Enrile vs. Salazar [GR 92163, 5 June 1990]; Panlilio vs.

de Leon [GR 92164]

En Banc, Narvasa (J): 3 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concurs in GR 82164 and took no part in GR 92163

Facts:
 On 27 February 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Branch 103, in Criminal Case 9010941.
 The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors
composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis
and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November
29 to December 10, 1990.
 Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant.
 The following morning, 28 February 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City
where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig.
Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel,
filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on 2
March 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been: (a)
held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books; (b) charged with a
criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary
investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; (c) denied his right to bail; and (d)
arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first
having personally determined the existence of probable cause. The Court issued the writ prayed for,
returnable 5 March 1990 and set the plea for hearing on 6 March 1990.
 On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return for the respondents in the present
case and in GR 92164, which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. The
parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on 6 March 1990, after which the Court issued its
Resolution of the same date granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty
conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for
Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively.
 The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter
of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues
raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and
two against granting bail to the Panlilios.

Issue: Whether a petition for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a
right to bail or vindicating its denial.
Held:
 The criminal case before Judge Jaime Salazar (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City [Branch 103]) was the normal venue for invoking Senator Enrile's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment.
 The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said judge.
 The correct course was for Enrile to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail,
claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
 remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked,
and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.
 Even acceptance of Enrile's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a
non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense,
would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious
recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the Judge.
 All the grounds upon which Enrile has founded the present petition, whether these went into the
substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the
prosecuting panel or of the Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable
in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to the
Supreme Court.
 There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability or competence of the Judge — indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than
fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental
importance as to disqualify every court, except the Supreme Court, from deciding them; none, in
short that would justify by-passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation
through the hierarchy of our courts.
 Parenthetically, this is the reason behind the vote of 4 Members of the Court against the grant of bail
to Enrile: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its
error. It makes no difference that the Judge issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial
practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may
be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital
offense is charged. It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been
recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or
weakness of the evidence against him.
 Hence, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio
must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence Enrile and the Panlilios are entitled to bail,
before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to them being merely
provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by Enrile and the Panlilios. Once bail is fixed by the judge, the
corresponding bail bond filed with the Supreme Court shall become functus oficio.

Maguddatu vs. Court of Appeals [GR 139599, 23 February 2000]

First Division, Kapunan (J): 4 concur

Facts:
 Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, Atty. Teodoro Rubino, Antonio
Sabbun Maguddatu and several other "John Does" were charged with murder before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, for the killing of Jose S. Pascual. On 23 October 1985,
Maguddatu, et. al. filed a motion to be admitted to bail on the ground that the prosecution's evidence
is not strong.
 After partial trial on the merits, the trial court issued an order, dated 20 December 1985, granting
Maguddatu, et. al.'s motion for bail and fixing the amount at P30,000.00 each. On the same day,
Maguddatu, et. al. posted bail through AFISCO Insurance Corporation. On 6 January 1987, AFISCO
Insurance filed a motion before the trial court praying for the cancellation of Maguddatu, et. al.'s bail
 bond because of the latter's failure to renew the same upon its expiration on 20 December 1986.
 There is no showing, however, of any action by the court on said motion. On 2 January 1998, the
trial court convicted Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, together with
Atty. Teodoro Rubino, of the crime of Homicide and sentenced them to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of 8 years of Prision Mayor medium, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. The judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia.
 Accordingly, on 19 February 1998, the trial court issued an order for the immediate arrest of
Maguddatu, et. al. and their commitment to the custody of proper authorities. While remaining at
large, Maguddatu, et. al., on 27 February 1998, filed a Notice of Appeal from the order of conviction
for homicide with a motion to be granted provisional liberty under the same bail bond pending
appeal.
 The trial court does nor appear to have resolved the motion for bail pending appeal.
 Instead, it forwarded the records to the Court of Appeals.
 On 8 January 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, ordering the appellants to show cause
within 10 days from notice why their appeal should not be deemed abandoned and accordingly
dismissed for their failure to submit themselves to the proper authorities and to the jurisdiction of the
court from which they seek relief in the meantime that no bail has yet been approved for their
temporary liberty and, further considering that the approval of the same is discretionary and not to be
presumed; and in the meanwhile, the Station Commanders of the Manila Police Station, Manila and
the Makati Police Station, Makati City to file a return of the Order of Arrest issued by the Regional
trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City on 19 February 1998 in Criminal Case 12010. A Compliance and
Motion, dated 8 February 1999, filed by Maguddatu, et. al. explained their failure to submit to the
proper authorities. Despite the compliance and motion filed by Maguddatu, et. al., they remained at
large.
 On 23 June 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the resolution under question denying Maguddatu, et.
al.' application for bail and ordering their arrest. Aggrieved by the foregoing resolution, Maguddatu,
et. al. brought the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court on 30 August 1999. Pending
resolution of the petition, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution, dated 8 September 1999,
declaring that the appeal filed is deemed abandoned and dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124,
New Rules on Criminal Procedure, and thus ordered the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati
City to issue warrants of arrest for the immediate apprehension and service of sentence of Aniceto
Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu.

Issue: Whether Maguddatu, et. al. are entitled to bail during the whole duration their case is on appeal.

Held:
 The Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all the accused except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Herein, despite an order of
arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the Court of Appeals, Maguddatu, et. al. had
remained at large.
 It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or
otherwise deprived of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Maguddatu, et. al.'s Compliance and Motion dated 8
February 1999, came short of an unconditional submission to the court's lawful order and to its
jurisdiction.
 Further, the trial court correctly denied Maguddatu, et. al.' motion that they be allowed
provisional liberty after their conviction, under their respective bail bonds. Apart from the fact
that they were at large, Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court
 Administrative Circular 12-94, provides that "the Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused
to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to
the consent of the bondsman." The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used
during the 15-day period to appeal (Rule 122) and not during the entire period of appeal.
 This is consistent with Section 2(a) of Rule 114 which provides that the bail" shall be effective
upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner canceled, until the
promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was
originally filed in or appealed to it."
 This amendment, introduced by SC Administrative Circular 12-94 is a departure from the old
rules which then provided that bail shall be effective and remain in force at all stages of the case
until its full determination, and thus even during the period of appeal. Moreover, under the
present rule, for the accused to continue his provisional liberty on the same bail bond during the
period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessary.
 From the record, it appears that the bondsman, AFISCO Insurance Corporation, filed a motion in
the trial court on 6 January 1987 for the cancellation of petitioners' bail bond for the latter's
failure to renew the same upon its expiration. Obtaining the consent of the bondsman was, thus,
foreclosed.
 Furthermore, pursuant to the same Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused may be admitted to bail
upon the court's discretion after conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. However, such bail shall be denied or bail previously
granted shall be canceled if the penalty imposed is imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more
than 20 years if any one of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5 is
present. Herein, Maguddatu, et. al. are not entitled to bail. Firstly, Maguddatu, et. al. violated the
conditions of their bail. Maguddatu, et. al.'s non-appearance during the promulgation of the trial
court's decision despite due notice and without justifiable reason, and their continued non-
submission to the proper authorities as ordered by the Court of Appeals, constitutes violations of
the conditions of their bail. Moreover, it appears that Maguddatu, et. al. failed to renew their
expired bail bond, as shown by a Motion, dated 6 January 1987, filed by AFISCO Insurance
Corporation, praying for the cancellation of petitioners' bail bond because of the latter's failure to
renew the same upon its expiration. Lastly, Maguddatu, et. al. had no cause to expect that their
application for bail would be granted as a matter of course precisely because it is a matter of
discretion.
 In fact, the filing of a notice of appeal effectively deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to
entertain the motion for bail pending appeal because appeal is perfected by the mere filing of such
notice. It has been held that trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after
conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's
sound discretion.

De la Camara vs. Enage [GR L-32951-2, 17 September 1971]

Resolution En Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part

Facts:
 Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested on 7
November 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the
killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato,
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21 August 1968.
 Thereafter, on 25 November 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First
Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against de la
 Camara, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid
occurrence.
 Then on 14 January 1969, came an application for bail filed by de la Camara with the lower court,
premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of 21
August 1968. He likewise maintained his innocence.
 Judge Manuel Lopez Enage (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte
and Butuan City, Branch II) started the trial of de la Camara on 24 February 1969, the prosecution
resting its case on 10 July 1969.
 The Judge, on 10 August 1970, issued an order granting de la Camara's application for bail,
admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that de la Camara would
flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount
of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and
P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder.
 On 12 August 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such
order, sent a telegram to the Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting
that a P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable.
 De la Camara filed motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Judge however
remained adamant. De la Camara filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In
the meanwhile, de la Camara had escaped from the provincial jail.

Issue: Whether the judge has absolute discretion in the determination of the amount of bail, excessive enough
to discourage the accused from fleeing.

Held:
 Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.
So the Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes
meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the
fundamental law.
 It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against
excessive bail. As construed in the latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of money
bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial and declared that 'bail set at a higher figure than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment."
 Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of 10 August 1970 fixing the amount
of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by de la Camara, the sum of P840,000.00 for the
information charging multiple murder, there being 14 victims, and the sum of P355,200.00 for the
other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being 12 victims, is clearly violative of this
constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount
required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00
for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in the present case that the
Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses.
 No attempt at rationalization can give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is grim
irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post
such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently
yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a
mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level.
 There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances
be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of
desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required
 could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach.
 It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be
availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then. De la Camara's
subsequent escape, however, cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the relief prayed
for. What the Judge did, on the other hand, does call for repudiation from the Supreme Court.
 And lastly, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez on the case of Villasenor vs. Abano, there is a guideline
in fixing of bail. 1. Ability of the accused to give a bail, 2. Nature of the offense, 3. Penalty for the
offense charged, 4. Character and reputation of the accused, 5. Health of the accused, 6. Character
and strength of the evidence, 7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial, 8. Forfeiture of other
bonds, 9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from Justice when arrest, and 10. If the accused is
under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.

Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-62100, 30 May 1986]

En Banc, Fernan (J): 9 concur, 1 took no part

Facts:
 Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management,
Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the
management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said
business, but acts as president of the former corporation.
 Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this
jurisdiction, Manotoc, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his co-
stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the
appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for
Trans-Insular Management, Inc.
 The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc. (SEC Case 001826, "In the Matter of the
Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr.,
Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners"), was granted and a management committee was organized
and appointed.
 Pending disposition of SEC Case 001826, the SEC requested the then Commissioner of
Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear Manotoc for departure and a memorandum to this
effect was issued by the Commissioner on 4 February 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration
Regulation Division.
 When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a
fake, 6 of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against Manotoc and one Raul
Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due
course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Criminal Cases 45399 and 45400, assigned to Judge
Camilon; Criminal Cases 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove).
 In all cases, Manotoc has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU
Insurance Corporation as surety. On 1 March 1982, Manotoc filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country", stating as ground therefor his desire
to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities."
 The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both Judge Camilon and Judge
Pronove in their orders dated 9 March 1982, and 26 March 1982, respetively, denied the same. It
appears that Manotoc likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the
recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated 4 February 1980, but said request was also
denied in a letter dated 27 May 1982.
  Manotoc thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. On 5 October 1982, the appellate
court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Dissatisfied with the appellate
court's ruling, Manotoc filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
 Pending resolution of the petition, Manotoc filed on 15 August 1984 a motion for leave to go
abroad pendente lite. On 20 September 1984, the Supreme Court in a resolution en banc denied
Manotoc's motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite.

Issue: Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.

Held:
 A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated
in the bail bond or recognizance.
 The condition imposed upon Manotoc to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As held in People v. Uy
Tuising (61 Phil. 404 [1935]), "the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the
accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said
accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and
processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued
does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction."
 Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts. The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed
or filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from
the public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection.
 Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment.
 The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from
leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and
whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the
latter.
 In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his
allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for
permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise.