Esparza Czech National Identity

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National identity and the Other: imagining the EU from the Czech Lands
Daniel Esparza a
a
Department of Romance Studies, Palacký University, Olomouc, Czech Republic
Online publication date: 23 April 2010
To cite this Article Esparza, Daniel(2010) 'National identity and the Other: imagining the EU from the Czech Lands',
Nationalities Papers, 38: 3, 413 — 436
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Nationalities Papers
Vol. 38, No. 3, May 2010, 413 –436
National identity and the Other: imagining the EU from the

Czech Lands
Daniel Esparza∗
Department of Romance Studies, Palacký University, Olomouc, Czech Republic

(Received 9 June 2009; final version received 17 December 2009)
National identity is constructed through successive identifications with significant

Others. This article discusses the phenomenon of change and continuity in Czech
identity. It is focused here on the identification towards the EU, which has become
the most significant Other of today in two ways: (a) (change) contributing to
overcoming the identity crisis provoked by the drastic changes that occurred
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between 1989 and 1993 (change of regime, disappearance of the USSR and the
break-up of Czechoslovakia), and therefore the subsequent drastic changes in
relations with past significant Others: communism, the USSR, and the Slovaks; and
(b) (continuity) reaffirming one of the fundamental elements during the national
revival in the nineteenth century, democracy, upon which the various identifications
towards the EU have been aligned. According to the differing interpretations of what
democracy means, and three other criteria of the “levels of Othering,” the EU has
been “imagined,” on the one hand, as an entity where Czechs can flourish in their
identity and ensure their freedom and democratic values (positive Other), and, on
the other, as an “oppressor” entity which portrays democratic deficit, restricts
freedom, and threatens Czech national identity (negative Other).
Keywords: national identity; Czech Republic; EU; the Other
Introduction
The increasing virtualization of reality through the mass media and the saturation of infor-
mation in modern societies1 have produced modern Man disoriented by the complexity of
reality; “In a world where image is of ever growing importance” there is a frenzied search
to be different.2 Difference, or the difference – sameness dichotomy, is the starting point of
this research. “Difference” is usually understood as the opposite of identical; a word
derived from the Latin root idem, which means “the same.” The word “identity” derives
from that Latin root as well. As Nasio explains, identifying oneself is a movement
towards the Other (El Placer 100). Identifying oneself means to incorporate as yours
something from the Other. Thus, identity is the result of an interactive relationship of
antagonistic forces between the wish to be similar to something and to be different
from something. This is the basis of this research, which emphasizes the importance
and necessity of the Other to construct identity. As Miroslav Hroch (“From Ethnic
Group” 101) notes: “imagining the existence of the Other, people can imagine their
own group, their own country.”3
In general, the Other has usually been understood only in one way, as a negative entity
upon which the individual, groups, ethnic communities or nations construct their identi-
ties: “we” are different because we are not like “them.” In this sense, the Other is perceived
∗
Email: daniel.esparza@upol.cz
ISSN 0090-5992 print/ISSN 1465-3923 online

# 2010 Association for the Study of Nationalities
DOI: 10.1080/00905991003641947
http://www.informaworld.com
414 D. Esparza
as an enemy or threat.4 However, in this article I consider the Other as both positive and
negative, in the sense that national identity is constructed through successive identifi-
cations with significant Others – positively, when the Other, or some part of it, is
“admired” and imitated, negatively when the Other, or one part of it, is apparently
“hated,” and thus apparently rejected.
The Other in the formation of identity is a symbolic entity upon which the images of
oneself are projected, once again, both positively and negatively, as if it were a screen. The
Other could be a person, a historical character, a music band, an ethnicity, a nation, an
empire, an ideology, a political concept like democracy, a wish, as well as “a historical
event or era, a political institution, a specific collective non-national entity” (Petersoo
119), or “women for men, the rich for the poor, Californians and New Yorkers for Mid-
western Americans, the young for the old, conservatives for Marxists, tourists for
natives, and so on” (Riggins 4 qtd. in Petersoo 119).
All societies have the need to reaffirm and transform themselves periodically through
collective rites and ceremonies. This phenomenon of change and continuity was observed
by Durkheim in his Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915). Although he did not
apply it directly to national identity, he observed how in many ways the symbolic world of
primitive religions still remains in contemporary societies. This article focuses on how the
EU has emerged as the most significant Other for the Czech Republic, and how the path to
EU accession for this country has acted as a “ritual” element in two ways. Firstly, in the
transformation of the contemporary Czech national identity, as far as the identifications
towards the old significant Others are concerned, and therefore to the extent of contribut-
ing to overcoming the identity crisis provoked by the drastic change of roles from the pre-
vious significant Others which disappeared between 1989 and 1993: (i) communism
1948 – 1989; (ii) the USSR and the Warsaw Pact; and finally (iii) Czechoslovakia (the
Slovaks as internal Others). Secondly, the road to the EU has been useful in reaffirming
one of the most significant and distinctive characteristics of the Czech national revival
(narodnı́ obrozenı́) in the nineteenth century, i.e. the value of democracy, which has
endured until today (continuity),5 as it demonstrates the fact that democracy has been
the most remarkable characteristic of the EU as far as the Czech public is concerned
(see Table 11).
How, when and why is the EU positive or negative? In order to examine the various
identifications towards the EU in the Czech Republic, this article examines the following
sources: (i) the official discourses of Czech Presidents Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus; (ii)
the electoral programmes of the main Czech political parties; and (iii) public attitudes
through surveys. The aim is to order the various EU identifications obtained from these
sources into one classification. I provisionally propose “the levels of Othering” where
the Others are classified as positive or negative, according to four criteria:6 (I) democracy:
does the EU reinforce democracy in the Czech Republic or constrict it? (II) Czech national
identity: does the EU reinforce it or constrict it? (III) The economy: does the EU improve
the standard of living in the Czech Republic or not? (IV) International security: does the
EU reinforce the security of the Czech Republic or threaten it? In general, we can consider
that there is a positive Other when the majority of the identifications towards the Other, yet
not necessary all, are positive, and thus admired, accepted and incorporated as good, and
therefore total or partially imitated. An example of this positive “imitation” at the level of
states and European integration is the adoption of the EU acquis by the candidate
members. On the other hand, there is a negative Other, when the majority of the identifi-
cations are negative, yet not necessarily all of them, and thus the Other is apparently
rejected, at least in everyday discourse. For example, the roots of European integration
Nationalities Papers 415
in the 1950s were created in conscious opposition “against” the Second World War, which
was rejected as something that could not be repeated, and also in conscious opposition
against the USSR. This general definition of the Other (positive and negative) is not uni-
versal, but only provisional to this research.
National identity and the Other

The increasing interest in national identity7 is closely related to the “general obsession” in
studies about identities (personal and collective) that seem to be a symptom of the Zeitge-
ist, precisely and paradoxically, when the spirit of the times is dominated by a crisis of
identity, or a generalized crisis of identities.
Identity and national identity are slippery concepts which are exposed to a variety of
interpretations from different perspectives and scientific disciplines; there is no universal
definition.8 However, this reason is not strong enough to prevent many scholars from
daring to research and consider certain parameters to observe and even to measure it.
As far as the studies on national identities are concerned, Anthony D. Smith (Nationalism
18) defines national identity as “the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the
pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive
heritage of nations, and the identifications of individuals with that pattern and heritage,
and with its cultural elements.” Moreover, Montserrat Guibernau (Identity of Nations
11) takes into account the psychological dimension of the nation, and adds that national
identity “is a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation
and of sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations.” However,
we cannot forget the existence of some “dissidents” in this matter such as Rogers Brubaker
(28 – 63), who argues that national identity does not exist or, more precisely, cannot be
measured, because it does not represent any analytical category.
Despite the fact that there is no universal definition for national identity, we can note
that, except for Brubaker’s argument, some points appear to be widely accepted by a
majority of scholars, even if they represent different paradigms. The most significant
point is that nations and national identities are not fixed, nor eternal, neither immutable,
but fluid, dynamic and open to change, reinterpretation and renegotiation through the
time (Erikson; Guibernau, Identity of Nations 11; Hobsbawm 9; Hroch, “From National
Movement” 78– 97; Petersoo 118; Smith, Nationalism; Todd 567).
The Other as an essential element in the construction of an identity was first studied at
the beginning of the twentieth century by psychoanalysis9 and philosophy. Freud first, but
Jean Paul Sartre and Jacques Lacan later, provided a solid theoretical framework of the
Other which was acquired step by step and applied by other disciplines interested in the
formation of collective identities in modern societies – for example sociology, social
psychology, anthropology, history or political science. Drulak (National and European
Identities), Göl, Holy, Lorenzi-Cioldi and Doise, Petersoo, and Triandafyllidou (“National
Identity and the Other”; Immigrants; “Popular Perceptions of Europe”), among others, are
only a few examples of this interest in Otherness in the last two decades.
As far as studies on national identity are concerned, the concept of the “significant Other”
as an essential element in the construction of national identity was first introduced and
popularized by Anna Triandafyllidou in her “National Identity and the Other.” Almost 10
years later it was applied by Pille Petersoo to the exploration of the EU as a significant
Other in the transformation of contemporary national identities; specifically, she worked on
Estonian identity, and how Estonians have constructed their identity towards successive
identifications with significant Others, from the past (Germans and Russians) to the present
416 D. Esparza
(EU). Although Henri Tajfel did not coin the term “significant Other,” the father of social iden-
tity theory is essential to the understanding of the term “significant Other” since he introduced
the concept of social identification through differentiating one’s group from other groups.10
This approach and exploration of the Other with respect to national identity and the EU
is relatively new.11 That is why, in general, most of the literature and the axis of the debate
about the EU in the last decade – both in the Czech Republic and in other European
countries – has been addressed with regards to the following: (a) the eastern enlargement
and the integration of the new members into the structures of the EU (Henderson; LaPlant
et al.; Marek); (b) negotiations with the EU (Mayhew); (c) the Europeanization of Central
and Eastern European countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier); (d) the Europeaniza-
tion of the Czech political parties (Baun et al.); (e) the compatibility of European identity
with national identities (Drulak, National and European Identities; Guibernau, Identity
of Nations 89– 118; Ruiz et al.; Smith, “National Identity”; Triandafyllidou, “Popular
Perceptions”); and (f) the study of EU identity and its significance for European
integration (Cram).
The various imaginings of the Other

I understand by EU imaginings the materialization of these EU identifications through a
mental image, which is endowed with symbolic meaning. Since it is impossible to enter
the brain of an individual and observe that mental image directly, the only possible way
to identify and interpret such “imaginings” is through its externalization amongst individ-
uals through their attitudes, speech, writing, painting, and so on. At the collective level –
an institution or a political party for example – we should not use the term imaginings
(although we usually do) because institutions cannot imagine by themselves in the same
way as an individual can, yet they can externalize and broadcast images (speeches, propa-
ganda, marketing, spots, logos, slogans, etc.) which are normally negotiated beforehand
among representatives of such institutions.
In the Czech Republic, the EU plays a negative or a positive role depending on who
does the imagining. Obviously, national identity and the imaginings of the nation are
not homogeneous amongst all national members since they are not shared in the same
way by all, because the experiences from, for and towards the nation are not the same
for everyone. Although some collective images of the nation (community and territory)
are shared by most members,12 there are differences in how individuals give priority to
certain concrete images instead of others (depending on their own circumstances), and,
moreover, all members usually do not share the same interpretation, which is the symbolic
meaning of those images. Therefore, variables such as age, gender, political ideology, reli-
gion, economic status, profession, geographical situation and family structure, among
others, influence such imaginings in relation to the nation (national community and
national territory), because, depending on some of these variables, the individual (personal
level) or even institutions (collective level) of the same nation will differ in giving priority
to certain images of the nation, in spite of others. Thus, those individuals who share a
higher number of variables will probably have more things in common and will probably
share more collective images, not to mention the same marks or symbolic meanings of
them. Let us see a specific example which puts in practice the theory of these variables
concerning the Czech Republic,13 which in fact means an anticipation of the observation
of the various EU imaginings that I shall study in the second part of this research.
We can examine the hypothetical case of two male individuals in the Czech Republic
today, both KSČM (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy/Communist Party of Bohemia
and Moravia) voters, who were born and still live in the northern Moravian-Silesian city of
Jesenik (approximately 13,000 inhabitants), are both retired and 70 years old. These two
individuals will probably share many images of the nation, not only in the priority of the
same images but also in sharing the same meanings for them. Both, probably, will observe
the communist regime in Czechoslovakia (1948 – 1989) positively, because they will
“remember” such times as a period of values where criminality, drugs and unemployment
did not exist. In this way, they will interpret the Czechoslovak chapter of February 1948,
when the communists took over, not as a coup d’état, as it is usually seen today in the
Czech Republic, but as the glorious Communist Revolution. Similarly, they will probably
perceive the EU of today as negative or suspicious, because it represents a potential threat
to Czech independence and freedom, which stands for “neoliberal” values. On the other
hand, if we take the hypothetical case of two Czech Catholics, KDU-ČSL (Křesťanské a
demokratické unie – československo strany lidové/Christians and Democratic Union –
Czechoslovak Popular Party) voters who were born in the capital of Moravia, Brno
(approximately 350,000 inhabitants), are 40 years old, are both businessmen and have a
high level of income, they will probably “imagine” Czechoslovakia’s communist era as
a negative Other. They will “remember” and give priority to images of the lack of
freedom of that time, and, of course, today they will perceive the EU positively,
because it portrays values of freedom, democracy and economic prosperity where they
can develop and improve their ideas and businesses, not to mention their personal
challenges.14
Identity crisis
The phenomenon of identity crisis is useful in this research in order to understand the
process of change and continuity in national identity through the variations of identifi-
cations towards significant Others. An identity crisis acts as a turning point upon which
the relationship and identification towards the Others drastically change. The term identity
crisis was popularized by Erik Erikson in the 1950s. According to him, this phenomenon
occurs at the individual level, when there is “a necessary turning point, a crucial moment,
when development must move one way or another, marshalling resources of growth,
recovery and further differentiation” (Erikson 16). Applied to the national level, the iden-
tity crisis may occur as a result of an abrupt and sudden historical change as a result of war,
revolution, foreign invasion, coup d’état, or natural disaster.
In this research, I understand a generalized national identity crisis as when the relation-
ship and identifications with the most significant Others drastically shift, usually as a result
of a sudden historical change, like, for example, the end of the communist regime and the
dissolution of the USSR between 1989 and 1991, because this implies a total and deep
change in the roles, relationships, and identifications towards the Others, in all sectors
of the national population and all individuals. These types of collective crises of identity
are not an automatic consequence of a simple political crisis, whereas, conversely, in times
of political stability the collective identity crisis disappears. Taking into account that the
identity crisis is the result of the drastic change of the relationships and identifications
towards significant Others, the identity crisis finishes when the identifications and the
relationships with the new Others – both positives and negatives – are consolidated, as
could happen now in the Czech Republic. This final observation concerning the end of
the Czech identity crisis following EU accession is controversial and arguable, which I
admit is difficult to demonstrate. The most important thing is not to attempt to find “the
answer,” as if there were only one; it is more creative – “creative” in the sense that it
418 D. Esparza
would create a debate – to think that this proposal may stimulate an intensive debate
among researchers on this topic.
In the Czech case, as mentioned above, it can be observed that a set of drastic political,
social and economic changes occurred between 1989 and 1993: the end of a communist
regime; a new market economy; the disintegration of the USSR (1991) and, finally, the
break-up of Czechoslovakia (1993). These changes gave rise to, among other things, (i)
the sudden disappearance of significant Others like the USSR in 1991; (ii) new levels
of relationships with the Slovaks, who became external Others after the break-up of
Czechoslovakia in 1993; and (iii) the formation of new relationships towards significant
Others, such as the EU or NATO.15 Obviously, the perceptions, identifications and
relationships towards these new significant Others were not homogeneous among the
members of the Czech nation and were dependent on their past social positions, but all
of them experienced a sudden and drastic change towards their most significant Others,
either positive or negative. Thus, the communists became a minority and moved to the
opposition. The “democrats” became a majority, represented largely by Civic Forum,
and formed government. The dissidents were no longer dissidents. And the rulers, or
those who had been visible supporters of the Marxist ideology before 1990 – who
enjoyed privileged positions – were further removed from power, and were sometimes
prosecuted or discriminated against in the new society.16 Moreover, the new economy
spawned new socio-economic classes, the nouveau riche, the new poor, businessmen,
and the unemployed. Similarly, the meaning of the break-up of Czechoslovakia was inter-
preted differently. For example, Václav Klaus, prime minister at that time of the Czech
part of Czechoslovakia, supported the disintegration of the country, while in contrast,
Václav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia at the time, took a negative view of the end
of Czechoslovakia.
Besides the drastic and generalized change of roles, relationships, and identifications
towards the Others, we can describe at least two visible symptoms of that identity crisis.
The first, in the discussion around the name of the new state; while in Slovakia the term
Slovensko was natural, in the Czech Republic the term Česko, at that time, was not inter-
nalized and accepted by all because such a name was further related to the Bohemian part
of the state, in Czech Čechy, and therefore many Moravians and Silesians did not identify
with such a denomination for the whole country. The second symptom of the identity crisis
was linked to the revival of a new version of the mythical Česká otazká (Czech question)
amongst the Czech intellectuals of the 1990s.17 This concept was popularized by Masaryk
at the end of the nineteenth century. It is formed by a set of philosophical and historical
meditations about the Czech nation, when Czechs were living within the structures of
the Habsburg monarch and were without their own state. The questions “who are we?”
and “where do we want to go?” raised by the debate on identity during the 1990s and
the first years of the twenty-first century in the new Czech Republic were similar to the
Česká otazká at the end of the nineteenth century. If we understand that a referendum is
a collective ritual where the citizens of a nation-state can simultaneously answer the
question or questions that they are asked, the answer from the 2003 referendum was
clear: the EU.
The various attitudes and imaginings of the EU

In this section I shall examine the period 2001 – 2007. The examination of these six years is
useful because it takes three years before and three years after EU accession. Thus in this
six-year period, I shall observe and interpret the main identifications towards the EU
through the following sources: (i) the presidential speeches of Havel and Klaus; (ii) the
electoral programmes of the main Czech political parties; and (iii) the Czech public.
Finally, I will classify the various EU attitudes and imaginings in the Czech Republic
under the criteria of the “levels of Othering.”
Czech presidents: Havel and Klaus – two opposed ways of perceiving the EU
Probably because of the charismatic image of Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslo-
vakia (1918 – 1935), the presidency is the most popular and respectful democratic
institution in the Czech Republic. The presidency comprises not only the president but
also a team of people who surround the president. In this sense, the president and the
presidential speech is the tip of the iceberg of one important institution. However, it is
obvious that the team that surrounds the president is normally appointed by the president.
This means that the presidency takes the form of the leader, and that is why his/her
speeches are negotiated under the criteria and ideology of the president, at least in the
Czech case. Taking this into account, I shall observe the speeches of Václav Havel and
Václav Klaus as presidents of the Czech Republic, until now the only two presidents of
the Czech Republic since its foundation in 1993, and today probably the two most
well-known Czech contemporary politicians abroad.18
This examination of the presidency’s speeches or official writings is based on the
results of in-depth research in which 85 speeches (or official writings) have been
observed19 (all the texts are published on the official website of the Czech presidency
between May 2001 and April 2007),20 which I summarize in Table 1. Although the refer-
ences of all 85 speeches can be seen in that research, in this article I shall include in the
list of references only those which are quoted here. The EU was a relevant topic for both
presidents,21 as we can see in Table 2. In this sense, Havel mentioned the term EU 18
times, in seven speeches, which means that he used it in 25% of his speeches. As far
as Klaus is concerned, he mentioned it 218 times, which means in 75% of the speeches
observed for this article. Tables 4 and 5 show some relevant concepts about the EU,
which were used by Havel and Klaus, as points of reference, in which we can see the
opposed meaning of the EU for them. In this sense, for Havel, terms such as the West,
civilization and global civilization are related to positive identifications towards the
EU; on the other hand, Klaus places more emphasis on concepts such as the EU super-
state, the EU democratic deficit and the Europeanism associated with negative identifi-
cations towards the EU.
Václav Havel
To Václav Havel (2001 – 2003) the EU and Europe were concepts that, at that time (i.e.
before EU accession), were not clearly distinguished. In many respects he used the term
Table 1. Period and observed speeches of Havel and Klaus (2001–2007).

Havel Klaus
(May 2001–February 2003) (March 2003–30 April 2007)
No. of speeches Period in months No. of speeches Period in months
28 22 57 50
Source: author.
420 D. Esparza
Table 2. Usage of the words “Europe” and “EU” in speeches by Havel and Klaus.
Havel Klaus
Total mentions Mentioned in % speeches Total mentions Mentioned in % speeches
(average) (total speeches) (average) (total speeches)
EU 18 25% 218 75.4%
(0.72) (7) (3.82) (43)
Europe 72 39.2% 195 71.9%
(2.57) (11) (3.42) (41)
Source: author.
Europe as if was the same as the EU. This is probably one of the reasons why the concept
of Europe is mentioned more frequently and in a larger number of speeches than the EU, as
we can see in Table 2, which is mentioned in only seven speeches (25% of his speeches).
In 17 speeches (60% of the total) Havel mentions his experience with the communist
regime and the Velvet Revolution to emphasize the changes and developments in the
Czech Republic. Havel does not pay attention to the economic benefits of the EU for
the Czech Republic. His discourse aims to emphasize the democratic values of the EU.
He rejects Klaus’ perception that the EU is becoming a superstate:
We are no longer building an empire in the classical sense of the word, that is a state entity in
which more enlightened or less enlightened sovereigns expand territory under their rule and
determine the order under which people there must live. We are building something funda-
mentally different: a democratic union of states consisting of equal citizens and nations.22
Europe and the EU were very relevant in his discourses. For him it meant a step towards a
higher level of integration, which he called global civilization (see Table 4). In this sense,
the EU integrates as a part of his philosophical conception of civilization (he mentions it in
15 speeches; see Table 4) and global civilization (he mentions it in four speeches; see
Table 4), representing a positive Other for him because it portrays the democratic
values of the “West” and the “Euro-Atlantic area,” freedom and respect for human
rights: “the prospect of joining the European Union has, from the very beginning, been
the engine of democratisation and transformation which has taken place in our countries.
A Return to Europe was what our citizens voted for in the first free elections.”23 In this
way, NATO and the US are other positive Others associated with the West and the
global civilization he dreams of, as we can deduct from Table 3. For Havel, the inter-
national security of the Czech Republic is very important. He does not hide his admiration
for NATO, which for the most part shares the same values as the EU:
Table 3. Usage of the words “NATO” and “USA” in speeches by Havel and Klaus.
Havel Klaus
Total mentions Mentioned in % speeches Total mentions Mentioned in % speeches
(average) (total speeches) (average) (total speeches)
NATO 98 34 39.2% 24.6%
(3.5) (0.59) (11) (14)
USA 26 26 28.5 33.3%
(0.92) (0.92) (8) (19)
Source: author.
Table 4. Havel – EU associated with democratic values of the West

Total times No. of speeches in which theme was % of
mentioned mentioned speeches
Civilization 33 15 53.5
West 36 8 28.5
Global 4 4 14.2
civilization
Source: author.
our membership in the North Atlantic Alliance is a very important milestone in the history of
our country, because this kind of anchor is really firm, reliable, and it means that we have not
only powerful, strong and influential allies who are ready to help us in case of threat, but it also
means that this Alliance is based on sharing certain values [. . .] the founding document of the
Alliance, which says that it is an Alliance sharing certain values – democracy, rule of law,
plurality, human rights, and at the same time, it is an Alliance which embraces a certain
geographic area of the World – the Euro-Atlantic area.24
We can even notice that NATO is more relevant than the EU. He mentions NATO (98
times in 11 speeches) and the US (26 times in eight speeches) more times than the EU (see
Table 3). Taking into account that only his last 22 months in the presidency were observed,
two possible reasons could explain this fact: (i) for Havel NATO was very important for
Czech security, especially after the terrorists attacks in New York (11 September 2001);
and (ii) in 2002, NATO was relevant, because in his last year as president, a NATO
summit took place in Prague, in November.
Havel’s attitude towards the EU is open and active – open because for him Czech
national identity will be reinforced in the EU; active in the sense that the EU is an oppor-
tunity for the Czechs to participate in the future of the world. In the following words from
his New Year’s speech on 1 January 2002, we can observe not only this open and active
attitude but also his admiration for and positive recognition of the EU, not to mention his
hope that the Czech national identity will flourish in the EU:25
We should not be deceived by talk to the effect that within the European Union our Czech
national identity would dissolve. It is we alone who could dissolve it, and actually many of
us are doing just this day by day: by corrupting the Czech language, by trivializing Czech
architecture, by destroying the Czech countryside, by disregarding Czech culture as a mere
“appendage”, by kicking free critical thinking in the ankles. Our national identity and the
threat allegedly confronting it are most frequently discussed by those who are the least
certain as to whether or not they harbour it. The way we can become incorporated into Euro-
pean and international relationships is by being well aware of what we are – that is, by earning
respect for our efficiency, by our discoveries, our thinking, our courage, the ways in which we
are responsible for the World, the ways in which we protect our cultural heritage, and by our
concern for the state of our country; and not by incessantly speaking of our identity and inces-
santly frightening ourselves with the thought that someone might wish to steal it from us. I
have not noticed that the European Union has in any way harmed the identities of the
Finnish, the Portuguese or the Irish. On the contrary, for those nations the European Union
has paved the way for their further progress, while posing to them anew the question of
how specifically they may wish to contribute to common progress.
In general, most of the identifications towards the EU are positive.26 That is why for
him the EU acts as a positive Other in the sense that it fulfils in a positive way most of
the EU criteria relating to the levels of Othering determined at the beginning of this
research. With the exception of the economy, he never approaches this matter (either posi-
tively or negatively); for Havel, the EU reinforces Czech democracy, national identity, and
the security of the Czech Republic (for him, NATO is associated with EU defence).
422 D. Esparza
Václav Klaus
On the other side, for Václav Klaus, who became president in February 2003, the percep-
tions and attitudes towards the EU are quite different in comparison with his predecessor
Havel. For Klaus the EU is a core theme of his speeches and holds greater relevance
than for Havel, as we can see in Table 2. He does not consider his ideas Eurosceptic,
but “Eurorealistic.” He has an intergovernmental and very liberal approach towards the
EU. In this sense he dislikes every new EU treaty and summit, because they “take
Europe closer to a Single European State.”27 In 68% of his speeches he mentions his
experience with communism to raise awareness that the new threat is not communism
but “Europeanism,” as we can see indirectly in the following quote:
I am afraid that we face the same utopias as in the past, now in their computerized, digitalized
versions. I am convinced that the counter-arguments are the same today as in the past. We,
from the former communist countries, know what we are talking about.28
He opposed the EU Constitution, which he considered a “radical document with far-
reaching consequences for freedom and welfare of individual citizens and for the future
of nation-states,”29 and subsequently also rejected the Lisbon Treaty. Like his predecessor
Havel, he supports Czech membership of NATO and the existence of NATO as
“indispensable in securing stability, security and prosperity of the European continent.”
He emphasizes the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the US as “crucial in
the enforcement and stabilisation of democracy and civil economic liberties on the
European continent.”30
Václav Klaus has maintained a closed and defensive position towards the EU – closed
because he perceives the EU as a threat to Czech national identity, defensive in the
sense that his only priority is the defence of Czech national interests. He emphasizes
the “EU democratic deficit” (he mentions it in 12 speeches; see Table 5), not to
mention the excessive regulation and bureaucracy.31 Moreover, he hints that the EU is
a “superstate” which threatens the freedom of the nations in Europe (he mentions it in
11 speeches; see Table 5). Both indirectly or subliminally he has compared the EU and
the European Parliament as if they were new versions of the Soviet Union, emphasizing
the “paternalistic” and “bureaucratic” role of the EU as if it were the same as the
USSR: “We are well aware of the problems connected with the speedy and in many
respects artificial European unification; we know well the risks and operations of large
supranational bodies controlled by bureaucrats.”32 In the long-term historical perspective
we can consider these types of perceptions as symptoms of longue durèe33 where he, under
traumas of the past, imagines the EU as if it were the Habsburg Empire, the Third Reich, or
the Soviet Union. In the following words taken from two of his speeches, we get a hint of
the spirit of Klaus’ ideology:
The historic dismantling of Communism brought us freedom and sovereignty. Our gradual
approach to the European Union, adjusting to its requirements and in 2004 formally entering
into it was a process with much more different characteristics than the first one. It has brought
us less freedom, less democracy, less sovereignty, more regulation and more extensive
government intervention.34
We must learn how to live in Brussels’ structures and in the complicated supranational organ-
ization which has nothing to do with poetry. We must not get lost there. We must make sure
that our identity does not get blurred and that we do not lose the basic attributes of the Czech
state.35
For Klaus the EU plays a controversial role that I have provisionally labelled as
“frustrated” negative Other for the following reasons. In general, his identification and
relationship towards the existing EU are more negative than positive. If we have in
Table 5. Klaus – EU as a negative Other (oppressor).

Total times No. of speeches in which
mentioned theme was mentioned % of speeches
EU/superstate 12 11 19.2
EU/democratic deficit 15 12 21
Europeanism 20 8 14
Source: author.
mind the four criteria of the levels of Othering, only one can be considered positively –
security – but this has always related to NATO, and not the EU. In economic terms the
EU is ambiguous. He has consistently downplayed or underestimated the benefits of the
Structural Funds for the Czech Republic. Similarly, he has emphasized the lack of a
fully free market in the EU. When he has supported the benefits of EU accession he has
done so not as a result of EU membership but as a consequence of the liberalized European
space: “we are aware of the benefits of EU integration and we consider benefits from our
mere presence in a liberalized European space to be much more important than potential
explicit financial benefits coming from the European institutions.”36 He perceives the EU
as a threat to Czech identity, and the EU a superstate with a high level of democratic
deficit. However, it is “frustrated” because in spite of his deeply criticizing the EU struc-
ture and institutions, he not only accepts there is no better alternative to the EU but also
admits that EU accession was “one of the most important events in the history of the
Czech state,” not only in the history of the Czech Republic since 1993, but for “those
one thousand years” of Czech existence.37
Czech political parties

The study of party political programmes is a useful resource in order to observe how insti-
tutions broadcast and externalize their “imaginings” or, put differently, their images,
because, as stated above, institutions cannot imagine in the same way that an individual
can. Such images are normally negotiated beforehand among the representatives of
such institutions. Thus, based on the observation of the electoral programmes of the elec-
tions of the Low Chamber of deputies (2002 and 2006) and the European Parliament
(2004), I shall show the most significant identifications towards the EU of the main
Czech political parties. A list of these electoral programmes is given in the Appendix. I
have observed only those parties which obtained representation in the three elections:
ODS (conservatives); ČSSD (Social Democrats); KDU-ČSL (Democratic-Christians)
and KSČM (Communists). In order to gain an idea of how representative these four
parties are in Czech society, see Table 6.38
ODS: the EU as a “frustrated” negative Other

The Civic Democratic Party (Občanská Demokratická Strana), founded in 1991 by Václav
Klaus,39 is a conservative and neoliberal party with an intergovernmental perspective of
the EU, known in the European Parliament as a Eurosceptic party. However, the civic-
democrats prefer to call it “Eurorealism,” catching the spirit of Jan Zahradil (ODS
deputy in the European Parliament) and the party’s founder Klaus. The ODS opposed
the European Constitution, and supported its “simplification and transparency.”40
424 D. Esparza
Table 6. Low Chamber election results, 2002 and 2006.

2002 2006
Deputies % votes Deputies % votes
CSSD 70 30.20 74 32.3
ODS 58 24.47 81 35.8
KSCM 41 18.51 26 12.81
KDU-CSLa 31 14.27 13 7.2
a
In 2002, the KDU-CSL and US-DEU participated together under the name of Coalition (Koalice). In 2006, the
US-DEU did not obtain parliamentary representation.
Source: Czech Statistical Office.
It rejects the concept of a federal EU. This party has promoted the idea of a “flexible
Europe,” a concept advanced in the 2002 and 2004 electoral programmes. This “flexible
Europe” entails “the ability of a flexible reaction, conformability and the capacity of rapid
response”41 in a constantly changing world. This is the opposite of what the party con-
siders “Fortress Europe,” that is to say, the excessive paternalism and protectionism of
the current EU. This party is in favour of reducing the deepening of EU integration,
and strongly supports the removal of all barriers to obtain a fully free market.
In general, the ODS has hardly emphasized any advantage or positive aspect of the EU.
According to the four criteria, the ODS identifications towards the EU are ambiguous, yet
in general it is not satisfied at all with the current EU, with the exception of the security
criterion, which is clearly positive yet always linked to NATO and transatlantic relations:
“to contribute to the creation of the common, politically, economically and militarily inter-
connected Euro-Atlantic area that would present the core of global democratic civiliza-
tion,”42 and also claiming that any future European project of defence must not weaken
NATO and transatlantic relationships.43 As far as national identity is concerned, the
ODS does not appear to be particularly concerned about the impact of EU accession
since the Czech Republic joined the EU, as it is not mentioned. However, prior to EU
accession the party displayed a fear that Czech national identity could be eroded within
the EU. That is why it emphasized the need to “keep a clearly delimited national iden-
tity.”44 With respect to democracy, in the electoral programmes there are no direct refer-
ences to the EU’s “democratic deficit” and neither is there any reference to the
reinforcement of democracy in the EU. However, we can observe that the ODS is not sat-
isfied at all, in the sense that it emphasizes the discrimination of the new Member States
and the reduction of freedom and independence of the nation-states. In economic terms,
the ODS has hardly emphasized the benefits of the Structural Funds and even less how
it would use them. The ODS mentions only that it will “promote more effective allocation
of distributed resources including changes of EU structural funds,”45 or that it supports
them to improve the infrastructure.46 This party has emphasized the lack of freedom of
movement for workers and it has defended a higher level of liberalization for the
markets in the EU, which are still hampered by many protectionist rules. Moreover, the
ODS considers the current Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) “discriminatory towards
farmers of the new members states.”47
Finally, I have labelled the ODS identifications as “frustrated” negative Other not only
because of its ambiguous approach and attitudes towards the EU but above all because
there is a huge contradiction in this party. While the elite in Prague remain very Euroscep-
tic, most ODS voters are pro-European.48
ČSSD: the EU as a positive Other

The Social Democratic Party (Česká Strana Sociálně Demokratická) considers the EU a
successful project, and “accuses” the ODS and Klaus’ ideas to be part of a plan to disman-
tle the EU.49 Most of its identifications towards the EU are positive. This general attitude
can be summarized in Chapter 8.2 of the 2006 electoral programme: “a strong EU means a
strong Czech Republic and a strong and prosperous Czech Republic strengthens the EU.”
With the exception of Czech national identity (the programme makes neither positive nor
negative references), mostly positive identifications predominate in the other three criteria.
In terms of economics, the EU portrays more positive than negative images, because in
general the EU generates favourable conditions for the Czech Republic to get closer to
the most developed countries of Western Europe, and provides more opportunities for
young people. In this sense, this party emphasizes the importance of Structural Funds in
order to modernize the regions of the country. It supports the current social policy, and
rejects the EU as a mere free trade zone, as defended by the ODS. However, the ČSSD
considers that the salaries in Europe are not balanced, and it emphasizes the need to
balance the position of Czech farmers with the rest of Europe.50 For the socialists, the
EU reinforces democracy. In this sense this party stresses the role of the European Parlia-
ment as a democratic link between the EU and its citizens, and also the role of the ombuds-
man to support citizens. Moreover, the EU represents the values of solidarity and equality,
stressing that the new laws improve the position of women in society.51 With respect to the
fourth criterion – security – the party in the 2004 electoral programme identified posi-
tively with the image of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and
never mentioned the necessity of a relationship with NATO, although it supports transat-
lantic relations.
KDU-ČSL: the EU as a positive Other

For the Christian Democratic Party – Czechoslovak Popular’s Party (Křesťanské a demok-
ratické unie – československo strany lidové), the EU plays the role of a positive Other,
because the majority of its identifications towards the EU are positive. With the exception
of national identity to which there is no reference, either positive or negative, the other
three criteria are mostly positive. In the electoral programme of 2002 (two years before
EU accession) in the fifth chapter titled “Coalition for a European Future and the Security
of our Country,” it explains and summarizes the admiration of and positive identifications
towards the EU:
European integration has become the largest and most successful project in the history of the
European continent. It is derived from shared European values, overcomes historical traumas,
brings a number of practical advantages and creates more space for individual freedom,
human rights and equal opportunities for all. The European Union is a community of democ-
racy, the rule of law, powerful economies and solidarity.
In this sense it is obvious that for this party the EU reinforces democracy in the Czech
Republic. As far as the economy is concerned, the EU is vital in order to reinforce and
modernize the Czech economy. Its positive identification and expectation in 2002, two
years before EU accession, was clear when the party rejected any hypothetical delay to
EU accession, because it would have been negative for the Czech economy: “postponing
our membership means losing out on investment, including investment from countries like
the USA and Japan who invest in the Czech Republic partly because they count on us
joining the EU soon.”52 Moreover, the KDU-ČSL emphasizes the positive effects of the
Structural Funds for the modernization of the Czech economy.53 With respect to security
426 D. Esparza
criteria, EU membership, associated with NATO, has reinforced the security of the Czech
Republic: “we appreciate that the United States of America is the dominant partner within
NATO. However, forces from the armies of Europe should be ready to cope with any local
conflicts.”54 Moreover, the party is “strongly opposed to the kind of European emancipa-
tion in the field of defence and security that would weaken NATO.”55
The Communist Party: the EU as a negative Other

The identification of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) towards the
EU can be considered ambiguous and contradictory in many ways, but in general it is very
negative. Most of its voters are not satisfied within the EU.56 We can notice that the KSČM
has shifted from an anti-EU position before EU accession towards a Eurosceptic approach.
This party was against EU accession during the EU referendum campaign in 2003, when it
feared a rise in prices, among other things,57 once the Czech Republic became an EU
member (the Communist Party became the second most voted for in the Czech Republic
in the elections to the European Parliament in June 2004). However, the KSČM has mod-
erated its rhetoric because it has seen the opportunity to develop some of its social ideas in
the EU. It accepts the opportunity and challenge to be in the European Parliament. With
respect to Czech national identity, there is no reference, either positive or negative.
The EU is a negative Other when the KSČM emphasizes the neoliberal spirit which is
responsible for the social disparity in Europe. However, it becomes partially positive when
the EU is considered a platform for striving against neoliberals, as was written in the 2004
European Parliament electoral programme, or when this party considers the EU regional
policy and Structural Funds useful. Moreover, it is not as negative when it considers the
EU to be a tool to prevent the destruction of the historical social and democratic achieve-
ments in Europe. However, it is absolutely negative when it states that the EU has a demo-
cratic deficit, excessive bureaucracy, and a lack of freedom for all the workers in Europe.58
With respect to security, the EU, as far as it is associated with NATO membership, is not
considered a sufficient security guarantee for the Czech Republic.59 The party opposes
NATO as a leftover from the Cold War, and because of the Alliance’s alleged lack of
respect for the principles of international law. In the long-term this party proposes to
erase the existence of NATO, or at least to take the Czech Republic out of this organiz-
ation. It is also proposed that the European Parliament and the national parliaments take
control of the EU’s military activities, inside and outside the European Continent.60
However, the communists hold a positive view of the Schengen area and the fight
against organized crime.
The Czech public

This section will provide an overview of the basic identifications of the Czech public towards
the EU, before and after accession. This means for whom and why the EU was perceived as
negative; and for whom and why the EU was perceived as positive. I shall use two sources:
surveys about attitudes towards the EU from the CVVM (Institute of Sociology of the Czech
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic) and Eurobarometer 67.
In general we can say that the perceptions and attitudes towards the EU in the Czech
Republic, despite not being the most pro-European country in the EU, are more positive
than negative. In 2003, in the EU referendum, 77% voted in favour, while 22% voted
against. In the Eurobarometer 67 of spring 2007, 61% of Czechs believed that the EU
was more positive than negative (see Table 9).
Before EU accession
Those who had more negative than positive identifications of the EU gave priority to
images associated with the following hypothetical threats (see Table 7): (a) rising
prices; (b) the Czech Republic would be a secondary member in the EU; (c) foreigners
would buy all the land and properties; (d) less independence; and (e) the bankruptcy of
many Czech banks and firms (Rezková, “Integrace”).
Those who perceived it positively and supported EU accession were influenced and
also gave priority to images associated with some positive expectations (see Table 8):
(a) a better standard of living; (b) the chance of working in the EU; (c) economic
growth; (d) full accession into EU structures; and (e) the possibility of travelling to
other Member States. Moreover, image was positive because the EU is seen as a represen-
tative of values such as democracy, cooperation, solidarity and tolerance (see Table 11).
After EU accession
As we can see in Table 9, after EU accession there are still more people who perceive
it positively than negatively. However, in Table 10, we observe that in April 2007, 27%
of Czechs were dissatisfied with EU membership. In a previous CVVM survey of 2005
(Horáková, “Postoje”), those who were dissatisfied with the EU spelt out the disadvantages
of being an EU member, such as: (a) foreign dependency and lack of freedom; (b) a
decrease in the standard of living in the Czech Republic (increased prices, lower salaries
and pensions); (c) the negative impact on agriculture; (d) the negative impact on the
economy (less competitive than other EU countries and increased unemployment); and
(e) immigration (arrival of foreign workers). According to another CVVM survey
(Horáková, “Smlouva”), the majority of people who were dissatisfied with the EU and
Table 7. Why don’t the Czechs want to support EU accession? (July 2002).
First Second Third Total
Reason (%) Reason (%) Reason (%) (%)
1. Increased prices 26 20 14 60
2. Fear of being a secondary member 30 12 9 51
3. Fear that foreigners will buy Czech properties 12 17 11 40
4. Fear of loss of independence 7 10 17 34
5. Rising unemployment and bankruptcy of Czech 7 12 13 32
companies
Source: CVVM (Rezková, “Integrace CR do EU – Aktuálni Postoje a Názory”; N ¼ 1103).
Table 8. Why do Czechs support the EU? (July 2002).

First Second Third Total
Reason (%) Reason (%) Reason (%) (%)
1. Hope of a better standard of living 19 16 19 54
2. Possibility of working “freely” in the EU 15 17 10 42
3. Higher economic development 7 15 17 39
4. Full accession into the EU 21 5 8 34
5. Possibility of travelling “freely” to the EU 6 10 11 27
Source: CVVM (Rezková, “Integrace CR do EU – Aktuálni Postoje a Názory”, N ¼ 1103).
428 D. Esparza
Table 9. Taking everything into account, would you say that (our country) has on average benefited
or not from being a member of the EU? (Spring 2007.) Response: positive
EU-27 (average) 59%
1. Ireland (IE) 86%
5. Poland (PL) 78%
6. Slovakia (SK) 76%
8. Spain (ES) 75%
16. Czech Republic (CZ) 61%
17. Germany (GE) 57%
23. Austria (AT) 44%
27. Hungary (HU) 40%
Source: Eurobarometer 67 (100).
Table 10. Evolution of satisfaction with EU membership.

Jan. 03 Mar. 04 June 05 May 06 Jan. 07 Mar. 07
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

Satisfied 37 30 36 36 33 32
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 33 40 37 40 45 36
Dissatisfied 21 18 20 20 17 27
Source: CVVM (Cadová-Horáková, “Clenstvı́ Ceské Republiky v Evropské Unii Ocima Verejnosti”, N ¼ 1056;
Cadová-Horáková, “Postoje Českych Občanů k Evropské”, N ¼ 1077; Horáková, “Postoje Českych Občanů k
Evropské Unii”, N ¼ 1069).
shared more negative identifications towards the EU were KSČM (Communist Party)
voters, were more than 60 years old, retired, unemployed or had a low level of income
and education.
On the other hand, despite the fact that a majority of Czechs perceive the EU more
positively than negatively, they are not very enthusiastic, as we can see in Tables 9 and
Table 10. In Table 9 we see how the Czechs, despite being above average (61%), as far
as the EU-27 is concerned (59%) they are in 16th position. According to Table 10,
despite the evidence that there are more Czechs who perceive the EU more positively
than negatively, we see that the general evolution from 2003 to 2007 shows a majority
of people who are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. Similarly, democracy is the most
important value portrayed by the EU (see Table 11), which is related to one of the most
significant elements and characteristics of the Czech nation. The majority of people
Table 11. Values portrayed by the EU

Oct. 02 Apr. 2006 Apr. 2007
+/2 +/2 +/2
Democracy 73/14 75/18 70/23
Cooperation 72/17 68/25 60/34
Solidarity 63/22 56/32 48/43
Tolerance 51/29 49/38 44/46
Justice 45/33 37/51 33/57
Equality 41/44 32/60 27/67
Source: CVVM (Cadová-Horáková, “Postoje k Evropské”, N ¼ 1017).
who reported being satisfied with the EU were ODS and KDU-ČSL voters between the
ages of 20 and 44, and had a high level of income and education (university studies).61
Czech Europhlegmatism
Although the majority of the Czech public is pro-European, it is necessary to note the
phenomenon of Czech “Europhlegmatism.”62 I understand by this term the relative lack
of interest in European topics in the Czech political arena, as is shown in the low partici-
pation in the European Parliament elections in 2004 and 2009 (29% in both elections).
Another symptom can be found in the peculiar gap between ODS voters and this
party’s elite with respect to EU affairs – where its political elite is quite critical of and
sceptical about the EU, but most of its voters and the regional and local elites of this
party are very pro-European. However, this fact doesn’t seem to be important enough
to vote against the ODS, or to force a change in attitudes towards the EU from the
ODS elite, in order to obtain more votes. In general, Czech voters and Czech parties con-
centrate on internal affairs such as reform of the public health system, tax reform or cor-
ruption cases. Unlike Germany, France, Luxembourg, Belgium or Spain, EU topics in the
Czech Republic, in general, do not represent anything relevant to internal political affairs.
Conclusions: the levels of Othering and the imaginings of EU accession

I propose to show how the various imaginings of this historical moment (EU accession) are
associated with past relationships with superpowers and the four provisional criteria of EU
levels of Othering: democracy, national identity, the economy and security.
The Czech Republic, obviously, was still located in the same geographical place after 1
May 2004; however, upon imagining the European political map after this date, we can
notice that this was basically imagined in two differing ways. I shall highlight a schematic
mental map of this EU accession in 2004.
(i) On the one hand, one group of individuals has imagined EU accession as a move-
ment “from the inside out,” as if the Czech Republic had moved “symbolically”
towards the West and had introduced itself into the EU (the EU symbolizing the
West). This group is constituted by Vaclav Havel, the ČSSD, the KDU-ČSL and a
majority of the Czech public, is generally associated with people who perceive the
EU positively because this “imagined” movement seems to represent EU acces-
sion as a consequence of free action and the decision of a free and democratic
country (referendum 2003) and who perceive that the democracy, national
identity, standard of living and international security of their country will be
Table 12. Levels of EU “Othering” (2001–2007).

EU positive – Czech favoured (a) Havel
(b) CSSD and KDU
(c) Majority of the public
EU not positive – Czech at a disadvantage (a) Klaus
(b) ODSa and KSCM
(c) Minority of the public
a
As explained in the text, there is a gap between the elite of the ODS and the voters, who are very pro-European,
including the local and regional elite.
Source: author.
430 D. Esparza
reinforced. Put simply, Czechs will be favoured within the EU. From a historical
perspective, these types of imaginings are associated with images of the past
where Czechs identified themselves positively with prosperous Western powers,
as during the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918 – 1938), supported by the demo-
cratic powers of the world at that time: the US, Great Britain and France. Or even
with one of the Golden ages of Czech history, the prosperous times of the elected
Bohemian king Karel IV (1346– 1378), when Prague became the capital of the
Holy Roman Empire.
(ii) On the other hand, there is a second group that has “imagined” the EU accession
the other way round, as a movement from “the outside in,” as if the EU had “inevi-
tably” invaded the territory of the Czech Republic, where the Czechs63 would be
placed at a disadvantage within the EU. In this group we find Václav Klaus, the
ODS elite (but not the voters), the KSČM and a minority of the Czech public
(associated with KSČM voters), which in general is associated with those who
have more negative EU identifications than positives, because it has increased
the lack of freedom and lack of independence in the Czech Lands. In this
sense, such individuals seem to have given priority to images of the past, associ-
ated with traumatic relationships with a world power in the past.
Firstly, Klaus, because in many ways he has emphasized EU accession as an invasion
against the freedoms in the Czech Republic, as if it were a new version or a “symbolic”
version of the USSR or the Habsburg Empire. He has had a mistrusting attitude, sometimes
fearful, that those negative images of the past were going to be repeated in the present with
the EU, like the “betrayal of Munich” in 1938 (the Munich Pact) or the “betrayal of
Moscow” in 1968, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Today, this means the fear of
an imagined next betrayal of Brussels, boosted by the “Eurofederalists,” who will
create a superstate or superpower called the European Union.
Secondly, the KSČM. This is the only party in the Czech Republic which has positive
images of past communist times in Czechoslovakia and the relationships with the USSR. It
thus perceives EU accession as a new threat from the West, which brought the values of
capitalism and neoliberals, associated – as during the Cold War – with criminality and
social disparity.64
In conclusion, taking into account the fact that national identity is constructed through
successive identifications with significant Others, we have partially examined the phenom-
enon of change and continuity in Czech national identity to the extent of observing that
after the identity crisis provoked during the drastic changes of 1989 – 1993, the EU has
become a new significant Other (change), which in spite of the dismissed importance of
past significant Others – such as the USSR, the Third Reich or the communist regime
– the various imaginings of the EU have been turning in many ways around the various
identifications and “remembrances” with those past significant Others. Similarly, these
identifications have always been related to one of the fundamental elements of Czech
national revival in the nineteenth century: democracy (continuity).
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Miroslav Hroch, Vladimira Dvořaková, Josef Opatrný, Petra
Mešťanková, Blake Faison, Ross Chambers, Florian Bieber and the anonymous reviewers
for valuable assistance in previous versions of this article. The usual disclaimers apply.
Notes
1. For further information about “the saturation of information,” see Gergen, Innerarity.
2. Daniel Esparza, “Freud y Picasso,” El Paı́s 25 May 2006 (22). For more information on the
concept of “civilization of the image,” see Richard Kearney.
3. The term “imagined,” as far as studies of nationalism and national identity are concerned, was
popularized by Anderson, where the nation is a “political imagined community.”
4. See Michlic.
5. Despite Ladislav Holy (82) emphasizing that this democratic characteristic is related to a myth
from the nineteenth century – due to the fact that the Czech experience with democracy was
non-existent at that time, and minimal during the twentieth century – it is necessary to say
that the Czech Lands have had a rather remarkable history with democracy compared to
other smaller European nations.
6. In future research, another new criterion might be added, or even might be applied in depth to
other Others, such as NATO, the US, or Russia. In the present research, I shall have them in
mind only as complementary actors of the EU, especially NATO and the US.
7. According to Gilligan, with respect to the IBSS (International Bibliography of Social Sciences),
in 1970, 0.1% of all the literature published in English contained the word “identity”; in 1990 it
was 0.4%, and in 1999 it was 0.9%.
8. What is the difference between identity and personality? For further information on this debate
see Sheldon Stryker.
9. For further information about identity and the Other from a psychoanalytical point of view, see
Nasio (Enseñanza 135 –65; El Placer 99– 104); Chemana (214– 18); Dor (90– 92).
10. See Tajfel (Human Groups; Social Identity).
11. See Esparza and World Tensions, “Interview with Miroslav Hroch,” where several thoughts
about Czech identity and the EU can be found.
12. For example, in today’s Czech Republic, the majority of the population share images such as the
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939 by the Third Reich, because they are repeated year after year
in black and white by the mass media, and the majority of these subjects, who were not even
born at that time, can imagine it in the same symbolic way – as negative images coming
from a negative Other – in the sense that the Third Reich destroyed the freedom, democracy,
prosperity and even the existence of their state founded after the First World War. For further
information about perceptions of the past and political attitudes of today in the Czech Republic,
see Dvořaková and Kunc.
13. To observe the relationship between identity and imagination, understood as a triadic structure
formed by imagination –language –identity, which works as if it were a feedback loop among
them, see Esparza (“The other” 57 –144).
14. In 2003, four months before the EU referendum in the Czech Republic, 61% of KSČM voters
were against the EU (only 21% for); ODS voters (79%) and KDU-ČSL voters (72%) were for
the EU. For further information see Rezková (“Čtyři Měsı́ce” 2). For other references in relation
to the perceptions of and satisfaction with the EU, according to vote preferences, see Chludilová
(5); Čadová-Horáková (“Postoje k Evropské” 2).
15. The EU (European Union) assumed its new name (Union) in the Maastricht summit of Decem-
ber 1991, just when the Soviet Union was about to break up. In this respect part of the USSR’s
identity (one of the most significant Others of the EU at that time) was devoured symbolically by
the new EU, taking part of its name (Union) and one decade later including some of the countries
under former soviet influence (the eastern enlargement). For further information about the EU
identity crisis since the 1990s, see Esparza (“Reflexiones sobre la Presidencia Checa”).
16. For example, the “lustrace” law, or the lustration, forbids StB agents and their informants, as
well as senior Communist Party officials, members of paramilitary units and intelligence
agents, from holding high government posts. Moreover, many teachers who supported the
Marxist ideology had to leave their positions at primary or secondary schools, not to mention
the universities. Even teachers of the Russian language, the most privileged language
between 1948 and 1989, had to learn English if they wanted to continue teaching languages,
since this Slavic language, which was associated with the oppressive communist regime, not
only became thought of as old fashioned but also was detested by many Czechs.
17. As an example, see this debate in the English version of the popular Czech journal Přitomnost
[New Presence], through the following articles: Jesenská; Klvaňa; Musil; Stroehlein; Struharová.
432 D. Esparza
18. An in-depth comparison of Havel’s and Klaus’ beliefs in relation to the EU prior to EU acces-
sion can be found in Peter Bugge.
19. For further information on the references of the 85 speeches, see Esparza (“The Other” 421–26).
20. ,http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/index_uk.html. (Václav Havel); ,http://
www.hrad.cz/cms/en/prezident_cr/klaus_projevy.shtml. (Václav Klaus).
21. I took into account only the concept of Europe when it was treated as a whole, not the mere
presence of the word Europe. For example, concepts of Central, Northern, Southern or
Eastern Europe were not taken into consideration, nor when “Europe” was mentioned, for
example, in the name Radio Free Europe, etc. The terms EU and European Union were con-
sidered to be synonyms.
22. “Europe and the World,” Senate, Rome, 4 Apr. 2002.
23. “Nice Treaty – Step towards a New Europe,” Irish Independent 16 Oct. 2002 ,http://old.hrad.
cz/president/Havel/speeches/2002/1610_uk.html..
24. “Address by President of the Czech Republic, Václav Havel, in Reference to the Foreign
Policy of the Czech Republic, on the Occasion of a Public Hearing in the Senate of the
Czech Republic,” Prague, Wallenstein Palace, 27 Nov. 2001.
25. New Year’s address, 1 Jan. 2002.
26. With the exception of deep criticism of the EU as far as the Lisbon Strategy was concerned, in
which the EU proposed to compete with the US to be the strongest economy by 2010, in spite of
emphasizing cooperation between both sides (4 Apr. 2002).

27. “Notes for the Berlin IIF Speech. Spring Meeting of the Institute of International Finance,”
Berlin, 4 June 2003.
28. Ibid.
29. “Czech Republic’s Transition, European Problems and the Fraser Institute,” 10 Nov. 2004.
30. “Address Delivered by President Václav Klaus on the Occasion of the 5th Anniversary of the
Czech Republic Membership in NATO,” 12 Mar. 2004.
31. In the following discourse he shows the meaning of the term “EU democratic deficit”: “The
recent enlargement of the EU will have a different impact. Because everything will be bigger
and more complicated, the inherent failings of the current EU system will increase and will
be more visible: both the democratic deficit and the lack of democratic accountability of EU
institutions will be more apparent than before; the composition of decision-making procedures
will further shift from a democratic type to a hierarchical one; the power of the EU “core” will be
strengthened; majority voting instead of unanimity will dominate decision-making in more and
more fields; attempts to get rid of existing deviations from the “norm” will lead to more inter-
vention from above; the distance of citizens from the centre of power, from Brussels, will grow;
the anonymity in decision-making will increase” (cit. 10 Nov. 2004).
32. “Address Delivered by President Václav Klaus to the Members of Diplomatic Corps on the
Occasion of the Czech National Day,” 28 Oct. 2004.
33. For further information on the symptoms of la longue durèe in Spanish society (the myth of the
two Spains), see Esparza (“Identidad Nacional”; “Imagining”). On the “Hussite Stigma” in
Czech society, see Esparza (“El Significado”); Esparza (“Klaus and the Reincarnation of the
Hursite Stigma”) or idem, “El Estigma del Corazón de Europa,” El Paı́s, 31 Mar. 2009.
34. “Freedom and Democracy in Contemporary Europe: An Insider’s View,” 5 Mar. 2007.
35. “Address of the President of the Czech Republic Delivered on the Eve of the Accession of the
Czech Republic to the European Union,” 30 Apr. 2004.
36. “Integration or Unification of Europe: Notes for the Berlin Speech,” 20 Nov. 2004.
37. Cit. 30 Apr. 2004.
38. For more information on the positions of the main Czech political parties towards the EU, see
Esparza and Mestanková; Drulak “The Czech”; Kopecký and Mudde (305 –07).
39. In December 2008, Václav Klaus not only resigned from the honorary presidency of the ODS
but also as a member of the party.
40. 2004 electoral programme, 4.
41. Ibid., 1.
42. Ibid., 3.
44. Ibid.

48. See the CVVM surveys in Chludilová (5); Rezková (“Čtyři měsı́ce” 2); Čadová-Horáková
(“Postoje k Evropské” 2).
49. 2006 electoral programme, Chapter 8-2.
50. 2004 electoral programme, chapter: “Rozvoj venkova a Zdrave životnı́ prostředı́.”
51. Ibid., chapter: “Solidarita a rovné přı́ležitosti.”
52. 2002 electoral programme, Chapter 5.
53. 2006 electoral programme, chapter “Agriculture and Rural Development.”
54. Ibid., chapter: “Defence.”
55. Ibid., chapter: “Foreign Policy.”
56. See Chludilová (5); Rezková (“Čtyři měsı́ce” 2); Čadová-Horáková (“Postoje k Evropské” 2).
57. 2002 electoral programme, Chapter 3-C.
59. 2002 electoral programme, Chapter 3-C.
61. See Horáková, “Smlouva” (CVVM survey).
62. See Esparza; “The Other”; Esparza and Mestanková.
63. The Czechs, understood as an “imagined community.”
64. This proposal is only applicable to the imagining of EU accession as a historical chapter. The
identifications can change. We have seen how the Communist Party changed its attitude once
it gained a presence in the European Parliament, and became more participative and active.
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Appendix: electoral programmes

ODS (www.ods.cz)
2002: “Nabı́zı́me vám pravici.”
2004: “Stejné šance pro všechny.”
2006: “Společně pro lepši život.”
ČSSD (www.cssd.cz)
2002: “Člověk na prvnı́m mı́stě.”
2004: “Vyberte si své europoslance.”
2006: “Jistoty a prosperita.”
KDU-ČSL (www.kdu.cz)
2002: “Dáme věci do pořádku: Rovné šance.”
2004: “Volebnı́ program 2004– 9.”
2006: “Klidná Sı́la.”
KSČM (www.kscm.cz)
2002: “S lidmi, pro lidi.”
2004: “S vámi a pro Vás. Doma i v EU.”
2006: “Volebnı́ program 2006– 10.”

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National identity and the Other: imagining the EU from the

Department of Romance Studies, Palacký University, Olomouc, Czech Republic

National identity is constructed through successive identiﬁcations with signiﬁcant

ISSN 0090-5992 print/ISSN 1465-3923 online

National identity and the Other

The various imaginings of the Other

The various attitudes and imaginings of the EU

Table 1. Period and observed speeches of Havel and Klaus (2001–2007).

Table 4. Havel – EU associated with democratic values of the West

Table 5. Klaus – EU as a negative Other (oppressor).

Czech political parties

ODS: the EU as a “frustrated” negative Other

Table 6. Low Chamber election results, 2002 and 2006.

ČSSD: the EU as a positive Other

KDU-ČSL: the EU as a positive Other

The Communist Party: the EU as a negative Other

The Czech public

Table 8. Why do Czechs support the EU? (July 2002).

Table 10. Evolution of satisfaction with EU membership.

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

Table 11. Values portrayed by the EU

Conclusions: the levels of Othering and the imaginings of EU accession

Table 12. Levels of EU “Othering” (2001–2007).

emphasizing cooperation between both sides (4 Apr. 2002).

47. 2004 electoral programme, 3.

Appendix: electoral programmes

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