International Journal of Philosophical Practice

Volume 7, No.1 (Spring 2021)

ISSN 1531-7900
pp. 79-88

On the Therapeutic Value of Contemplation

Jason Costanzo

Abstract: In recent times, we have seen a resurgence of interest in the application of philosophy
as a therapeutic for the purpose of alleviating the existential ills of human life. Within this paper,
it is argued that not only can philosophy be applied as a therapeutic, but that the very act of doing
philosophy is therapeutic. The paper begins with a discussion of human nature as bound to
finitude and the suffering of existence. The necessity to labor along with the need for relief from
labor in the form of recreation and play is then discussed. Play is thereafter distinguished from
leisure, and the concept of philosophical contemplation (theoria), following Aristotle, is
introduced. It is argued that the activity of contemplation results in relief from the suffering of
existence, and that its exercise may in consequence be considered a kind of therapeutic.

Keywords: Philosophical Therapy, Labor, Leisure, Aristotle, Contemplation (theoria)

A nyone familiar with Hindu or Buddhist thought will doubtless be familiar with the concept
of dukkha
human existence is in its essence dissatisfactory for the reason that it is fraught with longing and
suffering, coupled with the inevitably of death.1 Perhaps unsurprisingly, this concept is not
restricted to Eastern thought, as a variety of related senses also crop up within other religious
traditions. For example, within the three major western traditions including Judaism, Christianity,
Genesis 3, for example, we encounter

consequence cast out from the Garden, and punished with mortality along with the need to toil
for their daily bread. In this context, the Garden serves as a metaphor for an idyllic state free from
suffering, and in turn, fallenness becomes a metaphor for striving and the suffering of existence.

Throughout the history of philosophy, striving has likewise played an important role in
various accounts of the nature of existence, including human existence. In the dialogues of Plato,
e.g., striving appears in such metaphors as the body as the prison of the soul (Phaedo), of the cave
and bondage to appearances (Republic), of the erotic yearning for the good and the beautiful
80 Jason Costanzo

(Symposium, Phaedrus), and so on. In the Phaedo, for instance, Plato specifically describes

2
Far from unique, such a notion in fact circumscribes a rich philosophical and religious
tradition that sees human life as an odyssey fraught with hardship and perils.

Similar sentiments may also be found among later philosophers, e.g., as the Hobbesian
3
Striving can also be identified in the pessimistic works of the
th
19 CE philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. For him, human life is caught within the yearnings of
the Will, a metaphysical urge that ceaselessly strives without aim or purpose.4 So too in the works
of the 20thCE philosopher Martin Heidegger, striving appears in the form of the existential
characteristics of human being-there (Dasein). As self-aware and knowing, the human being
dwells within consciousness of the fact of its own existence along with death and the impending
nothingness (das Nichts). The human being is in turn one whose existence is oriented toward the
nothing, and in consequence, a being who lives life fraught with anxiety and dread ( Angst). Even
when life seems to putter along at a slow pace, boredom and the threat of meaninglessness arise
to antagonize us.5

Striving is no doubt tied to the fact of human finitude. All living things are born into the
world and must find ways to sustain themselves. The need to self-sustain further expresses itself
by the necessity to labor. We labor not for the love of labor, but to continue in our lived existence.
We thus labor for food, for clothing, for shelter, and like goods. Apart from labor, we would be
cast out upon the street to waste away in the famine that brings death.

classification of goods in Book II of the Republic.6

goods into those that are:

Class 1. Desirable solely for their own sake (as simple pleasures and enjoyments).
Class 2. Desirable for their own sake and for their benefits (as knowledge and
sight).
Class 3. Desirable solely for their benefits (as exercise and medical treatment).

Analyzing labor in terms of the above classification, we find that it generally falls within
the third class of goods. We labor not for labor, but for the benefits of labor.

But why work at all, one might ask? Why linger on within a burdensome and laborious
existence?7 Still more, if we do not labor for the sake of labor, since it serves as a means to an end,
then what is the end that we labor for? The apparent difficulty may in fact be simply (and yet, not
so simply) resolved: We seek one and all to repose in the Garden. For the Garden is the place where
suffering ceases, where all wants and desires are satisfied, and where death finds no entry. But
surely such a Garden is a mere ideal, or else, an existence that can only be had following death and
On the Therapeutic Value of Contemplation 81

the possibility of an afterlife?8 Even so, we might wonder whether or not there are moments in
finitude in which the Garden becomes accessible to us.

Consider for example the repose from labor that we enjoy on weekends, holidays, while
on vacation, and so on. Traditionally, the weekend is tied to the religious celebration of the
Sabbath or day of rest. We thus read in Genesis 2:2, that following creation, God rested from his
labors on the seventh day. Drawing a link between rest and labor, inasmuch as striving leads to
labor, and as rest follows from labor, to that extent, finite existence itself may be described as not
only bound by labor, but also by that which follows from it, which is precisely the day of Sabbath
or rest. But rest is itself tied to the concept of relief, so that from suffering, there follows rest, and
from rest, relief.

Continuing with our analysis, the concept of relief further yields the concept of being
relieved
daily tasks, whether tired or ill, all for the purpose of obtaining our daily bread. When the evening
arrives, we return home, and rest; and in such moments of rest, we are relieved of our burdens.
Part of this unwinding is physical, but another part mental. For example, consider the laborer who
returns home and yet is not home, who while sitting on the couch anxiously worries over the
details of the day and the work to be done tomorrow. If this process is repeated again and again,
9
the inevitable result is that such an indivi The stress is a direct
consequence of the inability to allow mental rest and relief to set in, which in this case implies a

There are likewise different kinds of relief that may be identified. Oftentimes, relief
involves recreational activities, such as a drink with friends, browsing the internet, watching a
television series, and so on. Recreation is further tied to the act of play.10 In play, we are liberated
from striving and the suffering of existence. During such occasions, consciousness of time is
suspended. We might compare the passage of time experienced during long hours at work to the
experience of time while at play, as a game of cards with friends. In the latter case, we almost
suddenly discover that our play has come to an end, and that it is time to return home. So too,
there is a connection between play, rest, and sleep. In sleep, we fall off into unconsciousness, and
if our slumber is restful, awaken in the morning with the feeling that but a brief interval had passed.

Still, we might wonder, what if we were free to engage in ceaseless acts of recreation?
Would this not lead to the happiest of circumstances? Upon initial reflection, such a state of affairs
might seem enviable. Further consideration, however, reveals potential dangers. Take the scenario
of abundant wealth coupled with an idle, labor-free existence. We awaken in the morning and
have nothing to do. We rise from our bed or perhaps lie in bed until the afternoon, thinking of
nothing, having nothing to do. Perhaps we decide to engage in recreational activities. So, we play
games, browse the internet, and so on. The days pass, over and over, again and again. The long
hours continue. The acts of recreation repeat themselves. The television episodes have all been
82 Jason Costanzo

watched, the internet has now lost its appeal. Even time spent at play feels unsatisfactory. In such
moments, the existential characteristics of human lived existence, as earlier described by
Heidegger and others, come to the fore. Suddenly, we find ourselves caught in the throes of
anxiety, boredom, emptiness, the suffering of existence. Death once again looms over us, and with
it, the abyss and nothingness. In such moments, questions of the meaning of life, or worse, the
11
Anxiety increases, and we feel
overcome. Collapsing before the weight, the human psyche begins its walk down the path of
12

Here we see that enjoyment of a labor-free existence filled solely by empty time and
recreation reaches a limit. We can play for only so long. We are in consequence left to ponder:
Perhaps labor is necessary after all? But if this were the case, then it seems that the need for
personal labor would be as necessary to human existence as the need for food and water. In effect,
all the carefree princes, billionaires, and all those who inherit glorious wealth, must therefore and
of necessity be terribly unhappy? Although such a description perhaps characterizes many such
instances of labor-free existence, it seems false to conclude that it must apply to all such cases. To
the contrary, it seems that the kind of freedom from labor that wealth, and other instances of
fortune bring about, only alter the conditions according to which the suffering of existence is

arises which penetrates more deeply into the recesses of the human spirit. Still more, it is precisely
the affluent, labor-free souls, who ignore the deeper callings of the spirit, that are most at risk of a
fall into psycho-spiritual poverty.

But what is lacking in playful recreation that its excesses should carry such existential
threats? Consider again the nature of play. The child plays for the sake of play, and apparently, for
no other reason. Play is liberating. It liberates the human being from the cravings and anxieties of
lived existence. In enjoying a game, we forget the daily concerns that might otherwise ail us. Akin
to an escaped prisoner who finds a safe house, in play we find a momentary reprieve from striving.
In time, however, we are compelled to exit the game, to go back on the run. Seen in this way, both
play and recreation, as a species of play, may be described as acts that momentarily liberate the
human being from striving. When the game ends, however, we must return to the suffering of
existence.

The act of play is likewise very much self-contained. The freedom and enjoyment of play

may most appropriately be classified alongside simple pleasures and enjoyments, as the first class
of goods, viz., as that which is desirable in-itself, irrespective of any consequences or benefits. This
includes both physical as well as non-physical forms of play. We can only play so many card games
or watch so many television episodes. At some point, more fundamental issues of meaningfulness
set in, and it is at such times that playful recreation comes to a halt.
On the Therapeutic Value of Contemplation 83

But with what shall the void now be filled? Shall we simply return to work? Surely there is
no wrong in this, and yet, if we inspect the relationship between work and play, we find that in
either case, we live life ever on the run. In labor, we run to work. In play, we run from work. Still
more, in both cases, we live as if in a dream. In work, consciousness is focused upon the task at
hand. In play, consciousness is embedded in the act of enjoyment. In neither case does anything
like self-awareness come to the fore. Having nothing left but these two options, the life of the
human being is in some sense reduced to that of the animal, living, as Aristotle has said, by
13
So then is our analysis complete? Have we accurately
accounted for the whole of the human condition? I would wager, rather, that there is something
more to be said.

Here the concept of leisure may be introduced.14 Whereas play liberates the human being
from striving, leisure also liberates, but yet is not play. The reason is that leisure, in contrast to
play, is an intentionally directed activity. It is an activity that is associated with what Aristotle in
15
the Metaphysics We readily see this in natural acts of curiosity. Human
beings, especially children, naturally seek out the novel. For sure, curiosity is often expressed
alongside play, and there is no reason to isolate the two. Both find their place within the context
of human lived existence. Still, we may conceptually classify and differentiate the two notions. A
playful child is not necessarily curious, nor a curious child necessarily playful.

classification of goods, we see that whereas play is identified with the first class of goods, the
pursuit of knowledge may rightly be placed within the second class of goods. Play is enacted for
the sake of play. Beyond that, from play there is derived little else. In contrast, the pursuit of
knowledge is a good that is desired not only for its own sake, but also for its benefits. We seek
knowledge both for the wonder that is obtained in the act of knowing as well as for the benefits
that follow from the possession of knowledge. As here understood, leisure is itself an expression
of natural curiosity in the pursuit of knowledge. Hence, leisure may be classified as an intrinsically
desirable good that likewise yields desirable benefits.

Of course, leisure has a larger scope than merely factual knowing. It is also tied to the
broader context of that which bestows meaning upon life, and in particular, which serves to edify
human existence. For this reason, we may speak of leisure, and anything that falls within its scope,
-
knowledge itself, including anything that intrinsically cultivates human existence, as the
refinement of the arts, the writing of poetry and literature, the cultivation of moral character,
religious experience, and so on. All of these notions may be classified beneath the larger class of

Still more, whereas the exercise of play reaches definite limits, the exercise of leisure does
not, or at least, not in the same way and sense. This can be seen especially in the context of the
84 Jason Costanzo

pursuit of knowledge. A card game generally offers little to no instruction in regards to the
meaning of life, except by analogy or metaphor. In contrast, the pursuit of knowledge directly
engages with questions of meaningfulness. One might argue that the pursuit of knowledge is itself
propelled on by questions of meaningfulness, including questions of the meaning or value of
exi
-

Classically, the pursuit of knowledge was further tied to the concept of contemplation
(theoria). Among the Greeks, particularly Aristotle, whose views I here follow, contemplation is
described as the fulfillment of the aims and ends sought in both knowledge as well as acts of leisure.
For example, in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle speaks of the happy life, identifying
contemplation with the highest form of human happiness or well-being (eudaimonia).16 In
chapters 7-8 of this work, he identifies a number of properties that describe both the nature of
contemplation as well as how it is enacted.17

First, contemplation is described as the most excellent (kratiste) human activity. It is the
exercise of that which is highest within human nature, which is precisely reason and the rational
life. In contemplating, the human being enacts its own highest perfections.18

Second, it is described as the most continuous (synchestate) and enduring (atryton)

activity. This is particularly important when seen in the context of the limits of play and recreation.
We can engage in physical forms of play, such as sports, for only so long. At some point, the body
tires. So too, mental games can only hold our attention for so long. At some point, we lose interest
in the endeavor, particularly, to the extent that such games are trivial. On the other hand, in
contemplating the universe, the extent of the stars, moral matters, the nature and possibility of
God, and so on, the opposite occurs. Rather than feeling wearied, the human spirit is enlivened,
and is further compelled to carry on in its contemplative activities. Curiosity and wonder drive
the soul into deeper inquiries. Hence, satisfaction in this case is both ongoing and recursive,
building upon each new advance. Although it must cease at times in order to engage in daily
labors, for only the gods can ceaselessly contemplate (as Aristotle notes), it can be renewed with
continued satisfaction.

Third, Aristotle suggests that contemplation is the most pleasant (hediste) activity. To see
why this is the case, we might draw
between quantitative and qualitative pleasures.19 First, there are quantitative pleasures. Such

piece of chocolate may be characterized as more pleasurable than a bowl of broccoli. Second, there
are qualitative pleasures. Such pleasures are divisible into kinds. Although they cannot be
measured relative to one another, they can be ranked. For example, although the pleasure derived
from reading books may not be as quantitatively pleasurable as that of eating chocolate, the former
nonetheless results in a pleasure that has a certain elevating effect upon the human mind and
On the Therapeutic Value of Contemplation 85

spirit. We might say that, as a pleasure, the former is higher in degree than the latter. Again,

20
For example, one says that it is better to see than
to be blind, and similarly with the other senses. In like fashion, as a pleasure, reading is better
(more edifying) than eating chocolate. Characterized in this way, contemplation results in a
qualitatively higher pleasure than any other activity, having the potential to bring about great
intellectual rewards and benefits.21

Fourth, contemplation is the most self-sufficient (autarkes) activity. This is evident from
the fact that in the act contemplation nothing other than thought is required. Even in prison or
sequestered at home, the human being is able to carry on in the enjoyment of contemplation.

Fifth, and finally, Aristotle describes contemplation as the most leisurely (scholastikon)
activity. With this, we are brought back round in a circle. Leisure was earlier described as a set of
meaning-giving activities that, akin to play, alleviate the human being from the suffering of
existence. Contemplation is in turn described as the leisurely activity that most alleviates the
human being from striving. But that which alleviates the individual from a pain or ill may generally
Greek therapeia refers to care and
concern, for example, the use of medicine to heal. Greek usage, however, expands upon this
notion. A therapy includes also care of the soul, and so too worship in the sense of the care of the
gods (sebia).22

We have likewise the concept of therapy as applied to the psychological ills of life.

form of philosophical practice that sought alleviation from the existential ills of life. One need only
read the Letters of Seneca or Plutarch, the Discourses of Epictetus, or the Meditations of Marcus
Aurelius to find such examples.23 In recent times, this latter notion has gained a happy resurgence.
We see practitioners today who are once again applying philosophy as a therapeutic.24 At the same
time, however, there is more to the story.

Returning to our earlier considerations, it is perhaps unsurprising that wherever the

concept of striving is found, there also we find some path toward liberation from striving. In
almost every religious tradition, that path is likewise identified, at least in part, with some form of
contemplative activity. Again, I expand upon this notion to include any form of meaning-giving
activity. We encounter contemplation in Hindu and Buddhist meditation, as also in the various
forms of meditative prayer within the biblical traditions. Alternatively, in philosophy, Aristotle
being our primary example here, contemplation is established as the fundamental rational

other kinds, such as psychological or spiritual forms. The therapeutic application of philosophy
involves the rational exercise of thought with the end of alleviating the human being from the
suffering of existence, from striving.
86 Jason Costanzo

Yet this implies that in its therapeutic applications, philosophy may be divided into two
kinds. First, there is the application of philosophy as a means to another end. In this context,
philosophy may be applied with the end of alleviating the existential ills of human life. One will

sense, that is, a good desirable for its benefits (as medicine). This is in particular the case insofar
as philosophy is restricted solely to such practical applications.

There is, however, a second sense and kind. This involves the therapeutic application of
philosophy as an end in-itself. It is precisely here that we identify the value of philosophical
contemplation. The value is that contemplation carries its own unique therapeutic benefits. In the
very act of contemplation, the philosopher is alleviated from the suffering of existence. Still more,
the philosopher qua philosopher does not contemplate for the sake of the therapeutic benefits of
contemplation, but rather, first and foremost, out of a deeply felt need to know. In consequence,
and perhaps even as an unintended consequence, the philosopher derives a benefit. For the act of
contemplation relieves the contemplator from the sufferings of existence. Hence, from this latter
perspective, philosophy is practiced as an end in-itself, from which a benefit is derived, so that it
may be classified as the second kind of good.

Interestingly, what we find is that philosophy has a manifold of therapeutic benefits. There
are the benefits of philosophy as a means to an end and as an end itself. Not only may philosophy
be applied as a therapeutic, but likewise in its very exercise, philosophy is therapeutic. Hence, we
may not only derive a good from philosophy, but also in philosophy. Indeed, this seems to be the
lesson that Aristotle conveys in his account of contemplation. As the highest activity of a rational
agent, contemplation serves as the highest form of care of the human soul (psyche), and as such,
a therapy that in its very exercise, alleviates the human being from striving, and in turn, the
suffering of existence.
Dr. Jason Costanzo is an Associate Professor of philosophy at Conception Seminary College (USA). He
specializes in German Continental Philosophy and the History of Philosophy.

1
Dukkha, Non- A
Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, ed. by Steven M. Emmanuel (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), pp. 26-45.
2
Plato, Phaedo 64a. All translations from Plato: Complete Works, transl. Benjamin Jowett (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1997).
3
This concept in fact originates with the Roman playwright Plautus, Asinaria, line 495.
4
See especially his magnum opus, Arthur Schopenhauer: The World as Will and Representation, 2 Vols., transl.
Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
5
These concepts are thoroughly developed in Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, transl., John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1962).
6
Plato, Republic 357a-358a.
On the Therapeutic Value of Contemplation 87

7
Oedpius at
Colonus, line 1225. Translation from Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments, transl. Sir Richard C. Jebb (Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 1899).
8
Although this may well be the case, it is worth noting that non-religious notions have also been espoused. One need
only consider the garden of Epicurus as but one early example.
9

Latin strictus stretched out. We might

compare this to a stringed instrument. As the string is tightened, there is an increase in pitch. If this is continued, there
is a risk of the string breaking. In like fashion the stressed-
aggravated. If further pushed, there may be a like breaking point and resulting rupture of emotion.
10

this. The garden is the place of repose and play. It also a place of nurture and growth, with children as plants and teachers
as gardeners. See, e.g., C. More Muelle, The History of Kindergarten: From Germany to the United States. (2005)
Retrieved from, https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1110&context=sferc
11
For a summary analysis of the deep connections between meaningfulness and mental health, especially in an
existential context, see Viktor Frankl, (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1984).
12
See in particular Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition For Upbuilding
and Awakening, ed. & transl. S., Hong, H. V., & Hong, E. H (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1983).
13
Aristotle, Met. 980b26. All translations from Aristotle: The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 Vols., ed. by Jonathan
Barnes (Princeton University Press, 1984).
14
My analysis of the concept of leisure here draws largely from the works of Joseph Pieper, especially, Leisure, The Basis
of Culture Contemplation and Happiness,
transl. Richard Winston & Clara Winston (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958).
15
Aristotle, Met. 980b1.
16
Aristotle, E.N., 1177a12-19.
17
Aristotle, E.N., 1177a20-1177b25.
18
I note that the rational life is highest within the context of human finitude. Spiritually, however, we might speak of
the elevation of human existence, so that still higher forms of perfection might be attained.
19
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863). Retrieved in, https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/readings/mill.pdf.
20

stand within a qualitative ontological ordering from nothingness to perfection, the latter being identified with God.
Alternatively, the pleasures of the mind or soul may be seen as qualitatively higher than those of the body on account of
the higher standing of reason and rational delight relative to physical feelings and desires. See, e.g., Peter Coffey,
Ontology: Or, The Theory of Being; An Introduction to General Metaphysics (New York: Longman, Greens & Co.,
1914). For a more recent account, especially in relation to the works of Thomas Aquinas, see George P. Klubertanz,
Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, 2nd edition (Oregon: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2005).
21
There are potentially interesting connections (extending beyond this article) between the Platonic concept of the Good
(to agathon) along with notions of fraternal love (agape
might describe contemplation as a form of gazing at the object of knowledge, akin to the way in which the lover gazes

but rather of a being-captured and enraptured by the beauty and goodness of the beloved. Still more, before the Good
(to agathon), the contemplator is captured and enraptured by the brilliance of beauty, the completeness of reality,
perfection, the sight of truth, etc., and in so gazing, stands agape and in awe. Without doubt, later notions of

22
We see this notion o Euthyphro dialogue.
88 Jason Costanzo

23
Apart from these early texts, see especially Pierre Hadot & Arnold Davidson, Philosophy As a Way of Life: Spiritual
Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1995); also, Pierre Hadot, The Inner Citadel: The
Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, transl. Michael Chase (Harvard University Press, 2001)
24
The works of Elliot Cohen are particularly relevant in this context. See, e.g., Elliot Cohen, Logic-Based Therapy and
Everyday Emotions (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016)