Hierarchy and Friendship: Ottoman

Practices of Diplomatic Culture and

Communication (1290s-1600)

Gu..neş Iş ksel*

Hitherto, no historian has attempted a comprehensive approach to the

aims, instruments and practices of Ottoman diplomacy, nor have historians
analysed the major claims and evolution of the latter over the longue durée.
This article does take a long view, beginning in the 1290s and continuing
to the end of territorial expansion, roughly at the turn of the seventeenth
century. I propose an exegetic framework to interpret the Ottoman
understanding of diplomatic practices, which evolved significantly over
the three centuries studied. While changes in the balance of inter-empire
power relations were surely a cause, one needs to take account of internal
factors as well. As Ottoman sultans and their servitors redefined the political
identity of their realm, they redesigned diplomatic practices in conformity
with changing priorities.

Regarding the late mediaeval and early modern Ottoman vision of the
world and its divisions, researchers confront two main problems: first,
the scarcity of written sources and second, the established perceptions
of modern historians about inter-state relations, war and peace. As a
result, we encounter a series of tendentious approaches to the Ottoman
understanding of ‘diplomacy’. In their analysis of the formation and
expansion of the Ottoman polity, specialists have preferred to focus on
the antagonism emphasised in various aspects of the ‘Holy War’ narrative.

*İstanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi, İstanbul, Turkey.

E-mail: gunesisiksel@yahoo.com

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© The Author, 2019   Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore/Washington DC/
Melbourne
DOI: 10.1177/0971945819897448
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Admittedly, this antagonism is ubiquitous in chronicles, inscriptions and

conquest bulletins (fethnâme). However, historians have seldom noticed
that Ottoman authorities negotiated with equal frequency, both within
the realm and with neighbouring states. As a consequence, hitherto
there is no ‘Ottomanist’ comprehensive approach to the principles and
instruments of diplomatic practice, their nature and their evolution over
a long period, between the foundation circa 1290s, and the end of the
conquest era, more or less at the turn of the seventeenth century. On
the other hand, historians of international law and diplomacy, when
acknowledging an Ottoman diplomatic culture, have insisted all the same
upon its incommensurability with the ‘Western’ variety. In this article,
by contrast, I address the non-belligerent, even irenic modes of contact
and historicise the negotiation processes, whose rules and tools certainly
changed in the course of three centuries.
Some remarks are in order here: diplomacy as a term was unknown
before the eighteenth century. Once having resorted to the anachronistic
usage of ‘diplomacy’ and ‘international relations’, most historians working
on earlier periods now hesitate between ‘external relations’, ‘foreign
policy’ and ‘diplomatic practices’ when naming their object of study. The
use of ‘external relations’ or ‘foreign policy’ appears restrictive, since
both suppose a clear distinction between the external and the internal
domains of a given empire, which few political figures of the fourteenth
or sixteenth century would have recognised. I therefore opt for the term
‘diplomatic practices’, which embraces several aspects of communication
and negotiation, as well as the manner in which culture and values
impinged on policies and procedures.

Diplomacy in the Construction of the Ottoman State

Judging from the extant narrative sources, the relations of Osman,
eponymous founder of the dynasty, with his neighbours, featured a
subtle combination of peace and war making. With the advice of persons
experienced in the politics of post-Seljuk and post-Mongol Anatolia,
he knew how to play on the weaknesses and rivalries of his opponents.
Chroniclers attribute to his son Orhan (r. 1326–1361) and grandson Murad
I (r. 1361–1389) new diplomatic practices including matrimonial and
commercial alliances. In this period, the success of the Ottoman Emirate
was, as a matter of fact, due to its adaptation to the new legal, political and

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military realities it encountered both in Anatolia and in the Balkans. Thus,

the late mediaeval treaties that the fourteenth-century sultans concluded
with other polities showed many legal and rhetorical borrowings from the
Byzantine, Italian as well as Slavic diplomatic traditions.
Nevertheless, the authority and power of the emirs depended mostly
upon their military capacities. Victories confirmed that Ottoman emirs were
successful in leadership, capable of protecting those who had accepted their
rule or aligned with it, while ensuring that their allies obtained considerable
trophies (ġanâ’im). Manifold co-optation strategies and ‘philanthropic’
concessions (istimâlet) increased Ottoman control over defeated enemies
and the populations whom they gradually won over to their side. More
often than not, the sultans preserved the status of landowning aristocrats
as well as that of the orthodox clergy, by incorporating them into the
fabric of the emergent Ottoman polity. Battles were rarely fought to the
death and the defeated rulers either remained on their thrones or other
members of their dynasty replaced them. However, the defeated rulers had
to supply military contingents upon demand of the emir, and their subjects
had to pay the yearly tribute (h arâc). As for the amount and content of
these payments, Ottoman sultans ˘ and viziers negotiated them with their
defeated opponents.
It is not easy to assess to what degree the ghazi emirs observed the
principles of Islamic Martial Law which, by a complex set of rules,
restricted and regulated wars: an attack without a declaration (dâvet)
counted as a violation of commonly accepted principles. During sieges,
attackers had to offer the option of surrendering on terms (vere). If taken
by force (‘anveten), the population of a given town could legitimately be
enslaved and even slaughtered. On the other hand, those who peacefully
(sulhen) accepted the terms of the victor were granted the safety of their
lives and movable property, together with freedom of religion, as long as
they paid the cizye (poll tax).1 Ottoman chronicles attest a sequence of
diplomatic moves during or after the sultans’ wars, to settle the conditions
of armistice; effective bargaining assured the honourable treatment of
noble captives, put an end to excessive looting and aimed at avoiding
abuses against the vanquished population.2 In other words, even wars
were vectors of diplomacy. Moreover, Islamic Law obliged the attacker

1
Veinstein, ‘Les fondements juridiques’: 511.
2
Âşıkpaşazâde, Osmanoğulları Tarihi: 363, 374.

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to justify his attack; for only if the latter formally expressed a reason in
conformity with the sharia could he claim that his war was licit.3 Even
so, it seems that the most salient point was the principle that permanent
peace with ‘unbelievers’ who had not submitted to a Muslim ruler was
impossible. A sultan might only conclude truces, and even these were
valid only as long as the welfare of the Islamic community required it.4

Diplomacy in the Service of Conquest

When the political structure of the Ottoman Empire became more complex
as the sultans’ rule expanded, the maintenance of diplomatic relations
emerged as a significant dynamic together with success in war.5 In fact,
contemporary sources misrepresent the frequency of embassies received or
sent by Ottoman rulers: such envoys were more frequent than it appears at
first glance.6 However, the sultans’ diplomacy was the work not of resident
ambassadors but of ad hoc embassies, on record from the fourteenth
century onwards. As a rule, the accession of a new sultan to the throne
(culûs) occasioned the dispatch of envoys to neighbours and allies. Apart
from ceremonial motives and the expression of continuing friendship, these
missions had manifest practical purposes, as they revalidated previous
treaties of alliance or protection and regulated problems related to trade;
furthermore, ambassadors gathered information about the intentions of
potential enemies.
When preparing a treaty, the parties first exchanged an initial draft
(temessük) including a list of obligations that the other party was supposed
to accept. Then the contracting parties compared the drafts and negotiated
over their provisions. These dealings must often have been oral, but we
only know about them if they had a written outcome.7 Having reached an
agreement, the relevant chanceries prepared a new bilaterally formulated
document, which contained the specific obligations and promises that the
parties were to take upon themselves. These agreements were overtly
or surreptitiously bilateral since the undertakings of one party depended

3
Imber, Ebu‘s-su’ud: 84–85.
4
Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam: 44.
5
Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid; Stavrides, The Sultan of Vezirs: 208–57.
6
Pedani, In nome del Gran Signore.
7
Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish: 47–49.

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on the other party’s fulfilling its obligations, as the madam ki clauses in

the treaties attest.8
An exchange of oaths (‘ahd) materialised the final agreement. Hence,
the generic name of Ottoman treaties (‘ahdnâmes), which literally means
letters containing the pledge of the sultan. When the two sovereigns were
not present in the same place, as was often the case, the ceremony of
swearing took place in the court of one ruler, in front of the representatives
of the other party.9 As soon as possible, the two parties reiterated this
ceremony in the ‘other’ court. Mutual oaths ensured the reciprocity of the
act by committing the good faith and sincerity (husn-i niyyet and ih lâs) of
˘
the contracting parties.10 If not explicitly conditioned upon the remittance
of an indemnity, the treaties seem to have come into force the moment
both parties took the oath. When the implementation of peace entailed
territorial changes, a joint mission delimited the territories in question and
ensured the transmission of lands and populations. On the Ottoman side,
these missions often included a kadi, who prepared a formal attestation
(hüccet) of the proceedings.11
The detailed terms and conditions of these agreements as well as
the process of negotiation enable us to view how the sultans and their
advisers articulated key issues. The Ottoman treaties with Western rulers
usually included several articles about the duration of the agreement, the
status of particular frontier regions and cities, modalities of transferring
populations and the exchange of slaves: thus, a written record was of
prime importance. Treaties contained provisions regarding theft, murder
and assault, bilateral commitments constraining both sides: thus, thieves
were to receive the same punishment no matter from which side they
came. To clearly demarcate the responsibilities of each side, detailed
regulations were thus necessary.12 By contrast, agreements with Muslim
polities, styled in a different manner and including frequent references
to the Koran, were, despite their lavish preambles, for the most part
laconic and merely confirmed the end of hostilities for the benefit of
the ‘Muslim community’.

8
Panaite, The Ottoman Law: 184.
9
Karamuk, ‘Hacı Zağanos’un Elçilik Raporu’: 391–404.
10
Panaite, The Ottoman Law: 170–78.
11
Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish: 58–67.
12
Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish: 185–86.

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In the first two centuries of Ottoman expansion, marriage alliances

and exchanges of hostages were essential instruments for enforcing the
treaties. Requiring hostages from vassals and defeated enemies not only
ensured the observation of peace but also spread Ottoman influence.
Moldavian, Wallachian and Crimean rulers regularly sent young princes
and nobles as hostages to the sultan’s palace; from the perspective of the
senders, it was useful to have these youngsters grow up in the company
of future Ottoman power holders, learning Ottoman customs and gaining
courtly experience. Some of these hostages even converted to Islam and
later occupied key positions in the sultans’ administration: we may cite
Scanderbeg (1405–1468), Mahmud Paşa Angelović (1420–1474), Vlad
the Impaler (1431–1476) and Hersekzade Ahmed Paşa (1459–1517) as
well-known examples.13
As no Ottoman archival records for dynastic marriages seem to have
survived, it is difficult to figure out the concerns of the contracting parties.
Royal consorts, even those who did not play a direct role in politics,
thanks to their position at court facilitated cultural transfers and mutual
acculturation. In 1346, the Byzantine emperor John VI Kantakouzenos
(r. 1346–1354) gave his daughter Theodora in marriage to Sultan Orhan:
this was the first and most celebrated of royal marriages. In 1378, Murad
I (r. 1362–1389) concluded an engagement with Tamara, the sister of
Ivan Sišman (1371–1395), tsar of Bulgaria, while her elder sister, Marija,
was married to the Byzantine emperor Andronicus IV Paleologos (r.
1376–1379). At the same time, Murad I married his sons to the daughters
of Anatolian emirs, and his own daughter Melek Hatun, otherwise known
as Nefise became the spouse of a prince of the Karaman dynasty. For a
decade, at least, this marriage diplomacy wove these Balkan and Anatolian
dynasties into an extended family.14
However, these arrangements rarely solved the problems between
former belligerents and often became obsolete due to the disagreement of
powerful groups within one of the polities concerned. Certainly, a royal
wife had to adopt her husband’s line of action, but it was not rare for the
fathers of these women to meddle in the domestic affairs of their sons-
in-law. Some royal brides made enemies among powerful courtiers and

13
Cazacu, Dracula: 38–44; Reindl, Männer um Bayezid.
14
Fine, Late Medieval Balkans: 220–22.

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went down in history as foreign intruders and corruptors, as happened to

Mileva Olivera Lazarević, Serbian wife of Bayezid I (r. 1389–1402). With
the waning political utility of these unions, Ottoman sultans and viziers
reformulated their vision of the world and its divisions, and at the turn of
the sixteenth century, they abandoned the practice of dynastic marriages.15

Actors of Diplomacy
As the final addressee of all communications, the main actor in the
diplomatic field was the sultan, who embodied the Empire throughout
its existence. As long as he remained active in the military field, he was
directly involved in negotiations. But when the successors of Süleyman
the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566) renounced this role and mostly remained
in the capital, there was a greater scope for viziers and officials of the
palace (enderûn) to play a more active part. In any case, sultans and
viziers carefully selected their envoys who were the image and voice
of the sultan abroad. Some of these people had been part of his close
entourage, though not necessarily in prominent positions. Some were
dragomans of the Dîvân-ı Hümâyûn (imperial council), or men from the
regions of the Empire close to their places of mission, who had advance
information on the cases with which they were to deal.16 Facilitated by
the familiarity that these envoys had accumulated on previous diplomatic
visits, their specialisation in a particular geographic area rendered
negotiations more efficient.
Ottoman ambassadors not only communicated and negotiated, but in
addition, had to constantly adapt to new realities ‘on the ground’. Political
contexts and thus the objects of their negotiations could change, even
between the time of departure and that of arrival. While couriers (çavuş
and ulak) ensured contact between an embassy and the centre, envoys’
limited decision-making power often made it necessary to inform the
sultan about the course of negotiations, to receive approval or further
instructions. In other words, the enemy number one of all negotiators
was the long distances, which delayed orders and messages. Envoys
occasionally corresponded with the sultans while abroad, but in the period

15
Işıksel, ‘Qu’y-a-t-il dire de plus’: 25–36.
16
Muslu, The Ottomans and Mamluks: 196–275.

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under study, they did not prepare detailed reports, which were to become
significant from the turn of the eighteenth century onwards.
The sultan was not the only commissioner of negotiations, for military
commanders-in-chief (serdâr) had important diplomatic prerogatives as
well. While on campaign, they had a considerable authority in foreign
affairs, which might include the conclusion of alliances and the distribution
of concessions (istimâlets). These commanders might decide on armistices
as well. In addition, princes of the dynasty in training for a future struggle
for the throne, local governors as well as power holders like uç-beyis
(marcher lords) and vassal princes undertook diplomatic initiatives of their
own, receiving delegations from neighbouring polities and delegating their
envoys abroad, with information gathering a major concern.17
By the mid-sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had frontiers
stretching from the Danube to the Indian Ocean, and was neighbour to
a variety of polities. At the imperial centre, there was no bureau with
specialised personnel and regional expertise. Obviously, the resolution
of border issues with the Kingdom of Poland had little in common with
problems involving sub-Saharan kingdoms and chieftaincies. Considering
these various configurations, even in peacetime the sultans delegated
a part of their sovereign powers to frontier governor generals, who
had a better knowledge of and expertise in the affairs of neighbouring
powers. Governors-general in the borderlands sent regular missions to
their counterparts in foreign polities discussing commercial problems,
negotiating frontier issues and managing ransom affairs. They were
moreover responsible for providing foreign delegations on their way to
the Ottoman capital with escorts, preparing the transport, lodging and
food of these envoys, giving them suitable presents and providing safe
conducts when these men set out for Istanbul. In addition, governors
general in frontier provinces acted as the main mediators between local
interest groups and the central administration. They had considerable
power and the imperial council often had no option but to ratify their
initiatives, since disavowing them would lessen the sultan’s prestige. In
other words, frontier diplomacy not only reduced the costs of diplomatic
action but compensated for the absence of resident embassies in foreign
capitals as well.18

17
Ivanović, ‘Cyrillic Correspondence’: 53; Vatin, ‘Les instruments’: 723–24.
18
Işıksel, ‘Managing Cohabitation’: 258.

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Hierarchy and Friendship in Sixteenth-century

Diplomatic Rhetoric
After their victory over the Mamluks in 1516–1517, the Ottoman sultans
inherited the title of ‘Guardian of the two holy cities’ (Mecca and Medina).
They established firm links with the sharifs ruling these two cities, and
assured the renovation of pilgrimage routes and water supplies, actions
which enhanced their prestige in the Muslim world.19 Moreover, during the
reigns of Selîm I (r. 1512–1520) and Suleiman the Magnificent, Central
Hungary, Iraq, Eastern Anatolia, the Aegean and important parts of the
Eastern Mediterranean, as well as Egypt and North Africa (Morocco
excepted) became Ottoman territories.
Even so, by the mid-sixteenth century, Ottoman campaigns could no
longer consistently contribute to the empire’s aggrandisement. By virtue
of necessity, sultans and viziers now emphasised political order rather than
permanent expansion, and the term Memâlik-i Mahrûse (Well-Protected
Dominions) came to designate a wide aggregation of lands under the
sultans’ control. In this configuration, newly subjugated lands became
either taxpaying provinces attached to the central administration or,
more often than not, client principalities and political satellites of different
size and stature.20 Thus in terms of the sultans’ political influence, the
world consisted of three areas: the centrally controlled territories and
inner vassal area (Kurdish principalities, North African governorates), the
outer vassal area (Christian tribute-payers, the Crimean Khanate) and the
remainder of the world.21
Consequently, what constituted the sultan’s superiority was not the
possession of supreme military power, but rather his pivotal position in a
highly complex and dynamic world. Ottoman suzerainty vis-a-vis other
states manifested itself in a hierarchy of relations. The chancery, which
diffused the self-representation of the sultan, adapted its discourses about
the nature of the Empire to the political realities of the times. Thus, Ottoman
diplomatic practice no longer defined the centrality of the sultan by the
boundary between the Ottomans and the ‘others’ to be overwhelmed, but
rather by the monarch’s pivotal function in the creation of a harmonious,

19
Faroqhi, Herrscher über Mekka: 195–200; Yılmaz, Caliphate Redefined: 4–8.
20
Işıksel, La diplomatie ottomane: 2–7.
21
Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire: 78–97.

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well-ordered equilibrium. Therefore, the Empire’s success and safety

ultimately depended less on the force that it could wield than on the
image of that force. It was the main responsibility of the ruler to defend
the Ottoman territories against the outside world (hifz u himâyet) and to
maintain justice (‘adâlet) within his realm. In the eyes of the ruling elite,
these principles, more than anything else, stood for stability and harmony.
As a corollary, each group and each individual was to remain in his place
(yerli yerinde), as defined by the ruler and his officials.22 Supposedly, this
ideal arrangement would produce a harmonious hierarchy of institutions
forming the polity (nizâm) and help to eliminate the dangers of disorder
(fitne), by bringing about a peaceful legal setting.23
Bandits, while ubiquitous, were a major danger to the sultan’s peace.
Hanefite legal tradition distinguishes banditry (hirâbe) from theft and
robbery by the use of violence in the former case. In addition, the
perpetrators needed to have formed a band and acted with premeditation.24
Banditry had a lexical affinity with war (harb), even if there was a formal
distinction. Enemies (harbī) were those rulers and/or people who had
declared war on Muslims or against whom the latter had declared war;
all other forms of organised violence featured as banditry. Still, this basic
differentiation of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ enemies left a ‘grey zone’, which
included tribal warfare and violent uprisings not amounting to full-scale
warfare.25 In any case, the sultan had to punish all sorts of rebellion and
crime, whatever their character and wherever they took place. Apart from
being harmful to the ruler’s subjects, Ottoman political thinking regarded
these acts as offences not only against the ‘honour of the sultanate’ (‘irz-ı
saltanat) but against the cosmic order as well.
In fact, the Ottoman imperial understanding of foreign policy had
much in common with the axioms for good government in the territory
ruled by the sultans. Officially, the empire was the centre of the inhabited
quarter of the world (rûb-ı meskûn) and the seven climes recognised by
Islamicate geographers.26 As the nizâm-ı ‘âlem or pax ottomanica rested

22
Ferguson, The Proper Order: 8–10; Lewis, The Political Language: 93–95.
23
Hagen, ‘Legitimacy and World Order’: 55–84.
24
Aykan, ‘A Legal Concept’: 252–71.
25
Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence: 47–52.
26
‘Cümle rûb‛-meskûn ve heft-iklîm zimâm-ı iktidârıma mun‛atif olub (the totality of the
inhabited quarter of the world and the seven climates incline towards my proclaimed power)’.

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upon the acceptance of harmony as something sacred, personified in the

institution of the sultanate, other human polities had an obligation to
accept the sultan’s order.
Keeping the peace thus required teaching other states and the subjects
of the latter to know their respective places. Throughout the sixteenth
century, the sultans’ chancery tried its utmost to formulate a view which
defined the Ottoman dynasty as the criterion of ‘international’ monarchical
society (burhân-ı h avâkîn). In their lavish intitulatio, the sultans, after
˘
enumerating the regions under their control, warranted by the right of
conquest, asserted the self-proclaimed right of distributing crowns to
subordinate rulers (tâcbahş-ı husrevân).27 Typically, the Ottoman chancery
defined relations with other˘ ˘political entities and the reception of their
envoys, as favours bestowed by the sultans, thus placing all interlocutors
in a subordinate position. In the letters sent out in the names of the sultans,
chancery scribes often formulated this ideal of world-hegemony. If an
Ottoman sultan made peace with the Hapsburg emperor, it was because
he had given an ‘authorisation to peace and amity because of his mercy
towards the subjects of the realms (re‘âyâ), who are a trust from God’
(vedâyi‛-i halîku’l-berâyâ olan re‛âyâya merhameten sulh u salâha ruhsat
˘ encounter a constant emphasis on paternalistic values such
virüb).28 We ˘
as protection, at least at the rhetorical level: ‘the permanence of the treaty
produces the prosperity and tranquillity of the subjects of the two sides’
(‘ahd u emânın bekâsı tarafeynden olan re‛âyâ ve berâyânın refâhiyyet
ü itmînânlarına bâ‛is olmaġın).29 These maxims recurred constantly in
Ottoman diplomatic correspondence to enhance the rhetorical conditions
of a ‘peaceful coexistence’.
As of this moment, the language of friendship became the chief
discursive framework whereby the Ottomans constructed their
relationships with their neighbours and other partners. Communications
thus featured effusive expressions of the love of one friend for another
(muhabbet). The term dostluk (friendship) often appeared together with

27
Işıksel, ‘Le sultan des Deux Terres’: 45–57.
28
Başbakanlık Arşivi Mühimme Defteri (abbr. MD) 27, n. 34.
29
MD 26, n. 315. See also MD 6, n. 785: ‘Mâbeyn islâh olunmaġla […] iki cânibin re‘âyâsı
zill-i sa‘âdet ve kenef-i himâyetimizde âsûde-hâl ve müreffehü’l-bâl olub (As peace between
[the two sides] is being made […] the protected flocks of the two sides are in tranquillity
and prosperity under our shadow and protection).’

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iyi komşuluk (good neighbourhood), ih lâs (sincerity), sadakat (fidelity)

˘ in itself and Ottoman diplomatic
and sulh (truce).30 Friendship had a value
protocol considered it as the foundation of entente and cordiality
(esâs-ı meveddet ve ihtisâs).31 Friendly monarchs were to continuously
exchange letters (bâb-ı muraselât).32 Often, the Ottoman chancery
qualified this friendship as ancestral and inherited (irsen ve iktisâben olan
dostluġunuz).33 Consequently, this term refers to a contracted relationship
that the parties involved seek to conclude, renew and observe. In this
peculiar way, the Ottoman chancery thus extended the language and
practices of friendship from interpersonal relations into another sphere,
while positing a hierarchical stance in the relation of the sultans’ empire
with its neighbours and allies.
In contrast to formal treaties of alliance, these ties of friendship
between the rulers of different polities were flexible and unrestricted
by legal sanctions. Friendly powers owed loyalty and sincerity to each
other and were not entitled to make use of their respective partner’s
weaknesses in times of crisis—although the sultans certainly appreciated
offers of help. Moreover, friendship required that the sultan’s partners
redefine their friends and especially their enemies in terms of Ottoman
priorities. The typical formula for organising political reality according
to the friend/enemy distinction was that the partner would be the ‘friend
of my friend and enemy of my enemy’ (dostumun dostu, düşmanımın
düşmanı), a clear demonstration of how the Ottoman sultans conceived
‘friendship’ and ‘enmity’. 34 Finally, in addition to justifying the
conclusion of alliances and the provision of help, friendship between
rulers legitimised commercial relations.
This line of policy best suited the Ottomans’ purposes in inter-empire
relations. In a legal-religious system that left no space for durable
peaceful relations with non-Muslims from beyond the ‘land of Islam’,

30
For instance, in the MD 7 these terms appear in the letters to the Hapsburgs (n. 2729,
2766), the Kings of Poland (n. 2729, 2732, 2742, 2746, 2748, 2750, 2755, 2770), and
France (n. 2756) as well as to the Republic of Venice. We find similar terminology in letters
addressed to Muslim rulers, namely the sultans of Morocco (n. 2460), Bukhara (n. 2721),
and Khorezm (n. 2723).
31
MD 21, n. 468; MD 22, n.106, 245.
32
MD 26, n. 874; MD 27, n. 256.
33
MD 6, n. 685; MD 7, n. 2729.
34
Panaite, The Ottoman Law: 301–02.

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 Hierarchy and Friendship  13

the ideology of friendship provided a workable, flexible model. This

alternative provided a way out of the dilemma posed by the fact that
the sultans legitimised their rule by their close adherence to the sharia,
yet knew that long-term peaceful relations with certain ‘unbelievers’
were a precondition for the stability of their empire. With this new
rhetoric, the Islamic concepts of the ‘abode of War’ and the ‘abode of
Peace’ inevitably lost their rigidity and uniformity. Certainly, these legal
categories remained important when regulating trade, administering
foreign residents in the sultans’ territory and dealing with Christian
vassal states. Nevertheless, in practical policy-making it is often difficult
to assess the impact of strict divisions between the ‘abode of War’ and
the ‘abode of Peace’.
Thus, the sultans quite frequently concluded strategic alliances with
European polities, even in the sixteenth century when the Ottoman
Empire was in its height. At the same time, the sultans were in a quasi-
permanent state of war with rival Muslim polities, such as Iran and
Morocco. While in law, the Infidels appeared as a ‘united “nation”/
community’ (cümle kefere milletü’l vahide), the Ottoman authorities
progressively recognised that they were in reality ‘divided nations/
communities’ (mütefferikü’l-milel). Thus, when addressing Christian
princes, the Ottoman chancery used honorifics as ‘the paragon of the
glorious seigniors of the Religion of Jesus, model for the illustrious
notables of the nation of Messiah, you who are the administrator of the
affairs of the community of the Nazarenes’. These ‘Christian seigniors’
were distinguishable from each other due to their respective political
powers, their relative seniority in their relations with the Sublime
Porte and especially by the quality of these relations with reference to
the ‘illustrious ancestors’ of the reigning sultan.35 Moreover, this new
rhetoric changed the perception of the treaties with powers from Latinate
Europe known as the ‘ahidnâmes/capitulations: the chancery now
omitted direct references to tributary relations, an important development
with regard to the legal framework of these treaties’.36 The ‘ahidnâmes
became wider in scope and relevance, taking on the form of a sultanic
institution, rather than functioning as an ad hoc arrangement, as the
specialists of Islamic Law tended to conceive them.

35
Işıksel, ‘Le sultan des Deux Terres’.
36
Groot, The Ottoman Empire: 149.

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Symbolic Aspects of Communication

In theory, the Sublime Porte was ‘not closed and by the grace of God,
always wide open’ to those who came to present ‘their sincere friendship
or enmity’.37 Thus, before foreign emissaries entered into Istanbul, a
çavuşbaşı, acting as master of ceremonies welcomed them. Those, who
had travelled on Western routes arrived in Büyükçekmece on the Sea of
Marmara, while envoys from the East set foot in the Ottoman capital
when entering Üsküdar. A seaborne embassy would first anchor in the
harbour of Yedikule, where welcoming ceremonies could take place as
well. Whether resident or extraordinary, the arrival of an embassy was
arguably one of the most crucial events, which would affect the entire
venture. In a world in which any shift in the ceremonial register could
signal a diplomatic slight, it was imperative to reassure or else dishonour
the foreign envoys on the public stage, in front of Ottoman officials, rival
diplomats, merchants and inhabitants of the city.
Ceremonies were specifically designed to convey a range of messages
and ideas about the nature of the empire and the sultan’s power. Diplomatic
ceremonial underlined the latter’s role as the warden of the well-ordered
political universe, and provided an impressive background for diplomatic
negotiations. The importance given to a diplomatic mission depended on
the political context, the prestige of its sender in the Ottoman hierarchy
of dignities and the presents brought for the occasion. It was uncommon
to discriminate against envoys because of the religion/denomination of
their rulers. Typically, the grand vizier received and interviewed envoys
on the third day after arrival. If of sufficiently high rank, the envoy’s next
step was an audience with other viziers, where the newcomers presented
and received gifts. An invitation to the palace followed in the course of
the week, if the sultan was in the city.
After the parade of public entry, officials displayed the presents of
the foreign ruler to the sultan in the second court of the Topkapı Palace,
where a connoisseur (mubassır) calculated their values. By rarities and
unique gifts, especially rare animals, foreign rulers wanted to impress
the Ottomans, and at times show off the technological superiority of

37
MD 47, n. 1077: ‘Âsitâne-i sa‛âdet-unvânımız mesdûd olmayubʿinâyet-i hakk celle ve
alâ ile dâimen mekşûf olub etrâf u cevânibde eger dostluġa ve düşmanlıġa kimesne gelüb
gitmesine men‛ u redd yokdur’.

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 Hierarchy and Friendship  15

their realm. Christian delegations had a reception cum meal before their
entrance into the presence of the sultan, while in the case of Muslims,
this event took place after the Ottoman variant of the ‘kowtow’ ceremony.
During the audiences there was not much talk, although the ceremonies
took place in a highly theatrical setting, regulated by a strict protocol.38
Whenever the sultan distributed diplomatic gifts to convey his universalist
claims, he rhetorically positioned them as signs of imperial generosity
and dominance. Especially the caftan accorded to prominent embassy
members materialised the bonds of suzerainty.39
This first audience, however, was not the ambassador’s only contact
with the sultan, and other meetings took place at public appearances of the
monarch in the city. Some places were obligatory visits for distinguished
guests, and the Ayasofya and other imperial mosques in the capital were
an occasion to demonstrate the superiority of Islam.40 At times, deliberate
humiliation of the ambassadors, whether from Christian or Muslim lands,
was part of diplomatic procedure as well, for instance by making the
envoys watch prisoners of war from their home territories paraded through
the streets of Istanbul.
Ambassadorial visits were highly monitored for security reasons,
especially to preclude spying in military zones. Theoretically, the members
of diplomatic missions had immunity, although in reality such norms
were frequently inoperative. Symbolic violence was quite the norm.
Submission to the sultan’s authority was emphasised not only through
the kowtow ceremony which suggested that both ambassadors and those
they represented were, at least symbolically, subjects of the sultan but
also by various other means such as unfriendly and even brutal treatment
at times—imprisonment included.41 
The Sublime Porte clearly differentiated extraordinary from resident
embassies, and thus, the protocol surrounding their respective receptions
varied as well. Venetian representatives visiting the Ottoman realms were
no novelty to the sultans, as these envoys had appeared at court even before
the conquest of Constantinople. However, apart from his ambassadorial
functions, the bailo à Costantinapoli operated as a mediaeval institution;

38
Necipoğlu, Architecture, Ceremonial: 76–110.
39
Brummett, ‘Ottoman Ceremonial Rhetorics’: 1741–52.
40
Le Thiec, ‘La sortie du Grand Seigneur’: 747–76.
41
Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire: 60–62.

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in his quality as a consul, he was the chief of a community (tâ’ife), which

made him a semi-official Ottoman state agent.42 When Francis I of France
(r. 1515–1547) established his permanent embassy in 1535, the Porte
conceived the new French mission in the same manner as Süleyman and his
officials had long regarded the Venetian institution.43 Ambassadors resident
in Istanbul did not enjoy the same prerogatives as their colleagues in other
European capitals, and the allocations and ceremonies practised at their
arrivals differed from those accorded to the extraordinary ambassadors
when coming to the Sublime Porte.44
Ottoman authorities viewed the resident ambassadors of France, and
at a later stage those of Britain and Netherlands, as agents of the Ottoman
polity. These diplomats presented petitions as their regular channel of
communication, in particular when attempting to ensure the everyday
application of the capitulations.45 Resident ambassadors’ complaints sprang
from their belief that the capitulations were bilateral agreements, enacted
according to the norms of ius gentium. However, this was not quite true
because the sultan could alter and even remove articles previously granted,
whenever he deemed such a policy appropriate—at times without even
notifying the other party. Moreover, local governors and officials enjoyed
a great deal of flexibility when interpreting and applying the capitulations,
so that certain privileges were not operative across the Ottoman territories
in their entirety.46

Concluding Remarks: The Guise of

Unilateralism and Its Limitations
Especially during their formative centuries, Ottoman dignitaries, receptive
to the world around them, transferred and reinterpreted the diplomatic
institutions and techniques of their neighbours. As frontier lords, they
seized on the possibilities offered by their location at the node between
major polities and trade routes, by exploiting available advantages
through manifold alliances and commercial relations. The sultans and
their chanceries repeatedly defined what they meant by friendship, good

42
Dursteler, ‘The Bailo in Constantinople’: 1–25.
43
Veinstein, ‘Les fondements juridiques’: 517–19.
44
Işıksel, La diplomatie ottomane: 23–25.
45
Skilliter, William Harborne.
46
Faroqhi, ‘The Venetian Presence’: 345–84.

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 Hierarchy and Friendship  17

neighbourliness and peace, which demonstrate that there were certain

recognised standards of diplomatic conduct between the Ottomans and
the political entities with which they coexisted and with whom they
negotiated. To a large extent, the Ottomans and their neighbours observed
analogous diplomatic principles. Embassies and negotiations respected
these commonly accepted rules.
As the Ottoman state expanded, however, it began to receive delegations
not only from foreign lands but also from its own subjects living in distant
provinces and frontier regions. Often, the same institutions and practices
regulated internal and external relations. In other words, their main patterns
were homologous. Indeed, at the heart of the Ottoman polity there was a
constant dialogue and not merely a series of rulings emanating from the
centre.47 Exchanges of petitions on the one hand, and responses on the
part of the sultans on the other, decided questions of privilege, status and
resource distribution. This description is no mere metaphor, since many
dialogues took place between the representatives of Ottoman power, and
the personages delegated by its allies, subjects and rivals. Even when at
their most powerful, the sultans worked to establish a strict balance of
power (mudara), to avoid the formation of a strong coalition or even an
offensive alliance against the Empire.
The paradigm of the sultans’ supremacy was a later but salient feature
of Ottoman political communication. But one cannot but ask, why this
constant effort and ostentatious behaviour to make others believe in the
superiority of the Porte? When seeking to answer this question, we need
to retain that diplomacy was/is the subtle continuation of antagonisms
by other means. Once the sultans succeeded in having the principle
of unilateralism accepted, they gained a considerable ‘home ground
advantage’ as well as upper hand in various negotiations, to say nothing of
reducing the need for sending out and maintaining Ottoman ambassadors.
At the same time, a polity’s capacity for unilateral action is only as
great as its effective power and symbolic capital. As long as the sultans’
supposed or real military superiority continued, the Ottoman claim of
unilateralism and centricity made sense, both practically and ideologically.
During the seventeenth century, however, this fictitious yet convincing
claim started to lose its credibility, both in the realm and outside of it,
and consequently, the Ottoman elite redefined not only the principles,

47
Ferguson, The Proper Order: 11–13.

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18    Gu..neş Iş ksel

instruments and techniques of their diplomacy but also ultimately revised

their understanding of the Empire’s place in the world.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the
research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/
or publication of this article.

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