5.
RE: Request for Live Coverage of the Trial of Former President Joseph Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001

FACTS:
On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the
country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President
Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request
was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and,
still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001,
the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.
ISSUE:

Whether media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public.

HELD:
NO. In Estes v. Texas, US The Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal defendant:
"Witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous. They are then
subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect their testimony.
Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects
him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his
defense. Finally, the television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or
inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public."
The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in the
courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more judicial
means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process rights of the accused
shall take precedence over the people's right to information. The accused has the right to
a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is his life and
liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized trial.
IBP in its Resolution of 16 Apri1 2001 :” Live television and radio coverage can negate
the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial; at
stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very
credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage
of the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging
the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular;
and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but
will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.”
Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance forthwith the
life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample
safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is
a price too high to pay.
6
Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against
Maguindanao Gov. Zaldy Ampatuan, et al.
AM No. 10-11-5-SC
June 14, 2011

Doctrine: A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies that the court
doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.

Facts:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners
were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst
election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the
tragic incident which came to be known as the "Maguindanao Massacre" spawned
charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197
accused.
The National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual
journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition
before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these
criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be
permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable
guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines (NPC) and Alyansa
ng Filipinong Mamamahayag (AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition praying that
the Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to focus only on
the Maguindanao Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned
duties, and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video
cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside
the court.

IN SHORT FOR RECIT:

Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage
of court proceedings. They state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has
attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of
the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are
being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and
that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of
media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reported for
each media institution.

Issue:
Whether the court should grant the petitioner’s prayer for a live broadcast of the
trial court proceedings

Held:
The court partially granted pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer for a live broadcast of
the trial court proceedings. One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao
Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even
the parties to the cases, the private complainants or families of the victims and other
witnesses inside the courtroom.
Even before considering what is a reasonable number of the public who may
observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the
proceeding already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be
gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest
beyond mere curiosity to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded
parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the
defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.
7. ROQUE V. OMBUDSMAN
GR 129978
DOCTRINE
long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for
even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of
the information. True --- [for] the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected
by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a
device for setting back time.
x x x the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the
information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
petitioner to due process and the speedy disposition of cases against him. Accordingly,
the informations x x x should be dismissed x x x.
FACTS
Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS), assigned in Koronadal, South Cotabato, until her compulsory
retirement on May 17, 1991. Mabanglo was likewise a Schools Division Superintendent
of the DECS, assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until his compulsory retirement on
May 8, 1997.
Soriano and Enriquez of the COA, by virtue of COA Regional Office Assignment Order
No. 91-174 dated January 8, 1991, conducted an audit on the P9.36 million allotment
released by the DECS Regional Office No. XI to its division offices.
COA found some major deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, violations of COA Circular Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and Section
88 of Presidential Decree No. 1445.
Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao against several persons, including petitioner Mabanglo on May 7, 1991, and
against petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991.
Thereafter, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits.
OMB-MIN-91-0201, which involved petitioner Mabanglo, was resolved by the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding that all the respondents [were] probably guilty of
violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act
3019). The same was approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on September 19,
1997.

An Information dated March 18, 1997, for Violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019,
as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila, against several respondents,
among them, petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo.
Thereafter, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits.
OMB-MIN-91-0203, which involved petitioner Roque, was resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman-MIndanao, recommending the filing [of cases] and prosecution of all the
respondents for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act 3019. The same was
approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on August 22, 1997.
Two Informations similarly dated April 30, 1997, for violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic
Act 3019, as amended, and for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic 3019, as amended,
were filed.
ISSUES
Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving [the] complaints
against petitioners (respondents therein) which violated their constitutional right to [a]
speedy disposition of cases[; and]
Whether or not, such undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving the complaints against
petitioners, would warrant dismissal of said complaints.
RULING
Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsmans duty, as mandated
by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him.
More important, it violated the petitioners rights to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases filed against them. Although respondents attempted to justify the
six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy
Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost six years for the latter
to resolve the Complaints.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to
due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct
of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of speedy disposition of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
(both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioners constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.

People vs Lumague, GR No. L-53586, January 30, 1982

Facts:Respondents Lumague are siblings who are accused of killing of one Antonio
Regalado, acredit investigator of the Social Security System. Respondents had been
implicated in thekilling. Rolando Lumague had been charged with frustrated murder and
slight physical injurieswhile Ponciano Lumague was charged with frustrated homicide and
was also charged in the Provincial Fiscal’s Office of La Union with direct assault of an
agent of a person in authority and robbery. The trial court convicted Ponciano, Rolando
and Mario Lumague of murder,sentenced them to death and ordered them to pay
solidarily to the heirs of Regalado Php32,000.00 without giving them the opportunity to
defend themselves properly.
Separate Trial was made to Juanito Lumague who was later on arrested. Juanito’s
counsel did
not present any evidence during the trial and he was convicted of murder, sentenced to
deathand ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim.

Issue: W/N the court is correct in convicting all the four accused?

Held: With respect to the first three accused, the trial court erred in not allowing them to
present additional evidences in their behalf and to testify for themselves. Therefore, their
conviction is not proper. The courts should have granted their motion to present additional
evidence.With respect to the conviction of Juanito who had a separate trial, his guilt
beyond reasonable ground was proven by the prosecution which destroyed his
presumption of innocence and his conviction proper.

With respect to Juanita Lumague, who withdrew his plea of not guilty, who was tried
separately and whose guilt was also established by means of the evidence presented
against him, we find that the counsel's contentions are devoid of merit. Juanito's guilt was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. His plea of guilty and the evidence introduced by the
prosecution destroyed the presumption of innocence in his favor. There is conclusive
evidence that he was the one who stabbed Regalado. In doing so, he conspired with the
other assailants of the victim particularly with the assailant who treacherously struck
Regalado on the back with a hoe Even Juanito's mother admitted that he took part in the
assault (408-9, 413-4). And, of course, the fact that Juanita was a fugitive from justice for
several months is an indication of his guilt.The trial court correctly held that the killing was
murder qualified by treachery and abuse of superiority and aggravated by cruelty. Hence,
death is the proper penalty. Juanito's plea of guilty is not mitigating because it was made
after the prosecution had commenced the presentation of its evidence.
With respect to the other three accused, Ponciano, Mario and Rolando Lumague, who
pleaded not guilty and who were tried ahead of Juanito, there is merit in their contention
that they were denied due process of law because they were not given a chance to
testify in their behalf and to present additional evidence.
An accused has the constitutional right "to be heard by himself and counsel" and the right
"to testify as a witness in his own behalf ". The denial of such rights is a denial of due
process, as held in People vs. Santiago, 46 Phil. 734. See People vs. Abuda, L-30009,
February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 789.
Due process of law in a criminal prosecution consists of a law creating or defining the
offense, an impartial tribunal of competent jurisdiction. accusation in due form. notice and
opportunity to defend, trial according to established procedure, and discharge unless
found guilty (16A C.J.S. 617).
The constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. "No court of
justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right." (Abriol
vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 534).
Fundamental fairness, which is the essence of due process, requires that the three
accused should be allowed to testify on their defenses and to present additional evidence
to prove their innocence
9. PEOPLE vs. HOLGADO

G.R. No. L-2809. March 22, 1950

Facts:

Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the CFI of Romblon with slight illegal detention.
According to the information, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and
detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby
depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty."

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the information above described without
a counsel but the accused was only instructed to plead guilty by one Numeriano Ocampo.

It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment, the offense
charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment it is
said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention."

In the information filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado
of the crime of slight illegal detention."

The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense charged is
merely "slight illegal detention" as the offense is named therein or the capital offense of
"kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment.

Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been
presented by either party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the
facts pleaded in the information.

Issue:

Whether the accussed was sufficiently given the right to counsel.

Rule:

Under the provision of Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, when a defendant
appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: (1) It must
inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; (2) after
giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
(3) if he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio
to defend him; and 4) if the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court
must grant him a reasonable time therefor.

Our Constitution guarantees is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel."

Held:

No. The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused.

The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you
going to plead guilty?"

¬ Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an
attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could
have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilty
if he had no attorney.

¬ And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in
our Constitution.

The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real
and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the
plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the
accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a
good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court
became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and
found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong
for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a
qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the
accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and
the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by
counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness
of the offense found to be capital by the court.
Dispositive:

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below
for a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have
and to be assisted by counsel. So ordered.

10.
People of the Philippines vs. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 175929 December 16, 2008

FACTS:
On August 7, 1995, Mario Pader, Manny Viscaya and Rafael Santarin who are neighbors
and friends are conversing at the front of the barangay hall. By that time, Rommel De La
Cruz was behind them at about 2 meters. Where Vizcaya returned to the place where
Pader and Santarin were after buying cigarettes, De La Cruz came from behind and
stabbed Santarin.
Appellant’s version: He claimed that on the night of August 7, 1995, at about 7:00 p.m.,
he went to collect his fees for electrical services rendered from neighbors. It was about
that time when he passed by the group of Viscaya who were seated in front of the
barangay hall but did not join the group but went on his separate way. He went to the
houses of his “clients” to collect his fees until 8:00 p.m. He did not go home to his parent’s
house later that evening because he was angry with them and his siblings. He slept in a
parked passenger jeep that was half a kilometer away from his parent’s house. He woke
up at 3:00a.m. and took a passenger jeep bound for the pier. He took a boat to Cebu City,
arriving there the following day at about 6:00 a.m. He stayed in Cebu City for four years.
His family in Cebu City was surprised to see him when he got there.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting De La Cruz on the crime of murder on the
account of prosecution witness.
HELD:

No. The emphasis, gesture and inflection of the voice are potent aids in understanding
the testimony of witnesses as determined by the RTC. Conviction can still be had on the
basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. No rule exists which
requires a testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. Witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered. Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on
the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where
such testimony is found positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone
testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction. Although the number of witnesses may be
considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with
the greatest number. That Viscaya did not see the weapon used does not impair his
credibility. As he explained, he failed to see the weapon used to stab Santarin because
the incident happened so fast. There is neither jurisprudence nor rules of evidence that a
witness’ credibility is affected if there is failure to see the weapon used in the commission
of the crime. To rule along the twisted logic of appellant could be absurd.

Viscaya was unrelenting in positively identifying appellant as the one who stabbed
Santarin. Note that Viscaya and appellant were neighbors for about fifteen (15)years.
There could have been no mistake in
Viscaya’s identification of appellant as the assailant. It is settled that when conditions of
visibility are favorable, and when the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion
as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Absent any evidence
showing any reason and motive for the witness to prevaricate, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists, and the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
Appellant has not presented any shred of evidence that Viscaya was impelled byan
improper motive in identifying him as the assailant. When appellant was asked why hewas
charged with the killing of his first cousin, all he could say was “hindi ko po alam sa kanila.”
Appellant’s claim that Viscaya had an evil motive in testifying against him because they
had a previous misunderstanding is too flimsy an excuse.
Appellant’s denial and alibi are not worthy of belief. It is an oft-quoted doctrine that positive
identification prevails over denial and alibi. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, appellant must establish that:
(a)he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and
(b) he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the
crime, or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission.
Appellant does not dispute that he was near the scene of the crime on August 7, 1995. It
was not also physically impossible for him to have been the author of the crime, and after,
hide to avoid being prosecuted. In fact, during cross-examination, appellant explicitly
admitted that the distance from where he slept and place of the stabbing incident was
only for a short distance. Another circumstance which glaringly points to the guilt of
appellant is his flight,not only from the scene of the crime, but also from the clutches of
the authorities. Flight of an accused from the scene of the crime removes any remaining
shred of doubt on his guilt. Indeed, the wicked flee, when no man pursueth, but the
innocent are bold as a lion.
11
People vs Espejon
GR No. 134767
February 20, 2002

Facts:
Appellant raped his daughter, Jovielyn, several times on separate occasions and
days while his wife is attending to the wake of her father. Sometime in 1996, the older
sister of Jovielyn, Lilibeth, came home from Manila. Their mother was very happy to see
her and so she asked her to stay but Lilibeth declined and told her mother the truth why
she left for Manila. She has been raped by his father twice, one when she was 7 years
old, and the other one is when she was 14 years old. Upon hearing this, Jovielyn had the
courage to tell her mother about her ordeal. Her mother then brought her and her sister,
Lilibeth, for medical examination and filed rape charges against the accused. An
information was filed bearing the dates: “that sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent
thereto” and “that sometime in the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto”.

Issues:
Whether the appellant was deprived of the opportunity to defend himself fully by
reason that the Information had not specifically alleged the exact date of the commission
of the crime.

Held:
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense
and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a
crime is not an essential element of it. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact
or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its
commission. The failure to specify the exact date or time when it was committed does not
ipso facto make the information defective on its face.
Thus, the validity of the Information cannot be successfully assailed by the
appellant on the basis of the prosecution’s failure to allege the specific actual date of the
rape. In fact, this court has ruled that even a variance of a few months between the time
indicated in the information and that established by the evidence during the trial does not
constitute an error so serious as to warrant a reversal of a conviction solely on that score.
Having satisfactorily established the fact that appellant had sexual intercourse with
his daughter against her will at or about the time alleged in the Information, the
prosecution is entitled to a conviction. To reiterate, the exact date of the commission of
the crime is not an essential element of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is the fact
of having had carnal knowledge of a woman by means of force or intimidation.
 However, the court agreed with the appellant that the trial court erred in imposing
the death penalty on the ground that the minority of the victim had not been alleged in the
Information. This court has consistently held that the minority of the victim must be alleged
in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during the trial. Failure to allege
the age of the victim will preclude a conviction for qualified rape and will bar the imposition
of the death penalty.
Thus, the appealed decision is modified. Appellant is guilty of simple rape only.

12. Tilendo vs Ombudsman

GR NO. 129978
May 12, 1999

Facts:
In December 1998, the Concerned Faculty Members of the Cotabato City State
Polytechnic College (CCSPC) filed before the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against
Tilendo for violation of RA 3019. They alleged that he enriched himself and his family
while he was the President of CCSPC using government funds for personal purposes.
The complaint likewise accused Tilendo of diverting and misusing the funds allocated for
the construction of the CCSPC Agricultural Building. Instead of utilizing the allotment for
putting-up the agricultural building, he only instructed his nephew to buy steel bars,
cement, sand, and gravel and hollowblocks while other materials were taken from the
scrap materials of the demolished academic school building.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is not accorded his right to speedy disposition of the case.

Held:
Yes. Tilendo’s contention of violation of his right to speedy disposition of case must
fail. There was no unreasonable and unjustifiable delay which attended the resolution of
the complaints against him in the preliminary investigation phase. The right to a speedy
disposition of cases is enshrined in the Constitution which provides that, all persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. This right however, is considered violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, which are
absent in this case.
 The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible. A simple
mathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient. The facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case must be examined in ascertaining whether the right
to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following must be considered: 1)
the length of delay; 2) the reason of the delay; 3) the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and 4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
In this case, there was no unreasonable delay to speak of because the preliminary
investigation stage officially began when the NBI filed before the Ombudsman a complaint
against Tilendo for violation of the relevant provision of RA 3019 and the RPC. Contrary
to Tilendo’s view, the preliminary investigation did not automatically commence upon the
filing of the anonymous letters in the Ombudsman.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PROCORO J. DONATO,
respondents. G.R. No. 79269 June 5, 1991

FACTS: In the original Information filed on 2 October 1986, later amended in an Amended
Information which was filed on 24 October 1986 in the RTC of Manila, private respondent
Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime
of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code. At the
time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in military
custody following their arrest; he had earlier escaped from military detention and a cash
reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his capture. A day after the filing of the original
information a petition for habeas corpus for private respondent and his coaccused was
filed with this Court which was dismissed on the basis of the agreement of the parties
under which herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face trial
before the court having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-
accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.”
Private respondent filed a petition for bail, which petitioner opposed in an on the ground
that since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the
accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong. On 5 June 1987 the
President issued E.O. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and
restoring to full force and effect Article 135. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored. Hence, respondent judge
granted the bail of the private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of bail was valid, and whether there was a valid waiver
of his right to bail
HELD: I. NO. Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.
It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. And so, in a similar case for
rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact that the accused
was already convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life
imprisonment, We granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency of his
appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous stand of the People that We must deny bail
to the accused because the security of the State so requires, and because the judgment
of conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail
becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The
court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But
once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter
of right. Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the
denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where
the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given
an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to
introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. It must be stressed that
under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer punishable by prision mayor and
fine. Republic Act No. 6968 amended Article 135 of the RPC increasing once again the
penalty of rebellion to reclusion perpetua. However, RA 6968 cannot be given retroactive
effect since it is infavorable to the respondents.

II. YES. We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right
to bail in G.R. No. 76009. When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that: “Petitioner
Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody
over his person.” They simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain
in actual physical custody of the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as
distinguished from the stipulation concerning his copetitioners, who were to be released
in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them. They agreed, however, "to
submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be
made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal
custody and court having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court
having jurisdiction over the persons of his coaccused. Such a fine distinction was
precisely intended to emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released,
but should remain in custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or had this been
unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a
clearer language.

NOTE: Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or
guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is
not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others,
or would be against public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.

14. People vs. Liwanag

GR No. L-27683 October 19, 1976

Facts:

In June 1942, accused Silvestre Liwanag, who grew up from the fams of Pampanga, fired
by patriotic fervor, joined HUKBALAHAP. He held the position of commander of Squadron
18-E with the station in Lubao, Pampanga until 1944, when he was promoted to the rank
of military inspector, a position he held until liberation when the organization was
disbanded. Before the national elections of 1946, the Hukbalahap was revived. The
accused was designated provincial commander for Pampanga and later as vice
commander of the Central Luzon Regional Command (CLRC).

In 1948, CPP held a conference in the mountains of Norzagaray, Bulacan attended by

the accused. In that conference, it was also agreed to change the name of "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or HMB. Being a member of the Hukbalahap and the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the accused was designated as
supervisor and adviser to Squadron 18 of Field Command (FC) of the HMB operating in
the province of Bataan until early in 1956. Among his duties were to see to it that orders
and directives coming from the Regional Command (RECO) 2, comprising the provinces
of Bataan, Zambales, Pampanga, Tarlac, Pangasinan and Bulacan, are obeyed and
implemented. The accused upon orders of his superior, planned and effected the capture
of Orani, Bataan in 1949 and Camp Makabolos in Tarlac on August 26, 1950.

In February, 1958, the accused and his men had an encounter with Government forces
in Magalang, Pampanga. The HMB sustained three casualties, while the Government had
two, including a P.C. lieutenant. The HMB under the command of the appellant retreated
to San Fernando, Pampanga, where they stayed until about the last part of March 1958,
when they again had an encounter with the P.C. and had to retreat to Bataan.

After this encounter, the accused asked for, and was granted, leave to rest and recuperate
from his ailment which he spent in the mountain of Bataan. Although on leave, his advice
was sought after.

In the evening of June 21, 1960, a PC patrol led by then Major Wilfredo Encarnacion
captured the accused and his wife, Rosita Manuel, in their hideout at Barrio Kalungusan,
Orion, Bataan.

For violation of the provisions of RA 1700, Silvestre Liwanag was charged in an

information filed before the CFI of Bataan, for having unlawfully and wilfully continued and
remained as officer and/or ranking leader of the outlawed Communist Party of the
Philippines and its military arm, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, until his
apprehension on June 21, 1960, without having renounced his aforementioned
leadership and/or membership therein within the period prescribed by law, and, while
remaining as such leader or high-ranking member, has taken up arms against the
Government by making and conducting raids, ambuscades and armed attacks against
civilians, Philippine Constabulary, and local police forces.

On April 14, 1961, the appellant filed a motion to quash the information upon the grounds
that the defendant has been previously convicted of rebellion based upon the same overt
acts as in the instant case, and that RA No. 1700 is an ex post facto law (bill of attainder)
in that it changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment or penalty than that
annexed to the crime when committed. The court denied the motion on September 11,
1961.

At the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution who testified at the preliminary investigation
were recalled and were again cross-examined by counsel for the appellant. To bolster
their case, the prosecution presented 3 additional witnesses. The defense, on the other
hand, presented the appellant himself who stated that after his apprehension, he was
charged with rebellion before the CFI of Pampanga and found guilty thereof; and he was
also charged with murder before the CFI of Tarlac and acquitted; and that he surrendered
to the PC patrol at Calungusan, Orion, Bataan on June 21, 1960.

On being cross-examined by the court, however, the appellant admitted membership in

the Hukbalahap, and later in the HMB, from 1948 to 1960, and did not take advantage of
the amnesty offered in 1948.

The trial court rendered the decision finding the accused guilty.

Issues:

1. Whether Liwanag was deprived of his fundamental right to confront the witnesses
against him.

2. Whether the "two-witness" rule on the same overt act has not been observed and
complied with in convicting him.

3. Whether Liwanag, since he had already been convicted of rebellion, cannot now be
prosecuted for subversion.

Held:

1. NO. The Constitution guarantees an accused person the right to meet the
witnesses against him fact of face. This provision "intends to secure the accused in the
right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such
witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their opportunity of cross-
examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions
or ex-parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the
recollection of the witnesses in the exercise of the right of cross-examination."

Here, the testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-parte
affidavits, but testimony of witnesses taken down by question and answer during
the preliminary investigation in the presence of the accused and his counsel who
subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination. The inclusion
of said testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to further cross-examine
the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduce and, pursuant to said order,
the witnesses were recalled to the stand during the trial and again examined in the
presence of the appellant. Upon the fact, there was no curtailment of the constitutional
right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face.

2. The "two-witness" rule was observed. The law adverted to, Section 7 of RA No.
1700, provides that "No person shall be convicted of any of the offenses penalized herein
with prision mayor to death unless on the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same
overt act or on confession of the accused in open court."

The offense is punishable by prision mayor to death if the offender is an officer or ranking
leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any subversive association a
defined in Section 2 of RA No. 1700; or if such member takes up arms against the
Government.

Here, appellant's being an officer or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its military arm, the HMB, is borne out by the testimony of Santos
Miguel, Melencio Guevara, Pablo Guintu, and Lazaro Esteban, former associates of
the appellant in the CPP and the HMB. In addition, there is his sworn statement wherein
the appellant admitted membership in the Central Committee of the CPP and recounted
his prismatic rise in the "Hukbalahap" and later in the HMB, as well as the numerous
armed clashed he and his men had with the Philippine Constabulary and police forces.
There is also the testimony of Pablo Guintu, Melencio Guevara, and Sgt. Sales
Cresencia as to the gun battle between a PC patrol and a group of HMB men led by
the appellant on June 8, 1960, in Mt. Timak, Abucay, Bataan, and on June 21, 1960, in
Calungusan, Orion, Bataan, where the appellant was captured along with his wife.

Besides, appellant admitted in court that he was a member of the "Hukbalahap"

and later the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or HMB and fought against the
government.
3. Violation of RA No. 1700, or subversion, is a crime distinct from that of actual
rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms
against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (RA No. 1700) punishes affiliation or
membership in a subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be
a public uprising and the taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion,
mere membership in a subversive association is sufficient, and the taking up of arms by
a member of a subersive organization against the Government is but a circumstance
which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.

In the rebellion case, the appellant and several others were charged and convicted of
rebellion for having risen publicly and taken up arms against the Government for the
purpose of removing the allegiance of the Republic of the Philippines or its law, the
territory of the Philippines, and in furtherance thereof, engaged in combat against the
forces of the Government, destroyed property, and committed serious violence during the
period from May 28, 1946 to June 19, 1957.

In the instant case, however, the accused is prosecuted under RA No. 1700 for having
remained a high ranking member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military
arm, the HMB, from January, 1946 to June 21, 1960, without having renounced his
membership in said organizations; and, being a member or officer of said subversive
association, has taken up arms against the Government.

Although the information charges the appellant with having taken up arms against
the Government, the same is not specific as to the period covered by it. But, since
the appellant is prosecuted for violation of RA No. 1700 it is deducible that the
period covered is that from June 20, 1957, when the Act took effect, up to June 21,
1960, when the appellant was captured. Inasmuch as the rebellion case covered the
period up to June 19, 1957 and the period covered in the instant case is from June 20,
1957 to June 21, 1960, the claim of having been put twice in jeopardy for the same act
cannot be sustained.

Dispositive:

UPON THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is, hereby
affirmed, with costs.
WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, HABEAS DATA

1.
Tijing v. CA
G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001

FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their
youngest child, Edgardo Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the
petition and ordered Angelita Diamante to immediately release the child, now named John
Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over to his parents. CA reversed and set aside the
decision rendered by the lower court. It questioned the propriety of the habeas corpus in
this case.

ISSUE:
Whether habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the minor.

RULING:
Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from
the persons entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to
enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody
of a third person of his own free will. It must be stressed out that in habeas corpus
proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual
presumption, including those as identity of the person.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the
parents and by the witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of
Angelita. Furthermore, there are no clinical records, log book or discharge from the clinic
where John Thomas was allegedly born were presented. Strong evidence directly proves
that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not capable of siring a child. Moreover, his
first marriage produced no offspring even after almost 15 years of living together with his
legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.
The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by
Thomas Lopez, the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the
attending physician or midwife in attendance of the birth should cause the registration of
such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of
his child. Certificate must be filed with the LCR within 30 days after the birth. The status
of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate were typed in as legally married, which is
false because Angelita herself had admitted that she is a "common-law wife."
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in
court, the two had strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and
his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Lastly, the
spouses presented clinical records and testimony of the midwife who attended
Bienvenida's childbirth.

2
In Re: Azucena L. Garcia
GR No. 141443
August 30, 2000

Facts:
Garcia petitions this court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in order to free, relieve,
and exonerate her from the penalty of imprisonment adjudged and imposed upon her, in
gross violation of her constitutional right to due process of law and other fundamental
rights pursuant to an allegedly void judgment rendered.
Garcia was charged with three counts of falsification of public documents in three
separate criminal information filed with the RTC, the first being for falsification of technical
description of land the other two being for falsification of declarations of real property.
She contends that where the proceedings were attended by violations of the
constitutional rights of the accused, the judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting
relief by the extraordinary legal remedy of habeas corpus.

Issue:
Whether the writ of habeas corpus must be granted.

Held:
 No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to
inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the
detainee. However, it is equally well-settled that the writ will not issue where the person
in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
and the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment or make
the order.
In the case at bar, petitioner can no longer seek relief via a petition for habeas
corpus having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of falsification of public
document and use thereof. Said judgment is already final and executory.

3. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG

KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP vs. JOVY
CABCABAN
UDK NO. 14817
DOCTRINE
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available,
not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor.
FACTS
Shirly Vingson (Petitioner) alleged that her daughter, Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang Ko)
ran away from home. Petitioner received an information from the police station in Bacolod
City that Shang Ko was in the custody of Jovy Cabcaban (Respondent), who was a police
officer in the said station. Since the Respondent would not release Shang Ko to her, the
former sought help from the NBI, who in turn, told her that the latter is in a private
organization, Calvary Kids.

Petitioner filed a petition for Habeas Corpus against the Respondent and the unnamed
officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City, because of several threats against her life in the said city.

The CA denied her petition for failure to clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko. The
former also denied the latter’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is available in the case.

RULING:

YES. Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is
available also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that
parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to
intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and
abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that
they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly
counseled.
Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod
City, it would be best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in that city.
Meantime, considering the presumption that the police authorities acted regularly in
placing Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids the Court believes that she should remain
there pending hearing and adjudication of this custody case. Besides she herself has
expressed preference to stay in that place.
4. G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985 LAURENTE C. ILAGAN et al. vs. HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE et al. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements
of the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly
issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the
IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. Thereafter, two other petitioners were arrested
for the same cause.
This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested
lawyers hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests
were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis
of Mission Orders. and that there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers
involved in national security cases.
On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for
hearing on May 23, 1985. Respondents contend that the lawyers were arrested due to
basis of a PDA issued by the President on January 25, 1985 and that the lawyers played
active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners herein were denied of their constitutional right to due process and
the benefit of a preliminary investigation.

HELD:
If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no
preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or
the Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation /
reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment
was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. So is it
explicitly provided for by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of the Rules of Court.
The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue against the validity
of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in
order that such investigation could be conducted.
... The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be
ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view.
Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely
to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently
waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate Court.
Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.- When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the
complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without
preliminary investigation having been first conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arrested officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask
for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible
person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in
the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.

Rationale: But on October 21, 1985, the SC ruled that the petition for habeas corpus was
already moot and academic since Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were detained by virtue
of a warrant of arrest by Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to a criminal case
of rebellion filed against them before the said court. It argued that the function of a special
proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention. But because
the detained lawyers’ incarceration was already by virtue of a judicial action in relation to
a criminal case, no matter if such case was filed more than two weeks after the arrests
were made, the remedy of habeas corpus supposedly no longer applies. The SC added
that questions to the legality of the arrest or lack of preliminary investigation should be
addressed to the Davao City trial court.

5. Rubrico vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

GR No. 183871 February 19, 2013

Facts:

On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan,
was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security
Squadron (AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas,
Cavite. She was brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was
released a week after relentless interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that
she would be a military asset.
Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and
arbitrary detention and grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and
Jonathan, but nothing has happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment
incidents to the Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing
eventful resulted from their investigation.

Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which

indicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the
abduction of Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of
amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be
ordered to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of petitioners
and for the Ombudsman to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with
the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for
damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the
case of Lourdes.

The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for summary hearing and appropriate action. At the hearing conducted on
20 November 2007, the CA granted petitioner’s motion that the petition and writ be served
on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate
resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case.

On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment, dismissing
the petition with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman.

Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, as party respondent, should be dropped

from the case that was dismissed by CA.

2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition.

Held:

1. YES. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a
concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an
express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already
understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head
of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.

The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for
failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for
the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.

2. Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo

proceedings - Command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied
under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. The evolution
of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war
and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest
terms, means theresponsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international
wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of
criminal complicity.

The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,

foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As
then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal
liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.

There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of
Command Responsibility – While there are several pending bills on command
responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that
doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to
hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances,
or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it
would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command
responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through
omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach
of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of
criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule
may have been committed.

Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to

pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation
in question to its natural end – The right to security of persons is a guarantee of the
protection of one’s right by the government. And this protection includes conducting
effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the
same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in the Velasquez
Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced: [The
duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed
by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends upon
the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effective search
for the truth by the government.

The remedy of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously – The

privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights
to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality
of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in
response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal
sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of
amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court partially granted the petition for review. It issued a decision as follows:

(1) Affirming the dropping of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition;

(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon,
and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command responsibility
principle, to attach accountability and responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff
and then PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing
harassments allegedly committed against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with
respect to the Ombudsman is also affirmed for failure of the petition to allege ultimate
facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes
and the threats and harassment that followed; and

(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent
Director-General of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigations already
commenced by their respective units on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and
the alleged harassments and threats she and her daughterswere made to endure are
pursued with extraordinary diligence as required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule. The
Chief of Staff of the AFP and Director-General of the PNP are directed to order their
subordinateofficials, in particular, to do the following:

(a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of
respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro,
Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit certifications of this
determination to the OMBUDSMAN with copy furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this
Court;

(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy
and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and

(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches
of respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo
Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid inpositively identifying and locating them.The
investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of the
Decision; and within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of
Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of the PNP are likewise directed to submit a
full report of the results of the investigations to the Court, the CA,the OMB, and
petitioners.

The Supreme Court accordingly referred the case back to the CA for the purpose of
monitoring theinvestigations and the actions of the AFP and the PNP.
6.
Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo

G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Supreme Court: Petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily
heard the Original Action for Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued
a judgment which is the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

FACTS:
Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United States,
enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. On 19
May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested in the
house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions
were resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the house
and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she was informed that
she is being detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-
New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her companions and
was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of
planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle. She was interrogated and
tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her communist beliefs.
She was informed by a person named “RC” that those who tortured her came from the
“Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted because her name is included in
the “Order of Battle.”On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular
phone with a sim card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident to the group
Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family. After her
release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her. Out
of apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card.
Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and
Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military
and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government agents who
were behind her abduction and torture.On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued
the writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of
evidence and appropriate action. The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of writsof
amparo and habeas data. However, the court a quo absolved the respondents
because it was not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the abduction
and torture of Roxas.Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo
petition.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation
of the perpetrators is enough ground for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of
amparo.
3. Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation of
the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is necessary before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.

HELD:
1. No.
DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally inaccurate –
The use of the doctrine of command responsibility as justification in impleading the
respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. Such doctrine
is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a
proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.
The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy –As held in the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the
writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order
to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty or security. It does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual
liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than
in a summary amparo proceeding. However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility does not preclude impleading military or police commanders on
the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or
indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded —not actually on
the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or
at least accountability.

2. It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence.
EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS
In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence –In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded
to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the
availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of
directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of
identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based
on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to
the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.

3. Yes.
EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS
Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim isan indispensable requirement before the privilege of the
writ may be extended –An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ
may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual
or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In the
case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or threatened violation of such
right. Hence, until such time that any of the respondents were found to be actually
responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas, any inference regarding the existence
of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched,
and premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of
the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
However, it modified the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as
follows:
Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall,
under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary
steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the
petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to
petitioner’s abduction and torture.
Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor,
and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance
to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, includingbut not limited to furnishing the
latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and
torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing
laws.
Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court,
the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its
investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the
records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days
from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its
corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection
to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may
hereinafter be determined by this Court.
The Supreme Court likewise referred the case back to the Court of Appeals, for the
purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether,
in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient
evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After
making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with
recommendation to the Supreme Court for its consideration. It was declared that the
Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to
accomplish its tasks under this decision.

RIGHT TO THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

1
Tilendo vs Ombudsman
GR NO. 129978
May 12, 1999
Facts:
In December 1998, the Concerned Faculty Members of the Cotabato City State
Polytechnic College (CCSPC) filed before the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against
Tilendo for violation of RA 3019. They alleged that he enriched himself and his family
while he was the President of CCSPC using government funds for personal purposes.
The complaint likewise accused Tilendo of diverting and misusing the funds allocated for
the construction of the CCSPC Agricultural Building. Instead of utilizing the allotment for
putting-up the agricultural building, he only instructed his nephew to buy steel bars,
cement, sand, and gravel and hollowblocks while other materials were taken from the
scrap materials of the demolished academic school building.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is not accorded his right to speedy disposition of the case.

Held:
Yes. Tilendo’s contention of violation of his right to speedy disposition of case must
fail. There was no unreasonable and unjustifiable delay which attended the resolution of
the complaints against him in the preliminary investigation phase. The right to a speedy
disposition of cases is enshrined in the Constitution which provides that, all persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. This right however, is considered violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, which are
absent in this case.
The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible. A simple
mathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient. The facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case must be examined in ascertaining whether the right
to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following must be considered: 1)
the length of delay; 2) the reason of the delay; 3) the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and 4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
In this case, there was no unreasonable delay to speak of because the preliminary
investigation stage officially began when the NBI filed before the Ombudsman a complaint
against Tilendo for violation of the relevant provision of RA 3019 and the RPC. Contrary
to Tilendo’s view, the preliminary investigation did not automatically commence upon the
filing of the anonymous letters in the Ombudsman.

2. CERVANTES VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR 108595

DOCTRINE

Right to speedy disposition of case.

FACTS

On March 6, 1986, Pedro Almendras filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan (predecessor
of the Ombudsman) a sworn complaint 2 against Alejandro Tapang for falsification of
complainant’s "salaysay" alleging that Alejandro Tapang made complainant sign a piece
of paper in blank on which paper a "salaysay" was later inscribed stating that complainant
had been paid his claim in the amount of P17,594.00, which was not true. Almendras
mentioned in the complaint that he sought the help of Cervantes who worked as analyst
in the Office of Labor Arbiter Ruiz. Tapang in a counter-affidavit denied the accusations
of Almendras. Cervantes also denied the accusations against him.

On May 18, 1992, more than six (6) years after the filing of the initiatory complaint with
the Tanodbayan, Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor Luz L.
Quinones-Marcos filed with the Sandiganbayan, assigned to the First Division, an
Information charging petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes, together with Teodorico L. Ruiz and
Alejandro Tapang with violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act 3019.

On October 2, 1992, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, Manila, a "motion to defer
arraignment due to pendency of reinvestigation or motion to quash and motion to recall
warrant of arrest" on the ground that (a) petitioner filed with the office of the Special
Prosecutor a motion for reinvestigation; (b) that the case against Cervantes "has
prescribed" due to unreasonable delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation,
and (c) that the acts charged in the information do not constitute an offense.

The Sandiganbayan in a minute resolution dates December 24, 1992 denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether there was violation of accused’s right to speedy trial.

RULING

YES. It took the Special Prosecutor (succeeding the Tanodbayan) six (6) years from the
filing of the initiatory complaint before he decided to file an information for the offense with
the Sandiganbayan. The letter complaint was filed with the Tanodbayan on March 6,
1986. The affidavit of the petitioner was filed therein on October 16, 1986. The Special
Prosecutor resolved the case on May 18, 1992. In their comment to the petition at bar,
the Sandiganbayan and the Special Prosecutor try to justify the inordinate delay in the
resolution of the complaint by stating that "no political motivation appears to have tainted
the prosecution of the case" in apparent reference to the case of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,
where the Court ruled that the "long delay (three years) in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan" was violative of the Constitutional right of
"speedy disposition" of cases because "political motivations played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case."

The Special Prosecutor also cited Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan alleging that, as in Alvizo, the
petitioner herein was "insensitive to the implications and contingencies thereof by not
taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter."cralaw virtua1aw
library

We cannot accept the Special Prosecutor’s ratiocination. It is the duty of the
prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless
of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his
acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him.

Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not
quashing the information for violation of petitioner’s Constitutional right to the speedy
disposition of the case in the level of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman.
Roque vs Ombudsman (GR No. 129978. May 12, 1999)

Facts: • • •
••

Petitioners Mabanglo and Roque are Schools Division Superintendents of DECS.

Auditors from the COA conducted an audit on the P9.36 million allotment released by the
DECS Regional Office No. XI to its division offices. Auditors Soriano and Enriquez found
some major deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act No. 3019), violations of COA Circular Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order
No. 100 and Section 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 Consequently, affidavits of
complaint were filed before the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao against several
persons, including herein petitioners. The Complaint against Petitioner Mabanglo was
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao way back on May 7, 1991, and that
against Petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991. On June 11, 1991, the said Office found the
Complaints sufficient for preliminary investigation. Significantly, no action was taken until
after the lapse of almost six years. For violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019, the same
Office recommended the filing of an Information against Petitioner Mabanglo only on
March 18, 1997, and against Petitioner Roque only on April 30, 1997. On August 14,
1997, petitioners instituted the instant petition for mandamus premised on the allegation
that "after the initial Orders finding the cases proper for preliminary investigation were
issued on June 1991 and the subsequent submission of their counter-affidavits, until the
present, or more than six (6) years, no resolution has been issued by the Public
Respondent and no case has been filed with the appropriate court against the herein
Petitioners.

Issue: WON there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving [the] complaints against
petitioners (respondents therein) which violated their constitutional right to [a] speedy
disposition of cases

Ruling: Yes. Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsman's duty, as
mandated by the Constitution 12 and Republic Act No. 6770, 13 to act promptly on
complaints before him. More important, it violated the petitioners' rights to due process
and to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against them. Although respondents
attempted to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the
recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took
almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints. 14 Thus, in Angchangco, Jr. v.
Ombudsman, this Court dismissed a Complaint that had been pending before the Office
of the Ombudsman for more than six years. We are not persuaded by respondents'
argument that the Petition for Mandamus became moot and academic when the
Complaints were resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao and the
Informations were filed. The same contention was rejected in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,
wherein the Court declared that the long and unexplained delay in the resolution of the
criminal complaints against petitioners was not corrected by the eventual filing of the
Informations.
4. Bernat vs Sandiganbayan

GR No. 158018, May 20, 2004

Facts:

On August 14, 1991, petitioner, along with several co-accused, were charged before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After arraignment and the presentation of the
parties’ testimonial and documentary evidence, the case was eventually submitted for
decision on August 23, 1994 before the Second Division. Thereafter, the case remained
pending and unacted upon until the reorganization of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to
Administrative Order 266-97, and the case was unloaded to the newly created Fifth
Division.

The case was originally assigned to Justice Godofredo Legaspi. Later, it was re-assigned
to Justice Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada on November 3, 1998.

Justice Cortez-Estrada was writing the decision of the case, she found out that the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) was missing from the records turned over to her.

Clerk of Court of the Fifth Division informed the parties and ordered them to attend a
conference to discuss on April 19, 2002

Petitioner filed a comment manifesting that he is strongly averse to any further proceeding
occasioned by the lack of stenographic notes, as he should not be prejudiced by the fault
or negligence of another

On September 4, 2002, petitioner filed his Motion to Dismiss but was dismissed by
Sandiganbayan

Issue:

Whether there was a violation of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable delay
in the disposition of a criminal case which stands undecided until May 2004 although
submitted for decision on August 25, 1994.
Rule:

Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of all persons to a “speedy
disposition of their cases.” Nevertheless, this right is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

Moreover, the determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and
cannot be based on a mere mathematical reckoning of time. Particular regard must be
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

As a guideline, the Court in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan mentioned certain factors that
should be considered and balanced, namely: 1) length of delay; 2) reasons for the delay;
3) assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and 4) prejudice caused by the
delay.

Held:

NO. the Court finds there was no violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition of
his case.

It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right — a situation
amounting to laches. petitioner herein failed seasonably to assert his constitutional right
to a speedy disposition of his case. During the 8-year period, prior to the April 19, 2002
conference between the parties, petitioner did not complain about the long delay in
deciding his case. It was only after the missing TSN’s were brought to his attention that
petitioner showed an interest in the termination of his case.

While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right
to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from
oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time,
we hold that a party’s individual rights should not work against and preclude the people’s
equally important right to public justice.

5.
DIMAYACYAC v. ROXAS
GR No. 136264, May 28, 2004
DOCTRINE:

Failure to file a motion to quash within the time prescribed under Section 1, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, is deemed to have waived the defect in the information.

FACTS:
An information for falsification of public documents docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q9118037 at the RTC of Quezon City was filed against petitioner Dimayacyac along with
some others. Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on two
grounds. First, that the officer who filed the information had no legal authority to do so,
and second, that more than one offense was charged in the information. Pending
resolution of the motion to quash, petitioner was arraigned.
By order of August 23, 1991, Judge Benigno T. Dayaw of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon
City to whose sala Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was raffled, granted the petitioner’s
motion to quash upon the second ground. Accordingly, the information was quashed.
More than two years after the quashal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-9118037
the Quezon City Prosecutor filed against the same accused including petitioner two
informations for falsification of public documents docketed at the Quezon City RTC as
Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-49988 and 49989. The Informations arose from the questioned
acts of falsification subject of the earlier quashed information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-
18037.
Petitioner later filed with Branch 103 of the RTC of Quezon City to which the informations
were raffled a motion for the quashal thereof on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner
argued at the court a quo that he would be placed in double jeopardy as he was indicted
before for the same offenses and the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but it was
denied.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that petitioner, by filing
the motion to quash and refusing to withdraw it after he was arraigned, is deemed to have
waived his right against double jeopardy, as his motion to quash constituted his express
consent for the dismissal of the information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner under the Information docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-93-49988 would constitute double jeopardy, considering that when the
Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was previously quashed, he had already
been arraigned.

RULING:
NO. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
It is held that when an appellant fails to file a motion to quash within the time prescribed
under Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, he is thus deemed to have waived the
defect in the Information. Moreover, an accused, who fails to object prior to arraignment
to a duplicitous information, may be found guilty of any or all of the crimes alleged therein
and duly proven during the trial, for the allegation of the elements of such component
crimes in the said information has satisfied the constitutional guarantee that an accused
be informed of the nature of the offense with which he or she is being charged. Verily, a
duplicitous information is valid since such defect may be waived and the accused,
because of such waiver, could be convicted of as many offenses as those charged in the
information and proved during trial.
In examining whether the other requisites for double jeopardy to attach are present, the
case at bench shows that although there was a valid indictment before a competent court
and petitioner, as the accused, had already been arraigned therein, entering a valid plea
of not guilty, the last requisite that the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent, is not present.
It should be noted that the termination of Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was upon motion
of petitioner who, on April 1, 1991, filed with the court an Urgent Motion to Quash which
was granted by Resolution dated August 23, 1991.

In this case, considering that since the dismissal of the previous criminal case against
petitioner was by reason of his motion for the quashal of the information, petitioner is thus
deemed to have expressly given his consent to such dismissal. There could then be no
double jeopardy in this case since one of the requisites therefore, i.e., that the dismissal
be without accused’s express consent, is not present.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION

1
US vs Tan Teng
GR No. 7081
September 7, 1912

Doctrine: The taking of a body sample for the purposes of evidence to be presented in
court does not violate the privilege of self-incrimination.

Facts:
Oliva is a seven-year-old girl living in her sister’s house. Teng was one of the
Chinamen who often visited their house to gamble. One day, Oliva was followed into her
room by Teng to which she was violated by Teng. A couple of weeks later, Oliva’s sister
found out that Oliva was suffering from gonorrhea and an investigation ensued. One of
the pieces of evidence used was a body sample form Teng’s private parts which the
medical experts concluded that Teng was also suffering from gonorrhea.

Issue:
Whether the admission of the medical result in evidence was violative of
appellant’s right against self-incrimination.

Held:
No. The prohibition against self-incrimination is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
The medical result does not call upon the accused as a witness- it does not call upon the
defendant for his testimonial responsibility.

Self-incrimination- covers the privilege of oral examinations before and during trial. The
taking of the body substance from his person does not violate such privilege.

2. BELTRAN VS SAMSON

GR 32025

DOCTRINE
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused
of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure
toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence
obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal
rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the
well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving
of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than
by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold
secret

FACTS

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the
respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in
his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for
the purpose of comparing the petitioner’s handwriting and determining whether or not it
is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.

There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings;
but the respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for,
inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court
below, and again which the instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of
section 1687 of the Administrative Code. Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the
Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel
witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power
must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.

And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders,
No. 58.

Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether the constitutional

provision invoked by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what is enjoined upon
him by the order against which these proceedings were taken.

ISSUE:

Whether the complainant be compelled to write down what the fiscal dictates and used
the said handwritten letters to compare the latter with the letter-evidence against the
complainant.

RULING:
No, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing
is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a
means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent
fiscal clearly states. the court said that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege,
there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who
is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is
required to furnish evidence against himself. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain
specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no
reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true
that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases
are accidental and do not constitute the raison d’ etre of the privilege. This constitutional
privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

3.SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC) and (Atty. Laserna v.
DDB and PDEA), regarding the constitutionality of RA 9165(c), (d), (f) and (g);
ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

FACTS: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing
shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary
schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school’s
student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and employees of
public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo
a random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive
for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground
for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code
and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall
undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)

On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations for the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection
with the May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator.
He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for
senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need
not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS),
a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally
infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power
when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the
manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection
clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions.

(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165
be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination,
and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

ISSUE/S:
1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically,
do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizure, and the equal protection clause?

HELD:
1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; while paragraphs
(f) and (g) are UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection
clause.

RATIO:
1) Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution (refer to the aforementioned facts). As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously
as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect,
a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect.
The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected
to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the
drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain
limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the
abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise: “Someone has said that the
powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean,
are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting
under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and
confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can
only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The
Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.”

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly
found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen
in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions
of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

2) The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165(c) requiring
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed,
it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be
sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements. A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not
only acceptable, but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student
population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and
protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random
drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of public and
private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this
regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug
testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the
individual right to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy
and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the
Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous
and does not merit serious consideration.

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means
the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into
one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary
sensibilities; and while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the
guarantee against unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of
particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.
Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights
of the public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been
held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or
intrusion. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is
really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not
telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec.
36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing
that the employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in
the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
work place.” It is to be noted the very reason RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard the
well-being of the citizens from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.

Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the Court. Unlike the situation
covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the
parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the
public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1)
day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
“randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged with a crime before
the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.
The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare
fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves
to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone
waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

4. Chavez vs CA

GR No. L-29169 August 19, 1968

Facts:

Accused were the following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias
"Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita",
Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe,
Charlie Doe and Paul Doe.

An information was filed that on or about the 14th day of November, 1962, in Quezon
City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the
consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle above-
described.

Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified
nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.

Trial Court:

On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City.

During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia (prosecution) asked Roger Chavez to be the first
witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused
(Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused
answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal on
the grounds that: (1) the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on
the witness stand including the accused; (2) If there should be any question that is
incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the court
will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the
question would incriminate him; and (3) Counsel has all the assurance that the court
will not require the witness to answer questions which would incriminate him.

Version of the prosecution of what happened:

Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird (car) and asked if it is for sale. Lee
answered yes. On November 12, Chavez met Sumilang and informed about the car.
The two went to Asistio and made a plan to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation
as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car
and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would
then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was
included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his
Thunderbird.

Chavez arranged the meeting with Lee on November 14. They agreed on the price and
went to Binondo to meet Dy Sun Hiok Lim which is the registered owner of the car.
Deed of sale was drawn and signed by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man approached
Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater.
Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to
the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of
the car to the note bearer.
 The two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. The two Chinese could not locate
Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked,
found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much
later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Chavez, Sumilang
and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54
near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang
P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction.
On the 14th of November, the registration of the car was transferred in the
name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in
Caloocan.

Version of Romeo Sumilang:

In the last week of September 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station.
The latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a
price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it could be held for him
with a down payment of P10,000.00.

On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car
was ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got
P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador. He immediately
gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the car's delivery.
It was then that Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already bought by a Chinese
who would be the vendor.

At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated.

There, Sumilang, also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual who warned that Chavez
was a "smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his
money. A certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez
to sign. After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his
fans, Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez and also by Pascual
and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. This receipt was offered as an exhibit by
the prosecution and by Sumilang. Johnson Lee turned over to Sumilang the deed of
sale, the registration papers and the keys to the car.

Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a
film shooting he saw Asistio who liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered
to buy it from him for P22,500.00 and Sumilang consented to the sale. Asistio tendered
a down payment of P1,000.00; the balance he promised to pay the next day after
negotiating with some financing company. Before said balance could be paid, the car
was impounded.
Ruling of the trial court and CA:

The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, he was thus cleared. So was
Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the
prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted. As to the other accused, the court
found no case against Pedro Rebulloalias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory".
The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was not
identified by Johnson Lee in court.

As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not
offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the
prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The trial court
branded him "a self-confessed culprit"

Chavez filed an appeal. The counsel of Chavez, Atty. Marquez, was ordered to file
brief but she failed. Instead she sent filed a written detailed information and also stating
that if she were allowed to file appellant's brief she would go along with the factual
findings of the court below but will show however that its conclusion is erroneous.
CA dismissed said appeal.

On June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals, directed the City Warden of Manila where
Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to
turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below,
and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.

Hence the petition for habeas corpus.

Issues:

1. Whether the constitutional right of the accused against self incrimination was
violated.

2. Whether the petition for habeas corpus is the right recourse of the accused.

Held:

1. YES. The Court held that such right is "not merely a formal technical rule the
enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it
secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. Therefore, the court may
not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt.
Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of
facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to
prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony,
to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand —with undiluted,
unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will. Compulsion as it is understood here
does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a
free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our
opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling
lips of the defendant.

In the case, petitioner was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to
testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and
invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut
statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the
judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody
to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense
counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." The
cumulative impact of all these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was
thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. For, in reality, the purpose
of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him.

With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify
to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent.
It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take
the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;
on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner
nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or
being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His
testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He
was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power
to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape
testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct
examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial. There is
no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal,
and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where
liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be
held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence.
 2. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpusis a high prerogative
writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whoseliberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are
disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental
right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if
another remedy which is less effective maybe availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure
by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a
recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final.

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez
whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely
proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by
law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto. The Court stated that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment.
By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself,
all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any
one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties
attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers... "

Dispositive:

Petition granted. The Court rendered judgment directing the respondent Warden of the
City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of
petitioner to discharge him from custody.

RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE FINES, AND CRUEL, AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS

1.
People v. Dionisio
GR No. L- 25513, March 27,1968
FACTS:
On or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in Manila City, Rosauro Dionisio, a person who
is not duly authorized in any capacity by the Games and Amusement Board to conduct a
horse race, did then and there willfully and unlawfully offer, arrange and collect bets for
the Special Daily Double Race being then conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club at
Makati and for that purpose has in possession the cash amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era
Racing Program, dated August 19, 1962, one list of bets, one ballpen and one booklet of
Daily Double receipt. He was thereby charged in violation of Republic Act No. 3063 and
sentenced to imprisonment for one month.

ISSUE:
Whether the penalty applied to his offense infringes the Constitutional provision that
“Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” (Art III
Sec. 1 clause 19, of the Constitution of the Phils)

RULING:
Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual punishment,
for the Constitutional structure has been interpreted as referring to penalties that are
inhumane and barbarous, or shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are
definitely not in this category. Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not
make it cruel and unusual. To come under the ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly
and plainly oppressive”, “wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community.”

2
Echegaray vs Secretary of Justice
GR No. 132601
January 19, 1999

Facts:
The conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray for the crime of rape of the 10-year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of death penalty for the
said crime have been affirmed by the Supreme Court. Petitioner filed a Petition for
Prohibition, Injunction, and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents
Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution
by lethal injection of petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the death penalty to be imposed on him violates the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Held:
No. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides
that in countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time
of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant
and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

3. DABALOS VS RTC

GR 193960

DOCTRINE

rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts

FACTS

Dabalos had willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously used personal violence against the
complainant whom he had a dating relationship with. The said violence constituted the
pulling of hair, punching the complainant's back, shoulder, and left eye which have
demeaning and degrading effects on the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a
human being, in violation of Section 5 (a) of the Republic Act 9262. In Dabalos' defense,
he averred that the relationship had already ceased at the time of the alleged incident.
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and
consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The
latter posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.
Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no
longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended
prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of
the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from
petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted.
Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the
physical injuries alleged in the Information.
ISSUE

Whether there is excessive punishment

RULING

NO. The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series
of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm,
namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s
wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom
he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering

Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the
act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such
limitation be inferred.

As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as
long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to
petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating
relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of
lenity7 because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction.
While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal
Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the
former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on
the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had a
sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the
protection of women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the
crime, such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent;
the act of violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private
respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the
RTC.

Right against double jeopardy

1.People vs. ELISEA YLAGAN, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-38443, November 25, 1933, ABAD SANTOS, J. “…The mere silence of the
defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the case does not constitute a consent
within the meaning of section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

FACTS: Elisea Ylagan was charged with physical injuries in the justice of the peace court.
The provincial fiscal filed an information charging her with serious physical injuries. The
defendant pleaded not guilty. The private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the deputy
provincial fiscal, moved for the dismissal of the case, which was granted by the court.
Eleven days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another information in the same justice
of the peace court, charging the same defendant with the same offense of serious
physical injuries. The defendant entered a plea of double jeopardy, based on section 28
of the Code of Criminal Procedure1. The court sustained the plea and dismissed the case.
Thus, the appeal from the Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the
dismissal of the case constitutes a waiver of constitutional right against double jeopardy.
HELD: NO. It seems clear that under the Sec. 28, defendant in a criminal prosecution is
in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions:
In a court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) upon a valid complaint or information;
3) after he has been arraigned; and
(4) after he has pleaded to the complaint of information.

Thus, the Court is in the opinion that the appellee has been once in jeopardy for the
offense for which she is now prosecuted. In United States vs. Ballentine, this court held
that there is no jeopardy until the investigation of the charges has actually been
commenced by the calling of a witness; however, this should be abandoned. There is no
provision or principle of law jeopardy. All that the law requires is that the accused has
been brought to trial "in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction,
after issue properly joined." Hence, issue is properly joined after the accused has entered
a plea of not guilty. The mere calling of a witness would not add a particle to the danger,
annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after going through the process of
being arrested, subjected to a preliminary investigation, arraigned, and required to plead
and stand trial. The rule against double jeopardy protects the accused not against the
peril of second punishment, but against being again tried for the same offense. The court
ruled in one case that, “ x x x The accused would never be free from the cruel and constant
menace of a never-ending charge, which the malice of the complaining witness might
hold indefinitely suspended over his head, were it not that the judiciary is exclusively
empowered to authorize, by an express order to that effect, the repetition of a complaint
or information once dismissed in the cases in which the law requires that this be done.
Such is, in our opinion, the fundamental reason of the article of the law to which we refer.
The accused, after being notified of the order rest dismissing the complaint may, as the
case may be, either rest assured that he will not be further molested, or prepare himself
for the presentation of a new complaint. In either case, the order gives him full information
as to what he may hope or fear, and prevents his reasonable hopes from being dissipated
as the result of an equivocal and indefinite legal situation. To this much, at least, one who
has been molested, possibly unjustly, by prosecution on a criminal charge, is entitled."
The Court ruled that the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the
dismissal of the case does not constitute a consent within the meaning of section 28 of
the Code 1 Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as follows: A person cannot
be tried for an offense, nor for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, for
which he has been previously brought to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined, when the case is dismissed or otherwise
terminated before judgment without the consent of the accused. of Criminal Procedure.
The right not to be put in jeopardy a second time for the offense is as important as the
other constitutional right of the accused in a criminal case. Its waiver cannot, and should
not, be predicated on mere silence.

2. Herrera vs Sandiganbayan

GR Nos. 119660-61 February 13, 2009

Facts:

Pat. Edgardo Herrera and Pat. Redentor Mariano, together with Pat. Roberto Barrera
andPat. Rodolfo Alcalde, all members of the Paranaque Police Station, were charged
with 2 countsof murder, for killing Shi Shu Yang and George Go, before the
Sandiganbayan (SB).

(NOTE: The other two accused, Barrera and Alcalde, did not file any more pleading after
they were convicted that’s why they are not part of the case.)

That on or about December 28, 1989 in Paranaque, Herrera and Mariano who
werelighting firecrackers near Chow Chow which is the restaurant owned by Go, and
when Go camedown with his pistol, he was apprehended by Pat. Barrera who introduced
himself as apoliceman, asked for the license of the .45 caliber pistol, and told Go that he
will bring the firearmto the police station for verification.

Barrera ordered Go and his Taiwanese friend Shi Shu toboard their jeepney. (In short,
kinda like entrapment/instigation). The police officers also ordered the Go and Yang to
undergo medical examination and thus they were taken to theParanaque Community
Hospital (PCH). Thereafter, Go and Yang were brought to Timothy Street, Multinational
Village where they were killed. The defense on the other hand claims that Herreraand
Mariano were just assisting Barrera in bringing some persons for medical examination.
Priorto the shooting incident, they were informed that George Go was previously arrested
by Barrerafor illegal possession of firearm. They brought Go and Yang to the PCH and
on the way back tothe police station, they heard a struggle ensue at the back of the patrol
van as Alcalde said, “George, bitawan mo ang baril ko.” And then they heard successive
shots. When they looked back, they saw Go grappling for the possession of a firearm
(later on, they said it was an armalite)with Alcalde, they stopped the car and alighted to
pacify the trouble but alas there were moreshots and they found Go and Young bloodied.
(Basically, Herrera and Mariano testified individually but they said almost the same
things.) The defense also presented Dr. Soliven’s findings that Go was positive for alcohol
and that Go had no signs of physical injuries.

What really happened: Mariano parked the patrol van along Timothy Street which wasa
practically deserted area, isolated from traffic and pedestrians. Alcalde, Barrera,and
petitioner Herrera brought out the two handcuffed victims from the back portion of
thepatrol van in order to eventually salvage them. Petitioner Mariano appeared to be
faking analleged interrogation and was trying to get the name of Shi Shu Yang, whose
identity was thennot yet immediately known. Later, petitioner Mariano also participated in
shooting at theunarmed victims. The SB convicted Herrera and Mariano each for 2 counts
of murder, and denied petitioners’ Joint Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, Herrera and
Mariano filed a petition for review on certiorari

Issues:

1. Whether the amended informations placed the petitioners in double jeopardy.

2. Whether the petitioners' counsel is allowed to conduct further cross-examination on

prosecution-witness Winterhalter.

3. Whether the testimony of Winterhalter is wanting in credibility

4. Whether the petitioners acted in self-defense.

5. Whether there was no absolute evidence to support conspiracy.

6. Whether petitioners are entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of

official acts.

7. Whether the petitioners are guilty of Murder.

Held:

1. NO. Public respondent Sandiganbayan ordered the amendment of the informations

and made it of record that the evidence adduced during the pre-trial of the case and the
hearing on the petition for bail shall be deemed automatically reproduced as evidence
during the trial of the case on the merits. Double jeopardy did not attach by virtue of
petitioner's plea of not guilty under the amended information. For a claim of double
jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the
case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.

In the present case, petitioners and the other accused pleaded not guilty to the original
informations. Thereafter, at the instance of the petitioners, through a joint petition for bail,
they raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the prosecution failed to
allege in the informations that the crimes were committed "in relation to their office." On
the same day, respondent court ordered the amendment of the informations accordingly.
Thus, the first requirement for double jeopardy to attach, that is, that the informations
against the petitioners were valid, has not been complied with.

Likewise, the fourth element was lacking. Petitioners cannot be validly convicted on the
basis of the original information as the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that
the crimes were committed "in relation to their office." Petitioners were thus not placed in
danger of being convicted when they entered their plea of not guilty to the insufficient
information. Moreover, there was no dismissal or termination of the case against
petitioners.

Furthermore, it was well-within the power of public respondent Sandiganbayan to order

the amendment of the information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure which states that if the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made. If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect
by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the
amendment.

2. YES. Rule 132, Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse
party as to any matter stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with
sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. The
cross-examination of a witness is a right of a party against whom he is called. Article III,
Section 14(2) of the Constitution states that the accused shall have the right to meet the
witnesses face to face. Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
also states that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Indeed, petitioners' counsel has conducted
an extensive cross-examination of witness Winterhalter on the scheduled dates of
hearing. Petitioners, therefore, cannot claim there has been any procedural infirmity in
the proceedings.

Moreover, the trial court has the power to direct the course of the trial either to shorten or
to extend the direct or cross examination of a counsel. Under Rule 133, Section 6 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, the court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon
any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to
the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this
power should be exercised with caution. Thus, it is within the prerogative of the trial court
to determine when to terminate the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution or the
defense.

3. YES. The trial court had the opportunity to observe first-hand the demeanor and
deportment of the witnesses, and, therefore, its findings that the witnesses for the
prosecution are to be believed over those of the defense are entitled to great weight.
Winterhalter recognized the petitioners as the ones who cooperated with Pat. Barrera in
killing the victims. She saw the events unfolding with the use of her binoculars 80-90
meters away. She established the identity of the petitioners as the companions of Pat.
Barrera when he effected the killing. It has been ruled that findings of fact of the trial court
on credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect. The Court has
refrained from interfering with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which as
been misapprehended or misinterpreted. None exists in this case.

After the incident, Winterhalter's neighbor, who was also a foreigner, has been receiving
death threats. She herself has been getting death threats too, yet she voluntarily testified
in order to shed light on the commission of the crime. In fact, she did not even know the
two victims. Indeed, where there is nothing to indicate that a witness was moved by
improper motives, his positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand,
made under solemn oath, should be given full faith and credence. It has not been
shown that Winterhalter has any reason to falsely implicate petitioners.

Winterhalter narrated that Pat. Barrera and Pat. Alcalde, together with petitioners, were
responsible for the death of the victims. This was confirmed by the post mortem report
prepared by Dr. Roberto Garcia, medico legal officer of the NBI, showing the gunshot
wounds on the different parts of the victims' body.
4. NO. By invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, petitioners assume the
onus of proving: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Petitioners failed to discharge
this burden.

To proceed with the argument that there was unlawful aggression by the two deceased
who tried to get the pistol tucked in the waist of one of the police officers, petitioners
should prove that they used reasonable means in repelling the aggression. Considering
that both deceased where handcuffed and unarmed and had restricted movements,
it could only mean that the perceived threat to petitioners' lives were not
sufficiently serious, in which case they were not justified in shooting the hapless
victims who were unarmed. Petitioners could have simply subdued the two victims
in a manner as to engage them in a fight without necessarily killing them. Moreover,
the autopsy reports showing the extent of the wounds sustained by George Go and Shi
Shu Yang tend to discredit the version of the defense.

5. NO. Conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a
concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime. The familiar rule in
conspiracy is that when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each
is responsible, when the conspiracy is proven, for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the conspiracy.

In this case, petitioner Herrera drove the vehicle along Timothy Street to a place which
was less conspicuous to passersby. There, Pat. Alcalde, Pat. Barrera, and petitioner
Mariano brought out the two victims from the back portion of the van in order to perpetuate
the killing. Petitioner Mariano alighted from the right front seat of the van and stood beside
Pat. Alcalde and Pat. Barrera who began shooting the victims. According to Winterhalter,
petitioner Mariano even appeared to be writing something on a sheet of paper
immediately before the shooting, although it cannot be determined with certainty as to
whether he was making an inquiry or merely noting the names of the victims. While it
was Pat. Barrera who actually shot the two victims, the evidence showed a common
design on the part of both petitioners as they did not do anything to prevent him
from killing the victims, thus, indicative of the fact that they are in unison with the
criminal design of the Pat. Barrera. Petitioner Herrera alighted form the van without
doing anything to prevent the killing, and worse, after the killing took place along the
street, petitioner Herrera even helped carry the two victims into the van while petitioner
Mariano, the driver, remained in the vehicle during the incident. Consequently, applying
the rule that the act of one is the act of all, petitioners are thus as guilty as Pat.
Barrera and Pat. Alcalde. In fact, conspiracy need not be established by direct
evidence but may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.

6. NO. In order to consider the defense of fulfillment of a duty, it must be shown that: (1)
the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office;
and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the
due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office.

There was no showing that petitioners should resort to inflicting injuries and even
to the extent of killing the victims as there was no resistance at all from them when
they were apprehended. The two victims were handcuffed and unarmed while the
petitioners and the other police officers were armed with pistols and a rifle. Aida Veloria
Magsipoc, Supervising Forensic Chemist of the NBI conducted the paraffin test on
George Go and Shi Shu Yang which yielded negative results, thus showing that the
victims never fired a gun and were totally defenseless in the face of the fully armed
police officers.

Moreover, the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly
and unremittingly considered as important indicia which disprove a plea of self-
defense or defense of stranger because they demonstrate a determined effort to
kill the victim and not just defend oneself. The victims were repeatedly shot at close
range and on vital parts of their bodies, thus indicia that the police officers really intended
to kill them. Clearly, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties on
the part of the petitioners and the other police officers does not apply.

7. YES. The killing of the two victims was proved to have been committed with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden
attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to
escape. Frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the
victim is unarmed. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victim to defend himself/herself or to retaliate.

Clearly, the elements of murder have been proven: 1). that the two victims were killed; 2).
that petitioners and the two other accused killed the victims; 3). that the killing was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery committed by the petitioners and the
two other accused who conspired together in killing the victims; and 4). that the killing
was not parricide or infanticide.
Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of showing that public respondent
Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error. The Decision of public respondent
Sandiganbayan, dated December 13, 1994, finding petitioners Pat. Eduardo Herrera y
Baltoribio and Pat. Redentor Mariano y Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals for two (2) counts of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the time of
their sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification for public office is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. Additionally, petitioners are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Shi
Shu Yang and George Go y Tan each in the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity,
P50,000 as moral damages, P11,500 for actual damages, and P25,000 as exemplary
damages. Costs against the petitioners.

3.
People v. Balisacan
GR No. L 26376 August 31,1996

FACTS:
Defendant-appellee Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos
Norte. The information alleged that on December 3, 1964, in Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte, the
accused assaulted and stabbed to death Leonicio Bulaoat.
The accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty. At his counsel's petition,
however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. The
accused testified that he stabbed Bulaoat in self-defense because the latter was
strangling him. He further stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police after
the incident.
The court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused on the basis of his testimony.
Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether the instant appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.

HELD:
NO. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy.
In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently,
however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances,
that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the court a quo
recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a
quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new
plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there
having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of
acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
Furthermore, as aforestated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without
giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the
testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And
for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal,
therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus cannot
constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below already
gave credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution, without in
any way doubting the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper to remand this case
to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of the same court, in one
of the two other branches of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to
the court for further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is, for plea by the
defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and
judgment thereafter.
4
People vs Adil
GR No. L-41863
April 22, 1977

Facts:
Farma while armed with a piece of stone, assault, attack, and use personal
violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said Miguel
on the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which required medical assistance
from 5 to 10 days baring complications. The accused entered a plea of not guilty. When
Miguel developed a permanent scare and deformity on the face, he filed a more serious
charge arising from the same incident.

Issue:
Whether there is double jeopardy in the case.

Held:
No. When the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed
since the incident in which the injuries or consequence to be suffered by said offended
party. Evidently, it was only later that the alleged deformity became apparent. In a
jurisprudence, it was held that if after the prosecution a new fact supervenes on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving
rise if indicted for the new offense. In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this
case, the plea of double jeopardy of private respondent FAMA cannot hold.

5. YAP VS LUCERO
GR 12669
No reference available

Involuntary servitude
1.Caunca vs Salazar GR No. L-2690 January 1, 1949

Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin
Estelita Flores, an orphan and an illiterate, who was employed by the Far Eastern
Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. 

An advanced
payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work
as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was
disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was
applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before
she could be allowed to leave.

Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without
returning the advance payment it gave?

Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact
that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does
not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to
transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be
lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief
in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed,
to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the
unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place
a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice
as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical
coercion.

Ratio:

On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a valid
reason for respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere with her desire to leave. Such
indebtedness may be multiplied by thousands or millions but would not in any way
subtract an iota from the fundamental right to have a free choice of abode. The fact that
power to control said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses to
the agency is no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of
business cannot be controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human
dignity is not merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or business bargains.
Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other business
enterprise.

Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any
person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor
to work for him, against his will, as household servant or farm laborer."

Moral restraint
is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where a housemaid is prevented from leaving
her employ because of the influence of the person detaining her.

2. Robertson vs Baldwin

165 US 75 January 25, 1897

Facts:

Robert Robertson and three other seamen contracted with a shipping company to serve
on a voyage of the barkentine Arago from San Francisco to Washington State and then
to Valparaiso, Chile. By the time the ship reached Astoria, Oregon, the men had become
dissatisfied with the work. They departed the ship without permission.

The master of the Arago sought and obtained a warrant for their arrest pursuant to the
Shipping Commissioner’s Act of 1872. U.S. Marshal Barry Baldwin jailed them pending
the Arago’s departure date, and then forcibly returned them shipboard.

With help from the Seamen’s Union of the Pacific, they challenged the constitutionality of
the Shipping Commissioner’s Act.

Issue:

Whether sections 4598 and 4599 conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, forbidding
slavery and involuntary servitude.

Held:
NO. the Supreme Court rejected their suit, holding that merchant seamen under
contract could be legally compelled to work notwithstanding the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude.

Justice Henry Billings Brown, writing for a majority of eight, offered several justifications
for the ruling. First, he reasoned that the Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to
change the law with regard to “services which have from time immemorial been
treated as exceptional,” and that seamen had been legally prohibited from
“deserting” (quitting their jobs) since the days of ancient Rhodes. By itself, this
criterion could not do the work of distinguishing exceptions from prohibited practices. The
Thirteenth Amendment was enacted precisely to abolish practices that had been
recognized in law from time immemorial. There could be no time-honored exceptions to
a ban on slavery and involuntary servitude until and unless there was such a ban in effect.
When Congress first provided for the forcible return of deserting seamen in 1792,
for example, most states permitted slavery, indentured servitude remained lawful,
and the Constitution provided for the return of any person “held to Service or
Labour” who escaped across state lines. In that legal context, a seaman’s contract
would have looked more like a short-term indenture—lawful in any trade—than an
occupational exception to a general ban on slavery and involuntary servitude. On
the criterion of origins in “time immemorial,” then, seamen’s contracts could not
be distinguished from numerous other instances of coerced labor.

Second, Brown warned that if a sailor could not be coerced to work, then he could
“abandon his ship at any intermediate port or landing, or even in a storm at sea.”
Brown held that even if the Amendment did generally prohibit such enforcement, seamen
were excluded from protection.

To distinguish seamen from other workers, Brown offered a third justification. Sailors
could be denied the right to quit work because, like children and wards, they
required the guidance and protection of others. In particular, Brown suggested that
seamen were “deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility for their acts which
is accredited to ordinary adults.” He found supporting evidence in what he considered
to be “very careful provisions” of law protecting seamen against “the frauds and cruelty of
masters, the devices of boarding-house keepers, and, as far as possible, against the
consequences of their own ignorance and improvidence.”

Dispositive:

The judgment of the court below is, therefore, affirmed.

NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBTS

1.

Serafin v. Lindayag
A.M. No. 297-MJ, September 30,1975

Facts:
Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 to Carmelito Mendoza, then
municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was
filed against her. Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against
respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on
the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further
she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum
of money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiff’s case. (Judge here committed
gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.

Issue:
Whether there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment
of plaintiff for non-payment of debt?

Held:
Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan
granted by her friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was
an old friend of the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of
demand she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they
could get her valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge
therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the
very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day
the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty
of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby dismissed from the office of municipal judge of
Guiguinto, Bulacan.

2. People vs Nitafan
GR No. 75954
October 22, 1992

Facts:
Several informations for violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 960 were filed
against private respondent in different courts. The Solicitor General filed separate motions
for consolidation of the informations, which were granted. Before the Manila RTC, the
informations were reassigned to Branch 52 presided by public respondent Judge Nitafan.
The respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case no 92-107942 on the ground
that the subject CB circular is an ex post facto law. In a separate order, he also dismissed
the two remaining criminal cases ruling that it violated the private respondent’s right
against double jeopardy.

Issue:
Can a judge motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismiss a criminal
information or complaint without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based
on the alleged violation of the latter's right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy?

RULING:
On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every law carries with it the presumption
of constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court. To rule that the CB Circular is an
ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private respondent
nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower courts, will not
pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly
assailed in an appropriate action. With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked
by respondent judge, the same is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this
case. Double jeopardy connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as
that in the first or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration
thereof.
In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any
such jeopardy terminated. The first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2)
before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Private respondent
was not convicted or acquitted nor did the cases against her dismissed or otherwise
terminated, which definitely shows the absence of the fifth requisite for the first jeopardy
to attached.
The petition is GRANTED

3. TIOMICO VS CA

GR 122539

DOCTRINE

PD 115 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
provision of non-imprisonment for non-payment of debt. The Trust Receipts Law punishes
the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to the
prejudice of another regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not. The law does not
seek to enforce payment of a loan. Thus, there can be no violation of the right against
imprisonment for non-payment of a debt.

FACTS

Tiomico opened a Letter of Credit with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) for $5,600
to be used for the importation of two (2) units of Forklifts, Shovel loader and a truck
mounted with crane. On October 29, 1982, the said machineries were received by the
accused, as evidenced by the covering trust receipt. Upon maturity of the trust receipt, on
December 28, 1982, he made a partial payment of US$855.94, thereby leaving an unpaid
obligation of US$4,770.46. As of December 21, 1989, Tiomico owed BPI US$4,770.46,
or P109,386.65, computed at P22.93 per US dollar, the rate of exchange at the time.
Failing to pay the said amount or to deliver subject machineries and equipments, despite
several demands, the International Operations Department of BPI referred the matter to
the Legal Department of the bank. But the letter of demand sent to him notwithstanding,
Tiomico failed to satisfy his monetary obligation sued upon.
Consequently, he was accused of a violation of PD 115. Arraigned thereunder, Tiomico
entered a plea of Not Guilty.
On January 30, 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision finding petitioner guilty of a
violation of PD 115, and sentencing him accordingly.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals came out with a judgment of affirmance,
ISSUE
Whether PD 115 is unconstitutional.
RULING
NO. Court has repeatedly upheld the validity of the Trust Receipts Law and consistently
declared that the said law does not violate the constitutional proscription againts
imprisonment for non-payment of debts. (People vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312; People vs.
Nitafan, 207 SCRA 726; Lee vs. Rodil, 175 SCRA 100). Such pronouncement was
thoroughly explained in Lee vs. Rodil (supra) thus:
Verily, PD 115 is a declaration by the legislative authority that, as a matter
of public policy, the failure of a person to turn over the proceeds of the sale
of goods covered by a trust receipt or to return said goods if not sold is a
public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. As held
in Lozano vs. Martinez (146 SCRA 323, 338):
. . . certainly, it is within the authority of the lawmaking body
to prescribe certain act deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts that the
law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The State can do
this in the exercise of its police power.
In fine, PD 115 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to
the constitutional provision of non-imprisonment for non-payment of debt.
Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder

1.RAUL H. SESBREÑO v. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, GR No.

106588, 1997-03-24
Facts:
On April 3, 1980, petitioner purchased from Estrella Benedicto Tan two (2) parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55917 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu Cit
The conveyance included "a residential house of strong materials constructed on the lots
above-mentioned"[5] located in Cebu City.
Thereafter, petitioner declared the real property constructed on the said lots for purposes
of tax assessment as a residential house of strong materials with a floor area of sixty (60)
square meters. Effective in the year 1980, the declared property was assessed by
Respondent
City Assessor of Cebu City under Tax Declaration No. 02-20454 at a market value of
P60,000.00 and an assessed value of P36,900.00.[6]
During a tax-mapping operation conducted in February 1989, the field inspectors of the
Cebu City Assessor discovered that the real property declared and assessed under Tax
Declaration No. 02-20454 was actually a residential building consisting of four (4) storeys
with a fifth... storey used as a roof deck. The building had a total floor area of 500.20
square meters. The area for each floor was 100.04 square meters. The building was found
to have been made of Type II-A materials. On October 17, 1990, these findings were
confirmed by the Board of
Commissioners in an ocular inspection conducted on the subject property.
Petitioner protested the new assessment for being "excessive and unconscionable,"[8]
contending that it was increased by more than 1,000% as compared to its previous market
value of P60,000.00 or assessed value of P36,900.00 under Tax Declaration No.
02-20454 and "that he bought the building including the lots for only P100,000.00 on April
3, 1980, which amount should be the market value of the building for purposes of
determining its assessed value."[9] He questioned the new assessment before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals of Cebu City, which however dismissed petitioner's appeal
on January 11, 1990.[10] Hence, petitioner elevated his case to Respondent Central
Board of Assessment Appeals.
Arguing that he should not be liable for back taxes, petitioner states that Respondent
CBAA should have applied Section 24, instead of Section 25, of PD 464. These statutory
provisions read:
"Section 24. Date of effectivity of Assessment or Reassessment. All assessments or
reassessments made after the first day of January of any year shall take effect on the first
day of January of the succeeding year: Provided, however, That the... reassessment of
real property due to its (1) partial or total destruction, or to (2) a major change in its actual
use, or to any (3) great and sudden inflation or deflation of real property values, (4) or to
the gross illegality of the assessment when made or to any other... abnormal cause, shall
be made within ninety days from the date any such cause or causes occurred, the same
to take effect at the beginning of the quarter next following the reassessment.
Section 25. Assessment of Property Subject to Back Taxes. Real property declared for
the first time shall have back taxes assessed against it for the period during which it would
have been liable if assessed from the first in proper course but in no case for... more than
ten years prior to the year of initial assessment; Provided, however, that the back taxes
shall be computed on the basis of the applicable schedule of values in force during the
corresponding period.
If said taxes are paid before the expiration of the tax collection period next ensuing, no
penalty for delinquency shall be imposed, otherwise the taxes shall be subject to all the
penalties to which they would have been liable had they originally become delinquent
after... assessment of the property in the usual course."
Opposing the application of Section 25 of PD 464, petitioner posits that Respondent
CBAA "misread or misinterpreted" the same, specifically the phrases therein referring to
"property declared for the first time" and "prior to the year of initial assessment."[24]
Without expressly stating so, petitioner purports to argue that Section 25 is inapplicable
because the property in question has been declared for assessment as early as 1980
(and even before that, by the prior owner), and not "for the first time" in 1989
Petitioner insists that Respondent CBAA should have computed the assessed value of
the property based on its market value as defined in paragraph n, Section 3 of PD 464,
to wit:
"n) Market Value is defined as "the highest price estimated in terms of money which the
property will buy if exposed for sale in the open market allowing a reasonable time to find
a purchaser who buys with knowledge of all uses to which it is adapted and for... which it
is capable of being used." It is also referred to as "the price at which a willing seller would
sell and a willing buyer would buy, neither being under abnormal pressure.
Issues:
a. Whether or not respondent CBAA's assessment is discriminatory, unjust,
confiscatory and unconstitutional.
b. Whether or not P.D. No. 20, as invoked in the doctrinal jurisprudence of Reyes vs.
Almanzor, 196 SCRA 328, may be applied to the case at bar in relation with par. n, Sec.
3, P.D. 464 defining 'market value' which was cited in the Reyes vs.
Almanzor case (x x x)."
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
Principles:
Petitioner's argument is not novel. In Lopez vs. Crow[25] which involved the interpretation
of Section 12[26] of Act 2238, a provision similar to Section 25 of PD 464, the Court
rejected a parallel argument that the said provision
"refers solely to real estate declared for the first time and does not apply to the area which,
upon revision, has been shown to be in excess of that which was formerly declared."[27]
The Court held that the area in excess of that declared by the taxpayer... was deemed
declared for the first time upon its discovery. It ratiocinated thus:[28]
We cannot sustain petitioner's contention. The cited provision merely defines "market
value." It does not in any way direct that the market value as defined therein should be
used as basis in determining the value of a property for purposes of real property taxation.
On the... other hand, Section 5 of PD 464 provides unequivocally that "(a)ll real property,
whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at the current and fair market value
prevailing in the locality where the property is situated."[31]
Contrary to petitioner's contention, acquisition cost cannot be and is not the sole basis of
the current and fair market value of a property. The current value of like properties and
their actual or potential uses, among others, are also considered. Thus, it has been held:
"x x x (A)ssessors, in fixing the value of property, have to consider all the circumstances
and elements of value, and must exercise a prudent discretion in reaching conclusions.
Courts, therefore, will not presume to interfere with the intelligent exercise of the...
judgment of men specially trained in appraising property. Where, as the Supreme Court
of Louisiana says, (when) the judicial mind is left in doubt, it is a sound rule to leave the
assessment undisturbed. (Viuda e Hijos de Pedro P. Roxas vs. Rafferty [1918], 37 Phil.,
957; New
Orleans Cotton Exchange vs. Board of Assessors, supra.)"[32]
Other circumstances militate against the acceptance of petitioner's argument.
Unscrupulous sellers of real estate often understate the selling price in the deed of sale
to minimize their tax liability. Moreover, the value of real property does not remain
stagnant; it is... unrealistic to expect that the current market value of a property is the
same as its cost of acquisition ten years ago. In this light, a general revision of real
property assessment is required by law every five (5) years[33] to ensure that real
properties... are assessed at their current and fair market values.
Petitioner also argues that "the number of stories that a building has or its floor area are
irrelevant, immaterial or impertinent in the determination of market value as basis for
computing the assessed value."
This deserves scant consideration. It is a matter of plain common sense that a building
with more floors has a higher market value than one with fewer floors, provided that both
are of the same materials. Hence, the tax declaration of the building in question should
have... accurately reflected its actual area and number of floors, these being necessary
for the accurate valuation thereof.
Petitioner's Fourth Issue: Application of Section 23 of PD 464
Petitioner argues that the CBAA erred in refusing to apply Section 23 of PD 464 which
provides:
Section 23. Certification of Revised Values to the Secretary of Finance. When the
provincial or city assessor shall have finished a general revision of property assessments
for any province, municipality or city, he shall so certify to the Secretary of
Finance and the assessments shall become effective and taxes shall accrue and be
payable thereunder in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
Petitioner claims that Respondent City Assessor of Cebu City has not yet completed the
general revision of property assessments for years 1981-1984 and has not yet submitted
the certification required by Section 23 of PD 464 to the Secretary of Finance; hence, he
may not yet be... held liable to pay any assessment.[34]
This claim lacks merit. As found by Respondent CBAA,[35] the questioned assessment
had not been imposed pursuant to a general revision of property assessments that had
not yet taken effect. Respondent CBAA held:
"(F)or purposes of determining the back taxes due for the years 1981 to June 30, 1987,
the excess area of subject building should be assessed on the basis of the Schedule of
Base Unit Construction Costs for Buildings applicable for the 1978-1979 General
Revision. The... tax declaration covering the said assessment became effective in 1981.
To determine the back taxes due for the years July 1, 1987 to 1989, the same excess
area should be assessed using the 1981-1984 Schedule of Base Unit Construction Costs
of Buildings. The 1981-1984 Schedule of
Values were approved by the Secretary (Minister) of Finance on May 22, 1984 (Exh. "17")
and became finally effective on July 1, 1987 (See Memorandum Circular No. 77 dated
March 1, 1987). The tax declaration covering the aforesaid assessment became effective
on July 1,... 1987."[36]
Petitioner, for his part, has failed to prove that this finding constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

2. Fajardo vs CA

GR No. 128508, February 1, 1999

Facts:

In 1981, Fajardo was charged with violation of BP 22. At the time he committed the
offense, PD No. 968 allows an accused who appeals his conviction to still apply for
probation.

In 1988, the trial court convicted Fajardo of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty PD No. 968, became effective (in 1986), providing that no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from
the judgment of conviction. Fajardo, however, still appealed his conviction.

When he lost the appeal, he filed motion for probation before the trial court contending
that he was eligible for probation because at the time he committed the offense in 1981,
an accused who had appealed his conviction was still qualified to apply for probation and
that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused who had interposed an
appeal was ex post facto in its application and hence, not applicable to him. The trial court
denied Fajardo’s motion for probation and so did CA.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether petitioner could qualify to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.

Held:

NO. At the time of the commission of the offense charged--violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22--in 1981, petitioner could have appealed if convicted and still availed himself of
probation. However, petitioner was convicted on May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that
time, petitioner no longer had the option to appeal and still apply for probation if
unsuccessful in the appeal. Presidential Decree No. 1990 was then in full effect. Hence,
he could no longer apply for probation since he had appealed.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41447. Costs against petitioner.

3.
People v. Ferrer
GR NO. 148821, July 18, 2003

FACTS:
Co-respondents herein were charged in violation of RA 1700 or Anti Subversion Law by
instigating, recruiting, inciting others to rise up and take arms against the Government
with the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines.
Respondents, who were charged in violations of RA 1700 (Anti Subversion Law) moved
to quash the charged and alleged that the said law is Bill of Attainder.
The Law punishes any person who "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliates himself
with, becomes or remains a member of the Party or of any other similar "subversive
organization.

ISSUE:

Whether the law in question or the RA 1700/ Anti Subversion Law is a bill of attainder.

HELD:
No.Article 3 Section 22 of the Constitution provides: No ex post facto law or bill of attainder
shall be enacted.
A Bill ofAttainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence
is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional
ban against bill of attainders serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by
confining the legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of
the judicial function.
The singling our of a definite class, the imposition of burden on it, and a legislative intent
to stigmatise statute as a bill of attainder.
The Supreme Court held that when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen
that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the member thereof for
the purpose of punishment. What it does is simple to declare the party to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition.
The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for definitional purposes. In
fact the act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any
organisation having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on
individuals but on conduct.