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The Dignity of Legislation
The Dignity of Legislation
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Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation , 54 Md. L. Rev. 633 (1995)
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Essay
THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION
JEREMY WAMRON*
* Professor of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, School of Law (Boalt
Hall), and Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Berkeley. B.A., 1974; LL.B.,
1978, University of Otago, New Zealand; M.A., 1981; D. Phil., 1986, University of Oxford.
This Essay is an expanded version of the Gerber Lecture given at the University of
Maryland School of Law on October 12, 1994. Earlier versions were presented at the Co-
lumbia Legal Theory Workshop, and at workshops at the University of Otago Law School
and the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University. I am
grateful to all who offered suggestions and criticisms on those occasions and in subsequent
conversations and correspondence. Particular thanks to Jim Allen, Geoffrey Brennan,
Tom Campbell, Jules Coleman, Meir Dan-Cohen, George Fletcher, Don Gifford, Daniel
Goldberg, Kent Greenawalt, Bonnie Honig, Sanford Kadish, Martin Krygier, Rae Langton,
Charles Larmore, Michael Meyer, Stephen Perry, Richard Pierce, Nelson Polsby, Robert
Post, Eric Rakowski, Joseph Raz, Deborah Rhode, Dan Rodriguez, Alan Ryan, Carol
Sanger, Philip Selznick, Quentin Skinner, John Smillie, Peter Strauss, and Paul Thomas.
1. JoHN LOCKE, Two TREAnTsEs OF GovERmMEwsr 425 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1970) (3d ed. 1698) (Second Treatise 212).
2. Id.
3. The student is now Professor Jacqueline Stevens, of the University of Michigan's
Political Science Department.
634 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:633
12. Id. at 62. This description is taken from the eighteenth century Swiss legal theorist
J.C. Bluntschli.
13. See id. at 73-75 and references cited therein.
1995] THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION
14. Suppose there are three voters-V, W, and X-voting independently, each with a
0.6 chance of being right about the question they are addressing. When Vcasts her vote,
there is a 0.6 chance she is right and a 0.4 chance she is wrong. When Wcasts her vote,
there is a 0.6 x 0.6 = 0.36 chance that a majority comprising at least Wand Vwill be right, a
0.6 x 0.4 = 0.24 chance that Vwill be right and Wwrong, and a 0.4 x 0.6 0.24 chance that V
will be wrong and Wright. (There is also a 0.16 chance that they are both wrong.) Now
the third voter, X casts her vote. If Vgot it right and Wwrong, there is a 0.24 x 0.6 0.144
chance that a majority comprising only Vand Xwill be right. And if Vgot it wrong and W
right, there is the same chance (0.144) that a majority comprising only Wand Xwill be
right. The overall probability that a majority will be right then is 0.36 (VWX or VW) +
0.144 (VX) + 0.144 (WX) = 0.648, which is higher than the 0.6 individual competence we
began with.
For a sense of the difference that an increase in group size can make, consider that if
we add to the group two additional voters of the same individual competence (0.6), we get
a competence of 0.68256 for the five members deciding by a majority. To get a group
competence of higher than 0.9, we need only add an additional 36 members with individ-
ual competencies of 0.6. See Bernard Grofman & Scott Feld, Romseau's General Wilk A
CondorcetianPerspective, 82 AM. POL. So. Rzv. 567, 571 (1988).
MARYLAND ILAw REVIEW [VOL. 54:633
but because, having been invented by one man only, they all
tended towards the same end. 7
The most common concern, however, is about the coordination of
large numbers of members in a given legislative session. William
Blackstone described the task of extracting a "system from the discor-
dant opinions of more than five hundred counsellors" in a representa-
tive assembly as "Herculean."" And when Jean-Jacques Rousseau
asked, in The Social Contract, "How can a blind multitude, which often
does not know what it wills... carry out for itself so great and difficult
an enterprise as a system of legislation?" 9 it was partly this difficulty of
co-ordination that he had in mind. He addressed it with his image of
"the law-giver" a mythic figure distinguished, in this context, as much
by his singularity as by his "superior intelligence."" °
A hundred years later, we hear echoes of the same concerns, now
in English political theory. John Stuart Mill worried about the pros-
pects of coherent legislation emerging when bills are "voted clause by
clause in a miscellaneous assembly." 1 He argued in general that
"[n]o body of men, unless organized or under command, is fit for
action"22; and since legislative functions are as much matters of action
as executive functions, he concluded that "a numerous assembly is as
little fitted for the direct business of legislation as for that of adminis-
tration. " " Walter Bagehot wrote in similar fashion about the House
of Commons: "Here are 658 persons, collected from all parts of Eng-
land [sic], different in nature, different in interests, different in look
and language."2 4 How is something coherent supposed to emerge
from the babel of their cross-cutting proposals and counter-proposals?
There is a saying in England, Bagehot added, "'a big meeting never
17. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD 36 (F.E. Sutcliffe trans., Penguin Books
1968) (1637), quoted-though not with approval-in MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION
AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 9-10 (1987).
18. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 267, quoted in DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF
LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN 61 (1989).
19. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT II. vi, at 37 (G.D.H. Cole trans.,
1950) (1762).
20. Id. at 39.
21. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, ch. V, at 77
(Currin V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1958) (3d ed. 1865). Mill continued: "The incon-
gruity of such a mode of legislating would strike all minds, were it not that our laws are
already, as to form and construction, such a chaos, that the confusion and contradiction
seem incapable of being made greater by any addition to the mass." Id.
22. Id. at 71.
23. Id. at 76.
24. WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 138 (Garland Publishing 1978)
(1878).
640 MARYLAND LAW RE [VOL. 54:633
5w
Our theme in all this is the size of the modem legislature, the
plurality-the sheer numbers-of persons that law-making involves.
How could something which is so obviously a bad idea-in Bagehot's
words law-making by a "big meeting"-have become so entrenched as
a principle of constitutional organization? One response we might
offer is to highlight the efforts that have, in fact, been made in most
legislatures to limit the number of members who participate actively
in the drafting and consideration of a given measure. Legislative pro-
posals may come ready-drafted from the executive, as in Britain, and
their passage controlled by the executive through the mechanisms of
party discipline. Or consideration of a bill may be concentrated
under the much more manageable auspices of a specialist congres-
sional committee, as in the United States. But though these practices
are certainly important, they do little to explain the continuing associ-
ation of the authority of a statute as law with its emergence from an
institution comprising hundreds of representatives who deal with one
another as equals. The requirement that a bill be deliberated upon
and passed by Congress or Parliament as a whole survives, not merely
as a "dignified" charade (like Royal Assent in the United Kingdom),"
but as something which is regarded as a matter of right by the repre-
sentatives themselves and as crucial to the standing and authority of
legislation in the community. Hard-headed political scientists might
locate the real action in the executive, in the corridors of Congress, or
in the committee system. But I have no doubt that if they were advis-
ing constitution-framers in an East European country, for example, on
the appropriate body for making laws, they would urge the institution
of something like a large parliamentary or congressional assembly.
And that would not be understood as a quaint concession to anachro-
nism, like urging them to adopt a constitutional monarchy. It would
be seen as a matter of real importance. Somewhere in our tacit theory
of the authority of legislation is a sense that discussion and validation
by a large assembly of representatives is indispensable to the recogni-
tion of a general measure of principle or policy as law.
II
So far, I have drawn upon a broad variety of materials in what we
might call political, legal, and constitutional theory. One would ex-
pect, however, some more specific and rigorous guidance on these
matters from analytical jurisprudence, more narrowly conceived, par-
30. See BAGEHOT, supra note 24, for the contrast between "dignified" and "effective"
elements in a constitution.
642 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:633
31. JOSEPH RAz, THE AuTHOrm OF LAw: ESSAYS ON LAw AND MORAirrv 47-48 (1979).
"A law has a source if its contents and existence can be determined without using moral
arguments.... The sources of a law are those facts by virtue of which it is valid and which
identify its content." Id.
32. H.L.A. HART,THE CONCEPT OF LAw 90-93 (1961).
33. HANS KELSEN, THE PuRE THEORY OF LAW 196, 222 (1967).
34. JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYsTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY
OF LEGAL SYSTEM 210-16 (2d ed. 1980).
35. RAZ, supra note 31, at 105; see also id. at 87-88.
1995] THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 643
41. See RONALD DwoRKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 239-40 (1986); RONALD DwORKIN; TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1977).
19951 THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION
42. But seeJeremy Waldron, Legislative Intent and Unintentional Legislation, in LAw AND
INTERPRETATION (Andrei Marmor, ed.) (forthcoming).
646 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:633
43. For a the critique of the intentionalist approach, see, for example, DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE, supra note 41, at 317-21.
44. ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 113-23, 159-65 (1992); see also
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALYrr OF FREEDOM 23-105 (1986).
45. See Waldron, supra note 42.
46. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAws IN GENERAL 18 (H.L.A. Hart ed., Athlone Press 1970)
(1782) (emphasis added). Austin's language is similar: "Every positive law, or every law
simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons, to
a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is
sovereign or supreme." I JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ONJURISPRUDENCE 116 (Robert Campbell
ed., 1874) (Lecture VI).
1995] THE DIGNrIY OF LEGISLATION 647
47. I am not saying that Bentham was uninterested in legislative assemblies. On the
contrary, he can claim to have founded the peculiar English obsession with the shape and
furniture of legislative chambers-an obsession which, for example, surfaces again in the
writings and speeches of Winston Churchill. See K.C. WHEARE, LEGISLATUREs 7-13 (1963).
But Bentham saw no consequences for jurisprudence in the assembly aspect of legislation.
48. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 185 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge 1991) (1651).
49. Id. at 132.
50. THOMAS HOBBES, DE CrvE 37 (Howard Warrender ed., Oxford 1983) (1651).
51. See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 48, at 120, 129, and 184.
648 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:633
III
There is one additional explanation for our neglect of the com-
position and processes of legislatures in modem legal philosophy. It
has to do with the level of generality at which analytical jurisprudence
defines its agenda. Its practitioners believe that there are important
philosophical tasks to be performed at the level of general jurispru-
dence-that is, jurisprudence addressing the very ideas of law and
legal system, apart from the peculiarities of particular jurisdictions.5 3
From the perspective of general jurisprudence, the possibility that a
legislature might consist of one person or many persons is a variable
that is simply beneath notice. Because those who take this approach
do not want general jurisprudence to confine itself to the study of
democracies, for example, they hold that we should not build into our
concept of legislation the premise that it is necessarily the product of
52. Cf JOHN FiNis, NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RiGH-TS 23-49 (1980).
53. We see this approach taken to an extreme in Joseph Raz'sjurisprudence, where on
the basis of the mere logical possibility that a legal system might exist without a legislature,
Raz deems an investigation of legislatures to be philosophically inessential. See RAz, supra
note 34 and accompanying text. Raz takes a similar view about the relation between law
and sanctions: since a legal system could exist without sanctions, the fact that all existing
legal systems uphold their norms with rules and penalties is a mere contingency, and thus
of limited philosophical interest. Id, at 175-86.
1995] THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION
56. Cf PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SociAL THEORY AND THE PROM-
ISE OF COMMUNrY 270 (1992) ("Rational authority has quite a different foundation [than
traditional authority]. Instead of immemorial custom, whose origins are lost in mystery,
some form of enactment is the font of legitimacy. Rationality calls for explicitness, coher-
ence, predictability, and impersonality.").
57. See KELLEY, supra note 55, at 91-108 and 167-206, for a rich, detailed and nuanced
account of the role of custom in European jurisprudence, from the twelfth to the seven-
teenth century.
58. BENTHAM, supra note 46, at 235.
59. HART, supra note 32, at 44-48, 77-96.
60. There is an excellent brief discussion of some differences in KELSEN, supra note 33,
at 224-29.
1995] THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION
IV
In the remainder of this Essay, I want to explore one way in which
taking the composition of legislatures seriously might have important
pay-offs for our understanding of statutes and of the way they present
themselves to us in a modem legal system. I shall pursue a hunch
about a connection between the diverse composition of legislatures
and something which is sometimes referred to as the peculiar "textual-
ity" of statutes.
Legal theorists have long been fascinated by the textual quality of
law-by the fact that legal conundrums can often be expressed as
problems about the meanings of words.62 I doubt whether "the letter
of the law" is an idea associated only with legislation; custom has its
"letter" too, as it signifies its presence in well-worn, almost incantatory
sayings. But legislation is the legal form in which emphasis on the
words themselves-ipsissima verba-is most prominent in modern ju-
risprudence. A statute consists of an enacted form of words; and the
61. Compare the criticisms of utilitarianism as a basis for political philosophy in JOHN
RAwLs, A THEORY OFJuSTICE 28-29 (1971):
There is no reason to suppose that the principles which should regulate an associ-
ation of men is simply an extension of the principle of choice for one man. On
the contrary- if we assume that the correct regulative principle for anything de-
pends on the nature of that thing, and that the plurality of distinct persons with
separate systems of ends is an essential feature of human societies, we should not
expect the principles of social choice to be utilitarian.
62. See, e.g., LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTrICE (Gregory Leyh ed.,
1992); CosTAs DouziN.As ET AL., POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW OF TExT IN THE
TEXTS OF LAw (1991).
652 MARYLAND LAW REviEW [VOL. 54:633
63. PATRICK S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FoRM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW 97 (1987).
64. But see KENT GREENWALT, LAW AND OBJEcTrVrrv 66 (1992), for a discussion of the
idea of "overlapping" formulations.
65. This is not to be read as implying that the distinction between canonically-worded
and non-canonically-worded standards corresponds to the distinction between "rules" and
"principles" as in Ronald Dworkin's earlyjurisprudence. See DwogRIN, TAKING R cHs SERI.
OUSLY, supra note 41, at 22-31. Dworkin's distinction turns, not on textual canonicity, but
on the kind of normative force that different standards are conceived to have. Id.
Dworkin insists, moreover, that it is a mistake to suppose that even statutory rules have
canonical formulations: "[1]t is a commonplace that lawyers will often misrepresent the
rules that a statute enacted if they simply repeat the language that the statute used. Two
lawyers might summarize the effect of a particular statute using different words... ; they
1995] THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION
might still both be saying the same thing." Id. at 76. Of course, even if this were true, i.e.,
that standards are constructed through interpretation, it may still be the case that the
language used in the statute is canonical in regard to the process of interpretation in a way
that the language used by other sources of law is not.
I doubt that Dworkin would deny this. His recent characterization of the judge's task
in regard to legislation is as follows: "He [i.e., Hercules, the ideal judge] tries to show a
piece of social history-the story of a democratically elected legislature enacting a particu-
/ar text in particular circumstances-in the best light overall...." DwoRKN, LAw's EMPIRE,
supra note 41, at 338 (emphasis added).
66. See Robert S. Summers, Statutes and Contracts as Founts of FormalReasoning, in EsAs
FOR PATRICK ATrYAH 71, 74 (Peter Cane and Jane Stapleton eds., 1991).
67. AmA M & SUMMERS, supra note 63, at 100-01.
68. Atiyah and Summers cite an observation byJudge Posner, Statutoy Intepretation-in
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHS. L. Rxv. 800, 807-08 (1983), to the effect that a
judge "rarely starts his inquiry with the words of the statute, and often if the truth be told,
he does not look at the words at all." Posner himself acknowledges that this is more accu-
rate as a description of constitutional interpretation, and that it applies to legislation only
in regard to statutes which have been around for a long time, which have accumulated a
large body of case law around them, and which even in their original wording invoked
common law concepts and traditions; for example, the Sherman Act. Id. at 808.
69. See, for example, the comparison between statutes and contracts in American law,
in AmviYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 63, at 42.
654 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:633
V
I began with the familiar fact that everywhere legislatures consist
of hundreds of members. These throngs of people do not simply as-
semble from time to time and vote on laws. It is surely part of our
normative image of legislatures that they are bodies where delibera-
tion takes place. Think back to the John Adams's idea outlined in
Part I: A representative legislature "should be an exact portrait, in
miniature, of the people at large,"7 ° so that when the legislators talk to
one another, different parts of society can be taken, through their
representation, to be talking to one another.
The importance of deliberation was also emphasized by John Stu-
art Mill:
Representative assemblies are often taunted by their enemies
with being places of mere talk and bavardage. There has sel-
dom been more misplaced derision. I know not how a repre-
sentative assembly can more usefully employ itself than in
talk, when the subject of talk is the great public interests of
the country, and every sentence of it represents the opinion
either of some important body of persons in the nation, or of
an individual in whom some such body have reposed their
confidence. A place where every interest and shade of opin-
ion in the country can have its cause even passionately
pleaded, in the face of the government and of all other inter-
ests and opinions can compel them to listen and either com-
ply or state clearly why they do not, is in itself, if it answered
no other purpose, one of the most 71
important political insti-
tutions that can exist anywhere.
But we saw earlier that Mill did not entertain a particularly rosy view of
parliaments as places for action.7 2 It is not clear that he regarded this
business of "talking" as anything other than an expressive opportunity
to vent a variety of grievances and complaints.
There is, however, an older tradition in political theory which as-
signs an important synthetic function to talking in the context of prac-
tical deliberation. That tradition has its most explicit origin in the
Politics of Aristotle. For, although Aristotle inclined to the view that
the law-giver in an ideal society would be "the one best man,"7 3 he
conceded that
There is this to be said for the Many. Each of them by him-
self may not be of a good quality; but when they all come
together it is possible that they may surpass-collectively and
as a body, although not individually-the quality of the few
best. Feasts to which many contribute may excel those pro-
vided at one man's expense. In the same way, when there
are many [who contribute to the process of deliberation],
each can bring his share of goodness and moral prudence;
and when all meet together the people may thus become
something in the nature of a single person, who-as he has
many feet, many hands, and many senses-may also have
many qualities of character and intelligence. This is the rea-
son why the Many are also better judges [than the few] of
music and the writings of poets: some appreciate one part,
some another, and all together appreciate all.74
What lies behind this is the idea that a number of individuals may
bring a diversity of perspectives to bear on issues under consideration,
and that they are capable of pooling these perspectives to come up
with better decisions than any one of them could make on his own.
That, after all, is why Aristotle took it as the mark of man's political
nature that he was endowed with the faculty of speech.7 ' Each can
communicate to another experiences and insights that complement,
complicate or qualify those that the other already possesses; and when
this happens in the deliberations of an assembly, it enables the group
as a whole to attain a degree of practical knowledge that surpasses
even the coherently applied expertise of the one excellent legislator.
We may or may not buy Aristotle's view that the many can in this
way come up with better results than the one. But the existence of
diverse perspectives in the community and the helpfulness of bringing
them to bear on proposed laws are surely important features in any
account of why the task of legislating is entrusted to assemblies. I be-
lieve that 'these features in turn frame the way in which we should
think about the deliberative process itself, and in particular how we
73. THE PoLrrxcs oF AiusoTLE 141 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford 1958) (bk. III, ch. xv,
1286a).
74. Id. at 123 (bk. III, ch. xi, 1281a-1281b) (passages in square brackets are the transla-
tor's interpolations.) See also id. at 141-42 (bk. III, ch. xv, 1286a).
75. Id. at 5-6 (bk. I, ch. ii, 1253a).
656 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:633
should regard the relatively high level of 76 formality associated with de-
bate and action in a legislative assembly.
I said a moment ago that Aristotle's view about the wisdom of the
multitude is connected intimately with his teaching that the mark of
man's political nature is his capacity for reasoned speech. It is worth
pausing at this point to notice a renewed emphasis on speech, dis-
course and conversation in political and legal theory, particularly in
theory that has been influenced by the work of Jurgen Habermas.77
Jurists influenced by Habermas have suggested, for example, that a
commitment to the United States Constitution is "less a series of pro-
positional utterances than a commitment to taking political conversa-
tion seriously.... [T]he Constitution is best understood as supportive
of such conversations and requiring a government committed to their
maintenance.",7 They suggest too that the authority of judicial deci-
sion-making is "sustained less by the perceived correctness of the re-
sult than by the coherence of the result, for coherence permits
conversation, and it is ultimately
79
a faith in our ability to converse mor-
ally that holds us together."
Much of this is far-fetched in ways I cannot go into here-in its
aestheticism, for example, or in its conception of discourse as an end
in itself. But one point is particularly important for our purposes.
There is a constant temptation in modern discourse-jurisprudence to
take as an implicit procedural ideal the model of an informal intimate
conversation among friends. Certainly, an informal conversation
among friends has attractive features of equality, openness and mu-
tual respect. But it also tends to be predicated upon the idea that
participants share implicit understandings and that their interaction is
oriented towards the avoidance of adversarial disagreement and the
achievement of consensus. These, I think, are qualities which are
76. In their discussion of the inherent formality of statute law, Atiyah and Summers
neglect this aspect. See supra note 63, 96-114. They stress (i) its "rank formality" (i.e.,
priority over other forms of law), (ii) its "content formality" (i.e., tendency to embody
arbitrary or conventional elements), (iii) its "mandatory formality" (i.e., the application of
standards embodied in a statute is non-optional; it cannot be "distinguished" as case-law
can), and (iv) its "interpretive or textual formality" (i.e., the identification of the law em-
bodied in a statute with a canonical form of words). The aspect on which I am concentrat-
ing here may be regarded as a fifth dimension: (v) procedural formality. I shall argue in
Part VI, infra, that (v) contributes considerably to our understanding of (iv).
77. See especiaIlyJURGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
(1990).
78. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 193 (1988).
79. LrEF H. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MAKING: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ART OF POLITICS 143 (1985).
1995] THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION
80. Even among friends, conversation may have to become more formal to the extent
that it is purposive and action-directed rather than casual. I am grateful to Philip Selznick
for this point.
81. See the discussion of Salman Rushdie's apprehensions about communitarian poli-
tics in India, in Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U.
MICH. J.L. REFo RM 751, 792-93 (1992).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:633
82. See 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 19-21 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., Fischaff et al. trans., U. of Cal. Press 1978).
1995] THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 659
VI
We left our diverse legislators in their chamber, a little unsure of
each other and a little tongue-tied. We might imagine that from time
to time one of them will stand up and make a proposal to her fellow
representatives. When she does, it may evoke a flurry of responses.
Some she will recognize as opposing her idea; some will appear to
misunderstand it. Others may put forward a different proposal or a
counter-proposal, which in turn will evoke similarly confusing re-
sponses. Some members may stand up and make speeches on quite
different matters. They may tell stories of tenuous or indeterminate
relevance about the problems and experiences of their constituents.
Others may interrupt by chanting slogans, singing hymns, telling
jokes, or shouting threats. Matters that various members conceive as
having great urgency will cut across one another. Responses to one
idea will be taken as responses to a different idea, and no one will be
able to keep track of where they have got to on any particular front.
83. See especiallyJoHN RAWLS, PoLrrIcAL LIBERALISM (1993). For a powerful argument
that Rawlsian liberalism does not go far enough in addressing diversity and difference, see
IRs MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLmCS or DIFFERENCE (1990).
84. See MARTHA MINow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
AMERICAN LAW (1990).
MARYLAND LAW RE [VOL..w54:633
VII
I have focused so far on what the ideal model of a diverse legisla-
ture contributes to our understanding of procedural formality in law-
making. I now want to turn to the relative formality of legislation-
i.e., statutes-considered as products of processes of this kind.
85. See, e.g., PHILIP LAUNDY, PARUAMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 61 (1989).
86. Cf RAwLs, supra note 61, at 126-30 (describing co-existence, mutual vulnerability,
moderate scarcity, limited altruism, and ethical and religious diversity as "the circum-
stances of justice").
19951 THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION
VIII
If there is anything to this hypothesis, then we might want to start
thinking about the textual canonicity of legislation in a slightly differ-
ent way. I said in Part I that one of the values most commonly associ-
ated in the modern world with legislation is democratic legitimacy:
We should defer to statutes because they have been enacted by a dem-
ocratically elected entity. Just as the idea of democracy is insufficient
to explain why we prefer a large elected legislature to a single elected
legislator, so the democratic principle is insufficient to explain the
particular way in which authority is accorded to legislation in the mod-
ern world, viz., by taking seriously the exact words that were used in
the formulations that emerged from the legislative chamber. If I am
right, we now have an explanation for the importance of the ipsissima
verba which is oriented primarily to the legislators' dealings among
themselves, rather than directly to the issue of their collective author-
ity vis-a-vis the people.
The final step, then, in pursuit of this hypothesis would be to
show how this account of the importance of a text to the legislators is
connected with the authority of the text for its intended audience.
Here there are a couple of lines to pursue. First, as we have seen, the
existence of orderly discussion is necessary to secure whatever Aristo-
telian advantages accrue from deliberation in a large and diverse
group. Unless the diverse experiences and knowledge of the various
legislators can connect and be synthesized, it is unlikely that their in-
teraction will produce standards that are superior to those that any
individual citizen could work out for herself. The conditions for or-
derly discussion, then, are indirectly conditions for the legislature's
authority, in the Razian sense.8 9 In other words, authority requires
superior expertise; superior expertise comes from deliberation among
those who are different from one another; deliberation among those
who are different from one another is possible only on the basis of
formal rules of order; and crucial to rules of order is the postulation
of an agreed text as the focus of discussion.
Second, respect for statute law is partly a matter of respect for the
legislature as a forum whose representativeness is an aspect of the fair-
ness 90 of the way a community makes its decisions. To the extent that
representativeness requires diversity in the assembly, respect for that
fairness is a matter of respecting the conditions under which diverse
representatives can deliberate coherently. Thus, fairness-based re-
spect for the legislature as a body may require not only that we respect
the standards which it posits, but also that we respect these more for-
mal aspects of the way in which its posited standards are arrived at-
89. See RAZ, supra note 44. Professor Raz sets out the following thesis about the justifi-
cation of authority claims:
[T]he normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person
involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons
which apply to him . . . if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than trying to follow the
reasons which apply to him directly.
Id. at 53.
90. Fairness, in the sense defined by DwoRmw, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 41, at 164-65.
1995] THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 665
and thus that we respect the standards in question under the auspices
of text-based formality.9 '
Ix
It is unlikely that the account just given is the full story or the only
explanation of the peculiarly formal or text-based way in which we
approach pieces of legislation. But it furnishes a glimpse of the op-
portunities that may open up for jurisprudence when we pose ques-
tions about the composition of legislative institutions and take
seriously the possibility that law made by an assembly of persons may
differ significantly, in concept as well as in quality, from law made by
one person.
The argument that I have developed also indicates the possibility
of closer ties between jurisprudence and democratic theory than have
existed hitherto. Too often, analytical jurisprudence in the common
law tradition, with its emphasis on courts and its depiction of the legis-
lature as a disreputable, embarrassing and inconvenient sideshow,
contrives to present the political provenance of our laws as a matter
unworthy of philosophical notice. The impression we are given is that
the question of provenance goes to the political credentials of the leg-
islator, which may in turn determine the substantive content of legisla-
tion; but provenance appears largely irrelevant to the status of
legislation as law or to the conception of law-as, for example, a gen-
eral rule, a moral principle, or an interpretable text-which legisla-
tion exhibits. In the last analysis, that impression may be correct; that
is, it may be the case that we can do all the philosophical and concep-
tual thinking that we need to do about law while ignoring the issue of
who makes law and on what authority. But it is not something we are
entitled to assume a priori. It is surely worth exploring the possibility
that the nature of law reflects the conditions under which it is made.
A legal system which vests final authority in an assembly comprising
hundreds of representatives-and which does so as a way of expres-
sing principles of popular sovereignty, self-government and demo-
cratic self-determination-may require a somewhat different sort of
jurisprudence from that appropriate to a system dominated by the
edicts a single, rational law-giver.
91. A fuller account of this respect would present it not only as a theory of general civic
obligation to the legislature, but also as an issue of the respect owed to the legislature
specifically by the courts, in the context of democratic legitimacy and the separation of
powers.