1.2.

3 It is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of Staple

1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the impugned order regarding

the internet shutdown do not run afoul of Art. 14 of the Constitution.

2. Art. 14 of the Constitution provides that every person in the territory of Staple is

entitled to equality before law, and equal protection of laws.1 The principle of equality

mandates two conditions for a classification to be permissible. Firstly, “the

classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation”. 2 Secondly, the

differentia must have a “rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the

statute in question”.3

3. Also, for a legislation to be in consonance of principles of Right to Equality as

enshrined under Art. 14, it should not be arbitrary.4

4. The impugned order is not in violation of Art. 14 as, first, the classification is based

on intelligible differentia [1], second, there exists a rational nexus between the

classification and the object sought to be achieved [2], and last, the impugned order is

not arbitrary [3].

1.2.3.1. The classification is based on an Intelligible differentia

5. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Article 14 forbids class

legislation but it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of
1
INDIA CONST. art. 14.
2
State of Rajasthan v. Mukan Chand, (1964) 6 SCR 903, ¶8 (India) [hereinafter Mukan Chand].
3
Leelabai Gajanan Pansare v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2008) 9 SCC 720, (India).
4
E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3, ¶85 (India).
 legislation.5 If it appears that the impugned legislation is based on a reasonable

classification founded on intelligible differentia,6 & that the said differentia has a

rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by it then, 7 its validity cannot be

successfully challenged under Article 14.8 The doctrine of classification is a

subsidiary rule evolved by the courts to give practical content to the doctrine of

equality.9

6. Differential treatment does not per se amount to violation of Article 14 of the

Constitution and the intelligible differentia has to be conducive to the functioning of

modern society.10 The classification under Article 14 need not be of persons only;

even offences of a serious nature may be treated as a class and tried in a way different

from ordinary offences and dealt with by a drastic procedure without violating the

equal protection clause.11

7. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the state legislature has imposed

a restriction on Internet and all forms of information technology driven

communications including social and online communications. The legislature also

created an offence who forfeits Section 68b of the Information Technology Act 2015

for the prevention of false and libellous information through these platforms. Since,

the situation in Thorland became tensed after the provocative speeches of Dissenter

brothers and their reports through Trizag and led to widespread violence and attack on

the police. Therefore, it is necessary to classify people who are deliberately spreading

it and risking public order at large. It is contended that the basis adopted for

5
Budhan Chaudhury v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191.
6
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873.
7
Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369.
8
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.
9
L.I.C. of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, (1995) 5 SCC 482.
10
Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust, (2011) 2 SCC 575.
11
Rehman Sagoo v. State of J&K, AIR 1960 SC 1.
 classification is the deliberate intention. It is specifically for those accused persons

who have deliberately disobeyed the order relating to public order made under the

authority of State legislature which has resulted into the spread of the violence along

with false and libellous information.

1.2.3.2. There is a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved

8. The counsel most humbly submits that the differentia adopted as the basis of

classification must have a rational or reasonable nexus with the object sought to be

achieved by the statute in question. 12 It is settled law that differentiation is not always

discriminatory.13 If there is a rational nexus on the basis of which differentiation has

been made with the object sought to be achieved by particular provision, then such

differentiation is not discriminatory and does not violate the principles of Article 14

of the Constitution.14

9. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the provisions of the Section

carry stringent conditions for the prevention of the worsening situation of Thorland

which are generally found in legislations enacted to tackle serious crimes and save the

society from inflictions of such crime.15 In view of current violence and public unrest,

and the seriousness of the situation, the classification has a rational nexus with the

object of the amendment which prima facie discloses to be the protection of society

from deliberate and malignant act by the people who provoke these violence, which

has the effect of disrupting the public order of the state.

12
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873.
13
Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123.
14
Union of India v. M.V. Valliappan, (1999) 6 SCC 259.
15
The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, (Act 61 of 1985), s. 37; The Terrorism and Disruptive
Activities Act, (Act 28 of 1987), s. 20(8); The Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, (Act 30 of 1999),
s. 21(4).
 1.2.3.3. THAT THERE IS NO ARBITRARY STATE ACTION.

10. This Hon'ble Court has held that arbitrary state action infringes Art. 14 16 of the Const.

If a law is arbitrary or irrational, it will fall foul of Art. 14. The Court also held in

Style17 and Dolly Chanda18 among others, that state actions should be guided by

reason and not humour, whim, the caprice of personal predilections of the person

entrusted with the task on behalf of the State, and exercise of all powers must be for

public good instead of being an abuse of power. In the instant case, it is submitted that

the State is guided by both public good and reason. The validity of the legislation

draws from the fact that it was forwarded in accordance with citizens' public interests

and rights. It is not arbitrary but rather just, fair, and reasonable. It provides a

reasonable classification and procedure, which is. In light of the spread of the

violence, which can lead to widespread panic across the nation and take away the

many fundamental rights of the Rashtra citizens enshrined under Part III of our

Constitution, this Order is in furtherance of public order and interest.

11. In conclusion, the mere fact that some hardship or injustice is caused to someone is no

ground to strike down the rule altogether if otherwise, the rule appears to be just, fair

and reasonable, and not unconstitutional.19

16
A.P. Aggarwal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2000 SC 205 (India).
17
(Dress Land), (Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (1999) 7 SCC 89, 100 (India)).
18
Dolly Chanda v. Chairman, Jee, (2005) 9 SCC 779 (India).
19
A.P. Coop. Oil Seeds Growers Federation Ltd. v. D. Achyuta Rao, (2007) 13 SCC 320 (India).