STATUTORY RIGHTS V.

NATURAL RIGHTS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q.
RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 104768 | July 21, 2003 | En Banc | Justice

Carpio
Political and International Law | Political Law | Political Organization and
Government Structure | General Considerations | Preliminary Matters

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum. However, the protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Declaration of Human
Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,

directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as
these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government
did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is
thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.

FACTS:
Based on the mandate of President Corazon Aquino’s E.O. No. 1
creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government which was
tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, the
AFP Anti-Graft Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas.
The AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas,
finding ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of
₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
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The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379
against Ramas. The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other
hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit,
Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas. It
alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income
from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his
public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate
and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. It
prayed for forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and equipment
in favor of the State.

In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a

residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at
₱700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other
legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City
and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated
from the house of Dimaano.

Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas

from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of
the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken
from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the ground
that there was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied.

Petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal
search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification
of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the
Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of
the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and
items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her
since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy
any constitutional right.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is,
after the actual and effective take-over of power by the
revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance
by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986, immediately before the
adoption of the Provisional Constitution.
2. Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during
the interregnum.

RULING:
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary

government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the
extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of
the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the
interregnum.

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained
operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the
PCGG before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The
sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the takeover
of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the
Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a

revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could
validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of
Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary
to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing

considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze
and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have
received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already
mentioned, the Provisional or “Freedom” Constitution recognizes the
power and duty of the President to enact “measures to achieve the
mandate of the people to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the
leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest
of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts.” And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the “authority to issue
sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March
25, 1986.”

Even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy,

under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found
in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure

government, assumed
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant
to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant
requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.” Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that
no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence.

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides

in its Article 17(2) that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property.” Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it
as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles
of international law and binding on the State.
Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights of individuals under the
Declaration. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the
Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. The Court
considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and
that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of
international law laid down in the
Covenant. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government
could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance
with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25

March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if
contravened, rendered such directives and orders void.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,

directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long
as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have
also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the
revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued
by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched
and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in

the warrant. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it
seized these items. The seizure of these items was therefore void, and
unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must
be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them,
Dimaano.
HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR

TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.

L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.Demetrio B. Salem &
Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner
Union.

PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang in protest to express their
grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass
demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. called for a meeting with the leaders of the
PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was
stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an
exercise of the laborers’ inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of
speech, and freedom for the petition for redress of grievances.

The Management informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. This was followed with a warning of
possible dismissal of workers should they push with the rally as it would constitute to illegal
strike and is a violation under the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not
be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts
should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, the
Respondent filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift,
charging them with a “violation for unfair labor practices under Section 4(a)-6 in relation to
Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA
providing for ‘No Strike and No Lockout.’ “. Petitioners thereafter were held guilty by CIR for
bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal

Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held:
Yes. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society” and the “threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,”
permitting government regulation only “with narrow specificity.”

A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,

namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent
firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report
to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently
their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.

Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local
police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly
and of the petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers
of PBM were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution — the untrammeled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6
o’clock in the morning to 2 o’clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights.

The employees’ pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as
they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a
matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families.
Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As
heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the
demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause
for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is “a potent means of inhibiting speech” and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as a mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of the petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom
of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the
Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more participants, the more persons can be
apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be
regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position
and abet continued alleged police persecution.

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription, but human rights are imprescriptible. If human
rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities,
of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.

CARAM VS SEGUI (G.R. NO. 193652 AUGUST 5, 2014)

Caram vs Segui
G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

Facts: Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano
Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of
marriage. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun
and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for having a second
illegitimate son. On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial
MedicalCenter, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13,
2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

Issue: Whether or not writ of Amparo is the proper remedy available to the Petitioner.

Held: No. Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the
latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for
adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child
and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee
the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLUSTER

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

US vs TURIBIO
G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUIS TORIBIO,
defendant-appellant.

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of
Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a
carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter
of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft
purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in
the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he
contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in
his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is
an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Facts: The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided
for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote
the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to
render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain
by its enactment

The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat the purpose of
the law.

The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private
property by police regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction
placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be
authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.

The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of
the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested with public
interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy the requesites of
a valid exercise of police power

The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent
domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a mere
regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public
interest.
hurchill vs. Rafferty, G.R. No. L-10572, December 21, 1915
( 32 Phil 580)
CASE DIGEST

FACTS: The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to
destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason
that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege
otherwise.

ISSUE:Was there valid exercise of police power in this case?

HELD: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government
belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those
fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of
the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power
and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid.
But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety,
or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.

"The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."

"The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said,
however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order,
peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate
any of the provisions of the organic law."

"It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting
the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "the greatest good of the greatest
number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling
for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social
conditions demand correction."
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be
put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and
preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."

"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than
to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."

HERMANO OIL v TOLL REGULATORY BOARD

742 SCRA 395
G.R. No. 167290
November 26, 2014
FACTS: Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation owned a parcel of land at
NLEX. The petitioner requested that respondent Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) grant an
easement of right of way, for it had been deprived of its enjoyment and possession by
the fence that barred its entry. TRB denied based on the Limited Access Highway Act.

Hence, petitioner sued TRB and Engr. Dumlao demanding specific performance, the
grant of the easement of right of way and damages being deprived of its property
without due process, just compensation and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can claim just compensation.

RULING: No. The limited access imposed on the petitioner's property did not partake
of a compensable taking due to the exercise of the power of eminent domain.

The putting up of the access fence on the petitioner's property was in the valid exercise
of police power. Toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the
fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close
regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on
toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but
reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it

There is no question that the property was not taken and devoted for public use.
Instead, the property was subjected to a certain restraint, i.e. the access fence, in order
to secure the general safety and welfare of the motorists using the NLEX. There being a
clear and valid exercise of police power, the petitioner was certainly not entitled to any
just compensation

EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW

PEOPLE V. CAYAT (1939) |EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAUSE
February 5, 2017

G.R. No. L-45987, 68 Phil 12, May 5, 1939

DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian tribe was
found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor
(one bottle of gin) which is not a native wine.
2. Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the non-
Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their so-called
native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.
3. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory
and denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due process and it is an improper
exercise of police power.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
RULING:
 No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
 Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classifications.
The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class.
 Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification rests on real
and substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a
way to the geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines of a low grade of
civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure peace and order among the non-
Christian tribes. The experience of the past and the lower court observed that the use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which
hamper the efforts of the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, the
said act is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature understood
that civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of
protection and security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members of same class.

ORMOC SUGAR CO. V. TREASURER OF ORMOC

CITY (1968) | EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
February 5, 2017

G.R. No. L-23794, 22 SCRA 603, February 17, 1968

Doctrine: For a classification to be valid, it should be applicable to future conditions as well.

Facts:
1. The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passedOrdinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing “on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc
City a municipal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States of America and other
foreign countries.”
2. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20,
1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.
 3. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complain tagainst the City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause.
4. On the other hand, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city’s
power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited
constitutional limitations.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause.
Held:
 Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause.
 The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar
a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification
applies only to those who belong to the same class.
 The questioned ordinance does not meet the requisites for a reasonable classification.
 The ordinace taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
 To be reasonable, it should be applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar
central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later
a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Case Digest: ANG TIBAY VS. CIR, GR. No. 46496, February 27, 1940

DOCTRINES OF THE CASE:

 The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of

procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable
(Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that
the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process
in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
 There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character. The first of these rights is the right to hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
 thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controvercial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.

FACTS:

Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a shortage of leather
soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union.
According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to systematically terminate
the employees from work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that
Ang Tibay is guilty of unjust labor practice because the owner, Teodoro, is
discriminating against the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National
Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer. The Court of
Industrial Relation decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion
for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the
said motion.

The motion for new trial was raised because according to NLU, there are documents
that are so inaccessible to them that even with the exercise of due diligence they could
not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations. That these documents, which NLU have now attached as exhibits
are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered therein.

ISSUE:

Whether the union was denied due process by CIR.

HELD:
To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a
special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is
the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ
of the government.

Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far
more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes
arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords
and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and
in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and submit
evidence in support thereof;

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have something to support itself;

(4) The evidence must be substantial;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate;

(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.

SC said there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to failure to
receive all relevant evidence. Thus, the motion for a new trial was granted and the
entire record of this case is remanded to the CIR.

EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO v. VICENTE PALANCA

G.R. No. L-11390, 26 March 1918
Street, J.

DOCTRINE

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a
seizure of the property under legal process, where it is brought into actual custody of the law, or
may result from the institution of legal proceedings which gives the court has power over the
property under special provisions of the law.

FACTS

Engracio Palanca entered into a mortgage agreement with Plaintiff-Appellee El Banco Español,
secured by various parcels of real property. After the execution of the agreement, Engacio left
the Philippines for China where he lived and died. Thereafter, the mortgage defaulted, prompting
the Plaintiff-Appellee to institute an action for foreclosure of the mortgaged property before the
Court of First Instance (CFI). Since Engracio was a non-resident at the time of the action, the
Plaintiff-Appellee made the necessary notice by publication, and deposited in the post office a
copy of the summons and complaint to Engracio’s last known residence. The action proceeded
before the CFI with Engracio failing to appear. As such, a judgment by default was rendered in
favor of Plaintiff-Appellee, ordering Engracio to deliver the amount of the mortgage. Failure to
comply shall result in the public sale of the mortgaged property. The payment was never made.
Thus, the CFI ordered the sale of the mortgaged property.

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After seven (7) years, Defendant-Appellant Vicente Palanca, the administrator of the estate of
Engracio, filed a motion to set aside the order of the CFI on the ground that it never acquired
jurisdiction over Engracio or over the subject of the action. The CFI denied the motion; hence,
the present Petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CFI acquired jurisdiction over the action for foreclosure.

RULING

YES. The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the
litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, where it is brought
into actual custody of the law, or may result from the institution of legal proceedings which gives
the court has power over the property under special provisions of the law. An example of the
latter is jurisdiction over the res whereby the court assumes to exercise jurisdiction in rem over
the property, and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world, without
even taking actual physical control over the property. Further, in an action to foreclose a
mortgage against a non-resident, the relief must be confined to the res and not against the person
himself.

In the present case, the mortgaged property is the sole thing which is impleaded and is the
responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. The jurisdiction of the
CFI is based exclusively on the power which it possesses over the property under the law on land
registration.

TAN vs. BARRIOS, [G.R. Nos. 85481-82. October 18, 1990.]

In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied
prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was
promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the
Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases
where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights
of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, is no
longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the
violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process…xxx

The public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Cruz
vs. Enrile as their authority to refile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners who had
been tried and acquitted by Military Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is an
unreasonable application of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will be searched in vain for such
authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced a court martial, much less those who had
been acquitted by such bodies more than a decade ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. herein…xxx

The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-accused
before Military Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military
courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case
of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional
right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the
charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this Court (Aquino vs.
Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and came before us.

Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against the petitioners would
place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic.

LOPEZ v. ALTURAS DIGEST

DECEMBER 19, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

QUIRICO LOPEZ v. ALTURAS GROUP OF COMPANIES and/or

MARLITO UY

G.R. No. 191008 , April 11, 2011

FACTS: Quirico Lopez (petitioner) was hired by respondent Alturas Group of

Companies in 1997 as truck driver. Ten years later or sometime in November 2007,
he was dismissed after he was allegedly caught by respondent’s security guard in the
act of attempting to smuggle out of the company premises 60 kilos of scrap iron worth
P840 aboard respondents’ Isuzu Cargo Aluminum Van with Plate Number PHP 271
that was then assigned to him. When questioned, petitioner allegedly admitted to the
security guard that he was taking out the scrap iron consisting of lift springs out of
which he would make axes.
Petitioner, in compliance with the Show Cause Notice dated December 5, 2007 issued
by respondent company’s Human Resource Department Manager, denied the
allegations by a handwritten explanation written in the Visayan dialect.
Finding petitioner’s explanation unsatisfactory, respondent company terminated his
employment by Notice of Termination effective December 14, 2007 on the grounds of
loss of trust and confidence, and of violation of company rules and regulations. In
issuing the Notice, respondent company also took into account the result of an
investigation showing that petitioner had been smuggling out its cartons which he had
sold, in conspiracy with one Maritess Alaba, for his own benefit to thus prompt it to
file a criminal case for Qualified Theft against him before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bohol. It had in fact earlier filed another criminal case for Qualified Theft
against petitioner arising from the theft of the scrap iron.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was not afforded procedural due process.

RULING: This Court has held that there is no violation of due process even if no
hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the
controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.

Petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side when he was informed of the
charge against him and required to submit his written explanation with which he
complied.

The above rulings are a clear recognition that the employer may provide an employee
with ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of a
representative or counsel in ways other than a formal hearing. The employee can be
fully afforded a chance to respond to the charges against him, adduce his evidence or
rebut the evidence against him through a wide array of methods, verbal or written.
After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the
employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a letter,
memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer evidence in support thereof,
like relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily time records) and the
sworn statements of his witnesses. For this purpose, he may prepare his
explanation personally or with the assistance of a representative or counsel. He
may also ask the employer to provide him copy of records material to his
defense. His written explanation may also include a request that a formal
hearing or conference be held. In such a case, the conduct of a formal hearing or
conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist substantial
evidentiary disputes or where company rules or practice requires an actual
hearing as part of employment pretermination procedure.

The right to counsel and the assistance of one in investigations involving termination
cases is neither indispensable nor mandatory, except when the employee himself
requests for one or that he manifests that he wants a formal hearing on the charges
against him.