Republic vs.

Sandiganbayan
GR No. 104768

Facts:

 Upon the assumption of the then President Corazon C. Aquino following the
successful Revolution in EDSA, she immediately issued Executive Order No. 1
(EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG).
One of the primary tasks of the PCGG is to recover all the ill-gotten wealth of the
then former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. His Family, Relatives, subordinates
and close associates.

 On March 3, 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence

a search warrant captioned with “illegal possession of firearms and ammunition”.

 The Sandiganbayan ruled that the confiscated properties from the house of
DImaano were illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence.

 The Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred with its decision

 The Petitioner asks the Court to take judicial notice that the raid team conducted
the search and seizure on the 3rd of march 1986 (Five days after the EDSA
revolution)

 The Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at the time
by virtue of Proclamation No.1 announcing that President Corazon Aquino and
Vice President Salvador Laurel were “taking power in the name and by the will of
the Filipino People”

 Petitioner also asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 constitution which guaranteed private respondents
exclusionary rights.

Issue:

 WoN the revolutionary government was bound by the bill of rights of the 1973
constitution during interregnum

 WoN the protection accorded to the individuals uinder the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human rights
remained in effect during the interregnum.
Held:

 The court held that the Bill of Rights under the previous government or the 1973
Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directive and orders of the revolutionary

government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent
and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973
constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than
the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the
interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under the bill of
rights because there was neither a constitution nor a bill of rights during
interregnum

 However, the court also held that the protection accorded to individuals under
the covenant and the declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to

enjoy, under the covenant and declaration almost the same rights found in the
bill of rights of the 1973 constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government,

assumed responsibility for the state’s good faith compliance with the covenant to
which the Philippines is a signatory.
Article 2(1) of the covenant requires each signatory state “to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present covenant”
Article 17(1) of the covenant state that the revolutionary government had the
duty to insure that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.

The declaration to which the Philippines is also a signatory state in its Article
17(2) that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the
signatories to the declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, the
court has interpreted the declaration as part of the international law and binding
to the state.

The revolutionary government did no repudiate the covenant nor the declaration
during the interregnum.
Philosophical Underpinning/s:
Concurring Opinion
The right to protect oneself against unreasonable search and seizure, being a right
indispensable to the right to life, liberty and property, may be derived as a conclusion
from what Aquinas identifies as man’s natural inclination to self-preservation and self-
actualization. Man preserves himself by leading a secure life enjoying his liberty and
actualizes himself as a rational and social being in choosing to freely express himself
and associate with others as well as by keeping to and knowing himself.

Considering that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a natural right,
the government cannot claim that private respondent Dimaano is not entitled to the
right for the reason alone that there was no constitution granting the right at the time
the search was conducted. This right of the private respondent precedes the
constitution, and does not depend on positive law. It is part of natural rights.

In holding that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental and
natural right, we were aided by philosophy and history. In the case of the exclusionary
right, philosophy can also come to the exclusionary right's aid, along the lines of Justice
Clarke's proposition in the Mapp case that no man shall be convicted on
unconstitutional evidence. Similarly, the government shall not be allowed to convict a
man on evidence obtained in violation of a natural right (against unreasonable search
and seizure) for the protection of which, government and the law were established. To
rule otherwise would be to sanction the brazen violation of natural rights and allow law
enforcers to act with more temerity than a thief in the night for they can disturb one's
privacy, trespass one's abode, and steal one's property with impunity. This, in turn,
would erode the people's trust in government.