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Changes in Mitigation: Comparing Boston's Big Dig and 1950s Urban Renewal

Article  in  Public Works Management & Policy · July 2002

DOI: 10.1177/1087724X02007001005

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 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT
Bushouse / BOSTON’S
& POLICY / JulyBIG DIG AND 1950S URBAN RENEWAL
2002

CHANGES IN MITIGATION
Comparing Boston’s Big Dig
and 1950s Urban Renewal

Brenda Bushouse is an BRENDA BUSHOUSE

assistant professor of public University of Massachusetts
policy and political science
at the University of Massa-
chusetts, Amherst. She holds This article explores the mitigation efforts of the Central Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) pro-
a joint position between the ject and compares them with Boston’s urban renewal history. The CA/T project,
Department of Political Sci- known as the Big Dig, replaces the elevated highway built during urban renewal
ence and the Center for with a tunnel under Boston Harbor, a 14-lane crossing of the Charles River, and an
Public Policy and Adminis- 8-to-10-lane underground expressway. The project is expected to be completed in
tration. Her main areas of 2004 and will cost more than $14 billion. Of this price tag, an estimated $3 billion
research relate to the role of has been spent on mitigation, with considerably more mitigation costs off budget.
nonprofit organizations in The extensiveness of mitigation for the CA/T project represents a distinct difference
the United States. Currently, between urban renewal and highway projects of the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1950s,
she teaches courses on federal urban renewal and highway programs allowed local governments to
urban politics, public policy, steamroll over cities without adequate representation of citizen interests. In the
and nonprofit management. 1990s, participation requirements and environmental review has led to a reversal to
She holds a Ph.D. in public the extent that citizen, business, and environmental stakeholders hold critical veto
policy from Indiana Univer- points that can effectively derail public works projects. Although there are
sity and a master’s in public undoubtedly gains by having a more inclusive planning process, the extensive costs
administration from Syra- to mitigate issues raised by stakeholder groups, especially environmental stake-
cuse University. holders, raises the question of whether other cities with decaying highway systems
will be able to replicate the Big Dig. Given the reality of mitigation requirements,
the prospect for future megaprojects does not look promising.

In this business you’ve got to take some groups by the throat and say, “Look, do this or I’ll break
your neck.” And they’ve got to believe you’ll do it.
—Ed Logue, director of Boston Redevelopment Authority
(quoted in “Boston’s Powerful Model,” 1966, p. 152)

We will not bulldoze neighborhoods. We will not take one person’s home. We will not make people
so unsure about the future that they are afraid to fix the roof because they don’t know if the state will
show up tomorrow to take their home.
—Governor Dukakis (quoted in The Boston Herald,
“Duke’s About-Face on the Tunnel,” 1983, p. 31)

Introduction

The Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel (CA/T) project currently under way in the City of
Boston is the largest public works project ever undertaken in the history of the United States.

AUTHOR’S NOTE: I thank Emily Hopta for her able research assistance and two anonymous reviewers
for their helpful comments.
PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY, Vol. 7 No. 1, July 2002 52-62
© 2002 Sage Publications

52

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 Bushouse / BOSTON’S BIG DIG AND 1950S URBAN RENEWAL 53

The CA/T project replaces the deteriorated six-lane elevated highway built through the heart of
Boston in the 1950s with a state-of-the-art transportation system (see www.bigdig.com/thtml/ The current traffic
mapframe.htm for a map of the project). The current traffic burden on the Central Artery far sur- burden on the Central
passes the 75,000 intended capacity. The most recent figures report the 7-mile downtown Artery far surpasses the
stretch to handle a daily traffic load of more than 190,000 vehicles (Beck, 1999). As a result, the 75,000 intended
Central Artery is infamous for its 10-hour traffic jams and an accident rate four times the capacity.
national average (Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel Project Page, 2002).
The solution to Boston’s traffic nightmare has come in the form of the CA/T project, known
as the Big Dig. This ambitious project includes demolishing the elevated highway and rerouting
traffic underground, building a 4-lane underwater tunnel that crosses Boston Harbor, and build-
ing a 14-lane crossing of the Charles River. This massive public works project includes a com-
mitment by state and local governments to keep the city open during construction with minimal
disruptions to residents and businesses. Construction started in 1991 with an estimated cost of
$2.8 billion. The CA/T will now cost more than $14 billion when completed in 2004 (Lewis,
2002), with approximately $8 billion from federal sources (Luberoff & Altshuler, 1996).1 This
enormous price tag (which continues to grow and is now under federal investigation) represents
the material and engineering costs involved in a construction project of this magnitude, but it
also includes an estimated $3 billion in mitigation costs, with significantly more off-budget
(Beck, 1999). The definition of mitigation, as stated in the Environmental Impact Report for the
CA/T project, is “planning of design and/or construction to overcome or avoid adverse impacts”
(Massachusetts Department of Public Works, 1990). More colloquially, the definition of miti-
gation as presented on the Big Dig’s Web site is “finding ways to break the massive project down
into manageable human terms, controlling the impact of construction while maintaining a via-
ble project budget” (Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel Project Page, 2002). The reality of
mitigation is that it is a very expensive process of resolving conflicts with businesses, environ-
mental groups, and citizens.
In the 1950s, when the original Central Artery elevated highway was constructed and great
stretches of the city were razed under the guise of federal urban renewal, the idea of expending
this magnitude of funds on mitigation would have been unthinkable. The Big Dig Web site
claims that the project is turning the history of urban highway construction on its head:

Where highway projects once bulldozed the neighborhoods and bisected cities in the name of
mobility, the CA/T project is reuniting neighborhoods and preserving the fabric of a city, even as it
makes dramatic improvements in its transportation system. (Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel
Project Page, 2002)

However, after reviewing the history to date, what emerges is not quite the rosy picture claimed
by the Big Dig Web site, but rather a sobering reflection of the reality of large-scale public works
projects. Federal policies of the 1950s and 1960s allowed city governments to steamroll over
neighborhoods without adequate representation of citizen interests, especially minority and
low-income citizens’ interests. But in the hyperlitigious environment of the 1990s, we have
moved to the opposite extreme, in which there are effective veto points at virtually every junc-
ture, especially from environmental stakeholders.
This article explores how city/state relations with stakeholder groups have changed in the
administration of public works projects. It compares the roles of Boston, Massachusetts’s busi-
ness, environmental, and citizen stakeholder groups in public works projects in the 1950s and
1960s to the CA/T project. The article begins with a history of Boston’s public works programs The strong-arm tactics
in the 1950s and 1960s, with particular attention paid to the city’s relations with citizen groups. of this era provide an
The strong-arm tactics of this era provide an interesting contrast to the current emphasis on pub- interesting contrast to
lic participation in the Big Dig project. The article then turns to a current day analysis of the city the current emphasis on
and state’s relations with business, environmental, and citizen groups during the Big Dig pro- public participation in
ject. The focus is on analyzing the mitigation efforts with major stakeholder groups with an eye the Big Dig project.
toward who participates and how their concerns are incorporated into the planning process. The
article concludes with prospects for future large public works projects.

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54 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / July 2002
The mayor approved
the final version of the
plan in 1957, and the
area was completely
razed by 1960.
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The Urban Renewal Legacy in Boston
The 1949 Housing Act (under Title 1) authorized federal loans and grants to communities for
slum clearance and redevelopment. In 1954, redevelopment became “renewal” that then
allowed federal funds to be expended on commercial and industrial areas.2 Local governments
used the power of eminent domain to seize private property for public uses or resell it to devel-
opers. Federal housing policies, combined with the National Defense Highway Act of 1956, led
to what is referred to as the urban renewal steamroller. In Boston, urban renewal affected 3,223
acres and more than 50% of the population, and federal grants per capita were the highest in the
nation (Stainton, 1972; Tager, 1998). Similar to other urban renewal programs around the coun-
try, Boston’s focus was on revitalizing the central business district. A major objective of the plan
was to rehabilitate old neighborhoods, but the critical issue for Boston urban renewal was the
definition of rehabilitate. The plan called for a reversal in the suburbanization trends in which
middle income Whites fled the city, leaving a concentration of minorities and low-income resi-
dents in the cities (Keyes, 1969). Given that this was the underlying logic of rehabilitation, it is
no surprise that Boston’s urban renewal favored demolition of low-income housing in favor of
more upscale developments.
The dominant perspective of city leaders at the time was that low-income areas needed to be
removed before the city could revitalize (Keyes, 1969; King, 1981). Renewal sites were chosen
based on visibility and political feasibility. This basically meant that those desirable sites that
did not threaten politically powerful interests were chosen first (Keyes, 1969). The salience of
political power becomes clear when comparing urban renewal projects in Boston’s South and
West Ends with urban renewal in the North End.
In both the South and West Ends, Boston’s urban renewal projects razed neighborhoods
without effective opposition from residents. The first urban renewal project, the New York
Streets project in the South End, razed a low-income, multiethnic area, only to have it lie vacant
for several years, waiting for development into a light industrial area (King, 1981). The West
End, populated in the 1950s by working-class Italians, Jews, and other ethnic groups, was
thought to have considerable economic potential due to its proximity to the downtown. Even
though it is now understood to have been a vibrant working-class community (Gans, 1962), the
city under the Hynes administration labeled it a slum, thereby qualifying it for federal urban
renewal funds. In 1950, the Boston Housing Authority applied to the federal government for
preliminary planning funds to study the West End (as well as the South End and Roxbury), and 3
years later the decision to redevelop the West End was announced officially. The mayor
approved the final version of the plan in 1957, and the area was completely razed by 1960. The
plan included relocating approximately 7,000 residents, demolishing virtually the entire area,
and replacing it with luxury, high-rise apartment buildings and townhouses (Gans, 1962).
There was little organized citizen protest regarding the city’s plans in the South End or the
West End. Gans (1962) argues that long-time residents did not believe that redevelopment
would actually happen and therefore did not organize. Some citizens organized against the West
End project by forming the Save the West End Committee, but it only represented a small per-
centage of residents.3 The Committee attempted to block the project using the court system,
arguing that the classification of the West End as a slum was based on incorrect statistics, but the
case was unsuccessful and the demolition continued.
The ability of residents to exert political pressure to halt urban renewal projects resulted in a
very different fate for Boston’s North End. Unlike the South and West End residents, the North
End residents were a more cohesive voting block and could affect electoral outcomes. The
North End was the center of Boston’s Italian community. Even though Italians were not part of
Boston’s power structure at the time, it was not politically possible to redevelop that area with-
out alienating Italian voters. Elections for the city council were at-large, meaning that officials
were elected not by ward or district but across the city. This type of electoral system favors well-
known candidates and makes it difficult for minority or less well-financed candidates to win an
election (Ross & Levine, 2001). Therefore, whereas the North End Italians were not able to pro-
duce sufficient votes to elect a representative from their own community, they were capable of
 Bushouse / BOSTON’S BIG DIG AND 1950S URBAN RENEWAL 55

affecting electoral outcomes of the mainly Irish candidates on the ballot. The attempt to rede-
velop the North End was quickly shelved when city officials realized it would alienate Italian
voters (Gans, 1962).
In contrast, even though the West End had a plurality of Italian residents, it was not seen as
the center of the Italian community and therefore not a threat to city representatives. The at-
large electoral system works to the disadvantage of less concentrated voting blocks. Without an
organized voice tied into the power structure to champion the vibrancy of the community (to
counter it being labeled a slum), the powers that be in Boston effectively acted as a steamroller
in the West End and South End.
In the late 1950s, Boston’s economy was in poor shape, and aspiring mayoral candidate John
F. Collins effectively used urban renewal as a campaign issue to win the election. After taking
office in 1960, Collins brought Ed Logue in as the director of the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA).4 Logue presented the “90 Million Dollar Development Program for Boston”
to radically alter the physical landscape of Boston. A key part of the plan was to join the plan-
ning board and BRA and place them both under Logue’s control, thereby combining planning
and execution and centralizing control of urban renewal in Boston. During his 6 years as devel-
opment administrator, Logue built the BRA into the city’s largest and most influential public
agency. This success is due chiefly to Logue’s ability to win federal funds, the support of Mayor
Collins, his alliances with major downtown business interests (financial, real estate, and news-
papers), and his political skill (Keyes, 1969).
BRA’s centralized power, combined with enabling federal legislation, gave increased power
to the urban renewal steamroller. Despite requirements in the 1954 federal Housing Act requir-
ing local community participation in developing and executing the urban renewal program,
BRA’s strategy was to manipulate the process so as to result in its preferred alternative.5 How-
ever, to comply with federal requirements, BRA decentralized administration so that each area
of the city had a BRA team to work with on renewal projects. According to one historical
account, BRA would present the neighborhood committee with three plans—the middle one
being preferred by Logue—assuming that through negotiations the committee would choose
the middle option. However, power was still centralized with Logue in that he had the final say
and could step in if the committee was not supporting the plan (Keyes, 1969). A public hearing
would be scheduled only after committee acceptance of the plan. The federal government The federal government
required that a comprehensive plan for neighborhood improvement be accepted or rejected in its required that a
entirety at a public hearing. The “either-or” process created a situation in which BRA would not comprehensive plan for
allow itself to lose at the public hearing stage. In one infamous public hearing regarding the neighborhood
Charlestown renewal project, the residents had broken down into factions supporting and improvement be
opposing renewal. In the 1965 public hearing in which the residents would need to support the
accepted or rejected in
plan, BRA waged an all-out battle to turn opinion to its side, with Logue personally getting
its entirety at a public
involved. In the public hearing, pandemonium broke out and there was a vote in the midst of
which all those in support of renewal were asked to stand. The newspapers carried a picture of hearing.
Logue standing on a table counting hands (Keyes, 1969). In the midst of this chaos, Logue
declared a victory for urban renewal (Tager, 1998).
Even though the Collins administration’s urban renewal era was heavy handed, the renewal
plans for demolishing housing were decreasing as years passed. In contrast to the West End, in
which nearly the entire area was razed, in Charlestown the amount of housing targeted for
demolition decreased with each successive plan. The first plan called for 60% of Charlestown
housing to be demolished. The 1962 plan decreased the amount so that only 19% of families
(4,000 people) would have to relocate. The final plan called for 11% demolition of residential
structures, translating to approximately 2,000 people having to relocate (Keyes, 1969).
The city government’s alliance with business interests resulted in business being the most
influential stakeholder; however, with each renewal project, negatively affected citizens
became more vocal.6 With the advent of the War on Poverty programs and the political activism
of the 1960s, Collins began to lose his popular support. Residents of one proposed renewal site
rented a large billboard addressed to the mayor stating, “To Hell with Urban Renewal” (Tager,
1998, p. 248). Business interests remained faithful to the Collins administration’s urban renewal

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56 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / July 2002
Gaining support in the
1980s for such a massive
public works project as
the Big Dig was no easy
task.
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program, but popular opinion turned against massive urban renewal projects. Faced with a loss
of political support, Collins did not seek reelection in 1967. BRA director Ed Logue launched an
unsuccessful mayoral bid; his failure reflects the growing discontent with the power politics of
urban renewal. In contrast, incoming Mayor Kevin White was elected on a platform of champi-
oning neighborhoods (Dreier & Keating, 1990).
7
The Big Dig Reversal
Fast forward to the 1980s, and we have a Boston in which any large-scale relocation effort
would immediately set off a political storm of protest. In 1970, citizen protest regarding high-
way development reached a crisis resulting in the governor declaring a moratorium on all new
highway development (Grant & Lemer, 1993). Gaining support in the 1980s for such a massive
public works project as the Big Dig was no easy task. Governor Dukakis faced a challenging
political environment in which to decide to support the project.8 Because Governor Dukakis had
previously supported the moratorium on highway development, choosing to support the Big
Dig in 1983 was a major policy reversal. Dukakis directly addressed how he intended to strike
the balance between the public’s need to access the city with the private concerns of residents by
vowing not to take a single person’s home. This pro-neighborhood stance prompted the much-
needed support of powerful U.S. congressman Tip O’Neill who, as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, vowed to use his influence to back federal funding for the project only under
conditions that were acceptable to his Somerville, Cambridge, and Boston constituents. House
Speaker O’Neill’s stewardship was the key to Massachusetts acquiring its unused portion of the
1956 Interstate Highway funds. Thus, the stage was set on the political and funding fronts for
the project to begin.
Changes in stakeholder groups created a much less hospitable environment in which to
advance such an immense public works project than their counterparts during the 1950s and
1960s urban renewal era. Although business interests, for the most part, remained aligned with
state and local government, Boston’s citizens had become much better organized and politically
savvy. In addition, new federal environmental laws facilitated the development of environmen-
tal stakeholders with substantial veto points to affect the planning and construction of public
works projects.
To ensure continued support for the project, Big Dig planners invested significant effort and
funds for mitigation. Planners vowed to keep Boston working with minimal disruption, which
meant that any business, citizen, or interest group disrupted had some incentive to complain. In
practice, this has meant considerable efforts to work with citizens, businesses, and interest
groups to minimize disruption and find workable solutions.
One of the current problems with Big Dig cost overruns (original budget was $4 billion but is
now estimated to be more than $14 billion) is that the original budget did not include costs asso-
ciated with mitigation. Robert Albee, Boston’s chief engineer when the project’s initial plans
and cost estimates were first developed, concurs in saying, “My best estimate is that mitigation-
related issues represent about one-third of the total project cost [when the total cost was esti-
mated at $10.8 billion]” (Beck, 1999, p. 62).
Mitigation and the Big Dig
The sources of pressure for mitigation efforts on the Big Dig project fall into three stake-
holder groups: business, environmentalists, and neighborhoods. The differentiation of stake-
holder groups is a distinct shift from the urban renewal era, in which business allied itself with
local government and the neighborhood groups were mostly outside the power structure.9 As
will be described in detail below, in the 1990s environmental stakeholders have become a pow-
erful force and, because of the political situation described above, neighborhoods have gained
considerable stature in affecting decisions. The complexity of mitigation led an exasperated for-
 Bushouse / BOSTON’S BIG DIG AND 1950S URBAN RENEWAL 57

mer Boston Transportation Commissioner Richard Dimino to characterize the situation as a

game of “three-dimensional chess” (Luberhoff & Altshuler, 1996, p. IV-3). In the sections
below, each major stakeholder group is explored to determine the impacts each has had on the
Big Dig.

BUSINESS STAKEHOLDERS

By successfully mitigating business concerns, project officials created one of the project’s
most powerful and loyal proponent groups for the CA/T. Downtown businesses with a stake in
the CA/T project formed the Artery Business Committee (ABC) in 1989 to monitor the pro-
ject’s impact on the local business community (Beck, 1999). ABC represents more than 60 com-
panies that employ more than 100,000 workers. Its membership includes most of the major
downtown property owners, engineering and design firms, law firms, architects, and planners
(Luberhoff & Altshuler, 1996). With its membership, ABC is capable of high-quality analyses
and carries political clout.
Two of the biggest concerns for many Boston businesses were access to Logan Airport and
maintaining an accessible and functional downtown. Big Dig proponents were able to convince Big Dig proponents
business owners that the project management had their best interests in mind. ABC allied itself were able to convince
with the state to protect the project and member interests. However, there were other factions of business owners that the
the business community that were not brought on board so easily. project management
One of the first and most dramatic examples of business mitigation came as a result of plans had their best interests
to remedy a previous design miscalculation by constructing a bridge across the Fort Point Chan- in mind.
nel. Executives at Gillette, Boston’s largest employer, asserted that the proposed construction
would disturb their sensitive manufacturing instruments. During the initial planning stage in
1983, a meeting was called among the Gillette executives, Massachusetts Transportation Secre-
tary Frederick Salvucci, and his chief of staff Mike Shea to discuss the possible outcomes of the
proposed Fort Point Channel construction project. “They made it clear,” said Shea, “if we went
ahead with it, they were going to leave the city of Boston.” Shea’s response was, “When the
city’s largest employer tells you they’ll leave, it’s over” (Sennott, 1994, p. 1). Rather than giving
up all hope, Salvucci and his team reached out to Gillette engineers and together they solved the
design problem.
Unfortunately, not all business people are interested in collectively solving the problem so
that both the project and the business interest move forward. For one restaurateur, the mitigation
efforts of the Big Dig looked more like deep pockets to be exploited. The owner of Francesco’s
restaurant, a North End pizza place, had long maintained that “he lost at least $40,000 worth of
business when trucks associated with the burying of the elevated Central Artery blocked the
entrance to his restaurant when they relocated utility lines” (Milne, 1996, p. 29). However,
bankruptcy court records obtained by The Boston Globe showed that the owner had filed for
protection from creditors in July 1993, which was approximately a year before construction
work began near the restaurant. Regardless of the apparent timing issue, then CA/T project
director Peter Zuk explained that every effort was made to mitigate any appearance that the situ-
ation was caused by insensitivity toward local business concerns. In fact, Zuk told The Boston
Globe that “Big Dig officials had paid the restaurant $13,000 to mitigate the effects of con-
struction and damage, and had worked with creditors to schedule debt payments” (Milne,
1996, p. 29). Even with this financial assistance the restaurant closed, but it is an example of how
the CA/T can become a scapegoat for every adverse business situation in the city.
In another situation, the owner of a parking lot serving Logan Airport went to great lengths to
fight plans to take a small section of his business property. After exploring several options for
relocation of ramps to Logan Airport, Big Dig planners determined that it was necessary to take
a 50-foot section of the Park ’N Fly parking lot located in East Boston and owned by a Boston
businessman and several out-of-town investors. This part of the harbor tunnel project had
already been reconfigured to mitigate resident concerns, and the new plan was seen as a win-win
solution. However, owners of the Park ’N Fly did not agree. The local owner, Richard Goldberg,
solicited political support to no avail and then turned to mobilizing residents. He formed the

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58 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / July 2002
Even though the
physical space of the
airport would not be
expanded, East Boston
residents exploded in
opposition.
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Save East Boston Committee to block the project and hired several residents to work on the
committee. Logan Airport is located in East Boston, and residents were particularly likely to
organize against airport expansion. Therefore, he portrayed taking the parking lot as an airport
expansion issue instead of part of the harbor tunnel project of the Big Dig (Luberhoff &
Altshuler, 1996). At the same time, Massachusetts Port Authority (the state authority adminis-
tering Logan Airport) had announced plans for building a new terminal at Logan Airport. Even
though the physical space of the airport would not be expanded, East Boston residents exploded
in opposition. The timing was such that some residents united against the Big Dig’s Park ’N Fly
property taking, even though administratively the two issues were not connected.10 The owner
formed a second committee, the East Boston Environmental Rights Committee, to fight reloca-
tion of the ramp by claiming it was just disguised airport expansion. The Park ’N Fly lawyers
took a strategy of seeking out any area where the Big Dig might be vulnerable to challenge, even
if the issue had no bearing on the Park ’N Fly issue.11 The owner also successfully lobbied the
state legislature. In spite of the owner being indicted for bribing a state official, the state legisla-
ture included a provision banning the state from taking the parking lot in a 1990 bill. However,
Governor Dukakis used his line item veto power to remove it. The Park ’N Fly mitigation dem-
onstrates the political and legal depths that a well-financed business owner opposed to a small
part of the overall project can substantially thwart the process.
ENVIRONMENTAL STAKEHOLDERS
Unlike during the 1950s urban renewal era, today environmental stakeholders hold critical
veto points and must be reckoned with effectively or else they have the potential to bury projects
in the courts. Although environmental interests played a part in earlier public works projects
(for a discussion of conservation groups’ impact on Boston’s interior beltway construction in
the 1960s, see Lupo, Colcord, & Fowler, 1971), it was not until the National Environmental Pro-
tection Act (NEPA) was passed that environmental groups were provided with an effective tool
to influence the process. NEPA requires an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) to be written for
public works projects to assess the potential for environmental consequences. This process has
turned into a substantial endeavor in which there are many junctures that groups opposing the
public works project can effectively alter or even halt the process.
A good example of environmental concerns burying a public works project is New York
City’s Westway project. This $2 billion project involved a 4.2-mile stretch of highway on the
west side of Manhattan linking Battery with 42nd Street. Much of the highway was to be a tun-
nel through a 169-acre landfill in the Hudson River. Environmentalists, with the support of the
Environmental Protection Agency, countered that the Westway project would destroy a critical
striped bass habitat. After 10 years of planning, a court order banned construction and essen-
tially killed the project (Elkin, 1985). There were many junctures in which it appeared that the
CA/T project would suffer the same fate as Westway (Beam, 1990; Howe, 1991). The environ-
mental regulations alone took 6 years to complete; the initial EIR was published in 1985, but it
was not until 1991 that the project received final authorization from the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, with the federal agency administering NEPA requirements.
Mitigation of CA/T environmental issues ranged anywhere from the benign process of
securing an array of required environmental permits, to the creative dumping of landfill into the
Boston Harbor to erect the Spectacle Island State Park, to having to construct entirely separate
transportation projects. An environmental issue that arose early in the project was dealing with
rats dislodged from construction. The issue received national attention in 1990, and even though
there was a plan already in place to deal with the rat problem, the media attention and pressure
from Boston’s Mayor Flynn created the political need for more state action. The result was a
state-funded $150,000/year state-of-the-art rat-control program, the most extensive rodent con-
trol program ever used on a highway project anywhere in the world (Hodges & Hale, 1998;
Luberhoff & Altshuler, 1996).
The largest example of environmental mitigation is the result of a group of environmentalists
who charged that the increased automobile traffic generated by the CA/T would in turn have a
 Bushouse / BOSTON’S BIG DIG AND 1950S URBAN RENEWAL 59

negative effect on the region’s air quality. The Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), a nonprofit
environmental group, intervened in the regulatory process on behalf of the environmentalists,
and the consequence was the largest mitigation package in the history of the CA/T project. The
CLF sought to pressure the state into providing alternative means of transportation by proposing
a mitigation package that included 15 extensions of commuter rail lines and construction of new
parking facilities at suburban stations. The Boston Globe reported that “the foundation had
made it clear it would sue to block the project if the state refused to agree to extensive mitigation
efforts” (Lehigh, 1990, p. 55). After 5 months of negotiation, the state agreed to fund the $1 bil-
lion mitigation package separate from and in addition to the CA/T budget. The total end cost of
the CLF settlement and its “string of improvements to the [mass transit] system [were later] pro-
jected to cost $3.6 billion by the time of their scheduled completion in the year 2010” (Palmer,
1994, p. 1). In exchange, the CLF “agreed not to sue over environmental matters and, indeed, to
intervene in support of the project if others try to block it on environmental grounds” (Lehigh,
1990, p. 55). A Boston Globe reporter concluded that “hundreds of expensive mass transit and
other environmental promises [have been] made to buy support—or at least silence—from
opponents of the project” (Palmer, 1994, p. 1).
The classification of this type of mitigation depends on the eye of the beholder. Some would
argue that CLF was coopted and now is in a position of not being able to sue even if there are
serious environmental issues that need to be addressed. Or it could be viewed as another win-
win situation in which the Big Dig gets to continue without being sued at every turn in exchange
for off-budget concessions to the CLF. Or, if you are James Kerasiotes, the recently fired chair-
man of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, you may feel that a great deal of extortion
occurred in the name of environmental mitigation (Luberhoff & Altshuler, 1996, p. V-25).
Regardless of the interpretation, the reality is that environmental stakeholders have critical veto
points and must be reckoned with effectively or else they have the potential to bury public works
projects in the courts.

CITIZEN STAKEHOLDERS

Even though the Big Dig project does not take anyone’s home, there is still considerable need
to mitigate its impact on neighborhoods due to traffic problems associated with the construction
and noise pollution. To aid with neighborhood mitigation, the state contracted with the City of
Boston (Palmer, 1994). Similar to the urban renewal era, the strategy was to decentralize by hav-
ing contact points throughout the city. The City’s Community Relations Office hired 10 com- The City’s Community
munity liaisons responsible for fielding neighborhood concerns and resolving them. The liai- Relations Office hired
sons also work with the contractors and engineers to address issues. Neighborhood liaisons are 10 community liaisons
point persons responsible for holding public meetings and distributing information (S. Collins, responsible for fielding
personal communication, December 9, 1999). Interviews with liaisons indicated variation in neighborhood concerns
who attends. In the Chinatown District, attendees are architects, planners, environmentalists,
and resolving them.
real estate interests, and developers, whereas in the Leather District attendees tend to be com-
munity activists. In the Downtown District the meetings are mostly attended by business groups
(W. Moy, personal communication, January 11 and 14, 2002; J. Sgarano, personal communica-
tion, January 17, 2002). Liaisons indicated that attendance and participation depends on the
issue at hand and varies considerably. In addition to regularly scheduled public meetings, there
is a 24-hour hotline to report complaints, and during the night there is a “noise patrol” composed
of project and city staff that monitors construction noise. The project maintains an extensive
Web site that includes notices of community meetings and the community liaisons’ phone num-
bers and e-mail addresses (Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel Project Page, 2002).
The need for mitigation was never more pressing than in 1990, when arguments from citizens
and environmental stakeholders resulted in a complete redesign of the initial 16-lane, 110-foot-
high, three-bridge system that had been planned to span across the historic Charles River. The
state representative for Boston’s North End and part of Charlestown, Democratic Representa-
tive Salvatore F. DiMasi, went so far as to file legislation in an effort to block what was then
known simply as Scheme Z. DiMasi justified his actions by saying, “We’re going to have to live

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60 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / July 2002
The Conservation Law
Foundation played a
major role in forcing
Big Dig planners to play
by their rules to ward
off endless litigation.
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with this massive, ugly structure for a long time.” He then cautioned, “Let’s not make a mistake”
(Howe, 1990, p. 1). As a result of political pressure from citizens, environmental groups, and
elected officials, Big Dig officials agreed to redesign the crossing and a citizen advisory board
was formed to consult on the design. After a 2-year and several million dollar delay, construc-
tion on a politically acceptable design was set to begin.12
But for other conflicts, compromises to reach palatable solutions are not possible. The North
End/Waterfront construction site has been the topic of frustration by citizens negatively affected
by the construction and alterations. Things as seemingly minor as shifting a traffic light and
removing a wheelchair ramp at an intersection have major impacts on the residents directly
affected. However, Big Dig officials point to the need for these changes to reach larger goals of
traffic movement after the project is completed. In response, some residents (primarily low-
income and retired people) formed the North End/Waterfront Central Artery Committee and
demanded that they have their own technical consultant to level the playing field. Big Dig offi-
cials pointed to the neighborhood mitigation program of community liaisons run by the city as a
means for citizen participation in the project, but the Committee countered that the liaisons are
not trained experts and are not able to adequately represent their interests (Lupo, 1994).
It appears that even if every stakeholder is “brought” to the table, there are some that sit with
the grown-ups and some relegated to the kiddie table. In that way, the Big Dig process is not
unlike the 1950s urban renewal era in which the political and/or economically powerful could
protect their neighborhoods but the less well connected and financed were not successful. How-
ever, the comparison is substantially limited in that the Big Dig effects on neighborhoods are at a
completely different scale in that no residents are being forced to relocate. Many are inconve-
nienced, but no one’s house is being demolished, let alone entire neighborhoods.
Mitigation and Prospects for the Future
Even though in current day Boston there is no Ed Logue figure who can come in and enforce
his preferences, ultimately someone’s preferences have to prevail. For the stakeholder groups
discussed above, the mitigation process varies considerably. The downtown business stake-
holders have been able to effectively organize and ally themselves with the state to protect their
interests, much like in the 1950s urban renewal era. The Conservation Law Foundation played a
major role in forcing Big Dig planners to play by their rules to ward off endless litigation. The
Central Artery Environmental Oversight Committee, a coalition of public and private groups
that tracks mitigation promises, stated that of the costliest and largest mitigation commitments,
more than half were not directly related to the project. Rather, they were necessary to gain envi-
ronmental or popular approval (Palmer, 1994). In some cases, residents joined forces with busi-
ness and environmental interests to advocate for changes, such as with the complete redesign of
the Charles River crossing.
Big Dig officials claim that from the initial planning stages of the CA/T to the present day,
public policy makers have consistently met the needs of the community in a way that allows for
a win-win resolution in that the stakeholders get their concerns addressed and the Big Dig pro-
ject continues, even if in altered form. The outstanding question is whether the end product is
improved because of the mitigation efforts. Given the increase in the Big Dig’s price tag, some
might argue that the big loser in this resolution is the tax-paying public outside of Boston.
Because the federal government will have paid for approximately half of the project, it is the
non-Boston tax paying public who have supported the project and are the ones who lose in this
bargaining environment. If Massachusetts had not been able to extract such large funding
amounts from the federal government, the extensive mitigation efforts would not have been pos-
sible. However, many would argue that it is precisely because of the federal environmental leg-
islation that such extensive mitigation efforts are necessary in the first place.
These new mitigation needs reflect the changes in the public policy–making environment
from the time of the original Central Artery project and urban renewal projects of the 1950s to
the more recent CA/T project currently under way. Whereas in the past abutting residents were
 Bushouse / BOSTON’S BIG DIG AND 1950S URBAN RENEWAL 61

forced from their homes, today any group with the financial capacity to hire lawyers can
threaten to block public works projects through the court system. One could argue persuasively
that federal legislation has created an 800-pound gorilla dominating public works planning and
construction. In this era of the omnipresent threat of lawsuits, it is a wonder that the Big Dig pro-
ject has continued.
This remarkable change in the political and regulatory environment marks the development
of a new model of political mitigation in which consensus building is the key. Luberhoff and
Altshuler (1996, p. VI-6) find that although the mitigation costs represent a sizable portion of an
already large project budget, the extraordinarily difficult and expensive, yet supremely impor-
tant, process of consensus building is the single most valuable lesson learned from the CA/T
project. Federal legislation has created rules regarding public participation in public works
planning processes, as well as establishing critical veto points in the planning process. Without
effective consensus building, public works projects are extremely vulnerable. Luberhoff and
Altshuler acknowledge “that projects with significant numbers of intensely motivated oppo-
nents are simply not feasible anymore” (p. VI-8). The challenge is for creating meaningful ave-
nues for dialogue among stakeholder groups to attain design and implementation processes that
facilitate investment in a shared outcome.
The reality of mitigation is that large public works projects are only feasible if the govern-
ment has extremely deep pockets and willingness to compromise with stakeholder groups. The
Boston Globe reporter Thomas Palmer (1997) concludes, and I agree, that “the essential lesson
of the big price of the Big Dig is that public participation—with an end toward doing big things
but also pleasing most everybody, rather than rolling over a neighborhood—costs money” (p. 8).
The complication for other cities looking to replicate the Big Dig to solve their transportation
problems is that the federal pockets are not as deep. The federal transportation fund allocations
have been altered by the 1998 Transportation Equity Act in such a way that other states will not
be able to extract the huge amount of federal funding necessary to undertake projects on a simi-
lar scale as Massachusetts’s Big Dig.13 In this respect, the prognosis for federal funding of large
public works projects is quite dim. Given the complexity and expense of the Big Dig, it may be Given the complexity
the first and last of its kind. and expense of the Big
Dig, it may be the first
and last of its kind.
Notes

1. In 1987, when the project cost was forecasted to be $4.4 billion, Massachusetts expected the federal government
to pay for 90% of the estimated cost (“Dukakis Reaches Out,” 1989). As the total cost continued to increase, the percent-
age to be covered by the federal government decreased.
2. Initially, redevelopment funds were to be used to raze dilapidated housing and build new housing. The shift to
renewal allowed cities to raze housing and replace it with commercial and industrial development.
3. The committee was led by a resident of Beacon Hill, which had two negative effects on the potential for the com-
mittee to affect the political process. First, he was seen as an outsider. Second, he had a reputation in Boston for champi-
oning unpopular, eccentric causes; thus, his credibility was in question (Gans, 1962).
4. Logue had been the chief of New Haven, Connecticut’s extensive renewal effort and first came to Boston as a
consultant.
5. Other criteria included: development of appropriate building codes, a comprehensive plan for the community’s
redevelopment, neighborhood analyses to determine problem areas, an administrative organization capable of carrying
out renewal activity, financial resources to support the locality’s share of the renewal program, and housing resources
for those displaced (Anderson, 1964, pp. 17-18).
6. See Tager (1998) for a discussion on the role of business elites in the Collins’s administration.
7. I acknowledge Todd Audyatis for his research assistance in the following two sections: “The Big Dig Reversal”
and “Mitigation and the Big Dig.”
8. Unlike in the previous federal urban renewal legislation in which the federal government administered funds
directly to cities, intergovernmental relations have shifted toward federal/state relations. Currently, the city plays a
much smaller role in federally funded public works projects and the state has a greater role.
9. The exception being the neighborhoods populated by the politically influential.
10. The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority has jurisdiction over the Big Dig, whereas Logan Airport is administered
by the Massachusetts Port Authority.
11. For example, the lawyers brought suit over the Charles River Crossing, which did not affect Park ’N Fly.
12. See the Big Dig’s Web site for visual renderings of the bridge (www.bigdig.com/thtml/mapframe.htm).

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 62 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / July 2002

13. The Federal Interstate Highway Program reimbursed approximately 90% of the Central Artery/Tunnel (CA/T)
project’s construction costs until June 1998, when the federal funding formula changed with the passage of the Trans-
portation Equity Act for the 21st Century. With passage of this Act, Massachusetts no longer was able to extract more
funds than it paid in to the Highway Trust Fund. Consequently, Massachusetts has to shoulder a greater portion of the
CA/T project’s costs than originally anticipated (Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel Project Oversight Coordination
Commission, 2000).

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