Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Date: 20190913
Between:
Crown
- and -
Offender
Restriction on Publication
Identification Ban – See the Criminal Code, section 486.5.
By Court Order, information that may identify any victim of any offence referred to
in these proceedings must not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any way.
There is also a ban on publishing the contents of the application for the publication
ban or the evidence, information or submissions at the hearing of the application,
and information that may identify any victim referred to in any exhibit in these
proceedings.
NOTE: This judgment is intended to comply with the identification ban.
_______________________________________________________
and 3 years probation), mischief under $5,000 in 2001 (suspended sentence and probation for 2
years), failing to comply with a probation order in 2002 (60 days intermittent and 6 months
probation), and possession of child pornography in 2007 (2 years imprisonment). As a result of
this last conviction, he was found to be a Long-Term Offender under s. 753.1(3) of the Criminal
Code and following completion of the sentence was bound by a 5-year Long-Term Supervision
Order. [Further statutory references will be to the Criminal Code.] The LTSO expired in October
be a dangerous offender, the Crown requests that the application be treated as a Long-Term
Offender application. The Crown seeks traditional determinate sentences for the remaining
Current Offences. The Defence contends that Mr. Scrivens should not be declared to be a
dangerous offender, but if he is so declared, that he be sentenced for the predicate offence, or, in
the alternative, that he be sentenced for the predicate offence for a term exceeding two years and
ordered to be subject to long-term supervision for a period not exceeding 10 years.
Table of Contents
A. Timing of Application............................................................................................................ 8
B. Order for Assessment ............................................................................................................. 8
C. Consent of the Attorney General ............................................................................................ 8
D. Notice Outlining Basis for Application ................................................................................. 8
VII. Threat..................................................................................................................................... 44
A. Timing of Application
[19] Under s. 753(2), “[a]n application under subsection (1) must be made before sentence is
imposed on the offender” unless certain exceptional conditions have been satisfied. The Crown’s
application was made before Mr. Scrivens was sentenced.
B. Order for Assessment
(c) a copy of the notice has been filed with the clerk
of the court or the provincial court judge, as the
case may be.
[24] The Crown duly gave notice to Mr. Scrivens following the making of the application,
outlining the basis of the application. Notice was given to Mr. Scrivens more than seven days
before the application. A copy of the Notice has been filed with the clerk of the court.
Page: 9
satisfied that the criteria for a dangerous offender finding have been established, I must find that
Mr. Scrivens is a dangerous offender. I have no discretion not to impose the dangerous offender
designation.
[32] Finally, I confirm that the dangerous offender provisions serve the ultimate end of
preserving public safety or of protecting the public from a particular type of offender who
purposes, and in giving opinions on risk and risk management. The reason for the differential
treatment of Dr. Zedkova was that she did not have the scope or depth of experience of the other
experts. Most of her experience was with mentally disordered offenders rather than with sexual
offenders. Her qualification was meant to mark that she certainly had more relevant knowledge
and experience than a lay person, an ordinary physician, or a non-forensic psychiatrist, but she
did not have degree of expertise of the other experts. For all that, Dr. Zedkova’s testimony was
B. Principles
1. Behaviour
[54] The ss. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii) patterns are patterns of “behaviour.” The pattern, then, is
constituted by conduct or acts, not by thoughts, motivations, or dispositions. According to the
Court of Appeal in Neve at para 106, “[t]he starting point for the threat evaluation therefore is
[64] I will provide an overview of Mr. Scrivens’ past offences then an overview of the
predicate offence.
2. Mr. Scrivens’ Criminal History
[65] Mr. Scrivens has no youth record.
[66] Mr. Scrivens was convicted of the following offences prior to conviction for the Current
[90] At the end of November 2015 (after the s. 810.1 recognizance issued), JW offered to take
TH’s children to the Rental House for some days so TH “could have a break.” Mr. Scrivens and
JW transported the children.
[91] Mr. Scrivens visited JW and the TH family at TH’s residence.
[92] On or about December 5, 2015, TH asked Mr. Scrivens to watch the children so she and
have aided or abetted the production of child pornography. His distribution and possession
offences were not, in that sense, “contact” offences.
[108] I will set aside the issue of whether the violence occurring in the production of child
pornography is attributable to distributors or possessors of such material. I will set aside as well
possessors’ responsibilities for encouraging and enabling the continued production of child
same or similar form, order or arrangement; though if this has occurred, it may
well suffice.
[111] Distribution of child pornography and possession of child pornography are similar to
contact sexual offences not in all respects, they are not the same offences, but they are similar “in
result,” in terms of the nature of the sexualized violence inflicted on children, the degradation,
violation of privacy and dignity.
2. No Pattern?
[123] Mr. Scrivens contended that the criminal history evidence and the predicate offence
disclosed no pattern of repetitive conduct. Again, if I were to be left with a reasonable doubt
about whether the evidence supported the finding of a requisite pattern, Mr. Scrivens could not
be declared a dangerous offender.
planning (on the moral complexity and varieties of “impulsivity” see R v LaBerge, 1995 ABCA
196, Fraser CJA at para 20).
[134] Mr. Scrivens relied on some minor authority in committing the first contact offence.
When committing the predicate offence, he was the temporary caregiver for AH. As the Defence
put it, he was “solely responsible for [AH’s] wellbeing:” SWA at para 266.
year old victim, as did the failure to comply with probation offence. The victims were
significantly older than the victims depicted in the child pornography.
[143] Again, both the contact offences and the non-contact offences were serious sexual
offences. They were not the product of repeated conduct. They were not, as a whole, part of a
pattern.
[147] Before responding to this question, some cautions from Neve must be flagged: The
pattern of behaviour is a pattern of conduct, of action, not of thoughts, not of disposition. For
thoughts to be relevant to the pattern assessment, those thoughts must be connected to action.
Opinion evidence may illuminate whether a pattern exists, but the interpretation offered in
opinion must be grounded in the offender’s acts. Thus, paras 127, 131, and 139 of Neve:
nudity since he was about 14 or 15 and to view child pornography since about 1997: ER at 4;
ZM2, 48.23-24.
[154] Dr. Choy confirmed that the cause of Mr. Scrivens’ disposition is “unknown:” CR at 18.
He was raised by his parents in a stable middle-class family. There were no adverse events in his
childhood. His childhood, educational history, and work history are unremarkable: VDR at 16.
gets aroused. He reported that ‘his main preference is younger girls’ – that his ‘only addiction is
pre-pubescent’ but he ‘is turned on a lot by younger girls’:” VDR at 11.
[182] Dr. Ennis reported Mr. Scrivens as having stated that he viewed child pornography 1-2
hours per day. He viewed it late at night, after his wife went to sleep: ER at 8.
(vi) Predicate Offence
his proclivity was to engage in sexual conduct with children at the upper range of his
interest
his offending is covert, hidden from official supervision or his family (the possession
offence), yet discoverable, not deeply hidden.
[192] The 1997 and 2002 contact offences were linked as sexual activity with children at the
that he’d mentioned to Dr. Jung. This fantasy could not therefore form part of any pattern of
conduct. It does, however, form part of the background that makes sense of the predicate offence
and shows the profound continuity of his various offences.
[200] I am not suggesting that the moral blameworthiness of child pornography offences and
contact offences like sexual interference will always and in every case be identical or precisely
referring to Hajar, “violence” does not require more than non-consensual sex; violence is
inherent in the assault: at para 114. The level of violence goes to aggravation, not to whether a
measure of violence has occurred.
[207] But if that interpretation is correct and “aggression” denotes physicality, actual contact or
its threat, the child pornography offences would not form part of the pattern of aggressive
offences (or six, since there were two distribution counts) and the predicate offence involved
three interferences with the victim. In all of these instances, he clearly failed to restrain his
behaviour. He chose to commit criminal acts. His failure to restrain his behaviour has been
repeated. I find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Scrivens’ pattern of repetitive behaviour
shows a failure to restrain his behaviour.
[222] In the result, the answer to the first main question in this application is that the Crown has
established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Scrivens engaged in a pattern of conduct under
ss. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii).
determination that an offender will continue to be dangerous in the future, past the
date on which he or she would ordinarily have been released from prison for their
most recent crime. How is that threat to be determined? Whatever else may be
placed on the threat scale, this much is clear. No threat can be found without
proof of past behaviour which meets at least one of the three separate thresholds
under ss.753(a)(i), (ii) or (iii). If any one is met, then the judge is able to go on
has a future reference. The latter clause of s. 753(1)(a)(ii) concerns indifference to “the
reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons’ behaviour. That clause looks to behaviour
in the future and its consequences for others.
[231] This interpretation is consistent with Neve at para 115:
[115] Under s.753(a)(ii), the persistent aggressive conduct must show a
penalty stage, it helps determine the appropriate sentence to manage this threat.
Thus, offenders will not be designated as dangerous if their treatment prospects
are so compelling that the sentencing judge cannot conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that they present a high likelihood of harmful recidivism or that their
violent pattern is intractable: see Neuberger, at p. 7-1, by M. Henschel. However,
even where the treatment prospects are not compelling enough to affect the
Justice Joyce’s point is well-taken. If intractability for designation purposes entailed that change
was impossible or risk could not be managed in a determinate term, ss. 753(4) and (4.1) would
serve no purpose.
C. The Harm
1. Harm and s. 753(1)(a)(i)
[248] I will proceed on the basis that the harm language of s. 753(1)(a) governs, and is not
expanded by the particular mode of satisfying the s. 753(1)(a) requirements through
subparagraph (a)(ii). Otherwise, different if not inconsistent types of harm would be
contemplated within a single statutory paragraph. Subparagraphs (i) and (ii) may, as I have
interpreted them, apply to distinguishable conduct. Both subparagraphs, though, are to show
threat as identified in their parent paragraph (a). Reading s. 753(1)(a) to have different meanings
VII. Threat
[250] To determine whether the Crown has established that, on the basis of his pattern of
conduct, Mr. Scrivens constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of
others, I will review the evidence relevant to the threat assessment, then determine whether the
Crown has met this part of its burden.
[251] The evidence relevant to the threat assessment concerns Mr. Scrivens’ personal history,
his treatment and institutional history, his pattern of conduct including the predicate offence, and
psychological and psychiatric evidence. The issues of intractability and Mr. Scrivens’ treatment
prospects are engaged. Much of this evidence is contextual. It aids in understanding the
prospective significance of Mr. Scrivens’ pattern of conduct. But the threat must remain founded
on that evidence of pattern of conduct.
A. Personal History
1. Childhood and Family History
[252] Mr. Scrivens experienced no adverse events or barriers in his childhood. He has
described his childhood as happy: VDR at 16.
[253] He suffered no significant medical issues.
[254] He had no history of antisocial behaviour during childhood: VDR at 16.
[255] Mr. Scrivens’ parents are still alive and he has had occasional contact with them since
leaving BC moving to Alberta, although it appears that he last saw them in 2014. He has a
brother, from whom he is estranged.
[256] Mr. Scrivens has a grade XII education. No significant incidents occurred in his
educational history.
2. Intimate and Marital Relationships
[257] Mr. Scrivens has had eight or nine adult sexual partners. He has never resorted to sex
trade workers.
Page: 45
[258] In about 2003, Mr. Scrivens commenced what would become a common law relationship
with an adult woman. They lived together and were married in 2007. They have two children.
This relationship ended in 2007 after he was convicted for the possession of child pornography
offence. He has not seen the older child in about 10 years. He has never seen the younger child.
[259] Mr. Scrivens had an intimate relationship with JW, a biological male. They met at
Bowden Institution.
intensity treatment. Low-risk offenders should not receive high-intensity treatment. The “need”
principle is that the targets of treatment should be the actual criminogenic needs of an offender.
The “responsivity” principle is that interventions should be delivered in a way that
accommodates the “learning styles,” personality traits, or responsivity factors of the offender.
The aim is to optimize the offender’s response to the intervention: E27, 35.3-34, 36.1-6;
TVDM6, 32.18-33.1-3; ZM1, 73.19-33.
[278] Dr. Jung said “You can give as much treatment to a person as you can, but if they’re not
going to actually be motivated to actually engage in that treatment, it’s like putting them in a
room and hoping that they’re going to absorb some of it.”
[279] Dr. Jung noted that Mr. Scrivens continually engaged in masturbatory reinforcement of
his sexual fantasies relating to prepubescent children. He was not changing his beliefs: Jung11,
[287] Later, in February 2008, his parole officer recommended that Mr. Scrivens “be assessed
for the Clearwater Program for Sexual Offenders at the Regional Psychiatric Centre (Prairies) or
the Phoenix Program…:” EDD001102-002.
[288] On May 6, 2008, Mr. Scrivens inquired with Correctional Program Officer Dolanz as to
his place on the waitlist for the MISOP. “He expressed a desire to take the program and stated
that he has a fairly short sentence and has a parole date coming up in October 2008.” Other
(b) SOMP
[310] The Program Performance Report – Final, April 6, 2010, recognized that Mr. Scrivens
had “attended all sessions.” The Report stated that Mr. Scrivens “drastically underestimates his
risk to re-offend.” He did make some gains, particularly respecting his cognitive distortion that
pornography does not hurt anyone or create victims. That target was “partially reached:”
EDD000514-001-002. Mr. Scrivens was recommended for another block of 12 sessions.
[315] The Program Performance Report – Final, June 22, 2011, recognized that Mr. Scrivens
had “attended all sessions.” It stated that he’d completed his fifth block of 12 sessions in March
2011. The report stated that Mr. Scrivens had excellent attendance, was an active participant,
challenged other participants in respectful and appropriate manner, was open to being challenged
himself, and was cooperative and respectful with the facilitator and other group members. There
have been improvements in his overall attitude and demeanour: EDD001193-001-004.
he will stop taking libido suppressing medication following completion of the LTSO
he is confident that he can avoid offending, particularly contact offending, but he is not
confident that he can avoid using images of children to masturbate
he continued to engage in risky masturbatory activities
he lacks insight into his sexual attractions
(e) Medication
[331] Mr. Scrivens was prescribed libido-reducing medication from his time at Bowden
through to the end of his LTSO (ZR at 20; VDR at 59), and resumed taking this medication
during the s. 810.1 recognizance process and during his time in custody for the Current Offences.
Medications included SSRIs, cyproterone acetate (Androcur), and leuprolide (Lupron). Androcur
and Lupron are anti-androgen medications, reducing testosterone production and effects. Dr.
Scrivens needed support and that it was good for Mr. Scrivens to engage with the community. He
wanted Mr. Scrivens to attend medieval re-enactment events: Peachman 55.27-8, .33-34; 77.5-
212; 84.13.
[338] Det. Peachman referred Mr. Scrivens to Dr. Jellicoe with FACS so that Mr. Scrivens
could comply with terms of his release recognizance and later the 810.1 recognizance: Peachman
[351] Dr. Jellicoe reported that Mr. Scrivens was open to taking libido-reducing medication
other than Lupron, which had significant negative side-effects. He cooperated with the
medication regime prescribed by Dr. Rodd: Jellicoe25, 24.35-25.2; 28.20-22.
[352] Dr. Jellicoe testified that Mr. Scrivens’ crime cycle factors were boredom, loneliness, and
isolation. The s. 810.1 recognizance conditions made it hard to find social outlets. She denied,
[361] Mr. Scrivens stated to Dr. Van Domselaar that the victim “didn’t say no” and he took this
as “misconstrued consent.” He also reported that the victim had remained in contact with him
after the offence: VDR at 6.
[362] Mr. Scrivens told Dr. Zedkova that now he understands that the victim did not consent.
This was a situation of misconstrued consent. The incident, though, was not traumatic for her:
ZM1, 50.16-20.
just in case the opportunity arises, so, you know, it’s more of a just planting seeds
and seeing if there’s a time to harvest.
Q Or it’s more - would it be fair to characterize it as more focussed on creating an
opportunity or putting yourself in what, if you had the insight, would be a high
risk situation rather than selecting a target and sort of going after a specific
person?
[375] The desistance period begins on release into the community: TVDM8, 38.21-31.
[376] Two lessons from the desistance research: First, the longer an offender doesn’t offend the
higher the probability that the offender won’t offend. Second, even high-risk sexual offenders
may not remain a high risk forever. They do not inevitably reoffend. See TVDM7, 92.23-24;
98.30-37.
Due to the tendencies just described, initial treatment efforts must focus on
cultivating his engagement in the therapeutic process. Clinicians will have to
devote extra initial effort to establish comfort and rapport with him. This is
because requests for information may provoke fear and edginess, and may be seen
as a form of painful and embarrassing self-exposure, which he finds highly
aversive and deeply threatening. While he has a strong desire to be accepted by
[389] In particular, elevations in Factor 1 traits may interfere with or be barriers to treatment:
TVDM8, 17.29-36. Dr. Ennis described Factor 1 as referring to a narcissistic personality
disposition. Other people are treated as vehicles for self-gratification.
(b) Assessment
[390] In his 2007 assessment of Mr. Scrivens, Dr. Choy scored Mr. Scrivens at 16 on the PCL-
evasion …. [He] has been able to craft a ‘double life’ during multiple periods … most
recently in the many months leading up to and including the index offence period …. Mr.
Scrivens is also very adept at being ‘brutally honest’ in some areas … which then serves
to distract from or conceal his deceit in other areas:” VDR at 53; see also TVDM6, 62.
conning/manipulative – used to keep others from discovering his sexual proclivities;
according to Dr. Van Domselaar, “[h]e also makes use of his ability to present only
(b) Assessment
[402] RSVP risk factors fall within 5 categories, Sexual Violence History, Psychological
Adjustment, Mental Disorder, Social Adjustment, and Manageability.
(i) Sexual Violence History
[403] This set of risk factors includes chronicity (persistence, long duration) of sexual violence,
Now, I will say, in Mr. Scrivens’s case, as I recall, he made some statements
indicating that he had his own sort of bright lines around behaviour with children
that he thought were unacceptable, that children were not naturally inclined to
engaging in sexual intercourse, for example; therefore, he didn’t find that to be
permissible to engage in those behaviours with children; however, he thought it
was permissible to engage in oral sex or fondling and those sort of things. So he
has never completed community supervision or probation without incurring a new charge: ER at
16. Dr. Ennis observed that Mr. Scrivens’ offence history “is characterized by planned,
organized, deliberate behaviours aimed at achieving his offence goals and avoiding detection.
His criminal behaviours have rarely been impulsive:” ER at 15.
[416] Dr. Ennis testified as follows (E27, 33.13-25):
6. STATIC-99R
(a) Nature of the STATIC-99R
[421] The STATIC-99 and the STATIC-99R (i.e., “revised”) are “actuarial measure[s] of
relative risk for sexual offence recidivism:” VDR at 47. The STATIC-99R is a widely used and
accepted risk assessment tool: ZR at 37. The STATIC-99R is intended to position offenders in
of re-offending within a particular period: E27, 15.27-16.5. Dr. Van Domselaar testified that
(TVDM6, 5.7-6.17)
So people with a 6 are more likely to re-offend than people with a 4 who are more
likely to re-offend than people with a 2 and so on down the line. And the ranking
of where they sit in the overall distribution, whether they’re at the 90th percentile
7. STABLE-2007
(a) Nature of the STABLE-2007
[436] The STABLE-2007 was developed to assess change in intermediate-term risk status, to
assess treatment needs, and to predict recidivism in sexual offenders. When combined with static
risk measures, creating a composite assessment of risks and needs, it enhances the prediction of
Based on empirically derived estimates, men with the same risk profile as Mr.
Scrivens have been found to recidivate sexually (including sexually-related non-
compliance offences) at a rate of 25.5% within three years of opportunity (95%
confidence interval between 15% to 36%), and a rate of 28.9% within five years
of opportunity (95% confidence interval [between] 17.9% and 40%): VDR at 49,
61.
(b) Pedophilia
[452] Dr. Ennis testified that (E27, 29.31-39) that
[W]hen we talk about sexual deviance and prescribing medication to suppress
libido, that is dialing back the degree to which the individual is preoccupied with
it, but we do not have any evidence as a field that you can alter somebody’s
manifested … in Mr. Scrivens’ practiced ability to live parallel lives, both … within his own
mind and … in how he has structured his employment, accommodations, and interpersonal
relationships:” VDR at 59. His ability has helped him avoid detection but “simultaneously serves
only to deepen his self-loathing, while keeping him from the very supports [he needs]:” VDR at
59.
(d) Conclusions about Mr. Scrivens’ Risk
treatment and supervisory personnel, to ensure that interventions are compatible with Mr.
Scrivens’ personality traits.
[463] A further factor, perhaps implicit in the three identified, but worth breaking out on its
own, concerns Mr. Scrivens’ will. By that I mean his willingness to change, his willingness to
engage in treatment, his willingness to do the hard work of developing a self-management plan,
[471] Mr. Scrivens, it should be acknowledged, had been in a common law relationship that led
to marriage and two children. In addition to the social stability and capacity for social stability
that this relationship demonstrated, there was absolutely no evidence that Mr. Scrivens did
anything at all that was in any way improper with his first-born child. He has had no contact with
his second child.
[482] Mr. Scrivens has offended. He has fallen short. But in each case Mr. Scrivens pled guilty
to his offences. He consented to the LTSO that was part of his 2007 possession offence. He
consented to the s. 810.1 recognizance. He has taken responsibility for his offences.
[483] Neither Dr. Van Domselaar nor Dr. Zedkova suggested that Mr. Scrivens could not be
treated. Indeed, both devoted considerable attention to the types of conditions that would have to
[500] When predicting risks of sexual violence, the likelihood of the events or circumstances
triggering the violence must be considered: see, e.g, R v Luedecke, 2008 ONCA 716, Doherty
JA at paras 88, 91, 111. In this case, boredom, isolation, and loneliness; encountering apparently
arbitrary and unfair events in life (and reacting with frustration and disappointment); and
encountering children are all virtually certain to recur in Mr. Scrivens’ life. This reality strongly
reinforces the likelihood that Mr. Scrivens would reoffend in the manner of his pattern of
[507] Mr. Scrivens has had years of treatment and programming. Ignoring the Terrace, BC
sessions, Mr. Scrivens worked with Dr. Jung in 2002-2003. In connection with his possession of
child pornography sentence, he completed the MISOP at Bowden, then over 100 sessions of the
SOMP while in the community.
[508] Yet he still re-offended. And the predicate offence involved more severe, more
[515] Mr. Scrivens, or part of Mr. Scrivens, can see, if only belatedly, that he has not stopped
himself from doing what he knew he should not do. Remorse comes too late. Until Mr. Scrivens
can learn to get ahead of his desire, to attend to risk and to manage his risk, he will act with
indifference.
[516] Mr. Scrivens is not utterly indifferent to the consequences of his behaviour on children.
VIII. Sentence
[519] I arrive at the third main question: If the Crown has established both pattern of conduct
and threat, am I satisfied by the evidence adduced in the hearing that a lesser measure than
indeterminate detention in a penitentiary will adequately protect the public against the
commission of a serious personal injury offence by Mr. Scrivens?
[520] The designation of Mr. Scrivens as a dangerous offender does not determine his sentence.
His sentence must be determined under ss. 753(4) and (4.1) and the general sentencing
provisions of the Criminal Code. I shall consider the principles governing dangerous offender
sentencing, the steps of sentencing analysis, and whether a sentence other than indeterminate
detention will adequately protect the public.
A. Principles Governing Dangerous Offender Sentencing
[521] Subsections 753(4) and (4.1) provide as follows:
753(4) If the court finds an offender to be a dangerous offender, it shall
(a) impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period;
(b) impose a sentence for the offence for which the offender has been convicted
— which must be a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of two
years — and order that the offender be subject to long-term supervision for a
period that does not exceed 10 years; or
(c) impose a sentence for the offence for which the offender has been convicted.
(4.1) The court shall impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate
period unless it is satisfied by the evidence adduced during the hearing of the application
that there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure under paragraph (4)(b) or (c)
Page: 81
will adequately protect the public against the commission by the offender of murder or a
serious personal injury offence.
1. Dangerous Offender Proceedings are Sentencing Proceedings
[522] Dangerous offender proceedings are sentencing proceedings. In Boutilier at para 53,
Justice Côté confirmed that
The judge should . . . take into account all the evidence available
before making a determination, which will inevitably require a
thorough investigation. Once such an investigation has been
conducted, it will be up to the judge to determine the sentence;
there is no obligation on any of the parties to prove on any
standard the adequate sentence one way or another.
[533] In addressing this first stage of the sentencing analysis, I am governed by Justice Côté’s
direction in Boutilier at para 63 that “an offender’s moral culpability, the seriousness of the
offence, [and] mitigating factors … are each part of the sentencing process under the dangerous
offender scheme.”
[534] I have also taken into account Justice Côté’s comments at para 55 of Boutilier, re-
A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of
responsibility of the offender.
The “gravity of the offence” concerns what the offender did wrong: R v Arcand, 2010 ABCA
363 at para 57. The degree of responsibility concerns the moral culpability of the offender in
committing the offence.
[537] Proportionality requires the court to ensure that the punishment fits the crime. The
punishment must be neither excessive nor inadequate.
In R v Brodt, 2016 ABCA 373, Chief Justice Fraser distinguished common law and statutory
totality at paras 5 and 6:
[5] …. Under common law totality, the drug offences should typically run
concurrently to one another within each group of offences. As this Court noted in
R v May … a sentencing court should consider “the worst of the offences in the
transaction, and then go on to assess what effect the other collateral or associated
718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of
a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the
objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.
Again, in dangerous offender sentencing, the objective of prevention has elevated significance
but does not negate the need to consider other penal objectives in relation to a particular offender
and his or her particular offences.
Page: 88
[546] In Hajar, the Court of Appeal confirmed a starting point sentence of 3 years for “major
sexual interference where the offender is an adult, that is, at least 18 years of age:” at para 11. At
para 12, the Court of Appeal wrote that “[w]e identify later in these reasons a number of
circumstances that would aggravate the three-year starting point for major sexual interference,
including breach of trust, and additional violence beyond that intrinsic to the conduct itself.” At
para 81, the Court of Appeal wrote that
(b) Use of drugs, alcohol or other substance on the child to facilitate the offence;
deliberation leading to the offence. The offence occurred as a result of a series of bad decisions
by Mr. Scrivens, as opposed to being the execution of a detailed plan. Regardless, the offence did
not occur on the sudden. It certainly was not “opportunistic” in the sense of occurring relatively
spontaneously, based on a single error or small number of errors of judgment. There is a modest
reduction of Mr. Scrivens’ blameworthiness to reflect the reduced element of planning leading to
the predicate offence.
a series of courses offered by New Life Ministries, including Managing Emotional Pain,
The Servant of God, Ready to Give an Answer, Guilt and Shame, the Holy Spirit at
Work, Lessons on Christian Living, Mending Hearts, Trust, Hope – and I note that his
grades ranged from 95-100
(at least) 75 Bible Courses by correspondence through New Life Ministries
responsibility, including his guilty plea, in my opinion, the sentence warranted for the predicate
offence, without considering Mr. Scrivens’ dangerousness, is 7 years imprisonment.
(e) Sentence for the Remaining Current Offences
[578] The remaining Current Offences are as follows:
count 3, between April 2 and November 5, 2015 – s. 145(3), Failure to Comply with
need time and effort to overcome his desire. Two years is not enough to reverse 30 years. Two
years is not enough time to learn what he needs to learn. Three years would be equally
insufficient.
D. Determinate Sentence and LTSO
[592] Since a conventional sentence for Mr. Scrivens’ predicate offence will not adequately
I can’t see … that anyone could be able to supervise him, a parole officer or
probation officer who had even less resources than we did. When you have
somebody who is doing all of that in secret, I don’t know that it’s possible.
2. Initial Responses
[599] Some concerns can be dealt with directly. Others require a more elaborate response.
[605] I have taken the following considerations into account in assessing whether a determinate
sentence followed by an LTSO will adequately protect the public from the risk posed by Mr.
Scrivens.
(a) Experts and Programs
[606] Both Dr. Van Domselaar and Dr. Zedkova were of the view that Mr. Scrivens should
[617] I noted above that both Dr. Ennis and Dr. Zedkova did not consider the Terrace group
program that Mr. Scrivens participated in as being entirely appropriate or effective: ER at 7;
ZM1, 73.39-41.
[618] The express purpose of Mr. Scrivens’ possession of child pornography sentence was to
ensure, to the extent this was possible, that Mr. Scrivens would be able to participate in the
[624] Because some elements of Mr. Scrivens’ past programs and treatment were not
responsive to his needs, there is greater scope for Mr. Scrivens to improve through completing
the HISOP and subsequent maintenance programs.
(e) Program Revision
[625] The HISOP has been revised. CSC’s programs are research-based and are revised in line
Dr. Van Domselaar described the Good Lives model as being “strength-based psychology,” that
works with persons based on their strengths: TVDM7, 30.1-8; see also ZM5, 100.1-25.
[626] The approach of the Good Lives model to programming is not, in Dr. Van Domselaar’s
opinion, contrary to the more traditional RNR approach of CSC programming, but involves an
expanded and more sensitive exploration of the responsivity aspect of the RNR model: TVDM7,
32.11-13.
[627] A Good Lives approach would be more aligned with Mr. Scrivens’ responsivity factors
than the older HISOP or MISOP approach. Dr. Van Domselaar’s view was that the new strength-
based features of the program would be better aligned with Mr. Scrivens’ responsivity factors:
TVDM8, 19.17-41.
[628] Not only may Mr. Scrivens benefit from taking the HISOP, and not only may past
programming and treatment deficits be corrected, but the mode of delivery of the HISOP will be
more conducive to Mr. Scrivens obtaining full benefit of the revised HISOP.
(f) Mr. Scrivens’ Attitude
[629] Mr. Scrivens gave a statement under s. 726.
Page: 101
[630] He acknowledged that he has had a hard time with treatment and his motivation for
treatment. He wants treatment now. He knows that his active participation in high-intensity
treatment is necessary to get his addiction under control. He knows he must take libido-
suppressing medication. He recognizes that in the past he did not put real effort into his
treatment. He thinks that he will be able to succeed now. He has a team that will work with him.
He is not alone. He will not be alone again.
aggravating circumstances may be relevant to determining the fit penalty. Every sexual
interference does not deserve the maximum sentence. There are moral distinctions between even
serious acts of sexual interference. The number of assaults, the time span over which the assaults
occurred, whether the assaults violated a parent-child relationship, the presence of gratuitous
violence, and other aggravating factors referred to in WBS show, by their limitation or absence,
where Mrs. Scrivens’ offence falls on the scale of culpability as compared with other sexual
[655] Given the foregoing, when can Mr. Scrivens be reasonably expected to be in a position to
manage his condition in a determinate time? When can it be safe for Mr. Scrivens to be
supervised in the community, and for how long should Mr. Scrivens be supervised in the
community?
(b) Determinate Sentence
[659] To ensure that Mr. Scrivens’ treatment needs are met, the sentence for the predicate
offence should be raised to 9 years. To ensure that the totality principle respecting consecutive
sentences is not violated and to ensure that the total sentence does not exceed a fit and
proportional sentence, the sentences for the remaining Current Offences shall be concurrent with
the sentence for the predicate offence.
[27] From a reading of these sections, it is clear that neither under the Criminal
Code nor under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act does the court
hearing a dangerous offender application have any power to determine the terms
of a long-term supervision order. That is not unreasonable because if, for
instance, a judge sentences an offender to a long term of imprisonment, he or she
is not in a position to know what the offender will be like in his attitudes and so
[672] Mr. Scrivens knows the consequences if he reoffends when in the community, whether
on statutory release or during his LTSO or thereafter. I would expect that he would not breathe
free air again. To the extent that Mr. Scrivens remains motivated by self-interest rather than by
any broader concerns, the consequences should be a significant and sufficient deterrent.
[673] In my opinion, the basic work done while incarcerated plus 10 years of dedication by Mr.
for count 10, s. 811, Breach of s. 810.1 Recognizance (unauthorized attendance near
places where children are likely to congregate), I sentence Mr. Scrivens to 1 year
imprisonment concurrent with the sentence under count 2.
[679] Under s. 719(3), Mr. Scrivens has, as of today’s date, spent 1,298 days in custody. As
discussed above, this time in custody is to be credited at 1.5 days per day of custody. Mr.
Scrivens’ 9 year sentence under count 2 shall therefore be reduced by 1947 days or about 5.33
[686] Under the authority of Justice Martin’s decision in R v Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58
declaring s. 757 invalid, no Victim Fine Surcharge is imposed on Mr. Scrivens.
W.N. Renke
J.C.Q.B.A.
Appearances: