Ros vs. DAR, GR 132477, Aug.

31, 2005 468 SCRA 471

Fact: Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. By
virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal Council, these lands were reclassified as
industrial lands. On 03 April 1995, the Provincial Board of Cebu approved Balamban’s land use plan and
adopted en toto Balamban’s Municipal Ordinance No. 101 with the passage of Resolution No. 836-95 and
Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8, respectively. As part of their preparation for the development of the subject
lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the necessary permits and appropriate government
certifications. Despite these permits and certifications, petitioner received a letter from Director of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Office for Region 7, informing him that the DAR was
disallowing the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed him to cease and desist from
further developments on the land to avoid the incurrence of civil and criminal liabilities. Petitioners were thus
constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City  for Injunction with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction the RTC, ruling that it is the DAR which has
jurisdiction, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. At the Court of Appeals, the public respondents
were ordered to file their Comments on the petition. Two sets of comments from the public respondents, one
from the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Office and another from the Office of the Solicitor
General, were submitted, to which petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply. the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision  affirming the Order of Dismissal issued by the RTC. A motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners was denied in a resolution dated 30 January 1998. 
 
Issue: Whether the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by LGU pursuant to its authority has
the effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of the CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR?
 
Held: No, after the passages of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP), agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to
go through the process of conversion. jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands
already reclassified before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 are exempted from conversion. The agricultural
lands must go through the required process of conversion despite of having undergone reclassification. In the
current case, there is no final order of conversion. The subject landholding was merely reclassified. Conversion
is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural
land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other
hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and
procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to
undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.
MARCIANA ALARCON v. CA GR No. 152085, Jul 08, 2003
FACTS: Respondent corporation, Pascual and Santos, Inc., is the owner of several salt beds with an area of
around 4 hectares, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Manuyo, Parañaque. In 1950, it instituted petitioners as
tenants of the saltbeds under a fifty-fifty share tenancy agreement. The harmonious tenurial relationship
between petitioners and private respondent was interrupted in 1994, when the city government of
Parañaque, represented by then Mayor, authorized the dumping of garbage on the adjoining lot. The garbage
polluted the main source of salt water, which adversely affected salt production on the subject landholding.
Petitioners informed respondent of this, but failed to take any step to stop the dumping of garbage on the
adjoining lot. Petitioners filed a protest but their complaint was ignored. They again filed with the RARAD of
Region IV a complaint against respondent and the Mayor for maintenance of peaceful possession and security
of tenure with damages. Subsequently, they amended their complaint to one for damages and disturbance
compensation, with prayer for temporary restraining order and injunction. RARAD rendered a decision holding
that under Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 8101, issued in 1981, the subject salt beds have been
reclassified to residential lands. Consequently, the juridical tie between petitioners and respondent was
severed, for no tenurial relationship can exist on a land that is no longer agricultural with petitioners entitled
to disturbance compensation. It was held that the DAR had no jurisdiction over the complaint against the
Mayor and dismissed the same. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed in toto the above decision of the RARAD. The
CA reversed the decision of the DARAB, and ordered the dismissal of petitioners' complaint.

ISSUES: Whether or not a mere reclassification of the land from agricultural to residential, without any court
action by the landowner to eject or dispossess the tenant, entitles the latter to disturbance compensation?

HELD: A tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure. He can only be
ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law. This is clearly stated in Section 7 of RA
3844. Section 36 provides the different grounds and manner by which a tenant can be lawfully ejected or
dispossessed of his landholding. One of them is the reclassification of the landholding from agricultural to
nonagricultural. It is clear that a tenant can be lawfully ejected only if there is a court authorization in a
judgment that is final and executory and after a hearing where the reclassification of the landholding was duly
determined. If the court authorizes the ejectment, the tenant who is dispossessed of his tenancy is entitled to
disturbance compensation. Moreover, contrary to petitioners' claim, the reclassification of the land is not
enough to entitle them to disturbance compensation. The law is clear that court proceedings are
indispensable where the reclassification of the landholding is duly determined before ejectment can be
effected, which in turn paves the way for the payment of disturbance compensation. The parties can still
continue with their tenurial relationship even after such reclassification. In fact, it is undisputed that in this
case, the parties continued with their landlord-tenant relationship even after the enactment of Metro Manila
Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01. It was only in 1994 when this relationship was interrupted because of the
dumping of garbage by the city government. Clearly, it was this latter event which caused petitioner's
dispossession, and it would be unfair to oblige respondent to pay compensation for acts it did not commit.

In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject landholding was merely reclassified.
Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of
agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on
the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and
procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to
undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes. Since
in this case, there is neither a final order of conversion by the DAR nor a court judgment authorizing the
tenants' ejectment on the ground of reclassification, as a result of the landowner's court action, there is no
legal basis to make respondent liable to pay disturbance compensation.
FORTICH vs. CORONA G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998
Facts:  This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the
Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners.
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144
hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view
of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and
raise the income of its people. Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on
November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject
land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of
CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries. After a careful evaluation of the
petition vis-a-vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the
instant application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be
sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for
employment and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the
municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as
there are none) does not guarantee such benefits. In pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal
mandate and in view of the favorable recommendations of the various government agencies, the subject
Order of Department of Agrarian Reform, was SET ASIDE, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP
decision which having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The DAR filed a second
motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the President.
Some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to
protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-
beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In
Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the entire
144-hectare property be set aside.  President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and
promised to resolve their grievance within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding
Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and
recommend possible solutions to the problem. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the
strikers’ protest by issuing the so-called “Win/Win” Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona. A copy of the “Win-Win” Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of
Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997 28 and, on
December 4, 1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary
Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence this case.
Issue: Whether the Office of the president still have Jurisdiction when it entertained the Second Motion for
Reconsideration and became the basis of the Win-Win Resolution?
Held: No, When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of
March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the
said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction,
the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that
only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even
if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been
entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing
the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening
the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and
executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.