NATIONALISM, BISMARCK AND THE GERMAN UNIFICATION

INTRODUCTION: NATIONALISM AND CONSERVATISM IN THE PRUSSIAN CONTEXT

The Peace Settlement of 1814-15 turned Prussia towards Germany. It had lost much of its
Polish positions and gained land in central and western Germany. There was no hope in
reviving the eastern project, if any advances were to be made, they had to be in Germany.
Whereas Austria developed interests outside Germany, Prussia could only look to Germany.
With the onset of nationalism and liberalism in Europe, in the period after the Peace
Settlement of 1814-15, many countries in the west upheld liberal values. Catholic church
authority was criticized, the Settlement was declared anti-national and many liberal policies
such as liberal trade agreements, a more participatory society, mobilization of educated
public opinion and more economic and political freedoms. Intensification of such sentiments
played a huge role in the period leading up to the Crimean war of 1854-56 that finally
undermined the Settlement. At the heart of this liberal ideal there an assumption of a
consensus based on a common culture mediated through a common language. Britain and
France took for granted the idea of a national culture as a basis of political and economic
freedom – under such conditions, there could only be a constitutional government with a
restricted role for coercion. Public opinion in these countries looked to constitutional
government of states and the pursuit of such liberal policies.
A very different set of assumptions was made by conservatives, especially in central and
eastern Europe. In these circles, life was still seen as ordered by birth, privilege and Christian
belief with the monarch at the pinnacle of the hierarchy with the nobility and the church to
support them in the maintenance of order. Such conservatism had implications also for
diplomacy and warfare. International relations were seen as contact among like-minded
princes and their aristocratic servants, who shared a common culture as well as familial ties.
The prince remained commander-in-chief of the army, which was offered by nobles.
Germany occupied a middle position here.
Conservative assumptions largely worked in Berlin but were faltering at the face of
nationalist and constitutionalist movements. Public debt was reduced and agricultural
reforms were carried out. The military began to be scaled down from the 1830s and in 1834
Prussia established the Deutsche Zollverein, which referred to an agreement to abolish tariff
berries between German states and operate on the basis of common tariffs externally.
Many industries, like food export, suffered in the eastern regions and stood to gain from
liberalization of trade. There were strong elements in governments who thought
liberalization was the best recipe to promote development and reduce public expenditure.
Accordingly, the state reduced interference and organized customs unions. After the 1840s,
Prussian economy started to grow rapidly. Noble manors were now owned by non-nobles
and there was developed an economic and professional upper middle class of great
prestige. Advanced regions like the Rhinelands generated a larger middle class and
demanded a more equal and participatory society.
But the Germans did not live in a national state like the English or French but it was not like
the cultivation of German national nationalism saw repression from above and indifference
among the public. They were never placed in a position of subordination to other language
groups. Their national culture was never challenged so much as their political organization
along national lines. This is why, initially, nationalist opinion in Prussia was content with the
provisions of the 1814-15 Settlement, which was at the same time declared anti-national in
western Europe. As one moved from the west to the east, nationalism became synonymous
with maintaining status quo and status quo in Germany referred to maintaining German
security against French advance (Britain and Russia led largely non-interventionist policies
after the Crimean War of 1854-56). The Deutsche Bund (or German Confederation) provided
for in the 1814-15 Settlement, protected Germany against France by ensuring Habsburg pre-
eminence in Germany. And for precisely this reason, nationalist opinion in Prussia was
generally anti-French and pro-Austrian.
This vital administrative and organizational (after the Franco-Prussian war, almost translated
to an anti-French) element in German nationalism, both in Prussia and Austria, not only
never diverted focus from military reforms and rebuilding but also secured liberal support
inasmuch as it could not be opposed on economic terms. As a result of this, conservative
elements and high-ranking military officials still commanded influence and respect in
government, so much so that a large part of Prussian policy towards the southern German
states was based upon the pro-Prussian military policies of these states.
The conservatives, initially, maintained a policy of dualism and status quo towards Austria.
An ambitious foreign policy would have costed money and would have meant constitutional
concessions to secure loans. In 1847 the government wished to borrow money for a railway-
building project but constitutional agreements in 1815 required that all provincial
assemblies be brought together in a single United Diet. When the Diet demanded a state-
wide constitution, Frederick William IV dissolved it.

THE PARLIAMENTARY CRISIS IN THE 1840s AND 1850s

In 1848, liberal revolutions broke out across Europe. The Bund was suspended. Frederick
William saw this as both a threat and an opportunity. While he agreed to freedoms such as
free assembly and freedom of the press, he also declared that Prussia would go forth into
Germany. This could be seen as an attempt to concentrate Prussian energies outwards and
take advantage of other German governments including Austria.
In fact, most energy was devoted to internal problems during 1848, following the collapse of
crown authority in late March. In November, the King took the initiative to remove the
Prussian National Assembly from Berlin. In December, he issued a constitution of his own. In
April 1849, he rejected the offer of the imperial crown made to him by the National
Assembly. At the same time, with help from both the governments and moderate liberals,
he tried to extend Prussian control over other parts of northern and central Germany.
However, Austrian recovery and the clear desire of the German states to not fall under
Prussian control forced him to abandon this policy in Olmuetz in November 1850.
After 1850, government was in the hands of an aristocratic elite of high officials and army
officers; democratic provisions made in 1848 were unilaterally amended in an authoritarian
direction. A two-house system was adopted. The two houses were the Higher House
(Herrenhaus) and the Lower House (Landtag). The higher house was dominated by the old
nobility. Members to the lower house were elected based upon a three-class voting system.
Every electorate was divided int three classes with equal tax liabilities, who elected the
same number of electors. These electors then elected the representative of the
constituency. Insofar as this system favored wealth over privilege, it was not a traditional
conservative measure; but it was profoundly anti-democratic, proved by the poor turnouts
in the lower classes of the electorates. Besides, manipulation of votes made the Lower
House quite pliable until the end of the 1850s.
After Olmuetz, all the conservatives were concerned with was that Austria respect Prussia’s
rights and status. Officials in power in Berlin, all highly conservative, generally were
reluctant to challenge the status quo in Germany. They knew their demands did not have
popular middle-class support.
This policy did not change much in the New Era (1858-62). Wilhelm succeeded Frederick
William as prince-Regent in 1858 after the latter’s mental instability had declared him unfit
to rule (Frederick William died in 1861). Frederick William never really wanted to be king; he
was above all a military man. At the same time, he had little sympathy for the conservative
clique that ran the administration in the 1850s. He did away with vote manipulation in the
Lower House, which led to a moderate liberal majority in the 1858 elections. William was
happy to allow moderate liberals into government. This gave many liberals hope for more
liberal reforms at home and a more assertive policy in Germany. The effect of constitutional
government since 1848, no matter its flaws, was to create state-wide political organizations
and connection focused on parliament with which a reform-minded ruler could come to an
understanding.
Liberals were soon disappointed. In 1859, Prussia was divided over how to react to the
Italian war. Some in Prussia wanted to exploit Austria’s difficulties and move on Germany.
The dominant view in Prussia was that Prussia should support Austria, as a fellow German
power, as a defender of the status quo, in order to contain the French threat; but Prussia
wanted to offer such support at a cost, namely the command of federal forces in the
German theatre of war. This demand did not only aim to shift the balance of dualism in
Prussia’s favor. It also was born out of the genuine threat of French advance on the
Rhinelands. As it were, Austria was not ready to pay this price at first. It fought alone and
lost to Italy. Meanwhile, the cost of cooperating with Prussia kept increasing. This led
Austria to rapidly sue for peace with France.
Austria had lost but Prussia had lost equally; the dualism policy was in danger but there was
no alternative policy to take its place. Prussia did assert independence in Germany vis-à-vis
the Vienna Settlement but could not challenge Austrian pre-eminence in Germany.
At home, the King was alarmed at the decrepit performance of the military exposed by the
partial mobilization ordered during the crisis of 1859. This led Wilhelm to introduce radical
reforms to the military. These reforms produced two results: one, they almost doubled the
size of the military to 110,000 and two, they increased the strength of the reserves,
Landwehr, as well. Furthermore, the Landwehr was relegated to garrison and rear-line
duties whereas it had a much more numerical and functional role in the unreformed army.
These measures required large increases in expenditure, numbers of cavalry officers and
infantry regiments. A bill to achieve this was introduced in the Landtag in February 1860.
The majority in the Landtag had no objection to the strengthening of the military; they knew
this was an important instrument for a strong national policy. But they did object to these
reforms on both political and financial grounds – taxation would increase immensely and a
strong army would become a powerful tool in the hands of the crown to use against internal
opponents. They believed the reason for this to be that these reforms would eliminate the
civic influence induced by short full-term service and the presence of a strong reserve.
Therefore, the parliament wouldn’t agree to the full set of reforms and only granted monies
for its partial fulfillment. The king wasn’t willing to compromise but repeated elections
resulted in strong liberal majority that eventually displaced the moderates and formed the
Progressive Party in 1861.
When the situation reached deadlock in the autumn of 1862, William started hinting at
abdicating. Instead statesman Albrecht von Roon persuaded him to grant Bismarck an
appointment of Minister-President.

BISMARCK’S APPOINTMENT TO MINITSER-PRESIDENT

Otto von Bismarck was sent to Berlin as ambassador in 1848 to defend the crown.
Thenceforth he became actively involved in the politics of the cuter-revolution, usually
suggesting the most brutal measures be taken against it in order to discourage any future
attempts at disturbing the proper order of things. In his view, the bulk of the rural
population did not care for liberals and radicals and would happily go back to obeying their
God-given rulers if the conservatives had sufficient confidence to reassert their claim to
power.
Bismarck’s reward in playing his part in royalist counter-revolutionary politics was that he
was sent as ambassador to the Diet of the restored Bund of 1851. In Frankfurt, where the
Federal Diet met, Bismarck first encountered Austrian pre-eminence. This was a particularly
galling moment for a conservative and ambitious Prussian such as him. Austria then was still
in the grip of assertive policies, even though the most ambitious elements of those policies –
the Confederation and the Zollverein – were undermined. Austria became Bismarck bête
noire and the destruction of the Bund his main concern.
Bismarck, while in Berlin, constantly advised the exploitation of Austrian weakness, first
during the Crimean war of 1854-56 and then during the Italian war of 1859. He did not share
the general assumption of his fellow conservatives that the preservation of conservative
rule at home entailed the maintenance of status quo abroad, especially in Germany.
Less remarked on than Bismarck’s obsession with the destruction of Prussian dualism in
Germany is his qualification of Protestantism. Bismarck was always alive to the need to
command loyalty of his subjects, even if that did not mean making them citizens of a
parliamentary democracy. In the later 1850s he increasingly came to realize that forward
movement for Prussia meant thinking beyond traditional dynastic structures and appealing
to some level of nationalistic sentiment.
Bismarck’s advice in the 1850s was unrealistic. Before 1854, Austria could rely on Russian
support. Before the reforms of 1861, the Prussian army was weak. The Emperor William’s
policies had little middle class and popular nationalist support, which was generally anti-
French and pro-Austrian, because France was experiencing the best military and diplomatic
performance at that time. Even though it must be remembered that Bismarck’s picture of
the current situation was far from complete – given that he was located in Frankfurt at the
time and would have been better able to put his obsessive anti-Austrian attitude into
perspective had he been in Berlin – there is no reason to believe that his policies would have
worked in the 1850s just because they worked in the 1860s.
In 1859 Bismarck was appointed ambassador to Russia, partly to get him out of the way
during the crisis caused by the Italian war and because he had dissented from the policies of
Berlin. In 1862, he was sent to France, which gave him an opportunity to study the French
government closely. Surprisingly, the rule of Louis-Napoleon intrigued him more than it
offended him – here Bismarck differed from his fellow conservatives too, along with his
willingness to contemplate agreements with the French ruler to strengthen Prussia’s
position in Germany.
It wasn’t so much his diplomatic opinions that led to Bismarck’s appointment as Minister-
President in 1862, but the current internal political crisis in Prussia. Bismarck had always
been a strong defender of the royal prerogative and this was supposed to be his role now.
Although he had his own doubts about Wilhelm’s intransigence about military reforms, in
his interview with the Emperor he declared his unswerving loyalty and willingness to act as
the king’s servant in defiance of the parliament. In a way, he made his appointment one of
personal fealty rather than of constitutional office; an emotional relationship that
established a strong sense of obligation on the king’s part, which Bismarck was often to use
to his advantage later.
Therefore, Bismarck assumed power as a man who would rule in defiance of the Parliament.
One of his first steps was to withdraw the ending budget and start extracting revenue on the
previous budget. He justified this view with his ‘constitutional gap’ theory. This stated that
the constitution made no provision for the conduct of government in the event that there is
a breakdown of relationship between the Crown and the parliament; under such
circumstances, however, the government could not be expected to cease all activity. The
liberals rejected a justification in constitutional terms that allowed their demands to be
ignored, but Bismarck was certain that they would not go much further than protest.
Given this internal crisis, it was difficult for Bismarck to carry through the assertive policies
in Germany he had advocated earlier. Such policies he knew would not command
conservative support. When he tried to appeal to the liberals in his notorious speech about
a German policy based on ‘iron and blood’ rather than parliamentary resolutions, this was
seen as a threat to them rather than an invitation to lead Prussia into Germany. Liberals
assumed he would not stay in power long if he opposed the strongest and most progressive
elements of society; conservatives watched him carefully for any signs of backsliding.
In the autumn of 1863, the constitutional crisis still remained unsolved. Bismarck’s main
achievement was an anti-Polish agreement with Russia that ensured Russian neutrality in
the future but enraged liberal opinion both at home and in Europe and led to confrontation
with assertive Austrian policy that made the maintenance of Austro-Prussian duality in
Germany difficult. Bismarck might want to break out of this cage but he could not seem to
find the key to the lock.
That key was provided by the onset of the Schleswig-Holstein crisis in November 1863.
Some historians view this as the moment when the unification of Germany began.

THE WAR BETWEEN GERMANY AND DENMARK

Schleswig and Holstein had already caused an international crisis in 1848-9, leading to a
brief war between Germany and Denmark. The issues were resolved by the Treaty of
London in 1852.
Schleswig and Holstein were two duchies under the Danish crown but were ruled on
different terms to Denmark proper. Holstein had a German-speaking population and was
also a member of the German Confederation. Schleswig’s southern and central districts
were dominated by a German-speaking population but it also had a Danish-speaking
population in the north and the center. The German-speaking population occupied the
leading social groups and dominated the states-government of Schleswig and Holstein.
The major political questions concerned the division of the Duchies and the terms of rule of
Denmark proper. The intensification of nationalist sentiment in Denmark as well as Germany
made it increasingly difficult. The Danish claimed that Schleswig belonged to Denmark and
must be ruled on similar terms to Denmark proper. German nationalists claimed that
Schleswig and Holstein belonged together and wished to integrate them into the German
Confederation.
In 1863, before Christian IX’s succession, the Danish government drew up a charter (the
March charter) that incorporated Schleswig into the Danish kingdom; on this basis a
constitution was drawn up in November. Christian signed the constitution shortly after
acceding to the Danish throne. At this point German national sentiment exploded. It was
claimed that the title of Duke of Schleswig-Holstein be given to Frederick, the Duke of
Augustenberg, who would bring both Duchies into the German Confederation.
It is unclear whether Bismarck had a definite policy when the crisis broke in November 1963.
This was an opportunity for forward policy but he did not want to alienate other European
powers. His decision was to act in defense of international policy, which dismayed the
national movement and the Federal Diet, but it provided legitimate diplomatic ground for
action and hopes for Austrian cooperation.
In December 1863, when Saxon and Hanoverian troops occupied Schleswig, Bismarck was
confident about going ahead with his preferred option – annexation of the Duchies into
Prussia.
Without any clear guarantees that the connection between Denmark and the Duchies could
only be severed through mutual consent, or any guarantees of conformation to conditions
of the agreements settled upon in 1851-52, Bismarck justified his claim by saying that
Denmark was not fulfilling conditions that would enable it to continue to govern the
Duchies.
At the peace table in London, Bismarck had to go along with the proposal of the Personal
Union but was spared the difficulty by Danish refusal that was based upon the belief that
acceptance would subject the Danes of Schleswig to German domination, precluding any
chance of altering the local government. He also pointed out to German nationalism, which
he was happy to encourage at that time, as something that has to be taken into account.
Difficulties would have resulted if Denmark accepted the proposal of the partition of
Schleswig, which in British opinion was a neat and national resolution, but Denmark refused
and Bismarck was let off even that hook.
Bismarck had now to go along with the Augustenberg rule. But he made it clear that if
Augustenberg assumed the tile of Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, it would have to adopt
Prussian military system, allow Prussia to operate its naval bases, build a canal across its
territory and become a member of the Zollverein. Augustenberg might have been ready to
accept these demands but Austria could not.
Once Austro-Prussian troops had occupied both Duchies, Bismarck was content to wait. He
assured Austria that he was quite happy to let present military arrangements continue
indefinitely.
In did seem for a time in 1865 that Bismarck was prepared to advance on Austria when
Austria began to push the Augustenberg candidacy; there are a number of reasons why his
did not happen. There was still a powerful peace party in Berlin, including the Crown Prince,
who wanted to maintain a policy of dualism towards Austria. Wilhelm himself needed some
pursuing to break alliance with Austria, an alliance that was directed against Napoleon’s
France in 1813. Prussia was at the time dealing with the internal constitutional crisis, which
made it difficult to raise monies and revenues for an advance on Austria. No agreements
had been negotiated with Italy that would help weaken Austria, opening it up a two-front
war.
Thus, the decision was put off, but Bismarck had made it clear that he wanted to end
dualism in Germany and to do what was needed to go to war with Austria.

THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR

Bismarck did not achieve much by way of laying the groundwork for battle with Austria. The
political genius in Bismarck was rather displayed during and immediately after the war. In
Prussia, on 3 July, that is the day of the battle of Koeniggraetz but before news of the
victory, there had been elections to the Landtag. The liberal opposition suffered decisive
defeat. The war manifesto had been couched almost entirely in terms of Prussian
patriotism, interests and honour. For a conservative, this situation could be used to settle
the constitutional crisis in favour of the monarchy. Bismarck did precisely the opposite.
He introduced into the Landtag what is known as the Indemnity Bill, offering a settlement to
the Landtag: a return to constitutional rule. The government would put its measures before
parliament for approval in the ordinary way; parliament would not seek retribution for its
treatment since 1862. Bismarck did not admit to any wrongdoing. He still adhered to the
‘constitutional gap’ theory on which he had justified his actions since September 1862.
Nevertheless, this was a major concession to parliament and liberalism given the strong
position Bismarck now occupied. He could have just as easily modified the constitution to
weaken the position of parliament, but he decided against it.
Why did Bismarck behave in this way?
We must remember that in many ways he was a product of modern political conditions. He
was well aware of the importance of favourable public opinion, especially from those
middle-class circles that dominated the press and the most dynamic parts of the growing
economy. Bismarck constantly talked about the need to have the support of the major social
groups. Parliament in his view was not an instrument of government, but a vital way of
consulting with and gaining the support of powerful social forces.
Bismarck believed that his constitutional concessions allowed Prussia to show a united face
to the outside world, especially Austria and France, offered the best way of integrating the
newly annexed territories into Prussia and persuaded the south German states that the new
political creation was not authoritarian Prussian rule. The idea of appealing to German
nationality in a way that extended to alterations in state organization now became a part of
Bismarck’s policy.
Furthermore, Bismarck had negative memories of the conservative intrigues of the 1850s.
He had no more wish to fall into the hands of the ‘ultras’ at court and in the army than into
those of parliamentary liberals. In pushing through the Indemnity Bill Bismarck was in part
preserving his independence, occupying a fulcrum position that enabled him to play off
counterposing interests and institutions against one another.
The Indemnity Bill divided Prussian liberals between a minority who could not put behind
them four years of unconstitutional rule and harassment and a majority who saw this as a
golden opportunity to help shape the new Germany that would arise out of Prussian victory.
Bismarck's other major concern was to bring the war to a rapid conclusion. Wilhelm and the
army leadership, wanting to consolidate their victory, contemplated marching south and
occupying Vienna. Bismarck opposed this. He knew that one or two successful battles do not
necessarily finish a war. To push Austria into a humiliating position would encourage
resistance in that country, the raising of new armies, the problems of occupation. In the
meantime, Napoleon was starting to move to take advantage as he had always planned.
Russia had hoped for Austrian success and envisaged intervening although she received no
encouragement from Britain.
In one sense Bismarck always held to the policy of dualism. Prussia could never conquer
Austrian Germany. Prussia would not have found it very easy to control south Germany,
especially when different regions the Catholic states of Bavaria and even its northern
Protestant states, Austrian Silesia and Wuerttemberg owed loyalty to their present ruler and
that it would weaken Prussia to take over such areas. In addition, Austrian Germany was a
part of the Habsburg Empire, an essential element of the stability of Europe.
Bismarck finally, with the help of Italian advance, prevailed upon Wilhelm, much to the
King’s and the Army leaders’ distaste. The peace settlement was very generous: no territory
or indemnity was claimed from Austria. Isolated, her major armies in disarray in the north
and locked in a struggle in Italy as well, Austria was glad to accept and the Peace of Prague
(August 1866) was soon agreed.
Prussia was less charitable to the Protestant rulers of north and central Germany who had
opposed her in the war. The King of Hannover, the Elector of Hesse and the Duke of Nassau
were in effect deposed and their territories annexed directly to Prussia. Bismarck did not
want to leave them any territory or base from which to plot recovery. Schleswig and
Holstein also became a Prussian province. After a period of direct rule under military and
civilian commissars these new provinces were incorporated into Prussia on the same
administrative and constitutional terms as the old provinces.
Prussia extended her new influence in north and central Germany by putting into practice
elements of the plan for federal reform issued in March 1866. The states north of the river
Main not annexed to Prussia joined with her in the North German Confederation. A
Bundesrat was established, over which William presided, made up of state delegations and
dominated by Prussia. The Confederation also had a lower house, a Reichstag, which was to
be elected by all males of 25 years of age or above.
In this way Bismarck hoped to convince both northern and southern Germany worried
about the expansion of Prussian power that the new Germany would have a genuinely
popular and national character. The National Liberal party won the first elections to this
Reichstag cooperated closely with Bismarck for the next decade.
Four considerations were to dominate German politics between 1867 and 1871. First,
Prussia had to absorb and integrate her new territories and the North German
Confederation had to develop a firm institutional life. Second, there was the question of
relations between northern Germany and the German states south of the river Main. Third,
revanchism in Austria needed to be handled. Fourth, there was the question of France,
which had gained nothing from the war between Austria and Prussia.
Prussian victory had become clear on July 3. It was on the day of Koeniggraetz that the cult
of Bismarck, as a genius statesman who showed the way to the formation of a German
nation, began.

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

After 1867, Bismarck’s greatest concern was to absorb what Prussia had gained in northern
and central Germany. He also wanted to build bridges to the south German states. To some
extent, Prussian treatment of north Germany condition Bismarck’s policies towards south
German policies. In his internal policies to this end, he attached importance to warding off
international interference and accordingly encouraged anti-French sentiments especially but
not exclusively in the northern and protestant German states. Increasingly, he was having to
stress the national character of his internal policies.
In the 1870s, Bismarck’s cautious forward policies were faltering. He dismissed the National
Liberal idea of inviting southern Baden to join the North German Confederation, lest this
encourage anti-Prussian sentiment in the south. Nevertheless, in the north, Bismarck was
still dependent on the National Liberals more than he liked. In the south, his military
reforms had become counterproductive, partly due to rejection by the governments of
Bavaria and Wuerttemberg. But at the same time, Bismarck feared that the southern states
such as Bavaria and Wuerttemberg might fall, because they were pro-Prussian in matters of
military reform. Bismarck also had cause to be concerned with Austria and there was always
the threat that France would exploit disputes to undermine Prussian dominance in
Germany.
By 1870, however, Bismarck was convinced to advance in the direction of war and in July, he
spurned the opportunity to avoid war. Three reasons could be given for this decision. One,
Prussia always feared that Count Beust in Vienna might finally get Austria around to form an
anti-Prussian alliance; elimination of the French threat precluded that possibility. Two, the
south German states were slipping out of Prussian control; a national war with an old
enemy, France, threatening the German nation could bound the southern states in military
alliance and stop that slippage. Three, Bismarck always feared that France was going to keep
demanding concessions from Prussia, like it did with Italy, till Prussia had become a client
state – a liberalised French government, mobilising instead of containing its public opinion,
and continuing with military reforms might as well become a formidable power in a few
more years. Moltke shared Bismarck’s view that war must be fought sooner or later.

Unlike the war of 1866, the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 was a national war. The German
national movement engaged fully behind the Prussian government. The princes of southern
Germany brought their states into war and south German troops fought as effectively as
their northern counterparts. However, it would be wrong to explain these events in terms of
deep-rooted national antagonism. As recently as in 1813 the south German states –
Napoleonic creations – were allied to catholic France, against protestant Prussia; up to 1870
France did not look upon Prussia with as much hostility as it did upon Britain or Russia.
French patriotism was engaged by military defeat, Prussian patriotism by military success.

This national war aroused the demand for a more comprehensive victory. Bismarck did not
want to stop after winning the initial battles or after the fall of Napoleon. This is was not
because of national pressure but because Bismarck had realised that the present situation
was different from the situation in 1866: France's isolation had been exposed and national
emotions had to be satisfied.

Though Bismarck did not go as far as Moltke, who preferred a war of much greater
destruction, for the time being a tripartite consensus among Bismarck, Moltke and national
opinion led to the siege of Paris. When the French government tried to mobilise popular
anti-German patriotism, there was resistance from the Paris Commune — the Commune
was brutally repressed by the French government and this resulted in a civil war.

Whereas Prussia could introduce military reforms based upon universal conscription,
unworried about the political loyalties and able to override liberal objections, the more
bourgeois society of France from fear of radical populism rejected such a military system
when it was proposed in the 1860s.

Bismarck had not resisted the radicalising effects of sustaining war. The peace settlement
was vengeful — Alsace and Lorraine were annexed to Germany. Partly this was justified in
grounds of strategic security. Partly liberal arguments were employed; arguments that
declared that the inhabitants of Alsace were German. A new form of liberalism based on
language and even race was being born and was replacing a liberalism based on choice and
participation.

A heavy indemnity was imposed on France. Bismarck had no intention of upholding

‘legitimate’ government in France or establishing diplomatic relations. Bismarck knew
France was never going to be able to accept a strong German neighbour and therefore
maintained that policy towards France must be one of superior strength. Of course, this
gave rise to the very sentiments the new government claimed it would contain.
After France was secured, Bismarck turned his attention to the southern German states.
There was no question of annexing these states into Germany, and Bismarck was sensitive
to their needs. Before a constitution was drawn up for the new state, separate treaties were
made with each south German state. In particular, Bismarck was concerned with securing
Bavaria and to that end included massive bribery of King Ludwig and special concessions to
Bavaria in his political methods.
These treaties were the most important constituent of the constitution of the new state.
The preamble to the constitution described it as arising out agreements between individual
states. The constituent assembly played much more the role of a ‘rubber stamp’ in 1870-1
than in 1867. Liberal objections were disregarded on many aspects; for example, the
decision to use the term ‘empire’ in the title of the new polity was something the liberals
were unhappy with.
In this way, Bismarck balanced growing national liberal sentiment in northern Germany with
the Catholicism of southern Germany. In many respects, the state of 1871 was turning back
from the unitary, parliamentary and liberal trends of the North German Confederation.
Parliamentary deputies weren’t invited to the grand ceremony to proclaim the Empire. The
trappings of dynasty, army and honour dominated the occasion, while national institution
and language were conspicuous by their absence as the ‘German nation’ was addressed and
the Empire proclaimed in its name.
On 18 January 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles.

Aurchisman Mukherjee
Roll No.: 001900901031
Department of Philosophy