Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc

The Unity of the Virtues and the Ambiguity of Goodness: A Reappraisal of Aquinas's Theory
of the Virtues
Author(s): Jean Porter
Source: The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring, 1993), pp. 137-163
Published by: on behalf of Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc
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 THE UNITY OF THE VIRTUES AND THE
AMBIGUITY OF GOODNESS
A Reappraisalof Aquinas'sTheory of the Virtues

Jean Porter

ABSTRACT
This paper examines Aquinas'scontention that the virtues are necessarily
connected, in such a way that anyone who fully possesses one of them,
necessarily possesses them all. It is argued that this claim, as Aquinas
develops it in the Summa Theologiaeyis more complex, interesting, and
plausible than it is often taken to be. On his view, the cardinalvirtues can
be said to be connected in two senses, correspondingto the two senses in
which certain virtues can be said to be cardinal, namely, as general quali-
fications of all virtuous action and as particular normative ideals having a
specific content. This distinction suggests, in turn, that Aquinas's claim
that the virtues are connected should be understood as a psychological
thesis about what is characteristicof the virtuous person's distinctive way
of acting, as well as a thesis about the interrelationships among the differ-
ent cardinal virtues considered as discrete normative ideals. So under-
stood, Aquinas's claim that the virtues are connected is seen to be a
necessary implication of his metaphysically grounded theory of human
action. At the same time, it enables him to offer an interpretation of the
complexities of moral discourse that is illuminating and at least prima
facie plausible, taken on its own merits.

As IS WELLKNOWN,Aquinas DEFENDSthe claim that anyone who

truly possesses one virtue possesses them all. Hence, in the Summa
Theologiae we read,
Moral virtue may be taken either as perfect, or as imperfect virtue. Im-
perfect moral virtue, indeed, ... is nothing other than a certain inclination
in us to do some work of a kind that is good, whether that inclination is

I am indebted to Joseph Blenkinsopp,Alasdair Maclntyre, and the anonymousreferees

of the Journal of Religious Ethics for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I
also want to express my appreciationto the Institute for the Study of Liberal Arts at the
University of Notre Dame, which supportedmy work on this essay through a research
grant for the summer of 1991.

137
138 Journal of Religious Ethics

from natureor custom. And takingthe moralvirtuesin this way, they

are not connected.Forwe see one who,fromnatureor fromsomehabit,
is preparedto do worksof liberality,who nonethelessis not preparedfor
worksof chastity.However,a perfectedmoralvirtueis a habitdirectedto
a good work done well. And takingthe moralvirtues in this way, we
ought to say that they are connected,as nearly everyoneagrees [I-II
65.1].1

Few passages in the Summa express the distance between Aquinas's

intellectual world and our own more clearly than does this one. To-
day, not only is it not the case that "nearly everyone agrees" that the
virtues are connected; it is more nearly the case that everyone agrees
that they are not (Geatch 1977, 161-68;Pincoffs 1986, 73-100;Wallace
1978, 121-27;for a rare defense of the unity of the virtues, see Casey
1990, 70-78). The thesis of the unity of the virtues is widely dismissed
as a prime example of a moral theory that is hopelessly at odds with
our experience. After all, almost none of us can boast of a wholly con-
sistent character, whether good or bad. We must all admit to at least
one or two vices, but most of us can lay claim to one or two good quali-
ties as well. Must we deny that these good qualities are true virtues?
On Aquinas's view, it would seem, we must indeed, but such a conclu-
sion seems unrealistic. Not only does it seem to contradict our sense
of the value of our own and others' good qualities, even seen in the
context of our failings, but it would appear to make the criterion for
true virtue so stringent that it could never be met. Ironically, the the-
sis of the unity of the virtues, taken seriously, may well imply that
there is no true virtue to be found on earth- and that, from a certain
common-sense point of view, would seem to be sufficient reason to
reject the thesis.
Of course, a medieval Christian theologian might have been more
willing than we are to embrace the conclusion that no virtue is to be
found on earth. We might therefore be tempted to think that the the-
ory of the unity of the virtues belongs to the theological dimension of
Aquinas's work and that he embraced it precisely because of its nega-
tive implications concerning human moral achievement. However, a
careful examination of Aquinas's overall theory of virtue does not sup-
port this assumption. To be sure, Aquinas's analysis of the theological
virtues does significantly transform his account of the unity of the vir-
tues, but not in the direction of denying that anyone can be truly virtu-

1 All references to Aquinas are references to the Summa Theologiaeunless other-

wise indicated. All translations of Aquinas are my own.
 The Unity of the Virtues 139

ous.2 Indeed, Aquinas intends the thesis of the unity of the virtues to
apply first of all to the acquired cardinal virtues, as his explanation in
the article just quoted makes clear:

For this [the connection of the virtues], a twofold reason is assigned, in

accordancewith the diverse ways in which the cardinal virtues are distin-
guished. For as has been said, some distinguish them accordingto certain
general conditions of the virtues, insofar as discretion pertains to pru-
dence, rectitude to justice, moderationto temperance, firmness of the soul
to fortitude, in whatever matter these things may be considered. And ac-
cording to this, the rationale for the connection [of the virtues] is clearly
seen, for firmness does not have the praise of virtue if it be without mod-
eration, or rectitude, or discretion, and the same rationale applies to the
others. . . .
Others, however, distinguish the aforesaid virtues in accordance with
their matter. And accordingto this, the rationale for their connection is
given by Aristotle in the sixth book of the Ethics. For as has been said
above, no moral virtue can be had without prudence, in that it is proper to
moral virtue to make a right choice, since it is an elective habit. However,
for a right choice [to be made], an inclination towards a due end, which is
directly [given] through the habit of moral virtue, does not alone suffice,
but one must also directly choose those things which are directed towards
the end, which is done through prudence. . . . Likewise also, prudence
cannot be possessed unless the moral virtues are also possessed, since pru-
dence is right reason concerning things that can be done, towards which
one is rightly related through the moral virtues. Hence, just as specula-
tive science cannot be had without the understanding of principles, so
prudence cannot be had without the moral virtues. From which it mani-
festly follows that the moral virtues are connected [I-II 65.1;compare I-II
61.4 ad 1].

2 Aquinas holds that not only are the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity
infused directly by God, but so are the cardinal virtues of the graced individual (I-II
63.3); hence, anyone who has the theological virtues is necessarily also prudent, just,
courageous,and temperate (I-II 65.3). The infused cardinal virtues are specifically dif-
ferent from their acquiredcounterparts,however, since they direct the human person to
a different end, namely direct union with God rather than natural human perfection (I-
II 63.4). Even more interestingly, they do not function in the same way as do the ac-
quired virtues, precisely because they are bestowed directly by God without the process
of habituation presupposedby the acquiredvirtues. Unlike the acquired virtues, they
are compatiblewith the presence of persistent contrary inclinations, which would have
been removed by habituationin the case of the acquiredvirtues, but which can remain
in someone who has the infused virtues to such a degree as to render their operation
difficult and unpleasant (I-II 65.3 ad 2). In other words, Aquinas allows for a great deal
more actual imperfection on the part of those who are virtuous through grace, than
those who are virtuous through their own labors!
140 Journal of Religious Ethics

I have quoted this passage at some length because it summarizes

Aquinas's understanding of the unity of the virtues in an especially
helpful way. First of all, it spells out his view that the necessary con-
nection among the cardinal virtues is grounded in the relationship be-
tween prudence and the moral virtues properly so called, and
therefore, in the relationship between intellectual and desiderative el-
ements in good human action.3 Moreover, it indicates that for Aqui-
nas, the thesis of the unity of the virtues is more complex than it is
often taken to be. We are told that the cardinal virtues can be said to
be connected in two senses, corresponding to the two senses in which
certain virtues can be said to be cardinal, namely, as general qualifica-
tions of all virtuous action and as particular normative ideals having a
specific content. This distinction suggests, in turn, that Aquinas's
claim that the virtues are connected should be understood as a psycho-
logical thesis about what is characteristic of the virtuous person's dis-
tinctive way of acting, as well as a thesis about the interrelationships
among the different cardinal virtues considered as discrete normative
ideals.
If Aquinas is indeed to be read in this way, as I shall argue below,
what difference does it make to the overall plausibility of his version
of the thesis of the unity of the virtues? The interpretation offered
here may or may not render this thesis more palatable to our contem-
poraries, but in my view, it does render it more interesting. More im-
portantly, it helps to explain why it is that Aquinas, who is neither
naive nor obtuse, is committed to defending a thesis that has struck
many moral theorists as being both. As I will try to show, Aquinas's
claim that the virtues are connected is a necessary implication of his
metaphysically grounded theory of human action.
At the same time, in the course of developing my interpretation of
Aquinas's claim that the virtues are connected, I hope to show that
this thesis is of contemporary interest, even though it may not be per-
suasive to those who do not find Aquinas's overall theory of morality
to be compelling. It enables him to offer an interpretation of the com-
plexities of our moral discourse and experience that is illuminating
and at least prima facie plausible taken on its own merits. Moreover,
it brings into focus certain issues raised by the recent shift to virtue-
oriented approaches to ethics.

3 Strictly speaking, prudence is an intellectual virtue, rather than a moral virtue,

since the moral virtues regulate the desiderativefaculties; however, Aquinas adds, pru-
dence is usually ranked with the moral virtues, since it cannot function without them
(see MI 57.4,5;II-II 47.1).
 The Unity of the Virtues 141

In what follows, I will focus on the philosophical aspects of Aqui-

nas's theory of the virtues, bracketing the more distinctively theologi-
cal aspects of that theory. The distinction that Aquinas draws
between the acquired cardinal virtues, which direct their subject to-
wards a naturally attainable form of human happiness, and the in-
fused theological and cardinal virtues, which direct their subject
towards personal union with God, provides a basis for approachinghis
overall theory of the virtues in this way (I-II 63.2-4). At the same
time, the more properly theological aspects of his theory of the virtues
are sufficiently complex, and sufficiently distinctive, to call for a sepa-
rate extended treatment. My hope is that this discussion of the more
properly philosophical aspects of Aquinas's theory of the virtues will
be of interest even to those who are primarily concerned with that
theory as a theological account of the moral life. It is impossible to
understand Aquinas's moral theology at any point without a careful
examination of the philosophical presuppositions of that theory, and
in this case, at least, those presuppositions are also of interest in their
own right (for a fuller discussion, see Porter 1992).

1. The Unity of the Virtues and the Meaning of Action

As we saw in the passage quoted at the beginning of this essay,
Aquinas's interpretation of the claim that the virtues are connected
depends on a distinction between imperfect and perfect virtues. Any
abiding disposition productive of those sorts of actions that are gener-
ally desirable can count as an imperfect virtue. However, as Aquinas
explains elsewhere, a human action can be said to be good in the
proper sense only if it is good in every respect (I-II 18.4;compare I-II
18.1). In order consistently to meet this exacting criterion in his activi-
ties, an individual must be possessed of perfect virtue, which is distin-
guished from deficient forms of virtue precisely in that it disposes the
agent to do (generically) good actions well. Of course, this explanation
immediately raises a still more basic question: What does it mean for
an action to be done well, that is to say, to be done in such a way as to
be good in every respect? At this point in his exposition, Aquinas pre-
supposes that we are already familiar with his extensive discussions of
the meaning of goodness in general and the application of this concept
to human action. Hence, in order to make sense of him at this point, it
is necessary at least to sketch the main lines of his general theory of
goodness (for a more detailed discussion of this theory, see Porter
1990).
The key to Aquinas's general theory of goodness may be found in
two remarks that he repeats in a variety of contexts throughout the
142 Journal of Religious Ethics

Summa: All creatures are good, and all creatures seek the good.
These claims are meant to be mutually interpreting, with the latter
claim being more fundamental (I 48.1). Each creature seeks the good
in the most basic sense, according to Aquinas, in that each creature
naturally strives to attain the most complete form of existence possi-
ble to a creature of its specific kind, or to sustain that complete exist-
ence once it has been attained (I 5.1; I 6.1; I 60.3; I 62.1; I 63.3; I 65.2).
This striving unfolds in and through the operation of the creature's
intrinsic causal powers, which of course takes place in a context of
complex interactions with other creatures in a mutually shaped causal
matrix (I 5.4; 1 115.1,2). To the extent that it has attained the ideal of
its species, the creature's intrinsic powers are appropriatelyactualized,
and it is said to be perfected. Since whatever is perfected to any de-
gree is said to be good, the creature that has attained even partial
perfection is said to be at least conditionally good (I 5.3). Hence, every
creature that exists at all is to that extent good, since no creature can
exist without instantiating, however incompletely, some species or
other (I 50.2ad 1). At the same time, it may be said to seek the good in
that it continues to strive towards ever greater perfection of being in
accordance with the ideal of being that is proper to its species (II-II
64.5).
It will be apparent that the concept of goodness, for Aquinas, is inti-
mately connected with the concepts of being, causality, and order. To
be good without qualification is to fulfill the ideal of some species of
being, that is to say, to be perfect in accordancewith some ideal. Cor-
relatively, whatever exists is good to some degree, since it is ipso facto
perfected to some extent or it would not exist at all (I 5.3). The crea-
ture's exercise of causality is thus to be interpreted normatively, in
terms of its orderly progression from a less to a more complete instan-
tiation of its own specific ideal (I 5.4). At the same time, in and
through this progression, the creature fits into a wider causal matrix
which also has its proper order and therefore enjoys a kind of good-
ness and existence in its own right. Ultimately, the creature finds its
place in the cosmos of ordered interrelationships that is the universe
as a whole, even if its development towards its own perfection is frus-
trated in some way (I 47.1,2;I 48.2). In this sense, every creature is
said to strive for, and to love, the good of the universe as a whole, even
more than its own particular good (I-II 109.3).
It should be emphasized that this progression of the creature to-
wards its own goodness and the good of the universe does not presup-
pose consciousness. Subrational creatures move towards their specific
form of perfection through the unfolding of their intrinsic causal pow-
ers, which are naturally determined to particular outcomes, and in the
 The Unity of the Virtues 143

process, they find their proper place, so to speak, in a wider web of

causal relationships (I 65.2). However, the progression of the human
person towards her perfection as a human being, which she seeks
under the general rubric of happiness, is more complex, and so is her
attainment of a proper relationship between her individual good and
wider forms of goodness.
Aquinas holds that the rational creature is to be distinguished from
all lower kinds of creatures by the fact that whereas the latter are
directed towards their final end by the natural unfolding of their
causal powers, the rational creature can only attain her specific perfec-
tion through actions which are knowingly directed by her towards the
attainment of that end, understood under the rubric of happiness (I
22.2 ad 4; I 103.1 ad 5; I-II 1.3,8;MI 12.5). Correctively, those of her
active powers which presuppose consciousness for their operation are
all dependent in some way on the functioning of her intellect. Not
only is her will, which is the form of appetite proper to a rational crea-
ture, dependent for its activation in a particular act of choice on an
intellectual judgment that a given object is good (I 82.4; I-II 8.1), but
her passions, which she shares in some form with all the animals, al-
ways presuppose some cognitive judgment, grounded in reason, that a
particular object is desirable or noxious (as the passions of subrational
animals do not [I 81.3]). That is to say, the active powers of the human
creature are not determined to particular objects, as the powers of
subrational creatures are (I 105.4;I-II 10.1,2). These powers must be
qualified by dispositions over and above their natural dynamisms, if
the human person is to be able to move towards her individual perfec-
tion and the attainment of wider forms of goodness through actions
knowingly directed towards that goal (I-II 49.4; I-II 55.1).
These abiding dispositions, which direct the active powers of the
human creature towards particular sorts of actions, are nothing other
than the virtues (I-II 55.1). At this point, we should note that the term
"virtue"is wider than our discussion so far has suggested; it includes
intellectual qualities such as knowledge and wisdom, as well as practi-
cal capacities like skills and proficiencies in the arts (I-II 56.3;I-II 57; I-
II 58.3). Of course, virtues of these sorts are morally neutral. In con-
trast, those virtues which shape the passions and the will, and the in-
tellect insofar as it is directed towards human action simpliciter, are
necessarily moral because the desiderative faculties are the immediate
springs of action, and Aquinas holds that particular actions are never
morally neutral (I-II 18.9). To the extent that an individual's moral
virtues are perfected- that is to say, to the extent that they are moral
virtues in the most proper sense- they will perfect her active powers
in such a way as to lead to actions which are good without qualification
144 Journal of Religious Ethics

in that they fully promote or instantiate the attainment of her specifi-

cally human good (I-II 55.3,4;I-II 65.1). In other words, perfected vir-
tues will always give rise to morally good actions; in contrast, the
imperfect virtues, which also qualify the desiderative faculties, typi-
cally result in actions which are good only in some limited respect (I-II
65.1). Aquinas thus accepts Augustine's definition of a moral virtue,
not as any habit, but as a habit which is productive of good actions:
"Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of
which no one can make bad use, which God brings about in us, without
us" (I-II 55.4;the last clause, Aquinas adds, applies only to the infused
virtues).
At this point, we must ask what it means, more specifically, to say
that the virtues perfect the active powers of the human person in such
a way as to give rise to actions that are good without qualification. In
order to answer this question, we must recall that the human person,
unlike subrational creatures, can only move towards her specific
perfection through her own actions, knowingly directed towards the
attainment of that end, understood under the rubric of happiness. In
other words, precisely because she is a rational creature, capable of
determining her own actions on the basis of rational knowledge, the
human person's capacity to act well will be a component of, and not
merely a disposable means to, her attainment of perfection as a human
being. Thus, virtue, which enables the human person to act well (that
is to say, in accordance with her specific nature as a rational animal),
can be understood as a disposition by which the human soul is in-
formed by reason (II-II 47.6;compare I-II 57.5; I-II 58.2). At the same
time, in Aquinas's view human goodness cannot be understood solely
in terms of adherence to the canons of logic. In order to act in accord-
ance with reason, it is necessary that the person act and sustain action
in accordance with a correct understanding of what it means to be a
good human being (I-II 1.2,7;I-II 3.2).
Perfected moral virtue, according to Aquinas, can thus be under-
stood as a disposition by which the individual translates her general
knowledge of that in which her good consists into specific actions.
How is this translation supposed to take place? Is it sufficient for the
individual to know what her true good is in order for her to do it? If
this were the case, the virtues would consist in nothing other than a
settled, rationally informed tendency to act in accordance with one's
true happiness as a human being. It is easy to see why, on this supposi-
tion, the perfected moral virtues would be regarded as necessarily con-
nected. In effect there would only be one true moral virtue, namely,
correct knowledge of the good. We would have to speak of unitary
virtue, rather than arguing for the unity of diverse virtues.
 The Unity of the Virtues 145

In fact, Aquinas rejects this conception of true virtue. After setting

forth this view, which he attributes to Socrates, he goes on to say:

This, however, proceeds from a false supposition. For the appetitive

part does not obey reason entirely at command,but with some contradic-
tion; hence, the Philosopher says, in Politics, Book 1, that reason com-
mands the appetitive parts by a political rule, by means of which, that is to
say, one [rules over] free people, who have the right, in some instance, of
contradicting [one's directives]. Hence, Augustine says, in his Commen-
tary on the Psalms, that sometimes the intellect goes ahead, and the affec-
tion follows either late, or not at all: insofar as sometimes, the passions or
the habits of the appetitive part so act, that the use of reason is impeded in
some particular. And in this sense, what Socrates said, that when knowl-
edge is present there is no sin, is somewhat true, if this be extended to
include the use of reason in a particular instance of choice.
So, therefore, in order for the human person to act well, it is necessary
not only that the reason be well disposed through a habit of intellectual
virtue, but also that the appetitive power be well disposed through the
habit of moral virtue. And so, just as the appetite is distinguished from
the reason, so moral virtue is distinguished from intellectual virtue.
Hence, as the appetite is the principle of the human act insofar as it par-
ticipates to some degree in reason, so moral habit has the character of
human virtue, to the extent that it is conformed to reason [I-II 58.2].

We may conclude from this passage that the proper relationship be-
tween the intellect and the appetites, particularly the passions, is a
central problematic for Aquinas's theory of the virtues. In order to
explain their connection, he must offer some account of the way in
which these different faculties are ideally related, and correlatively, of
how their correct interrelationships can break down. We now turn to
that account.

2. The Unity of the Virtues in a Unified Self

As we have already noted, truly virtuous action cannot be explained
solely in terms of the agent's possession of a true general knowledge of
the good. It also presupposes that the agent's appetites are brought
into harmony with what she knows, in general terms at least, to be in
accordance with her true good. But how are we to understand the
process by which this harmony is to be attained?
As we would expect, the answer to this question is complex, just as,
on Aquinas's account, the appetites of the human person are complex.
To begin with, we must draw a distinction between the will, which is
the form of appetite proper to a rational creature, and the passions,
which we share with the animals. Aquinas observes that the will is
naturally directed towards whatever the reason perceives to be in ac-
146 Journal of Religious Ethics

cordance with one's true good, and so it does not stand in need of a
special virtue to direct it towards one's proper good (I-II 56.6, espe-
cially ad 3). That does not mean that there are no characteristic vir-
tues of the will; both justice and charity fall within that category.
However, both of these orient the individual towards goods which
transcend his own proper individual good- namely, the common good
or the supreme goodness of God. The passions, on the other hand, are
not spontaneously oriented towards the individual's own proper good
since they are grounded in sensual perceptions that particular objects
are desirable or noxious. For this reason, they must be brought into
harmony with the individual's overall judgments that particular ob-
jects are or are not congruent with his overall well-being as a human
being (I-II 56.6. ad 3; compare I-II 17.7).
How, then, are we to understand the process by which the passions
of the virtuous person are brought into harmony with the deliverances
of her intellect as mediated through prudence and implemented
through the will? Almost two centuries after Kant, we readily assume
that this process must consist in somehow subduing or restraining the
passions, whenever they threaten to deflect us from our better judg-
ment.4 Aquinas does indeed seem to say at some points that the pas-
sions are restrained or bridled by the virtues (see, for example, II-II
123.3;II-II 141.3 ad 2). We might therefore be tempted to argue that
he holds that the passions are forces which stand over against intellect
and will, forces which must be subdued and directed by the latter pow-
ers if the agent is to pursue her true good. In spite of its initial plausi-
bility, this interpretation involves at least one serious difficulty.
According to Aquinas, every human action proceeds from the will.
Hence, there is no room in his psychology for the contrast that this
interpretation implies between actions that proceed from the will and
actions that proceed from the unruly passions (I 81.3; I 82.4; II-II
156.3).5

4 For example, in his influential The Varieties of Goodness,Pincoffs quotes G. H. von

Wrightas follows: "The role of a virtue, to put it briefly, is to counteract,eliminate, rule
out the obscuringeffects which emotion may have on our own practicaljudgment, i.e.,
judgment relating to the beneficent or harmful nature of a chosen course of action"
(1986,94). While he criticizes this definition on other grounds, Pincoffs does not ques-
tion the fundamental point that the virtues are meant to counteract the distorting ef-
fects of passions.
5 Aquinas does allow for the possibility that a person might be driven insane by ex-
cessive desire, with the result that he loses the capacity to act in a reasoned way alto-
gether, and in that case, his actions would be neither voluntary nor, strictly speaking,
involuntary (I-II 6.7 ad 3). But in that case, his acts would not be human actions in the
 The Unity of the Virtues 147

In fact, Aquinas does not set the passions over against the intellect
and will, as many later theorists do.6 Of course, he considers the intel-
lect, will, and passions to be distinct faculties of the human soul, but at
the same time, his analysis makes it clear that these faculties are in-
terdependent and can only be analyzed in conjunction with one an-
other. We are offered an indication of how to interpret his psychology
in De Veritateyin which he remarks that "Properly speaking, it is not
the sense or the intellect which knows, but the human person through
each of these" (II.6 ad 3, cited Gilson 1947, 186). In other words,
human perception is not to be understood in terms of distinct capaci-
ties which must somehow be brought together; rather, what is funda-
mental is the thinking and perceiving agent, whose unified act of
perception can then be analyzed in terms of its distinct components.
In the same way, what is fundamental to Aquinas's account of action is
not his analysis of the distinct faculties of intellect, will, and passions,
but rather his analysis of the person in act, whose action can then be
analyzed in terms of the distinct faculties in and through which he
acts.
Recall what Aquinas identifies as distinctive about human behavior.
Like all creatures, we act in pursuit of the good, and ultimately, of our
own perfection (I-II 1.8). Like the animals, we act in pursuit of the
good as consciously apprehended; however, unlike the animals, our
conscious apprehension of the good can only be mediated through the
judgments of the intellect, which determines what counts as the true
human good and judges whether this or that desideratum will pro-
mote that good or not (I 81.3;I-II 1.8). Fully rational action, for Aqui-
nas, always proceeds out of some judgment to the effect that a
particular desideratum will in fact promote the agent's true happiness
in some way (I-II 1.6).7 Of course, an action may fall short of this

proper sense at all, as would be the case with anyone else who is so insane as to be
incapable of the use of reason (compare I-II 1.1).
6 In modern times, the most influential treatments of the relationship between the
passions and reason have probablybeen those of Hume and Kant, both of whom argued
that passions and reason are not only distinct, but in some sense incompatible forces;
see, for example, Hume [1739-40]1973,456-64,and Kant [1785]1964,4-13.
7 Does this mean that fully rational action must always proceedout of an explicit and
well-thought-outconceptionof the human good, which is consciouslybrought to mind at
the moment of choice? Aquinas does not hold that even a fully rational agent necessar-
ily brings her conceptionof the true good to consciousnessat every moment of choice (I-
II 1.6 ad 3). But as far as I can determine, he does not address the question of whether,
and how far, the conceptionof the human good held by a rational agent must be explicit
and well-thought-out. At least, there is nothing in his discussions of the human good
and human action that would preclude an acknowledgment that even fully rational
agents are most likely to hold a conceptionof the human good that is largely implicit in
148 Journal of Religious Ethics

ideal, and yet still count as an action, if, for example, the agent acts in
pursuit of an immediately attractive good without at some point con-
sidering whether it will promote his overall good. Even in this case,
the agent acts out of an intellectual judgment, on the basis of which
this or that aim of action is brought under the general category of
goodness.
It is of critical importance to realize that in so acting, the rational
agent is simply fulfilling the general inclination towards goodness and
self-perfection characteristic of all creatures, in the way proper to a
creature of this specific kind, that is to say, a human being. To put the
same claim in another way, the conscious and self-reflective love
proper to the rational creature is only a specific form of that love for
one's own proper good that is found in some form in all creatures,
even inanimate things ("love" in this context does not imply con-
sciousness [I-II 1.8; I-II 109.3]). That is why, for Aquinas, the inclina-
tions of the rational or intellectual creature can be understood by
analogy with the simpler, yet parallel, inclinations of subrational crea-
tures (I 60.5).
This account of the will has one implication which is critical for a
correct understanding of Aquinas's psychology. Aquinas does not hold
that the will is an indeterminate capacity to aim for and choose any-
thing whatever, or even a capacity to aim at anything that can be de-
scribed in any way whatever as a good. It is true that he holds that the
will is necessarily not determined to any one particular object, but it is
determined nonetheless by a necessary orientation towards the agent's
own specific perfection, that is to say, towards her happiness. Hence,
it is necessarily the case that an agent believes, at least at the moment
of action, that the object for which she acts will contribute to her over-
all well-being, that is to say, her happiness (I-II 1.6).
We are now in a position to appreciate the significance of one of the
most striking aspects of Aquinas's psychology, that is, the very close
connection that he sees as obtaining between intellect and will. In his
view, the will can only aim at those goods presented to it by the intel-
lect, and yet, the intellect and all the other powers of the soul can only
be actively engaged at the command of the will (I 82.4; I-II 9.1). We
can now see why he connects intellect and will so closely, for if the
will is necessarily directed towards the agent's happiness, then it can
only be engaged on the basis of some conception of that in which hap-
piness consists, however rudimentary or even wrong-headed that con-

their commitments and convictions. What he cannot allow, however, is that a fully ra-
tional agent could act on the basis of received views of the good that she never, at any
point, subjects to reasoned scrutiny.
 The Unity of the Virtues 149

ception may be. Hence, the activities of intellect and will at a

particular moment of choice can best be understood as two moments
in one process by which the rational creature grasps her proper good
(or perhaps a similitude of the same), and acts accordingly.
So far, our analysis of Aquinas's psychology has not mentioned the
passions, and yet, on his view, these faculties also play a crucial,
although subordinate,role in human action.8 Unlike the will, the pas-
sions are appetites directed towards particular classes of goods,
namely, those which are perceived as such immediately through the
senses (I 80.2;I 81.1;I-II 22.3). Aquinas argues that all the passions can
be identified with one of two faculties of the soul, namely, the faculty
of concupiscence, through which we move towards what is perceived
to be good and grieve the absence of the good, and the irascible faculty,
through which we actively resist what is perceived to be noxious (I
81.2; I-II 23.1). Because they are oriented directly or indirectly to-
wards sensually apprehended goods, which are necessarily particular,
the passions are not capable, in and of themselves, of directing the
human person to his overall good, which can only be grasped and pur-
sued through the abstracting powers of the intellect (I-II 56.6 ad 3).
Nonetheless, it does not follow that human passions are simply non-
rational tendencies towards particular goods, as the passions of the
sub-rational animals are. To the contrary, Aquinas asserts that the
passions can obey reason, explaining that whereas the objects of the
passions of animals are determined by natural instincts, our own pas-
sions receive their objects from the reason (I 81.3). In other words, we
learn what to desire, what to fear, and so on, and therefore, our pas-
sions are dependent upon our reasoned judgments, just as the will is.
In the same question, he goes on to say that the passions cannot pro-
duce action without the consent of the will. Hence, the passions are
subordinateto both the intellect and the will and never function apart
from them.
So far, it might seem that for Aquinas, the difficulty with the claim
that all the virtues are connected, taken as a claim about the psyche of
the virtuous individual, would not be its implausibility, but its point-
lessness. It would seem that the intellect, the passions, and the will
are so closely connected that they can never be anything but united.
Yet, even on Aquinas's terms, there must be some sense in which the
movements of the passions can be at odds with the judgments of the
intellect concerning the true human good. He discusses such a condi-
tion in his discussion of the incontinent person, who experiences her-

8 In my interpretationof Aquinas'stheory of the passions, I have drawn extensively

on Lee Yearley's excellent analysis (Yearley 1990,72-112).
150 Journal of Religious Ethics

self, and is seen by others, as being at war with herself. She is

consistently drawn to act, or actually does act, in ways that are incon-
sistent with her considered judgments of that in which her own good
consists (II-II 156). How are we to understand this phenomenon?
The key to understanding incontinence within the parameters of
Aquinas's psychology may be found in his claim that the passions are
always dependent on some prior judgment of the intellect to the effect
that a given object is desirable or noxious. If these judgments were
always formed after the individual had arrived at her mature concep-
tion of the true human good, then there would be no basis for a con-
flict between her passions and that wider judgment. Of course, in
practice, the passions are shaped long before the individual has the
maturity to bring a comprehensive conception of the human good to
bear on her judgments about particulars. For this reason, the passions
may well be shaped on the basis of conceptions of the good that the
individual herself later comes to regard as incomplete or false. Should
this occur, then these misconceptions about the good, even though
they are recognized as such, may nonetheless continue to influence
the spontaneous judgments and reactions of the individual through
the operation of her misformed passions. In the case of the inconti-
nent individual, these misformed passions lead her to misjudge that in
which her true good consists and to act accordingly, even though she
may come to see her mistake immediately after acting (II-II 156.1,3).
We can now see why Aquinas admits that there is a sense in which
anyone who knows what is good will necessarily pursue it. This claim
is true, in his view, on the presupposition that in order to pursue one's
true good, it is necessary actively to know it at the moment of action.
The incontinent person does know her true good, but that knowledge
is only latent at the moment at which she acts. Her situation contrasts
with that of the continent person, who does manage to act in accord-
ance with his best overall judgment as to what his human perfection
demands in a particular instance, but who nonetheless still feels the
effects of a contrary judgment informed by the passions (II-II 155.1).
The continent person is better off than the incontinent, but he still
falls short of true virtue because his actions are marked by inner
conflict.
Correlatively, Aquinas does not equate true virtue with control of
the passions, in the sense of suppressing them. Rather, he affirms that
in the person of true virtue passions are always in harmony with over-
all judgments as to what counts as the true human good (I-II 58.3 ad 2;
II-II 155.4). In other words, the passions of the truly virtuous person
have been formed in such a way that she is habitually inclined to de-
sire what is good for her and to fear or be averse to what is truly harm-
 The Unity of the Virtues 151

ful for her. This capacity, to desire one's true good and to fear one's
true harm, is simply what it means to have the virtues of temperance
and fortitude.
The will, too, has a characteristic cardinal virtue, namely, justice.
What characterizes justice is that it directs the agent towards some
good that is more comprehensive than her own individual good,
namely, the common good (I-II 56.6). We have already noted that just
as the passions need to be oriented towards a wider good than the good
as generally apprehended, namely, the good of the individual as a
whole, so the will, which is naturally oriented towards the individual's
own good, needs to be oriented towards still wider and more compre-
hensive goods. At the same time, the orientation towards the common
good proper to justice does not suppress the individual's orientation
towards her own proper good or render it otiose.9 No society can at-
tain its common good unless it is just, and the norms of justice include,
for Aquinas, limited yet real safeguards that protect the individual
from certain fundamental harms and certain kinds of infringements
on her liberty. Hence, the just person, who wills the attainment of the
common good, does not thereby cease to will her own private good;but
she wills her own proper good in a way that is closed to an unjust
person- namely, as one member of a just society who attains her per-
sonal well-being in concert with others and not in opposition to them.
What is the relationship of prudence, the cardinal virtue of the prac-
tical intellect, to the central virtues of the passions and the will? This
question is of course crucial for understanding Aquinas's claim that
the cardinal virtues are connected, since he supports that claim by ar-
guing that no one can either possess prudence without the moral vir-
tues (I-II 58.5) or have the moral virtues without prudence (I-II 58.4).
We can readily understand why he would claim that no one can have

9 Although it is true that Aquinas says that the common good takes precedence over
the good of the individual (for example, at II-II 47.10), his treatise on justice makes it
clear that a just society, that is attaining its common good, will necessarily respect cer-
tain constraints on what it can do to the individual. Political authority cannot take an
individual'slife, her bodily integrity, or her freedom of movement if she is innocent of
criminal activity (II-II 64.6; II-II 65.1,3);it cannot proceed against her except through
fair and impartialjudicial procedures,even if she has attacked the community through
criminal activities (II-II 67-71);and it cannot force her either to marry or not to marry
(II-II 104.5). Hence, the commongood does not simply supersede or override the private
goods of the individualsin a community;rather, a limited but real degree of respect for
individuals'private goods is an intrinsic component of the common good. For this rea-
son, the individualwho orients herself towards the common good is thereby committed
to reconceptualizingher private good, but she is not committed to disregardingher pri-
vate good altogether. I have argued for this interpretation of Aquinas's conception of
the common good in more detail elsewhere (Porter 1990, 124-41).
152 Journal of Religious Ethics

prudence without the moral virtues. For prudence, as he understands

it, is simply the capacity to apply one's general knowledge of the true
human good to particular circumstances, and obviously, the exercise of
such a capacity presupposes that one desires the attainment of the
true human good (I-II 58.5). Of course, it is possible to imagine some-
one who does desire his true good, but fails to act in accordance with
that desire, as is the case with the incontinent person. In order for a
well-formed desire for one's true good to be effective, it is necessary
that it shape the desiderative faculties through the moral virtues,
which consistently direct the will and the passions towards what is
proper to the human good, that is, toward a life conducted in accord-
ance with reason (I-II 64.1; II-II 47.6).
But why should the moral virtues require prudence? Why is it not
sufficient to produce good action that a person simply act, spontane-
ously as it were, in response to the promptings of his good desires?
Aquinas answers that prudence is necessary to the moral virtues be-
cause it determines the mean of the virtues (I-II 58.4;II-II 47.7). How,
then, are we to understand the expression "the mean"? The mean of a
virtue, formally understood, is equivalent for Aquinas to the norms of
reason with respect to the agent's own passions or her dealings with
others (I-II 64.2). Of course, if this formal orientation is to have a con-
tent, it must be directed in accordancewith some judgment as to what
the norms of reason concretely require in a given situation (I-II 64.2).
Thus, Aquinas explains, while it belongs to the nature of the moral
virtues to seek the mean (so that this, the end of virtue, sets a goal
prior to prudence), nonetheless, the nature of virtue does not suffice
to determine what, concretely, is the mean of a particular virtue. This
latter activity belongs to prudence, which determines what the norms
of reason concretely entail in particular situations (II-II 47.7).
What, concretely, does this mean? In order to interpret Aquinas
satisfactorily at this point, it is necessary to go beyond what he explic-
itly says, but I believe that the following interpretation makes sense of
his diverse comments on the moral virtues, prudence, and their inter-
connections, and that it does so without contradicting his overall psy-
chology at any point.
Recall that accordingto Aquinas, human passions are dependent on
reasoned judgments. For this reason, human children, unlike puppies
and kittens, must learn what to desire and fear (at least, beyond a very
rudimentary level) if their passions are to be formed. Because the
will, which has no parallel among the animals, is a rational desire for
one's true good, it is still more obvious that it can only be formed in
and through a process of education as to that in which one's true good
 The Unity of the Virtues 153

consists, seen in relation to the good of others. How is this process of

education to take place?
Anyone who has had any experience at all with small children will
know that discursive reasoning on the nature of the human good will
not play a large role, especially not in childhood's early stages.
Rather, what the well-brought-up child will receive, especially at first,
will be instruction by way of very simple precepts, example, and story,
all of which will convey to her what sorts of responses are usually
consonant with the true human good in given sorts of situations. It is
important to realize that if all goes well, this process will simultane-
ously form the child's passions and will, and will begin to form the
virtues correspondingto those faculties. Indeed, given the assumption
that she is being raised in accordance with sound ideals of virtue, this
process of forming her passions and will is nothing other than the pro-
cess of training her in those customs of good behavior that will eventu-
ally provide the basis for the acquired virtues. As a result of this
training, she will spontaneously desire what the true human good
would usually require in the sorts of situations that we normally face.
So, for example, she will come to have a spontaneous aversion to tak-
ing what is not hers and a spontaneous desire for healthful meals and
exercise, rather than chocolate and unbroken leisure.
Note that up to this point, the well-brought-up child is still only ca-
pable of stereotypical responses in familiar situations. Even at this
level, she is capable of more than simple mindless imitation of her
betters, since in the process of forming her desires, she has already
been taught a great deal about what the human good concretely re-
quires, probably without noticing it. Nonetheless, so long as she stays
at this level, she will not be capable of fully virtuous action. It may be
that in a particular situation the stereotypically virtuous response is in
fact inappropriatefor some reason. If one's little brother is drowning,
it would not be modesty, but something else, that would prevent one
from stripping in order to swim out and save him; if a particular war is
unjust, it may be more courageous to refuse to fight than to stand firm
in battle. In order to make good judgments in non-typical situations
like these, the child must learn how to apply her expanding concep-
tion of the human good to particular, perhaps unprecedented sets of
circumstances. That is, she must develop the virtue of prudence,
which is nothing other than the ability to apply her general conception
of the human good to particulars.
Seen in this light, the moral virtues and prudence are connected in a
reciprocal and ongoing process of formation. Prudence develops in
and through ongoing reflection on the concept of the human good im-
plicit in one's first formation in the virtues, and as one's prudent abil-
154 Journal of Religious Ethics

ity to deal with different kinds of situations emerges, one's moral

virtues become more fully developed, subtle, and flexible. At the
same time, the different components of the human psyche develop in
such a way as to reinforce one another in every action. Just as every
truly virtuous human action will reflect the wisdom that is mediated
through prudence, so it will also reflect the conscientiousness proper
to justice, and the firmness and restraint proper to fortitude and tem-
perance, considered as aspects of virtue generally considered.

3. The Substantive Unity of the Virtues

What is the relationship between the thesis of the unity of the vir-
tues, interpreted psychologically, and the same thesis, taken as a claim
about the substantive content of the virtues, considered with respect
to their special matter? As I read Aquinas's theory, the former ver-
sion of this thesis implies the latter. That is, the view that all the fac-
ulties of the virtuous person are unified by being put into right
relationship with one another implies that the ideals of conduct
proper to the lower faculties are at least partly defined by the ideals
proper to higher faculties.
As we have already remarked, Aquinas's analysis of the logic of the
virtues demands that any virtue truly so called be a quality productive
of genuinely good actions. Given that an unconditionally good action
must be good in every respect, it follows that true virtue must result in
actions which are good from the most comprehensive point of view
humanly possible. That is, a truly good action must be congruent with
the most comprehensive form of goodness that falls within human
comprehension, which will generally be the common good of the indi-
vidual's community, or perhaps the good of humanity taken as a
whole.10 The passions, left to their own devices, so to speak, cannot
aim at the good on this level. They cannot even aim at the individual's
own proper good without the direction of the will, as guided by pru-
dence. Similarly, the will, left to itself, is directed towards the individ-
ual's proper good, but it must be regulated by justice, again informed
by prudence, in order to pursue the individual's good in and through
an intelligent pursuit of the common good.
Hence, each of the appetites towards goodness that informs the
human psyche must be regulated by norms proper to a higher faculty,
if it is to move the human person towards what is genuinely good. For

10However, Aquinas does not seem to hold that a good human action must actually
aim at the most comprehensive good possible, namely, the good of the universe as a
whole; see I-II 19.10.
 The Unity of the Virtues 155

this reason, each of the cardinal virtues, considered as a particular nor-

mative ideal, is open-ended. We cannot determine what counts as true
temperance or fortitude without evaluating seeming instances of these
virtues in the light of the higher norms supplied by justice and pru-
dence (II-II 58.5,6; II-II 147.1 ad 2). Justice itself, which consists in
rendering to each what is due, cannot be put into action without the
guidance of prudence to determine what, concretely, counts as one's
due (II-II 47.11),and prudence, in turn, as we have seen, is empty with-
out the starting-points for reflection provided by one's initial forma-
tion in the moral virtues (I-II 58.5; II-II 47.6).
It follows that the so-called virtues of those who are not virtuous
overall do not count as virtues in the proper sense, although Aquinas
does allow that such qualities may be described as virtues in a quali-
fied sense. Of course, Aquinas can stipulate that the terms "true vir-
tue," "true courage,"and so forth are to be understood in this way, but
the question that remains is whether this stipulation allows Aquinas
simply to dismiss what would seem to be a powerful objection to his
theory. After all, to anyone not in the grip of a metaphysical theory of
goodness, it would seem obvious that there are plenty of people who
possess some virtues and not others. In other words, it might seem
that Aquinas's general theory of goodness as applied to action has led
him to a theory of the virtues that is seriously at odds with our ordi-
nary ways of understanding and speaking of the virtues.11
Nonetheless, I will argue that even judged by the standards of our
ordinary ways of talking about the virtues, Aquinas's theory of the
virtues is more persuasive than it may appear at first sight to be. His
theory illuminates our ordinary moral reflections in at least one sig-
nificant way: It enables us to make sense of the difficulty, built into
any discourse about the virtues, in distinguishing between true virtues
and their similitudes. That is, it enables us to make sense of, and to
build upon, a common distinction between qualities that are really
praiseworthy, and other traits of character, superficially similar,
which on closer examination prove to be pernicious, or at least not
truly desirable.12 As we will see, Aquinas's elaboration of this distinc-
tion implies an answer to what we may call the common sense objec-
tion to his claim that all the virtues are connected.
A little reflection will indicate that we do indeed commonly make
distinctions among true virtues and their similitudes. At least one

111 am grateful to the late Alan Donagan for pointing this objection to Aquinas's
theory out to me.
12Yearley offers an especially helpful discussionof the distinction between true vir-
tues and their similitudes in Aquinas (Yearley 1990, 79-94,124-28).
156 Journal of Religious Ethics

common counter-example to the thesis of the unity of the virtues,

namely, the bravery shown by someone fighting in a bad cause, tends
to obscure this fact, because the behavior of soldiers on the battlefield
can be more readily isolated from their character as displayed in eve-
ryday life than can other, more frequently encountered cases of simili-
tudes of the virtues. When we turn to examples that we are more
likely to encounter in everyday life, the importance of being able to
distinguish true virtues from their various sorts of counterfeits be-
comes more apparent.
For example, nearly everyone would agree that honesty is a good
quality for which someone can legitimately be praised. Yet it is easy to
imagine situations in which we would at least have cause to question
whether someone's honesty is really all that praiseworthy, taken on
the whole:

1. A young man always says exactly what is on his mind to anyone

who asks, and sometimes to those who do not ask. He never stops
to think what effect his comments might have, because it has
never occurred to him that he might injure or pain others- or vio-
late his own interests- by his thoughtless self -disclosures.
2. A somewhat different sort of case is presented by a young woman
who is temperamentally frank and open, who hates any sort of
deception, and therefore says whatever she is thinking. In her
case, blunt honesty is the result of a temperamental dislike of con-
cealment, rather than a sheer failure to think through the effects
of her words. However, the practical effect is likely to be the same
in her case as in the preceding case. Because she says what is on
her mind, no matter what the situation, this blunt young woman
does unnecessary damage to herself and others.
3. A man who runs a small family grocery store is always scrupu-
lously honest in his dealings with his customers, suppliers, and
employees. He is fond of saying that honesty is the best policy in
the long run, and in any case, it has never occurred to him that a
grocer should function in any other way. His father and grandfa-
ther, who ran the business before him, behaved in just the same
way. However, he has no particular commitment to honesty as a
general policy. For example, he never hesitates to lie to his wife if
he stays out late with his mistress. In this, too, he is simply follow-
ing the conception of a particular role (in this case, the role of a
husband) as it was exemplified by his father and grandfather.
4. A woman attempts to build her life around an ideal of absolute
independence, self-sufficiency, and pursuit of her well-being. It
would be easy to imagine that such a commitment might lead her
 The Unity of the Virtues 157

to promote her interests through lying, but she interprets her

ideal in a more interesting way, as implying a disdain for the feel-
ings and opinions of others that does not permit her to attempt to
consider their reactions to her words at all. Thus, she always says
exactly what is on her mind as a matter of principle, however
hurtful her words might be to others, or even to her own immedi-
ate interests, since only in this way can she express her aristocratic
lack of concern for others' reactions to her (in which, in her view,
her own true good consists).

These four cases have been chosen to exemplify four ways in which
it would be at least plausible to say that someone exhibits a similitude
of a virtue, but not the true virtue itself. In the first two cases, what
seem at first to be examples of honesty appear on closer examination
to be instances of indiscretion, grounded in the former case in a kind
of reckless ignorance about the effects of one's words on others, and in
the latter case in a more attractive, but still problematic, temperamen-
tal frankness. In the third case, an individual behaves honestly only
because, and only insofar as, it is expected of someone in his social
role. In the last case, a person is honest as a matter of settled policy,
but her policy (I would argue) is a bad one; she is honest in pursuit of a
bad end. What these four cases have in common is that, in some sense,
the individual exhibiting the seeming virtue does not know what she
or he is doing; that is, she or he does not act out of knowledge about
what the human good involves and what sort of life would be neces-
sary to exemplify it. Admittedly, in the last case, the woman who al-
ways tells the truth out of disdain for others does in fact act out of
some kind of conception of that in which her true good consists, but
because her idea of her good is so distorted, she too can be viewed as
acting out of a kind of ignorance of the human good.
And so what? What difference does it make to someone's actual
conduct, at least with reference to the sphere of life covered by a par-
ticular virtue, if she acts out of ignorance or temperament or custom
or even out of a bad conception of the good? As long as she somehow
manages to act in accordancewith the virtue in question, even for bad
reasons or no reasons at all, why should we deny that she really does
possess that virtue? It may seem that Aquinas's analysis reflects a
kind of intellectualist prejudice that we would do well to repudiate.
What this objection presupposes is that the persons described in the
examples above really do possess and act out of a character trait that is
essentially the same as the honesty of the truly virtuous person. It is
hardly obvious that that is the case. To the contrary, these examples
illustrate the fact that what seem to be virtues can express qualities of
158 Journal of Religious Ethics

one's character that are undesirable on the whole. To put matters

more bluntly, one's seeming virtues can turn out on closer examina-
tion to be vices in disguise, as, for example, the seeming candor of the
man in the first case turns out to be thoughtless recklessness. In such
a case, when the seeming virtue is seen in the context of the person's
whole life, it may well become apparent that the underlying character
trait is expressed in behaviors that are morally dubious as well as in
those that seem at first to reflect some virtue. If it is serious enough,
such a negative trait can distort the shape of a person's whole life in
such a way that the seemingly good behavior that it produces will fit
into an overall way of living that is in some way inadequate or even
harmful to the agent herself and to others. To continue with our first
example, thoughtless recklessness, which may give the appearance of
frankness and honesty on some occasions, may well also be expressed
in callousness towards the interests and feelings of others and careless
disregardof the agent's own long-term interests and needs. Moreover,
if this hypothetical young man should somehow rid himself of the vice
of thoughtless recklessness, the seeming virtue that that vice produced
might well be eliminated in the process. If he became more cautious,
he might well find that he could no longer bring himself to say some-
thing unwelcome to his hearers even when he had a good reason to do
so.
The qualities expressed in the second and third examples are differ-
ent; here we are not dealing with an obvious vice masquerading as a
virtue. The blunt young woman acts out of what is surely a combina-
tion of good traits, taken in themselves, namely, frankness and an
aversion to duplicity. The grocer seeks to fulfill the expectations of
his social role; while this trait is not so attractive as honest frankness,
it is surely necessary in some degree if one is to function in society at
all. In each case, what is potentially a good tendency of character, or a
good combination of tendencies, is distorted because it is not intelli-
gently shaped by the agent's overall conception of the good. For this
reason, even the good traits exhibited in these examples can turn out
to be distorting and destructive when seen within the context of a
whole life. The young woman's temperamental frankness, unbal-
anced by any wider conception of the human good, can very easily lead
her into the same sorts of destructive disregardfor her own well-being
and the needs and claims of others that sheer unthinking recklessness
can produce. The grocer's willingness to respect conventions will not
provide much of a basis for virtuous behavior in unconventional situa-
tions, and it may well lead him to respect conventions that are vicious
in their overall effects, again distorting the overall shape of his life.
 The Unity of the Virtues 159

What these three examples have in common, therefore, is that an

apparent virtue is in some way distorted by a species of thoughtless-
ness, which has a corrupting effect on the individual's overall life. In
the fourth example, what seems to be a virtue is in fact an expression
of an overall way of life that is distorted at the root because it is based
on a pernicious conception of the human good. Paradoxically, the dis-
dainful truthfulness of the proud woman will bear a closer resem-
blance to true honesty than the similitudes will do in any other case.
In each case, the agent has a habitual disposition to tell the truth,
which disposition is informed by a wider conception of the human
good. And in each case, it is that wider disposition that gives shape to
the individual's life as a whole and expresses itself in the whole range
of traits of character that go to make up her overall personality. How-
ever, in the case of the woman whose conception of the good is dis-
torted, that conception will express itself in a life that is distorted in a
variety of ways, for example, in insensitivity to her own emotions and
those of others or in a willingness to inflict cruelty. Hence, the con-
trast between genuine viciousness and virtue reveals most clearly
what is nonetheless true in every case: What is determinative of the
shape of the individual's life is not the set of character traits that he
possesses, considered as an ensemble of distinct qualities, but the un-
derlying dispositions and commitments that inform those character
traits.
What these examples suggest is that the argument to the effect that
even someone whose overall character is seriously deficient may pos-
sess some isolated, yet true, virtues in the midst of all his faults as-
sumes, without justification, that the so-called virtues of the morally
deficient person really are just the same traits of character, productive
of the same actions in every case, as the virtues of one who is virtuous
overall. But this is not the case (Casey 1990, 67-83). The virtues can-
not be considered as discrete components of the personality of the
truly virtuous person, components which can be separated out of the
context of her overall personality with their structure and behavioral
expressions intact. For this reason, the person who possesses a simili-
tude of a given virtue will not consistently behave in the same way as
the truly virtuous person, even in the particular area of life that the
seeming and true virtues regulate. The truly honest person, whose
truthfulness is regulated by an adequate comprehensive conception of
the human good, will tell the truth in situations in which a menda-
cious person, or even a conventionally honest person, would not do so,
but she will also conceal the truth in circumstances in which a
thoughtless or proud person would tell the truth. She will not
thoughtlessly blurt out truths that would be hurtful to others, and she
160 Journal of Religious Ethics

will protect her own privacy and her appropriate self-interest by

avoiding indiscriminate self-disclosure. Her truthfulness will be con-
ditioned also by a sense of the competing claims that must be negoti-
ated in any serious moral life, in such a way that she will recognize
when the demands of justice and concern for others require her to
withhold, or perhaps even to conceal the truth, and she will act ac-
cordingly (Wallace 1978, 118-21).
What, then, are we to make of the undoubted fact that even people
who are obviously not perfect in virtue may well nonetheless be admi-
rable in many ways? Given that Aquinas can help us to understand
the complex judgments that reveal the flaws in seeming virtues, can
he also account for the fact that even acknowledging the flaws, seem-
ing virtues can still be quite admirable? Yes; he allows for this sort of
judgment by distinguishing between virtues that are virtues without
qualification and virtues that are virtues only in a secondary sense. A
seeming virtue may well reflect an incomplete but real positive devel-
opment of some human capacity, or else, a good disposition that could
readily be developed into a genuine virtue. As such, even this simili-
tude of a virtue would be desirable and praiseworthy in itself, and bet-
ter for the agent herself and those around her than the corresponding
vice would be. Indeed, the rudimentary virtues of the continent and
incontinent will often be of this sort.

4. Conjunctions with Contemporary Moral Theory

If the reading of Aquinas developed above is convincing, then it will
be apparent that his claim that the virtues are all connected is integral
to his overall moral theory, as that theory is grounded in a wider ac-
count of human action. Understood in this way, his defense of the
unity of the virtues may or may not be convincing to a modern reader,
but we can at least appreciate why, on his own terms, the thesis of the
unity of the virtues would appear to be cogent and compelling. The
question that remains, of course, is whether Aquinas's defense of this
thesis renders it credible, or at least interesting, in the context of con-
temporary thought. In other words, is this defense of historical inter-
est only, or does it have relevance to contemporary concerns?
Another essay would be necessary in order to address this question
fully, but some tentative observations on the present-day significance
of Aquinas's account of the unity of the virtues are nonetheless in
order.
It is all too easy to take the thesis of the unity of the virtues as set-
ting out a precisely defined criterion by which to separate the virtuous
from the seemingly-but-not-really virtuous, the truly righteous from
 The Unity of the Virtues 161

the scoundrels. Understood in this way, this thesis is indeed implausi-

ble, because it simply refuses to recognize the many varieties of
human excellence that can co-exist with human weakness, blindness,
or outright vice. But if the analysis just offered is accurate, it would be
a mistake to read the thesis of the unity of the virtues as Aquinas un-
derstands it in this way. As was just noted, he does allow for the possi-
bility of true human excellences even on the part of those who do not
possess virtue in the fullest sense. He simply insists that in such a
case, the excellences that are displayed will be deficient in some way
that can be identified and interpreted by comparison with the ideal of
true, that is, integral, virtue. Understood in this way, his views are
perhaps not so far removed from ours after all. Aquinas speaks in
terms of perfect and imperfect virtues, whereas we speak in terms of
the ambiguity of human goodness. It may be that behind these two
quite different terminologies there is a shared sense of the complexity
and the limitations of our efforts to know and to live out the good.
Understood in this way, Aquinas's defense of the unity of the virtues
can contribute to our own efforts of moral discernment in at least two
ways. The first of these has already been suggested by the analysis of
the preceding sections. If that analysis is accurate, then Aquinas may
be said to offer us one set of interpretative keys for understanding
moral deficiencies. That is, he helps us to distinguish between two
different kinds of moral failures: (1) those that can be traced to an
inability to sustain one's commitments in the face of contrary desires,
fears, or inconveniences and (2) those that stem from some sort of
thoughtlessness or some misconception of the nature of the human
good. Correlatively, he challenges our pervasive assumptions about
the nature of moral goodness and its relation, on the one hand, to psy-
chological abilities and, on the other hand, to a reasonable and hu-
mane estimation of what morality demands. He calls into question the
widespread, and facile, belief that nothing is required for moral good-
ness but a sincere willingness to fulfill the demands of morality.
This contribution remains valuable even though it is bound to seem
incomplete and therefore inadequate today. We have resources to in-
terpret moral failures that Aquinas did not have, including a more so-
phisticated psychology and a more subtle and complex sense of the
ways in which social structures shape and limit human lives. Precisely
because our evaluative framework includes a richer psychology and a
more adequate understanding of society, we are able to recognize
forms of moral failure to which Aquinas was largely blind (for exam-
ple, complicity in social sin), as well as to offer better explanations for
phenomena (such as continence and incontinence) that he could iden-
tify but could not explain fully. His account of the virtues, together
162 Journal of Religious Ethics

with the philosophical psychology in which it is grounded, is incom-

plete and stands in need of reformulation to take account of subse-
quent developments in our understanding of the human individual
and society. That it is incomplete does not mean that it is wrong.
Even as it stands, it can provide a plausible interpretation of some (al-
beit not all) kinds of moral failure or deficiency.
Aquinas's defense of the unity of the virtues can contribute to con-
temporary moral theory in another way: by helping us to understand
more precisely what is implied in adopting a virtue-oriented theory of
morality. As we have seen, Aquinas interprets the thesis of the unity
of the virtues in such a way that it implies that any act truly expres-
sive of one of the moral virtues may be correctly redescribed as an act
of a higher virtue or virtues, so that an act truly expressive of temper-
ance or fortitude is also ipso facto an act of justice, and an act truly
expressive of justice is also an act of prudence. Hence, for him, no
action can be fully described and evaluated from a moral point of view
unless it is considered from more than one viewpoint, corresponding
to the different levels of goodness that the human agent pursues.
In this respect (as in many others), Aquinas's theory of morality is
very different from those modern theories which evaluate behavior in
terms of the single criterion of conformity to a moral law. This differ-
ence may help to explain why it is that the thesis of the unity of the
virtues which seemed so uncontroversial to Aquinas and his contem-
poraries yet seems so incredible to us today. For if conformity to a set
of independently derived rules is the only criterion of morally good
behavior- such that all other moral judgments, including judgments
of virtuousness, are derived from that criterion- then indeed a claim
that the virtues are united does not make much sense. On this view,
the virtues can be nothing more than habitual tendencies to act in a
way that conforms to the rules of morality. It is possible consistently
to observe one particular moral rule and totally to ignore another;
consequently, if the virtues are to be understood as mere tendencies to
obey particular moral rules, a given individual may well possess some
virtues and not others. For Aquinas, on the other hand, the correct
descriptions of actions, and correlatively, the rules of morality, are
subsequent to ideals of virtue, and these ideals, in turn, cannot be un-
packed in isolation from one another, but are mutually interpreting.
Hence, while Aquinas certainly does not deny the existence of a
moral law, he does not see that law as being underived and supremely
normative. Rather, the moral law for him is grounded in a more fun-
damental vision, of a human life that incorporates the diverse goods of
human existence into a unified whole, in concert with others who are
similarly striving to attain their true good. His insistence that even
 The Unity of the Virtues 163

the acquired cardinal virtues are connected reflects his hopefulness

that it is at least conceivable that the diverse goods of human life
might be brought into harmony with one another. Ultimately, his de-
fense of the thesis of the unity of the virtues will be persuasive to the
degree that we share that hopefulness, and we must reject it if we do
not.

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