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Covert Diplomacy between Egypt and Israel
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during Gamal Nasser’s Tenure

IR-303: Diplomacy: Theory and Practice

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NDU-BS-17/F-446

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Submitted to: Sir Ameer Abdullah
Submitted by: Aamina Urooj

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 Abstract

The Armistice agreement signed after 1948 war render Israel and Arab countries to cease fight. The
agreement was considered as a precursor of peace by Israel and they tried various ways to make it
permanent while Egypt saw it as a temporary truce which did not end the war. Egypt, along with
other Arab countries demanded Israel to return to 1947 partition borders and repatriation of
Palestinian refugees. Israel on the other hand sought full peace with all Arab states but did not ready
to leave the areas which it gained for the new settlements. The impossibility of this situation failed
any peace effort made by UN or Great power mediation. There were numerous of events which
deteriorated Egypt-Israel relations. Egypt took an active part in boycotting Israel’s economy by
blockading Israel’s shipping in Suez Canal and Strait of Tiran. This escalated tensions at border.
Apparently rising frictions between both countries’ relations did not, however, prevent secret
communication between Egypt and Israel. Such contacts, which began even before the creation of
Israel, became a permanent feature of Egypt-Israel relations. An indirect and direct exchange of
messages was a normal phenomenon where messages passed through foreign embassies or neutral
mediators where various Israeli representatives met with prominent Egyptians; diplomats,
businessmen, journalists and politicians and vice versa. In this document, the existence of these
covert channels, their level and the process of secret negotiations under Egypt’s president Jamal
Abdul Nasser’s tenure will be analysed and it will be seen how significant those rounds of
negotiations were in the later declared peace process occurred during Anwar Sadat’s regime.

Introduction

“Diplomacy ends when war begins, war ends when diplomacy begins”.

Similar is the case of Gamal Abdul Nasser’s Egypt during his tenure and his interaction with the new
born state of Israel. He is the charismatic leader of Egypt with the ambitions of uniting Arabs under
his rule and getting the region rid of the British rule. Leading ‘Free Officers’ in the revolution of 1952,
he came into power in the result. Ousting Mohamed Naguib, one of the leaders of the revolution,
Nasser became Prime Minister in 1954 and later the president in 1956. Under his rule Egypt went in
confrontation with Israel in 1956 and a full blown war in 1967 which damaged almost entire Air
Force of Egypt. It lost Sinai Peninsula, control over Strait of Tiran and ability to hurt Israel by
Fedayeen again. But even then Nasser did not opt for any peaceful agreement with Israel overtly.
Behind the scene however, there were many channels of secret talks for establishing peaceful co-
existence which most of the time did not bring a positive response. But these rounds of negotiations
hold a significant role for the establishment of better relations between two countries. Analysts
argue that if Jamal Nasser could have paid heed to these options concluded in these secret
communications, there was a chance to save lives of thousands that were lost during these
confrontations throughout his tenure.

The inception of the state of Israel did not happen to be a normal phenomenon. To this day, Israel
could not maintain full peace inwith its neighbours and has remained amidst the challenging states
of Middle East. The 1948 war was the manifestation of the non-acceptance of Israel in Middle East,
so the priority task for Israel for strengthening its footholds was to establish a peaceful
neighbourhood. Its efforts to mend these hostile relations have remained consistent even before the
establishment of the state. For that, track II diplomacy was a befitting source that was used by Israel
in multiple Arab states because establishing the peaceful relations with Israel openly was not in the
norms of the those states.

Israel continued the efforts to make a harmonious environment in its neighbour, the great success in
this regard came from Egypt. The first Arab state, which signed a peace deal with Israel; the Camp
David Accord was made public in 1979 in Anwar Sadat’s regime but the attempt for peace
negotiations started a couple of decades ago with previous regime of Gamal Abdul Nasser 1. Ever
since the inception of the state of Israel, the leaders from the country tried to correspond with the
echelons of Egypt. Due to the sensitivity of the situation in the region it was a taboo to talk about the
peace talks with the state of Israel, that’s why most of the attempts were of covert nature and
sometimes remained confidential. To preserve the secret nature of these talks, intelligence agencies
of the two countries, with the collaboration of the American Central Intelligence agency (CIA), also
played a major role. Meanwhile, sometimes the negotiations were initiated by intelligence
agents2.Major Powers also played their part to create a way to settle down the tension in region.

Throughout his tenure, Nasser apparently refused all the efforts made by Israel of sending messages
of peaceful settlement through many representatives of state, journalist and other influential
individuals through secret channels. There were various series of meetings conduced on different
places where representatives from both countries met and tried to negotiate on peaceful line;
sometimes on the behalf of the Jamal Nasser. A number of agreements were made through
bargaining but the implementation could not happen so often. Disagreements from either of the
sides broke the negotiations at multiple occasions. But these negotiations were important and paved
the way for the future peaceful agreement done by the successor of Nasser.

Israel’s approach through influential individuals

Pursuing leaders in Arab state for peaceful settlement has remained top priority of the state of
Israel. State representatives, journalists, military officials, foreign mediators and people from
intelligence have been activated by the Israeli government to work upon this task. In one of the
channels president of Egypt Gamal Abdul Nasser was also involved. Covert meetings however,
remained the mean to achieve the goal.

The secret contact, as stated earlier, started even before the inception of Israel and they resumed
after it gained the land in Palestine. A friendly relations established between Yeruham Cohen, an
Israeli intelligence officer, and Mohammad Riyadh, a brigadier in Egyptian Army, during the talks for
armistice between two countries in 1948. On invitation of Cohen, Riyadh met him at KibuttzGivat
Brenner followed by a number of other meetings at Beersheba and Ashkelon. Cohen also visited
Egypt several times and in February 1950 he met with Nasser in Fallujah followed by another
meeting in April in Uja. The agenda of these meetings was to create a permanent channel of
communication where Egypt would be persuaded to make the Armistice agreement permanent and

1
Ido Yahel, “Covert Diplomacy Between Israel and Egypt During Nasser Rule: 1952-1970”, Sage Open, October-
December 2016.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244016667449
2
Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars (London: Futura Publications: 1992) 98-132
it will be converted in full peace between two countries 3. And through Egypt, Israel could approach
other Arab states as well.

The frequency of these meetings and Israel’s attempt to pursue Nasser for establishment of peace
between two countries increased after the revolution by Free Officers and subsequently Nasser’s
gaining of power. Israel sent a number of mediators to Cairo carrying a message of beginning peace
treaty with Egypt. Richard Grossman, a British MP, was sent by Ben-Gurion, then Prime Minister of
Israel, himself to meet with Nasser. The meeting was held at William Lackland’s home. He was an
American diplomat who later turned to be a CIA agent. Nasser did not accept the offer to talk with
Israel and said that “his first priority is to get rid of British from his country 4”. Another effort was
made by Mahmoud Azmi, a senior advisor of Egyptian delegation to UN who invited
MohamoudHeikal, an Egyptian journalist and confident of Nasser, to meet with the Jewish scientists
Albert Einstein. Einstein asked Heikal to notify Nasser that “he wishes to act as a mediator to initiate
peace between two countries”. The message was delivered by Heikal and Nasser discussed it with
his people but he did not give a positive response to this call too.

Operation Alpha

Despite clashes on other policies in Middle East, America and Britain have symmetry on the issue of
Arab-Israel conflict and both wanted to show their efforts over it. The Armistice agreement did not
bear fruitful results and it did not evolve further peace treaties between the countries so another
approach was needed to bring which can settle the issue by bargaining. The emergence of issues
resulted in Cold war in Europe and Far East; the western powers did not want to lose grounds in
Middle Eastern region. They thought that this conflict is a major source of Arab resentment towards
the West and thereby it threatened the vital economic and strategic interests of the West in the
region and made it vulnerable for Communist penetration 5.

As a result, a secret plan was concluded by Washington’s Francis Rusell and Whitehall’s Evelyn
Shuckburg which wasknown as ‘Operation Alpha’. The purpose of this plan was to achieve a non-
belligerence agreement between Egypt and Israel. The assumptions of the plan were that the Israel
would repatriate 75,000 refugees and compensate the other and would cede the territory in Negev.
Holy places in Jerusalem would be controlled by international supervision. In return Israel would get
insurance of border safety by the great powers and Arab blockade would also be ended.

3
Hesi Carmel, Intelligence for Peace: the role of Intelligence in times of Peace, (Routledge: 1999) 49-58
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=HeaNAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA50&lpg=PA50&dq=Cohen+and+Nasser
%27s+meeting+in+1950&source=bl&ots=dr6oVK5-
w7&sig=ACfU3U0j5olvrCgrQoxHfa98nG16DZ3ebg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjioe_r3rXoAhUFgRoKHU92Dhc
Q6AEwEnoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=Cohen%20and%20Nasser's%20meeting%20in%201950&f=false
4
Ido Yahel, “Covert Diplomacy Between Israel and Egypt During Nasser Rule: 1952-1970”, Sage Open, October-
December 2016.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244016667449
5
Neil Caplan, Futile Diplomacy: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in
Arab-Israel conflict, 1954-1956, (Routledge: 1997), 111-116
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=j05JHMFH-
G8C&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=why+United+states+launched+Operation+Alpha&source=bl&ots=srDXdYBBr
W&sig=ACfU3U2mrOxDMcXBOSrwyZ98jKSjdydHkw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjP-
M2j47XoAhVkzoUKHTgvA2wQ6AEwDXoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=why%20United%20states%20launched
%20Operation%20Alpha&f=false
United States’ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles led the project. He made visit to Cairo in May
1953, and raised refugee problem and recommended that it would be solved partially, if not fully, by
the resettlement of Palestinians on the arid lands which were irrigated by the Jordon and Yarmouk
rivers. It would be known as Jordon Valley Authority (JVA). The plan got approval from Nasser’s
government and they were willing to help bringing other Arab states to the negotiating table. Nasser
did not rule out peace and welcomed the efforts of these powers. Considering other offers, Nasser
was adamant that Nagev territory had to be ceded in full. Israel did not agree on it. They were willing
to discuss the issue in direct negotiation, and agree to minor border adjustment and reunification of
some Palestinian families but they did not fully agree to relinquish territory and repatriate the
refugees. These responses by both parties thus impasse this effort too. Similar efforts were made
later on with slight difference in concession. Project Gamma, Guildhall and operation Omega were
among them which have eventually collapsed as two parties did not come to convergent terms.

Paris secret talks

In the summer of 1954, Israeli Military Intelligence AMAN activated a sleeper cell; a group of
Egyptian Jews who conducted bomb attacks in Egypt in order to undermine Cairo’s relations with the
US and Britain. Israel did not want these powers to leave and make the attack look like that Nasser
cannot control Suez Canal6. The operation Susannah was failed and Egypt arrested those spies and
there Public trial was due. This event triggered many responses from both sides which included
overt actions and covert communications.

Parallel to this event a series of meetings were conducted in Paris including the ones Nasser was also
the member. One of the goals of these meetings was to prevent Egypt from execution of spies
captured in operation Susannah. Another series of meetings were held by Egyptian colonal Oqsa
with Eliyahu Sasson and Reuven Shiloah, who served as chief of Mossad, Israel’s top Intelligence
agency, till 1952. Following this meetings a series of additional meetings were held by Sasson and
Reuven with Oqsa and a personal representative of Nasser, who came to Paris especially for this
reason. These talks were comprehensive than the previous ones and produced document of
understanding7 between Egypt and Israel mentioning four points: preventing incidents at border by
both countries, maintenance of telephonic contact between the parties to resolve the issue,
establishment of direct channel communication through each country’s representatives in Paris and
safe passage of Israeli cargo through Suez Canal, on the condition that the ships will bear a foreign
flag. This secret agreement was signed and following that, Nasser allowed Israeli representative in
Cairo to promote the preparation for summit meeting between two leaders of the countries.

It was noted by Moshe Shette, Israel’s then Prime Minister, in his diary that the meeting was
confirmed between him and Nasser. Technical preparations were to be handled by intelligence
pipelines. On Israeli side former chief of staff Yagael Yadin as a representative to Cairo and two
members from CIA Kermit Roosevelt and Jin Angleton were selected. Sharett conveyed Yadin
instruction about the trip to Cairo. While this historic moment was on the corner, there were a series
of events unfolded that eliminated this secret contact. One day after the message was delivered, the
6
Michael B. Oren, “Secret Egypt-Israel Peace Initiative prior to the Suez Campaign”, JSTOR.
file:///F:/Downloads/4283378.pdf
7
Michael B.Oren, “Escalation to Suez: the Egypt-Israel Border war 1949-1956, JSTOR.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/260827?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
court in Cairo sentenced death to two of the leaders of Operation Susanna and after three days, they
were hanged. This conduct on Egypt’s side made Shette angry on Jamal saying that he could not
forgive them and stop the execution of those leaders. In response, after three days a force of Israeli
Para troops raided an Egyptian military camp in Gaza and killed 37 soldiers 8.

Suez Crisis

Michael Bar-Zohar in his book ‘Spies in the promised land’ has written about the secret but direct
and efficient relation of Nasser and America’s Intelligence Agency CIA, and how CIA agents, State
Department experts and Public relations men penetrated the newly formed government in Cairo
which came in the result of the revolution. This entente between Egypt and America led the former
to request the later to aid them in organizing their Army and secret service. In result Egypt got a
considerable help from USA which in return which hoped to Egypt’s faith in spreading USA’s agenda
of democracy and expel USSR and ideology of communism from getting influence in the region. The
supply of arms from USA however, was not sufficed for what Egypt really needed for coping Israeli
security threat. It was not in the interest of USA on the other hand to arm Israel’s enemy. So, in
1955, to the little knowledge to Roosevelt, a CIA agent, Nasser signed arms deal with USSR which
provided it MIGs and 17s, Ilyushin bombers, Stalin tanks, submarines, half-tracks, cannons and light
arms9.

This agreement broke the delicate balance of forces in the Middle East and Israel turned to USA for
providing them the arms. Iser, the then chief of Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad, told American
that “if you give us arms, there will be no war”. Americans refused to give Israel arms. On the
recommendation of Eisenhower, Robert Anderson, a dynamic businessman and Eisenhower’s
assistant secretary embarked on a secret mission to Cairo. In November 1955 he landed in Cairo and
went directly to Koubala Palace, where Nasser greeted him with smiles and promises. After his
private interview with Nasser he went Tel Aviv to meet with Ben-Gurion, who told Anderson that
“Tell Nasser, that I am ready to meet with him at any time, in any place, even in Cairo, in order to
discuss peaceful relations between Israel and Egypt”. Back to Cairo, he met Nasser who was in
completely changed mood this time and he gave Anderson an answer that he would repeat many
times for such occasions: “I would have been ready to meet with Ben-Gurion as you suggested, but
now, if I did, I would be assassinated within the hour” 10. Knowing positions of both American and
Egypt’s side the decision taken by Israel showed on 29 October, 1956 when Israeli troops attacked
Egypt and in flash got control of the Sinai Peninsula and reached the Suez Canal.

1956-1967

8
Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars (London: Futura Publications: 1992) 98-132
9
Michael Bar Zohar, Spies in the Promised Land, (United States of America: Houghton Miffin Company Boston:
1972), 144-155
10
Michael Bar Zohar, Spies in the Promised Land, (United States of America: Houghton Miffin Company Boston:
1972), 144-155
The war put end to the efforts, made by America and Britain to bring peace between two countries,
and further secret contacts were also ceded. But Abruish 11 in his book has noted multiple attempts
made that tried to establish talks between Egypt and Israel in time period of 1956 to six days war.
Ben Gurion and Nasser exchanged messages through Dan Hammerskjold, UN Secratery General at
the time. Ben Gurion continued his insist on personal meeting with Nasser but he refused
considering the fact that he would be assassinated 12.

A series of meetings between Meir Amit, then chief of Israeli Intelligence agency and Azam Din
Khalil, Egyptian Air Force colonel are described in Amit’s book Head to Head 13. These meetings were
held in knowledge and approval of both countries’ leaders. In one of the meetings the Mossad, with
the approval of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, drafted a letter and delivered it to Khalil. The letter
elaborated these points: establishment of permanent and confidential communication line between
Eshkol and Nasser, willingness of Israel to help Egypt in getting international aid, commitment of
Egypt to accept the Johnston’s program regarding the distribution of water between Israel and other
Arab states and taking measures to prevent violence in the region. In later meetings Amit added two
other requirements: lowering anti-Israel propaganda in Egypt and providing passage to ships which
carry cargo to Israel who wave a foreign flag. Cairo did not show further support and gradually this
channel was also cut permanently.

Six days war onwards

War of June turned the tables all together. The surprise attack by Israel made Egypt to suffer a major
blow where they lost almost 90% of their Air Force and Sinai Peninsula. Israel captured East
Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights. Nasser resigned after this humiliation but
returned soon after the Egyptian citizens showed support by massive street demonstrations. After
Israel’s complete victory and Egypt’s massive loss apparently halt all the secret channels of
communication. In fact the eight Arab countries gathered in Khartoum and decided on three no’s; no
to peace with Israel, no to recognition and no to negotiation. Egypt was part of it. It seemed that as
long as Nasser would be the president, there will be no peace with Israel. But a couple of attempts
are noted by Noa Schonmann in her MA thesis “Tactics of Peace” 14 in which she had noted that
Nasser personally tried to open direct peace talk with Israel.

One of the attempts was made in October 1967 when Robert Anderson arrived in Cairo. He made
several meetings with Egyptian President and his advisors. He was told that Egypt is eager to make
peace with Israel but considering the situation of the region, open talk would be suicidal therefore
superpowers should impose such an agreement in the region followed by enforcement by
International body. Nasser suggested that this agreement would be based on the principles of
President Lyndon Johnson for a regional agreement according to which the following things will be
preserved:
11
Said K. Abruish, Nasser, The Last Arab: A Biography, (Thomas Dunne Books).
12
Michael B. Oren, “Secret Egypt-Israel Peace Initiative prior to the Suez Campaign”, JSTOR.
file:///F:/Downloads/4283378.pdf
13
Meir Amit, Head to Head, (Had Arzi Publishing House: 1999).
14
Nao Schonmann, “Tactics of Peace: The role of Peace Overtures in Nasser’s Post War Foreign Policy Making”,
Tel Aviv University, January 1, 2005.
https://www.academia.edu/1002994/Tactics_of_Peace_The_Role_of_Peace_Overtures_in_Nassers_Postwar_
Foreign_Policy_Making
  Right of Israel to exist along with all other countries in the region
 Free passage to civilian ships in Gulf of Aqaba and Suez Canal
 Full withdrawal of Israel from the territories which it had occupied during the war
 Ending of hostilities between Arab states and Israel
 Resolving the refugees’ problem

United States accepted the initiative and drafted a proposal with United Kingdom and Jordon and
sent it to Security Council. The draft was based on five principles mentioned in Nasser-Anderson
meeting. In later meetings between US ambassador and Mahmoud Riad, Egypt’s foreign minister, it
was to Riad that Egypt decided to support Indian draft in Security Council which had been a part of
six non-permanent members e.g. India, Brazil, Mali, Argentina, Nigeria and Ethiopia. This Indian
proposal, however, did no accepted by Israel because it wanted Israel to withdraw fully from
occupied territories of the war and did not explicitly mention its right to exist and full cease of state
hostilities. Following that, United States also did not support it. For them Egypt withdrew from
original draft because of the pressure from Soviet Union so the dialogues did not continue further.

Conclusion

Apparently Camp David Accords in Sadat’s regime was the first time when an Arab country took a
step for extending peaceful relations with the state of Israel. But, there were many attempts that
had been taken before this peaceful agreement was made public. Because of the covert nature of
these communications, there is little knowledge about the existence of secret channels of
communication in Gamal Abdul Nasser’s tenure where multiple rounds of negotiations were held.
None of them however, bore a fruitful result.

The formal relations between Egypt and Israel remained hostile throughout the political tenure of
Gamal Nasser because none of the Arab nation accepted the existence of Israel whole heartedly.
Same relations were maintained by Egypt with Israel on inter-state level. But Israel did not leave the
efforts to pursue Egypt for extending peaceful relations between two countries. For that reason both
of the states kept the secret channels of communications open continuously

Tensions at border, territorial disputes and the question of sovereignty over lands remained bone of
contention between two countries and the agenda of those meetings were mostly these topics. The
issues got worse when a series of events were unfolded in response by both countries. It started
when Egypt ordered execution of two of the group members of Operation Sunnah, Israel’s
retaliatory military incursion into Gaza that killed 39 Egyptian citizens, subsequent Egypt-Soviet arms
deal which angered American and British leaders who then withdrew their promised support for
building Aswan Dam, nationalization of Suez Canal in retaliation for the withdrawn support and the
subsequent invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain and France. These series of events made both
countries to remain engage with each other in coming times and gave each other the chance to
settle the relations by talks rather than fight. These rounds of talks did not favour any of the parties
in short run but they certainly played important part for later government to pave the way towards
establishing peace.