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Practices in Airport Emergency Plans
AIRPORT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM
ACRP SYNTHESIS 115

Practices in Airport
Emergency Plans
A Synthesis of Airport Practice
Stephanie Murphy
Ashlee Herring Delventhal
Crystal Kline
Blanca Rand
Tidal Basin Government Consulting, LLC
Alexandria, VA
Subscriber Categories
Aviation • Safety and Human Factors • Security and Emergencies
Research sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration
2021
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

AIRPORT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM ACRP SYNTHESIS 115
Airports are vital national resources. They serve a key role in trans- Project 11-03, Topic S04-24
portation of people and goods and in regional, national, and interna- ISSN 1935-9187
tional commerce. They are where the nation’s aviation system connects ISBN 978-0-309-67376-1
with other modes of transportation and where federal responsibility for Library of Congress Control Number 2021930156
managing and regulating air traffic operations intersects with the role of
© 2021 National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
state and local governments that own and operate most airports. Research
is necessary to solve common operating problems, to adapt appropriate
new technologies from other industries, and to introduce innovations into
the airport industry. The Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) COPYRIGHT INFORMATION
serves as one of the principal means by which the airport industry can Authors herein are responsible for the authenticity of their materials and for obtaining
develop innovative near-term solutions to meet demands placed on it. written permissions from publishers or persons who own the copyright to any previously
The need for ACRP was identified in TRB Special Report 272: Airport published or copyrighted material used herein.
Research Needs: Cooperative Solutions in 2003, based on a study spon- Cooperative Research Programs (CRP) grants permission to reproduce material in this
sored by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). ACRP carries out publication for classroom and not-for-profit purposes. Permission is given with the
applied research on problems that are shared by airport operating agen- understanding that none of the material will be used to imply TRB, AASHTO, FAA, FHWA,
cies and not being adequately addressed by existing federal research FTA, GHSA, NHTSA, or TDC endorsement of a particular product, method, or practice.
It is expected that those reproducing the material in this document for educational and
programs. ACRP is modeled after the successful National Cooperative not-for-profit uses will give appropriate acknowledgment of the source of any reprinted or
Highway Research Program (NCHRP) and Transit Cooperative Research reproduced material. For other uses of the material, request permission from CRP.
Program (TCRP). ACRP undertakes research and other technical activi-
ties in various airport subject areas, including design, construction, legal, Cover photo captions: (Top) Aircraft waits to be de-iced on a snowy night and (bottom)
maintenance, operations, safety, policy, planning, human resources, and ARFF crews train on smoke simulator.
Cover photo credit: Ashlee Herring Delventhal
administration. ACRP provides a forum where airport operators can
cooperatively address common operational problems.
ACRP was authorized in December 2003 as part of the Vision 100—
Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act. The primary participants in NOTICE
the ACRP are (1) an independent governing board, the ACRP Oversight The report was reviewed by the technical panel and accepted for publication according to
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stakeholders, and relevant industry organizations such as the Airports The opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this report are those of the
Council International-North America (ACI-NA), the American Associa- researchers who performed the research and are not necessarily those of the Transportation
tion of Airport Executives (AAAE), the National Association of State Research Board; the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; or the
program sponsors.
Aviation Officials (NASAO), Airlines for America (A4A), and the Airport
Consultants Council (ACC) as vital links to the airport community; (2) TRB The Transportation Research Board; the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
as program manager and secretariat for the governing board; and (3) the Medicine; and the sponsors of the Airport Cooperative Research Program do not endorse
products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers’ names appear herein solely because
FAA as program sponsor. In October 2005, the FAA executed a contract
they are considered essential to the object of the report.
with the National Academy of Sciences formally initiating the program.
ACRP benefits from the cooperation and participation of airport
professionals, air carriers, shippers, state and local government officials,
equipment and service suppliers, other airport users, and research organi-
zations. Each of these participants has different interests and responsibili-
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project. The process for developing research problem statements and
AIRPORT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM
selecting research agencies has been used by TRB in managing coop-
erative research programs since 1962. As in other TRB activities, ACRP are available from
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Primary emphasis is placed on disseminating ACRP results to the Business Office
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training aids, field visits, webinars, and other activities to ensure that and then searching for TRB
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outstanding contributions to research. Dr. Marcia McNutt is president.
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COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAMS
CRP STAFF FOR ACRP SYNTHESIS 115

Christopher J. Hedges, Director, Cooperative Research Programs
Lori L. Sundstrom, Deputy Director, Cooperative Research Programs
Marci A. Greenberger, Manager, Airport Cooperative Research Program
Tanya M. Zwahlen, Senior Program Officer
Stephanie L. Campbell, Senior Program Assistant
Eileen P. Delaney, Director of Publications
Natalie Barnes, Associate Director of Publications
ACRP PROJECT 11-03 PANEL

Joshua D. Abramson, Tupelo Regional Airport, Tupelo, MS (Chair)
Debbie K. Alke, Montana Department of Transportation, Helena, MT
Gloria G. Bender, TransSolutions, LLC, Fort Worth, TX
David A. Byers, Quadrex Aviation LLC, Melbourne, FL
Traci Clark, Allegheny County Airport Authority, West Mifflin, PA
David N. Edwards, Jr., Greenville–Spartanburg Airport Commission, Greer, SC
Brenda L. Enos, Burns & McDonnell, Newton, MA
Patrick Magnotta, FAA Liaison
Liying Gu, Airports Council International–North America Liaison
Adam Williams, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Liaison
Christine L. Gerencher, TRB Liaison
TOPIC S04-24 PANEL

Christopher R. Bidwell, Airports Council International–North America, Washington, D.C.
Traci Clark, Allegheny County Airport Authority, West Mifflin, PA
Scott A. Corzine, Ankura Consulting, Inc., New York, NY
Terrence Daley, Transportation Public Health Preparedness Consultants, LCC, Lithonia, GA
Paul Khera, Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, Juneau, AK
Meaghan Smalley, Jacksonville Aviation Authority, Jacksonville, FL
Brandy Welch, IEM (formerly LAX, American Red Cross), Playa del Rey, CA
Marc Tonnacliff , FAA Liaison

ABOUT THE ACRP SYNTHESIS PROGRAM

Airport administrators, engineers, and researchers often face problems for which information
already exists, either in documented form or as undocumented experience and practice. This infor-
mation may be fragmented, scattered, and unevaluated. As a consequence, full knowledge of what has
been learned about a problem may not be brought to bear on its solution. Costly research findings
may go unused, valuable experience may be overlooked, and due consideration may not be given to
recommended practices for solving or alleviating the problem.
There is information on nearly every subject of concern to the airport industry. Much of it derives
from research or from the work of practitioners faced with problems in their day-to-day work. To
provide a systematic means for assembling and evaluating such useful information and to make it
available to the entire airport community, the Airport Cooperative Research Program authorized the
Transportation Research Board to undertake a continuing project. This project, ACRP Project 11-03,
“Synthesis of Information Related to Airport Practices,” searches out and synthesizes useful knowl-
edge from all available sources and prepares concise, documented reports on specific topics. Reports
from this endeavor constitute an ACRP report series, Synthesis of Airport Practice.
This synthesis series reports on current knowledge and practice, in a compact format, without the
detailed directions usually found in handbooks or design manuals. Each report in the series provides
a compendium of the best knowledge available on those measures found to be the most successful
in resolving specific problems.
FOREWORD
By Tanya M. Zwahlen
Staff Officer
Transportation Research Board
The objective of ACRP Synthesis 115: Practices in Airport Emergency Plans was to gather informa-
tion about the issues and challenges experienced by airport managers, with airport emergency plans
as useful and actionable documents for supporting airports in defining roles and responsibilities of
stakeholders during emergencies, identifying specific threats that could affect airports, and estab-
lishing communication protocols for the airport community. The audience for this timely resource
is the airport community and stakeholders. The report gathers relevant data specific to airport emer-
gency plan practices that can be applied effectively to other airports, including general aviation air-
ports, whether they are required to maintain an airport emergency plan.
The information contained in this synthesis was obtained using four sources. First, a literature
review compiled relevant existing research about the topic. Second, the consultant participated in an
in-person plenary panel discussion with 175 attendees. Third, the consultant also surveyed 81 airport
representatives from 62 airports. Fourth, the consultant conducted interviews with airport officials.
Stephanie Murphy and team members Ashlee Herring Delventhal, Crystal Kline, and Blanca Rand
of Tidal Basin Government Consulting, LLC, collected and synthesized the information and wrote
the report. The members of the topic panel are acknowledged on page iv. This synthesis is an imme-
diately useful document that records the practices that were acceptable within the limitations of the
knowledge available at the time of its preparation. As progress in research and practice continues,
new knowledge will be added to that now at hand.
15719-00b_FM-3rdPgs.indd 5
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. 1/28/21 3:32 PM

CONTENTS
1 Summary
4 Chapter 1 Introduction
4 Background
5 Study Methodology
5 Literature Review
7 Synthesis Organization
7 Selection of Airports and Data Collection
10 Chapter 2 History and Development of the Airport
Emergency Plan
10 History of the Airport Emergency Plan
11 Requirements for Airport Emergency Plan Development
16 Chapter 3 Current Airport Emergency Plan Practices
16 AAAE International Airport Emergency Management Conference,
Plenary Session
17 Online Survey (SurveyMonkey)
19 Is the AEP Seen as an Actionable and Sufficient Response Document?
22 Successful Practices in Developing and Updating the AEP
23 Challenges in Developing and Updating the AEP
25 Challenges in Using the AEP During an Incident
26 How Is the AEP Used?
27 How Can Airports Make the AEP Actionable and Relevant?
27 Metrics for Developing AEP Annexes
28 Development of Annexes, Plans, SOPs, or Checklists
30 Overcoming Challenges
32 Socializing the Plan
33 Other Partner Preparedness Plans
34 The Proof—Training, Testing, and Validation
35 Inspection Feedback
35 Lessons Learned
36 What Would Airport Respondents Change About the AEP?
37 Chapter 4 Case Examples
37 Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT)
38 AEP Practices and Processes
40 Successful Practices
40 Lessons Learned
40 Summary
41 George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH)
43 Lessons Learned
43 Summary
44 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (FLL)

47 Lessons Learned
47 Summary
47 McCarran International Airport (LAS)
49 Future Planning and AEP Practice Refinement
49 Innovative Solutions Developed
50 Other Successful Practices
50 Lessons Learned
51 Summary
51 Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA)
53 Lessons Learned
54 Summary
54 Boulder City Municipal Airport (BVU)
55 AEP Status and Use
56 Challenges Experienced in Developing and Implementing an AEP in a General
Aviation Airport
56 Successful Practices in AEP Development at a GA Airport
56 Considerations for Other GA Airports Considering Developing an AEP
57 Summary
57 Centennial Airport (APA)
58 AEP Use
59 Challenges Experienced
60 Summary
61 Chapter 5 Salient Findings
63 Lessons Learned
63 Enduring Challenges
65 Chapter 6 Conclusions
65 Major Conclusions
66 Further Research
67 Glossary of Terms
76 Acronyms and Abbreviations
78 Airport Codes
80 Appendix A References and Bibliography
83 Appendix B Annotated Bibliography
90 Appendix C SurveyMonkey (Online) Survey Questions
and Responses
36
1 Appendix D Phone Interview Questions
137 Appendix E McCarran International Airport
EAP Reference Guide
Note: Photographs, figures, and tables in this report may have been converted from color to grayscale for printing.
The electronic version of the report (posted on the web at www.trb.org) retains the color versions.

SUMMARY
Airports prepare to respond to emergencies through various means and methods. Among
the many forms that preparedness has taken, one method is developing and updating an
airport emergency plan, or AEP. An AEP is meant to support airports in defining roles and
responsibilities of stakeholders during emergencies, identifying specific threats that could
affect airports, and establish communication protocols for the airport community. Title
14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 139.325, and Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-31C regulates AEPs. Many airports have opted
to maintain AEPs to the regulation standard, then focus on enhancing their preparedness,
response, and recovery efforts through development, training, and exercise of additional
all-hazards plans.
The objectives of the synthesis were (1) to identify the issues, challenges, and work-
arounds experienced by airport managers with AEPs as useful and actionable documents;
and (2) understand FAA inspectors’ perspectives about how AEPs ameliorate risks and
guide emergency response actions. The synthesis provides data from respondents on their
practices as it relates to understanding and developing their AEPs.
The authors gathered relevant data specific to AEP practices that can effectively be
applied to other airports, including general aviation (GA) airports, whether required to
maintain an AEP or not. The data was gathered through a review of relevant literature
on the topic; an in-person plenary panel discussion at the American Association of
Airport Executives (AAAE) International Airport Emergency Management Conference
in Chicago, Illinois, on July 16, 2019, with 175 attendees; an online survey provided to
81 airport representatives from 62 airports (26 large-hub, eight medium-hub, 13 small-
hub, three nonhub primary, six nonhub general aviation, and six nonhub reliever) with a
response rate of 45 airports, or 73%; and seven 45-minute phone interviews with airports
(five large-hub and two GA). Unsuccessful attempts were made to contact and collect
data from associated FAA airport inspectors to validate findings and gain collaborator
and regulator experience and practice.
For the purposes of this study, airports of varying categories, as defined by the National
Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS), were included and afforded the opportunity to
respond to survey questions about their AEP practices, as well as an opportunity to speak
further with the synthesis team about these practices. The survey was anonymous, allow-
ing airports to answer openly and honestly about their practices. A list of airports
provided with the survey is in Appendix C; however, this list does not indicate who
responded.
1

2 Practices in Airport Emergency Plans
Overview of Feedback
A majority of survey respondents indicated that their airport’s AEP is sufficient as
a response document and fulfills the requirements of the AC; however, respondents
ultimately indicated that the AEP is difficult to use or not used at all when response opera-
tions are underway. Based on respondents’ answers, this is either because the AEP is too
cumbersome, is not detailed enough or updated, or is lacking in the necessary information.
Respondents agreed or strongly agreed that to ensure airport personnel understand their
roles and responsibilities during an incident, they (the respondents) have found a benefit
in creating and developing other hazard-specific plans as a supplement to the AEP. Other
patterns that emerged from respondent data show that the AEP, the task of updating the
AEP, and ensuring that it is in sync with all other airport preparedness plans are often the
responsibility of one person. Since one person is solely dedicated to the task, respondents
indicated experiencing challenges when updating the AEPs. Additional challenges ranged
from having to have multiple plans to meet local, state, and federal guidelines and regula-
tions to keeping the plan broad enough for the various hazards the airport could experience
while providing specific processes for responding to those incidents.
Challenges are not only present when developing or updating an AEP but are also
encountered when actually using the AEP during an incident. While some airports want
to build out the AEP, others have been successful by reducing the size of the document by
only including the required information. Some airports have removed everything beyond
the regulatory requirements from the AEP and placed nonregulatory information in stand-
alone plans. Regardless, throughout the survey, respondents indicated that the AEP is a
necessity, although successes and challenges arise as they strive to find the right balance
between regulatory adherence and the preparedness of the airport community.
The case examples provided in this synthesis highlight successful practices as well as
lessons learned from five large-hub and two GA airports. The AEP practices that are part
of the case examples are updating AEPs or developing all-hazards plans through a needs
assessment or gap analysis (Charlotte Douglas International Airport); updating the AEP
through use of a review committee (George Bush Intercontinental Airport); develop-
ment of AEP annexes and training requirements using various metrics (Fort Lauderdale-
Hollywood International Airport); socializing the AEP with stakeholders (McCarran
International Airport); incorporating updates into AEP processes following a real-world
incident (Seattle-Tacoma International Airport); and AEP development at GA airports
(Boulder City Municipal Airport, Pearson Field Airport, and Centennial Airport). For further
information about the case examples, please refer to Chapter 4 of this synthesis.
Major Findings
The findings of this synthesis demonstrate that airports are using the AEP as a founda-
tional plan for all required information, then finding innovative ways to communicate
and exercise the plan(s), incorporate lessons learned into AEPs, and develop new plans to
fill perceived or identified gaps. As airports encounter emergencies of varying sizes, types,
and complexities beyond airfield and aircraft accidents, airports find themselves in need
of plans that seek to manage all types of hazards and threats.
Airports are therefore enhancing the AEPs through development of all-hazards plans,
capabilities-based planning efforts [e.g., evacuation, transportation, continuity of operations
plans (COOPs), or communications], or threat- and incident-specific plans (e.g., severe
weather plans, epidemic or pandemic, or active shooter or assailant plans). In addition,

Summary 3
airports are finding innovative ways to ensure stakeholders are aware of their roles and
responsibilities. Examples identified include establishing review committees, building
standalone checklists, and developing reference guides.
Major conclusions of the study include the following:
1. Many airports have opted to maintain AEPs to the regulation standard, then focus on
development, training, and exercise of supplemental all-hazards plans. Traditional
emergency management (EM) practices are being incorporated into airport programs,
placing importance on gap and threat assessments, training and exercise programs, and
a formal improvement planning process.
2. Airports have created innovative AEP practices to ensure the airport has relevant plans
necessary to respond to and recover from threats that could affect the airport and its
stakeholders.
3. Engagement of stakeholders internally and externally to the airport community is a
vital component to successfully developing, updating, and implementing the AEP and
its companion plans or annexes.
4. Exercising and training on the plans are successful methods to initiate and maintain
stakeholder engagement in developing and maintaining these plans.
5. Airport emergency managers and operators are being proactive in collaborating with
stakeholders, both internally and externally to the airport.
6. Establishing an after-action report (AAR) and improvement plan process helps improve
the AEP and supporting documents.
7. Using innovative AEP practices such as involving subject matter experts, creating
stakeholder books, and establishing AEP-review working groups help facilitate stake-
holder engagement, understanding of roles and responsibilities, and inclusion of
expertise external to the airport.
8. The AEP in its current iteration is not as user-friendly as airports want because
regulations surrounding development, update, and maintenance of the AEP can
be prescriptive in nature and require significant time to get approved.
9. Aligning and cross-walking the multiple plans at airports [e.g., communicable disease
plans, irregular operations (IROPS) plans, terminal evacuation plans, and so forth] or
plans that could affect the airport developed by surrounding jurisdiction(s) (e.g., mass
casualty plans, evacuation plans, or severe weather plans) is valuable to ensure plans
do not conflict or have duplicate information, and enhance the airport’s ability to
respond to and recover from incidents and events.
10. Airports benefit from using a gap analysis or the threat and hazard identification and
risk assessment process to understand gaps in planning.
Further research identified by this synthesis could delve more deeply into specific AEP
practices such as collaborating with local EM organizations; developing a recommended
process for airports to develop AARs and conduct improvement planning following
exercises, events, and incidents; and understanding ways airports can more closely mirror
existing EM planning processes.

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Background
The processes and practices airports use to update and enhance their airport emergency
plans (AEPs) vary because of a number of factors. The factors include threat and hazard iden
tification and risk analysis (which establishes the need for in-depth all-hazards planning and
plan development processes), political and executive leadership priorities, the ability to engage
with partner agencies and jurisdictions, staff experience and availability, regulatory require-
ments, and incidents that provide real-world experiences that lead to enhancements.
Airports are required to follow Code of Federal Regulations, title 14, part 139 (14 CFR,
part 139), requirements for being a certificated airport while also abiding by the requirements
set forth in 14 CFR, part 139.325, to have an AEP. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-31C provides guidance for preparing and planning for the
new environment of modern threats, but guidance is 10 years old and may lack nuance for
planning for new and modern threats.
The AC 150/5200-31C and 14 CFR, part 139.325, have been described by respondents of
this synthesis report as overly prescriptive, cumbersome, rigid, and inflexible. Many have
opted to maintain AEPs to the regulation standard, then focus on development, training, and
exercise of additional all-hazards plans. These bifurcated practices are described throughout
this synthesis.
Traditional emergency management (EM) practices are being incorporated into airport
programs, placing importance on gap and threat assessments, regular training and exercise
programs, and a formal improvement planning process. Collaboration with internal and
external stakeholders has been of particular importance, with emphasis placed on building
relationships, educating partners, and cross-walking plans with the AEP.
Throughout this synthesis many scientific, aviation, and EM terms, acronyms, and abbre
viations are used. At the end of this synthesis are the definitions of these items. They should be
referred to often to enhance understanding of the report, interpretation of the results, and
major findings.
The report indicates that airport personnel in the course of their AEP practices may identify
gaps the AEP simply does not cover. Therefore, they may want to enhance the AEP through
developing other functional annexes and/or standalone plans. They may also choose to
conduct specific practices that lead toward development of more inclusive, robust plans by
using a comprehensive planning process, establishing specific processes for updating the AEP,
and identifying needs through gap analyses. However, many personnel do not have the time
or the experience to understand what can or cannot be done with the AEP and how best to

Introduction 5
go about closing the identified gaps. The AEP process (i.e.,

reviewing, updating, sharing, and exercising the AEP) is often
assigned to personnel as an “other duty as assigned,” on top
of their already heavy workload.
Therefore, the purpose of this synthesis is to document and
describe current practices and challenges airports face when
developing, revising, and using their AEPs for emergency
response and recovery activities. This includes use of their
current AEPs in an operational environment, practices for
updating the plans to ensure relevancy, and determining when
to enhance the AEP with supporting annexes or separate
all-hazards plans. Ultimately, this synthesis offers and high-
lights successful practices as well as lessons learned from
airports as AEPs are updated and refined to create useful and
actionable documents.
Firefighters approach a small aircraft, Centennial Airport (APA)
For this synthesis, “successful practice” is defined as a tech-
nique or methodology that, through experience and research,
has proven to reliably lead to a desired result. “Lessons learned” is defined as learning gained
from the process of performing the activity (i.e., exercising or responding to incidents and
events). The purpose of documenting lessons learned is to share and use knowledge derived from
experience to promote the recurrence of desirable outcomes and/or preclude the recurrence of
undesirable outcomes.
Study Methodology
The objectives of the synthesis were (1) to identify the issues, challenges, and work-arounds
experienced by airport managers with AEPs as useful and actionable documents; and (2) to
understand FAA inspectors’ perspective with how AEPs ameliorate risks and guide emergency
response actions. The audience for this report is the airport community, FAA, and stakeholders.
As a result of difficulties connecting with the FAA, the synthesis team was unable to achieve and
complete the second objective. Further information about this is provided below in the section
titled Selection of Airports and Data Collection.
Literature Review
For the literature review, the authors used keywords to identify relevant literature for this
synthesis. Keywords included “transportation emergency plan,” “airport emergency plan,”
“business continuity plan,” “continuity of operations,” and “irregular operations (IROPS).”
The literature reviewed can be found in Appendix B: Annotated Bibliography.
There is little written about AEP practices. An article by Kraus, Plos, and Vittek (2014) does
identify that
Airport emergency planning is a very important element in ensuring the safety and security of air
transport. Airport emergency planning will therefore get more and more attention, because even a small
event will have a great impact on the finances of the airport operator. From the perspective of manage-
ment of financial resources, the airport operator would be constantly more inclined to creating and
improving the airport emergency plan (AEP).
The article gives a broad overview of mistakes made by airport operators as well as success-
ful practices in revising the AEP without commenting on the logistical considerations of

actionable steps or subgoals. Although this article focuses on non–U.S. airports, the themes
identified are similar to what has been identified in the data for this synthesis. Primarily, the
literature suggests that the AEP is problematic because it is often created and maintained simply
because it is a requirement and regulation.
Other available peer-reviewed articles outline the need for special attention to be paid to
protected classes and abnormal operation risks and hazards in addition to normal operations.
Protected classes include race, color, religion or creed, national origin or ancestry, sex, age,
physical or mental disability, veteran status, genetic information, and citizenship. The literature
also indicated EM programs, services, and activities should be accessible to everyone, including
people with disabilities as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and
the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act.
The literature review uncovered a sample of possible annexes that can complement AEPs,
including the following:
• ACRP Synthesis 60: Airport Emergency Post-Event Recovery Practices (Smith et al. 2015)
• ACRP Research Report 171: Establishing a Coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for
Airports (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2017)
• ACRP Research Report 201: Airport Emergency Communications for People with Disabilities and
Others with Access and Functional Needs and ACRP Synthesis 73: Emergency Communications
Planning for Airports (IEM, Inc. 2019 and Smith et al. 2016)
• Airport Terminal Incident Response – Terminal Incident Response Plan (TIRP) (National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2009)
• Protected and nontraditional class considerations (ADA, DAFN, and patrons with mental
health needs) (Anderson 1988; IEM, Inc. 2019; and National Academies of Sciences, Engi
neering, and Medicine 2016)
• ACRP Report 12: An Airport Guide for Regional Emergency Planning for CBRNE Events
(Stambaugh et al. 2009)
• ACRP Report 160: Addressing Significant Weather Impacts on Airports: Quick Start Guide
and Toolkit (ICF International et al. 2016)
• Contingency Planning for Unexpected Passenger Delays (National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, April 2013)
Small- and nonhub or GA airports may have other considerations outside of the scope of
hub airports. These considerations can include GA size, complexity, operations, personnel,
facilities, geography, and types of aircraft served. The authors identified Emergency Guidebook
for General Aviation Airports: A Guidebook for Municipal Airport Managers (2005–2020) as a
resource for GA airports looking to develop an AEP. In other sources reviewed, the authors of
ACRP Synthesis 72 (Smith et al. 2016) explain that the development of a “checklist is designed
to assist airport managers, EMs, and planners in the development, implementation, and evalu-
ation of effective exercise programs . . . [with the added] benefits from going beyond regulatory
minima for training and exercises.”
Lastly, previous reports and syntheses by the ACRP also informed this synthesis. A review of
the ACRP Final Report for Project 04-19, Airport Emergency Planning Template: NIMS–Incident
Command System Compliance (Corzine et al. 2018), provides further insight into AEP practices
by the 20 airports interviewed during that project. In the Project 04-19 report, the interviews
summary revealed that changes were experienced as a result of the 2009 update to the AC,
specifically to the airports’ safety, security, and EM cultures. However, these changes were
dependent on availability of resources and airport size. Not unique to the Project 04-19 report,
and as synthesized here, some airports reported that they do not add information to their AEPs
beyond what is required by regulation, thereby becoming “as much a compliance exercise as an
effort to improve fundamental emergency readiness.” Because the FAA was unable to provide

Introduction 7
input or comment into this synthesis, the synthesis team considered information provided by
the FAA to Project 04-19 as included in the Final Project Report. As stated in the Project 04-19
Final Report, “The FAA recognized that there is a wide variance in knowledge, experience and
capability between larger, well-staffed emergency management teams at larger airports on the
one hand, and smaller Index A and B airports on the other that may not be as well staffed and
funded, in their relative ability to develop AEPs.”
Synthesis Organization
The synthesis is organized into six chapters. This first chapter is the introduction to the
synthesis. Chapter 2 provides relevant background and history about AEPs and federal regula-
tions, and Chapter 3 discusses current AEP practices, as synthesized from the respondent data.
Chapter 4 includes the case examples highlighting specific AEP practices by airports around the
country. Chapter 5 provides salient findings from the respondent data, to include successful
practices, lessons learned, and enduring challenges as they relate to AEP practices. Chapter 6
provides the conclusions of the synthesis. The references, bibliography, further case example
reference information, and survey data can be found in the supporting appendices.
The glossary of terms, along with the abbreviations and acronyms found at the end of this report,
will help provide context or define words, acronyms, or terms that may be new or unknown to
the reader.
Selection of Airports and Data Collection

The authors gathered data and input from respondents, specific to AEP practices, that can
effectively be applied to other airports, including GA airports, whether required to maintain
an AEP or not. The data was gathered through a review of relevant literature on the topic; an
in-person plenary panel discussion at the AAAE International Airport Emergency Management
Conference on July 16, 2019, in Chicago, Illinois, with 175 attendees; an online survey using
SurveyMonkey provided to 81 airport representatives from 62 airports (26 large-hub, eight
medium-hub, 13 small-hub, three nonhub primary, six nonhub GA, and six nonhub reliever)
with a response rate of 45 airports or 72.58%; and seven 45-minute phone interviews with
airports (five large-hub and two GA). For the purpose of this study, airports of varying cate
gories, as defined by the NPIAS, were included and afforded the opportunity to respond to
survey questions about their AEP practices, as well as an opportunity to speak further with
the synthesis team about these practices.
During the first opportunity for data capture, the 45-minute AAAE International Airport
Emergency Management Conference plenary session, “Preparedness, Response, and Recovery,”
the audience was asked about their AEP practices and the challenges they experienced when
updating and/or developing their AEPs, supporting annexes, or other supporting plans.
Comments captured during this plenary session are included in this synthesis in Chapter 3.
On August 15, 2019, approximately 3 weeks following the conference plenary session,
the second opportunity for data capture was sent to airport representatives. This outreach
included an online survey using SurveyMonkey that was sent to airport representatives and
FAA Inspectors through FAA representatives. A total of 45 respondents participated in the
survey, which was available for response for 60 days.
The survey averaged approximately 25 minutes, with 44 required questions, four non
required additional questions, and 29 nonrequired demographic questions, for a total of
77 questions. Once the required section of the survey was complete, respondents were provided

the option to answer further, in-depth questions or to complete and finish the survey.
Respondents completed the entire survey, including follow-on questions, in approximately
40 minutes. A total of 31% of respondents chose to continue the survey beyond the required
questions and answer the additional questions.
Following the online-survey open period, respondents were provided an opportunity
to speak with the authors through a phone interview if they indicated in the online survey
that they wanted to be contacted to provide in-depth information about their AEP practices.
A total of eight respondents indicated they wanted to be contacted for follow-up. The synthesis
team was able to conduct phone interviews with five of those respondents (three did not respond
to requests for further follow-up). The team also interviewed two GA airports who did not
participate in the initial survey. During the phone interviews, airports were asked the same
eight questions about their AEP practices (these questions can be found in Appendix D).
Through the interview process, successful practices and lessons learned have been fleshed
out and synthesized into case examples. Those airports have also been included in Chapter 4,
Case Examples, about their innovative AEP practices.
FAA Inspector Survey

For this synthesis, the synthesis team attempted to gather information from FAA inspectors.
An FAA representative used an official memo and specific survey link to provide to FAA
inspectors. The memo was provided to the FAA Union for the FAA inspectors and distributed
accordingly. FAA inspectors were informed the survey was anonymous and included five
FAA-specific questions to answer. During the 2 months the survey was open and available,
the synthesis team received no responses. Following the survey and during development of
the synthesis, the FAA was contacted and provided with the synthesis for review and comment.
One of the objectives of this synthesis is to “understand FAA inspectors’ perspective with how
AEPs ameliorate risks and guide emergency response actions.” Because of the lack of data, the
synthesis team was unable to achieve and complete this objective.
Collection of Data: SurveyMonkey

Data collection was completed using the program SurveyMonkey in which a survey was
created based on institutional knowledge of AEPs and recommendations by the project
panel. The survey was designed to request honest and open feedback. The sample was taken
from large-, medium-, and small-hub airports, as well as nonhub primary, reliever, and GA
airports. The survey encouraged anonymity based on the sensitivity of the topic, while also
allowing participants to be interviewed and responses attributed later if their identifying
information was given.
Defining Stakeholders
Throughout the synthesis, many groups are considered to be “stakeholders” that inform,
influence, or need to support the AEP and practices. Stakeholders can include, but are not
limited to, the following:
• Airport operators and staff who are directly employed by the airport
• Airlines and staff
• Tenants and staff
• Local, state, and federal government agencies—government, EM, medical examiner, or
regulatory
• First responders who have roles and responsibilities for an emergency at or with the airport

Introduction 9
• Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the American Red Cross

• Private organizations that may support the airport and/or airline (roles and responsibilities)
during an emergency or event (contracted staff )
Successful Practices
Throughout the synthesis, the synthesis team uses the term “successful practices.” This term
is used to clarify that through the literature review, plenary session, online survey, and phone
interviews, multiple practices have been identified by the respondents that proved successful
for them, at their airport, as they navigated updating AEPs and developing other types of
annexes or plans. Therefore, the synthesis team recognizes that these practices were successful
for that airport. The synthesis team has thus synthesized that information and presents it here,
should it be of use for other airports. The synthesis team defines successful practice as a
technique or methodology that, through experience and research, has proved to reliably lead
to a desired result.

CHAPTER 2
History and Development of

the Airport Emergency Plan
This chapter includes the history and background of the airport emergency plan (AEP). Here
the synthesis team provides the foundation for why airports need to have an AEP, regulatory
requirements of the AEP, and elements that are included in an AEP.
History of the Airport Emergency Plan

On August 2, 1985, Delta Flight 191 crashed on approach to Runway 17L after experienc-
ing microburst winds at Dallas Fort Worth International Airport (DFW). The crash resulted
in significant changes across the aviation industry, including the requirements for emergency
planning at airports. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation identified
multiple challenges with the response to the crash and subsequently released Safety Recom-
mendation A-86-090 on September 3, 1986. The recommendation identified improvements
to notification procedures, reviews of emergency plans with stakeholders and mutual aid
responders, and a recommendation for airports to hold a full-scale exercise every 24 months.
In 1989, AC 150/5200-31 was released by the FAA, partially in response to NTSB’s Safety
Recommendation A-86-090. This required certain 14 CFR, part 139, airports to maintain an
AEP, meeting specific requirements, especially related to communication and notification
procedures. In addition, airports were required to conduct an annual review of the plan and
a full-scale exercise every consecutive 36 months (NTSB 1986).
Ten years later, the updated AC 150/5200-31A was released by the FAA in June 1999.
The AC referred to the four phases of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s)
concept of comprehensive emergency management (CEM): (1) mitigation, (2) preparedness,
(3) response, and (4) recovery. The AC also discussed responsibilities of government leaders
under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288,
also known as the “Stafford Act.” The Stafford Act indicated that local governments were
responsible for protecting people and property at airports under their jurisdiction during
emergency situations. However, the AC stopped short of requiring a CEM program, continuing
to focus exclusively on response operations. “The AEP does not need to reflect all four phases of
CEM. Rather, its focus should be mainly on response and initial recovery issues. Detailed Miti-
gation Plans, Administrative Plans, or Recovery Plans can be handled separately” (FAA 1999).
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks had a substantial impact on airports and the
entirety of the first responder and EM community. The most significant of these impacts was
the release of the National Response Plan (NRP) in 2004, later replaced by the National Response
Framework (NRF) in 2008. The NRP would transform the way responders plan, communicate,
and coordinate with each other. The NRP included the introduction of the National Incident
Management System (NIMS) and the related Incident Command System (ICS).
10

History and Development of the Airport Emergency Plan 11
In response, AC 150/5200-31B was released in March 2009

and was quickly replaced by version C in June of the same year.
The most notable change in the updated AC was the inclusion
of the NRF and NIMS. The AC indicated AEPs needed to inte-
grate NIMS into an airport’s command and control structure,
including the use of an emergency operations center (EOC)
for coordinating the response. The introduction of NIMS in
the AC 150/5200-31C (2009) brought airport response in line
with the standardized structure used by public safety entities
throughout the United States. As with superseded versions,
the AC continued to stop short of requiring a comprehensive
emergency plan focused on all phases of disaster.
Present day (2020), AEPs continue to adhere to the most
current 2009 version of the AC and follow the template set
forth by the AC. The airport’s FAA inspector prior to changes
being made must approve variances to the template.
ARFF supports airport emergency exercise, CLT
The core of current AEP requirements continues to include
Source: Michael Tobin, CLT
many of the facets outlined in the original 1989 AC. These
facets include command and control, communications, alert
and warning, public information, protective actions, law enforcement, fire and rescue, health
and medical, resource management, and operations and maintenance. Procedures for each
are outlined in their respective functional annexes in the plan. In addition, annexes outline
the response to specific hazards, based on hazards identified in the airport’s hazard analysis.
Airports also continue to adhere to the requirement of conducting a comprehensive review of
the plan once per year and a full-scale exercise every 36 consecutive months.
Requirements for Airport Emergency Plan Development

Maintaining an AEP is required for all airports holding an FAA 14 CFR, part 139, operating
certificate. Airports classified as “part 139” airports include any airport in the United States
with scheduled passenger service of aircraft carrying nine passengers or greater or unscheduled
passenger service of aircraft carrying 31 passengers or greater (Federal Aviation Administration
2013). The AEP is developed in coordination with airport tenants and stakeholders, public safety
and EM organizations, and other government and community organizations with a stake in
the plan. Airports are required to review the plan internally and externally with organizations
with responsibilities in the plan, once per year. A tabletop exercise (TTX) is often used as a tool
in this review. In addition, all Class I, II, III, and IV airports are expected to conduct a full-scale
exercise of the AEP no later than once every 36 consecutive months. Class I, II, and IV airports
are those that currently hold part 139 Airport Operating Certificates (AOCs). Class III are
those airports that will be newly certified. As previously discussed, development of the AEP is
guided by AC 150/5200-31C. The following is a brief overview of the AC and its recommen-
dations for AEP development.
The AC begins with a brief introduction, discussing the purpose of the AEP. It also includes
information on format and organization, an overview of determining hazards, and a note
on the importance of collaboration with local stakeholders. The application of the AC and
a summary of changes from the 1999 version are also included. This is followed by a brief
first chapter, Chapter 1: The Airport Emergency, which provides an overview of emergencies at
airports in general.

Chapter 2 of the AC relates AEPs to the larger EM and public safety community. This
section addresses mutual aid agreements with surrounding communities and reminds users
of the importance of a collaborative approach to emergency planning. It also discusses the
Stafford Act, NRF, and other related policies. Chapter 2 highlights the importance of using
the ICS, especially when coordinating response efforts with outside agencies. This is laid out in
detail in Chapter 6-1-1, Command and Control. As mentioned previously, the AC describes the
components of a comprehensive EM program, but reiterates the AEP is focused specifically on
response and short-term recovery.
An overview of the plan development processes is included in Chapter 3, with six primary
steps:
1. Review other related plans.
2. Form a planning team.
3. Do research.
4. Develop the plan.
5. Validate the plan.
6. Train, then complete drills and exercise.
There are three steps that occur prior to the development of the plan. A review of other
plans, AARs, and special facets of the airport indicate the level of work already completed and
provide background on hazards and vulnerabilities.
The remainder of the AC acts as a template or a guide for the
format of the AEP. Chapter 4 states, “The FAA does not man-
date a particular format. However, for airports certificated
under 14 CFR, part 139, the FAA recommends the use of the
guidance in this publication” (Federal Aviation Administra-
tion 2009). While the exact format may not be mandatory,
following their recommended format ensures airports meet all
the requirements. Airports may deviate from the recommen-
dation, but it must be reviewed and approved by the FAA to
ensure all requirements of the AC are being met.
The FAA’s format of the AEP consists of four major chapters:
Basic Plan, Functional Annexes, Hazard-Specific Sections, and
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Checklists. The
Basic Plan provides the general overview, including purpose,
assumptions, and responsibilities. The functional annexes are
the “how to” of the document. They include activities such as
ARFF apparatus puts out a fire during a part 139 full-scale exercise, CLT
command and control, communications, alert and warning,
and other task-based information. The hazard-specific annexes
are developed to address response to certain hazards which may need detailed guidance or
may be required as a result of regulatory considerations. SOPs and checklists will be associated
with each hazard in the hazard-specific section.
Sections of the Basic Plan include the following:
1. Introduction
2. Introductory Information
3. Purpose
4. Situation and Assumptions
5. Operations
6. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

7. Administration and Logistics

8. Plan Development and Maintenance
9. Authorities and References
The first three sections of the Basic Plan provide overall
administrative and general information. Section 4, Situa-
tion and Assumptions, begins looking at the hazards being
addressed and scope of the plan while Section 5, Operations,
provides the overall concept of operations for responding to
incidents that may affect the airport and community.
Section 6, Organization and Assignment of Responsibil
ities, displays information to support emergency response
actions. The FAA has identified 10 specific functions, or
capabilities, the airport must be able to demonstrate (Com-
munications, Direction and Control, Alert and Warning,
Emergency Public Information, Protective Actions, Fire and U.S. Air Force joins a part 139 full-scale exercise, CLT
Rescue, Law Enforcement, Health and Medical, Operations Source: Michael Tobin, CLT
and Maintenance, and Resource Management). In addition,

an organization(s) must be assigned responsibility for each function (See Figure 1). Section 6
of the Basic Plan lists each organization and their associated responsibilities. A matrix may be
included as well, showing the relationship of the organization to the function.
Chapter 7 of the AC explains in detail how the 10 functions should be represented in the
functional annexes of the AEP. Logistics, resource management, and finance are all located in
Section 7 of the Basic Plan. Policies for requesting and using resources and related documen-
tation should be included in this location. The Basic Plan then wraps up with a description
of how the plan will be maintained, training and exercise requirements, and any references
included.
Functional annexes include the following:
• Section 1. Command and Control—Structure for overall management of the event. Utilizes
the ICS (Title 49 CFR §1542).
• Section 2. Communications—Includes all manners of communication for event, including
equipment, policies, and procedures.
• Section 3. Alert Notification and Warning—Notification and status updates of an event to
employees, stakeholders, partner organizations and mutual aid, and the public.
• Section 4. Emergency Public Information—Information dissemination to the public,
including media and social media. Utilizes the Joint Information System.
• Section 5. Protective Actions—Actions to ensure life safety and protection of property.
Include evacuation and shelter-in-place.
• Section 6. Law Enforcement/Security—Law enforcement response. Coordinated with Air-
port Security Program, as required by Title 49 CFR §1542.307, Airport Security (Title 49
CFR §1542.307).
• Section 7. Firefighting and Rescue—Includes aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF), struc-
tural fire, rescue situations, and hazardous materials incidents. Must meet requirements of
Title 14 CFR §§139.315-319, Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting: Index Determination.
• Section 8. Health and Medical—Emergency medical services (EMS), public health, envi
ronmental health, mental health, and mortuary services.
• Section 9. Resource Management—Logistics, equipment, and supplies.
• Section 10. Airport Operations and Maintenance—General oversight and management of
airport functions and personnel.

Figure 1. Emergency response organization responsibility matrix.

(Source: Federal Aviation Administration, 2009)
Additional possible functions suggested by the FAA include damage assessment; search and
rescue; mitigation and recovery; mass care; and CBRNE protection. Plans identified during
the research phase of the planning process should be referenced during the development of the
functional annexes.
The structure for functional annexes mirrors that of the Basic Plan, minus the introductory
portion. Sections include a) Purpose, b) Situation and Assumptions, c) Operations, d) Organiza-
tion and Assignment of Responsibilities, e) Administration and Logistics, f ) Plan Development
and Maintenance, and g) References and Authorities.
Chapter 7 outlines Hazard Annexes and Checklists for nine hazards required to be included.
The format for these is outlined in the AC. These annexes include the same sections as the
functional annexes, but also add sections for innovative planning considerations, SOPs, and
Checklists. Examples of functional SOPs and Checklists are included in the appendices of the
AC. Often, these can be used as templates for developing their respective documents.
Hazard annexes include the following:
a. Aircraft incidents and accidents
b. Bomb incidents, including designated parking areas for the aircraft involved
c. Structural fires
d. Fires at fuel farms or fuel storage areas
e. Natural disasters

f. Hazardous materials/dangerous goods incidents

g. Sabotage, hijack incidents, and other unlawful interference with operations
h. Failure of power for movement area lighting
i. Water rescue situations, as appropriate
An annex for Crowd Control has been added to the AC, although it is not noted as a required
annex. It is important to note that two annexes, (b) Bomb Incidents/Terrorism and (g) Sabotage,
Hijack Incidents, and Other Unlawful Interference with Operations are considered sensitive
security information (SSI) and need be handled accordingly. Some airports will keep these
annexes as documents separate from the AEP. The structure of the AEP and its associated sections
can be seen in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Airport emergency plan structure (SOPs = standard operating procedures
and ARFF = aircraft rescue and firefighting).
(Source: Federal Aviation Administration, 2009)

CHAPTER 3
Current Airport Emergency

Plan Practices
This chapter interprets the data and results collected from three different methods: group
discussion during a plenary session at the AAAE International Airport Emergency Manage-
ment Conference in Chicago, Illinois, survey results from an online survey provided to airports
of all sizes and types throughout the United States, and phone interviews with seven airports
providing input into their AEP practices.
AAAE International Airport Emergency

Management Conference, Plenary Session
During the 2019 AAAE International Airport Emergency Management Conference in
Chicago, Illinois, July 16–18, 2019, a plenary panel session was held on Tuesday, July 16, from
2:30 p.m. to 3:15 p.m. central daylight time with 175 conference attendees, to discuss their
current AEP practices. During this session, a moderator asked a series of informal, unscripted
questions (different from the questions contained in the online survey) of the conference
attendees in the session about their AEP practices. A panel of two experts, including the
principal investigator of this synthesis and one from a large-hub airport, provided input into
the discussion and asked additional unscripted questions of the group to gain insight into
how the airports at the conference conduct their AEP practices. Furthermore, the synthesis
team took notes of the comments from the plenary session, and the interpretation of these
results is presented here.
Notes captured general comments from the audience as various members shared their
thoughts and activities specific to AEPs. Some attendees in the session stated they, as the airport,
hesitate to consider the AEP to be an actionable document that can be effectively used during
an emergency. However, attendees commented that if an airport were to revise or include
more information than is outlined in the AC to have a plan that is more actionable, the airport
may be subject to regulatory or monetary consequences if the AEP is not used exclusively as
written. To avoid these risks, many airports will simply follow the format outlined in the AC
and nothing further. The AEP as required does manage risks and provide planning awareness
that does not compromise any proprietary or secure information that an airport would not
want accessible through public records. Many airport emergency managers agreed that the
AEP, in its current required format, is not comprehensive nor an all-hazards document, and
therefore, not actionable.
Some attendees commented that the AEP is a sound foundational document, allowing an
airport to identify further hazards or threats that may affect the airport and thereby create
annexes or plans to address these threats. Some airports felt that although the current AC
provides in-depth guidance for the AEP, it has also created a much larger and cumbersome plan
16

Current Airport Emergency Plan Practices 17
to keep up-to-date and has made it more difficult to ensure stakeholders understand their roles
and responsibilities as outlined in the large document.
Some airport conference attendees reported that the AEP is regularly updated simply because
of regulatory requirements. Participants asked, “Is it the AEP legislation or the Advisory Circular
itself that bogs down the development and/or use of the AEP?”
Online Survey (SurveyMonkey)

Following the AAAE conference panel and plenary discussion, 81 airports throughout
the country were invited to participate in an online survey to provide input about their AEP
practices. These airports were selected through industry relationships, panel recommenda-
tions, and airports requesting inclusion who attended the AAAE conference. The purpose of
the questionnaire was to capture the current state of practice as well as any challenges airports
face when developing, revising, and using their airport’s AEP for emergency response and
recovery efforts. The 81 contacts represented 62 airports (26 large-hub, eight medium-hub,
13 small-hub, three nonhub primary, six nonhub GA, and six nonhub reliever). A total of
45 airports, or 72.58%, completed the survey. Respondents were asked to provide feedback
regarding their experience with AEPs, including challenges confronted, the use of companion
annexes or additional standalone plans, and how they have socialized and trained their airport
communities on these plans. The survey took approximately 20 to 30 minutes to complete.
Participants were given the opportunity to attribute their responses; otherwise, anonymity was
assured. For the purposes of this synthesis, responses are generalized and overall are not
attributed to individuals or airports unless it has been approved. Further follow-up interviews
were conducted with seven airports and their in-depth responses are included in the inter
pretation of the results as indicative of their AEP practices at their airport(s).
The data collected encompasses information from participants about their AEPs, including
effectiveness and usefulness as a response guide, the regulations surrounding development
and upkeep, and how the AEP is used at their specific airport. Other data gathered included
challenges confronted in the development, maintenance, use, and socialization of the AEP,
as well as successful practices in the same areas. The seven airport interviews delved further into
seven categories of AEP practices (questions built upon the foundation of the online survey
questions) and included the following:
• Metrics for developing AEP annexes
• Socializing the plan(s)
• Incorporating AEPs into training and exercises
• Incorporating lessons learned into AEP updates and annexes
• Other partner preparedness plans
• AEP update challenges
• Overcoming challenges
Figure 3 illustrates the types of organizations who responded to the survey. A total of 43 of
the respondents identified as an airport. Two identified as “other” or not an airport, and
none identified as FAA inspectors. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the respondents among
departments, divisions, and offices represented. Out of the 45 respondents, 53% are emergency
managers, 38% are airport operations, and 9% chose other and specified as consultant and
fire/police (includes ARFF). One “other” respondent identified as airport safety, security, and
emergency preparedness.
Of the 28 respondents who identified the size of the airport for which they were
answering survey questions, respondents indicated they were responding for 17 large hubs

Figure 3. Question 1. Type

of organization. (Source:
SurveyMonkey results)
(of 26 survey recipients), six medium hubs (of eight survey recipients), four small hubs
(of 13 survey recipients), and three GA or reliever airports (of 15 survey recipients). It is impor-
tant to note three respondents answered for multiple airports under their purview.
Not all respondents were willing to name the airport they represented, but of those who did,
participating airports included the following:
• Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (AUS)
• Cecil Airport and Spaceport (VQQ)
• Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT)
• Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW)
• Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD)
• Dallas Fort Worth International Airport (DFW)
• Ellington Airport (EFD)
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Emergency Airport Risk Corporate Federal Other (please
Management Operations Management Aviation specify)
Administration
Figure 4. Question 2. Which department/division/office are you representing?
(Source: SurveyMonkey results)

• Fairbanks International Airport (FAI)

• Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (FLL)
• George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH)
• Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL)
• John Wayne Airport–Orange County (SNA)
• Louisville International Airport (SDF)
• McCarran International Airport (LAS)
• Memphis International Airport (MEM)
• Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport (MSP)
• Orlando International Airport (MCO)
• Portland International Airport (PDX)
• Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport (SAV)
• Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA)
• Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD)
• Washington Reagan National Airport (DCA)
• William P. Hobby Airport (HOU)
Is the AEP Seen as an Actionable

and Sufficient Response Document?
Throughout the survey, several questions elicited responses from participants that gave
indicators of how they view the AEP as an actionable and sufficient response document.
In Question 39, as seen in Figure 5, respondents were asked to rate the following statement
(on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being “Strongly Disagree” and 10 being “Strongly Agree”): “The
current AEP circular and policies meet the needs of airports to appropriately develop and update
AEPs.” The average was 5.1, meaning respondents indicated that on average, they neither agree
nor disagree with the statement.
When asked why they rated their answer the way they did, the responses indicated agreement
to meeting needs but added that the practical application could use improvement as well as
Figure 5. Question 39. On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being “Strongly Disagree”
and 10 being “Strongly Agree,” please rate the following statement. The current
AEP circular and policies meet the needs of airports to appropriately develop and
update AEPs. (Source: SurveyMonkey results)

another update to the AC. Respondents indicated that airports could take more ownership of
creating necessary plans, annexes, or complementary procedures to the AEP beyond what the
AC requires. Comments included the following (summarized for clarity):
• EM as a profession has grown; several lessons learned have been incorporated, applied, and
passed successfully since the AC 150/5200-31C update.
• Airport growth, tenant expansion, and additional spaceport requirements should be
incorporated into the AC.
• The AC provides useful and needed information and requirements. However, because of the
prescriptive nature of the AC, the result can be a complicated and difficult-to-use document.
• Ensuring the AEP is updated, maintained, managed, and appropriately shared is labor intensive.
If staff are assigned to this function as an “other duty as assigned,” there may not be as much
return on investment (ROI) or benefit as if someone focused on the AEP as their sole job.
• Understanding the AEP outlines the basics for the plan. Airports can always add to the AEP
if appropriate.
• The hazard-specific sections need to be updated.
• The AEP is a necessary document for FAA oversight to objectively determine compliance by
airports—and the AC and policies provide updates and modifications necessary—but the
AEP itself should not be what causes creation of underlying response/recovery plans. These
can and should be developed as part of a logical, long-term EM program and process.
• The AC and policies no longer accurately represent the current threat/risk landscape at airports.
• The AEP provides a base response and recovery plan for a lot of airports. It has a purpose,
but the process needs to be reviewed to ensure airports look at all-hazards.
Question 11 asked survey respondents to rate their responses from strongly disagree to
strongly agree for 13 statements, as illustrated in Table 1. The average of responses was based on
a Likert scale (out of 5 points; 1 being strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree).
Table 1. Question 11. (Source: SurveyMonkey results)
On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree) rate the
following statements:
The airport's AEP is actionable and sufficient enough to be a response document for the
airport.
3.13
I, my airport, and airport community use the AEP regularly.
2.87
The AEP provides adequate and actionable information to respond to and recover from an
incident.
3.0
I find the AEP to be generic and does not provide me or those who need to respond
adequate information to do so.
3.45

Table 1. (Continued).
On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree) rate the
following statements:
I have to create and develop other hazard-specific plans that are complements to the AEP
to ensure airport personnel understand their roles and responsibilities during an incident
or event.
4.08
The AEP contains all hazards that my airport could be threatened by.
2.5
I review lessons learned from other airport incidents and events and incorporate their
lessons learned into my own AEP or preparedness plans.
4.08
There is one person solely dedicated to the AEP, its update, and ensuring all airport
preparedness plans are cross-walked with it.
3.16
I get active participation from all of the relevant stakeholders during the annual AEP review
and update process.
3.13
Updating the AEP is a challenge and does not provide any value added to our response or
recovery efforts.
2.95
The AEP checks a box and nothing more.
2.83
I incorporate the AEP into training and exercises beyond the required annual training and
triennial exercise.
3.63
The AEP can be improved.
4.65

A total of 41% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their airport’s AEP is sufficient
as a response document for the airport, while 34% disagreed or strongly disagreed. A total of
23% remained neutral on the question. However, the statement, “I find the AEP to be generic
and does not provide me or those who need to respond adequate information to do so,”
provided further insight into respondents’ perceptions of the AEP with 56% agreeing with
that statement.
A total of 80% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that to ensure airport personnel
understand their roles and responsibilities during an incident, that they (the respondents)
may find benefit in creating and developing other hazard-specific plans to supplement the
AEP. Support for this is also seen in the varied annexes, SOPs, and all-hazards plans iden
tified during the data gathering and reflected in the AEP-practices case examples included
in Chapter 4.
Other patterns that emerged show that the AEP, its update, and the process of ensuring that
it is in sync with all other airport preparedness plans are often the responsibility of one person
solely dedicated to the task. Roughly 43% of respondents agreed that they receive active
participation from all relevant stakeholders during the annual review and update process,
35% disagreeing with the statement, and 20% remaining neutral. A combined 20% agree that
the AEP contains all-hazards that threaten the airport, and 60% disagree. Again, the results
appear to reflect (as further reported in the survey) that to ensure active participation and an
all-hazards approach, they, as the airport, consider developing innovative ways to engage
stakeholders and develop plans that speak to any threats and hazards that are not included as
part of the AC.
Lessons learned from other airport incidents are regularly used to inform an airport’s AEP
or supplemental plans, and 45% of respondents agree that updating the AEP provides added
value to their airport’s response and recovery efforts while 30% do not, and 23% of respondents
remain neutral. A total of 67% incorporate the AEP into training and exercises beyond the
required annual training and triennial exercise. Finally, 85% of respondents agree or strongly
agree that the AEP can be improved.
Successful Practices in Developing

and Updating the AEP
Respondents throughout the survey referenced various successful practices when developing
and updating their AEP. In Question 12, 29 respondents were willing to share their successes
as well as the challenges they faced when developing or updating the AEP. One respondent
considered the fact that they have a plan at all to be a success.
The most common text response by participating airports to this question related to
“stakeholder engagement.” Though often worded differently, respondents’ most common
successes referenced collaboration with internal and external stakeholders. Responses included
the following:
“Great feedback from stakeholders.”
“Collaborating with stakeholders.”
“Police, fire rescue, and airport operations build a closer working relationship through the
review and updating process; they become fully invested in the document.”
“The biggest success has been our engagement with stakeholders. There is always a willingness
from our partners to assist with development and revisions.”
“Engagement from stakeholders improves when ownership is explained.”
“Getting feedback from co-workers to make it more of a working document.”

“The major success when updating our AEP is the collaboration of all of our stakeholders.
I ensure that each department/agency that has a role in the AEP is present for the discussion,
and that we solicit honest feedback from each regarding what the AEP says they will do. . . .”
“Additional input from airport stakeholders and not just emergency response organizations.”
Other documented practices reported in Question 12 included the following:
• Custom tailoring the AEP to an airport’s specific operation
• Contracting with an outside consultant to rewrite the AEP
• Assigning each unit, the task of updating the plan specific to their area of responsibility
• Creating a process to identify best practices
• Acquiring updated tenant contact information to disseminate the AEP via electronic means
• Creation of a 3-year cycle to include the AAR/Improvement Plan (IP) from the Triennial
Exercise, the thorough review and update to the AEP, and an update to the COOP
Challenges in Developing and Updating the AEP

Airports showed great consistency in their responses to questions about challenges with AEP
development. Common themes were the rigid format of the AEP, stakeholder participation,
resistance to making changes, competing priorities, and timeline for executive and final regula-
tory approval prior to updated plans being implemented. In addition, airports noted there was
redundancy because of the need to have multiple plans which contain the same information
to meet local, state, and federal guidelines and regulations. Responses also indicated it was a
challenge to keep the plan broad and holistic enough for the various hazards the airport could
experience.
The format for the AEP includes the same sections in the basic plan, functional annexes,
and hazard annexes. Airports felt this format resulted in repetitive information throughout
the AEP. For example, Command and Control is included in the basic plan, then again in
each annex. For many airports, the command and control structure remains the same, with
small variances for some hazards. In addition, airports commented about the rigidity of the
plan format. Some felt it did not leave a lot of room to add additional information, such as
preparedness and long-term recovery activities.
Stakeholder participation in the planning process can make all the difference. When it
happens, an active and engaged group of partners can stimulate the entire process; ideas
feed off one another in true partnership with all benefiting from the collaborative process.
When it does not happen, the negative impact can be just as significant. Just as the most
common successful practice listed was an engaged group of stakeholders, one of the biggest
challenges noted by respondents was a lack of stakeholder participation or the slow pace at
which stakeholder feedback is provided. Survey comments relating to stakeholder challenges
include the following:
“Getting the units to provide timely responses.”
“Stakeholder participation.”
“Getting ALL to actually read and review [the AEP].”
“Most of the partners [are] apoplectic to the process and review.”
“Getting [timely] feedback from stakeholders — but they eventually comply with solid input.”
“Getting consistent policy/procedural updates/feedback from all levels and users of our
facility.”
Resistance to change was also noted as a challenge. The AEP has remained relatively consistent
throughout its existence. As EM becomes professionalized in airports, there has been tension
between airport operators who want to keep the plan the way it has always been and EMs who

want a comprehensive, all-hazards plan. At least one airport indicated senior leadership was
concerned about the liability of a more comprehensive plan, indicating a more comprehensive
plan may have implications if the airport does not follow through with everything in the plan,
be it from lack of resources, ability, or for any other reason. There is also concern over receiving
FAA approval and the ability to pass inspections if too many changes are made.
Concern was expressed multiple times that the plan was more focused on airside events and
did not always place the same emphasis on landside, public spaces, or the terminal/secure areas.
There was also a desire to include more support services such as food, baggage services, and
hotels in the AEP or into the planning process. As a result, airports have created additional
annexes, SOPs, and standalone plans to close this gap. Many felt their time and staff were
better served focusing on developing and maintaining supplemental plans, as opposed to
the AEP, as a result of more use and the applicability of the additional plans. In addition,
some airports felt limited time and shifting priorities affected their ability to get participation
in AEP development from other departments and stakeholders.
Others felt that the AC and policies work, but just need some adjusting.
“The policies typically meet the needs of airports, but there’s room for improvement.”
“While it works, it could always be stronger and more useable.”
“It still provides the basis, but we can go further as an organization and as an industry.”
The majority opinion as indicated throughout the survey is the requirement that the AEP
must be approved by the FAA provides minimum requirements that may not be sufficient in
responding to an actual emergency. To have the plans they need to provide a timely and efficient
emergency response, the airports prefer to develop separate function-specific and/or hazard-
specific plans that will provide the detailed guidance necessary when responding to various
emergency incidents.
Based on survey responses, the time it takes to update an AEP can be anywhere between under
6 months to a year or more. Adding to the length of the process is a possible executive review.
The executive review can significantly prolong the process, depending on who reviews it. In
some cases, executive review consists of an executive leader (airport director, executive director,
general manager) who reviews, provides input, and then final approval. Or it may be as com-
plicated as going before an airport’s director of operations and security, chief operating officer
(COO), several other executives, and several other stakeholders for review and feedback, with
the revised version being sent through the same group of people one more time. As seen in
Figure 6, 61% of respondents indicated there was a process for executive review.
Figure 6. Question 22. Was there

a process for executive review?

Again, based on these responses, airports have developed alternative practices to close
gaps they’ve identified, such as developing all-hazards plans, checklists, and reference guides
consolidating the AEP information, and pulling stakeholders together to meet regularly for
AEP updates, either from exercises, real-world events, or the required annual review. Some of
these successful practices are discussed in-depth in Chapter 4, Case Examples.
Challenges in Using the AEP During an Incident

Challenges are not only present when developing or updating an AEP but are also encoun-
tered when using the AEP during an incident, as seen in the responses to Question 15, “What
challenges have you experienced when using your AEP during response and recovery efforts?”
Respondents ultimately indicated that the AEP is difficult to use or not used at all; either
because it is too cumbersome, is not detailed enough or updated, or is lacking in the necessary
information. Challenges listed include the following summarized responses (grouped into
categories):
• Hard to Use/Too Big/Unable to Access
– Checklists are too lengthy, and/or checklists are not set up in an order that flows with a
typical incident.
– The AEP is unusable as a real-time reference in the field/at an incident command post
(ICP).
– The need to flip back and forth in a large binder is a cumbersome process during an
emergency.
– The AEP is too large and inflexible and difficult to train to.
– Because of time limitations during a real-world event, the AEP becomes a reference
document only.
– Not used because of the sheer size of the document, which makes it impractical for use
in field work.
– The plan is too robust to use.
– Access to the document is a challenge. Having a quick access guide would be helpful.
• Plan Information Not Relevant/Does Not Contain Correct Information/Out of Date
– The annexes are not updated.
– The AEP is not specific enough to guide a response.
– The AEP was not adequate enough to address all the response and recovery efforts
of the airport.
– Not enough detail for recovery information.
– Airport plans and airline plans are divergent; airline and airport plans need to be more
in sync.
– The AEP does not cover anything after the initial response; subsequent responses and
recovery are not described.
– Contact information for contract vendors is not up-to-date.
– Too general; not enough detail provided on actions to take or risks/hazards to assess and
mitigate.
– The AEP does not accurately reflect the large municipality that an airport encom-
passes. There are no sections in recovery that address debris management or damage
assessment.
• Layout/Formatting Issues
– The layout does not lend itself to easy and immediate reference.
– If it follows the FAA guidelines, it does not have sufficient information when needed during
an incident.

• Lack of Familiarity with Roles and Responsibilities/Understanding of the AEP

– There is lack of familiarity with the AEP by the airport community.
– Personnel may conduct activities they deem to be useful or necessary without adhering
to the roles and responsibilities listed in the AEP; or personnel may voluntarily respond
without being activated or asked for.
– There is a need to ensure all responders are briefed on updates that have been made but not
pretested.
• Communication
– There is a lack of communication between administration and field responders when
updating the AEP. Administrative personnel do not consult with field responders for
content.
When asked, “How do airports integrate the AEP with emergency response and recovery
activities?” many respondents reported it is not possible or it is difficult to do so. One respondent
said they use it “after the fact,” while another said,
Currently, the AEP provides a loose framework (checklist) for response and recovery to various
incidents, mostly focused on the airside of the operation, not the terminal or landside. . . . Part 139
[focuses on] airside activities/equipment; therefore, 90 percent of the AEP focuses on airside. . . .
In response to integrating the AEP with emergency response and recovery activities,
respondents shared the thoughts and methods by which they do this:
• Making actionable plans that accurately reflect staff (including confidential contact infor
mation), training, and capabilities;
• Developing a COOP to serve as a guiding document for operations response and recovery
and using the EM process to address major business disruptions;
• Ensuring the AEP and response activities are in sync;
• Separating the AEP from SOPs; making the former a higher-level document and the latter
targeted to first responders;
• Using the AEP primarily as a training aid and reference document, and occasionally as
a confirmation checklist;
• Referencing the AEP during emergencies;
• Using real-world responses to validate/update their AEP; and
• Using the AEP as an overall guide to develop more detailed checklists and operating guidelines.
Training and exercises followed by AAR/IP are also commonly seen as an effective practice
to integrate the AEP with emergency response and recovery activities.
How Is the AEP Used?

When asked if the AEP is used operationally, 57% of respondents said “no” (see Figure 7).
Those who responded “yes” were asked how; those who responded no were asked why not.
Some of those who use the AEP operationally use aspects of it during incidents, but do not use
the plan as a reference guide; others use it during training for new airport operations personnel.
One respondent uses it daily; others use it in more complex and lengthy response scenarios;
and still others only look at it after an incident has occurred. Those who do not use it opera-
tionally cite several challenges such as the overwhelming information contained within the
AEP, difficulty in maintenance because of the large size of the plan, the generality, and lack
of detail, that the AEP is too basic and not based on day-to-day operations, and that the AEP
needs to be more actionable.

60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
YES NO
Figure 7. Question 45. Is the AEP used operationally?
How Can Airports Make the AEP Actionable

and Relevant?
In Question 35, “What are ways airports can make the AEP actionable and relevant to
the myriad of stakeholders?” the survey gave respondents the opportunity to convey their
ideas on how airports can make the AEP actionable and relevant. Some airports are working
to minimize their challenges by including field personnel in the process, clarifying roles,
continually engaging with stakeholders, stressing the importance of the process of planning
and exercising, holding departments accountable, and engaging with top leadership to set
expectations and enforce them.
Metrics for Developing AEP Annexes

Some airports indicated they used metrics to identify if they should or needed to develop AEP
annexes. The authors also asked the airports being interviewed to describe their AEP metrics.
Each had one commonality: the annual FAA inspection.
Airports subject to part 139 requirements are inspected annually by the FAA to ensure the
airport meets all requirements necessary to maintain their AOC. One requirement includes
maintaining an AEP in accordance with part 139. Across the board, airports noted this as their
primary metric for their AEPs. In addition, airports stated the completion of recommendations
or changes requested from the inspector were a measure of a successful plan.
Additionally, some airports also indicated their measurements of success were not limited
solely to the FAA inspection. These metrics were related to having a comprehensive EM program,
focused on all-hazards, and the incorporation of stakeholders and partners into their plan-
ning efforts. However, airports differed in their approach to this practice. Some developed
their AEPs to reflect this. Others kept their AEPs to the minimum requirements and developed
additional plans or annexes. Regardless of the approach, airports set the bar for such metrics
based on capabilities identified through traditional EM tools, such as gap analysis, THIRAs,
improvements identified through AARs, and the need to integrate with stakeholders and
community partners.

Development of Annexes, Plans, SOPs, or Checklists

Respondents indicated they have created a multitude of AEP annexes to address their
challenges; most specifically, that the AEP does not speak to all-hazards and threats the airport
could face. Respondents indicated that they have developed the following annexes, plans, SOPs,
or checklists:
• Active Assailant Plan
• Active Shooter Plan
• Active Threat
• Administration Facility Evacuation Plans
• Air National Guard Letter of Agreement (LOA)
• Aircraft Emergency Response
• Airport EOC Plan
• Airport Terminal Emergency Plan
• Airport Training and Exercise Plan
• Airside Incident Detailed Responses, including AEP Checklist
• All-Hazards Functional Annexes specific to Division Directors, Maintenance, Environmental,
and Customer Service Staff (regardless of threat or hazard)
• Animal Care Plan
• ARFF Equipment & Capabilities
• ARFF Tactical Operating Guidelines
• Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
• Civil Disturbance
• Communicable Diseases
• Communications All-Hazards Plan
• Community Emergency Response Team Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
• Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Plan
• Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
• Crisis Communication Plan/Emergency Communications Plan
• Critical Infrastructure Airport Grid Map Book
• Crowd Control Evacuation Guide
• Dependent Population Plan
• Directory of Rental Car and Taxicab Companies
• Disabled Aircraft
• Earthquake Plan
• Emergency Medical All-Hazards Plan
• Emergency Notification Responsibilities
• EOC Activation Manual
• EOC Section Coordinating Procedures
• Family Assistance Center Operating Guide
• Family Assistance Center or Family Assistance Support Plan(s)
• Family Assistance Plan for Non-Aviation Related Events
• Fire, Police & Aviation Partnership Objectives
• Flooding Plan
• Gas Drilling
• Hazard-Specific Plans, to include tropical weather, pandemic, and so forth
• Hazardous Materials
• Hurricane Preparedness Plan
• Incident Management
• Information Technology (IT)/Cyber Attack
• Interagency Aircraft Accident Plan

• Irregular Operations (IROPS)

• Landside Emergencies
• LOA on Emergency Response Between Agencies
• Mass Care Plan
• Mass Casualty
• Mass Evacuation
• Media Plan
• Minor Medical Incident
• Mutual Aid Plan
• Pandemic
• Power Outages (not just for airfield)
• Rapid Recovery Plan
• Severe Weather Plan
• Spaceport Operations
• Special Events
• Surface Management
• Terminal Building Evacuation
• Terrorism Plan
• Transportation or Transportation Evacuation Plan
• Unmanned Aerial Systems or Drone Plan
• Water Rescue
• Web Emergency Operations Center (WebEOC) User’s Manual
• Western Airports Disaster Operations Group (WESTDOG)
• Winter Storms
The survey response to Question 17, “How is a decision made to add a functional annex that
is not required by the FAA?” is shown in Table 2 and illustrates survey indicators of methods
used to assist in making the decision that a specific functional annex should be added.
Table 2. Question 17. How is a decision made to add a functional annex
that is not required by the FAA? (Source: SurveyMonkey results)
Answer Choices Responses (%)
Risk analysis (identifying the risks to the airport and developing plans to 48.39
mitigate those risks)
Business case analysis (the business wants or needs a plan to manage an 25.81
issue, such as curbside traffic during an emergency)
Threat hazard analysis (threats to the airport are identified and plans 58.06
developed)
Airport/executive priorities (the airport leadership or executive leadership 35.48

have asked for plans, or prioritized specific issues)
After-action reports from our airport’s exercises, incidents, or events 48.39
After-action reports from other airports’ incidents 45.16
Please list another method for determining development of an annex and/or plan 29.03
not previously listed.

Question 17 also asked the respondents to list other methods not previously mentioned for
determining development of an annex and/or plan. Responses ranged from “to save time in the
AEP review and update process,” to “public outcry. . . .”
Among the responding airports that have developed annexes or supplemental plans, responses
suggests a major motivator in developing those plans to be lessons learned from a real-world
incident where the need was made clear to the airport during the response phase; another
motivator was the need to ensure a timely and efficient response that will lead to a quick
recovery with minimal operational impact.
Once it is determined to add a functional annex or supporting plan, airports address devel
opment in several ways. Efforts include the following:
• Team effort, driven by a contracted subject matter expert (SME)
• Discussion with first responders and tower manager
• Team effort with in-house coordination and collaboration with relevant stakeholders
• Single-person development of the plan
• Development by airside operations with input from stakeholders
• Development by EM
• Plans and best practices from other airports used to guide and inform the new annex
Survey responses indicate that planning teams are used most often as an AEP practice.
Table 3 illustrates the makeup of planning teams according to the survey.
Overcoming Challenges
Survey responses identified several challenges with AEP development, but airports are
determined to overcome them. Airports interviewed showed success in ensuring plans are
useful and robust while fulfilling FAA AEP requirements. Airports have also used innovation
to bring stakeholders onboard with supporting AEP development. Many of the examples of
overcoming challenges involved communication and understanding of the AEP. One approach
was to use plain language when discussing plans with stakeholders, as is often done during
the part 139 annual TTX. The airport survey response indicated that staff made a conscious
effort to avoid EM, response jargon, and other lingo in their
discussions. As a result, stakeholders had a greater under-
standing of the plan and their role in it. Another airport used
the “What’s in it for me?” approach. They began their conversa
tions with airport departments and organizations by explain-
ing the benefit of the AEP to their business line. This created
more investment in the plan. Many airports used working
groups for plan maintenance, which has proven to be success-
ful in emergency coordination across the country. Two air-
ports stated they found success through sheer persistence. They
continued to reach out to and ping contributors to the AEP to
ensure input was included and engagement was consistent.
While some airports want to build out the AEP, others have
been successful by reducing the document. Some airports have
removed everything beyond the regulatory requirements from
the AEP and placed all this information in standalone plans.
They indicated this streamlined the AEP and resulted in stronger
Airport staff participate in an AEP tabletop exercise with stakeholders, CLT supplemental plans. In addition, they were able to modify all
Source: Michael Tobin, CLT plans not included in the AEP, allowing for more flexibility.

Table 3. Question 20. If planning teams were used to develop additional
plans, who was involved? (Source: SurveyMonkey results)
Answer Choices Responses (%)
Airport Operations 87.10
Law Enforcement 87.10
Fire Department 90.32
Administration 45.16
Information Technology 45.16
Corporate/HQ 16.13
Executives 35.48
Finance 22.58
Airlines 64.52
Tenants 58.06
Airport Volunteer Groups 25.81
Local Jurisdictions 38.71
CBP 48.39
TSA 54.84
FAA 41.94
ATCT 32.26
FBI 41.94
NTSB 19.35
Other (Federal) 22.58
Local EM Agency/Office 51.61
Engineering/Maintenance 41.94
Landside 67.74
Airside 70.97
Transportation/Shuttle/Bus Providers 35.48
Taxi services 6.45
Transportation Network Companies (e.g., Uber, Lyft) 9.68
Other (please specify) 19.35

• Safety/Risk Management
• EM

Socializing the Plan

Once the plan is finalized and has received FAA approval, it is ready to be rolled out for
training, exercising, and implementation. Methods for sharing the plan differ, as illustrated in
Table 4.
Some airports only share the AEP with new personnel in airport operations, security, police,
and ARFF, while others expand it to include all airlines, departments, and external mutual
aid agencies. As seen in Table 4, exercises are by far the most popular way to share the plan,
especially TTXs, which are attractive because of their informal, no-fault, discussion-based
format, as well as the recommendation for the annual review of the AEP with stakeholders.
Although in-person communication was considered the most successful practice, there are
situations where this is not always feasible. In addition, partners may benefit from having access
to the plans and other tools at their convenience for training or reference. The most common
approach to providing this is through electronic means. As seen in the survey responses, airports
provide electronic access to the AEP with password protection or other security measures in
place. This was achieved through intranet and similar systems which could be accessed at the
user’s convenience. Other airports provide hard copies to partners.
Some airports use innovative tools to share the document, including mobile applications,
checklists, photo sharing, and online collaboration tools (see Figure 8). In response to
Question 26, “Has the airport enlisted any innovative tools to help with the plan, response,
recovery, or general knowledge share of the document?” one airport stated it enlists SMEs
as speakers at tabletops and workshops to conduct an educational component on the topic
under discussion.
For example, when focusing on the Communicable Disease Plan, an airport brought in
a local Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) official and a local public health
officer. The airport also invited local law enforcement jurisdictions that have implemented
Table 4. Question 24. How does the airport share and socialize the new plan(s)?
Answer Choices (select all that apply) Responses (%)
Workshop 36.67
Tabletop Exercise 70.00
Full-Scale Exercise 43.33
Training Sessions 56.67
Webinars 0.00
Provide Soft/Hard Copy to New Employees with "Need to Know" 56.67
Other Ways Not Listed 26.67

• List on website
• Seminar with airlines
• Internal training sessions
• Smaller drills in between triennial full-scale exercise
• Email soft copies
• Secure document portal, password protected
• Meetings to share AEP

50.00%
45.00%
40.00%
35.00%
30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
Apps Checklists Photo Sharing Online Other Ways
Collaboration Tools not Listed
Figure 8. Question 26. Has the airport enlisted any innovative tools to help
with the plan, response, recovery, or general knowledge share of the document?
unmanned aerial system programs to discuss drone technology; and the FAA Flight Standards
District Office (FSDO) to discuss recreational and commercial drone regulations. The same
airport also hosts quarterly unified ICP drills; they invite law enforcement and fire departments
from the surrounding five jurisdictions, intelligence agencies, federal agencies, airlines, and
airport divisions to participate. It gives stakeholders an opportunity to run through the basics
(ICP vehicle setup, establishing objectives, communication, and relationship building) in a
no-fault environment. This airport has found this AEP practice to be of great value.
All airports participating in interviews stated they shared their AEPs with other airport
departments, airline partners, government agencies, and other stakeholders where applicable.
Airports strove to think “outside the box” and were very proactive in the way they communi-
cated the plans to partners. Most agreed meeting in person was most effective but also identified
alternative means for communicating the plans.
Airports have a significant number of partners who not only need access to the plans but need
to understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency. This is best communicated
in person to allow for a dialog and ensure understanding. Airports took different approaches
to this, including group presentations, road shows, and working groups. In the road show
approach, EMs went to the stakeholder’s location and met with them directly. Alternatively,
working groups allowed for group conversation, feedback, and requests for changes. Tours of
airport EOCs, sites for family assistance centers, and other critical locations also provided an
opportunity for partners to better relate to and understand the information in the plan.
One of the more successful methods for distributing AEP materials was to provide guides
and checklists to stakeholders and partners. These documents are easy-to-read snapshots of the
most important information stakeholders need to know. While not directly a part of the AEP,
some airports in hurricane areas have applied similar measures with their hurricane plans.
Other Partner Preparedness Plans

There may have been a time where airports were considered “islands,” operating inde
pendently of outside organizations, but the interviews proved this is no longer the case. Every
airport interviewed stated they work closely with their surrounding cities and counties, ensuring

plans are integrated. They have worked to “deconflict” discrepancies, while communicating
needs and expectations. Most have also developed COOPs or BCPs, which have been included
in their local city or county COOPs.
Airports also participate in local and state EM planning meetings and committees, with a
focus on mass casualty plans being a common thread. Several airports participate in their local
area’s THIRA process and plan development.
The Proof—Training, Testing, and Validation

A plan is a living document, constantly changing with each exercise or real-world event. Infor-
mation or guidelines that were relevant or accurate in one version may be obsolete in the next
iteration. And a plan is only as good as the accuracy of its information. Training stakeholders
is the first step for thorough integration of the concepts and principles outlined in the AEP,
annexes, checklists, and SOPs. Testing a plan through regular exercises, drills, and workshops
validates a plan and keeps it sharp, ensuring it remains an effective tool to guide response actions
during an emergency.
It is standard practice to train and exercise a plan once it has been communicated. Airport
EMs were asked about their practices in this area and responses were mixed. Some only
incorporated the AEP into exercises regulated by FAA part 139, preferring to focus on more
comprehensive plans for other exercises, while others referred to the AEP for almost all
of them.
Currently, AEP training is required annually by all airport employees with a role in the
emergency plan per Title 14 CFR 139.327, Self-Inspection Program (Federal Aviation Admin-
istration 2009). This training usually falls outside of EM and is a part of a larger training
program for employees working on the airfield, maintenance, and other critical roles. In
addition, airport employees and stakeholders, primarily public safety and airline personnel,
are required to annually review the AEP; however, this is not a formal training program.
Many airports use a TTX to fulfill this requirement.
All airports interviewed stated they provide training beyond
the requirements mentioned above. Such training does not
necessarily focus on the AEP. Instead, it is centered on an
all-hazards approach or hazard-specific approach for critical
threats, such as hurricanes and active shooter. Training is
strongly focused on coordination, with topics on EOC opera-
tions, policy group roles, and department or organizational
responsibilities. Most airports also incorporate training on
ICS into their program.
Airport approaches to exercises appear to be similar, but
there are variances. There are two exercises focused on the
AEP that are required by the FAA; the annual review, usually
in the form of a TTX and a triennial full-scale exercise. For
some airports, these are the only times they exercise the
AEP. Like training, several airports prefer to take a more
comprehensive approach to exercises, focusing on recovery
and continuity of operations, for example. They may also
exercise an SOP or standalone plan developed for a critical
hazard. At least one airport indicated their belief that they
The Mobile EOC is used during the airport emergency exercise should increase the amount of AEP-based exercises and were
Source: Michael Tobin, CLT integrating this into their program and practices.

Of the airports who responded to the survey, 56% have had an opportunity to test and
validate their plans using a combination of seminars, workshops, tabletops, games, drills,
functional exercises, and full-scale exercises. All (100%) conducted AARs after exercises or
significant events. This AEP practice appears to be universal and demonstrates a successful
practice across the industry.
Most respondents implement a standard AAR/IP process that begins with a hotwash and
then a debrief meeting and roundtable discussion resulting in a list of corrective actions that
are documented in an AAR with assigned tasks and deadlines for completion, including any
necessary changes made to the AEP. Discrepancies are documented and corrective action
plans established with specific tasks assigned to specific individuals with specific deadlines.
One respondent said their AAR process consists of an executive-led discussion of their obser-
vations, with input encouraged from some stakeholders.
Another respondent provided a log, commonly known as ICS Form 214, to all exercise
participants. This allowed participants to capture information that feeds into AARs. Another
airport designed exercises that focused on the basics of a response. Exercises were designed
to make participants look at the specifics of what they would be doing at the time to ensure no
detail was overlooked.
Another respondent pointed out that AARs have been used to modify procedures and
learning tools but not to amend the AEP “because of the current general nature of the AEP.”
Inspection Feedback
Some respondents throughout the survey asserted that the AEP as submitted to FAA to
meet regulatory requirements is not useable for specific emergencies envisioned at the airport.
Respondents state that it is too complicated or too generic; that it is not actionable, flexible,
or realistic enough; and that it does not meet the needs of their particular airport. Despite
these objections to the AEP, some airports report positive feedback from their FAA inspectors
regarding their submitted AEPs. When asked what kind of feedback they have received from
the FAA inspectors, respondents reported the following:
“That [the AEP] is innovative, extremely up-to-date, thoroughly researched, and collabora-
tively created.”
“That [the AEP] is a great document and meets all of the requirements plus more.”
“The Southwest region has been very supportive of the AEP as written and the airport’s efforts
in the development of the plan.”
“Positive feedback was given, though 450 pages to stamp.”
“They allow us to distribute the AEP electronically to stakeholders.”
“[The AEP] meets the requirements of the FAA.”
“Solid document–in 4 years, no recommended changes.”
“We have not received any feedback specifically about our AEP. We did have an inspector
tell us that we should conduct more tabletop exercises; hence why we conduct one every
other month.”
Lessons Learned
Analysis of lessons learned is a significant part of an AAR. Some survey respondents said
lessons learned have been incorporated into the AEP or annexes with others indicating they
had not. Some lessons learned are incorporated into the AEP shortly after postexercise debrief,

while others are included in the AEP revisions and submitted with the next annual update.
When asked how they have been incorporated, respondents gave the following replies:
“We update and change the plan after major mitigation plans have been created and/or
when new major initiatives have been put into place to close a gap.”
“Updated our Communicable Disease Plan, Evacuation Plan, and Fuel Farm Fire Plan.”
“It appears to be too much of a ‘lift’ to make the wholesale changes to the AEP, so we
incorporate them into other, more functional plans.”
“The few updates that have occurred were token changes; none of the needed major updates
have been made.”
“Tasks were moved to more appropriate areas.”
“Lessons learned get captured by all AEP review stakeholders as the year progresses, including
Emergency Preparedness as the coordinator of this process—and they get woven into the
AEP as appropriate. Some do not, as they are too tactical. But they are generally referenced
in the AEP [document] (just not duplicated—the AEP points to underlying plans—but
does not repeat them).”
“Additions of new hazard-specific sections such as Active Shooter.”
Every airport interviewed had a method for ensuring lessons learned were incorporated into
plans. Airports did point out lessons learned were often written into other plans or resulted in
the creation of an entirely new plan. However, there were times when changes were also made
to AEPs and/or annexes following an exercise or real-life event. This was another area where
traditional EM practices influenced airport practices.
Many airports have a formal process in place to ensure updates take place. Airports develop
AARs following an event to capture strengths and challenges and identify areas for improve-
ment. Some airports created working groups, responsible for tracking improvement items,
ensuring changes take place, and including changes in future plans.
What Would Airport Respondents Change

About the AEP?
When asked in Question 41 what respondents would change about the AEP and how they
would do it, responses repeated or confirmed statements made in other sections of the survey.
Question 42 asked how they believe those changes would improve emergency response at
airports. Responses continue to include making the plan smaller and more manageable.
However, again, respondents have overcome this enduring challenge by creating checklists
from AEP information and quick reference guides for stakeholders to use during a response.
Other thoughts include allowing the AEP to be more in line with, or mirror, local emergency
plans such as emergency operations plans (EOPs) or use the established EM planning process
(as outlined in the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101), THIRA process, or the National
Fire Protection Association 1600. Other responses include changing how the airport manages
the AEP to include having the EM office or department (if one is at the airport) manage the
AEP throughout the life cycle.

CHAPTER 4
Case Examples
The case examples provided in this synthesis reference major concepts distilled from the
literature review and from interviews. This section includes documents from the following
airports that can be shared as examples for the larger airport community:
1. Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT)
2. George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH)
3. Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (FLL)
4. McCarran International Airport (LAS)
5. Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA)
6. Boulder City Municipal Airport (BVU)
7. Centennial Airport (APA)
Practices explored in the case examples demonstrate innovative approaches airports have
taken to build and strengthen their AEPs and associated programs. Two examples will look
at the roles of needs assessments and gap analysis in AEP development. Other examples will
highlight the use of collaborative methods of AEP maintenance through committees, stake-
holder outreach, and other group meetings. The application of an AEP in a real-world event is
discussed in the study on the Horizon Air aircraft theft and crash in Seattle. Lastly, examples are
provided about how part 139 AEP standards can be applied in the GA environment.
Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT)

AEP Practices: Updating AEPs or developing all-hazards plans
through a needs assessment or gap analysis
Airport Characteristics
Case Example: Communicable Disease Response Plan
American Airlines’ second-largest hub
Airport Background: One of the top 10 busiest airports in the
Owned by the City of Charlotte
United States and American Airlines’ second-largest hub, CLT is
ranked the sixth-busiest airport in the United States and the seventh in Operated by the Charlotte Aviation
the world, averaging 1,400 daily aircraft operations and transporting Department
122,000 passengers daily (2018). This case example is based on an 1,400 daily aircraft movements (2018)
interview with Michael Tobin, CLT emergency management coordi
nator (EMC), documentation provided, and other relevant documented 550,013 aircraft movements annually
sources. (2018)
Identified Need: CLT receives numerous flights from the Caribbean, Home to 18,000 employees and
Europe, and Canada daily, so there is ample opportunity for an infec- 50 companies
tious disease to travel to Charlotte.
37

15719-02_Ch04-06,Glossary,Acronyms,AirportCodes-3rdPgs.indd 37 1/28/21 3:45 PM
Objective: Develop a Communicable Disease Response Plan that outlines roles and
responsibilities as well as processes for investigating and managing an infectious disease at
the airport.
AEP Practices and Processes

History and Catalyst for Communicable Disease Response Plan
The AEP in its current state met the part 139 requirements but was in all aspects a generic
document. A challenge faced by the airport was an inherent rigidity in the requirements that
does not necessarily support an all-hazards approach. As a result, a number of annexes were
created to provide response guidelines for hazards not addressed in the AEP that could have
an impact on the airport, including, for example, the Family Assistance Annex, the Terminal
Evacuation Plan, and the Communicable Disease Response Plan.
Infectious diseases are one of many threats that can have

an adverse impact on the operations, health, and safety of
airport staff and passengers. Improper handling of an infec-
tious patient can cause flight delays and potentially widespread
public health consequences and could have an economic
impact on the airport. A well-managed response, however,
could save lives and mitigate against some of the worst poten-
tial consequences for passengers as well as the airport, and
could have a positive impact on public perception of the air-
port as a responsible and caring entity. Such a response does
not happen by accident but is the result of a well-developed,
maintained, and exercised plan.
Frequent daily flights from the Caribbean, Europe, and

Canada provide ample opportunity for infectious diseases to
CDC staff visit CLT during plan development
travel to Charlotte. Although CLT is an international airport,
the airport does not have a CDC Quarantine Station on-site.
The closest CDC station is in Atlanta. This means that in the
event of an investigation involving an infectious disease at
CLT, the inquiry would have to be carried out by the airport,
airline, Mecklenburg County Emergency Medical Services
Agency, local hospital systems, and Mecklenburg County
Public Health in consultation with the CDC via teleconfer-
ence. This challenging process makes it extremely important
that the Communicable Disease Response Plan exists to offer
guidance to all participating parties, providing for a cohesive,
smoother, and more effective response.
The Communicable Disease Response Plan was the result

of a request by CDC’s Division of Global Migration and
Quarantine. The CDC approached CLT with the recommen-
dation to develop a Communicable Disease Response Plan,
referencing it as a best practice at other airports, and CLT
CDC staff presenting to airport personnel about communicable disease
planning agreed. The plan was developed in 2018, a year that presented
Source: Michael Tobin, CLT many challenges for the airport’s response agencies.

Case Examples 39
Purpose of the Plan

The plan was created to protect the health of travelers and airport/airlines staff and to limit
the spread of infectious diseases to the community at large. International and national travel
capability allows people infected with serious diseases to carry the agents that cause such
diseases to distant locales.
Identifying, isolating, and treating people infected with serious agents as soon as possible
will limit the spread of the agent and its impacts on human health and society.
Planning and Coordination

Planning meetings began in April 2018. These meetings focused on the purpose of the plan
and a review of roles and responsibilities traditionally performed by all agencies. There was
a consensus among the participating agencies that they had performed all the elements of a
plan during previous incidents but needed to record and organize their actions into a coherent
document. A CDC airport-response-plan template was used to organize and format the team’s
thoughts and actions.
Mecklenburg County Public Health led efforts to draft the initial plan, which was submitted
to the planning committee for review and feedback. The review/revision process was repeated
several times. Two hurricanes, outbreaks of hepatitis A within the county, and technical diffi
culties created challenges, slowing the progress of plan development. A final sign-off by agency
was not completed until March 2019.
The following agencies were involved with developing the plan:
• U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

• Mecklenburg County EMS
• CLT Airport
• CDC Division of Global Migration and Quarantine
• North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services
• Mecklenburg County Public Health
The following agencies provided secondary support:
• Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency Management Office

• Charlotte Fire Department
• Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department
• Atrium Healthcare System
• Novant Health
• Metrolina Healthcare Preparedness Coalition
• Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Disseminating the Plan

Memorializing roles, responsibilities, and response and recovery actions into a Communi-
cable Disease Response Plan increases the ability for all participating response agencies to work
together and provide a more effective response. That can only happen if all participating
agencies are aware of the plan, have a copy of it, and have worked together to test it—not only
through exercises, but with the occasional activation of the plan triggered by sick passengers
who meet specific characteristics.

Once developed, the plan was disseminated to the necessary stakeholders through emails,
phone calls, conference calls, and meetings. Many representatives of the agencies who partici-
pated in developing the plan are members of other regional committees and could socialize the
newly developed plan to a larger audience.
• Stakeholder outreach: Airport EM is not an island. Successful planning and response are
dependent on all participating agencies working together. Relationship building is key to
this success. Mecklenburg County Public Health was instrumental in the initial drafting of
the Communicable Disease Response Plan. Reaching out to engage all stakeholders pro-
vided the necessary feedback and engagement needed to create an effective Communicable
Disease Response Plan.
• Relying on available expertise: When developing a Communicable Disease Response Plan,
drawing on the expertise of public health officials is a necessary practice. Responding to an
infectious disease event is not a routine occurrence in the aviation industry. When planning
for such an event, it is important to include the people who are proficient in the topic and
understand the process for responding to it.
• Using the experts to gain stakeholder buy-in: The airport invited the CDC Division of Global
Migration and Quarantine to come speak to CLT on two separate occasions. The first meeting
was with the CLT Stakeholders Group. The stakeholders group meets biweekly and includes
various groups within the airport community; airlines, public safety officials, FBI, TSA, FAA,
concessions, retail, and others with a vested interest in the daily work environment at CLT.
The second meeting was with the CLT Security Cabinet Meeting, a consortium of TSA,
FBI, Homeland Security, local law enforcement, fire department, EMS, airport security,
airport EM, airport operations, and other officials who discuss specific airport-related security
and law enforcement issues and projects.
Having the CDC speak to these groups provided the stakeholders with the opportunity to
ask questions and to hear directly from the CDC about why the program was so important,
ultimately helping to acquire the stakeholder buy-in the airport needed to move forward.
Lessons Learned
• Collaboration and partnerships are the keys to success along with a strong plan to back up the
process. Shortly after the plan was implemented, the airport had several potential incidents
involving communicable disease. The plan’s notification process was followed; all parties
received communication, and the potential threat was resolved quickly without impacting
the overall operation of the airline and airport.
• Transparency encourages engagement and trust. Be open and honest with the process and
do not be afraid to bring in the experts. Having the CDC conduct a site visit was a strong
indicator that not only was the airport serious about the program, it also allowed the partners/
stakeholders to provide their input into the plan.
Summary
Coming from county EM, the EMC found very quickly that aviation EM is not quite
the same as jurisdictional EM, though the basics remain the same. Representatives of most
responder agencies approach an incident involving an airport within their own experience and
understanding of EM, not realizing that EM in the aviation industry has its own processes
and terminology. This is a challenge that can be overcome through stakeholder engagement,

Case Examples 41
face-to-face meetings, and collaboration on planning, training, and exercising. When looking
to develop AEP annexes or all-hazards plans, bring relevant stakeholders together that have
a role in the incident, conduct a gap analysis of the issues at hand, identify the appropriate
measure to mitigate the gaps identified, and develop a plan collaboratively.
The CLT EMC discovered that the AEP, while in compliance with FAA rules, was not broad
and flexible enough to allow for responses to multiple types of incidents not covered in the AEP.
As a result, and at the urging of the CDC Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, CLT
developed a Communicable Disease Response Plan in collaboration with numerous stake
holders and agencies. The plan was signed off on and disseminated to all necessary stakeholders.
Throughout the process, the value of this coalition of planners became apparent in the final
production of a cohesive and effective plan that outlines roles and responsibilities as well as
processes for investigating and managing an infectious disease at the airport. The relationships
built are maintained as the plan is exercised and updated and they continue to add to the
effectiveness of the plan in identifying and managing communicable diseases at the airport.
George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH)

AEP Practices: Updating the AEP through use of a review committee
Case Example: AEP Review Committee Airport Characteristics
Airport Background: George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) is United Airlines’ largest hub
an international airport in Houston, Texas. Originally named Houston
Owned by the City of Houston
Intercontinental Airport, it was renamed in 1997 after George H. W.
Bush, the 41st president of the United States. IAH is part of the Houston Operated by the Houston Airport
Airport System (HAS) which also includes the William P. Hobby System
Airport (HOU) and Ellington Field (EFD).
466,738 aircraft movements annually
IAH is ranked the 18th-busiest airport in the United States, averaging (2018)
1,278 daily aircraft operations and transporting 43.8 million passengers
Supports 170,000 local jobs
annually. This case example is based on an interview with the EM
coordinator of the Safety & Emergency Management Division for
the three-airport system, documentation provided, and other relevant
documented sources.
Identified Need: When Hurricane Harvey struck Houston in 2017, dumping 51 inches of
rain over the city, rising flood waters caused IAH and HOU to close, canceling thousands of
flights and preventing evacuation by air. IAH had a hurricane plan, but it did not address
flooding, and the AEP did not include a flood plan. With roads closed and flights canceled,
hotels filled quickly and/or were inaccessible. Between IAH and HOU, more than 800 passengers
and airline staff were stranded with no place to stay for 36 hours. In the aftermath of Hurricane
Harvey, a need was identified for more all-hazards and all-weather planning. An AEP Review
Committee was used to review this real-world incident and determine whether any relevant
updates should be made to the plan.
Objective: Establish a consistent method to update the AEP using a collaborative approach.

The AEP for IAH includes annexes as part of the plan instead of as separate supplemental
documents. Previously, the plan was fragmented, consisting mostly of multiple plans in many
departments throughout the airport. Multiple plans meant multiple updates and maintenance

by multiple departments. IAH conducted a gap analysis of the various plans throughout the
airport; the resulting conclusions included supporting plans, revising plans, or including them
into the AEP. HAS’s EM cross-walked all the airport’s plans, revised them, and integrated them
into one document—the AEP. Today’s AEP is the core document referred to for instruction
and guidance in preparing for and responding to emergencies. To best support response and
recovery efforts, the AEP includes all-hazards annexes. Annex samples include the following:
• All-Weather Plan
• Tornado Plan
• Terrorism Plan
• Continuity of Operations Plan
• Evacuation Plan
Instead of multiple plans spread across the airport’s multiple departments, one plan is
established as a master document; and instead of multiple people being tasked with updating
and maintaining multiple plans, a portion of those people work together to provide an annual
review of the AEP or a postincident AAR where they offer their recommendations for updates
or annexes.
The AEP Review Committee was formed in about 2016 following the airport’s part 139 exer-
cise. The airport recognized there was a gap in response practices among multiple departments,
and the team needed to be on the same page. The AEP Review Committee includes representa-
tives from the following departments:
• Airside Operations
• Landside Operations
• Safety—Safety Management System (SMS) and Occupational Safety and Health Administration
• Emergency Management and Preparedness
• Police and Fire (as needed)
The committee meets once a year to review plans; however, after an exercise or drill the team
may meet to discuss the AAR and make recommendations for updating the AEP or relevant
annexes. During these meetings, there is no specific agenda. It is facilitated by the HAS EMC,
and the committee discusses relevant items in a particular plan that the group wants to review
for updating. This review also includes any lessons learned or best practices following an
exercise. Once recommendations are made, changes may be incorporated into a particular
AEP or annex or a particular section in a plan.
Recognizing that the AEP is not developed nor updated in a vacuum, and since the AEP is
managed by the airport’s airside operations department, recommendations are discussed with
them. Updates are incorporated as necessary and appropriate.
Division managers and the airport general manager are involved in the update review
process so that these leaders can give input, support, and approval of recommended updates at
the time of the review. The biggest revision to the AEP annex using this method was following
Hurricane Harvey. The hurricane plan was expanded and modified into an all-weather plan
that includes flooding threats. The changes made to that plan helped with Tropical Storm
Imelda in fall 2019. Based on lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey and updates made
to the plan, the airport made the decision to close its facilities sooner than later and made
multiple notifications to stakeholders; and before vehicles could get stuck, they coordinated
closures to roads that typically flood. The airport increased their recovery efficiency by closing
for 18 hours during Tropical Storm Imelda versus 36 hours for Hurricane Harvey.
The plan fostered better decision making early on, limited operational impact, and helped
ensure passengers arrived at their destination.

Case Examples 43
• Exercises and training: The AEP is incorporated into training, exercises, and drills.
– The airports train on the AEP during triennials.
– Biannual tabletops train to the annexes.
– Aviation security trains on the terrorism plan/AEP annex.
• IAH trains and exercises to the Harris County Aviation Plan, a plan that complements and
mirrors the AEP.
• The AEP Review Committee ensures lessons learned and best practices are included in annual
AEP updates.
• Minor changes are made to the AEP, while major changes are made to the annexes.
The changes to the AEP format (annexes within the plan versus separate supplemental
documents scattered across multiple departments) and the review/update process (annual
review by the AEP Review Committee) were proven successful when Tropical Storm Imelda
resulted in only 200 passengers stranded for 18 hours. The airport and airlines were able to
make better decisions early in the incident, limiting the operational impact to passengers,
personnel, and all other stakeholders.
Lessons Learned
• When comparing the response between Hurricane Harvey and Tropical Storm Imelda, the
following became clear:
– All-hazards and all-weather plans have become an integral part of the IAH AEP. Hurricane
Harvey demonstrated the value in converting the hurricane plan to an all-weather plan
that includes flooding.
– Time to respond: During Tropical Storm Imelda, airlines were able to put staff and passengers
up in local hotels because they were given enough time to respond to the threat.
• While it is sometimes customary for an AEP to be managed and controlled by airside
operations, there are disadvantages to such a practice:
– There is more to an AEP than airside operations.
– The AEP becomes a collateral duty, and limited attention may be given to maintenance of
the document.
• Management of the AEP by either an all-hazards group with input by the occasional SME
or by an emergency manager who would initiate collaboration that would ensure the plan
speaks to as many stakeholders as possible.
Summary
When Hurricane Harvey struck Houston in 2017, rising floodwaters caused IAH and HOU
to close, canceling thousands of flights and stranding more than 800 people for 36 hours. IAH
had a hurricane plan, but it did not address flooding and the AEP did not include a flood plan.
With roads closed and flights canceled, hotels filled quickly and/or were inaccessible. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, a need was identified for more all-hazards and all-weather
planning. Additionally, the EM coordinator of the Safety & Emergency Management Division
for the Houston airports system decided that the AEP as it was currently formed was fragmented
with too many plans and too many people being responsible for updating their plan in what
was a “collateral duty.” An AEP Review Committee was established to review incidents and
determine whether any relevant updates should be made to the plan. All plans were gathered,
updated, and incorporated as annexes into the AEP, making one document the core plan.

As a result of the updates and the changes to procedures, when Tropical Storm Imelda struck,
the airport closed for only 18 hours, hundreds fewer people were stranded, and airport operations
recovered more quickly with limited impact to passengers, airlines, and airport personnel.
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (FLL)

AEP Practices: Development of AEP annexes and training requirements using various metrics
Case Example: Using real-world incident and collaborative group input to inform AEP annex
development
Airport Background: One of the fastest growing airports in the
United States, the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport
Airport Characteristics (FLL) is the 18th-busiest airport in the United States and the 10th-
busiest in the United States for international traffic, transporting
Owned by Broward County
35,963,370 passengers and 333,465 aircraft movements annually.
Operated by Broward County Aviation
On Friday, January 6, 2017, FLL experienced an active shooter
Department
event. At approximately 12:54 p.m., a male passenger arriving on a
333,465 aircraft operations (2018) flight from Minneapolis obtained a handgun from his claimed baggage
and intentionally discharged the weapon in the baggage claim area of
18th-busiest airport in the United States
Terminal 2, killing five innocent bystanders and wounding six. The
(2018)
chaotic, panic-induced self-evacuation of people into secure areas led
10th in the United States for to an additional 40 injuries.
international traffic
As a result of the incident an AAR was developed to identify best
One of top 50 busiest airports practices and lessons learned during the event. Several improvement
items included incorporating and updating elements into all-hazards
Approximately 900 flights per day plans to improve support and coordination response operations and
Home to 17,148 employees streamlining the AEP and annexes.
Generates a total of 255,386 direct, FLL also engages with several collaborative groups to inform their
indirect, and induced jobs disaster resilience efforts. These groups include the FLL Emergency
Response Coalition (FERC) and FLL Partnership Committee meetings
with various airport stakeholders.
To ensure stakeholders understand the newly developed annexes, FLL developed a training
matrix and plan for ICS concepts and principles that support the AEP practice of training
staff about AEP elements.
Collectively, these metrics—a real-world AAR and collaborative stakeholder groups—have
resulted in AEP annex development that enhances FLL’s preparedness and ability to respond
and provide recovery to all-hazards incidents.
Identified Need: Although the AEP contains the required information and chapters refer-
encing hazards that could affect FLL, the airport identified the need to streamline plans and
incorporate into a consolidated AEP, thus creating supporting annexes.
Objective: To develop AEP annexes that are all-hazards and consolidated into one AEP
document.

The airport uses various metrics to determine the need for developing all-hazards annexes.
Some metrics include executive leadership prioritization of needs, previous real-world incident
AARs, and the use of an EM working group called the FERC.

Case Examples 45
The FERC discusses current emergency plans, available training opportunities, exercises, and
EM efforts at the airport to drive preparedness efforts, including plan development.
The larger FLL Partnership Committee with airlines and tenants meets monthly. This meeting
is used to discuss airport operations, security, TSA, and other airport issues. Feedback from this
group supported the development of a Crisis Communications Plan in addition to the Rapid
Recovery Plan. The Rapid Recovery Plan involved the airport and partners that will have to
mobilize quickly to get runways back open and operational.
Through these collaborative efforts, FLL determined that their AEP would best serve their
community as an umbrella system, consolidating multiple plans into one. As a unified umbrella
document, the AEP houses AEP-supporting annexes that have been developed or are currently
under development.
FLL has identified the following annexes included as part of the AEP (Figure 9):
• Hurricane Preparedness Manual

• Communicable Disaster Emergency Response Plan
• Terminal Evacuation Plan
• Severe Weather Plan
• Active Threat Plan
• Emergency Operations Center Reference Manual
• Airport Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) Annex (complements the County COOP
and uses their template)
• Rapid Recovery Plan (Airfield Recovery Plan)
• Crisis Communication Plan
• EOC Activation Manual (under development)
As plans are created, these are available to stakeholders with roles and responsibilities
contained within the AEP. AEPs and annexes are provided as requested and ahead of potential
threats or during the appropriate season (e.g., hurricanes). Another way FLL aims to share their
AEP and annexes in the future is through the use of WebEOC. WebEOC is an online EM portal
where users can document situational information, track resources, and share documents. FLL
is moving toward implementing a plan repository within WebEOC for personnel to access
as needed.
Figure 9. AEP annexes, SOPs, and manuals. (Source: FLL)

Table 5. FLL EM staff training matrix.
FLL Emergency Management Training Recommendations
LEVEL 1 LEVEL 2 LEVEL 3

TRAINING TRAINING TRAINING
COURSE COURSE NAME AIRPORT BRANCH SPECIALISTS

NUMBER COMMAND DIRECTORS MANAGERS
SECTION UNIT STRIKE
CHIEFS LEADERS TEAMS
DIVISION TASK
DEPUTY
SUPERVISORS FORCES
SECTION
GROUP
CHIEFS SINGLE
LEADERS
RESOURCES
ICS-100 Introduction to ICS   
ICS-200 Basic ICS   
ICS-300 Intermediate ICS for   +

Expanding Incidents
ICS-400 Advanced ICS for Complex   +

Incidents
IS-700 NIMS: An Introduction   
IS-702 NIMS Public Information  +

Systems
IS-706 NIMS Intrastate Mutual  +

Aid, An Introduction
IS-775 EOC Management and   +

Operations
IS-800 NRF, An Introduction  
EOC Familiarization   
Position-Specific Training  + +
AEP Familiarization   
 = required training; + = recommended/additional training.
Lastly, to ensure stakeholders understand the plans, including the AEP, FLL has implemented
a training program that incorporates in-depth AEP and ICS training as well as exercises beyond
the part 139 requirements. FLL created a training matrix (see Table 5) that outlines the training
requirements for personnel.
• Take lessons learned seriously. Knowledge obtained through lessons learned has been incor-
porated, operationalized, and put into practice at FLL. One such successful practice is the
teaching of a FEMA ICS course for senior and elected officials. As part of a regular training

Case Examples 47
program, the class involves a high-level overview training and provides the leadership with a
better understanding of ICS principles (which is the response system outlined in the AEP).
• Make the AEP accessible to stakeholders. The AEP is circulated through stakeholder groups.
FLL offers the AEP to stakeholders who request a copy.
• Share experiences. FLL wants to share their success stories and past challenges on the road
by providing workshops and training presentations on aviation EM (including AEP famil-
iarization). The intent is to share information about aviation EM and the importance of
airports to a region; what aviation EM is; how it complements county/local programs; and
some examples of emergency response at airports, as well as an airport’s role during and
after disasters.
Lessons Learned
• Managing AEP updates. FLL EM staff in the past received little to no background training or
knowledge about developing and updating the AEP. Previous staff provided a copy of the
AEP but no additional information. Other than the AC 150/5200-31C, there is no further
guidance on the frequency required for updating the AEP and/or any supporting documents.
• Train and exercise to the plan. FLL does not currently train to the AEP beyond the part 139
requirements. FLL is looking to move beyond simply having a plan that meets federal require-
ments, but to develop a plan that is valuable to partners year-round and to train to the plan,
including what it encompasses and how it is activated and updated. FLL will implement
additional training for Fiscal Year 2020, including taking advantage of FEMA’s Virtual
Tabletop Exercise Program. Future efforts also include more in-depth AEP training with
stakeholders, including for more effective evacuation during the active shooter event with
fewer injuries.
Summary
FLL uses several metrics for developing supporting AEP annexes. From real-world incidents
to collaborative working groups, FLL incorporates feedback, AARs, the FLL strategic plan
(2018), and group input to inform development of these annexes. This helps to build stakeholder
engagement and buy-in as the airport enhances its preparedness and
builds its resiliency. Furthermore, FLL has established a training matrix
outlining the training needs to support understanding of the concepts Airport Characteristics
and principles contained within the AEP and annexes by stakeholders.
Ultimately, FLL has used many inputs to develop all-hazards plans that 9th-busiest airport in the United States
close gaps and prepare its community. Owned by Clark County, Nevada
Operated by the Clark County

McCarran International Airport (LAS) Department of Aviation
Credit: This body of work was a collaborative production by the Operates four general aviation airports
Clark County Department of Aviation, Airside Operations Team, 1,479 daily aircraft movements (2018)
and EM
539,866 aircraft movements annually
AEP Practices: Socializing the AEP with stakeholders (2018)
Case Example: Innovative ways LAS socializes the AEP with Home to 18,500 personnel employed
stakeholders by Clark County, the airlines, and
Airport Background: McCarran International Airport (LAS) is part support tenants
of the nation’s core 30 large-hub airports. It is the 9th-busiest airport

in the United States, transporting more than 49.7 million passengers in 2018 and averaging
136,200 passengers daily. Approximately 85% of McCarran’s passengers are origin and destina-
tion travelers, meaning they start or end their air travel itinerary at LAS.
McCarran is an enterprise fund operation owned solely by Clark County, Nevada, and
operated by the Clark County Department of Aviation. Clark County also operates four GA
airports: Henderson Executive Airport (HND), Jean Sport Aviation Center (OL7), North Las
Vegas Airport (VGT), and Overton/Perkins Field (UO8).
Led by McCarran, Clark County’s aviation system generates an annual economic benefit of
nearly $30 billion for southern Nevada.
More than 1,500 employees work for the Department of Aviation and another 18,500 per-
sonnel are employed at McCarran by the airlines, concessionaires, and other support tenants.
The Clark County Fire Department ARFF Station 13 maintains three response-ready Striker
firefighting trucks, a paramedic unit (Squad 13) and qualified and trained firefighting staff
in accordance with 14 CFR, part 139, with qualified on-duty firefighters housed on the airport.
LAS ARFF maintains staffing and equipment availability 24/7, meeting the airport Index E
requirements (index means the type of ARFF equipment and quantity of fire extinguishing
agent that the certificate holder must provide in accordance with 139.315, and specifically for
aircraft at least 200 feet in length).
McCarran is also a global leader in technology. It is one of only two major airports in the
world (along with Hong Kong International) that uses radio frequency identification tags to
track 100% of outbound checked baggage. McCarran also helped pioneer the use of multi
airline, common-use ticketing kiosks, and in 2012 introduced self-baggage check-in and
self-boarding technologies.
The west side of LAS has two fixed-base operators (FBOs) that support charter and GA opera-
tions, which includes a satellite CBP office for processing arriving foreign visitors. Helicopter
operations exceed 500 flights per day from the west side, with the Grand Canyon as the primary
tour destination, along with event air taxi service and aerial tours of the Las Vegas Strip.
Identified Need: In 2018, following a basic revision to the AEP, updating of various pages,
including general formatting and seeking feedback from airline stakeholders for comments, the
current emergency administrator saw that the AEP was too cumbersome for stakeholders to gain
a thorough understanding in a quick and efficient manner in regard to the expectations of them
during an emergency as outlined in the AEP. New airlines
would request emergency planning information, but there
was nothing prepared to give them other than the full docu-
ment, which did not offer an easy and digestible format for
stakeholders to understand their roles and responsibilities
specific to the threats and hazards identified in the AEP.
The emergency administrator saw the need for a condensed
version of the AEP that could be distributed to new airlines and
partners; a quick reference guide and checklists were created
that provide easy access to phone numbers, maps with grids,
and a list of what to do and who to call during emergencies.
Objective: To create quick reference guides, quick start
guides, and checklists to provide stakeholders with easy access
to basic AEP information, as well as response and recovery
Airport emergency exercise, LAS
processes needed during emergencies, both for use in the field
Source: Emergency Administrator, LAS
(at the incident location) and at the EOC.

Case Examples 49

History and Catalyst for Developing Innovative Ways
to Socialize the AEP
Prior to 2017, all plans and exercises were additional duties divided among personnel,
including the operations coordinator, who later became the airport’s first emergency admin-
istrator. He felt the AEP was a good start, but just a start. While it complied with FAA 14 CFR,
part 139, regulations, he realized the AEP is too large of a document to be physically used
during an emergency. Knowing the AEP contains valuable information, he consolidated several
checklists from information within each AEP annex for the various stakeholders that would be
involved in an incident. In doing so, it became clear that there were some gaps in planning that the
AEP did not address. For example, the AEP does not address incidents that take place inside the
terminal, such as an active shooter event or the discovery of luggage with a large amount of illegal
drugs. Another issue was nonstandardized terminology. Although the NIMS was fully adopted by
LAS in accordance with the FAA’s AC 150/5200-31C, there can still be
residual nomenclatures that persist throughout an airport or aviation
environment. For example, an airline may use the term “friend and family
assistance center,” instead of the NTSB’s term, “family assistance center.” ICS 214 Form
• An activity log
• Records details of notable activities
Future Planning and AEP Practice
during an incident or event
Refinement
• Includes resource tracking, basic
LAS continues efforts to refine AEP practices, ensuring stakeholders incident activity, critical actions/
understand what to do during an emergency, which is of the highest decisions, and a timeline
priority. The emergency administrator is working toward creating a • Often used in the field and in EOCs
working group that would address these issues. The working group
would consist of a team of experts from the airport community to per-
form a gap analysis and provide solutions for closing those gaps within
the AEP, with the goal of creating a plan that would offer substan-
tial guidance and standard procedures for responding to or recover-
ing from an event. It would also condense that information into the
quick reference guide, which provides easy access to basic informa-
tion that stakeholders need during an emergency. The emergency
administrator recognizes that the AEP is the go-to document and,
should stakeholders need to delve deeper into response actions or
operations, they can always refer to the full AEP. ICS 214 Form can
be a model.
Innovative Solutions Developed

The quick reference guides (example included in Appendix E) and
checklists are filtered and simplified versions of the AEP that include
directions for what to do during emergencies—who to call, phone
numbers, maps with grids, and other basic information, much of
which is extrapolated from the AEP. Other reference documents
include quick-start guides for personnel who will report to the EOC
and use the WebEOC software (a system used to document and track
EOC activities, reports, and resources). The first volume produced
50 guides that were quickly distributed and enthusiastically received.
The second volume is in production and will include sections on
bomb threats, active shooters, swine flu, H1N1, and Ebola.

Some items for use during exercises and emergency are modeled after ICS Form 214 and
feed into the ability to inform the AAR. Collectively, LAS ties together the larger AEP docu-
ment with practical application by providing personnel with these guides and checklists,
giving them the ICS 214 forms to complete during an exercise or event (capturing what they
are doing, when they make decisions, and important actions taken) to then inform an AAR and
make updates to the AEP.
Other Successful Practices

• One-on-one interfacing with stakeholders: The emergency administrator takes the time for
individual face-to-face meetings with airline station managers and new personnel to discuss
emergency roles and responsibilities and to educate them about what is in the plan and what
they can expect during an emergency or event.
• Onboarding tour of the EOC: Provides the stakeholder with the information they would
need to respond to an incident, including where in the EOC they will be located, phone
numbers, and seating arrangements.
• Training and exercises:
– EM provides ICS 214 to triennial participants in a tablet form (i.e., multiple blank ICS 214
forms, bound together across the top border instead of single-sheet pages) enabling
participants to record their actions and the sequence of events, informing the AAR.
– TTXs are function-focused (e.g., facilities, maintenance, and the like) and checklists provide
appropriate guidance for use by participants.
– LAS trains and exercises multiple shifts at multiple times and multiple days for training
continuity and experience.
– EM provides a grid map of the airfield to better familiarize staff with the layout of the
airport.
– Use exercises with teams that are smaller in nature but that feed into the larger incidents
outlined in the AEP and AARs to improve overall response and recovery operations
through unencumbered honest dialogue often omitted in large groups.
– EM uses the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) guidance for
conducting exercises.
• Identify the return on investment: EM at LAS identifies the ROI when updating the AEP; what
benefit it offers the organization and its customers: identification of gaps to support the ROI,
and development of solutions to close those gaps (e.g., quick reference guides, checklists).
Lessons Learned
• The AEP is redundant: Much of the AEP is duplicative, and the capabilities needed to manage
the incident are often the same, regardless of the incident. Therefore, checklists allow users to
understand the roles and responsibilities that are similar across various threats or incidents.
(McCarran’s Emergency Action Plan Reference Guide can be found in Appendix E.)
• Change is rarely eagerly embraced: Stakeholders across the board often resist change out of
a fear of the unfamiliar or do not recognize change may be necessary to solve unexpected
issues. One way to resolve this is to manage expectations. Arming staff with the knowledge
of what to expect so that they know what actions to take, why those actions are necessary,
and what their own specific roles and responsibilities are enables them to be better prepared,
more open, and accepting of change when it is required.
• Do not overload the AEP with multiple MOUs and LOAs: To streamline response, limit delays,
and minimize issues, LAS references other plans, LOAs, MOUs, and so forth, and does not
place these items directly within the AEP.

Case Examples 51
• Reference support services in the AEP (food services, baggage services, and the like) and then
provide opportunities for them to exercises their roles (refer to training and exercises under
“other successful practices”).
• Build relationships internally: Airport personnel, airlines, support services, and external agency
or jurisdiction representatives are key to a successful plan and response.
Summary
While the AEP provides information necessary to respond
to and recover from incidents and events at the airport, the
emergency administrator identified that there were gaps to
bridge and the information contained within the AEP needed
to be accessible to all stakeholders.
The resulting development of the quick reference guides
and checklists was a successful response to the need for air-
port personnel, airlines, and support services to have infor-
mation at their fingertips, accessible and easily digestible for
use during emergencies and events.
Understanding the airport community and how best to
serve it allows LAS to create innovative AEP practices when
socializing their AEP throughout the community. As LAS
Triennial airport emergency exercise, LAS
continues to improve and refine their practices, they will use Source: Emergency Administrator, LAS
a working group of experts to address the gaps in the AEP and
the resulting quick reference guides and continue to use a
creative approach to training and exercises. All these efforts and AEP practices have resulted
in an airport whose employees, airlines, and support services are more familiar with the AEP
and better equipped to respond effectively during an airport emergency.
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA)

AEP Practices: Incorporating updates into AEP processes following a real-world incident
Case Example: Unauthorized flight and ensuing crash of Horizon airliner
Airport Background: Operated by the Port of Seattle, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport
(SEA) is ranked as the eighth-busiest U.S. airport, serving 49.8 million passengers and more
than 432,315 metric tons of air cargo in 2018. With a regional economic impact of more
than $22.5 billion in business revenue, Sea-Tac generates more than
151,400 jobs (87,300 direct jobs), representing over $3.6 billion in
direct earnings and more than $442 million in state and local taxes. Airport Characteristics
A total of 32 passenger airlines serve 91 nonstop domestic destina-
tions and 29 international destinations, including Canada, Mexico, Owned and operated by the Port
and seasonal operations. This case example is based on an interview of Seattle
with the airport, documentation provided, and other relevant docu- 438,391 aircraft operations in 2018
mented sources.
Annual passenger traffic: 49,849,520
In August 2018, a Horizon Air employee stole an aircraft and
crashed it off airport property. Subsequently, the airport conducted Generates 151,400 jobs (87,300 direct
and published an AAR detailing 34 recommendations for improvement, jobs)
including updates to planning processes and all-hazards plans.

Identified Need: Following real-world incidents, airports can incorporate lessons learned
and best practices into the AEP and any supporting annexes, as well as all-hazards plans. As a
result of the aircraft accident, Seattle drafted additional SOPs in the event of a future occurrence.
Objective: Incorporate lessons learned from the AAR and IP into the AEP.

The SEA AEP is a comprehensive document developed based on the guidance of the AC.
While many other airports develop annexes to their AEP, SEA chooses not to include supporting
plans, but instead incorporates processes and enhancements to their main document. There are,
however, additional SOPs and standard operating guidelines (SOGs) that have been developed
parallel to the plan to keep it streamlined for FAA compliance.
The AEP is updated on an annual basis; throughout the years, the airport has worked to keep
it simplified, stripping it of unnecessary steps and cutting outdated processes. For example,
the AEP included a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) Plan in the Fire Department portion of the
AEP. Since King County has a standard MCI plan that supports the airport as well as the
region, including such a plan in the AEP was redundant. The airport removed the MCI plan
and instead referenced the County MCI Plan. Allowing for references to plans that support
the airport in addition to the region instead of duplicating them has helped to simplify the
AEP and remove the burden of updating the same plan in multiple documents.
Prior to and after the Horizon Air accident, SEA has placed an emphasis on incident
management and response for the AEP. To complement these efforts, the airport maintains
a rigorous training program, including biannual refresher requirements for the ICS and the
NIMS. In coordination with that training, the airport ensures that the AEP is consistent with
ICS/NIMS principles.
In August 2018 an airline employee, in what was called a “spectacular theft,” appropriated an
empty Bombardier Q400 turboprop plane. The ground service agent took off on a 75-minute
flight in which he executed steep banks and a barrel roll while being followed by fighter jets
before eventually and intentionally crashing to his death on an island southwest of Seattle in
Puget Sound. He was not trained to fly. After a 3-month investigation, the FBI concluded that
he acted alone. His death was ruled a suicide. In his own words to the air traffic controller,
he was “just a broken guy, got a few screws loose. Never really knew it until now.”
The flight closed down airport traffic. A pair of F-15 fighter jets broke the sound barrier
while approaching the plane, and it started a national conversation.
In addition to seizing public attention, the inexplicable event caught the interest of airlines
and airports across the country, as well as the NTSB and other authorities, who all demanded
to know how such a thing could happen. Investigations found no criminal or terrorist links
and no clear motive. The purloining pretend pilot was a properly credentialed airline employee
whose responsibilities included regular access to aircraft. No protocols were broken until the
actual theft.
In the following months, all eyes were on SEA as the airport attempted to make sense of
a senseless situation. In the immediate aftermath, the airport reviewed their security mea-
sures and assessed their procedures. Workers already were subject to background checks and
screenings for drugs and alcohol. The airport already led the industry with its full employee
screening program requiring all employees to pass a physical security screening, including
magnetometer scans, before entering secure areas of the airport.
Prior to this incident, SEA had implemented a national best practice of formal AAR/IP
process to review their current plans, practices, processes, and procedures and identify areas

Case Examples 53
for improvement following exercises and real-world incidents. The AAR brought to light gaps
in those areas and as a result, SEA crafted additional SOPs, such as processes for immediate
notifications upon alert of the incident, including the FAA, Joint Terrorism Task Force, and
airport and airline leadership, as well as local jurisdictional points of contact (POCs) (e.g., the
State of Washington EOC Duty Officer) who then can notify the other jurisdictional stake-
holders and constituents who may need to know. Although several airports have experienced
real-world incidents, SEA established a formal process to review the incident, identify areas
to improve (to include identifying gaps in the AEP and all-hazards planning), and incorporate
the changes through an improvement process.
By using an AAR process and developing an AAR and IP, SEA has established a process for
updating their AEP when incidents affect the airport and its stakeholders. Key takeaways for
updating and improving the AEP or developing supporting plans include the following:
• Event notification: Improve timeliness of notification of first responders and key airport/
regional/federal stakeholders.
• Communications center coordination: Better define and delineate (or consolidate) roles
between the Airport Communications Center and the Port of Seattle 911 Center.
• Emergency communications and coordination: More timely and robust communication with
key tenants/stakeholders through existing systems in all areas of operations (e.g., landside,
terminal, and airside).
• Command and control roles: Clarify roles and responsibilities of the ICP, Emergency
Coordination Center, and Policy Group and train accordingly.
• Customer care plan: Develop a plan to address customer needs during large-scale disruptions to
airport operations (communications, food/water, medical, shelter, and transportation services).
• An AAR and an IP were completed, resulting in updates to the AEP, and additional proce-
dures were developed. For example, upon alert of such an incident, immediate notifications
will be made to the FAA, 911, airport and community leadership, and state points of contact
who can notify other stakeholders. Memorializing this into the AEP will help during future
events.
• A formal AAR review process for real-world events was adopted with the potential to provide
valuable feedback and a mechanism for tracking improvement items. This creates account-
ability for ensuring the AEP is up-to-date following a real-world incident.
• Use other events to inform AEP updates, such as the FLL active shooter incident from 2017.
SEA rewrote the entire Mass Evacuation Plan because of this incident. The Mass Evacuation
Plan helps support and supplement the nuances of the details of a terminal evacuation
outlined in the AEP.
• Additional SOPs were crafted to include notification in the event of a future occurrence
between the ramp tower, the FAA tower, and the airport’s 911, using a mass notification
system that includes the State of Washington’s constituent municipalities.
• A further notification process for emergency response personnel was also added.
Lessons Learned
• Leaving the AEP generic is difficult to do when the regulations create gaps in planning.
To bridge those gaps, airports are creating SOPs/SOGs to supplement the AEP specific to
each airport’s needs.
• Keep the AEP simple for FAA review. Each FAA representative is different. Communicate
with them to determine what they are looking for when validating an AEP.

• The AEP is dependent on collaboration. Be persistent when confronted with resistance or

apathy from stakeholders.
• Begin the review process early. Reach out to stakeholders; send cheat sheets to departments
to help them more quickly review the part of the plan for which they are responsible.
• Mental health conversations, planning, and training can occur regularly.
Summary
The value of an AAR/IP in the aftermath of an exercise or drill is widely known and a proven
benefit when root-cause analysis is properly conducted, leading to accurate recommendations
for improvement(s). The AAR is the reason for the exercise. Without a document that shines
a light on the gaps in a plan, along with a plan for bridging those gaps with corrective actions,
an exercise is wasted time. However, it is more difficult to examine lessons learned resulting
from a real-world emergency.
Airports may benefit from using these real-world events—their own and others—in the
same way to improve their AEP practices for updating AEPs and developing supporting
annexes or all-hazards plans. Learn from the emergencies and disasters. An emergency is an
opportunity to test the plan and to learn from what went well, what did not, and why. Using this
case example, airports can learn to formalize and structure their AEP processes to incorporate
lessons learned from real-world events along with corrective actions.
Some real-world events are rare but still somewhat expected. Hurricanes, fires, tornadoes,
and active shooter events are infrequent yet common enough to the extent that there is con-
sideration taken for these threats when updating the AEPs. Whether it is an event already
well considered or an incident not yet thought of, each real-world event requires a period of
reflection afterward. How did this happen? How could this have been prevented? What went
well? How do we get better? How do we improve our plans?
SEA learned from this and other real-world events. The airport developed an AAR/IP and
updated the AEP to reflect the corrective actions established, creating a stronger and more
effective plan to better mitigate against loss of life and property.
Boulder City Municipal Airport (BVU)

AEP Practices: AEP development at general aviation airports
Case Example: Boulder City Municipal Airport AEP with additional information about
Pearson Field Airport (VUO), Vancouver, Washington
Airport Background: Boulder City Municipal Airport is a GA airport serving Boulder City,
Nevada. It replaced Boulder City Airport, which was originally named “Bullock Airport.”
The Boulder City Municipal Airport is assigned BVU by the FAA and
BLD by the International Air Transport Association (IATA). IATA
assigned BVU to Beluga Airport in Beluga, Alaska.
Airport Characteristics
BVU passenger destinations are predominantly the Grand Canyon,
Open to the public with flights arriving at either Peach Springs Airport (DQR) or Grand
Canyon National Park Airport (GCN). Operators based at BVU include
Primary nonhub
the following:
Owned by Boulder City Municipality
• Papillon Grand Canyon Helicopters
No air traffic control tower at airport • Las Vegas Helicopters
• Scenic Airlines, operated by Grand Canyon Airlines
225,000 enplanements per year • Grand Canyon Airlines
• 5 Star Helicopter Tours

Case Examples 55
Identified Need: As a small primary nonhub airport without commercial service, BVU is not
required to meet part 139 standards, and, traditionally, they have not had a developed emer-
gency response plan that was more than a working document. The airport manager saw the
need for a coordinated response during an emergency.
Objective: AEP development for a noncertificated airport.

Unlike larger airports, GA airports are not required to meet part 139 standards. The newly
hired BVU airport manager, who has a background in EM, had previously worked at VUO in
Vancouver, another GA airport. VUO had developed an AEP because it was the only flat piece
of property that was accessible to material and equipment. In the event of a disaster that impacts
the community at large, VUO would become the primary location for staging equipment and
bringing in supplies because of its flat space and runway. The local EM organization there was
lacking the expertise to support the airport and the city with emergency planning and did not
understand the logistics side of the supply chain, as well as the nuances of airport response
during a disaster. For example, a cascading event, one in which certain responses to an emer-
gency are followed by an inevitable and unforeseen chain of events, could impact the airport
differently than the community, because an airport has different issues and concerns than
nonairport facilities.
Now at BVU, the airport manager considered that to be a successful practice worth emulating
at this airport, especially considering continual expansion and increased activity at BVU over
the past 10 years. Additionally, they can write the plan on a smaller scale and tailor it to their
needs and the activities that take place within the community.
In the cases of both BVU and VUO, management decided that an AEP was needed and that
the template from the FAA AC would be used.
AEP Status and Use

The planning that is currently in place at BVU is incomplete; the information shared covers
emergency notification and hands-on training with airport personnel. The AEP is currently
pending approval, so it has not been provided to anyone at the time of this writing.
At VUO, the airport manager/director was the approving authority for the AEP. Outside the
airport, it was distributed to a select few, including the chief of police, fire chief, battalion chiefs,
the county EM organization, and the Civil Air Patrol, since they would use the airport for search
and rescue activities. Both the county and the city would support an incident at the airport.
At this point, the BVU AEP has not yet been incorporated into training, exercises, or drills.
Incidents may regularly occur that involve several response organizations, and this allows the
teams, including the airport staff, to work together during a small-size emergency or event
(e.g., landing gear issues). This is not only because the AEP has not yet been approved but is
also because of the lack of resources for developing and facilitating exercises, a common issue
at GA airports with small staff.
For example, there were no exercises or training events at VUO. There was, however, an
annual event that provided the opportunity to work with fire and police on minor aircraft
incidents. After incidents, the team would have a hotwash to discuss successes and challenges.
If an event is large enough, airport staff can seek input and guidance from the Washington
Airport Managers Association.
As is typical with most emergencies, their greatest challenge was communications. The airport
would use VHF radios while fire and police would communicate via 800 megahertz (MHz)

radios, meaning they could not talk to one another during an emergency. If airport staff are
available, they will use small handhelds and communicate their information to the incident
command, who will then put it out on their 800 MHz radios.
Challenges Experienced in Developing and

Implementing an AEP in a General Aviation Airport
• Incident notification: Not all GA airports are well staffed or staffed for 24 hours a day.
Incidents sometimes occur without anyone’s knowledge. For example, an employee could
arrive at the airport to find a plane on the runway and no one who knows what happened.
– Communicating with emergency services: An initial incident is difficult because BVU has
no tower to communicate with emergency services. After hours in the evening, there is
no one there to call in an incident.
• Collaboration with fire and police has been a challenge, making development and imple
mentation of an AEP more challenging.
• Creation of a defined process: Much of it must be determined spontaneously because of
small staff, notification, and availability.
– Determining roles and responsibilities
– Moving emergency vehicles to airport locations
– Identifying staging locations
• Training police and firefighters to operate in an airport setting: An airport setting is different
from many other settings. In the event of a plane crash, it is important to know not to cut
the fuel line when there is still power in the plane. Not knowing where or even whether to
cut could exacerbate the problem. Firefighters and police need to understand where to go
during an airport emergency. The airport needs them, but if they are not trained to work
with the airport, they may be unfamiliar with the airport’s layout and can waste time searching
for a location.
Successful Practices in AEP Development

at a GA Airport
• AC 150/5200-31C: This is a boilerplate AEP provided by the FAA that guides the planner in what
needs to be addressed in the plan. BVU reviewed the AC for guidance in developing their AEP,
and then collaborated with local fire and police chiefs on responses to incidents at the airport.
• Coordination with local jurisdictions: Discussions covered the type(s) of assistance that may
be provided if an incident occurred at the airport requiring local EM or first responders.
The value of the airport during an emergency was emphasized. For example, the airport
can provide a staging area for supplies to move through, or staging for various equipment,
as well as to receive resources as needed.
• Train first responders on working with the airport: BVU has provided information to first
responders about access points, letting them know to have dispatch communicate with
the airport and to identify staging locations in case it is not an active incident (aircraft on
approach, for example). They have also explained to police what their role is (e.g., wait by the
gate, limit the access, and secure the perimeter).
Considerations for Other GA Airports

Considering Developing an AEP
• Put your ideas on paper and discuss them with staff and local responders to gain buy-in.
• Require staff to complete ICS training, beginning with ICS 200. ICS courses will provide basic
understanding of EM concepts and principles.

Case Examples 57
• EM responses at a GA airport should be coordinated by the city or county emergency

manager, as well as health departments, public works, and city/county administrators.
• Take advantage of available resources. Some helpful resources for someone who is not
necessarily experienced in working with airports include the following:
– AC 150/5200-31C
– www.airtap.umn.edu
– http://www.airtap.umn.edu/publications/factsheets/
– http://www.airtap.umn.edu/publications/factsheets/documents/emergency_guidebook.pdf
Summary
Having come from VUO, the new BVU airport manager was already familiar with the
challenges and requirements of operating a GA airport, including the fact that BVU was not
required to meet part 139 standards. While an AEP was not required, he still saw a need for
a more complete plan than the airport currently had and felt that an AEP would provide the
coordinated response needed during an emergency.
Using AC 150/5200-31C, a boilerplate provided by the FAA in developing an AEP, and in
collaboration with local fire, police, and EM, as well as using experience obtained in operating
a GA airport at VUO, BVU completed development of an AEP written on a smaller scale and
tailored to meet their needs.
Since the AEP has not yet been approved, it has not been implemented or used in training.
But the benefits brought about in the development stage itself so far have been notable. In the
process of developing the AEP, BVU began to work more closely with local responders and
EM, showing them how the airport can be of value to the community during an emergency
and training the responders on the unique needs of airports and what they need to know when
responding to an emergency at the airport.
Centennial Airport (APA)

AEP Practices: AEP development at GA airports
Case Example: Centennial develops a nonmandatory AEP
Airport Background: Centennial Airport is a GA airport in the Denver metropolitan area.
It was originally named Arapahoe County Airport when it opened May 12, 1968. In 1984, it was
renamed Centennial Airport in honor of the day Colorado became the 38th state in 1876, the
centennial of the day the United States Declaration of Independence was adopted by the Second
Continental Congress. With an average of 924 aircraft operations per
day, Centennial is one of the busiest GA airports in the United States.
Identified Need: As a GA airport, Centennial is not required to meet Airport Characteristics
part 139 standards, but decided to develop an AEP as a proactive
measure; a best practice they believed would have beneficial results. Public use
When creating the emergency response plan EM personnel made the Nonprimary reliever airport
decision to develop an AEP, using the AC as the fundamental building
block and customizing it to meet the airport’s needs. However, Centen- Owned by Arapahoe County Public
nial noted some portions of the AC were not applicable to them as a Airport Authority
non–part 139 airport. 337,947 aircraft operations (2018)
Objective: AEP development for a GA airport


The AEP was first drafted in the mid-1990s. Although the core of the plan has not changed
significantly over the years, new sections have been added as new types of emergencies have
emerged. As Centennial is not required to comply with part 139, the team recognized they had
some flexibility in deciding what to include in their AEP. For example, Centennial Airport
is not required to have a dedicated ARFF team because of the lack of commercial operations.
Therefore, the airport is not required to meet part 139 fire-response-time requirements. In this
case, their ARFF is part of South Metro Fire and Rescue (SMFR) and is not on site at the airport.
As a result of this flexibility, the airport has pulled some sections from the AC, such as the
functional areas, but has not included others. Their base plan mirrors the base plan of the
AC regarding organization. They also have hazard annexes that are set up as guided by the AC.
The AEP is open-ended, with detailed response operations and organized into two main
sections as follows:
• Base Plan. This section is made up of basic EM planning information that requires regular
updating, such as contact information, functional descriptions, and responsibilities.
• Annexes. Specific emergencies such as aircraft emergencies, bomb threats, terrorism, and
the like.
The goal of the airport is to provide a high-enough level of detail to provide guidance in
response, while remaining open-ended enough to allow for the variation between emergencies.
When updating the AEP, Centennial evaluates the need for additional annexes in light of the
changing risk landscape, upcoming regulations, or new EM practices. One example is Active
Shooter/Active Threat. This is an annex that was not part of their AEP several years ago but is
now considered a necessary inclusion in their current AEP.
Centennial chooses to update the AEP every 3 years. With approximately 350,000 operations
per year and significant training traffic, as well as the occasional aircraft accident, there is
considerable opportunity to incorporate lessons learned and best practices into the AEP.
Tabletop and full-scale exercises provide further opportunity to incorporate changes into the AEP.
AEP Use
Distribution: The AEP is provided to airport staff, local law enforcement, the fire depart-
ment, and by request to FBOs. SSI is removed for general distribution to the FBOs but is kept in
for emergency agency partners. Other tenants do not receive
the AEP unless requested. Instead, the airport discusses the roles
and responsibilities contained in the AEP with the tenants.
The airport works with those tenants to familiarize them
with emergencies and other aspects of the AEP. Outside agen-
cies are informed when updates are completed and provided
with an electronic copy, where applicable.
Training/exercises: The EM staff is trained to the AEP as well
as all new airport personnel. The AEP is incorporated into
training and exercise activities, including their triennial full-
scale aircraft-accident exercise that includes fire and local law
enforcement, as well as other response agencies.
Centennial has a close working relationship with the
Aircraft accident exercise at Centennial Airport SMFR. SMFR responds to airport incidents and is familiar
Source: Brian Lewis, APA with the AEP. The airport and fire department continuously

Case Examples 59
train together on emergency procedures, aircraft, and airport familiarization. Conversely,

Centennial participates in SMFR’s exercises as well as exercises hosted by local responder and/
or EM agencies.
Challenges Experienced
• Keeping information current: Contact information is verified; maps with new development
are updated every 2 years.
• Keeping partners updated: As a large department with frequent turnover, for example, the
sheriff’s office can be a challenge to keep current. The department is included in all full-scale
exercises and invited to train in between conduct of the exercises. Centennial participates in
TTXs, which include the sheriff’s office as well. But because the sheriff ’s office has limited
training days, getting on their calendar can be a challenge.
– Deputies sent to an emergency may often be people who are unfamiliar with the airport.
– Because Centennial sits within two counties (Arapahoe and Douglas), there are two
different sheriff ’s offices to keep updated.
– The sheriffs of Arapahoe and Douglas Counties are elected. Briefing can be a challenge
if they have no aviation experience.
• Making sure everyone who needs a copy gets one: In the past, this has not been done, but
currently, Centennial makes sure everyone who needs a copy receives one and that they
know what the changes are. To keep track, the airport keeps a distribution log.
• Deciding what to include in the AEP and what to keep separate: The decision to create a separate
plan is made based on the complexity of the plan and the scope of the new plan according
to the level of detail and the functions that may fall outside the scope of a typical emergency
operations plan, such as crisis communications or continuity of operations, both of which
have their own standalone plan.
• Incorporating changes that occur in the aviation industry and other changes that occur over time:
As with any airport and aviation environment, the threat and hazard landscape is always
changing and progressing. Ensuring staff and the AEP stay up-to-date in a reasonable period
can be a challenge.
• Communication: Having identified the need for a more effective way to convey information
to the public and the media, Centennial hired a media and communications manager (public
information) to write a procedure for communications. This has resulted in new and positive
relationships with local media and the development of a large and thorough Crisis Commu-
nications Plan that became a standalone document because of its detail.
• Avoid conflicting plans with other agencies: Prior to the release of any updates, the airport meets
with other agencies to ensure there are no conflicting issues between plans (i.e., deconflicting
or cross-walking of plans). This practice also ensures familiarity between Centennial and the
other outside agencies.
• Employee Handbook of Emergencies: Outside of Airport Operations, much of Centennial’s
staff is not connected with EM. As a plan directed mostly to operations staff and law
enforcement, the AEP is a plan that most employees are not familiar with. Airport staff need
an employee handbook that defines the roles and responsibilities for staff about what they
should or can do during specific emergencies that affect them. As a result, Centennial is
currently developing an employee guidebook to provide direction for incidents such as an
active shooter or a bomb threat.
• Using available resources to inform the AEP: Some of the Centennial staff serve as terrorism
liaison officers trained through the Colorado Information and Analysis Center (CIAC).

Terrorism liaison officers meet internally with Operations

and leadership to discuss intelligence, which they can
incorporate into AEP updates as appropriate. They use
this resource, along with other connections throughout
the community, to inform the AEP.
Summary
Although the AC does not dictate the Centennial Airport
AEP, they use the AC as a guide and make the effort to comply
with it as much as is practical for a GA airport. Centennial has
refined and tweaked the AEP to suit the unique needs of the
airport. Some changes come as a result of working with the
CIAC, while other changes occur because staff deconflict or
Aircraft accident at Centennial Airport
cross-walk other plans with partner agencies. Many changes to
Source: Brian Lewis, APA the AEP come out of necessity, while others may be economi-
cally driven. As a GA airport, Centennial has the freedom to
build their own plan according to their specific needs without the requirement to comply
with the part 139 AC, all while still having access to the guidance provided by the circular.
The resulting document is a well-developed plan that works well for Centennial Airport.

CHAPTER 5
Salient Findings
Salient findings from the plenary session during the AAAE

Conference, SurveyMonkey results, and interviews follow.
Although practices vary across the country and at various
airports, common themes have presented themselves that
prove useful for highlighting in this synthesis.
Respondents indicated many successful practices in their
AEP practices. Some practices are in the way the airport
conducts the AEP review process and some practices are in
their inclusion of stakeholders, while others include adding
specific annexes to address threats not outlined in the AC.
Successful practices include working to better engage stake-
holders, including field personnel in the process, and seeking
AEP airport emergency exercise, CLT
out lessons learned from other airports. Others were more
innovative, such as creating a program called Helping All
Victims of Emergency in Need (HAVEN) designed to support
all victims of any major incident at the airport. Other airports created terminal evacuation
playbooks and airport support functions (ASFs) based loosely on the National Response
Framework’s Emergency Support Functions but tailored to an airport. During an active shooter
event, one airport mentioned printing out drawings of the shooter and placing them in tubes
for handoff to SWAT teams at the prescribed staging area. Other successful practices include
the following:
• Instituting smaller drills on key aspects that support overall AEP processes (e.g., biweekly
unified command multidiscipline drills or quarterly EOC drills)
• Refresher ICS training
• Updating of outdated (or nonexistent) plans with attendant training
• Engagement of senior leadership to lead by example and enforce accountability
• Implementation of a detailed tenant-based severe weather plan that builds upon the weather-
related hazard-specific sections in a detailed manner that actually contains diagrams,
procedures, and pertinent details for the tenants/airlines on which to use and train their staff
AEP review committees and working groups: Airports tend to look for new ways to engage
others in the AEP review process. One such practice is the use of an AEP review committee.
The committee meets to discuss changes or updates to the AEP, and review documentation
from incidents or exercises to determine if there is a need to update plans. The committee is a
multidisciplinary group, which provides a broad perspective on changes to emergency plans.
61

In one example, committee members consist of airside operations, landside operations, safety,
EM, and police and fire as needed.
Inclusion of local jurisdictions in AEP development: Airports discussed the benefits of including
local agencies in the planning process, providing many examples of this success. Airports dis-
cussed the benefits of teaching their local jurisdictions about airport and aviation response.
Some localities have developed plans to address aircraft accidents. More importantly, local
jurisdictions are learning how to respond to an airport, what to do, and how best to provide
support during an emergency. Charlotte Douglas International Airport understood that in
the case of an infectious disease at CLT, an inquiry would have to be carried out by not only
the airport, but also by the Mecklenburg County Emergency Services Agency, local hospital
systems, and Mecklenburg County Public Health. As a result, when the airport’s Communi-
cable Disease Response Plan was developed, Mecklenburg County Public Health led the draft
of the initial plan. Centennial Airport in Denver works closely with local partners, providing
their AEP to local law enforcement, including the sheriff’s offices in both Arapahoe and Douglas
Counties (the airport sits within both jurisdictions) and the SMFR, which lends it support in
responding to airport and aircraft incidents. Centennial also participates in SMFR’s exercises
as well as local emergency management or first responder exercises.
Policy group inclusion: Many senior leaders do not have an in-depth understanding of an
operational emergency response. Furthermore, when a significant event occurs, they do not
know how they fit into the response. However, these leaders also have the ultimate responsibility
for the success or failure of a large event. Multiple airports interviewed have created training
programs for senior leaders with an emphasis on ICS, EOCs, and the role of the policy group in
a major event.
Public outreach: Airport EMs have made great efforts to be involved in their local EM
communities. One example of these efforts is the tendency for airports to attend and speak at
EM conferences. This practice provides the opportunity for EMs to learn more about AEPs
and airport response. It also allows for networking and collaboration, ultimately building and
strengthening relationships. This practice facilitates collaborative communication. Another
practice identified was training and exercising the county aviation plan (if one exists), which
may mirror the AEP.
Using experts to gain stakeholder buy-in: Airports are constantly striving to build buy-in
and engagement from stakeholders. One method of successfully achieving this is to bring SMEs
into the conversation. An example provided was the use of the CDC to speak with stakeholders
during the development of a communicable disease plan.
Stakeholder onboarding: Some airports have developed a system and program for introducing
new stakeholders to the AEP, EOC, and response processes. This includes stakeholder binders
with relevant checklists, phone numbers, and EOC seating arrangements, and is provided to
new station managers and other new leaders. EOC tours and one-on-one meetings were also
mentioned as facets of programs.
Quick reference guides and stakeholder books: Many airports find the AEP to be difficult to
use in an operational setting because of the size and complexity of the document. A successful
practice used by one airport is the development of quick reference guides, quick-start guides,
and checklists for use by anyone working at the incident scene or EOC. The guides include basic
information such as phone numbers, maps, and directions for using software. More details on
this project are included in the LAS case example in Chapter 4 and in Appendix E.
Formalized after-action process: Almost all airports discussed the success of using a formalized
process for reviewing improvement items following exercises and incidents. Specific processes

Salient Findings 63
varied, but all reported that having a system for the management of improvements ensured
they were reviewed, action was taken, and changes were incorporated into future plans as
necessary.
Threat/incident specific annexes, plans, or SOPs: Many airports identified the need to develop
annexes to complement the AEPs or as SOPs to provide operational guidance to stakeholders.
Some airports have included these in the AEP document while others developed plans or
SOPs separate from the AEP, and consequently the AEP then references these documents by
name. Many airports are also including the term “all-hazards” to indicate that these annexes,
plans, or SOPs are not specific to any one threat or hazard, but should address any that could
affect the airport, its property, or stakeholders.
Lessons Learned
Airports shared lessons learned about their AEP practices, including making sure to cross-
walk the AEP with other airport or jurisdictional plans, creating open dialogue with stakeholders,
and conducting a gap analysis to identify supplemental plans needed to fill gaps and holes.
Coordinate plan changes with major events: Many major events can impact an airport’s
emergency plan(s). These can range from significant updates to other plans to changes to airport
initiatives or structures. Changing and updating plans as these events occur help close the
gaps between the document and actual operations. If not, response and recovery actions or
new tactical operations may be missed and not included in the AEP.
Supplemental plans: The importance of supplemental plans has been discussed throughout
the surveys, interviews, and case studies. Supplemental plans can fill the gaps left behind from
the AEP. Many plans can also be updated more efficiently than the standard AEP without the
requirement of FAA approval. A multitude of examples of additional plans have been intro-
duced, with some of the most common being active shooter, communicable disease, severe
weather and hurricanes, EOC, and family assistance. Without these plans, personnel may be
unclear what their roles and responsibilities may be during these specific incidents.
Cross-walk plans: Comparing and deconflicting the AEP and supplemental plans with one
another helps avoid discrepancies and confirms the plans are reflective of one another. This can
also limit confusion and misunderstanding about roles and responsibilities. Airport plans may
then also be cross-walked with local, state, or other applicable emergency plans. Meetings and
working groups used to achieve this also support the sharing and communication of the plans,
as well as strengthening relationships. By cross-walking plans, the airport can also limit or
eliminate duplication of information.
Transparency: Create an open dialogue with stakeholders and partners. Sharing the AEP
and supplemental plans is critical to receiving buy-in. Honesty builds trust and strengthens
plans while gaining input from stakeholders with responsibilities contained within the AEP.
Enduring Challenges
Many successes have been discussed in the preceding sections; however, some challenges
persist and are more difficult to overcome. Airports described the following as being the
most persistent.
Current practices versus current standards: Throughout the survey, respondents indicated the
AEP in its current practice no longer meets the needs of airports as a comprehensive, holistic
response and recovery document given the many changes in the industry and threats to airports

over the last 10 years. They found the plan to be too text heavy, narrative based, and hard copy
driven. This has a created an enduring challenge that current practices are at odds with current
standards. Airports are going above and beyond to fill gaps they’ve identified through AARs,
THIRAs, gap analyses, and needs assessments to ensure the AEP, supporting annexes, or
all-hazards standalone plans provide actionable information for stakeholders when preparing
for, responding to, and recovering from an incident at the airport.
Size of document: The size of the document is also mentioned as an inhibitor and enduring
challenge to ensuring stakeholders understand their roles and responsibilities. Throughout
the document, roles and responsibilities are duplicated and redundant, leading to no further
value added per threat identified and adding to the size of the document. This then challenges
airports with updating all relevant parts on a timely basis as well as ensuring stakeholders
have an in-depth and thorough understanding of their role in response and recovery efforts.
If everything is important, then nothing becomes important.
Varied perspectives: Some respondents indicated that the AEP does not contain sufficient
information to be used as a response plan. Given the previous enduring challenge experienced
by some respondents that the AEP is too large, others reported that the information contained
within was not enough. These differing perspectives about the AEP—that it does not include
enough hazard planning—clearly demonstrates the varying viewpoints and AEP practices
from one airport to another. One group believes the document is too large; the other believes
that the AEP is not inclusive nor comprehensive enough to be a valuable tool. As a result,
both groups may bifurcate their efforts, keeping the AEP up-to-date while maintaining other
annexes, SOPs, or all-hazards plans.
Transition from airside operations to independent EM programs: Airports also find ongoing
challenges with the transition from an airside operations-based emergency program to an
independent EM program. Many airport EMs have spent their careers in traditional city, county,
or other government environments, then moved into the airport environment. Finding a
balance between airport operational priorities and a growing EM program has not always been
easy. The approach to AEPs, other emergency plans, and the training and exercising of the
plans has shifted as EM becomes more professionalized in the airport environment. In some
airports, conflict remains between airside operations and EM over the ownership of the AEP.
Stakeholder engagement: Numerous successes and lessons learned have been shared regard-
ing stakeholder engagement; however, it remains an ongoing challenge. Time restrictions,
competing priorities, and lack of understanding or communication creates the need to continu-
ously focus energy and effort toward engaging stakeholders. This challenge resides in both
internal airport departments and with external stakeholders.
Plan approval and regulations: Much has been said previously regarding the prescriptiveness
and restrictiveness of the format and sections included in the AC. Often, additional updates
or changes have been identified that need to be incorporated into an airport’s AEP before
the previous AEP changes and/or updates have been approved. As a result, some airports
will collect all changes and updates for a period of time, then complete one larger update.
Consequently, AEPs may not reflect what is occurring operationally.

CHAPTER 6
Conclusions
Airports across the country that are required to maintain an AEP have developed numerous
methods for meeting this requirement. They have learned lessons and established successful
practices to ensure compliance and readiness of their airport. The AEP may not be an easy
document to update, train and exercise stakeholders on, and keep actionable—unless those
responsible for the AEP maintain practices that ensure the AEP best supports the airport and
its community of stakeholders. What is clear is that those who are responsible for the AEP, and
who informed this synthesis, have made significant strides and enacted varying AEP practices to
ensure the health of the AEP and practical application during a response by the airport.
Major Conclusions
Analysis of the data has led to the development of the following major conclusions:
1. Many airports have opted to maintain AEPs to the regulation standard, then focus on
development, training, and exercise of supplemental all-hazards plans. Traditional EM
practices are being incorporated into airport programs, placing importance on gap and
threat assessments, training and exercise programs, and a formal improvement planning
process.
2. Airports have created innovative AEP practices to ensure the airport has relevant plans
necessary to respond to and recover from threats that could affect the airport and its
stakeholders.
3. Engagement of stakeholders internally and externally to the airport community is a vital
component to the successful development of, update to, and implementation of the AEP
and its companion plans or annexes.
4. Exercising and training on the plans are successful methods to initiate and maintain
stakeholder engagement in developing and maintaining these plans.
5. Airport EMs and operators are being proactive in collaborating with stakeholders, both
internally and externally to the airport.
6. Establishing an AAR and IP process helps improve the AEP and supporting documents.
7. Using innovative AEP practices such as involving SMEs, creating stakeholder books, and
establishing AEP review working groups helps facilitate stakeholder engagement, under-
standing of roles and responsibilities, and including expertise external to the airport.
8. The AEP in its current iteration is not as user friendly as airports want because regulations
surrounding development, update, and maintenance of the AEP can be prescriptive in
nature and require significant time to get approved.
9. Aligning and cross-walking the multiple plans at airports (e.g., communicable disease
plans, irregular operations plans, terminal evacuation plans, and the like) or plans that
could affect the airport developed by surrounding jurisdiction(s) (e.g., mass casualty plans,
65

evacuation plans, severe weather plans, and the like) is valuable to ensure plans do not
conflict, have duplicate information, and enhance the airport’s ability to respond to and
recover from incidents and events.
10. Airports benefit from using a gap analysis or THIRA process to understand gaps in
planning.
Further Research
The need for further research of various topics has been identified because of this synthesis.
Research topics include more in-depth discussions on topics that would facilitate and improve
the AEP and its processes. Further research speaks to expanding the understanding of successful
practices, lessons learned, or enduring challenges. Topics suggested below also fall outside the
scope of this synthesis but would prove beneficial to the airport and aviation community for
further follow-up.
• Conducting and developing THIRAs for airports. Several airports conduct THIRAs or
participate in the THIRA process with a local jurisdiction. Several airport respondents and
interviewees stated they would like better guidance on performing a THIRA in the airport
environment and further understand how it can complement the AEP.
• Collaborating, coordinating, and communicating with local and state EM agencies.
To develop actionable annexes and plans to support aircraft accidents, airports discussed
the need to actively engage with local and state EM agencies. Further research would identify
how those relationships support the airport community, how airports go about building
relationships, who they build relationships with, and why it is important to build the
relationships, especially during response and recovery efforts. Furthermore, the research
would help local jurisdictions understand how to respond to an airport, what to do, and
how best to support them during an emergency.
• Identifying the types of EM training staff at airports should take (developing a training
matrix for staff ). Training can include ICS, airport- or aviation-specific training, EOC
training, or new training such as active shooter or terminal evacuation training. Synthesizing
this data would allow airport EMs to identify various training and what staff would need
it to standardize across airports.
• Identifying AAR processes used by airports after exercises, incidents, and events; develop-
ing a process and format for airports to conduct AARs and IPs. Although HSEEP is a widely
accepted format for developing AARs, many airports may use other formats. There is a need
to educate airports on how to write an AAR, track improvements, and incorporate these
into the AEP.
• Understanding the various airport EOC structures at airports. Airports may or may not
have an EOC. If an airport has an EOC, the organizational structure may vary. Research sug-
gests that identifying what organizational structures are used and who staffs those positions
will provide value to airport EM programs.

Glossary of Terms
After-action report A document intended to capture observations of an exercise and make

recommendations for postexercise improvements. The final after-action report and improve-
ment plan are printed and distributed jointly as a single after-action report/improvement plan
following an exercise. See after-action report/improvement plan.
After-action report/improvement plan The main product of the evaluation and improve-
ment planning process. The after-action report/improvement plan has two components:
An after-action report, which captures observations of an exercise and makes recommendations
for postexercise improvements; and an improvement plan, which identifies specific corrective
actions, assigns them to responsible parties, and establishes targets for their completion.
Airport emergency plan The airport emergency plan addresses essential emergency-related
and deliberate actions planned to ensure the safety of and emergency services for the airport
populace and the community in which the airport is located.
Airport operating certificate Generally, airports in any state of the United States, the
District of Columbia, or any territory or possession of the United States serving passenger-
carrying operations of an air carrier certificated under 14 CFR, part 121 and 14 CFR, part 380
must hold airport operating certificates if (1) scheduled passenger-carrying operations are
conducted in aircraft designed for more than nine passenger seats, and (2) unscheduled passenger-
carrying operations are conducted in aircraft designed for at least 31 passenger seats.
All-hazards Natural, technological, or human-caused incidents that warrant action to

protect life, property, environment, and public health or safety, and to minimize disruptions.
Americans with Disabilities Act and Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act
A civil rights law that was originally passed by Congress in 1990 (as the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act) and protects individuals with disabilities from discrimination in the workplace
and other settings. A disability is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities; the person has a record of such an impairment; and the
person is regarded as having such an impairment (28 Code of Federal Regulations, sec. 36.104).
Apoplectic Overcome with anger; extremely indignant.
Appendix A supporting document such as a list of acronyms, a copy of statutes, or a map

that provides additional guidance and references for planning.
Bifurcate To divide into two branches or parts.
Command The act of directing, ordering, or controlling by virtue of explicit statutory,

regulatory, or delegated authority.
67

Common procedures Standardized, specific actions for staff to take in response to a variety
of hazards, threats, or incidents. Examples include evacuation, shelter-in-place, and family
reunification.
Common terminology Standardized words and phrases used to ensure consistency while
allowing diverse incident management and support organizations to work together across a
wide variety of incident management functions and hazard scenarios.
Communication, airport emergency plan A section of the basic plan that refers to the
internal and external strategies and tools to communicate with stakeholders in the event of
an emergency or incident.
Community A political entity that has the authority to adopt and enforce laws and ordi-
nances for the area under its jurisdiction. In most cases, the community is an incorporated town,
city, township, village, or unincorporated area of a county; however, each state defines its own
political subdivisions and forms of government.
Community hazards Natural, technological, or human-caused hazards in the community
that affect the airport both directly, such as damage to the airport facilities, and indirectly, such
as making a road to the airport impassible.
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 A guide designed to assist jurisdictions with
developing emergency operations plans. It promotes a common understanding of the funda-
mentals of planning and decision making to help emergency planners examine a hazard and
produce integrated, coordinated, and synchronized plans.
Concept of operations A component of the basic plan that clarifies the airport’s overall
approach to an emergency (i.e., what should happen, when, and at whose direction) and iden
tifies specialized response teams and/or innovative resources needed to respond to an incident.
Continuity of operations A functional annex providing procedures to follow in the wake
of an incident where the normal operations of the airport are severely disrupted.
Coordinate/coordination See incident coordination.
Critical infrastructure Assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital
to the United States that the incapacitation or destruction of such assets, systems, or networks
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health
or safety, or any combination of those matters.
Cross-walk/-walked To review two or more standards of operation, plans, annexes, and
so forth, to ensure the documents are deconflicted and complementary to the other; may also
include ensuring information is not duplicated in either document(s).
Direction, control, and coordination A component of the basic plan that outlines the
coordination efforts between airports and local fire, law enforcement, and emergency managers.
This section includes information on how the airport emergency plan fits into the airport and
community emergency operations plans.
Emergency Any incident, whether natural, technological, or human-caused, that requires
responsive action to protect life or property. Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, an emergency means any occasion or instance for which, in the
determination of the president, federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local
efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or
to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.
Emergency management/response personnel Includes federal, state, territorial, tribal,
substate regional, and local governments; nongovernmental and private sector organizations;

Glossary of Terms 69
critical infrastructure owners and operators; and all other organizations and individuals
who assume an emergency management role. Also known as an emergency or first responder.
Emergency medical services Services, including personnel, facilities, and equipment
required to ensure proper medical care for the sick and injured from the time of injury to the
time of final disposition (which includes medical disposition within a hospital, temporary
medical facility, or special care facility; release from the site; or being declared dead). Emer-
gency medical services specifically include those services immediately required to ensure
proper medical care and specialized treatment for patients in a hospital and coordination of
related hospital services.
Emergency operations center The physical location at which the coordination of infor
mation and resources to support incident management (on-scene operations) activities normally
takes place. An emergency operations center may be a temporary facility or may be located
in a more central or permanently established facility, perhaps at a higher level of organization
within a jurisdiction. EOCs may be organized by major functional disciplines (e.g., fire, law
enforcement, medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., federal, state, regional, tribal, city, county),
or by some combination thereof.
Emergency operations plan An ongoing plan for responding to a wide variety of potential
hazards. An emergency operations plan describes how people and property will be protected;
details who is responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equip-
ment, facilities, supplies, and other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be
coordinated.
Emergency support functions Emergency support functions provide the structure for
coordinating federal interagency support for a federal response to an incident. They are
mechanisms for grouping functions most frequently used to provide federal support to states
and federal-to-federal support, both for declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford
Act and for non–Stafford Act incidents.
Evacuation The organized, phased, and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of
personnel and visitors from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas.
Exercise An instrument to train for, assess, practice, and improve performance in preven-
tion, protection, response, and recovery capabilities in a risk-free environment. Exercises can
be used for testing and validating policies, plans, procedures, training, equipment, and inter
agency agreements; clarifying and training personnel in roles and responsibilities; improving
interagency coordination and communications; identifying gaps in resources; improving
individual performance; and identifying opportunities for improvement. Note: Exercises are
also an excellent way to demonstrate airports’ resolve to prepare for disastrous events.
Federal Of or pertaining to the federal government of the United States of America.
First responder See emergency management/response personnel.
Full-scale exercise A multiagency, multijurisdictional, operations-based exercise involving
actual deployment of resources in a coordinated response as if a real incident had occurred.
A full-scale exercise tests many components of one or more capabilities within emergency
response and recovery and is typically used to assess plans and procedures under crisis con
ditions and assess coordinated response under crisis conditions. Characteristics of a full-scale
exercise include mobilized units, personnel, and equipment; a stressful, realistic environment;
and scripted exercise scenarios.
Functional annexes Individual chapters in an emergency operations plan that focus
on procedures such as special needs or continuity of operations. These annexes address

all-hazards critical operational functions and describe the actions, roles, and responsibilities
of airports and participating organizations. In some plans, functional annexes are referred to
as emergency support functions.
Functional exercise A single- or multiagency operations-based exercise designed to
evaluate capabilities and multiple functions using a simulated response. Characteristics of a
functional exercise include simulated deployment of resources and personnel, rapid problem
solving, and a highly stressful environment.
Group An organizational subdivision established to divide the incident management
structure into functional areas of operation.
Hazard Something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an
unwanted outcome.
Hazard-specific annexes Individual chapters in an emergency operations plan that
describe strategies for managing missions for a specific hazard. They explain the procedures
that are innovative to that annex for a hazard type and may be short or long depending on
the details needed to explain the actions, roles, and responsibilities. The information in these
annexes is not repeated elsewhere in the plan.
Hazardous material Any substance or material that, when involved in an accident and
released in sufficient quantities, poses a risk to people’s health, safety, and/or property. These
substances and materials include explosives, radioactive materials, flammable liquids or solids,
combustible liquids or solids, poisons, oxidizers, toxins, and corrosive materials.
Holistic Characterized by comprehension of the parts of something as intimately inter
connected and explicable only by reference to the whole.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program A capabilities- and performance-
based exercise program that provides standardized policy, doctrine, and terminology for
designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating homeland security exercises.
Hotwash A facilitated discussion held immediately following an exercise among exercise
players from each functional area that is designed to capture feedback about any issues,
concerns, or proposed improvements players may have about the exercise. The hotwash is
an opportunity for players to voice their opinions on the exercise and their own performance.
This facilitated meeting allows players to participate in a self-assessment of the exercise play
and provides a general assessment of how the jurisdiction performed in the exercise. At this
time, evaluators can also seek clarification on certain actions and what prompted players to
take them. Evaluators should take notes during the hotwash and include these observations
in their analysis. The hotwash should last no more than 30 minutes. Synonym: De-brief
Human-caused hazards Hazards that rise from deliberate, intentional human actions to
threaten or harm the well-being of others. Examples include school violence, terrorist acts,
or sabotage.
Improvement plan For each task, the improvement plan lists the corrective actions that will
be taken, the responsible party or agency, and the expected completion date. The improvement
plan is included at the end of the after-action report. See after-action report/improvement plan.
Incident An occurrence, natural or human-caused, that requires a response to protect
life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist
attacks, terrorist threats, civil unrest, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials
spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms,
tsunamis, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other occurrences
requiring an emergency response.

Incident action plan A document outlining the control objectives, operational period
objectives, and response strategy defined by incident command during response planning.
Incident command The incident command system’s organizational element responsible
for overall management of the incident and consisting of the incident commander (either
single or unified command structure) and any assigned supporting staff.
Incident commander The individual responsible for all incident activities, including the
development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and release of resources. The incident
commander has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations and
is responsible for the management of all incident operations at the incident site.
Incident command post The field location where the primary functions are performed.
The incident command post may be co-located with the incident base or other incident facilities.
Incident command system A standardized on-scene emergency management construct
specifically designed to provide an integrated organizational structure that reflects the com-
plexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional
boundaries. An incident command system is the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel,
procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure, designed
to aid in managing resources during incidents. An incident command system is used for all
kinds of emergencies and is applicable to small as well as large and complex incidents. Incident
command systems are used by various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and
private, to organize field-level incident management operations.
Incident coordination The activities that ensure the on-site incident-command-system
organization receives information, resources, and support needed to achieve incident objectives.
Incident management The broad spectrum of activities and organizations providing
effective and efficient operations, coordination, and support applied at all levels of government,
using both governmental and nongovernmental resources to plan for, respond to, and recover
from an incident, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.
Incident management functions Prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, and
recovery activities that occur in advance of an incident, during an incident, and/or following
an incident.
Index The index of an airport is determined by a combination of (1) the length of air
carrier aircraft and (2) average daily departures of air carrier aircraft. For the purpose of index
determination, air-carrier-aircraft lengths are grouped as follows: (1) Index A includes aircraft
less than 90 feet in length; (2) Index B includes aircraft at least 90 feet but less than 126 feet in
length; (3) Index C includes aircraft at least 126 feet but less than 159 feet in length; (4) Index
D includes aircraft at least 159 feet but less than 200 feet in length; and (5) Index E includes
aircraft at least 200 feet in length. The index determines the required number of aircraft rescue
and firefighting vehicles and required amount of extinguishing agents.
Introduction, airport emergency plan A component of the basic plan that provides a
rationale for the airport emergency plan.
Jurisdiction A range or sphere of authority. Public agencies have jurisdiction at an inci-
dent related to their legal responsibilities and authority. Jurisdictional authority at an incident
can be political or geographical (e.g., federal, state, tribal, local boundary lines) or functional
(e.g., law enforcement, public health, school).
Lessons learned Learning gained from the process of performing the activity (i.e., exercis-
ing or responding to incidents and events). Formally conducted lessons-learned sessions are
traditionally held after an exercise, incident, or event, or near the completion of the incident or

event. However, lessons learned may be identified and documented at any point during the life
cycle. The purpose of documenting lessons learned is to share and use knowledge derived from
experience to promote the recurrence of desirable outcomes; and/or preclude the recurrence
of undesirable outcomes. As a practice, lessons learned includes the processes necessary for
identifying, documenting, validating, and disseminating lessons learned. Utilization and
incorporation of those processes includes identifying applicable lessons learned, documenting
lessons learned, archiving lessons learned, distributing to appropriate personnel, identifying
actions that will be taken as a result of the lesson learned, and follow-up to ensure that appro-
priate actions were taken.
Likert scale A type of rating scale used to measure attitudes or opinions. With this scale,
respondents are asked to rate items on a level of agreement.
Local government Public entities responsible for the security and welfare of a designated
area as established by law. A county, municipality, city, town, township, local public authority,
school district, special district, intrastate district, council of governments (regardless of whether
the council of governments is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under state law), regional
or interstate government entity, or agency or instrumentality of a local government; an Indian
tribe or authorized tribal entity, or, in Alaska, a Native Village or Alaska Regional Native Corpo-
ration; or a rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity.
Logistics The process and procedure for providing resources and other services to support
incident management.
Mass care Actions taken to protect evacuees and other disaster victims from the effects of
the disaster. Activities include providing temporary shelter, food, medical care, clothing, and
other essential life support needs to the people who have been displaced because of a disaster
or threatened disaster.
Mitigation Includes activities to reduce the loss of life and property from natural and/or
human-caused disasters by avoiding or lessening the impact of a disaster and providing value
to the public by creating safer communities. Mitigation seeks to fix the cycle of disaster damage,
reconstruction, and repeated damage. These activities or actions, in most cases, will have a
long-term sustained effect. Examples: structural changes to buildings, elevating utilities, bracing
and locking chemical cabinets, properly mounting lighting fixtures, ceiling systems, cutting
vegetation to reduce wildland fires, and so forth.
Multiagency coordination system A system that provides the architecture to support
coordination for incident prioritization, critical resource allocation, communications systems
integration, and information coordination. Multiagency coordination systems assist agencies
and organizations responding to an incident. The elements of a multiagency coordination system
include facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications. Two of the most
commonly used elements are emergency operations centers and multiagency coordination
system groups.
Multijurisdictional incident An incident requiring action from multiple agencies that each
have jurisdiction to manage certain aspects of an incident. In the incident command system, these
incidents are managed under unified command.
Multiyear training and exercise plan A multiyear plan providing a mechanism for long-
term coordination of training and exercise activities toward an airport’s preparedness goals.
This plan describes the program’s training and exercise priorities and associated capabilities,
and aids in employing the building-block approach for training and exercise activities.
National Incident Management System A set of principles that provides a systematic,
proactive approach guiding government agencies at all levels, nongovernmental organizations,

and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from,
and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order
to reduce the loss of life or property and harm to the environment.
National Response Framework A guide establishing a comprehensive, national, all-hazards
approach to domestic incident response. It intends to capture specific authorities and best
practices for managing incidents ranging from the serious but purely local, to large-scale
terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters.
Natural hazard Hazard related to weather patterns and/or physical characteristics of an
area. Often, natural hazards occur repeatedly in the same geographical locations.
Neighborhood hazard Natural, technological, or human-caused hazards occurring in
neighborhoods immediately surrounding the airport.
Nongovernmental organization An entity with an association that is based on the interests
of its members, individuals, or institutions. It is not created by a government, but it may
work cooperatively with government. Such organizations serve a public purpose, not a private
benefit. Examples of nongovernmental organizations include faith-based charity organizations
and the American Red Cross. Nongovernmental organizations, including voluntary and faith-
based groups, provide relief services to sustain life, reduce physical and emotional distress, and
promote the recovery of disaster victims. Often, these groups provide specialized services that
help individuals with disabilities. Nongovernmental organizations and voluntary organizations
play a major role in assisting emergency managers before, during, and after an emergency.
Objective A thing aimed at or sought; a goal.
Operations-based exercises Operations-based exercises are characterized by actual response,
mobilization of apparatus and resources, and commitment of personnel, usually held over an
extended period of time. Operations-based exercises can be used to validate plans, policies,
agreements, and procedures and include drills, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises.
They can clarify roles and responsibilities, identify gaps in resources needed to implement
plans and procedures, and improve individual and team performance.
Physical recovery A component of the continuity-of-operations annex outlining possible
relocation areas for administrative operations as well as plans to restore transportation and
food services; operations equipment and materials; and airport facilities and grounds after an
incident.
Plan development The process of generating and comparing possible solutions for
achieving goals and objectives, determining response and recovery capabilities, and identifying
resource gaps.
Plan development and maintenance A component of the basic plan that outlines
responsibilities for updating and maintaining the airport emergency plan. This section includes
a schedule for testing, reviewing, and updating the airport emergency plan.
Planning team A group of individuals with a variety of expertise and perspectives who plan
for all hazards.
Policy group A group of administrators or executives or their appointed representatives
who are typically authorized to commit agency resources and funds. Also called a multiagency
coordination group, a policy group can provide coordinated decision making and resource allo-
cation among cooperating agencies and may establish the priorities among incidents, harmonize
agency policies, and provide strategic guidance and direction to support incident management
activities. Policy groups may also be known as multiagency committees or emergency manage-
ment committees, or as otherwise defined by the multiagency coordination system.

Preparedness A continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising,

evaluating, and taking corrective action to ensure effective coordination during incident response.
Within the National Incident Management System, preparedness focuses on the following
elements: planning, procedures and protocols, training and exercises, personnel qualification
and certification, and equipment certification.
Prevention Actions to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring.
Prevention involves actions to protect lives and property.
Procedure A series of standard actions or operations that specify what airport personnel
should do in responding to and recovering from an incident.
Protected classes A group of people with a common characteristic who are legally protected
from employment discrimination based on that characteristic. Protected classes are created
by both federal and state law. Federal protected classes include race, color, religion or creed,
national origin or ancestry, sex, age, physical or mental disability, veteran status, genetic infor-
mation, or citizenship.
Public information Processes, procedures, and systems for communicating timely, accu-
rate, and accessible information on an incident’s cause, size, and current situation; resources
committed; and other matters of general interest to the public, responders, and additional
stakeholders (both directly affected and indirectly affected).
Public information officer A member of the command staff who serves as the conduit for
information to internal and external stakeholders, including the media or other organizations
seeking information directly from the incident or event.
Recovery Encompasses both short-term and long-term efforts for the rebuilding and
revitalization of affected communities. Examples: short-term recovery focuses on crisis
counseling and restoration of lifelines such as water and electric supply and critical facilities.
Long-term recovery includes more permanent rebuilding.
Recovery plan A plan developed to restore an affected area or community.
Resources Personnel and major items of equipment, supplies, and facilities available or
potentially available for assignment to incident operations and for which status is maintained.
Resources are described by kind and type and may be used in operational support or supervisory
capacities at an incident or at an emergency operations center.
Response Activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response
includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs.
Response also includes executing emergency operations plans and mitigation activities designed
to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and other unfavorable outcomes.
Shelter-in-place An official order, issued during an emergency, that directs people to stay
in the indoor place or building that they already occupy and not to leave unless absolutely
necessary.
Socialize The adoption of the behavior patterns of the surrounding culture specifically for
the response to an incident; to introduce acceptable response and actions to a group of agencies
that must work together to respond to an event.
Special needs population A population whose members may have additional needs before,
during, and after an incident in functional areas, including but not limited to maintaining
independence, communication, transportation, supervision, and medical care. Individuals in
need of additional response assistance may include those who have disabilities, who are from
diverse cultures, who have limited English proficiency, who are non-English-speaking, or who
are transportation disadvantaged.

Stakeholder A person with an interest or concern in something.

Structural Any component of the building whose primary function is to support the dead
load (e.g., building, roof).
Successful practice A technique or methodology that, through experience and research,
has proven to reliably lead to a desired result. A commitment to using the best practices in any
field is a commitment to using all the knowledge and technology at one’s disposal to ensure
success.
Tabletop exercise A discussion-based exercise intended to stimulate discussion of various
issues regarding a hypothetical situation. Tabletop exercises can be used to assess plans, policies,
and procedures or to assess types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, response to,
or recovery from a defined incident. TTXs are typically aimed at facilitating understanding of
concepts, identifying strengths and shortfalls, and/or achieving a change in attitude. Participants
are encouraged to discuss issues in depth and develop decisions through slow-paced problem
solving rather than the rapid, spontaneous decision making that occurs under actual or simu-
lated emergency conditions. Tabletop exercises can be breakout (i.e., groups split into functional
areas) or plenary (i.e., one large group).
Technological hazard These hazards originate from technological or industrial accidents,
infrastructure failures, or certain human activities. These hazards cause the loss of life or injury,
property damage, social and economic disruption, or environmental degradation, and often
come with little to no warning.
Terrorism As defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, activity that involves an
act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key
resources; is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other sub-
division of the United States; and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect
the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.
Threat Natural, technological, or human-caused occurrence or action that has or indicates
the potential to harm life, operations, the environment, and/or property.
Triennial An exercise that occurs every 3 years.
Unified command In incidents involving multiple jurisdictions, a single jurisdiction with
multiagency involvement, or multiple jurisdictions with multiagency involvement, unified
command allows agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional authorities and
responsibilities to work together effectively without affecting individual agency authority,
responsibility, or accountability.
Warning The alerting of emergency response personnel and the public to the threat of
extraordinary danger and the related effects that specific hazards may cause. A warning issued
by the National Weather Service (e.g., severe storm warning, tornado warning, tropical storm
warning) for a defined area indicates that the particular type of severe weather is imminent in
that area.
Watch Indication by the National Weather Service that in a defined area, conditions are
favorable for the specified type of severe weather, such as flash floods, severe thunderstorms,
tornadoes, and tropical storms.
Weighted average An average resulting from the multiplication of each component by a
factor reflecting its importance.

Acronyms and Abbreviations
AAAE American Association of Airport Executives

AAR after-action report
AC Advisory Circular
ADA Americans with Disabilities Act
AEP airport emergency plan
AOC airport operating certificate
AOP airport operating procedure
ARFF aircraft rescue and firefighting
ASF airport support function
ATCT air traffic control tower
AWARE Airport Weather Advanced Readiness
BCP business continuity plan
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (materials)
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CEM comprehensive emergency management
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CONOPS concept of operations
COO chief operating officer
COOP continuity of operations plan
DAFN disabilities, access, and functional needs
DHS Department of Homeland Security
EAP emergency action plan
EM emergency management
EMC emergency management coordinator
EMS emergency medical services
EOC emergency operations center
EOP emergency operations plan
ESF Emergency Support Function
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBO fixed-base operator
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FERC FLL Emergency Response Coalition
FOG field operation guide
FSDO Flight Standards District Office
FSE full-scale exercise
GA general aviation
76

Acronyms and Abbreviations 77
HAVEN Helping All Victims of Emergency in Need

HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICP incident command post
ICS incident command system
IP improvement plan
IROPS irregular operations
IT information technology
LEO law enforcement officer
LOA letter of agreement
MCI mass casualty incident
MOU memorandum of understanding
NIMS National Incident Management System
NPIAS National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems
NRF National Response Framework
NRP National Response Plan
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
POC point of contact
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
ROI return on investment
SME subject matter expert
SMFR South Metro Fire and Rescue
SMS Safety Management System
SOG standard operating guideline
SOP standard operating procedure
SSI sensitive security information
SW Southwest
THIRA threat and hazard identification and risk assessment
TIRP terminal incident response plan
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TTX tabletop exercise
UAS unmanned aerial system
VHF very high frequency
WebEOC Web Emergency Operations Center
WESTDOG Western Airports Disaster Operations Group

Airport Codes
21D Lake Elmo Airport

ANE Blaine Airport
APA Centennial Airport
APF Naples Airport
ASE Aspen/Pitkin County Airport
ATL Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport
AUS Austin-Bergstrom International Airport
AVL Asheville Regional Airport
BOI Boise Airport
BUR Hollywood Burbank Airport
BVU Boulder City Municipal Airport
BWI Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport
CLE Cleveland Hopkins International Airport
CLT Charlotte Douglas International Airport
CVG Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport
DCA Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
DEN Denver International Airport
DFW Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport
DQR Peach Springs Airport
DTW Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport
DUT Dutch Harbor/Unalaska
EFD Ellington Airport
FAI Fairbanks International Airport
FCM Flying Cloud Airport
FLL Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport
FWA Fort Wayne International Airport
GCN Grand Canyon National Park Airport
GEG Spokane International Airport
HAS Houston Airport System
HEG Herlong Recreational Airport
HND Henderson Executive Airport
HNL Daniel K. Inouye International Airport
HOU William P. Hobby Airport
IAD Washington Dulles International Airport
IAH George Bush Intercontinental Airport
IND Indianapolis International Airport
JAX Jacksonville International Airport
LAS McCarran International Airport
78

Airport Codes 79
LAX Los Angeles International Airport

LVN Airlake Airport
MCO Orlando International Airport
MDW Chicago Midway International Airport
MEM Memphis International Airport
MIC Crystal Airport
MSP Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport
OAK Oakland International Airport
OL7 Jean Sport Aviation Center
ORD Chicago O’Hare International Airport
PDX Portland International Airport
PHL Philadelphia International Airport
PHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport
PIT Pittsburgh International Airport
RDU Raleigh-Durham International Airport
RNO Reno-Tahoe International Airport
SAN San Diego International Airport
SAV Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport
SBH Gustaf III Airport
SDF Louisville International Airport
SEA Seattle-Tacoma International Airport
SFO San Francisco International Airport
SIT Sitka Rocky Gutierrez Airport
SNA John Wayne Airport–Orange County
STP St. Paul Downtown Airport
TPA Tampa International Airport
TUL Tulsa International Airport—R. L. Jones, Jr. Airport
TYS McGhee Tyson Airport
UO8 Perkins Field (also known as Overton Municipal Airport)
VGT North Las Vegas Airport
VQQ Cecil Airport and Spaceport
VUO Pearson Field Airport

APPENDIX A
References and Bibliography
References
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Corzine, S., et al. ACRP 04-19 Final Project Report: Airport Emergency Planning Template: NIMS—Incident
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Federal Aviation Administration. Airport Emergency Plan (FAA-150/5200-31A). Washington, D.C., 1999.
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Academies, Washington, D.C., 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.trb.org/ACRP/ACRPReport160.aspx.
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D.C., 2019.
Kleinschmidt, T., A. Goonetilleke, C. B. Fookes, and P. K. D. V. Yarlagadda. A Multi-Disciplinary Approach for the
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and Industrial Engineering, Vol. 8, No. 8, 2014. Retrieved from: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/70ca/
a52a3edf57bc068cb3a0d0a3c71fd502d565.pdf.
Massidda, A., S. Mattingly, and S. Satyamurti. Addressing IROPS Diversion-Related Extended Delay Events
Through a Coordinated Regional Airports/Airlines Diversion Network. Presented at 90th Annual Meeting
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National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Airport Emergency Planning Template:
NIMS–Incident Command System Compliance. The National Academies Press, The National Academies
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National Transportation Safety Board. Safety Recommendation A-86-090. Washington, D.C., 1986. Retrieved
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A-86-090.
Smith, J. F., R. E. Garcia, J. M. Sawyer, and K. A. Kenville. ACRP Synthesis 72: Tabletop and Full-Scale Emergency
Exercises for General Aviation, Non-Hub, and Small Hub Airports. Transportation Research Board of the
National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2016.
Smith, J. F., K. Kenville, and J. M. Sawyer. ACRP Synthesis 60: Airport Emergency Post-Event Recovery Practices.
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www.nap.edu/catalog/22151/airport-emergency-post-event-recovery-practices.
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Smith, J. F., K. Kenville, J. M. Sawyer, and R. E. Garcia. ACRP Synthesis 73: Emergency Communications Planning
for Airports. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2016. Retrieved
from: https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23591/emergency-communications-planning-for-airports.
Stambaugh, H., D. Sensenig, T. Copping, M. Argabright, J. Ockershausen, and L. Spencer. ACRP Report 12: An
Airport Guide for Regional Emergency Planning for CBRNE Events. Transportation Research Board of the
Title 49 CFR §1542.307. Airport Security, Section 307 Incident Management [Online]. Available: https://www.
law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/49/1542.307.
Title 49 CFR §1542. Airport Security, Title 49 CFR 1542. Airport Security, N.D. Retrieved from: https://www.
law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/49/part-1542.
University of Minnesota. Emergency Guidebook for General Aviation Airports, Minnesota Airport Technical
Assistance Program (AirTAP). Center for Transportation Studies, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN,
2005–2020. Retrieved from: http://www.airtap.umn.edu/publications/factsheets/documents/emergency_
guidebook.pdf.
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zations, Programs, Guidance, and Legislation. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emmitsburg, Md.,
2008.
Blanchard, B. W. Principles of Emergency Management and Supplement. Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Emmitsburg, Md., 2007.
Corzine, S. ACRP Report 93: Operational and Business Continuity Planning for Prolonged Airport Disruptions.
Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2013, pp. 146.
Deal, T., M. de Bettencourt, V. Huyck, G. Merrick, and C. Mills. ICS: Beyond Initial Response— Using the National
Incident Management System’s Incident Command System. Authorhouse, Bloomington, Ind., 2006.
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Federal Aviation Administration. Airport Emergency Plan (FAA-150/5200-31). Washington, D.C., 1989.
Fort Lauderdale City Commission, Press Play Fort Lauderdale Our City, Our Strategic Plan 2018. Fort Lauderdale,
Fla., 2018. Retrieved from: http://www.fortlauderdale.gov/home/showdocument?id=4642.
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport. Active Shooter Incident and Post-Event Response January 6,
2017, After-Action Report, August 15, 2017. Retrieved from: http://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/09/Ft.-Lauderdale-Hollywood-International-Airport-AAR.pdf.
IEM, Smith-Woolwine Associates, Inc., Kim Kenville Consulting, Newton and Associates, Inc., and Kimley-
Horn and Associates, Inc. ACRP Report 94: Integrating Web-Based Emergency Management Collaboration
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IEM, Inc., Smith-Woolwine Associates, Inc., and TransSolutions, LLC. ACRP Report 73: Airport-to-Airport
Mutual Aid Programs. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2012.
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https://www.lawa.org/-/media/lawa-web/projects-and-reports/lawa-t3-after-action-report-march-18-
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Incident Command System Compliance, ACRP Project 04-19. The National Academies Press, Washington,
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NIMS for Personnel and Resources at Airports. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies,
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ment Agency, Washington, D.C., 2013.
United States Department of Homeland Security. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101. Federal Emergency
Management Agency, Washington, D.C., 2010.

APPENDIX B
Annotated Bibliography
A review of the literature referenced provides background information for the synthesis.
Keywords used were transportation emergency plan; airport emergency plan; business
continuity plan; continuity of operations; and irregular operations (IROPS).
Addressing Significant Weather Impacts on Airports: Quick Start Guide and Toolkit
This report provides a toolkit that raises airport operator awareness about
vulnerabilities caused by significant weather events and helps airports develop more
robust contingency and recovery plans, in addition to their airport emergency plans.
This toolkit focuses on events that are “rare but plausible”; that is, events that may have
happened in the distant past, or in adjacent geographic areas, but are not common
event types at the airport itself, and therefore may not be in the forefront of the airport
managers’ minds. Development of the toolkit, Airport Weather Advanced Readiness
(AWARE), is based on a review of the historical weather data and impacts, as well as
best practices and lessons learned from airports’ responses to recent significant
weather events. This toolkit will assist airports of various types and sizes and their
stakeholders in effectively planning for, responding to, and recovering from significant
weather events. The Excel-based AWARE Toolkit first helps airports identify significant
weather event types that airports may wish to prepare for, drawing on historical
weather data relevant to the airport’s specific location. AWARE also contains seven
readiness modules that allow users to review best practices for preparing for these
different weather events, assess their readiness for those events, and generate
customized checklists for preparing for and recovering from weather events. The seven
modules are Administration & Finance, Planning & Environment, Airfield Operations,
Terminal Operations, Ground Transportation & Parking, Safety & Security, and a
consolidated streamlined version of the full toolkit for Small Airports. The toolkit also
contains the Impacts Tracking Module—a tool to help airports track the costs and other
impacts of weather events (e.g., flight delays) over time as events occur. ACRP Report
160 contains a quick start guide for the toolkit, followed by a more in-depth user guide
and then case studies.
ICF International, Burrst, Inc., KRAMER aerotek, and S. Barrett. ACRP Report 160:
Addressing Significant Weather Impacts on Airports: Quick Start Guide
and Toolkit. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies,
http://www.trb.org/ACRP/ACRPReport160.aspx
83

Airport Emergency Communications for People with Disabilities and Others with Access and
Functional Needs
This report provides guidance and tools for airports to aid in effective communication
with passengers and persons with disabilities, including those with cultural and language
differences. The guidance incorporates a primer that discusses issues, techniques, and
the unique requirements and challenges of communicating with people with disabilities
and others who have access or functional needs. It discusses uses of technology and
other methods that incorporate Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) considerations and
communication challenges with airport stakeholders, and training programs for airport
personnel, including templates for development of curricula. There are case study
examples of methods of emergency communication at airports and in other industries,
and for universal messaging for emergency communications. Included are templates for
airport emergency plans specifically addressing individuals with limited English
proficiency, step-by-step tools that include a needs assessment tool that airports can
use to determine what steps must be taken to comply with ADA requirements
concerning communications, and templates/worksheets/checklists for planning tabletop
exercises that focus on communicating with people with disabilities and access or
functional needs during emergency events.
IEM, Inc. ACRP Research Report 201: Airport Emergency Communications for People
with Disabilities and Others with Access and Functional Needs. Transportation
Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2019.
https://apps.trb.org/cmsfeed/TRBNetProjectDisplay.asp?ProjectID=4244
Airport Emergency Post-Event Recovery Practices

Emergency management theory and practice has focused primarily on the top priority of
safety, especially for aircraft rescue and firefighting. As a result, while many studies and
plans address emergency preparedness, mitigation, and response at airports, on the
whole the recovery phase receives at best a cursory treatment. The objective of this
synthesis is to gather commonalities and effective practices from representative
commercial and general aviation (GA) airports regarding postevent recovery. The most
directly accessible part of this report is the list of effective postdisaster airport recovery
practices and lessons learned that was derived from interviews with 37 U.S. airports
regarding specific recovery efforts following incidents that completely or partially closed
the airport. The list, which ranges from broadly applicable practices to more detailed
items, is designed to assist airport managers and planners in the development and
implementation of recovery plans. The list appears as Appendix A to this report. In
addition to the list in Appendix A, four case examples of actual airport recovery
operations as they played out in real time illustrate the complex dynamics of the
recovery process, the challenges inherent in planning for unforeseen events, and the
need for creativity and strong leadership under duress. Together, the list and case
examples can help guide airport managers as they shape their own individual planning
process for recovery after a serious incident.

Annotated Bibliography 85
Smith, J. F., K. Kenville, and J. M. Sawyer. ACRP Synthesis 60: Airport Emergency Post-
Event Recovery Practices: A Synthesis of Airport Practice. Transportation
Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2015.
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/22151/airport-emergency-post-event-
recovery-practices
Emergency Guidebook for General Aviation Airports

GA airports are typically found in smaller communities and have limited resources for
staff, equipment, supplies, mutual aid resources, and training. Acknowledging this and
compensating for it in emergency preparedness planning is imperative for providing
essential services. Ultimately, it is the owner’s responsibility to ensure that an airport is
safe and well managed. Since most GA airports are publicly owned, that responsibility
typically falls on the city, county, or airport authority. This guidebook describes not only
how to prepare an emergency and security plan to protect the public, but also how to
maintain safety in the process. Ensuring airport safety ranges from performing simple
daily preventive maintenance to developing and conducting a full-scale emergency
exercise.
University of Minnesota. Emergency Guidebook for General Aviation Airports, Minnesota

Airport Technical Assistance Program (AirTAP). Minneapolis, MN: Center for
Transportation Studies, University of Minnesota, 2005–2020. Retrieved from:
http://www.airtap.umn.edu/publications/factsheets/documents/emergency_
guidebook.pdf
Airport Terminal Incident Response Planning

This report provides a scalable tool that airport operators, terminal managers,
emergency managers, and planners can use to create and maintain integrated incident
response plans that address hazards in and around airport terminals. The airport
terminal incident response plan (TIRP) tool (available on CRP-CD-151, which
accompanies this report) assists in the development of a response plan that, when
implemented, would mitigate the impact of these events on the terminal users. These
response plans cover natural and manmade incidents such as hurricanes, snowstorms,
tornadoes, earthquakes, structural fires, electrical outages/power failures, bomb threats,
security breaches, and active shooter situations for evacuation, sheltering in place,
relocation, and repopulation/recovery and are applicable to a variety of sizes and types
of airports and airport terminals. In addition to the TIRP tool, the report contains a
user’s guide that provides a step-by-step process of generating incident response plans.
The report also contains an output example that demonstrates completed TIRPs using
the TIRP tool.
Griffith, D., A. Moore, G. Bender, K. Ayodhirumanujan, N. Sayadi, J. Smith, A. Dodson, C.
White, J. Sawyer, J. Quinn, and K. Williams. ACRP Report 112: Airport Terminal
Incident Response Planning. Transportation Research Board of the National
Academies, Washington, D.C., 2014.
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/22333/airport-terminal-incident-response-planning

A Multidisciplinary Approach for the Design and Management of Airport Terminals

Multidisciplinary approaches to complex problems are becoming more common—they
enable criteria manifested in distinct (and potentially conflicting) domains to be jointly
balanced and satisfied. This paper presents airport terminals as a case study which
requires multidisciplinary knowledge in order to balance conflicting security, economic,
and passenger-driven needs and correspondingly enhance the design, management, and
operation of airport terminals. The need for a truly multidisciplinary scientific approach
which integrates information, process, people, technology, and space domains is
highlighted through a brief discussion of two challenges currently faced by airport
operators. The paper outlines the approach taken by this project, detailing the aims and
objectives of each of seven diverse research programs.
Kleinschmidt, T., A. Goonetilleke, C. B. Fookes, and P. K. D. V. Yarlagadda. A Multi-
Disciplinary Approach for the Design and Management of Airport Terminals.
In Proceedings of the Third International and Twenty-Fourth All India
Manufacturing Technology, Design and Research Conference 2010—Global
Trends and Challenges in Design and Manufacturing (B. Satyanarayana and
K. Ramji, eds.), AUCE (A), Andhra University, Visakhapatnam, India, 2010.
An Airport Director's Perspective on Disaster Planning and Mental Health Needs

The director of the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport describes the
responsibilities of major airports in disaster planning and response, including mental
health needs. He discusses the impact of changes in the industry on airports' disaster
plans, relevant Federal Aviation Administration regulations, and typical features of
airport disaster plans. The need for psychological services is underscored by experiences
in several recent crashes. Psychologists and other mental health professionals are urged
to respond to airport directors' requests for assistance in planning, as well as to be more
proactive in communities where these issues have yet to be addressed by airport
management. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved.)
Anderson, T. An Airport Director’s Perspective on Disaster Planning and Mental Health
Needs. American Psychologist, Vol. 43, No. 9, 1988, pp. 721-723.
https://psycnet.apa.org/buy/1989-06285-001
An Airport Guide for Regional Emergency Planning for CBRNE Events

This report addresses the details airports should cover in their hazard and threat
assessments and in their airport emergency plans (AEPs) and annexes so that response
to significant incidents can be more thoroughly and accurately planned. It also discusses
special issues involving terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or
explosive (CBRNE) materials targeted to airports, and the mutual aid that would be
drawn from beyond the immediate locale. The results of an airport survey on
preparedness and the highlights from selected AEPs are presented for consideration by
other airports. Also, federal emergency preparedness standards are compared to the
provisions of AEPs in general, with suggestions on priorities for upgrading AEPs to meet
those standards.

Stambaugh, H., D. Sensenig, T. Copping, M. Argabright, J. Ockershausen, and

L. Spencer. ACRP Report 12: An Airport Guide for Regional Emergency
Planning for CBRNE Events. Transportation Research Board of the National
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/14221/an-airport-guide-for-regional-emergency-
planning-for-cbrne-events
Aspect of Reliability in Airport Business Continuity Management

The paper presents the issue of ensuring the continuity of the operation at the airport.
Requirements and objectives relating to business continuity management have been
defined in accordance with the ISO 22301 international standard. A study of reliability
issues was conducted, and the function of the reliability and operational readiness of
the airport was defined. The paper presented the concept of using function of operational
readiness in the risk assessment for the continuity of the airport.
Kozłowski, M. Aspect of Reliability in Airport Business Continuity Management. Journal
of KONBiN, Vol. 3, No. 35, pp. 2915, November 2015. DOI: 10.1515/jok-2015-0038.
Continuity of Operations Planning for Small Airports

Business continuity planning is the process of developing a plan for operating essential
operational and business functions in the face of a disruption caused by any types of
emergencies, incidents, or events. The purpose of this study was to compile information
about current continuity planning practices at airports of different types and sizes and
determine how they can be effectively applied to smaller airports to maintain resilient
operational and business capacity during a disruption, regardless of cause. This study
was explicitly not about emergency response but addresses business continuity planning
for both emergency and nonemergency disruptions. This report is a companion to ACRP
Report 93: Operational and Business Continuity Planning for Prolonged Airport
Disruptions. This synthesis report identifies alternatives and effective approaches for
continuity planning at smaller airports. A variety of resources are identified in this report
that smaller airports can use to develop inexpensive, noncomplex but practical
continuity plans, business continuity plans, or continuity of operations plans.
Varma, A., S. Germolus, and D. Beaver. ACRP Synthesis 78: Continuity of Operations
Planning for Small Airports. Transportation Research Board of the National
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23675/continuity-of-operations-planning-for-
small-airports
Emergency Communications Planning for Airports

All airports are faced with the challenges of dealing with the flow of accurate
information during emergencies—flows within the airport’s organization, between the
airport and its response partners, and between the airport and the public, either directly

or through the media. Changing technology affects all these flows, and airports are
challenged to acquire and effectively use the technology. Many airports find benefits
from going beyond regulatory minima for communication plans. This is true of the
Federal Aviation Regulation part 139 airports as well as for the general aviation airports.
An effective communication plan enhances not only safety but also customer service.
The focus of the report is on emergency communications planning and is specifically
designed for use by airport senior management, public information officers, and first
responders and emergency managers. The report includes sample communication-plan
tables of contents, field operations guides, and the checklist of effective
communications plans. These materials were derived from a survey of 60 U.S. airports
regarding their specific communications plans and procedures as well as from five highly
detailed case examples and five additional focused interviews. The checklist is designed
to assist airport managers, emergency managers, and planners in the development,
implementation, and evaluation of effective communications plans or crisis
communications plans.
Smith, J. F., K. A. Kenville, J. M. Sawyer, and R. E. Garcia. ACRP Synthesis 73: Emergency
Communications Planning for Airports. Transportation Research Board of the
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23591/emergency-communications-planning-for-
airports
Establishing a Coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports

TRB's Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) Research Report 171: Establishing a
Coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports, provides guidance to airport
personnel when assisting victims and families affected by an aviation disaster. This
guidebook incorporates practices for planning an effective response while coordinating
with different partners. The guidance is adaptable to both general aviation and
commercial service airports of any size. The guidebook includes a description of key
terminology, federal regulatory and statutory requirements, history and background of
the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act, and development of a strategic plan for
creating and implementing a local-airport victim and family assistance program.
View the toolkit that includes customizable checklists and forms airports can use to
support their family assistance program, training courses that provide an overview of
the guidebook, and materials compliant with the Homeland Security Exercise and
Evaluation Program.
Warner-Bean, S., K. Jenkins, J. S. Miller, C. Parkins, and R. Hoaflund. ACRP Research
Report 171: Establishing a Coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for
Airports. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington,
D.C., 2017.
http://www.trb.org/ACRP/Blurbs/175605.aspx

Tabletop and Full-Scale Emergency Exercises for General Aviation, Non-Hub, and Small Hub
Airports
The focus of this report is on exercise practices that can be used by small airports; that
is, general aviation, reliever, nonhub, and small-hub airports. The report includes
sample exercise tools and plans, the checklist of effective practices for tabletop and full -
scale emergency exercises, and a road map for developing an effective exercise
program. The purpose is to enable the reader to “grab and go” from the ideas and
sample exercise materials derived from a survey of 58 U.S. airports regarding specific
exercise plans and procedures; and from six detailed case examples. The checklist is
designed to assist airport managers, emergency managers, and planners in the
development, implementation, and evaluation of effective exercise programs. Every
airport in the study, general aviation as well as FAA part 139, found benefits from going
beyond regulatory minima for training and exercises. Many reported that the exercise
guidance in the Department of Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
(HSEEP) provides the most effective model for exercises, but most of those airports
noted that extensive effort is required to prepare staff to use HSEEP and to adapt the
HSEEP materials to fit the airport environment. Most often, airports said that they have
received valuable assistance from local-government-agency partners in developing
exercises, particularly exercises using HSEEP templates and forms.
Smith, J. F., R. E. Garcia, J. M. Sawyer, and K. A. Kenville. ACRP Synthesis 72: Tabletop
and Full-Scale Emergency Exercises for General Aviation, Non-Hub, and
Small Hub Airports. Transportation Research Board of the National
http://www.trb.org/Publications/Blurbs/174692.aspx

APPENDIX C
SurveyMonkey (Online) Survey

Questions and Responses
The researchers conducted an online survey that was sent to airports and FAA inspectors
through FAA representatives. The 81 contacts represented 62 airports (26 large-hub, eight
medium-hub, 13 small-hub, three nonhub primary, six nonhub general aviation, and six nonhub
reliever). A total of 45 airports, or 72.58%, completed the survey.
The survey length averaged approximately 30 minutes, with 39 required questions, 28
nonrequired additional questions for a total of 67 questions. Once the required section of the
survey was complete, respondents were provided the option to answer further, in-depth
questions or to complete the survey. Respondents completed the entire survey, including
follow-on questions, in approximately 40 minutes.
The survey/interview questions and responses are below. The information included is as
provided by respondents with edits indicated for spelling or clarity of comment. No other
changes to respondents’ data have been made.
For this synthesis, the research team attempted to gather information from FAA inspectors. An
FAA representative used an official memo and specific survey link to provide to FAA inspectors.
The memo was provided to the FAA Union for the FAA inspectors and distributed accordingly.
FAA inspectors were informed the survey was anonymous with 10 questions to answer.
Unfortunately, during the 2 months the survey was open and available, no FAA inspectors
participated. No FAA inspectors participated in the survey, and no data was collected from this
group.
The following questions were included on the FAA inspector survey:
• Type of Organization?
• Which Department/Division/Office are you representing?
• What are the most common additional annexes seen from airports? (Please
separate answersby commas)
• What omissions have been seen that cause trouble?
• What types of successful practices that have been identified for development,
integration, stakeholder inclusion, and approval by the FAA have been seen
at airports?
90

SurveyMonkey (Online) Survey Questions and Responses 91
• What are the key reasons you do not approve an AEP? Are there common
discrepancies?Are there interpretive issues involved in evaluating an AEP? If so,
what are these?
• How can these pitfalls be avoided?
• Is there anything else you'd like to add?
• Please provide further information if you said "yes" to the previous question.
• If you have any documents you'd like to share, please upload here. If the upload link
does not work, please email to smurphy@tidalbasin.rphc.com or
brand@tidalbasin.rphc.com.
Table 6 lists the invited airports and their categories.

Table 6. Survey-Invited Airports and Associated Category Listing.
Airport Airport Category
Code
21D Minneapolis-Saint Paul Metropolitan Airports NP-R - Nonprimary-Reliever
Commission—Lake Elmo Airport
Alaska Alaska Department of Transportation (DOT) and All - Nonhub, Primary, and
Public Facilities Southcoast Region Hub/Nonprimary Airport
ANE Minneapolis-Saint Paul Metropolitan Airports NP-R - Nonprimary—Reliever
Commission-Anoka County–Blaine Airport
APA Centennial Airport NP-GA - Nonprimary—
General Aviation
APF Naples Airport NP-GA - Nonprimary—
General Aviation
ASE Aspen/Pitkin County Airport NH-P - Nonhub Primary
ATL Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport LH - Large Hub
AUS Austin-Bergstrom International Airport MH - Medium Hub
AVL Asheville Regional Airport SM - Small Hub
BOI Boise Airport SM - Small Hub
BUR Hollywood Burbank Airport MH - Medium Hub
BVU Boulder City Municipal Airport NP-GA - Nonprimary—
General Aviation
BWI Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood LH - Large Hub
Marshall Airport
CLE Cleveland Hopkins International Airport MH - Medium Hub
CLT Charlotte Douglas International Airport LH - Large Hub
CVG Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport LH - Large Hub
DCA Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority— LH - Large Hub
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
DEN Denver International Airport LH - Large Hub
DFW Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport LH - Large Hub
(continued on next page)


Code
DTW Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport LH - Large Hub
DUT Dutch Harbor/Unalaska SM - Small Hub
FAI Fairbanks International Airport SM - Small Hub
FCM Minneapolis-Saint Paul Metropolitan Airports NP-R - Nonprimary—Reliever
Commission—Flying Cloud Airport
FLL Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport LH - Large Hub
FWA Fort Wayne International Airport NH-P - Nonhub Primary
GEG Spokane International Airport SM - Small Hub
HEG Herlong Recreational Airport NP-GA - Nonprimary—
General Aviation
HNL Daniel K. Inouye International Airport LH - Large Hub
IAD Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority— LH - Large Hub
Washington Dulles International Airport
IAH George Bush Intercontinental Airport LH - Large Hub
IND Indianapolis International Airport MH - Medium Hub
JAX Jacksonville Aviation Authority—Jacksonville MH - Medium Hub
International Airport
LAS McCarran International Airport LH - Large Hub
LAX Los Angeles World Airports LH - Large Hub
LVN Minneapolis-Saint Paul Metropolitan Airports NP-R - Nonprimary—Reliever
Commission—Airlake Airport
MCO Orlando International Airport LH - Large Hub
MDW Chicago Midway International Airport LH - Large Hub
MEM Memphis International Airport MH - Medium Hub
MIC Minneapolis-Saint Paul Metropolitan Airports NP-R - Nonprimary—Reliever
Commission—Crystal Airport
MSP Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport LH - Large Hub
OAK Oakland International Airport LH - Large Hub
ORD Chicago O'Hare International Airport LH - Large Hub
PDX Portland International Airport SM - Small Hub
PHL Philadelphia International Airport LH - Large Hub
PHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport LH - Large Hub
PIT Pittsburgh International Airport LH - Large Hub
RDU Raleigh-Durham International Airport SM - Small Hub
RNO Reno-Tahoe International Airport SM - Small Hub
SAN San Diego International Airport LH - Large Hub


Code
SAT San Antonio International Airport SM - Small Hub
SAV Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport SM - Small Hub
SBH Gustaf III Airport SM - Small Hub
SDF Louisville International Airport MH - Medium Hub
SEA Seattle-Tacoma International Airport LH - Large Hub
SFO San Francisco International Airport LH - Large Hub
SIT Sitka Rocky Gutierrez Airport NH-P - Nonhub Primary
SNA John Wayne Airport–Orange County MH - Medium Hub
STP Minneapolis-Saint Paul Metropolitan Airports NP-R - Nonprimary—Reliever
Commission—St. Paul Downtown Airport
TPA Hillsborough County Aviation Authority—Tampa LH - Large Hub
International Airport
TUL Tulsa International Airport-R.L. Jones, Jr. Riverside SM - Small Hub
Airport
TYS McGhee Tyson Airport SM - Small Hub
VQQ Jacksonville Aviation Authority—Cecil Airport and NP-GA - Nonprimary—
Spaceport General Aviation
Other invited entities:

Federal Aviation Administration

The following are questions posed to the participants of the survey and the respective summaries
of responses.
Question 1.
Type of Organization
Answer Choices Responses
Airport 95.56%
FAA Inspector 0.00%
Other 4.44%
Question 2.
Which Department/Division/Office are you representing?
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Emergency Airport Risk Corporate Federal Other (please
Management Operations Management Aviation specify)
Administration
Responses
Other (please specify)

• Consultant
• Police & Fire
• ARFF
• Airport Safety, Security & Emergency Management

**Questions 3 through 10 are for Federal Aviation Administration representatives. The

questions can be found at the beginning of this appendix.
Question 11.
Rate the following statements from strongly disagree to strongly agree (0 being strongly
disagree and 5 being strongly agree).
Questions Average
The airport's AEP is actionable and sufficient enough to be a response document 3.13
for the airport.
I, my airport, and airport community use the AEP regularly. 2.85
The AEP provides adequate and actionable information to respond to and 3.03
recover from an incident.
I find the AEP to be generic and does not provide me or those who need to 3.41
respond [with] adequate information to do so.
I have to create and develop other hazard-specific plans that are complements 4.11
to the AEP to ensure airport personnel understands their roles.
The AEP contains all hazards that my airport could be threatened by. 2.46
I review lessons learned from other airport incidents and events and incorporate 4.08
lessons learned into my own AEP or preparedness plans.
There is one person solely dedicated to the AEP, its update, and ensuring all 3.13
airport preparedness plans are cross-walked with it.
I get active participation from all of the relevant stakeholders during the annual 3.15
AEP review and update process.
Updating the AEP is a challenge and does not provide any value added to our 2.92
response or recovery efforts.
The AEP checks a box and nothing more. 2.81
I incorporate the AEP into training and exercises beyond the required annual 3.67
training and triennial exercise.
The AEP can be improved. 4.66

Question 12.
What success have you had when developing or revising/updating the AEP?
• We have taken a cookie-cutter plan that made very little actual sense and custom-tailored
to our ACTUAL operation.
• One success was the airport contracted with an emergency management consultant with an
aviation background to rewrite the AEP to meet the June 2011 FAA deadline. The AEP is
very comprehensive and has the potential to be a useable document.
• Assigning each unit, the task of updating their area of responsibility.
• Implement change with growth at the airport.
• The AEP has not been updated since 2015. Before my time here at the airport. (Joined
airport 2016).
• Creates a process to identify best practices. The 2011 rewrite also forced the airport to look
more critically at checklists and procedures that were being added to the document.
• Dedicated scribes.
• Currently revising it now; using it as an opportunity to bring external stakeholders together
to discuss the AEP.
• The AEP is a limited document in that any material added above the AC-required elements
is accountable in an investigation.
• N/A. I/we are just beginning a major rewrite of the AEP and supplementary documents.
• Great feedback from stakeholders.
• The AEP revising and update cycle is cumbersome, esoteric, and bureaucratic, providing
little opportunity to flexibility.
• Police, Fire Rescue, and Airport Operations build a closer working relationship through the
review and updating process. They become fully invested in the document.
• Updating changes that were no longer viable.
• The biggest success has been our engagement with stakeholders. There is always a
willingness from our partners to assist with development and revisions.
• Engagement from stakeholders improves when ownership is explained.
• It now exists.
• Stakeholder cats need herding, so we start in Aug. FAA review is Jan./Feb., so this gives
enough time. It's always a balance between adding too much detail that becomes
reviewable by FAA, and/or duplicating operational/tactical plans, and keeping the content
relevant and actionable during an emergency. Suffice to say, all tactical/operational plans
get reconciled to ensure consistency w/AEP as the backbone—updated religiously, annually.

• Very little; we try not to revise it since the approval process is so cumbersome.
• Good cooperation from other departments to contribute.
• Acquiring updated tenant contact information to disseminate the AEP via electronic means.
• I have created a three-year cycle to include the AAR/IP from the Triennial exercise, the
thorough review and update to the AEP, and an update to the COOP plan.
• Since it is occasionally referenced for training/exercises by the EP manager, areas of editing
and updating are quickly identified.
• Collaborating with stakeholders.
• Good participation.
• Getting feedback from co-workers to make it more of a working document.
• The major success when updating our AEP is the collaboration of all of our stakeholders. I
ensure that each department/agency that has a role in the AEP is present for the discussion,
and that we solicit honest feedback from each regarding what the AEP says they will do
versus what they actually do. If the responses are not the same, we make changes to
the document.
• Not applicable.
• Additional input from Airport Stakeholders and not just emergency response organizations.
Question 13.
What challenges have you faced when developing or revising/updating your AEP?
• That we have to have an AEP and an EAP, one for state and one for FAA, and the two don't
have the same layouts or requirements.
• On the flip side of the answer to Question #4, the AEP is so comprehensive (basic plan,
functional sections, hazard-specific sections, field response and EOC response checklists)
that it is an overwhelming amount of information to absorb when responding and to
maintain. There is a significant amount of duplicated information to meet the FAA
regulatory requirement.
• Getting the units to provide timely responses.
• Trying to get our contracted tower onboard with current and changes to the plan.
• (1) Stakeholder participation; (2) when revisions are added, the airport is typically ready to
implement. It then takes an undetermined period of time for FAA to review andreturn.
• Understaffing.
• Coordination of stakeholders and expectations of the document from non-airport
stakeholders; AEP vs. municipal EOP.

• The FAA Certifiers are spread so thin, the turnaround time is long, so making "stamped"
published changes can lag behind mission requirements.
• The existing AEP is not user-friendly, voluminous, and currently contains contradictory or
outdated information.
• Getting ALL to actually read and review it.
• The template and process are archaic, thereby lacking the fluidity of our changing
landscape. Most of the partners apoplectic to the process and review.
• The transient nature of police and fire assignments causes a cycle of relationship building.
When you get to a good point, a new person comes in. Airlines also have varying degrees of
commitment to emergency preparedness.
• Putting everything in it to be documented while still being an asset for a guide.
• Most recently, we approached our Certification Inspector wanting to complete a full rewrite
of the AEP to make it a more useful document. The response we got was, because we were
compliant, we should just leave it alone.
• It is hard to get included in the process as the manager responsible does not allow or accept
input from coworkers/stakeholders.
• Too many sections in function annex that require review. Makes it challenging to track.
• Sufficient support from management to support full implementation of the plan beyond the
“it's written on paper” phase.
• Getting feedback timely from stakeholders—but they eventually comply with solid input.
Initial review processes when I arrived (4 years ago) were to remove tactical plans that were
out of date and also had no place in the AEP as an overarching all-hazards, multi-discipline
document.
• It's difficult to keep it up to date in a timely manner because the approval process takes so
much time. We tend to therefore hold updates and revisions until the end of the year,
ensuring it is NOT an actionable document. The format is also ridiculously stupid. It's
primarily focused on the airfield, not the terminals, where the majority of emergency
management issues arise. Why care about power failure in the movement area and not a
power failure at the terminals? Why are natural disasters a single section when the
response to a flood or earthquake is totally different? The required format is difficult to
work with and nonsensical.
• It is controlled by Airside Operations and a lot of it is not shared with other departments.
• Getting consistent policy/procedural updates/feedback from all levels and users of our
facility.
• Information is not usually presented in an actionable format.

• There is only one full AEP review per year by most stakeholders, which is not sufficient.
• Getting feedback from other stakeholders.
• Duplication of response protocols in other plans and then having to update both.
• Getting fringe departments to see its true need.
• The major challenge we face is keeping it relevant and useful. It is hard to do that because
you have to remain cognizant about what information you put in the document, since you
want it to be effective, but you also do not want to be held to a standard you will not be able
to attain, post-event.
• Inclusion of additional hazards that impact airports. AEP is airside focus and most
emergencies today are landside.
• Keeping the document broad in scope yet specific to various groups and stakeholders.
Question 14.
How do airports integrate the AEP with emergency response and recovery activities?
• We try to make our actionable plans that accurately reflect what we are trained, staffed,
and equipped to do, not imaginary plans that say they have things covered but it’s all a
papertiger.
• As with any new or updated procedure, policy, plan, checklist, the key is to continuously
train all stakeholders on the changes.
• Training and exercises.
• Tabletop exercises.
• We developed the Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) to serve as a guiding document to
assist in our emergency response and recovery of our operations. We use the Emergency
Management process to address our major business disruptions.
• Exercises and routine public safety meetings.
• The AEP and response activities should be the same.
• AEP is a higher-level document/information document; SOPs are the policies/procedures for
first responders.
• Currently, the AEP provides a loose framework (checklist) for response and recovery to
various incidents, mostly focused on the airside of the operation, not the terminal or
landside. This is the rub: A part 139 is only about airside and associated airside
activities/equipment; therefore, 90 percent of the AEP focuses on airside as if the rest of
the airport will never be involved in an incident.
• Primarily as a training aid and reference document. It may be partially used as a
confirmation checklist.

• During all emergencies, pull it out and reference it.

• We really don’t. We rely on other support emergency plans, policies, and procedures,
including hazards-specific plans, job aides, and emergency manuals.
• The AEP is available in responding vehicles. It provides a structure for various response and
recovery activities.
• After the fact.
• Honestly, the AEP remains on the shelf and we use other supporting documents to guide
response and recovery.
• Our plan is quite generic and mostly put together to check the box on the part 139
Inspection. It does not hold up past the initial response, and all follow-on actions are
improvised by the Incident Commander.
• I have not explicitly done this yet.
• A reference document that states “you respond and do your job.”
• If the AEP is reflective of individual dept.'s operational plans (which it is 98% that way, we
hope), responses parallel what is identified at a somewhat higher level in the AEP, but we
always use real-world responses to validate/update the AEP.
• We use it as a very high-level planning document.
• Very little is shared. The AEP and other emergency response plans are handled by two
different departments.
• The AEP is used as an overall guide to develop more detailed checklists and operating
guidelines.
• Looking for some best practices here.
• By first testing it with training and exercises, which include the hazard-specific plans, then
by identifying areas of concern and improving the response of those items.
• Tabletop and live exercises.
• Add it into the respective plan at the end of the document; this is always a step in our
Airport Emergency Operations Center activations.
• Having a strong AEP, which is used during emergencies.
• Our airport integrates the AEP into our tabletop and full-scale exercises. Outside of planned
events, our airport has not used the AEP for response and recovery events.
• Daily, with the focus on basics like incident command and training.
• Used a reference to make sure we are addressing the conditions appropriately.

Question 15.
What challenges have you experienced when using your AEP during response and recovery
efforts?
• That people aren't familiar with it and aren't keeping their specific annexes, which are their
responsibilities, up to date.
• I have worked at four medium/large hub airports. The typical challenge is administrative
personnel updating the AEP do not consult with the field responders for content, checklists
are too lengthy, and/or checklists are not set up in an order that flows with a typical incident.
• Defining one another’s roles.
• The AEP was inadequate in addressing all the response and recovery efforts of the airport.
• The layout does not lend itself to easy and immediate reference.
• Freelancing activities.
• Recovery information is not detailed.
• There is a fundamental difference between what the airport uses versus an airline during an
incident. The airport's AEP supports operational actions during an incident through to
airport recovery to normal operations. The airline's Emergency Ops Plan seems to begin
largely from after the incident through the passenger care responses, then somewhere
returning to normal operations. By this difference, efforts are not viewed with the same
goals in mind. Somehow, both books need to contain each other's response outline so all
portions of an Emergency Ops Plan can be tested together in collaboration.
• It is currently unusable as a real-time reference in the field/at an ICP.
• Big binder and flipping back and forth.
• Too large and inflexible; not easy to train.
• You have to know the document before you respond. Due to time limitations, the AEP
becomes a reference document only. Recovery efforts generally provide more time and the
opportunity for individuals that are not as familiar with the AEP to use the document.
• Too many words [in the document].
• We don't use it.
• After the initial response, all other responses and recovery are not as described in the AEP.
After the US Airways 1702 and Southwest 1380, we discovered that numerous phone
numbers and companies we had listed were no longer in service and/or do not exist
anymore.
• Organization of the document can be challenging.
• Too general; just states for you to respond and do your job. Provides no details on what
actions to take or risks/hazards to assess and mitigate.
• We don't use it—each department uses their operational/tactical plans. During a response
or recovery, if departmentsdon't know their plans already, we've got a problem. No one

whips out the AEP to figure out how to respond or recover. It is there simply to affirm to FAA
in a single-source document that we've got our stuff together.
• We don't use it. We base execution checklists off of the vague plan and use those. That being
said, we don't reference the checklists in the AEP so we can avoid them being regulated.
Most airports do this in one way or another.
• We really haven't tested the AEP during a response.
• The sheer size of the document makes it impractical to use for any sort of field work--the
AEP is better used in an EOC environment.
• Items in the AEP don't accurately reflect the large municipality that an airport encompasses.
There are no sections in recovery that deal with debris management or damage assessment,
for example.
• Making sure all responders are briefed on new edits/updates that have been made but may
not have been pre-tested.
• Too robust.
• It is a huge document. Making it electronic and hyperlinked for easy access to the respective
plan/emergency would save time and allow info to be shared with other stakeholders
responding to the incident.
• If following the FAA guidance, it does not always have sufficient information.
• The only event that we have experienced since I have been at our airport is a terminal
evacuation as a result of a bomb threat. We as an airport did not follow the AEP guidance,
and we were challenged by our stakeholders, especially our airline partners, in the After-
Action discussions. This is how our Terminal Evacuation Plan was born.
• Plan is not really recognized. Other plans and procedures are used.
• Quick access to the document; having a flipbook or other quick access guide would be a
tremendous help—basically a mini-AEP.
Question 16.
If your AEP has additional annexes beyond what is required in the 150/5200-31C-
Airport Emergency Plan Advisory Circular, what are they?
• Mass Care
• IROPS
• Hazardous Materials
• Pandemic
• Mass Evacuation
• Communicable Disease
• Civil Disturbance
• Administrative Facility
• Evacuation Plans

• Spaceport Operations
• Spaceport Rocket Testing
• City of Austin–Interagency Aircraft Accident Plan
• Airside incident detailed responses, including AEP Checklist
• Disabled Aircraft
• Terminal Building Evacuation
• Minor Medical Incident
• Mass Casualty
• Emergency Response for Parking Structures
• Water Rescue
• EOC Activation Manual (EAM)
• EOC Section Coordinating Procedures (SecCorp)
• Hazard Specific Plans (HSPs) include Tropical Weather, Pandemic, and so forth
• Crisis Communication Plan (CPlan)
• Rapid Recovery Plan (RRP)
• WebEOC: User’s Manual (WebMan)
• Family Assistance Center Operating Guide
• Airport Training and Exercise Plan
• Communicable Disease Response
• Irregular Operations
• Surface Management
• Special Events responder procedures
• Power Outage
• Severe Weather
• Earthquake
• Flooding
• Winter Storms
• Active Threat
• Family Assistance Centers
• Mass Care (sheltering, feeding, and so forth)
• Threat Hazard Analysis
• Active Shooter
• Crowd Control
• Evacuation Guide
• Public Health Threat
• Family Assistance Plan for nonaviation-related events
• Active Threat
• Aircraft Emergency Response LOA
• AirportTerminal Emergency Plan
• Emergency Notification Responsibilities
• Airport Emergency Operations Center SOP
• Terminal Emergency plan
• Local Standard operating procedures
• Incident Management

• Crash Phone Procedure

• Air Pollution
• Epidemic Disease
• Gas Drilling
• Hurricane Preparedness Plan
• IT/Cyber Attack
• Landside Emergencies
• Terrorism
• Power Outages (Terminal/Landside)
• Critical Infrastructure
• AirportGrid Map Book
• ARFF Tactical Operating Guidelines
• Tarmac Delay Plan
• Directory of Rental Car and Taxicab Companies
• LOA on Emergency Response between Agencies
• Air National (LOA)
• Active Shooter Plan Emergency
• Response Checklist for Natural Disasters
• ARFF Equipment & (COOP) WESTDOG
• Mutual COOP Plan
• Communicable Capabilities
• IROPS Plan Aid Plan
• Disease Plan: Communicable Disease
• Community Emergency Response Team MOU
Question 17.
How is a decision made to add a functional annex that is not required by the FAA
(e.g., risk analysis, business case analysis, threat hazard analysis, airport priorities)?
Choices Responses
A Risk Analysis (identifying the risks to the airport and developing plans to 48.39%
mitigate those risks)
B Business Case Analysis (the business wants or needs a plan to manage an issue, 25.81%
such as curbside traffic during an emergency)
C Threat Hazard Analysis (threats to the airport are identified and plans 58.06%
developed)

Choices Responses
D Airport/Executive Priorities (the airport leadership or executive leadership 35.48%

have asked for plans or prioritized specific issues)
E After-action reports from our airports’ exercises, incidents, or events 48.39%
F After-action reports from other airports’ incidents 45.16%
G Please list another method for determining development of an annex and/or 29.03%
plan not previously listed.
Please list another method for determining development of an annex and/or plan not previously
listed.
• As stated above; the airport has developed several standalone mitigation plans as well
as a Continuity of Operations (COOP) and the Airport Care plans. However, these plans
are not part of the airport’s AEP. This was to save us the time in the AEP review and
update process.
• The attached plan had elements that were not required of the AEP and were just easier
to attach in their entirety.
• I believe it has been mostly topics that may be touched on in the required sections but
were complex enough to merit individual attention.
• Public outcry.
• No, but I would like to make it more comprehensive to include these.
• We don't—we keep the AEP ”pure”—but individual dept. SOPs/SOGs are always under
review and updating based on all the above—a continuous process.
• We refer to the additional documents as Appendixes and treat them as separate
documents. They are in the AEP as an additional source of information and reference.
Question 18.
What are the motivators when developing plans in addition to the FAA-required AEP? How is the
decision made to complete the minimum requirements or go beyond? Why did the decision get made?
• We will always go above and beyond the minimum requirement.
• Again, this answer is based on my experience at four different airports. Some airports prefer
to only put the 150/5200-31C current version requirements in the AEP and then have
separate CONOPS, SOPs, annexes, and so forth, as the useable documents. These airports
made this decision because if it is in the AEP, it must be stamped/approved by the FAA and
there is no flexibility if there is an actual incident [or] if there is an incident prompting an
investigation. Another airport I have worked at has everything related to emergency
response included in the AEP. This decision was made because it made sense to maintain
one, centralized document.

• To ensure the airport is capable of providing a timely and efficient response that will lead to
a quick recovery and minimum impact to operations.
• Cover Airport-specific requirements.
• Trended issues with airport growth.
• Stakeholder requirements.
• Due to the nature of our operation we found it necessary to develop the plans such as the
COOP plan. This development of this plan goes beyond the AEP requirements.
• Threat, hazard, and risk analysis coupled with the need to work with non-airport agencies.
Ability to have more digestible plans with the ability to implement changes without the FAA
approval process.
• Directive by the Executive Director.
• Executive Director's choice.
• To acknowledge the wide variety of threats to airports and [the] frequency they occur at
other airports.
• Motivator: Standard training of processes, minimizing bad habits. When confusion exists in
exercises or training, the plan must be modified to reinforce the desired behavior.
• Historically, I am not sure, but suspect they have evolved as needs were identified. Going
forward, there will be a focus on comprehensive usability, though this will likely involve
documents outside of the FAA-required AEP.
• Typically, in response to another incident.
• If there is a plan/policy/procedure/technology that can be developed or implemented to
protect the health, safety, welfare, and continuity of the airport and the people we serve,
we're going to work to get.
• Significant hazard, not covered by an existing annex, requiring a collective response from
the airport. We added a communicable disease response plan when H1N1 was a global
threat. It is now used for Ebola and other communicable disease responses.
• Staffing, resources, budgets.
• The AEP is not a useable document in actual response and recovery efforts. We have
developed Standard Operating Guidelines and supporting Operating Instructions to guide
our response and recovery. This was [a] decision that was made many years ago because
the AEP, even prior to the most recent revision to the Advisory Circular, was not a useable
document.
• In the wake of the FLL and LAX active shooter incidents, there was public outcry regarding
the airport not having an active shooter plan that is separate from a general terminal
evacuation plan. It is now in the planning phase.

• When the magnitude of hazard requires more detail than AEP provides.
• To provide adequate guidance to first responders on what actions are needed to [affect] a
response as put forward in the AEP.
• As stated in #9, we use exercise and real-world AAR/IPs for every significant incident to
inform/modify/create new plans, but they don't necessarily go into AEP unless they impact
a specific existing component.
• We identify the plans we need in order to provide the most efficient response to
emergencies identified in threat and vulnerabilities analyses.
• Additional plans are developed as a result of incidents happening and lessons learned.
• To ensure that the airport community has reference material to respond adequately, and to
train their employees on proper response procedures.
• Looking at current events/incident trends, integration into THIRA process [and] integration
into SMS process are factors that have prompted this airport to develop plans in addition to
the AEP. The decision is made as a reaction to the changing threat landscape.
• Having prepared staff and responders are motivators. As an example, although we conduct
a variety of training exercises/drills, we went beyond the minimum exercise requirements
by conducting monthly TTXs. Each TTX scenario focuses on various airport vulnerabilities
that are identified in the AEP.
• Generally related to response to an incident that occurred that caused operational impacts.
• Typically, if another agency (federal, state, municipal) requires a plan outside of FAA
requirements.
• Need or recommendations.
• We read case studies and after-action reports from other airports that have experienced
events that we have not, and use their lessons learned to develop mitigation plans so that if
that same scenario occurs at our airport, we are better prepared.
• Risk; need buy-in from leadership.
• Based upon previous incidents and lessons learned and to move the AEP Program forward.
Question 19.
Once the need was determined, how did the plan get developed?
• Team effort, driven by a top-notch experienced plan writing phenom.
• At my current airport, an emergency management expert with an aviation background was
contracted to develop the AEP with significant input from airport stakeholders.
• Emergency Management group was assigned the task to complete.
• Discussion with first responders and Tower manager.

• We hired a contractor to develop the COOP plan, but the contractor worked very closely
with the Emergency Management Team. The EM team took the COOP plan and developed
other tools and process[es] from the COOP tool that allows us to recover and make critical
decisions about the status of the airport operations.
• Communication, coordination, and collaboration with stakeholders.
• Single person development of the plan.
• Currently developing it now.
• 1. Initial writing; 2. Working group review and prioritization of details and development;
3. Edits and review; 4. Exercise the plan; 5. Conduct a drill; 6. Review and edit; 7. Publish the
plan; 8. Annual review and testing.
• Again, I am unsure, but likely through initial drafting, followed by stakeholder review and
comment, and revision as needed.
• Person was chosen.
• Through collaborative interactions with partners and individual initiative.
• The communicable disease response plan was developed by a committee composed of CDC,
Fire Rescue EMS, Airport Operations, state & local Health Departments, and airlines.
• Driven by executive priorities.
• Plans were developed by our Airside Operations team with input from all stakeholders.
Recently, we have added an Airport Emergency Management section at our airport thathas
taken on this role.
• The active shooter plan is being led by Russ & Baruzzini. We have monthly meetings where
every stakeholder is invited to hear about progress and talk about larger issues. Otherwise,
it is broken down into functional committees to address all of the subject matter in a timely
manner.
• Planning process to include SMEs and stakeholders.
• Single person developed and implemented.
• Collections of stakeholders and months of meetings to walk through SME review and
creation (again, not of AEP, but of revised plans, e.g., Mass Evacuation).
• We organized a planning team and the emergency management section wrote the plan.
• The concept is developed and created by our Emergency Preparedness Group.
• Through meetings, tabletops, and reviews of plans from other airports in some cases.
• Working group in the airport and best practices from other airports.
• Regular planning meetings were conducted by airport staff, stakeholders, and partners.
• By a team of subject matter experts.

• Assign to staff, create a workgroup of impacted stakeholders, draft a document, run by

legal, make corrections/updates, route for entire department division head review,
incorporate feedback, run by legal again, incorporate additional feedback, and then obtain
director signature.
• Small staffing working group reviewing procedures and relevant documents, while
attempting to make them fit into FAA guidance.
• Very specific plans may reference very detailed site plans (i.e., gas drilling).
• The plan is developed and maintained by my office. If another airport has a plan in place, I
ask for a copy of that plan and try not to reinvent the wheel. Once our plan is written, I
meet with the stakeholders to ensure that the plan will be effective during an event and
start to train on the plan.
• Through Airport Operations.
• Majority of plan development is conducted by Airport Emergency Management and Airside
Ops but with some involvement from stakeholders.
Question 20.
If planning teams were used to develop these additional plans, who was involved?
Airport Operations 87.10%
Law Enforcement 87.10%
Fire Department 90.32%
Administration 45.16%
Information Technology 45.16%
Corporate/HQ 16.13%
Executives 35.48%
Finance 22.58%
Airlines 64.52%
Tenants 58.06%
Airport Volunteer Groups 25.81%

Local Jurisdictions 38.71%
CBP 48.39%
TSA 54.84%
FAA 41.94%
ATCT 32.26%
FBI 41.94%
NTSB 19.35%
Other (Federal) 22.58%
Local Emergency Management Agency/Office 51.61%
Engineering/Maintenance 41.94%
Landside 67.74%
Airside 70.97%
Transportation/Shuttle/Bus Providers 35.48%
Taxi Services 6.45%
Transportation Network Companies (i.e., Uber, 9.68%

Lyft)
Other (please specify) 19.35%

• Safety—Risk Management.
• It is plan-specific, but all relevant SMEs are brought to the table. Probably 90%
of the above disciplines were engaged in the recent rewrite of the mass
evacuation plan.
• Depending on the plan—Health Department or Gas Driller.
• Emergency Management.

Question 21.
How long has it taken to regularly update your AEP?

• The EM team has not gone through the process of updating the plan. We review it as
required by the FAA but from what I heard it took over 1 year to get it approved.
• Are you asking how long the process takes, or how often is it done?
• Minor changes have occurred as needed, varying between a few months to a few years
between updates.
• It has been 7 years since the last major update, and I expect it to take about a year to
complete.
• We send out initial update notice 1st week of August w/ Nov-1 deadline. We know only half
will respond by then, so reminder sent for extended deadline to 15-Nov, and we start
yelling by 1-Dec at delinquents so we finally have all info by 1-Jan to compile and present to
FAA by Feb meeting/review.

Question 22.
Was there a process for Executive Review?
No
39%
Yes
61%
Yes No
Question 23.
What was the Executive Review process?
• Executives have time to review and ask for edits and then those are incorporated if they
make sense.
• All stakeholder directors, chiefs, executives had to sign off/approve each section before it
was sent to the FAA for approval—very lengthy process.
• Review of the timeline for completion and review of changes after the update was
completed.
• Airport Director review[s], discuss[es], and collaborate[s] with operations manager, first
responders and Tower management.
• Reviewing and signing the plan.
• Emailed section to appropriate parties.
• Sent to Executive Director to approve document.
• In progress.
• Each executive leader is provided the update of changes with a staff summary of changes.
• Periodic briefings and a final document review.
• The revisions are reviewed by the Senior Vice President of Operations, who briefs the
remainder of the Executive team prior to submitting the changes to the Certification
Inspector.

• After the update was made, it was forwarded to the airport's Director of Operations and
Security, COO, & several other executives and important stakeholders for review and
feedback. After taking their feedback, the AEP was edited and sent back out to the select
individuals for more feedback. If there are no more large/major changes, the AEP is then
sent to the FAA Eastern Region for approval.
• Send final version for review and sign-off.
• General manager of the airport has to sign off on the updates along with the COO of the
aviation department.
• Director of Operations review prior to submission to FAA.
• Updates were shared via chain of command.
• Present in a meeting of executives.
• Review and input from Senior Vice President.
Question 24.
How does the airport share and socialize the new plan(s)?
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Workshop Tabletop Full-Scale Training Webinars Provide N/A Other ways
Exercise Exercise Sessions soft/hard not listed
copy to new
employees
with "Need
to Know"
Note: N/A = not applicable.

Other ways not listed
• For the most part, the AEP is only shared with new airport operations, security, police at
any time. The AEP is also available on the airport's website.
• List on website.
• Seminar w/airlines; TTX (annual regulatory); internal training sessions; full-scale triennial
w/smaller drills in between. Distribution to all airlines, departments, and external mutual
aid agencies.

• Email.
• Electronic distribution via Box.com.
• We also have the plan located and available to applicable users via a secure document
portal, which is password-protected.
• Meetings and shared internally with staff, tenants and airlines.
Question 25.
What training tools are used when sharing and socializing the AEP and new annexes and how
does the airport ensure all stakeholders understand the requirements, roles, and responsibilities
in the AEP and/or annexes?
• Cloud-Based Access to Plans.
• Unified Incident Command Post (ICP) drills, Active Shooter/Force Protection Functional
Exercises, hazard-specific TTX. Joint exercises with local cities. Tenant outreach training at
shift briefings, safety meetings.
• Exercises.
• Tabletop exercise/Annual drills.
• Tabletops and workshops.
• Discussion at the tabletops.
• Developing.
• Meetings are conducted at the shop level of the organization to the senior leadership.
• Presentations in training sessions, informal plan reviews, required annual and triennial
reviews/drills.
• At the annual review.
• Working on new training standards through our Learning Management System.
• Tabletop exercises and staff briefings.
• We need a lot of improvement here.
• The AEP is not well- ”shared” or ”socialized.” Hard and digital copies are available for
training, but there are no additional training tools.
• Revisions are typically briefed during exercises and copies are provided to those that
affected by the changes.
• Incorporate into various ongoing TTX and FSE, but no other efforts at this time.
• Annual tabletop exercise.

• As stated in #15.
• None.
• Emails are sent to air carriers when updates to the AEP have been made.
• PowerPoint Presentations and electronic copies of AEP.
• Annual training session and TTX.
• TTX's, secure document portal, and face-to-face discussions.
• Online document-sharing portal.
• Socialize in our monthly tabletop exercise meetings.
• Workshops or group-specific training.
• We meet with the airlines and stakeholders every other month and use that time to
introduce new plans and/or annexes.
• Yearly training and updates through meetings.
• Plan walk-through 1x per year and a TTX ifapplicable.
Question 26.
Has the airport enlisted any unique tools to help with the plan, response, recovery, or general
knowledge share of the document?
50.00%
45.00%
40.00%
35.00%
30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
Apps Checklists Photo Sharing Online Other ways not
Collaboration Tools listed
• We always strive to bring in Subject Matter Expert (SME) speakers at TTX and workshops to
conduct a 10- to 15-minute educational component on the topic. For example, the local CDC
and Public Health Officer spoke at our annual AEP TTX , which focused on the Communicable

Disease response section. We invited local law enforcement jurisdictions who have
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) programs implemented to talk about "drone" technology
and the FAA FSDO discussed recreational and commercial drone regulations. 2. We host
quarterly Unified Incident Command Post (ICP) drills that are 1.5 hrs. We invite law
enforcement and fire departments from the surrounding five jurisdictions, intelligence
agencies, federal agencies, airlines, and airport divisions to participate. It gives us an
opportunity to run through the basics (i.e., ICP vehicle setup, establishing objectives,
communication, and building relationships) in a no-fault environment. It's been HIGHLY
valuable.
• Working on developing tools during in-progress revision.
• Only via email at this point; online collaboration tool would be welcome.
Question 27.
Are there specific enduring challenges that you have identified that are consistent across the
AEP development, revision, and/or update process? What are these enduring challenges?
• Individual Departments not keeping their components of the plan up-to-date.
• Approval process is a challenge.
• Timely receipt and the need to keep the AEP general to avoid FAA criticism.
• Having personnel in the GA community understand the need for certain 139 standards.
• Consistent stakeholder participation.
• Dedicated time.
• Coordination [of] stakeholder expectations.
• The time span from submission to approval to book.
• Getting 100% participation.
• Process standards; making changes to the plan and getting approval.
• Dedicated staff time to coordinate with all stakeholders; providing a series of drills and
exercises to familiarize stakeholders with the plan.
• Getting agreement with other department and mutual aid resources.
• There is no collaboration when it comes to updating the AEP. While it is updated, it is not
open for much outside input. The Ops Manager is the person that conducts the update
process.
• Stakeholder response and thorough review.
• Lack of interest or participation.

• Getting timely input—everyone is swamped, shorthanded, etc. (we're [the] fastest-growing

airport—now No. 8—constantly expanding and playing catch-up...). Dept.'s DO[s] make
solid, substantive contributions...it just takes a little nagging.
• The format and requirements are too restrictive and not realistic. If an airport is supposed
to identify its most pressing concerns and then figure out how to address them, why are
you telling us what the concerns are and how to develop the plan?
• Getting responses from departments/tenants/emergency response groups.
• The required sections in the AEP do not accurately reflect the current operation nor the
current threat landscape. Hence the update process feels very cursory.
• In earlier plans, we included the names of applicable staff/responders. We no longer do
this, since once a person leaves their position, the AEP is no longer current. We now just
include position titles.
• Conflicting priorities, stakeholder participation.
• The fact that the document is huge.
• Making sure we comply with FAA compliance is [a] priority.
Question 28.
Have you created any workarounds to deal with these challenges? If so, what are they?
• A tracking mechanism for when plans are updated, only designed to show who is/isn't
updating their plans since we have no enforcement teeth.
• Establish Field Operations Guides (FOGs), Airport Operating Procedures (AOPs), [and]
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) instead of updating the AEP content.
• Avoid adding information to the AEP that is not required.
• When airfield projects are implemented, additional funding requested for 139 standards to
be implemented.
• Explained our expectations/purpose for the document.
• Incentives to maximize participation.
• Yup, just get it done.
• Direct outreach explaining ownership.
• Start early—see timeline identified in prior section.
• Yes, we're developing a comprehensive emergency management plan, and the required
portions of the AEP are a small part of it.

• E-mail follow-up, airline station manager meetings, and then escalation up the chain of
command if those fail.
• No. Would welcome ideas.
• Schedule multiple sessions for feedback.
• Hold facilitated review meetings and point out areas that need attention.
• N/A—not responsible for the development and update.
Question 29.
Have you had an opportunity to test and validate the new plan(s)? Choose all that apply.
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Seminar Workshop Tabletop Game Drill Functional Full-Scale Other
Exercise Exercise (please
specify)
Question 30.
Are after-action reviews conducted after exercises or significant events?
YES 100.00%
NO 0.00%

Question 31.
Briefly describe the AAR process and how it relates to the AEP.
• We conduct a full AAR for each exercise and event. We document discrepancies, assign
themto ASFs (Business Units and a specific POC) and track their completion of lack thereof.
• If there is a significant incident, TTX, functional exercise, or FSE, we will work on an AAR/IP.
The challenge with this is following through with closing out all identified action items.
• Use HSEEP guidelines.
• All participants are brought together and given an overview of the processes applied and
solicit changes to the current plan.
• Meetings with involved parties, sometimes broken into functional areas, where strengths
and weaknesses are discussed. A corrective action plan with individuals tasked with items is
created as a result.
• Roundtable discussion, notes taken, document updated, draft sent for review.
• Depending on severity event, either informal hotwash or formal debrief.
• Key participants are assembled with direct association to the event to discuss the good, the
bad and the other items needing changes in the process not related to the event. Changes
are then forwarded to the decision maker to approval.
• Generally, it is an executive-led discussion of their observations, with input encouraged
from other stakeholders. I'm not sure if this has ever resulted in actionable tasks related to
the AEP.
• Typical Hotwashes.
• We follow HSEEP standards and conduct hotwashes and debriefings formally and informally
to gather information, synthesize the data, [and] to produce and share a plan.
• The sponsoring department conducts the AAR and produces a written report with lessons
learned and recommendations for change. Follow-up continues until all accepted
recommendations have been implemented.
• Scheduled within one month of event to look for areas of problematic implementation and
improvement.
• After-incidents and emergency preparedness exercise events, we have conducted the AAR
Process in line with the recommended FEMA AAR Guidelines. Past that, our Ops Manager
takes the recommendations/feedback and buries it in his office. No major updates/added
Annexes have occurred.
• Immediately following an incident, a hotwash is conducted to capture immediate action
items. For many incidents, a formal debrief is conducted to capture other lessons learned
and action items beyond what were captured during the hotwash. The action items are
tracked and assigned to appropriate individuals or groups. These action items are managed
by the Emergency Management team, and any items that require a change to the AEP or

supporting documents are made. Documents that are revised go through a document
review process that allows stakeholders the ability to make edits or suggestions prior to
publication.
• AEP draws from AAR/IP recommendations when process evolves.
• AAR reports have been used to modify procedures and learning tools, but not to amend the
AEP, because of the current general nature of the AEP.
• We instituted a formal AAR/IP process via SOG that all departments are signatory to—it
follows HSEEP structure and process and is a highly effective tool for capturing areas for
improvement and laying out the IP. However, getting action on the IP items is the bugger...
and we have no authority to enforce action...so IP progress is less than perfect.
• We gather and then discuss changes to be made. We never change the AEP.
• All departments involved in the exercise undergo a hotwash.
• AARs are basically "hotwashes" where procedures and actions taken are compared; the
AEP, checklists, and "tribal knowledge" is discussed to ascertain whether the airport
responded appropriately.
• The AAR process is a review of the incident and looking for things done well and things to be
improved upon. I have never looked back at the AEP after an AAR is completed. Rather, we
have created an IP to go with the AAR and assigned those responsible for items in the IP.
• AAR items of concern are cross-referenced in the AEP. Based on the issue, the AEP may be
updated if necessary.
• AAR or formal debriefs are generally held after an impactful event. Items that need to be
updated in the AEP will be identified.
• Generally, the AAR is developed during and after the debrief meeting. If a protocol change
is needed, then it is followed up on in the AEP.
• General review of the exercise as well as part of the review that deals specifically [with] the
relationship of how the event went in regard to the exercise.
• We use the HSEEP process for all of our After-Action meetings and reports that are
generated. We use the Improvement Plan to highlight deficiencies in the plan, if identified.
From there, we incorporate changes to the AEP during our annual review.
• Follows the basic planning process; does not really relate to the AEP.
• Reviewing the AAR minutes and cross-referencing them to the AEP to see where changes
and updates can be made.
Question 32.
Why aren’t after-action reviews conducted?
• No responses submitted.

Question 33.
How have lessons learned been incorporated into the AEP?
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Yes No Other (please specify)
Question 34.
How have lessons learned, best practices, and updates from incidents, events, and/or exercises
been incorporated into the AEP or annexes/plan(s)?
• We update and change the plan after major mitigation plans have been created and/or
when new major initiatives have been put into place to close a gap.
• Updated our Communicable Disease Plan, Evacuation Plan, and Fuel Farm Fire Plan.
• Several; however, the approval process can be challenging.
• Best practices identified can be used to alter work procedures and ultimately documented
in the plan.
• A few lessons learned have been added at this point.
• Maybe; unknown.
• They have not as of yet. It appears to be too much of a "lift" to make the wholesale changes
to the AEP, so we incorporate them into other, more functional plans.
• If a particular practice is modified, the new process is incorporated into the AEP.
• The few updates that have occurred were token changes; none of the needed major
updates have been made.

• Moving responsibilities to better areas.

• Process updated in AEP.
• These LLs get captured by all AEP review stakeholders as the year progresses, including
Emer/Prep as the coordinator of this process, and they get woven into the AEP as
appropriate. Some do not as they are too tactical. But they are generally referenced in the
AEP doc (just not duplicated; the AEP points to underlying Plans but does not repeat them).
• Changes made to the plan along with updates.
• Additions of new Hazard-Specific sections such as Active Shooter.
• Based on the issue(s), some items are updated and/or incorporated immediately; others are
noted and are updated/added during the next revision.
• Changes needed will be submitted with the next annual update.
• After the debrief, these are added into the AEP.
• Included into updates as relevant.
• It is through the AAR process that deficiencies are highlighted, and then changes are made.
Question 35.
What are ways airports can make the AEP actionable and relevant to the myriad of
stakeholders?
• Convert from a massive binder type of plan full of paragraphs and turn them into
"actionable" project plans tied to Mission Essential Functions, Tiered, and assigned to a
stakeholder. Then when you need to enact portions of the plan you can track what is being
activated, who ownsit, and what steps they need to do. It makes the whole plan actionable
instead of a manual.
• Include your responders who work incidents daily (i.e., Airport Operations field personnel,
LEO, fire captains, dispatchers, airport maintenance personnel). It works best to develop a
template and then have these personnel throw darts at it and refine it into a useable
document.
• Difficult to do because of how the FAA ties anything added to the AEP as required.
• Explaining their role during tabletop exercises.
• Ensuring that what is written reflects actual practices and verifying that stakeholders are
good with the plan.
• Designing a document that is easy to use and navigate and not 400 pages long.
• Purpose/expectation of the AEP must be communicated at the beginning. We view it as a
high-level document and department SOPs are the actionable procedures.

• The FAA should eliminate the stamping of each page. This does not add value to the AEP.
The FAA should view the airport "holistically," not just airside—more specifically, only the
airfield movement area and security perimeter fence line.
• By creating current, detailed, and self-contained documents pertinent to each stakeholder
group.
• Utilize and reference it more often.
• Change the process and requirements.
• Have an appropriate level of details to make the document useful in a variety of scenarios;
provide a bridge to their Local Emergency Response Action Plan.
• More functional use and less "regulatory requirement."
• Make it meaningful.
• Tasking and information that extends beyond "show up and do your job."
• Ensure it's well maintained, not overly general, and consistently reinforced that the AEP
should point to foundational operational plans that **must** be current and accurate
reflections of what those disciplines will do during all types of incidents.
• Keep them vague and plan outside of them.
• Constantly refer to it and use it.
• Cut down on the size and extraneous information and focus on actual actions that we need
our stakeholders to take; make the AEP about procedures, not bureaucratic prose.
• Host drills or tabletop exercises that incorporate certain operational parts of the AEP onan
annual basis and then complete an update based on lessons learned.
• Include the stakeholders in the AEP processes (editing, etc.).
• Incorporate the AEP into tabletops.
• Make it easily accessible; reduce a 200+-page document to something topic-basedand
hyperlinked for easier access.
• By taking it past the basic requirements of the FAA.
• Incorporate annexes; keep the AEP straightforward and expand on your response protocols
through the annexes.
• Develop a comprehensive emergency plan that is recommended and not required to meet
the specific requirements of the FAA.
• Holding the stakeholders accountable to the AEP.

Question 36.
Has anything been done at the airport to minimize these challenges?
• Still working on it.
• Including field personnel in the process.
• Constant explaining with defining the importance of everyone’s role.
• Continually trying to engage with stakeholders.
• The AEP is reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that it is relevant.
• Ongoing: stress importance of updating plans/policies/procedures, training on them,
exercising them to validate, hold dept.'s accountable (#1 challenge as EM—responsible for
everything...authority to enforce nothing), get buy-in from top leadership to enforce them,
set expectations, and drill regularly to maintain KSAs.
• Airportwide training sessions on Active Shooters, Severe Weather, and other hazards are
used to drill down to the core of an issue so that the stakeholder understands what is
expected ofthem.
• We do include the stakeholders whenever possible.
• Make sure exercises include all stakeholders.
• We have it on a “secured documents portal.”
• Yes, as much as possible without making it a regulation problem.
• Yes, additional plans and policies.
• Open dialogue and willingness to share information with partners throughout the airport.
Question 37.
Have there been successful practices that have been identified that are implemented today? If
so, please briefly describe.
• Too many to list... HAVEN (Helping All Victims of Emergency in Need) [is] designed to
support all victims of any major incident at the airport. Terminal Evacuation Playbooks, ASFs
(Airport Support Functions) based loosely of NIMS but tailored to an airport, etc.
• Including field personnel in the process and seek out lessons learned from other airports.
• Active shooter drawing printed and placed in tubes for handoff to Swat Teams at prescribed
staging area.
• AAR/IP formalization of process; rewriting of collateral plans that are referenced in AEP;
instituting recurring smaller drills on key aspects that support overall AEP processes, e.g.,
bi-weekly Unified Command multidiscipline drills; quarterly emergency communications
center (EOC) drills; refresher ICS training; updating of outdated (or nonexistent) plans
w/attendant training; engagement of senior leadership to lead by example and enforce
accountability (struggle).

• Implementation of a detailed tenant-based Severe Weather plan that builds upon the
weather-related hazard-specificsections in a detailed manner that actually contains
diagrams, procedures, and pertinent details for the tenants/airlines to use and train their
staff on.
• Again, including the stakeholders.
• Make efforts to have all stakeholders actually participate and provide feedback during
tabletops or exercises.
• Identify a need (AAR process) and work towards a policy solution.
• Reminding stakeholders and partners of updated information for them to review at their
own convenience; attending various Airport meetings and providing updates on the plan.
Question 38.
What can be done to improve the AEP today and for the future? What are the next steps in
making this plan applicable and actionable for airport staff responding to emergencies and
events?
• Start chipping away at updating sections, checklists, annexes, etc.
• An agreement between the Airport and FAA on what will be used in inspections and what
can be excluded.
• Expand toward a 139 standard; implement additional Spaceport requirements for rocket
testing.
• Allow for a more flexible template; create FAA-led planning workshops and trainings; the
Advisory Circular is too detailed, resulting in an unnecessarily rigid planning framework.
• Standardized templates from the FAA that [have] the standards that airports need to have.
• The AEP needs to be redefined by the industry.
• FAA to standardize terminology between Airlines, FBOs and Airports; develop an AC that
discusses communication abilities, EOC setup/design, Passenger Reception Area, Friends &
Family Reunifications Area, [and] address some terminal and landside incidents plans. True,
we must be careful in what is asked for, but the AEP today is only marginally better than a
paperweight. Finally, the checklists to honestly be useable must not reside in the AEP but a
standalone binder. Otherwise, those pages will not see the light of day except during once-
a-year review.
• More user friendly; easier to reference apps, etc.
• Simplify and streamline the process and the plan.
• Exercises and tabletops.

• So regulatory at this time.

• Modify organization to make it more useful; additional content to make it more useful.
• Better procedures in the AEP describing hazards and tasks necessary to recover and operate
the airport.
• I don't have a good answer... Perhaps emphasize that it must be reflective of solid
operational plans (SOPs/SOGs) that it relies on for stakeholder entities covered by its scope,
and those SOPs must be current, accurate, trained on, etc. To have the AEP be the “leading”
response/recovery document is a little bit tail-wagging-the-dog. If AEP is the “only”
response/recovery document for smaller airports, then I suppose it IS the end-all/be-all...
but for larger airports with more robust departments it should supplement individual dept.
plans, not supplant them.
• Emergency managers need to rewrite the Advisory Circular. There is no other way around it.
• I believe the AEP should be under the Emergency Management division and not Airside
Operation management.
• Simplification, across the board; focus on basic procedures.
• I would recommend tying the update to the AEP to the three-year cycle of the triennial
exercise. The updates to the AEP can be based on the AAR/IP from the triennial.
• More stakeholder involvement.
• Place more emphasis on the hazard-specific areas; include checklists; place less emphasis
on functional sections.
• Stay caught up with technology.
• Working to make it easier to use and more workable.
• A plan is only as good as the paper it is written on. The AEP needs to be more than just a
check-in-the-box document. It needs to [be] written, trained on and incorporated into
everyday life if it is to ever carry real weight during a response.
• Requirement vs. recommendation.
• An overall refresh of the program and what is contained within the AEP; many more threats
and emergencies that should be addressed within the AEP.

Question 39.
On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being "Strongly Disagree" and 10 being "Strongly
Agree," please rate the following statement: The current AEP circular and policies
meet the needs of Airports to appropriately develop and update AEPs.
12
10
6
Respondents
4
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Question 40.
Why did you rate your previous answer the way you did? Please briefly describe.
• The whole program needs an overhaul; it will be uncomfortable for many organizations to
actually have to really write a plan instead of copy [and] paste one, but it's the only way
forward.
• Emergency Management as a profession has grown, and several lessons learned have been
incorporated, applied, and passed successfully since the FAA's last 150/5200-31 AEP update.
• It’s good to have requirements, but there is [varied] consistency in how inspectors rate
between airports.
• Airport growth, tenant expansion and additional Spaceport requirements.
• The AC provides useful and needed information and requirements but is so bogged down into
the details in places it creates a very complicated and hard-to-use document in the end result.
• The AC needs to be updated.
• Currently, the policy is a labor action drain with a negative ROI.
• Our current AEP was primarily modified after the 2009 revision, and it seems highly
redundant and unusable. However, I am just starting the rewrite process.
• Gives the basics; airports can always increase if they choose to.
• I have not read the circulars and policy updates.
• [The] hazard-specific sections need to be updated.
• It’s a good tool, but often cloaked in red tape.

• Not used by all, but a few key departments [do] use it.
• I don't believe the needs of the airport match the intent the circulars are designed to fulfill.
• It's a necessary document for FAA oversight to objectively determine compliance by airports,
and the circular and policies provide updates and modifications necessary, but the AEP itself
should not be what causes creation of underlying response/recovery plans—they should
develop organically, perhaps using AEP all-hazards categories as a skeleton, but any good EM
manager will be doing that already.
• It meets the requirement and that is it—doesn't go into anything extra.
• There's an overabundance of extraneous information in the AEP Advisory Circular; the AEP,
in printed form, typically sits on a shelf and is never used.
• The circular and policies don't accurately represent the current threat/risk landscape at our
airport.
• The policies typically meet the needs of airports, but there's room for improvement.
• No strong opinion on the matter.
• Always room for improvement.
• While it works, it could always be stronger and more useable.
• The guidance is there; however, the way in which the AEP is written remains broad and not
practical for real-world responses.
• The AEP provides a base for a lot of airports. It has a purpose, but the process needs to be
reviewed to ensure airports look at all-hazards.
• It still provides the basis, but we can go further as an organization and as an industry.
Question 41.
If you could change one thing about the AEP, what would it be and how would you do it?
• The style of plan is binder-esque. It isn't designed to be easily acted upon. It is designed to
be read, not acted on.
• The outlined requirements from the FAA circulars.
• Define the purpose, explain the requirements for future need.
• Consistent FAA oversight across the regions.
• Make it a smaller-sized document and a living document so that when things need to be
updated, it isn’t a chore to update.
• Incorporate elements of the ESFs or a more-relatable EOP format to municipalities.
• Eliminate the Certifier stamp requirement; rationale: The airfield daily logs are not stamped
by the Certifier but inspected annually during the part 139.

• Make it user friendly—an easy-to-use reference and guide.

• Change the sections. Enable the users to identify which sections they wanted.
• Following current EM planning standards.
• To be useful in the field, the document should be electronic, with hot-links to specific
sections and all supporting SOPs, checklists, and related plans.
• [Who does the approvals].
• Organization.
• Its usefulness to line employees; it's wasted paper primarily in [its] current form.
• Nothing—it is fine for its purpose relative to our structure.
• I would change the list of required annexes to reflect current challenges in airport
emergency management.
• I want EM to manage the plan.
• Remove the SSI labeling and make it a public document.
• Make the update tied to the three-year cycle of the triennial exercise based on the AAR/IP
from the exercise instead of the yearly update that is required with the annual FAA
inspection. I would also create a plan template that closely mirrors the NFPA 1600 or the
DHS/FEMA THIRA process.
• Improved stakeholder participation with updates.
• Incorporate more checklists.
• I would make the document "beefier." I would write the document in a way that
stakeholders would want to refer to it in an emergency.
• Guidance vs. regulation.
Question 42.
What would this change help to do or improve in emergency response at airports?
• It would allow airports to more readily understand their core mission-essential functions,
prioritize recovery actions, and identify gaps and weaknesses easier.
• Nothing to add.
• Allow for a useable AEP.
• Mitigate risk, prevent loss of life and further damage to stakeholders; interest.
• Allow for a greater peer-to-peer review network and consistent plan writing.
• Ease of use for training staff and first responders.

• Ease the understanding of external stakeholders.

• It would provide a quicker update to changes in airport policy, equipment, fixtures, surfaces
and general information.
• Create consistent and confident responses to a variety of situations.
• Possibly make it easier to reference.
• All-hazards based in a way that the process is not threatening to the stakeholders and the
plan is actionable.
• The AEP [should] become a useable tool rather than a four-inch block of paper in the back
of the vehicle.
• Each airport is specific to the needs of the location and region. [Neither] the FAA nor TSA
can realistically know what is needed to respond to an emergency in each airport. Airports
are the experts atthe emergency response, not regulators in DC.
• Make it meaningful.
• Give employees and responders an actual guide on expected actions to be taken and
hazards assessed in the event of an emergency.
• It would allow for more flexibility in planning and be realistic to the problems we are facing
today.
• It will be managed by folks who know emergency response.
• Allow for wider dissemination of information to all stakeholders, including the public, so that
they understand how airport emergency responses truly work.
• It would allow for the updates to the plan to be more actionable and relevant to the current
operating environment.
• Stakeholders would have a [clearer] understanding of their roles during various
emergencies.
• AEP would be more focused on incidents.
• Help stakeholders easily find those protocols that interest them most.
• It would actually be used as a response document. Currently, the document is SO broad that
it will not be referenced during an event because the checkpoints are really broad and will
of course be hit every time.
• Guidance-focused.

Additional Questions—Not Required

Question 43.
Would you like to answer additional questions about further participation?
• 14 Yes
• 14 No
Question 44.
What other topics/issues exist that could be solved by an ACRP Airport Emergency Plan
Synthesis? What are gap issues that have not been inquired in this questionnaire?
• Plans are to[o] one-dimensional and only give lip service to "All Hazards" methodology.
• This research will provide credibility for the emergency management professional seated at
the "table." Also, adding information and examples of AARs (as a possible standard). This
would assist new emergency management professionals to discover how the aviation world
speaks and responds to incidents.
• Functional best-practice-based Airport Incident Management structures.
• Safety Management System and its influence on the AEP.
• The intent of the circulars does not seem clear enough to meet the needs of the airports
and expectations of the public.
• None come to mind (unless the AEP can force all departments in all airports to truly embody
ICS and practice those key tenets that will result in more effective response, thereby leading
to faster recovery and resumption of business, and get all departments and leadership to
reinforce these practices).
• How to develop an all-inclusive plan.
• Closer alignment of the AEP with the more traditional FEMA-based emergency plan
documents.
• I think you could honestly do an entire synthesis just on AEP annexes. I would also like to see
more research on Active Assailant planning for non-LEO [law enforcement officer]
responders.
• Going more in-depth within the four phases of emergency management and having a
broader scope of types of emergencies that can occur at an airport.

Question 45.
Is the AEP used operationally?
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
YES NO
Question 46.
If YES, when and how? If NO, why not?
• It should be referenced every time a major event occurs to see if the actions listed and taken
match reality. If not, the plan should be updated to match what is REALLY done.
• Overwhelming information; difficult to maintain.
• Aspects of the plan are utilized for every incident, but the plan itself is not pulled out and
used [as] a reference guide.
• During training for new Airport Ops personnel, alerts and other information is referenced to
in the AEP.
• Daily.
• Too big.
• Usually in more complex and lengthy response scenarios.
• It is too general to act as a guide to any response beyond “show up and do your job.”
• As stated previously, the AEP is reflective of underlying individual department SOGs, so they
use them but not because they're in the AEP.
• Too basic and not based in day-to-day operations.
• The AEP is a required document that sits on the shelf and only gets looked at after an
incident has occurred.
• The AEP itself needs to be more actionable and used as a quick reference guide.

Question 47.
What feedback have you received about your AEP from the FAA inspectors?
• That it is innovative, extremely up-to-date, and thoroughly researched and collaboratively
created.
• That it is a great document and meets all of the requirements plus more.
• The SW Region has been very supportive of the AEP as written and the airport's efforts in
the development of the plan.
• Positive feedback was [given], though 450 pages to stamp.
• Was not here for last visit.
• They allow us to distribute the AEP electronically to stakeholders.
• It meets the requirements of the FAA.
• Solid document—in four years, no recommended changes.
• Basic comments on procedures.
• Very little.
• We have not received any feedback specifically about our AEP. We did have an inspector
tell us that we should conduct more tabletop exercises; hence why we conduct one every
other month.
The remaining questions received no responses.

Question 48.
Do you want to be contacted by the research team to provide further, in-depth information and
details? If yes, please add your contact information.
Question 49.
Please provide your contact information.
Question 50.
Best way to contact me is?
Question 51.
Best day/time to contact me is?
Question 52.
Do you have examples of products you’ve developed that you believe would be relevant and
beneficial to include in the survey responses?

Question 53.
Please provide examples or further information.
Question 54.
Please provide any documents or files you believe may be relevant. If the upload link does not
work, please email smurphy@tidalbasin.rphc.com or brand@tidalbasin.rph.com.
Question 55.
Are there links that you would like to share that would support this synthesis?
Question 56.
Please provide relevant links. If you would prefer to email the links please send to the research
team.
Question 57.
Are there other airports that are doing innovative things with their AEP, either updating them,
building out functional sections, developing new standalone plans, or finding ways to make the
plan actionable? If so, can you share which airport and an appropriate contact for this survey?
Question 58.
Do you have documents that can be shared to include in the synthesis and potentially be used as
a case study? Do you have photographs or graphics/visuals that can be shared for use in the
synthesis?
Question 59.
If yes, please give a web address below or email products to the research team.
Question 60.
Would the respondent like to attribute their responses?
Questions 61–66. [Any reponses received were redacted to protect privacy.]
Name
Title
Organization name
Contact information
Phone
Email
Question 67.
Are you answering for more than one airport?
Question 68.
Which airports are you answering for?

Questions 69–72. [Any reponses received were redacted to protect privacy.]

Name
Title
Phone
Email
Question 73.
Please identify which size airport you are answering for. In order for the research to ensure
relevance to as many stakeholders as possible, we ask that you identify which size airport you
are answering for. If answering for more than one airport size, please list all that apply.
Question 74.
If identifying/demographic information is given, can comments be attributed to the individual or
airport?
Question 75.
Is there anything further you would like to add that has not been asked previously? If no, please
answer N/A.

APPENDIX D
Phone Interview Questions
Interviews were conducted with seven airports. In the SurveyMonkey results, eight airports
indicated they wanted the opportunity to provide further information by being contacted.
A total of five airports responded to requests for interviews; three did not. Another two General
Aviation airports who did not participate in the initial surveys were interviewed as well.
Information from the interviews have also been presented as case examples.
Interview questions are as follows:
1. What are your metrics for developing AEP Annexes?
2. Do you make the AEP available to the staff who will have roles and responsibilities during
an emergency? If so, how do you provide them with the AEP or relevant parts/plans?
3. Have you incorporated AEPs and annexes into operations, including training and exercising?
If so, how?
4. What techniques and procedures have you used for incorporating lessons learned and best
practices into AEPs and annexes?
5. What challenges and areas for improvement have you experienced when updating your
AEPs and/or developing annexes?
6. Do you de-conflict and complement other airport and/or local, state, and federal plans?
7. How have you overcome challenges in your AEP practices and are there any enduring
challenges you experience throughout the process?
8. Anything else you’d like to mention that we didn’t talk about?
136

APPENDIX E
McCarran International Airport

EAP Reference Guide
Emergency Action
Plan Reference
Guide
Airside Operations
Quick Reference Guide
McCarran International Airport

Las Vegas, NV
2018
137

Table of Contents
1- Alert 1 - Aircraft (Ground) Minor Emergency 20- Non-Sterile (Dirty) Aircraft
2- Alert 2 - Aircraft (Airborne) Major Emergency 21- Suspicious Substances CBRN Hazards
3- Alert 3 - Aircraft Accident 22- Infectious Disease/ Poison Control
4- Alert 4 - Aircraft Bomb Threat 23- Aircraft Diverts/Gate Holds
(Aircraft or Airline) 24- Wildlife / Bird Watch Condition Declaration
5- Alert 5 - Building Bomb Threat 25- Wildlife / Bird Strike Reporting
(Airport Facility / Employee) 26- Fuel / Fluid Spill
6- Alert 6 - Air Piracy - Hijacking 27- Automated Transit System Emergency Plan
Incidents and Other Unlawful 28- Fallen Soldier Detail
Interference with Operations 29- Rwy/Twy Navigational Aid Damage
7- Alert 7 - Structure Fires, Fuel Farm 30- Runway Design Standards Matrix
and Fuel Storage Areas 31- Aircraft Design Group Size
8- Natural Disasters: Hurricane, 32- ARFF Index Chart
Earthquake, Tornado, Volcano, Flood 33- Operational Airfield Limitations
9- Lightening and other Severe Weather 34- Airport Data Information
10- Hazardous Materials/Dangerous Goods 35- Rwy/Twy Intersection Arr & Dep Lengths
11- Movement Area Lighting Power Failure 36- Construction Site Inspection
12- Water Rescue Situation 37- Perimeter Fence Line Change
13- Crowd Control 38- POTUS, VPOTUS, VIP & Charters
14- Medical / Expired Passenger Response 39- EOC & ACC2 Stand-Up
15- Ground Vehicle Accident 40- EOC Layout Chart
16- SIDA Security Breach (SD McDonald) 41- WebEOC Quick Start Guide
17- Expired Badge and other Door Alarms 42- JIC & AMC Phone Numbers
18- Security Breach 43- Emergency Phases
19- Perimeter Fence Damage 44- Airfield Grid Map

McCarran International Airport EAP Reference Guide 139
Example Quick Reference Guide

















Example Checklists



Abbreviations and acronyms used without definitions in TRB publications:

A4A Airlines for America
AAAE American Association of Airport Executives
AASHO American Association of State Highway Officials
AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
ACI–NA Airports Council International–North America
ACRP Airport Cooperative Research Program
ADA Americans with Disabilities Act
APTA American Public Transportation Association
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
ATA American Trucking Associations
CTAA Community Transportation Association of America
CTBSSP Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOE Department of Energy
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAST Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (2015)
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
FTA Federal Transit Administration
HMCRP Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
ITE Institute of Transportation Engineers
MAP-21 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (2012)
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASAO National Association of State Aviation Officials
NCFRP National Cooperative Freight Research Program
NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program
NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
RITA Research and Innovative Technology Administration
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers
SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:
A Legacy for Users (2005)
TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program
TDC Transit Development Corporation
TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (1998)
TRB Transportation Research Board
TSA Transportation Security Administration
U.S. DOT United States Department of Transportation

ADDRESS SERVICE REQUESTED
Washington, DC 20001
500 Fifth Street, NW
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD
ISBN 978-0-309-67376-1
90000
9 780309 673761

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Practices in Airport Emergency Plans (2021)

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National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2021. Practices in

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AIRPORT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM

ACRP SYNTHESIS 115

A Synthesis of Airport Practice

Research sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration

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AIRPORT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM ACRP SYNTHESIS 115

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Learn more about the Transportation Research Board at www.TRB.org.

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COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAMS

CRP STAFF FOR ACRP SYNTHESIS 115

ACRP PROJECT 11-03 PANEL

TOPIC S04-24 PANEL

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ABOUT THE ACRP SYNTHESIS PROGRAM

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Practices in Airport Emergency Plans

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2 Practices in Airport Emergency Plans

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go about closing the identified gaps. The AEP process (i.e.,

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6 Practices in Airport Emergency Plans

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Selection of Airports and Data Collection

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8 Practices in Airport Emergency Plans

FAA Inspector Survey

Collection of Data: SurveyMonkey

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• Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the American Red Cross

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History and Development of

History of the Airport Emergency Plan

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History and Development of the Airport Emergency Plan 11

In response, AC 150/5200-31B was released in March 2009

Requirements for Airport Emergency Plan Development

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12 Practices in Airport Emergency Plans

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History and Development of the Airport Emergency Plan 13

7. Administration and Logistics

and Maintenance, and Resource Management). In addition,

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14 Practices in Airport Emergency Plans

Figure 1. Emergency response organization responsibility matrix.

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