CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHENOMENOLOGY

IN COOPERATION WITH
THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGY

Volume 35

Editor:

John J. Drummond, Mount Saint Mary's College

Editorial Board:

Elizabeth A. Behnke
David Carr, Emory University
Stephen Crowell, Rice University
Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University
7. Claude Evans, Washington University
Jose Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University
Joseph J. Kockelmans, The Pennsylvania State University
William R. McKenna, Miami University
Algis Mickunas, Ohio University
J. N. Mohanty, Temple University
Tom Nenon, The University of Memphis
Thomas M. Seebohm, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz
Gail Sojfer, New School for Social Research, New York
Elisabeth Ströker, Philosophisches Seminarium der Universität Köln
Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University

Scope

The purpose of this series is to foster the development of phenomenological philosophy through
creative research. Contemporary issues in philosophy, other disciplines and in culture generally,
offer opportunities for the application of phenomenological methods that call for creative responses.
Although the work of several generations of thinkers has provided phenomenology with many results
with which to approach these challenges, a truly successful response to them will require building on
this work with new analyses and methodological innovations.
HEIDEGGER AND LEIBNIZ
Reason and the Path

by

RENATO CRISTIN
University of Trieste,
Italy

With a Foreword by Hans Georg Gadamer

Translated by Gerald Parks

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 0-7923-5137-1

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword by H.G. Gadamer Page vii

Vorwort von H.G. Gadamer xi

Preface xvii

Bibliographical Note xxi

PART ONE: THE FOUNDATION

1. Topology of the Foundation 3

2. The Foundation as Fire and "Logos" 17
3. "Erörterung" of the Foundation: the Place, the End 33
4. The Path: from the Foundation to the Abyss 43

PART TWO: THOUGHT

5. On the Way Towards Thought 55

6. The Abacus and the Mirror 57
7. "As If We Were Children..." 97
8. The Path: from the Principle of Reason
to Meditating Thought 109

Index 131
 FOREWORD

by Hans Georg Gadamer

For any thinker of our time, Leibniz is both enigmatic and i m p o r t a n t .

Leibniz's immense output is still only partly accessible despite t h e
efforts of Dilthey, thanks to whom the first edition prepared by Hegel's
student Johann Eduard Erdmann has over time been supplemented b y
new editions. However, the preparation of a historical-critical edition of
the imposing legacy left by Leibniz which can meet modern needs is
such a gigantic enterprise that only a few first steps have been t a k e n
towards achieving it, and even these already run to many volumes. But
this is not the only thing that makes Leibniz both unknown and
attractive. Above all else, our attraction is due to his position m i d w a y
between the beginnings of modern science and the great tradition of
Aristotelian metaphysics. This was the life theme that was m o s t
peculiarly his own, and it was to have repercussions in each of t h e s e
areas, both on British empiricism and, in the form of idealism, on
Romantic and post-Romantic thought in Germany and its n e i g h b o u r i n g
countries.
In the period of neo-Kantianism this tension could still be r a t h e r
balanced, as the example of the young Cassirer shows. But later on a
further, peculiar speculative energy of thought and a marked power of
synthesis were needed, such as perhaps only bold and i n d e p e n d e n t
thinkers like Whitehead and, particularly, Heidegger possessed. In a n y
case, it is fascinating to undertake a thorough analysis of the revival of
Leibniz's spirit in Heidegger and Heidegger's strenuous effort to come to
grips with Leibniz's thought, also in view of the historical interest in t h e
influence exerted by Leibniz on contemporary thought.
The author of this book, Renato Cristin, has already shown that he is
a careful scholar of these problems. His vast knowledge of Heidegger's
writings and his accurate working method have achieved results in this
book, which I was able to see in manuscript, that will arouse interest not
only among Heidegger's German and Italian successors, but even in t h e
English-speaking world.
We must go even further if we are to evaluate correctly t h e
exceptional nature of the revisiting of Leibniz's thought and its
ambivalence in Heidegger's thought. It seems the destiny of m o d e r n i t y
that the subject of Leibniz's entire life still looms before us as an
insoluble problem: viz., the reconciliation of the vision of the world of
modern science with our metaphysical heritage, which fulfills o u r
Vlll Foreword

speculative needs. These seem to be two separate worlds that a r e

difficult to bring together, yet they both belong to the same world; and
our reason is constantly driven to seek the unity between these two
worlds in all their multiplicity and diversity: the one expressing itself in
mathematical formulas, the other taking shape in the endless dialogue of
human beings.
Cristin traces the documented phases of Heidegger's reflections on
Leibniz and analyzes them in a way that recalls the doctrine of the t h r e e
realms of Joachim of Fiore as well as the three phases in Hegel's thought.
I cite: Cristin distinguishes three phases: (1st phase) destruction as
liberation of the foundation of metaphysics; (2nd phase) the passing
beyond metaphysics, i.e., beyond the forgetfulness of Being; and ( 3 r d
phase) the other thought, in which metaphysics is overcome. The b r o a d
perspective that comes out of the confrontation that Heidegger
establishes with Leibniz becomes clear especially in the chapters of t h e
second volume of his work on Nietzsche. In this connection, let me q u o t e
Cristin's text (p. 5): "a merciless analysis, without any concessions to
humanism, of the dangers generated by man himself, who is now
understood only in an ontological and destiny-ridden sense, stripped of
all romanticism or existentialism."
The era of metaphysics is seen from the perspective of the history of
Being, or even from the history of the forgetfulness of Being. This m a y
also have been a reason for criticizing Heidegger's rash enterprise, w h e n
he formulated the question of Being in a new way. The question w a s
asked, however, as if the metaphysics of Aristotle and its elaboration in
Plato and Aristotle himself had not tangibly inaugurated the v e r y
problem of Being. Now it is precisely this metaphysics and onto-theology
that is designated by Heidegger as the beginning of the forgetfulness of
Being. But take note: it is not at all the disintegration of the m e t a p h y s i c s
of the Middle Ages into the nominalism of its later period that, along
with the birth of modern science, in the end repudiates as dogmatic
metaphysics in the classical Aristotelian sense. Although objections can
be raised also against the bold statement that the forgetfulness of Being
begins with the birth of metaphysics, history shows that Heidegger is
right. The West begins with early Greek thought and with t h e
development of logic based on declarative propositions. Inquiring
retrospectively into this founding of metaphysics, returning to t h e
"beginning," to Parmenides and Heraclitus and the first physiologein,
Heidegger tried to discover in logos something different from t h e
beginning of metaphysics as founded by Plato and Aristotle. Cristin
traces the bold interpretations that Heidegger makes of the enigmatic
fragments of Heraclitus and recalls that Heraclitus himself thinks of
logos and fire as being the same thing.
 Hans Georg Gadamer ix

In any case, this retrospective inquiry regarding the logos of

utterances is an important contribution to the research on Heidegger. 11
is curious to note that from this starting-point Cristin goes on to t h r o w
new light on Heidegger's ambivalent attitude towards Leibniz.
The clue to understanding this book's formulation of the question is
naturally the principle of reason. Here Heidegger has dared to state t h e
provocatory paradox that the principle "nihil est sine ragione" actually
means that nothingness has being, and is indeed without ratio, w i t h o u t
foundation. Thus, for thought, the truth of being becomes the abyss. By
making explicit, as Cristin does so convincingly, Heidegger's bold
conceptions regarding logos, Being, place, the foundation and the abyss,
research on Heidegger will certainly receive great impetus. Hence t h e
author deduces the nature of thought as a path. This is not a t h o u g h t
that grasps and takes possession. At times Heidegger calls it
"remembering thought." His is a distant echo of Hegel's attempt to weave
closely together Christianity and philosophy, and to reconcile t h e m
totally, but it does not tend toward any synthesis, such as t h a t
developed by Hegel.
Now, we may ask, from this perspective of non-calculating thought,
are we not led extremely far away from Leibniz? Leibniz's ideas a n d
work on the ars combinatoria and on the calculus have even given h i m
the status of a forerunner of cybernetics, as Wiener, the founder of
cybernetics, was well aware. By thinking through Heidegger's reflections
about logos, the foundation, reason and Being to their essence, can w e
see Leibniz in a new light? It is opportune to turn to Leibniz's criticism
of Descartes and to his reformulation of the question of metaphysics b y
means of the concept of "monad." Moreover, Heidegger, especially in t h e
appendix to his work on Nietzsche, has interpreted the definitions of
conatus and appetitus and the enigmatic function of the monad, i.e., t h e
function of being a mirror of the universe, as a deeper view of t h e
selfsame concept of being. It was a particularly felicitous intuition w i t h
respect to Leibniz to discover in the concept of existiturire, the thirst for
Being, the authentic definition of Being. In this way the Cartesian
dualism between extensio and res cogitans is effectively left behind. If,
then, we re-examine the Aristotelian tradition of the concept of
energeia, that tradition that already in the Renaissance was m a k i n g
heard its first new coinings of the concept of energeia in the sense of
this dynamics and this voluntarism of Leibniz's within the framework of
being, we may receive a foretaste of the constant ambivalence w i t h
which Heidegger has carried on his dialogue with metaphysics and its
beginnings, so that even the ambiguity in his view of Leibniz may b e
recognized as a furtherance of his grappling with metaphysics. Leibniz,
the great logician and creator of the calculus, is also a mystic, as Baruzi
and other students of his work have already pointed out. One may t h u s
X Foreword

more than ever realize the significance and importance of Heidegger's

seminal writings for later thinkers. Leibniz, the great logician, was also a
great theologian of mysticism.
Consequently, we finally achieve a better understanding of w h a t
Heidegger was aiming at with his audacious conversion of so clear and
univocal a principle as "nihil est sine rationed transforming it into a
hinting and ambiguous utterance. He deliberately turned this principle
inside out, giving it the meaning that for the "not" of nothing there is no
ratio. This is a turning towards negative theology and towards a n e w
dimension of the problem of Being and the intimate connection between
Being and nothingness. Heidegger sought for this dimension in the early
Greeks, though in the end he constantly had to acknowledge that t h e
ambivalence of the Greek philosophy of logos consists precisely in
embracing both poles: on the one hand, the interpretation (finally
completed in the Latinization of the concept) of logos on the basis of t h e
principle of judgment; and on the other, the echo of an experience of
Being that is more profound than anything that was ever explicitly
conceived of in the principles of the Greek philosophical tradition. But in
the dominant working of language, which is both polysemantic and full
of mystery, Heidegger can find ideas of confirmation and clarification
that are indebted to the texts. One could set beside Heidegger's
interpretation of the ambivalence of Leibniz also his interpretation of
Aristotle; he does not interpret the survival of Aristotelian m e t a p h y s i c s
in theological dogmatics as being the true Aristotle, but rather he finds
it in the way Aristotle thought about the changeability of Being. These
are views that, as I believe, bring Aristotle into a greater proximity with
the later consequences of Plato's dialectic, to which I have devoted much
of my work on Plato.
I would hope that these introductory words to Renato Cristin's book
may show that his speculative analysis of the figure of Leibniz and of
Heidegger's interpretation of him provides much occasion for thought.
 VORWORT

von Hans-Georg Gadamer

Das Thema Leibniz ist für jeden Denker unserer Zeit e b e n s o

rätselhaft wie bedeutsam. Leibniz's immenser Nachlaß ist noch
immer nur zum Teil erschlossen, obwohl seit Diltheys Bemühen die
erste von dem Hegelschüler Johann-Eduard Erdmann v e r a n s t a l t e t e
Ausgabe inzwischen durch neue Ausgaben bereichert ist. Eine
modernen Ansprüchen genügende historisch-kritische Ausgabe d e s
riesigen Nachlasses ist aber ein so gewaltiges Unternehmen, d a ß
seine Verwirklichung nur erste Schritte hat tun können, die s e l b e r
schon viele Bände umfassen. Aber es ist nicht nur das, was Leibniz
unbekannt und anziehend sein läßt. Es ist vor allem seine Stellung
zwischen der beginnenden Wissenschaftskultur der Neuzeit und d e r
großen Tradition der Metaphysik des Aristoteles. Das war sein
eigenstes Lebensthema. Es hat sich nach beiden Seiten ausgewirkt,
sowohl im Empirismus der britischen Kultur, wie als Idealismus in
dem romantischen und nachromantischen Deutschland und seinen
Nachbarländern.

Im Zeitalter des Neukantianismus ließ sich diese Spannung noch

einigermaßen ausgleichen, wie vor allem das Beispiel des j u n g e n
Cassirer zeigt. Später bedurfte es aber dazu einer eigenen
spekulativen Denkenergie und einer besonderen synthetischen
Kraft, wie sie nur so kühne selbständige Denker wie Whitehead u n d
Heidegger vor allem besessen haben. Jedenfalls ist es eine ü b e r a u s
reizvolle Aufgabe, über das historische Interesse an der Einwirkung
Leibniz's auf das gegenwärtige Denken hinaus, das Aufleben
Leibnizschen Geistes in Heidegger und seine A u s e i n a n d e r s e t z u n g
mit ihm neu zu durchdenken.

Der Verfasser des vorliegenden Buches, Renato Cristin, hat sich als
ein guter Kenner der Problemlage schon länger erwiesen. Seine
umfassende Heidegger-Kenntnis und seine gründliche A r b e i t s w e i s e
haben in diesem Werk, das ich im Manuskript kenne, Ergebnisse
erzielt, die nicht nur in der deutschen Heidegger-Nachfolge und d e r
italienischen Interesse finden werden, sondern gerade auch im
angelsächsischen Raum.

Man muß etwas weiter ausgreifen, um die Besonderheit gerade d e r

Wiederauf nähme Leibnizschen Denkens und ihre Ambivalenz im
Xll Vorwort

Denken Heideggers richtig einzuschätzen. Es scheint das Schicksal

der Moderne, daß Leibniz' Lebensthema noch immer wie eine
unlösbare Aufgabe vor uns steht, nämlich, die Weltsicht d e r
modernen Wissenschaft und das metaphysische Erbe, das u n s e r e n
spekulativen Bedürfnissen Genüge tut, zu versöhnen. Es scheinen
zwei schwer zu verknüpfende Welten, die doch beide der einen
Welt zugehören, und unsere Vernunft ist immer versucht, nach d e r
Einheit dieser beiden Welten in ihrer ganzen Vielfalt und in i h r e r
ganzen Andersheit zu suchen, die eine in m a t e m a t h i s c h e n
Formalismen sich vollendend, die andere im unendlichen Gespräch
der Menschen miteinander.

Cristin folgt zunächst den wohl dokumentierten Phasen der

Auseinandersetzung Heideggers mit Leibniz und gliedert sie in einer
Weise, die an die Lehre von den drei Reichen des Joachim von Fiore
erinnert, und die auch an Hegels Dreischritt im Denken gemahnt. Ich
zitiere: Cristin unterscheidet drei Phasen: 1. Phase: Destruktion als
Freilegung des Grundes der Metaphysik. 2. Phase: Überwindung d e r
Metaphysik, das heißt der Seinsvergessenheit und die 3. Phase: das
andere Denken, in dem die Metaphysik verwunden ist. Vor allem in
den Kapiteln im zweiten Band des Nietzsche-Werkes zeigt sich die
umfassende Perspektive, unter der Heideggers A u s e i n a n d e r s e t z u n g
mit Leibniz steht. Ich zitiere Seite fünf: "un'analisi spietata, e senza
cedimenti umanistici, dei pericoli generati dall'uomo stesso, inteso
ormai soltanto in chiave ontologica e destinale priva sia di
romanticismo ehe di esistenzialismo." Es ist die Perspektive der
Seinsgeschichte oder auch der Geschichte der Seinsvergessenheit,
die das Zeitalter der Metaphysik charakterisiert. Was man auch
gegen das kühne Unternehmen Heideggers denken mag, als er es
unternahm die Seinsfrage neu zu stellen. Da fragte man sich doch,
als ob nicht die Metaphysik des Aristoteles und ihre Ausgestaltung
in Plato und in Aristoteles gerade die Stellung der Seinsfrage
handgreiflich eröffnet hätten. Und man wird gerade diese
Metaphysik und Ontotheologie von Heidegger als der Anfang d e r
Seinsvergessenheit bezeichnet. Man beachte wohl: es ist also nicht
erst die Auflösung der mittelalterlichen Metaphysik im
Nominalismus der Spätzeit, die mit der Entstehung der neuzeitlichen
Wissenschaft am Ende die Metaphysik im klassisch aristotelischen
Sinne als dogmatisch verwirft. Gleichwohl, was man auch gegen
diese kühne Behauptung, daß die Seinsvergessenheit mit d e r
Entstehung der Metaphysik beginnt, einwenden mag - die
Geschichte gibt Heidegger Recht. Das Abendland beginnt mit d e m
Anfang des griechischen Denkens und der Entwicklung der Logik
anhand der Aussagesätze. In einem Hinterfragen dieser Begründung
 Hans Georg Gadamer Xlll

der Metaphysik, im Rückgang zum "Anfang", zu Parmenides u n d

Heraklit und den ersten Physiologei hat Heidegger versucht, im
Logos etwas anderes zu sehen als den Anfang der von Plato u n d
Aristoteles begründeten Metaphysik. Cristin folgt den k ü h n e n
Ausdeutungen Heideggers, die er an die heraklitischen Rätselsätze
wendet und beruft sich darauf, daß Heraklit selbst den Logos u n d
das Feuer zusammendenkt.

Die Durchführung dieser Hinterfragung des Logos der Aussage

bleibt auf jeden Fall ein wichtiger Beitrag zur Heidegger-Forschung.
Man ist gespannt, wie sich von da aus Heideggers a m b i v a l e n t e s
Verhalten zu Leibniz in einem neuen Lichte zeigen mag.

Den Leitfaden für die Vorbereitung der Cristinschen Fragestellung

ist natürlich der Satz vom Grunde. Hier hat Heidegger das
herausfordernde Paradox gewagt, daß 'nihil est sine ratione' in
Wahrheit bedeutet, daß das Nichts ein Sein hat, und zwar ohne ratio,
ohne Grund. So wird die Wahrheit des Seins zum Abgrund für d a s
Denken. In eindringlichem Vollzug der kühnen Gedanken
Heideggers über den Logos, das Sein, den Ort, den Grund und d e n
Abgrund, die Cristin expliziert, wird die Heidegger-Forschung o h n e
Frage reiche Anregungen finden. Der Interpret folgert daraus d e n
Wegcharakter des Denkens. Es ist kein begreifendes und
besitzergreifendes Denken. Heidegger nennt es zuweilen
'Andenken'. Das klingt von ferne an Hegels Versuch an, d a s
Christentum mit der Philosophie innerlich zu verschränken und
ganz miteinander zu versöhnen, zielt aber nicht auf eine solche
Synthese.

Nun mag man sich fragen, ist man nicht mit dieser P e r s p e k t i v e
eines nicht rechnenden Denkens in eine äußerste Leibniz-Ferne
gerät. Leibniz's Arbeiten und Ideen über die Ars combinatoria u n d
den Kalkulus, haben ihn doch geradezu zum Urvater der Kybernetik
erhoben, was deren Begründer Wiener auch nicht entgangen war.
Kann uns das Durchdenken der Heideggerschen Reflexionen ü b e r
Logos, Grund und Sein Leibniz in einem anderen Lichte s e h e n
lassen? Es liegt nahe, sich an Leibniz's Descartes Kritik und an seine
Vertiefung der Frage der Metaphysik durch den Monaden-Begriff
zu orientieren. Dazu hat Heidegger vor allem auch selber in s e i n e m
Nietzsche-Werk im Anhang die Bestimmungen von conatus u n d
appetitus und die rätselvolle Funktion der Monade, Spiegel d e r
Universums zu sein, als eine Vertiefung des Seinsbegriffs s e l b e r
angedeutet und war besonders glücklich über Leibniz; in d e m
Begriff des Existiturire, dem Durst nach Sein die eigentliche
XIV Vorwort

Seinsbestimmung zu finden. Damit wird in der Tat der

cartesianische Dualismus von Extensio und res cogitans hinter sich
gelassen, und wenn wir zurückdenken an die aristotelische
Tradition des Energeia-Begriffs, die in der Renaissance dann b e r e i t s
ihre ersten Umprägungen des Begriffes der Energeia im Sinne dieser
Dynamik und dieses Voluntarismus im Seinsbegriff anklingen läßt,
ahnt man die durchgängige Ambivalenz, mit der Heidegger das
Gespräch mit der Metaphysik und ihren Anfängen geführt hat, so
daß auch die Ambivalenz in der Auffassung Leibniz's sich als eine
Fortsetzung dieser Heideggerschen Auseinandersetzung mit d e r
Metaphysik erkennen läßt. Leibniz, der große Logiker und Schöpfer
des Kalkulus, ist zugleich ein Mystiker wie schon Baruzi und a n d e r e
Leibniz-Forscher betont haben. Ja man erkennt so erst recht, w a s
die Produktivität des Leibnizschen Einsatzes für die Folgezeit
bedeutet hat. Der große Logiker Leibniz war auch ein großer
Theologe der Mystik. So versteht man am Ende besser, was die
kühne Herausforderung will, mit der Heidegger einen so klaren u n d
eindeutigen Satz wie 'nihil est sine ratione' zu einem zweideutigen
Wink ins Schillern gebracht hat. Er hat diesen Satz bewußt auf d e n
Kopf gestellt und ihm den Sinn gegeben, für das Nein des Nichts
gebe es keine Ratio. Das ist eine Wendung zur negativen Theologie
und zu einer neuen Dimension der Seinsfrage und ihren i n n e r e n
Zusammenhang von Seins und Nichts. Heidegger hat diese
Dimension in den frühen Griechen gesucht - nicht ohne am Ende
immer wieder erkennen zu müssen, daß die Ambivalenz der
Logosphilosophie der Griechen gerade darin besteht, beides zu
umfassen, die schließlich in der Latinisierung vollendete
Interpretation des Logos vom Urteilssatz aus, und auf der a n d e r e n
Seite den Nachklang einer tieferen Seinserfahrung als je ü b e r h a u p t
in den Sätzen der philosophischen Überlieferung der Griechen
explizit faßbar ist. Aber in dem vieldeutigen und geheimnisvollen
Walten der Sprache vermag Heidegger Bestätigungen und Klärungen
zu finden, die den Texten schuldig bleiben. Man konnte d e r
Heideggerschen Interpretation der Ambivalenz Leibniz's auch seine
Interpretation des Aristoteles zur Seite stellen, in der er d a s
aristotelische Fortleben in der Metaphysik der theologischen
Dogmatik nicht als den wahren Aristoteles liest, sondern, wie er die
Bewegtheit als Sein gedacht hat. Das sind Perspektiven, die
Aristoteles, wie ich glaube, sehr viel näher an die s p ä t e n
Konsequenzen der platonischen Dialektik heranrücken, denen ich
einen guten Teil meiner Arbeiten zu Plato gewidmet haben.
 Hans Georg Gadamer xv

Mögen diese einführenden Worte zu dem Buch von Renato Cristin

zeigen, daß seine spekulative Behandlung der Figur von Leibniz u n d
ihrer Ausdeutung durch Heidegger vieles zu denken anregt.
 PREFACE

If Leibniz has been defined by Dilthey as a thinker who tries "to connect
the individual sciences by means of a connection of principles," we m u s t
certainly place Heidegger at a great distance from Leibniz's search for
principles. Nevertheless, a certain lack of system in Leibniz's philosophical
construction shows us that the typical feature of his way of proceeding b y
general rules consists in an analysis of the basic principle on which
philosophy can stand. Systematicity is one thing, harmony is another. It is
the latter that we find in monadology, which Leibniz continues to call a
"system": "nothing can be separated in my system, as everything in it is
perfectly connected." And to reach this degree of harmony and perfection,
"I begin," Leibniz writes, "from first principles." But to begin from first
principles does not mean, for Leibniz, to enclose the totality of being in a n
ideal cage formed of categories that, necessarily, are assigned to entities
and to which the ontological variety of the latter is reduced. Leibniz's
analysis of the basic principles runs along this inseparable logical-
ontological track: the principle of identity and of non-contradiction, t h e
principle of the identity of indiscernibles, the principle of sufficient reason.
Their union welds together the logical and ontic planes, in a search for t h e
principle. It is a search for the Satz understood not only as a propositional
principle, but also as the foundation of thought and existence in general.
In this sense Leibniz's radical difference from Heidegger seems to b e
reduced. Heidegger's "step backward" from metaphysics is a path t h a t
takes us back, in some respects, to Leibniz. Even if the d e s t r o y i n g
detachment that Heidegger interposes between his own idea of Being a n d
the entire tradition more resembles a critical destitution of m e t a p h y s i c a l
foundations than a positive elaboration of them, his immersion in
metaphysics to bring to light the unthought-of corresponds, to some extent,
to the unveiling of an original moment: a Satz understood not as a logical
principle but as the foundation-Grund on which Being rests; this Grund
belongs to Being and, in the final analysis, is Being itself.
If in Leibniz the basic principle may be identified as the principle of
sufficient reason, defined as "principium grande, magnum et nobilissimum"
or even the "key" to all monadology, the comparison with Heidegger m a y
prove to be stimulating, since the union between Being and Grund, taken as
foundation and reason, crops up constantly, and in a problematical way, in
XV111 Preface

Heidegger's itinerary. He devoted his university course in 1 9 5 5 - 5 6

(published under the title Der Satz vom Grund) to the relation b e t w e e n
Being and the foundation and to the principle of reason. Here t h e
interpretation of Leibniz's principle is intertwined with the affermation of
Being as the foundation and at the same time as a sinking into the abyss of
thought. For Heidegger this movement is a return to the ancient analogy
described by Parmenides: Being and thinking are the same thing. Thus t h e
foundation of thought becomes also the foundation of Being. But this is not
all: thought, viz., Being, is the foundation. We may then ask: What is
thought, i.e., Being, the foundation of? According to Leibniz, the foundation,
Grund or ratio, is the cause of everything that exists, while for Heidegger it
takes on the meaning of the historical horizon of the destiny of Being. To
Leibniz's answer, which accounts for the existence of the entity, Heidegger
opposes an ontological abyss or "bottomless pit," Ab-grund, in which t h e
entity is rendered problematical in its being and in its relation of co-
belonging to nothingness.
But, aside from this critical perspective, we find in Heidegger's
interpretation also a positive side: with his principle of reason Leibniz is
said to have formulated an ontological assumption of decisive importance.
This significance is not immediately apparent, but it must be brought to
light, by re-elaborating the principle in its essence. It is not so much a
question of establishing the cause that generates the entity, as d e t e r m i n i n g
the reasons inherent in Being. The reason for Being is the Being of reason.
It is thus not the principle that is highlighted, but Being. In this case, also
the basic question of metaphysics, "Why does something exist rather t h a n
nothing?" should be reformulated more or less as follows: Where does t h e
forgetting of Being and of its co-belonging with nothingness come from?
Where does the forgetting of the co-belonging in Being of Grund a n d
Abgrund come from? How far back does one have to go to rediscover t h e
genesis of this forgetfulness?
In modern thought, it is in Leibniz that ratio, in the sense of calculating,
of "accounting for" Being, began its subsumptive process; Being w a s
subordinated to it, and was objectified in it: such is Heidegger's thesis. But,
quite rightly, Heidegger sees in the principle of reason also a principle of
Being. His interpretation is a masterpiece of hermeneutics and unveiling:
Leibniz's principle of reason is, at bottom, a principle of Being, not of
causality of the entity. The significance of it is what has not b e e n
thoroughly thought out in Leibniz's formulation. It is perhaps what Leibniz
could not arrive at. But in Leibniz the opposition, which Heidegger
highlights so acutely, between "calculating" and "meditating" thought, a n d
the consequent superiority of the former in modern technology, is in
 Preface xix

reality toned down and almost reconciled in the principle of reason and in
monadology. Since it is a principle of existence, in it the root of existing is
never torn away from the plane of Being, and is not a mere a b s t r a c t
calculation, but rather a concrete "factuality," linked in some way to t h e
kind of thought that Heidegger would call andenkendes, which m e d i t a t e s
while being mindful of itself and Being. The harmonious turn of
monadology does not permit the isolation of reason as pure calculation or
as categorial objectivation; rather, it indicates the way to include it in t h e
movement of Being, to effect its possible return to what Husserl calls t h e
"foundation of meaning" of science, or also to the original sense of
philosophy propounded by Heidegger. Therefore, the critical d i s p l a c e m e n t
performed by Heidegger seems excessive, because for Leibniz reason is a
metaphor of the world, the reality of which is accessible to r e a s o n
inasmuch as reality itself is imbued with reason. This does not mean t h a t
the world is entrapped in the nets of rationality; rather, reason and Being
seem to balance each other out because they share the same essential
traits.
It is towards this analogy that we would like to lead the two t h i n k e r s
that are on stage here; the research around these two figures can find n e w
perspectives in the vicinity of this difficult dynamics; it is not a question of
cancelling out Leibniz's panlogism to embrace only a mysticism of causality
and Being, nor of conceiving of Heidegger as a rationalist, but of seeing h o w
their paths draw apart, keeping the echo of an old tautology and, albeit to
differing degrees, of an ambiguous but insuppressible voice such as that of
reason. It will thus be possible to define the exact role of Leibniz in
Heidegger's philosophical progress, but also to give a less o n e - s i d e d l y
"calculating" image of Leibniz and a more complex profile of Heidegger, in
which the event of Being can also approach the phenomenon of reason. I n
the end, reason undergoes a metamorphosis: it is no longer a m e r e
objectivation of the entity and a mastery of method, but an epoche of
technique and the guardian of Being.
The sense of the heritage of phenomenology that persists in Heidegger
may be revealed in this rewriting of the rational code, which is n o t
arbitrarily put aside, but is set on the tortuous path of our age, in which
many signs now point to new loci of rationality, ones that were
inconceivable until a short time ago and are as unexpected as a clearing in
a wood.
Heidegger tries to arrive at a "phenomenology of reason," not in t h e
strict sense of Husserl, i.e., as a description of its degrees of self-
understanding, but rather as the rediscovery of the game that Being plays,
arraying manifestness, evidence and openness on one side and latency,
XX Preface

concealment, and closure on the other. Reason is not identified as

consciousness, but glimpsed as a part of "being-the-L/c/Uwrcg." This way of
proceeding more closely resembles the unwinding of a path than t h e
application of predetermined rules and methodologies. It is for this reason
that here the focus is placed on the polarity between the path and reason.
But in Heidegger there is a precise idea of reason, which owes a lot to
Husserl, and which is found in his maintenance of meditating thought on
the plane of philosophy and - with a bit of daring - on that of reflection. I n
this sense one could speak of a path of reason, to show how, with t h e
metaphor of the path, Heidegger has transformed the traditional idea of
ratio, creating a metaphorical-conceptual dimension in which a kind of
reason (a Grund, we might say) continues to operate.
The first part of this book analyzes the concept of foundation-reason
{Grund) as a different option made by Leibniz and by Heidegger. Starting
from a description of the problem and a historical view of it, Heidegger's
critique will emerge as a reflection on the meaning and essence of r e a s o n
and the foundation, representing a considerable displacement of them,
wherein infallibile theoretical mechanisms and indubitable p h e n o m e n a l
substrata no longer exist.
The second part discusses the idea the two authors have of thinking,
thus envisaging the possibility that they may come close together on t h e
side of the type of thought that Heidegger calls "meditating." Lastly, w e
shall examine the hypothesis that, in Heidegger's thinking on Being, t h e r e
lies an original mingling of rational and meditating thought, an echo of t h a t
ancient harmony that timidly, and perhaps incompletely, was already to b e
heard in Leibniz.
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The works of Leibniz are quoted from the following editions, identified by the
abbreviations indicated:

Gph Die philosophischen Schriften von G.W. Leibniz, hrsg. von CJ. Gerhardt, Bd. I-VII,
Berlin 1875-90 (collotype reprint: Olms, Hildesheim 1965)

Ak Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, hrsg. von der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
Berlin, Berlin 1926ff. (the first Roman numeral indicates the series, the second
one indicates the volume)

BB Der Briefwechsel des Gottfried Wilhelm Leihniz in der Königlichen öffentlichen

Bibliothek zu Hannover, hrsg. von E. Bodemann, Hahn, Hannover 1889

BH Die Leibniz-Handschriften der Königlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover,

hrsg. von E. Bodemann, Hahn, Hannover und Leipzig 1895

C Opuscules et fragments inedits, Extraits des manuscrits de la Biblioteque Royale

de Hanovre, edites par L. Couturat, Alcan, Paris 1903 (collotype reprint: Olms,
Hildesheim 1963)

DS Deutsche Schriften, hrsg. von G.E. Gurhauer, 2 Bd., Berlin 1840 (collotype reprint:
Olms, Hildesheim 1966)

Dutens Opera omnia, nunc primum collecta, in classes distributa, praefationibus et

indisibus exhornata, ed. L. Dutens, T. I-VI, Genevae 1768

Rommel Leibniz und Landgraf Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels. Ein ungedruckter Briefwechsel
über religiöse und politische Gegenstände, hrsg. von Chr. von Rommel, 2 Bd.,
Literarische Anstalt, Frankfurt am Main 1847

The works of Heidegger are quoted from the Gesamtausgabe (Klostermann, F r a n k -

furt am Main 1975ff.) with the abbreviation HGA followed by the number
corresponding to the volume:

HGA 2 Sein und Zeit, hrsg. von F.W. von Herrmann (1977)

HGA 4 Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, hrsg. von F.W. von Herrmann (1981)

HGA 5 Holzwege, hrsg. von F.W. von Herrmann (1977)

HGA 9 Wegmarken, hrsg. von F.W. von Herrmann (1976)

HGA 12 Unterwegs zur Sprache, hrsg. von F.W. von Herrmann (1985)

HGA 13 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, hrsg. von H. Heidegger (1983)

HGA 15 Seminare, hrsg. von C. Ochvvadt (1986)

HGA 20 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Sommersemester 1925), hrsg. von P.
Jaeger (1979)
XX11

HGA 21 Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (Wintersemester 1925-26), hrsg. von W.
Biemel (1976)

HGA 23 Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin bis Kant (Wintersemester
1926-27), hrsg. von H. Vetter (in preparation)

HGA 24 Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Sommersemester 1927), hrsg. von F.W.
von Herrmann (1975)

HGA 25 Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft

(Wintersemester 1927-28), hrsg. von I. Görland (1977)

HGA 26 Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (Sommersemester

1928), hrsg. von K. Held (1978)

HGA 28 Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische
Problemlage der Gegenwart (Sommersemester 1929), hrsg. von C Strube (1997)

HGA 29-30 Die Grundhegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt - Endlichkeit Einsamkeit

(Wintersemester 1929-30), hrsg. von F.W. von Herrmann (1983)

HGA 31 Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie

(Sommersemester 1930), hrsg. von H. Tietjen (1982)

HGA 32 Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes (Wintersemester 1930-31), hrsg. von I. G ö r l a n d

(1980)

HGA 33 Aristoteles: MetapSysik IX (Sommersemester 1931), hrsg. von H. Hüni (1981)

HGA 39 Hölderlins Hymnen Germanien" und "Der Rhein" (Wintersemester 1934-35), hrsg.

von S. Ziegler (1980)

HGA 40 Einführung in die Metaphysik (Sommersemester 1935), hrsg. von P. Jaeger (1968)

HGA 41 Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen
(Wintersemester 1935-36), hrsg. von P. Jaeger (1984)
HGA 43 Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst (Wintersemester 1936-37), hrsg. von B.
H e i m b ü c h e l (1985)

HGA 44 Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die ewige

Wiederkehr des Gleichen (Sommersemester 1937), hrsg. von M. Heinz (1986)

HGA 45 Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte Probleme der "Logik" (Wintersemester

1937-38), hrsg. von F.W. von Herrmann (1984)

HGA 48 Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus (II. Trimester 1940), hrsg. von P. J a e g e r
(1986)

HGA 51 Grundbegriffe (Sommersemester 1941), hrsg. von P. Jaeger (1981)

HGA 52 Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken" (Wintersemester 1941-42), hrsg. von C. O c h v w a d t

(1982)

HGA 53 Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister" (Sommersemester 1942), hrsg. von W. Biemel (1984)
 XX111

HGA 54 Parmenides (Wintersemester 1942-43), hrsg. von M.S. Frings (1982)

HGA 55 Heraklit. 1 Der Anfang des abendlandischen Denkens (Heraklit) (Sommersemester

1943), 2. Logik. HeraElits Lehre vom Logos (Sommersemester 1944), hrsg. von M.S
Frings (1979)

HGA 61 Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die

phänomenologische Forschung (Wintersemester 1921-22), hrsg. von W. Bröcker
und K. Bröcker-Oltmanns (1985)

HGA 63 Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität (Sommersemester 1922), hrsg. von K.

Bröcker-Oltmanns (1988)

HGA 65 Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-38), hrsg. von F.W. von Herrmann
(1989)

The other works by Heidegger cited but not yet publioshed in the Gesamtausgabe
are indicated by the following abbreviations:

FB Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens, Erker-Verlag, St. G a l l e n

1984

G Gelassenheit, Neske, Pfulhngen 1959

GD Grundsätze des Denkens, in «Jahrbuch für Psychologie und Psychotherapie", 6,

Heft 1/3, 1958, pp. 33-41

ID Identität und Differenz, Neske, Pfullingen 1957

N Nietzsche, 2 Bd , Neske, Pfullingen 1961

SG DerSatz vom Grund, Neske, Pfullingen 1957

TK Die Technik und die Kehre, Neske, Pfullingen 1962

VA Vorträge und Aufsätze, Neske, Pfullingen 1954

WhD? Was heißt Denken?, Niemeyer, Tubingen 1954

Wph Das Wesen der Philosophie, manuscript from the early 1940s, copyright Dr.
Hermann Heidegger, 1987
ZSD Zur Sache des Denkens, Niemeyer, Tubingen 1969
 PART ONE

THE FOUNDATION
 1.
TOPOLOGY OF THE FOUNDATION

The main problem of Leibniz's metaphysics and logic is that of a n

absolute founding on the principle of sufficient reason. To meet this
need, "there must always be some foundation of the connection of t h e
terms of a proposition, which must be found in their notion" 1 . In this
way Leibniz expresses the "logicistic" (so to speak) formula of t h e
principle of reason; the formula is further, and differently, spelled out as
follows: "my great principle, one with which I believe all p h i l o s o p h e r s
should be in agreement, and one of whose corollaries is the vulgar axiom
that nothing happens without reason, [is that] whereby one can a l w a y s
account for why something has happened this way rather than in s o m e
other way." 2 The place of reason, of what Leibniz calls ratio, raison,
Grund, seems to be both in logic and in ontology. Reason, or also t h e
foundation, as the same word (Grund) is used for both, belongs to t h e
complete idea of a subject and thus to the logical-propositional s p h e r e ,
but also to the structure of things, of which it is, indeed, a p r i m a r y
constituent, and therefore to the realm of being. Leibniz never felt
compelled to justify this duplicity, nor was it a topic of much d e b a t e
with his correspondents. The problem of the difference between t h e
logical and ontic sides of the principium reddendae rationis sufficientis,
though it did emerge and determined Lebniz's way of proceeding, w a s
included within the problem regarding substance. The conflicting, or at
least polarizing, nature of this double significance was always placed
within the harmonious sphere of monadology; hence, without losing
their antithetical connotations, the categorial demarcation and t h e
ontological plane actually came to contribute to the conservation of t h e
architecture of monadology.
Faced with this organicistic interpretation, Heidegger seems to
occupy a position determined by a mainly ontological attitude. For h i m
the relation between logic and metaphysics (ontology) results in a
derivation of the former from the latter and (but this came only later) in
the co-belonging of both within the universal sphere of Being. In his
interpretations of Leibniz, he always, from the 1920s on, pointed out t h e
indissoluble link between the concepts of logic and metaphysics. His
entire interpretative effort of 1928, regarding the "first m e t a p h y s i c a l
principles of logic," aims at demonstrating this connection, and, within it,
the derivation pointed out above. In those lessons the hermeneutic a n d

1
GPh II, p 56.
2
Ibid.
4 The Foundation

critical aspect is merged with an explanatory intent: the result is a

monograph that makes a very detailed analysis of many of Leibniz's
texts. This is a profound work, which served the needs of interrogation
about Being that Heidegger was carrying on at the time, and which
researchers on Leibniz can today acknowledge as an acutely p e n e t r a t i n g
investigation into Leibniz's thought. Heidegger provided a summary of
these lessons entitled Aus der letzten Marburger Vorlesung, first
published in 1964; but the Nachschrift, the transcription of the e n t i r e
course, was not available until 1978. Until that time, then, the 1 9 2 8
course was unknown in all its theoretical breadth, despite the profound
interpretative implications of his 1964 essay. Yet already in 1929, in
Vom Wesen des Grundes, Heidegger was engaged in a discussion with
Leibniz, concentrating on the problem of Grund in relation to
nothingness (understanding the latter as "the nothingness of the entity,
hence Being, taken starting from the entity") dwelling, however, only on
one specific topic and offering reflections that deal with Leibniz's
thought only in part.
With Der Satz vom Grund (a course given during the winter semester
of 1955-56), the peculiarity of the principle of reason is integrated into
a discussion involving the whole of Leibniz's thought, creating a m o r e
advanced confrontation than the essay of 1929 or even the 1 9 2 8
lessons. By "more advanced" I mean a face-to-face comparison that goes
beyond the historical and systematic level of analysis, i.e., t h e
examination of Leibniz's thought in its historical structuring and i n t e r n a l
modifications, to grapple with its theoretical core in the strict sense.
Heidegger starts, and never departs, from what has been called t h e
principle that "holds Leibniz's system together," 3 the principle that,
according to von Aster, is the "alpha and omega of Leibniz's argument." 4
By focusing on the theoretical plane, Heidegger makes the figure of
Leibniz almost concretely visible, infusing it with the topicality t h a t
unmistakeably distinguishes his philosophical investigations. Lastly, if
we consider the hypotheses contained in the second volume of Nietzsche,
where Leibniz is viewed as the precursor of the modern age of nihilism,
and where he appears as the great corrupter of scientific and
rationalistic modernity, since (according to Heidegger) he was largely
responsible for pushing it towards the will to power of the atomic era,
we have identified the main cornerstones of Heidegger's interpretation. 5

3
O. Saame, Der Satz vom Grund bei Leibniz, Krach, Mainz 1961, p. 99. This is t h e
most complete work on the problem of the principle of reason in Leibniz. See also
J.C. Horn, Die Struktur des Grundes, Henn, Wuppertal 1972.
4
E. von Aster, Geschichte der neuern Erkenntnistheorie, de Gruyter, Berlin und
Leipzig 1921, p 237.
5
The summary of the last course held in Marburg, dedicated to Leibniz, was
published under the title Aus der letzten Marburger Vorlesung, in HGA 9, pp. 79-
101. The complete course was published in 1978 in HGA 26. The essay Vom Wesen
 Topology of the Foundation 5

These three texts represent three different historical m o m e n t s

belonging to different phases in Heidegger's thought. The 1928 course,
as well as the essay Vom Wesen des Grundes, hark back to Being and
Time, and to the phenomenological period of the 1920s, when Heidegger
reached his mature reflection on the "turning." The analyses of Nietzsche
II date from the years 1939-41 (with the exception of Chapter VII,
written in 1944-46) and fall into the phase, running from 1936 to 1 9 4 2 ,
marked by the great lectures on Nietzsche; from them emerge both a
portrayal of our age, characterized by the will to dominate embodied in
technology and science, and the true nature of Heidegger's philosophical
itinerary: a merciless analysis, without any concessions to humanism, of
the dangers generated by man himself, who is now understood only in
an ontological and destiny-ridden sense, stripped of all romanticism or
existentialism. Lastly, Der Satz vom Grund belongs to the last p h a s e ,
even if some twenty years separate this work of 1955-56 from the v e r y
last writings. In any case the topics dwelt on in these lectures fully
belong to the problematical discussions of Heidegger's last phase. T h e r e
is therefore a first phase in the reception of Leibniz that is o r i e n t e d
towards the problem of the world, a second phase regarding the subjects
of history and civilization, and a third phase devoted to the problem of
the totality of being, of the "look into what is." This threefold division
also corresponds to the three different and complementary attitudes
taken by Heidegger towards the entire metaphysical tradition: the first
stage is characterized by the idea of the destruction of m e t a p h y s i c s
(destruction=freeing the auroral foundation of metaphysics laid down b y
the Greeks); the second stage is marked by the overcoming
(Überwindung) of it, where the reasoning is supported by the hypothesis
that an ephocal turning-point of Being is just not impossible; and t h e
third stage is that wherein we see the acceptance (Verbindung) of
metaphysics, in which the essence of truth is an "other thought" t h a t
critically discusses metaphysics but does not supersede it.6
After Der Satz vom Grund Heidegger left us no more discussions of
Leibniz's philosophy, except for brief references scattered here a n d
there. Nonetheless we cannot maintain that Leibniz disappears from his
last meditations. His almost obsessive insistence on the planetary a n d
epochal dimension of technology always refers to Leibniz (albeit
indirectly), although he is viewed critically and negatively. This position,

des Grundes is in HGA 9, pp. 123-175. Der Satz vom Grund was published in 1957 b y
Neske, Pfullingen, while Nietzsche was brought out in two volumes in 1961, b y
Neske, Pfullingen. The lessons on Nietzsche are now being published in t h e
Gesamtausgabe (HGA 43, HGA 44, and HGA 48 are so far available).
6
For Heidegger's philosophical itinerary, see O. Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin
Heideggers, Neske, Pfullingen 1963 (2nd ed., 1983); F. W. von Herrmann, Die
Selbstinterpretation Martin Heideggers, Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1964; W.
Biemel, Martin Heidegger, Rowohlt, Hamburg 1973.
6 The Foundation

however, owing to the ambiguous play of identity and difference, almost

adumbrates the possibility of reconsidering him in a positive sense: "the
closer we come to the danger, the more clearly the ways towards w h a t
saves begin to be illuminated." 7 In Heidegger's final period, the synthetic
and hermeneutical effort seems to give way to some basic theoretical
findings: the fact of having defined Leibniz in the history of m e t a p h y s i c s
as one who fatally concealed being; of having designed to overcome h i m
by analyzing and accepting metaphysics itself; of having clearly shown
his responsibility for the supreme forgetfulness of Being that is
occurring in the atomic age.
These, briefly are Heidegger's results with regard to Leibniz. They
were obtained over a period of thirty years and are found both in t h e
works mentioned and in the still unpublished transcriptions and
protocols of university seminars. 8 We can conceive of this line of s t u d y
almost graphically: starting from a discussion of the whole of Leibniz's
works (1928), he moved on to a concentration on the central p r o b l e m
(1929), and then shifted from an overall perspective (1940-41) to a
further investigation into the principle of reason, albeit with results of a
comprehensive and, in this case, definitive nature (1955-56).
Heidegger's interest thus oscillated between partial surveys and general
visions, finally culminating in Der Satz vom Grund.
Heidegger's interpretation is a reading that could provisionally be
called ontological, antithetical to that, for example, of Cassirer, whose
work represents a transcendental and logicistic approach. At t h e
beginning of the century, Cassirer had highlighted the logical meaning of
the principle of reason, attributing to it a mainly gnoseological
significance. The primacy of the theory of individual substance,
maintained by Cassirer, would thus be connected with the
Erkenntnistheorie. Although this thesis, which is heir to t h e
interpretation of Leibniz proposed by Kant and related to the n e o -
Kantian tradition, is to some extent autonomous and original,
nevertheless, by the explicit admission of the author, it takes its place
alongside the interpretative hypotheses of Russell and Couturat t h a t
were put forward in the same years (1900-02). 9 With regard to t h e
principle of reason, Cassirer differs from Russell's criticism of Leibniz's
basic principles, which was used within an already structured t h e o r y

7
VA, p. 44.
8
Heidegger held seminars on Leibniz in the winter semesters of 1929-30, 1933-34,
1935-36, and 1940-41. I owe to Hartmut Tietjen, whom I here thank, the
information that the course given in the winter semester of 1926-27 dedicated to
Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin his Kant (in preparation as
volume 23 of the Gesamtausgabe) contains an extensive analysis of L e i b n i z ' s
thought.
9
Cf. B. Russell, The Philosophy of Leibniz, Allen & Unwin, London 1900; and L.
Couturat, La logiaue de Leibniz, d'anres des documents ineditK. Alcan Pnris 1Q01
 Topology of the Foundation 1

such as Russell's was, and his approach also differs from that of
Couturat, whose analysis is limited to the sphere of logic. In his opinion,
it is necessary to develop a criticism of the principle that connects t h e
logical version with the cognitive faculties of the self. Therefore it is n o t
so much a question of investigating being as a monad (nor should o n e
stop at the level of pure logic), as rather of recognizing the conditions,
i.e., its reasons, that make it possible as consciousness. In his opinion,
"Kant, in his historical appreciation of Leibniz's philosophy, has
explained the adducing of the principle of sufficient reason on the basis
of the need for a principle of synthetic judgments. The link, which h e
recognizes, between Leibniz and his own theory, at this point takes on a
deeper meaning to the extent that the principle of reason is
subordinated to a wider principle, in which the unity of the function of
identity in judgment comes into relation with the unity of self-
awareness." 1 0
Cassirer is inspired by Leibniz's statements about the necessity of a
priori reason, independent of experience, even if this thesis is
substantially different from that of Kant. In any case, one receives a n
almost intellectualistic image of the principle, though in Leibniz's
formulation it should preside over and correspond to existence. An
indirect criticism of this operation of Kantian orthodoxy seems to b e
traceable in Wittgenstein, when in the Tractatus he compares t h e
principle of reason to an "a priori intuition concerning the possible
formulation of the propositions of science." 1 ' Using a pair of images, t h e
blot and the network, he presents a separation between the geometrical
image of the former and its concrete form, which cannot be grasped o r
understood by the method of geometry. Instead, the image of a n e t w o r k
could be explained geometrically and constructed according to a
principle of reason: but "laws like the principle of reason, etc., deal w i t h
the network, not with what the network describes." 1 2 W i t t g e n s t e i n
locates the principle of reason in a dimension outside the "how" of t h e
world, and confined to the "what." If we translate this critical
observation into the argumentative terms of Heidegger, even allowing
for the distance that separates the two thinkers, we could say that t h e
principle of reason, in its sonorous logic, does not vibrate on t h e
wavelength of the essence of truth, i.e., the essence of Being, b u t
addresses itself to the propositional tone of truth and Being.
But in Leibniz logic and ontology are interwoven in an overall
metaphysical horizon, giving rise to hermeneutical difficulties and

10
E. Cassirer, Leibniz's System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen, Elwert,
Marburg 1902, p. 359.
11
L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Kegan Paul, London 1922,
proposition 6.34.
12
Ibid., proposition 6.35.
8 The Foundation

causing his interpreters to be excessively unilateral. Leibniz does not

focus only on the ratio cognoscendi, as Schopenhauer 1 3 believed, but, if
we take a close look at his attempt, it embraces the whole complex
quadruple root of Grund and the principle that states it. The principle of
reason is therefore, also for Leibniz, a "metaphysical principle." 1 4 In this
sense we should point out that some authoritative interpreters, such as
Kabitz and Martin, assign a primary role to metaphysics in Leibniz's
thought. 1 5 What, therefore, is the place from which the principle of
reason seems to speak? From Leibniz's point of view, we must think of a
topology stratified into three levels; that is, we must refer to t h e
subjective sphere and the cosmological one, finding in both traces of t h e
universal conjoining, the infinite foundation that can be led back to God.
In the monad, the foundation-reason consists of the ability of individual
substance to mirror the entire universe from its own point of view. I n
this sense it is connected with the perceptive and appetitive force, to t h e
conatus that is essentially inherent in the monad. It is not something
acquired and additional, but rather it is co-essential with the subjective
structure, forming part of the monadic innatism. As Leibniz explains, "a
good painter who, by exercise, becomes accustomed to the right
proportion, draws in accordance with the art of measurement and
vision," and even if the vision were not to take shape with clarity in his
consciousness, nonetheless it is the demonstration that "the Grund is in
him," as the reason of the petites perceptions: in nature, the principle of
reason is "the Grund of truth" or "the Grund of order." 1 6 It supports t h e
harmonious equilibrium of all the elements of the essent.
This consonance must, in the end, be traced back to God, who gives
rise to existence on the basis of the principle of what is best, but w h o
regulates himself always according to the principium rationis. What is
possible exigit existere at the moment when this principle, whose root is
in God, enters into play: "whoever believes that God does a n y t h i n g
without reason, that he is moved to do it by such a good pleasure that he
has in mind no rule or reason {ex absoluto beneplacito, ex liberate

13
A. Schopenhauer, Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden
Grunde, in Sämtliche Werke, edited by A. Hübscher, Brockhaus, Wiesbaden, 1946-
1950, Vol. I, pp. 48-49. In the first edition of this work Schopenhauer had,
however, stated that Leibniz had carefully distinguished between ratio
cognoscendi and causa efficiens.
14
Cf. O. Saame, Der Satz vom Grund bei Leibniz, eh., p. 42, n. 190.
15
Cf. W. Kabitz, Die Philosophie des jungen Leibniz, Heidelberg 1909 (reprint, Olms,
Hildesheim 1963); G. Martin, Leibniz. Logik und Metaphysik, de Gruyter, Berlin
1967 (2nd ed.). For general treatments of Leibniz's thought, see Y. Belaval, Leibniz:
Initiation ä sa philosophic, Vrin, Paris 1961; V. Mathieu, Introduzione a Leibniz,
Laterza, Bari 1967; D. Mahnke, Leibnizens Synthese von Universalmathematik und
Individualmetaphysik, Niemeyer, Halle 1925.
16
Gph VII, pp. 523, 517 and 521.
 Topology of the Foundation 9

indifferentiae), such a one believes that God is not perfect." 1 7 T h e

analisis situs of the foundation therefore presents us with a triple plane:
monad, world or cosmos, and God; they are all, each according to its o w n
characteristics, permeated by the principium magnum, grande et
nobilissimum.
Efficacy is thus the essence of the principle, but, as Heidegger points
out, there is a certain circularity among the terms that come into play:
the principle is valid inasmuch as there exists a God who confirms it a n d
materializes its energy, but on the other hand God exists precisely
because the principle is valid. In Heidegger's view, we are here faced
with a vicious circle: here "thought moves in a circle." 18 The topology of
the foundation seems to be reduced to an onto-theological circle t h a t
thus does not involve the authentic place, the veritable lucus of Being.
One has therefore to arrive at the area where the principle of r e a s o n
speaks of Being, or (to adopt Heidegger's equation between Grund a n d
Sein) the place where it speaks of itself in an authentic way, expressing
what Leibniz did not manage to make explicit. It is for this reason t h a t
Heidegger can say that "the principle of reason is one of the principles
that is silent about what is most peculiar to them." 1 9 We must, instead,
pay attention to subterranean theoretical modulations, which were left
aside by the philosophical tradition that concerned itself with t h e
principium, starting from Leibniz himself: we must listen to an evasive,
indeed unexpressed, voice, like that which in another situation w a s
called the voice of silence, "the sound of quietness." 20
The principle of reason has traditionally been a basic principle for
ontology: the ontologist has an absolute need to proceed in the direction
of the ultimate foundation of beings; for him the principle of r e a s o n
becomes a need for a metaphysical method, the very raison d'etre
behind the principle. 21 But the principle of reason does not express only
this ontological tautology; the problem of the principle of reason is, to
some extent, almost the problem of obviousness, understood in t h e
phenomenological sense. For the phenomenologist, to discuss
obviousness means to describe the world starting from a critical

X1
Ibid., p. 77.
18
SG, p. 56.
19
SG, p. 9 1 . On Heidegger's interpretation of the principle of reason, see U. W e n z e l ,
Die Problematik des Grundes beim späten Heidegger, Schäuble, Rheinfelden 1986;
R. Viti Cavaliere, // gran principio. Heidegger e Leibniz, Loffredo, Napoli 1989; s e e
also the protocol of a seminar led by J. Taminiaux in 1982, Protocole d'un seminaire
sur 'Le principe de raison' de M. Heidegger, in Raison et finitude, Cahiers d u
Centre d'Etudes Phenomenologiques, n. 3-4, pp. 3-59, and the Preface by J. B e a u f r e t
to M. Heidegger, Le principe de raison, French translation by A. Preau, G a l l i m a r d ,
Paris 1962, pp. 9-34.
20
HGA 12, pp. 26ff.
21
Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, La Idea de Principio en Leibniz, y la Evolution de la Teoria
Deductiva, Revista de Occidente, Madrid 1948, p. 195.
10 The Foundation

perspective that, so to speak, suspends its validity and meaning. Husserl

suggests putting the world between brackets, reducing its sense to t h a t
of transcendental subjectivity. But even the development of his thought
has shown that no subject can exist without a world; hence the epoche
becomes a method for acquiring the authentic worth of the world, b y
understanding it more profoundly. One must first lose the world in order
to find it again in its authenticity: this is Husserl's orientation with
regard to the problem of the immediate meaning of the world. From a
general standpoint, the whole operation whereby Heidegger
deconstructs the traditional meaning of the principle of sufficient reason
is very similar to the phenomenological destruction of obviousness.
The phenomenological significance of the lessons on Der Satz vom
Grund is not limited to the method by which the problem is tackled;
indeed, this approach marks the fundamental passage from a n a t u r a l
thought, one unmindful of Being, to another thought. The characteristic
trait of Heidegger's reading of the philosophical tradition contains an
unmistakeable trace of the critical and destructive force of Husserl's
phenomenological art, even if this affinity will have to be kept in m i n d
here without further analysis. We shall therefore have to proceed
without venturing further upon this phenomenological terrain.
Heidegger starts off by noting that the principle of reason is easy to
understand, reasonable, and states something that can immediately b e
assented to. It is obvious that everything that exists must have a reason,
a motive. Ever since the Greeks, the awareness of a necessary relation of
cause and effect has permeated everyday knowledge; any situation or
state of affairs must have its cause. Aristotle analyses the apxrj, splitting
it into the principles of being, of becoming, and of knowing. 2 2 In Roman
thought, with Seneca, the apxti was translated as the concept of causa
and, in its turn, subdivided into five causes: causa ex quo, a quo, in quo,
ad quod, propter quod. An entity is investigated starting from its cause;
or, when the cause is unknown, it is sought for in order to u n d e r s t a n d
the entity. The theoretical-scientific attitude to the world of beings is a
causal one: the notions and qualities that define an observed entity a r e
potentially contained in its cause or its contributing causes. In this
process, which moves from what is dissimilar to a single form, from
variety to singularity, from the determined to the determining, w e
notice the co-existence of various special disciplines within a
metaphysica generalis.
In this cognitive process by which one passes from an analysis of t h e
manifestation of an entity to an understanding of its origin, the concept
of cause undergoes two transformations: it is multiplied into infinite
concrete causes, which preside over the actual subsistence of entities,
but they in their turn contract, to become concentrated in a single
22
Cf. Aristotle, Physics, II, 7; Analytics II, 11; Metaphysics, I, 3 and IV, 1.
 Topology of the Foundation 11

universal notion, the source of all particular causes. This idea is

contained in that of the supreme being, God, who is the original a n d
absolute cause. In God the cause is the authentic Ursache, original thing,
primordial cause, the cause par excellence, absolute origin. The e n t i r e
world of beings is thus said to be nothing but the emanation or effect of
this divine causality. In the first cause the concepts of causality,
foundation, reason and motivation are fused, each losing its peculiar
features. The Ursache is also Grund; the foundation is also the origin.
This confluence of concepts, which we today realize is due to a n
insufficient logical differentiation, continued to condition the problem of
causality up until the end of the 18th century.
In German culture the assimilation of the concept of foundation or
reason to those of essence, of cause and, in a figurative sense, of God
dominates the entire development both of medieval mysticism and, w i t h
a different emphasis, of scholastic philosophy. Indeed, the latter r e d u c e s
the four causes (materialis, formalis, movens o efficiens, finalis) to t h e
will of God. In the 14th and 15th centuries, the word grunt (Grund in
modern German), was first used in "high", court literature, later on being
used in particular in the preaching of the mystics. Initially the w o r d
grunt contained the meaning of innerness and depth, and was generally
completed in the expression herzen grunt, the bottom of the heart. To
define its meaning, the mystics used a periphrasis: "the spiritual element
in man's essence," transferring the concept to the temporally e t e r n a l
dimension. In German mysticism Grund means Grund der Seele, b o t t o m
of the soul. Though there are, to be sure, semantic and speculative
differences, the concept of Grund concentrated in itself the essence of
the fundamental in thinkers as diverse as Mechthild von Magdeburg and
Ruysbroek, Tauler and Seuse, Meister Eckhart and even Jakob Böhme
and Angelus Silesius (hence well beyond medieval mysticism). As a
metaphor for God, Grund defines the unreachable, undefinable and m o s t
perfect essence of God. In this sense mysticism achieves the hyperbolic
connection between Grund and Abgrund, between foundation and abyss;
we find an original and absolutely new ontological version of this in
Heidegger. The essence of God, of supreme reason, is "unfoundable"
(unergründliches): thus the vision is expressed whereby the Grund, in
which "the foundation of God is my foundation and my foundation is t h e
foundation of God, is therefore, for the creatures, an absence of
foundation." 23 Where do I find the Grundl Eckhart asks, and he replies:
in myself, because "non habet quare, sed ipsum est quare.'14

23
M. Eckhart, quoted by F. Pfeiffer, Deutsche Mystiker des 14. Jahrhunderts, 2
vols., Leipzig 1857, Vol. II, p. 66.
24
M. Eckhart, Die lateinischen Werke, 5 vols., published in Auftrage der Deutschen
Forschungsgemeinschaft, Stuttgart-Berlin 1936ff., Vol. III, p. 41.
12 The Foundation

Thomas Aquinas treats the problem of the foundation in God in a

similar way to that of the mystics, just as he recognizes a primary link
between the Grund and the Augustinian concepts of intimum mentis a n d
abditus mentis. The figure of the unio mystic a achieves Saint
Augustine's Deus interior intimo meo, fusing in the supreme Ab-grund
the divine Grund with that of the human soul, and describing t h e
deiformitas of man.
The speculative importance of the mystics' meditations regarding
the Grund is unquestionable; suffice it to think of Schelling's reflection:
the Grund is absolute identity and original indifference; it is "the simple
ray, which departs from the absolute and is itself absolute." 2 5 But t h e
rationalistic refinement (which can already be seen in Cusano) which
was to cause the conception of Grund to be absorbed by the basic
concern of the beginning of the modern era, i.e., the question of method,
gradually introduces a more scientific element into the theological-
ontological model of the foundation. With Leibniz the problem of t h e
Grund openly becomes a difference that we could call aitiological; t h e
undifferentiated mystical causality is rationalized in a scientific
ontological design. We notice an evolution, or rather a real "qualitative
leap": the Grund is conceived of in the rational framework of a logical
principle. In the principle of sufficient reason, or determining reason,
Aristotle's analysis of the concept of cause is made even more complex;
in it, though they remain distinct, the concept of final cause and t h e
logical cause of relation between foundation and consequence a r e
interwoven. Causality and finality come together, both flowing into t h e
concept of final cause, as Hegel so authoritatively explained in his
interpretation of Leibniz's metaphysics. 2 6 The foundation is no longer
viewed as a mere cause, but is a philosophical whole that regards not
only the logical and formal aspect of scientific propositions, but also t h e
ontic and existentive aspect of the world, as well as the ethics of h u m a n
action. This sophisticated distinction does not, however, arrive at Kant's
differentiation between cause and condition, which makes it possible for
a thing to manifest itself or a phenomenon to be known. That is, it does
not fully express the difference between metaphysical foundation a n d
the conditions of possibility for experience. In any case Leibniz, for t h e
first time, illuminates an essential area of our thought, providing a
demonstration and a foundation for the previous obviousness of t h e
metaphysical principle.
Heidegger immediately recognizes the superior plane of Leibniz's
thought: the need for the founding, the possibility of seeing the Grund.

25
F. W. Schelling, Bruno oder über das göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge,
in Schillings Werke, published by M. Schröter, Beck und Oldenbourg, M ü n c h e n
1928, Vol. Ill, p 257.
26
Cf. G. Zineari. Leibniz. Heeel und der Deutsche fderdisrnuK Roll TVttelhnrh 1QQ^
 Topology of the Foundation 13

Given that the stratum of Being cannot be further founded, it is

nevertheless necessary to meditate on the foundation: is it perhaps t h a t
"the essence of truth and the position of the essence must be u n f o u n d e d
and hence every effort that aims at truth must, at bottom, r e m a i n
groundless?" 2 7 Certainly not; a way of arriving at the foundation m u s t
be made visible, a way of thinking of the foundation and reason, t h e i r
place and their destiny in the epochs of Being. We must ask ourselves:
"What therefore does 'founding' mean here and in general?" Founding is
remembrance of the foundation, whose origin is in transcendence, which
is Ursprung, the primeval leap, from which the foundation springs a n d
projects itself into the world: the foundation finds its leap {Sprung) in
the original transcendence, understood as the combination of Dasein a n d
Being. The foundation is Being; it is the unity of Being: Being is thus t h e
last and ultimate Grund of any founding. The unity of the world, which
scientific and representational thought assigns to the objectivizing
possibilities of the subject and to its ability to select and g r a s p
phenomena, therefore does not rest on the subjective foundation, on t h e
\JTTOK€I'H€VOI/ which Latin transformed into subjectum, but on the ground of
Being. The foundation or reason therefore does not belong to t h e
operations of subjectivity, or at least is not accessible to an individual
meta-reason and detached from the ontological and vital ground. Even in
the very principle of reason we find this itinerary, if we observe it
carefully: the reasons it investigates do not regard beings, but Being.
Heidegger discovers this way in Leibniz himself: "in truth, according to
the monadological principle it is not the single entity that is e n d o w e d
with force, but, on the contrary, force is Being, which alone causes a
single entity to be as such. [...] What we obtain from Leibniz's appeal to
the experientiality of shock and countershock is this: to conceive of t h e
universal fundamental lineaments of the essence of form it is n o t
necessary to return to the 'subject'." 28
The foundation must be investigated starting from Being, and r e a s o n
cannot be understood by resorting to ratio. From this perspective, t h e
foundation appears to be, not a stable and immovable base, but r a t h e r
something like Heraclitus' apxti, fire, which is inconstant and e p h e m e r a l ,
but at the same time fundamental. Or perhaps, to stay closer to
Heidegger's message, the foundation-reason is logos, as it was before it
was transformed into ratio. The vision of the Grund is therefore one of
the essential steps in understanding Being; indeed, it seems to b e
translated precisely into the historical understanding of Being: "the v i -
sion of the essence is itself the founding of the Grund."29

27
HGA 45, p. 76.
28
HGA 33, p. 102.
29
HGA 45, p. 86.
14 The Foundation

The principle of sufficient reason certainly calls into play a p r o b l e m

of causality, but in Heidegger's rewriting in terms of Ur-sprung, Grund
and Ab-grund (the ultimate plane of Being) causality is reformulated
and remoulded: "the basic principle of causality cannot be logically
derived from the logical principle of reason, but its necessity is based on
the fact that it is a necessary element of everything, as it is something
that belongs to the opening up of experience in general." We can t h u s
see that the experience of the foundation, of reason or even of causality
is "a precise unity between intuition led through time and thought,
which determines what is so intuited." 3 0 The foundation as causality
conceived of in absolutely new terms is a relation of thought with Being:
it is "a determined relation in its relational character as a temporal
relation, as a way of being-in-time. [...] Causality as being-cause means:
to go forward in time as a determining let-it-follow [...]. But this essential
determination of causality follows along the path of a determination of
internal possibility, i.e., of the essence of experience qua finite h u m a n
knowledge of mere presence in view of the context of its being m e r e l y
present." 3 1 The horizon of Heidegger's displacement of the principle of
reason therefore embraces the poles of temporality, of human finitude
and the infinity and unity of Being, of the necessity of the foundation
and the non-foundability of the Grund, of the infinite abyss of Being.
The need to found the activity of the intellect becomes manifest in its
insuperability, asserting itself as a primary need of thought. Therefore,
Heidegger says, it is amazing to observe the very long "incubation time"
that preceded the actual formulation of this "very obvious" principle. In
fact, it took over two thousand years for human thought to be able to
formulate explicitly, and in a formally correct manner, a principle that is
rooted in the very nature of the world. Towards the end of the 17th
century, Leibniz therefore expressed the central proposition of
metaphysics, responding to the tendency that marks modern thought in
its entirety and that only in that moment could take on a logical and
narrative form. The search for the foundations of thought and the essent
runs through all later philosophy: Leibniz showed and opened up t h e
Weg zum Grund, the path to the foundation, the path towards reason. He
opened up the way for the rationalization of the foundation: "the
demonstration of the entity in its founding, i.e., the said, t h e
demonstrated in discourse, the Acyö^vov as Aoyos- is the Grund, t h e
rational', only by this indirect path does Aoyos* receive the meaning of
reason [...]. To speak about...means: to demonstrate, to found the Grund,
to let the entity be seen in its whence and in its why." 32 The
demonstrative evidence would lead logos to be understood as reason,

30
HGA 31, p. 187.
31
Ibid., p. 188.
 Topology of the Foundation 15

which must be given in the search for the foundation of the being. This
is a manifestation of the naturalness of the principle of reason, which is
justified through the discursive, logical and propositional d e m o n s t r a t i o n
of the foundation.
Precisely because it is the plane used for the leap towards the o t h e r
beginning of thought, towards the meditating polarity of thinking, t h e
Grund is not reducible to a pure logical abstraction. We translate Grund
by "foundation" and "reason", letting the meaning oscillate each t i m e
towards one of the two concepts, because Grund is both g r o u n d -
foundation and reason. In his turn Heidegger proposes the following
equation: "Satz, vom Grund-principium rationis," bestowing on the t e r m
"reason" a wider meaning than that of the intellectual operator t h a t
seems to act in it. On the other hand, also the foundation must be t a k e n
in a wider perspective, one that is, so to speak, less "substantial." Let us
say then: principle of reason, though keeping in mind that "Grund is
understood here in a much wider and more radical sense than in t h e
traditional concept of ratio."33
This greater acuteness in discriminating the details of the Grund does
not, however, call into question its inconfutability or, better, its obvious
and plain aspect. The immediate obviousness of the principle of r e a s o n
does not mean, per se, that it is automatically understood: as Husserl
would say, the obviousness is fallacious, and the evidence of its m e a n i n g
is manifested rather in a series of concealments. Heidegger poses a
similar problem when he writes that "our relation with what is near h a s
always been obtuse and deaf." The foundation-reason, in its e x t r e m e
proximity to our nature, is thus at the same time what is farthest a w a y
and most difficult to understand. It is just because of its propinquity to
us that, according to Heidegger, the principle of reason has b e e n
constantly misunderstood and conceived of unilaterally. Leibniz himself,
in Heidegger's view, did not realize the risk involved in the total clarity
of the principle, because "for us men the path towards what is near is
always the longest and therefore the most difficult."34
The principle of reason therefore states something that we are not
able to grasp directly, although it seems to state something exceptionally
simple and obvious. It is on this gap that Heidegger bases his
interpretation: the principle of reason must be investigated in all its
enigmatic nature, not in its clarity. We must question it about what it
does not say, instead of analyzing further what it expresses openly.
Instead of retracing its logical and causal meaning, we must p e n e t r a t e
into the "strange light" that illuminates the sphere that in principle is
reserved for Being. But of course, in order to be able to transform t h e
principle of reason into a principle of Being, we will have to probe it in

33
HGA 26, p. 283.
34
SG, p. 14.
16 The Foundation

its unexpressed structure, thus bringing to the surface what Leibniz w a s

not able to say, reaching the critical area of thought: i.e., Being. It s e e m s
unquestionable that here we are exploring a territory that Leibniz does
not explicitly name or that, in any case, he does not express adequately,
even though we should never forget what Schelling said: "certainly
Leibniz saw more than he actually gave evidence of having seen. He was
endowed with a magic look, a look before which any object on which it
rested opened up as if by itself."35
The meaning of the principle of reason is implicitly derived from t h e
theory of substance: only the monad is a unitary substance, w h o s e
substantiality is the vital action of the monad, as Leibniz was to m a k e
clear in one of his last letters: "Vicissim posset dici omnem Monadem
'Monadare', sen corpus aliquod vivum vegetare, sed non ipsam
Monadari."7,6 Substance is the coming into being of the monad, substantia
est monadare, hence reason is the manifestation of the monad as
substance and subject: here we clearly see some concepts dear to
Heidegger, such as unity, dynamism, becoming, but while in monadology
they are linked to the monadic substance, for Heidegger they m u s t
inhere in Being. The criticism of reason is outlined as a criticism of
substance.
It is, then, not so important to rationally or empirically verify t h e
validity of the principle as to seek out an attitude of thought that is able
to produce, or rather to grasp, the appropriate light in which to make its
meaning appear. Our reflection must shift from the demonstration of t h e
efficacy of the principle to the liberation of the essence of reason. And
since this essence, which determines both the foundation and reason, is
not, in its turn, a further foundation or more extreme reason, but a
foundation/reason without a stable ground, an abyss, the w a y
inaugurated by Leibniz must lead us to a "breakdown" of traditional
ontology. 3 7

35
F.W. Schelling, Münchner Vorlesungen (1827), in Schillings Werke, cit., Vol. V,
p. 129.
36
G. W. Leibniz, Letter to M.G. Hansch of 4th September 1716, in Dutens, V, p. 173. I
thank Albert Heinekamp (Hannover) for directing my attention to this letter, as
well as for other precious suggestions regarding the problem of substance i n
Leibniz.
37
Also for Eugen Fink it is true that the absence of foundation is an abyssal
ground: "the roots of things are not things at all," Fink writes in Sein und Mensch,
AlhfT Frfihiira-Miinrhpn 1Q77 n 9QO
 2.
THE FOUNDATION AS FIRE AND AS LOGOS

The silence and the quiet that envelop the Grund are not an ontic
limitation nor a sterile shell that blocks the relation between it (Grund) a n d
Being or paralyzes the transformations, the leaps, the various Sprünge of
Being that may spring from that Ur-sprung, from that origin. On t h e
contrary, silence, quiet, withdrawal, and absence make possible t h e
fundamental manifestation of the foundation. Certainly, the characteristics
of a phenomenon that draws back and manifests itself by concealing itself
cannot be analyzed by using the usual, objectivizing tools of scientific
research, but are a terrain for investigation where the only thought t h a t
can advance is one that grasps its essence, a non-objectivizing thought.
Heidegger outlined it, defining it as "meditating thought," grafted onto w h a t
he called the other beginning of thought. Right from the start, r e s e a r c h
regarding the phenomenon of the foundation requires a very special
attention and structure of thought. The bases of this thought are c o n d e n s e d
into an original agglomeration in which we may recognize: the
phenomenological polarity between subject and object (viz., the
revolutionary core of Husserl's phenomenology), a retreat to the dawn of
philosophy (the initial stage of Greek thought), the disclosing of poetic
thinking as the way toward andersanfängliches Denken (literally, t h o u g h t
of the other beginning), of meditating-poetizing thought (on whose t r a c k s
we find not only, and in an exemplary fashion, Hölderlin, but also t h e
tending of Nietzsche's "metaphysics" towards the Über). In Heidegger's
explosive mix, these bases are reshaped in explicit reference to the only
task of thought: to think Being. In relation to the foundation in its co-
belonging to Being, the fluidity of this mix makes itself felt, so as to
correspond to the unstable and elusive nature of the Grund, which is not
only ungraspable but also unmeasurable, approachable at most in t h e
ayxißaaiT), on arriving in its proximity.
The experience of the foundation is the experience of thought: t h e i r
difference is guarded and assured by the tortuous and impervious passages
of Being in its own unifying harmony. To characterize the foundation is like
defining Being, rediscovering an analogy in a correlation, discovering t h e
difference that lies even within co-originality. It is a question of grasping
and repeating the basic principles of thought and identifying them in t h e i r
co-belonging to Being. Heidegger assigns to himself (and to philosophy) t h e
18 The Foundation

task of letting words speak about the origin, letting things be expressed in
their original essence. This is the task of founding, understood as t h e
manifestation of the foundation, as the unveiling of reason, a highlighting
that does not, however, distort its obscure essence, the hidden and
scattered heart of Being. If we direct this research towards the very n a t u r e
of the foundation and reason, we must above all (but also after all) ask
ourselves: What is the foundation? How can we utter it? Thought and t h e
foundation are joined in the Grund-sätze, in the basic principles t h a t
regulate the activity of thinking. The Grundsätze express things, and n a m e
something as such. This uttering is, according to Heidegger, a saying, a
Xcyeiv: "to repute and render something for something." The saying t h a t
connotes a relation with the foundation typical of early Greek thought is
then transposed, in the Latin conception, into the verb rear, to compute,
and into ratio: "for this reason ratio becomes the translation of \6yos\" This
transformation then gave rise to the entire tradition of modern and
contemporary philosophy, the victorious philosophical mainstream, which
conceives of Xoyo? as ratio, Vernunft, pure reason. In it the ontological
element present in the Grund is subordinated and disappears in the logical-
affermative element of the Satz: the Grundsätze are now pure rules to
guide the intellect, principles of method for the making and objectivizing of
categories. The play of reason liberates itself from the original power of t h e
Aoyos' and puts philosophy on the tracks of method, doing away with any
thought of the co-originality of thought and things, which in the end is
replaced by a way of thinking that represents things by applying to t h e m
the tables of calculation and categories. Running along this track, "thought
as mere uttering, Xoyos-, ratio, becomes an Ariadne's thread for d e t e r m i n i n g
the Being of the entity. [...] Ariadne's thread means here: the modes of
utterance guide the gaze to the determination of the presence, i.e., of t h e
Being of the entity." 3 8 The decisive step in this process was rational
metaphysics as developed by Leibniz.
The backwards journey along the paths of the foundation does not,
however, lead Heidegger into the giddy and indistinct atmosphere of m y t h .
The original locus of the foundation does not coincide with the p r i m e v a l
half-light of myth, but is occupied by the uncertain glare of ratio essendi.
The use of the term ratio must not lead us to suppose any excessive
promiscuity on Heidegger's part with classical rationalism: when Leibniz
proposes to "translate Xoyo? as Ratio rather than as Verbum"™, he sets up a
precise logical identification which, though in him it is connected with an

™ HGA 41, p. 64.

,y
GPh III, 162 (letter to Th. Burnett of 11th June 1695).
 The Foundation as Fire and "Logos" 19

imposing metaphysical substratum, becomes increasingly isolated and its

value enhanced by his direct and indirect heirs, from Wolff to Russell.
Whereas, when Heidegger thinks of the Grund and recognizes its tonality in
the Heraclitean relation between unity and multiplicity, expressed in t h e
sentence "CK TravT^v ev K<X\ <E£ kvbs TravTa" (fr. 10 Diels), he does not p r o p o u n d
the logical hypostasis of the relation between the one and the many, but h e
illustrates the arc of oscillation of Being. In Heraclitus' sliding b e t w e e n
TTavTa and iv and between lv and uavTa, he sees the co-belonging of the s a m e
and the different: "here we are dealing [...] with the ratio essendi" he says,
but he adds that one cannot understand this relation "until one has t h e
Xoyos" in view."40 The conceptual-metaphorical aggregate composed of Xdyog-,
ratio and Grund finds, in Heidegger, a dynamic space in which it is
amalgamated by the plasticity of Being. In this operation of both reaching
and going beyond the ground, of pursuing the origin and immersing oneself
in its abyss, he does not appear as the thinker of division, of the laceration
between pure logic and fundamental ontology, between categorizing
thought and poetizing thought; rather, he seems to assert himself as t h e
philosopher of the co-originality of these differing forms of the two m a i n
modes of thought. At this level of analysis, i.e. from the standpoint of t h e
foundation, Heidegger seems to overcome the rupture between rationalism
and irrationalism, stationing his attempt on a steep crag that rests on
reason and its opposite, in the union of the ground-abyss of Being.
Heidegger's recovery of the original force of Western thought, ensconced in
the dawning moment of Greek thought, restores to us a double image
wherein logos and mythos meet without losing their own natures.
If we imagine Heidegger sitting on a mossy rock that dominates the hills
of the Black Forest, in search of a way of thinking the Grund, of grasping
"what founds all and gives a foundation to all," we obtain an analogy w i t h
the figure of Prometheus, intent on violating the divine vigil s u r r o u n d i n g
the vital essence of fire. But this comparison should not be carried b e y o n d
the limits of a preliminary and partial juxtaposition, because the
Promethean element in Heidegger's thought, which is present in the gaze
towards the essence of human Dasein, is softened in the more
encompassing and involving dynamism of pietas and the safeguarding of
the fourfold relation on which his vision of the cosmos is organized. He is
close to Prometheus when he says, with Heraclitus: "man lights up t h e
night" and, freeing himself from the total obscurity of the original chaos,
brings his own essence, which is both luminous and dark, into the cosmic
play of light and shadow. But he is far from Prometheus, even opposed to

M. Heidegger, E. Fink, Heraklit (Seminar Wintersemester 1966-67), in HGA 15, p. 219.

20 The Foundation

him, when he brings man's little light into the Open of the Lichtung (open
place, illumination, clearing, bright clearing), whose essence is not only
situated beyond what is human, but must also be guarded as such: in t h e
Geviert (Fourfold) earth and sky, mortals and immortals reach out in an
elastic and harmonious structure, but in the final analysis each remains in
its own place. The simultaneous presence of the Promethean element a n d
of its antithesis (represented by pietas) mirrors the unstable but
productive combination that causes the rational and irrational elements to
interact in Heidegger's thought.
This interacting play has a role also in Heidegger's determination of t h e
Grund. One of the primary objectives of thought is to grasp the foundation;
Heidegger seems to assign it vital importance, as appears from t h e s e
expressions of 1941: "to conceive the Grund means for us to reach the soil;
it means for us to come to rest there where alone staying and stability a r e
guaranteed, where all decisions fall, but from where every indecision
borrows its hiding-place. To conceive the Grund means to reach the Grund
of all in a knowing that not only takes cognizance of something, but is, qua
knowledge, a staying and an attitude. This knowledge of the Grund is m o r e
original, i.e. more 'gripping,' than common knowledge, but it is also m o r e
original, i.e. more decisive than any usual 'wanting', but also more original,
i.e. more intimate than any current 'feeling'." 41 Beyond any gnoseologism,
the Grund is knowledge of Being, an authentic expression of t h e
fundamental ontology. It exerts an appeal that cannot be u n d e r e s t i m a t e d :
to enable ourselves to listen to its call means to direct our thinking t o w a r d s
the very thing we need to turn to. We are therefore called upon to
undertake this task, namely that of leading our thought along the path of
meditation. In the regression towards the Grund we meet the Greeks'
experience of thinking; they approached the essence of the foundation in a
way that is still surprising to us. From that time, and precisely from
Periander of Corinth, we have received a penetrating saying: ^Aera TO väv
(be concerned with everything) which Heidegger glosses as: "reflect on t h e
fact that in the being in its totality, in what summons men from here, t h e r e
is everything. Always, first and last, consider the essential and assume an
attitude that is able to make you ready for such meditation. Like
everything that is essential, this attitude, too, must be simple, a n d
therefore also the referral that shows us this attitude, which is knowledge,
must be simple." 42

41
HGA 51, p. 3.
42
Ibid., p. 4.
 The Foundation as Fire and "Logos" 21

The experience of the foundation is therefore a form of knowledge, not

a mythical or doxastic imagining. Heidegger insists on the scientific n a t u r e
of the foundation, on its value, which is both epistemological and
ontological, precisely in order to counterbalance the fatal destiny of logos
with a conception that is not closed or self-excluding. He does not want to
enclose the path to the foundation within an exclusively evocative a n d
poetizing dimension, but he wants to make this sphaera lucis break out into
the framework of ratio, transforming logical concepts into Grund-Begriffe:
concepts of the foundation, ontologizing concepts, concepts that express a n d
are the foundation. It is a comprehensive constellation that must b e
expressed, because it is by means of the Grund that the totality of Being
and Dasein must take shape. What must be highlighted is "the disposition
to put into play the essential Being of man, and, before that, e v e r y t h i n g
that he considers is Being." 43
As always, for Heidegger it is Being itself that comes out; what is at
stake is Being, the Being that "exists only if Dasein includes Being." A n d
therefore, in order not to run up against the artifical division of t h o u g h t
imposed by the requirements of technology and cybernetics, he locates t h e
foundation in a unitary and all-inclusive whole, which, though rooted in the
metaphysical experience and the wonder of the first thinkers on t h e
Aegean islands, yet does not renounce the burden (and the richness) of t h e
logical-rational tradition. Supporting himself between the internal
boundaries of myth and the negative margins of the discourse on m e t h o d ,
Heidegger leaves no room for criticisms that accuse him of falling into
prophetic pronouncements or magical evocations. I would say that all of
Heidegger's circumnavigation around the Grund shows that such objections
are untenable. When, in a very brief summary, he traces the line of decline
of logos as the line describing the fall of Western metaphysics, he wants to
point out the inevitability of this falling parabola, but he does not imagine
a complete exiting from it: "when therefore Xoyo? has become ratio, this
latter has become reason [Vernunft], this has in turn become the t h i n k i n g
will [denkender Wille], and when this will qua will to power constitutes t h e
essential Being of man, even of the being as such in its totality, then also
'logic' as the doctrine of 'logos' has just as universal a meaning as physics
and ethics." 4 4 The planetary scope of logic and the subdivision of t h o u g h t
into the three disciplines mentioned here possess a negative connotation,
but this is the destiny reserved for metaphysics; this is the factuality of t h e
world we live in; this is what is and what we have to look at. It is with such

"Ibid., p. 2.
44
HGA 55, p. 225.
22 The Foundation

a lucid and disenchanted gaze that Heidegger stares into the abyss of t h e
foundation, espying in it, with an intuition that is both realistic a n d
magical, the germ of the forgetfulness of Being, mixed with the seed of
salvation from such forgetfulness. There is no nostalgia for a lost
foundation, because the time of the poverty and forgetting of Being is a
necessary reality that comes straight from that Grund wherein resides t h e
possibility of the 'other thinking.'
To point towards the foundation means, for Heidegger, to rediscover t h e
"first beginning" of thought, the Ionic origins of philosophy. This t e n d e n c y
to see in the first Greek thinkers (in those whom the history of philosophy
calls the "Pre-Socratics") an unequalled proximity to Being, a nearness to
logos and the foundation, is found in Nietzsche as a critical response to t h e
systematic nature of academic philosophy. It is clear that Heidegger not
only shares this critical position, but also establishes with Nietzsche a
profound contact, as can and must be done with the apex of W e s t e r n
metaphysics. It is indispensable to penetrate into the forest of m e t a p h y s i c s
in order to reconduct metaphysical thought to its forgotten, a b a n d o n e d
foundation.
Metaphysics takes Being as its supreme and universal theme, and e v e n
in the classical period it was the Being of entities that was formulated in it.
In agreement/disagreement with this approach, Heidegger states: "Being,
qua Grund, brings the entity into its mutual presence. The Grund shows
itself as present-ness." 4 5 The Grund explains the capacities of Being to
manifest itself, and is itself a phenomenon, which must be investigated
with a discourse appropriate to it, i.e. by means of a phenomeno-logy: a
phenomenology of the Grund. The event of the foundation is described,
albeit in a fragmentary and quasi-poetical way, by Heraclitus: TO. de -ndvTa
oiaiaOEi Kepauvos', "lightning governs every thing" (fr. 64); navTa yap, <$>T)OI, TO
nap €TT€A9bv Kpuvci Kai KaTaÄT^Tai, "since fire, he says, when it arrives, will
judge and condemn all things" (fr. 66).
In Heraclitus the Grund as fire (but also, as we shall see, as logos) is not
one of the elements, as for example in the fourfold cosmological s t r u c t u r e
of Empedocles, or in that of Anaxagoras, where it is part of a complex
interplay of elements, together with earth, air and water; rather, it is t h e
apxri, principle and foundation. In his commentary on Heraclitus' intuition of
the arche, Heidegger perfects his own theory of the foundation, stating both
the impossibility of a metaphysical "passing-beyond" of Heraclitus'
doctrine, and the intimate connection obtaining between this doctrine and a
modern conception of Grund such as that related to his own attempt to

4S
ZSD, p. 62.
 The Foundation as Fire and "Logos" 23

arrive at meditating thought. Heidegger's reading reshapes Heraclitus' text

in a series of new images, which nonetheless reveal themselves as being
subterraneously present in the text itself. Fragment 64 is rethought as
follows: TCL 6€ iravTa oiaKiCci Kcpauvos*, Heraclitus says, and Heidegger specifies:
"fire qua the thunderbolt 'governs', embraces with its look and in the first
place makes everything shine and passes through everything, illuminating
it in advance, in the form that always, in what only a look of the eye g r a s p s
once, every time the all arranges itself in its arrangement and stirs itself
up and divides itself." In a parenthesis he explains the meaning of his
choices and links between concepts: "(to stir up [fachen] means to begin
and, by beginning, to set out, i.e. to begin like the simplifying and t h e
simple that becomes enflamed like light. Therefore also <\>\iois is, not only
according to the word, the same as <\>dos, light, but the pure arising a n d
becoming ignited in the flame of enflamed fire (nüp) is in essence the same,
since we are not bound by appearances, to the extent that there is only o n e
appearance, instead of experiencing, in thinking of it, the pure appearing of
the enflaming beginning in the illuminating arising)". 4 6 Fire is t h e
foundation, fire (the thunderbolt) is Grund and as such it is without ground:
it is the grund-los principle, the abyss. In the coils of fire the all of t h e
entity is created and illumined; a glimmer of light is opened up onto Being.
Man brings "a little light in the night," a small fire that reveals a l u m i n o u s
opening for Being: "in the light of the fire so conceived, in the birth of c^uais*
so understood, every apparent thing now appears in the s t r u c t u r e d
confines of its form [...] 4>uai£, as the non-apparent harmony [Fügung] is t h e
noble opening, the Lichtung that finds its own essence. In this lucent
harmony, the entity in its entirety appears and irradiates." 4 7 Fire must b e
thought of in the sphere of c^uai?: "if we want to understand the thunderbolt
in the Greek sense, we must put it into a connection with the p h e n o m e n o n
of nature." 48
The fire founds the ontological opening of Lichtung and lets being
manifest itself without capturing it or forcing it into a metaphysical net.
Here Heidegger discovers and displays the profound root of m e t a p h y s i c s ,
its root, viz., the original ground. Already in his essay of 1939 on Book B l
of Aristotle's Physics, he had pointed out the essence of m e t a p h y s i c s :
"metaphysics is that knowledge in which 'historical' Western man
preserves the truth of his relations with the being as a whole and the t r u t h
about it. Meta-physics is, in a very essential sense, 'physics', i.e., a
knowledge of 4>uais\" It is in this sense that we understand his s t a t e m e n t
46
HGA 55, pp. 162-163.
47
Ibid., p. 163.
48
HGA 15, p. 14.
24 The Foundation

that "Aristotle's Physics is the basic hidden book of Western philosophy,

and it has never been sufficiently thought through." 49 But physics is, on t h e
basis of the relation between tyvoig and the fundamental principle, the birth
and emergence of a world, of a K6<J^OS\ forged by the blazing of the fire.
Heraclitus' Fragment 30 closes with these words: m)p aeic^ov, aTTTopevov p€Tpa
Kai aTToa߀vvun€vov [li-Tpa: "fire always living, which is kindled and
extinguished in accordance with the right measure." Heidegger transforms
these words into: "the fire that continually arises, that enkindles t h e
openings (clearings [Lichtungen]) and that extinguishes (closing itself) t h e
openings (into what is clearing-less [ins Lichtungslose])."50
This comment discloses an entire constellation of metaphors revolving
around the image of fire: thunderbolt, obscurity, darkness, extinguishing,
seeing, light; "fire thus closes, as only in the blazing of the thunderbolt, a n d
with it, in the sudden instant of its extinguishing, first of all the dark and
darkness arrives like a flash of lightning in appearing and at its
illumination, i.e., like the darkness that is lit up by a thunderbolt. M€Tpa a r e
measures in the original sense of openings [Weiten] which arise and t h e n
close up, in which only a glance of human seeing can enter and to which
this glance can open itself up, in order to succeed in seeing the m e a s u r e ,
that is the 'measure of the opening' [Spann-Weite] in which a being always
appears as such." 51 The fire-foundation is dilation and contraction,
brightness and darkness; it is the founder of a hidden harmony which, as
Heraclitus says, is more resistant than the manifest one. Heidegger's
sympathetic reading of the foundation outlined here contains a level or
"measure" of harmony that is greater than the tragic mood of separation
that is also present in it. 4>uais" is Fügung, a harmonic structure: in this sense
"((njcncr qua ap\xovia is the lighting-up of the gleaming, which is simplified in
the non-illuminated. <j>uais" is [...] the kindling of the gleam, the enflaming of
the flame." 52
For Heidegger, the whole problem of the relation with the foundation,
viz., the relation with Being, is contained in the Heraclitean link between lv
and TrdVra, in the cosmic-metaphorical play of fire and beings, light and
shadow, seeing and becoming manifest. The lightning flash that s u d d e n l y
lights up makes the being visible, and lets it manifest itself: just as
Heidegger had, so to speak, prescribed in the section on phenomenological
method in Being and Time. In its tending towards the foundation, t h e
phenomenological approach finds a set of original metaphors and an aim

49
HGA 9, p. 242.
50
HGA 55, p. 165.
51
Ibid., p. 171.
"2 Ibid., p. 161.
 The Foundation as Fire and "Logos" 25

calibrated on the primary phenomenon: Being. In this e x p e r i m e n t a l

imagery, the sudden flash of the thunderbolt is equivalent to a quick
glimpse of Being: "'to lighten' [Blitzen] means, according to the word and the
thing: to look [blicken]. In the glance [Blick] and as a glance the essence
enters into its own shining [Leuchten]. Through the element of its shining,
the glance retrospectively hides what it has grasped [Erblicktes] in looking.
But at the same time the looking guards in the shining the hidden obscurity
of its provenance as that which is not illuminated. The w i t h d r a w a l
[Einkehr] of the thunderbolt of the truth of Being is the glance (in-sight)
[Einblick]. [...] If forgetfulness turns back, if the world withdraws as
protection of the essence of Being, the lightning-up [Einblitz] of the w o r l d
occurs in the neglect of the thing. This neglect occurs in the mode of
dominion in the im-position [Gestell]. The lightning-up of the world in t h e
im-position is the lightning-up of the truth of Being in Being neglected. The
lightning-up is an appropriating event [Ereignis] in Being itself. The
appropriating event [Ereignis] is appropriating looking-at [eignende
Eräugnis]."^
To equate Blick with Blitz means also to insert an ontological potential
into the subjective activity of looking: to look is to be looked at. But this
coupling has a long history, albeit mostly subterranean and unknown, in
the formation of the concepts of the German language, not only in
philosophy but also in general literary discourse. It is not by chance that in
Leibniz we find a very clear reference: "[...] we may add the next w o r d s
that signify a colour, splendour, or what attracts the glance [...] Blicken from
Blitz, thunderbolt." 5 4 Here Leibniz's observation is made in a context of
etymological research, on the basis of a precise historical-linguistic interest,
but in its boldness the juxtaposition may well be put on the same plane as
Heidegger's comparison.
The terminological and functional analogy between fire and t h u n d e r b o l t
(Blitz) and look (Blick) leads Heraclitus' fragmentary and m e t a p h o r i c a l
thought into the history of Being, which Heidegger wants to rewrite or,
rather, to write for the first time. The look which would embrace reason,
the foundation and the situation of Being is called the "look into what is"
(Einblick in das was ist). The Einblick (look or glance) illuminates, like t h e
fire of the thunderbolt, the clearing of Being, which shines and is a free
luminous opening: Lichtung. And the event of the Lichtung is an Er-eignis
which originates as Er-äugnis, a sudden "eyeing" like the flashing of
lightning. "The look into what is, is the appropriating event. [...] By look

" TK, pp. 43-44.

^4 G.W. Leibniz, Collectanea Etymologica, in Dutens VI, part II, p. 184.
26 The Foundation

[Einblick] we do not name the sight [Einsicht] that we have of a being, but a
look [Einblick] like lightning [Einblitz] is the appropirating event of t h e
constellation of the turning in the essence of Being itself, i.e., in the epoch
of im-position [Gestell]."55 The epoch of forgetfulness of the p r i m e v a l
ground is our historical and ontic situation; if it is by starting from the look
upon this situation that we make the path that goes back to the foundation
passable, it is also by identifying the place of the foundation that we instil
efficacy into the glance into what is. In our times the echo of t h e
foundation continues to resound, that is, a flash of the initial t h u n d e r b o l t
continues to shine: "in the imposition, again as the essential destiny of
Being, there lingers a light of the thunderbolt of Being." Moreover, t h e
essential constitution of the thunderbolt makes the essence of man shine
out: "if the look takes place, then men are struck by the thunderbolt of
Being in their essence." 5 6 But in our time, in the epoch of m a x i m u m
deployment and maximum efficacy of the principium reddendae rationis
sujficientis, is it still possible to glimpse the profile of the foundation? I n
an age of rationis reddendae, in which logical causality acts as a hinge in
our relations with the world, is it still thinkable to put the foundation into
practice? Therefore, Heidegger asks, "do we see the thunderbolt of Being in
the essence of technology?" Do we see the light of Being in the technology
that is so pervasive in our lives and so domineering? Far removed from
any emotional involvement and from any sliding into nostalgic or prophetic
sacrality, Heidegger looks the face of planetary technology directly in the
eyes, managing simultaneously to unmask the essence of "what is" and to
listen to the silence of Being which is communicated to the world through
the foundation.
Before ^liaiss Heraclitus says, no one and nothing can hide. Heidegger
seems to be saying that one can forget the foundation, but one cannot
escape it: "each one [...] appears as a being not only within the Lichtung (of
Being). He does not just stand 'in' the Lichtung, like a rock or a tree or a
mountain animal, but he casts a glance into the Lichtung and this 'glancing'
is his £ü>rj, his 'life' as we say. The Greeks therefore conceive of 'arising' as
Being. He who looks into the Lichtung in an essential way is illuminated in
the Lichtung. His standing-in is a coming-out arising in the Lichtung."57
The sudden shining of the thunderbolt plays a major role also in
Leibniz's theory of creation. In particular, we may mention that for Leibniz
the concept of julguration is a metaphor for crealio continua. In t h e
Monadology the creation is an incessant flashing of lightning: "all created or
ss
TK, p. 44.
,ft
Ibid., p. 45.
' 7 HGA 55, p. 173.
 The Foundation as Fire and "Logos" 27

derived monads are productions and are born, so to speak, by virtue of

continuous lightning flashes of the divinity from moment to moment." 5 8
The metaphysics (and metaphorics) of light regard not only this ratio
essendi, but also a form of ratio cognoscendi: in referring to the m y s t i c s '
experience of revelation, Leibniz states that "they know by means of t h e
light, which the thing brings with it, which shines and flashes in t h e i r
souls." 59 As in Heraclitus, the fulguration is constant (uup aeic^ov:
figurations continuelles) and is the irradiating effect of the divine c r e a t i v e
action. This sudden, extremely rapid and all-pervasive action is like that of
emanation, another metaphor used by Leibniz. In fulguration the world is
created and mirrored in the divine infinite: by means of fulguration
microcosm and macrocosm are fused in the perspectivity of God. The idea
of light as a radiant flashing of God is also at the core of the treatise Von
der wahren Theologia mystica, where the thunderbolt is both a
manifestation of the intellect of God and the object grasped by the h u m a n
intellect: the expression lux intelligihilis contains in a nutshell both t h e s e
metaphysical aspects of light. With an unusual series of antitheses a n d
paradoxes, Leibniz says: "God is the easiest and the most difficult thing to
know; the first and easiest on the path of light, the most difficult on t h e
path of shadow." 6 0 The image of the irradiation of light is adapted here to
an onto-theological framework in which the reception of the light follows
an act of lightning that has its source in the creative power of the fiery
thunderbolt, as in Heraclitus, but in this case the fire of the lightning is not
a cosmological arche or Grund, as it was for the thinker from Ephesus, b u t
is rather a metaphor for God. In his theological use of this m e t a p h o r
Leibniz follows in the tradition of German mysticism; we may mention h e r e
the aphorism of Angelus Silesius: "God is an eternal thunderbolt."
The mystical way of relating the metaphor of the thunderbolt to t h e
concept of creation can be detected here, together with other themes t h a t
Leibniz takes from the mystics and incorporates into his philosophy: t h e
vision of God, union with God, God's being mirrored in the soul. Eugen Fink

^ G.W. Leibniz, Monadologie, § 47, in GPh VI, p. 614. See also the Discours de
metaphysique, § XIV, in GPh IV, pp. 439-440, where it is stated that created s u b s t a n c e s
are the continuous product of a divine emanation; and the Essais de Theodicee, §§ 3 8 2 -
385ff., in GPh VI, pp. 342ff., in which the main concepts are continuous creation,
flux, instant, and continuum.
sg
GPh 5, p. 34.
60
DS II, p. 410. On the question of the metaphysics of light, see W. Beierwaltes, Lux
Intelligihilis. Untersuchungen zur Lichtmetaphysik der Griechen, Fink, M ü n c h e n
1957; H. Blumenberg, Licht als Metaphor der Wahrheit, "Studium Generale," 10, 1957,
pp. 432-447. In particular, Beierwaltes maintains that the term "light" is an " a b s o l u t e
metaphor" (op. cit., pp. 36ff.).
28 The Foundation

considered this theory of creation to be the supreme expression of t h e

Christian position on metaphysics (whereas Aristotle, in his opinion, is at
the pinnacle of ancient metaphysics), but he also identified a passage t h a t
goes in the direction of an original thesis: viz., he finds in Leibniz an
attempt (albeit inadequate and full of unresolved difficulties) to t h i n k
about the event of the Open in Heidegger's sense. Fink even goes on to
translate the term fulguration with the word Lichtung: the ancient light
motif would hence acquire an energy like that emanated by Heidegger's
image. He thus states that Leibniz interpreted creation "with t h e
extraordinarily bold conceptual image of Lichtung.''61 In the fire of t h e
thunderbolt the world is forged as if by emanation from the divine
intellect: in this brightening a luminous Open is manifested in which t h e
glow of the lightning is not interrupted, but endures (it is the creatio
continua) as the essence of the monads and of the created world. According
to Fink, "Leibniz used the Lichtung as the ontological model for the idea of
creation," thus starting along a path that leads from Heraclitus, t h r o u g h
twists and turns, to Heidegger. Fink certainly knows the contradictions
obtaining in this comparison; hence his interpretation should become
merely a signal for us, to be used in order to try and find points of contact
and relations between Heidegger and Leibniz. The distance b e t w e e n
Leibniz's use of the metaphor and Heidegger's, moreover, becomes clear in
the light of their different aims: a description of the genesis of the u n i v e r s e
as a divine explicatio for Leibniz, and a history of Being as a return to t h e
ground of metaphysics for Heidegger.
Whereas for Leibniz the fulguration regards the relation between God
and man from the standpoint of infinity, for Heidegger the coupling of Blitz
and Blick expresses the problem of the foundation as the relation b e t w e e n
Being and Dasein from the perspective of the finiteness of existence. In this
latter slant, attention is focused on the link between unity and multiplicity,
between absolute identity in the foundation and ontological difference in
the world of beings. We may recall Heraclitus' Fragment 26, which states
that "man kindles a light in the night, when the light of his eyes grows
weak." Man lights a fire in the night: it is from this e x t r a o r d i n a r y
understanding that man has of himself at the dawning of Western
civilization that Fink draws the essence of the foundation; he expresses
himself as follows in his seminar on Heraclitus, held together with
Heidegger: "man has his restless place between night and light [...] m a n ' s
unstable place between night and light." Here the foundation is a restless
place, a clearing in the half-light: "to be alive and awake, to be asleep, a n d

61
E. Fink, Metaphysik und Tod, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1969, p. 149.
 The Foundation as Fire and "Logos" 29

to be dead are not three states, but three possible ways in which man m a y
behave, and in which he comes into proximity with the dark obscurity a n d
with the bright Open." 62 Continuing in this vein, Heidegger states: "if m a n
kindles a little light in the night, he does this so that, through the light in
the darkness, he may be given something else." 63 The little light is a
counterpoint on the backdrop of night and it is also a polar extreme w i t h
respect to the total light of day: "darkness is, if a light is lit up in it, in s o m e
sense also an opening. This dark Open is possible only in the Lichtung in
the sense of Da"M Once again the problem of the Grund appears as a
problem of relations, between Being and Dasein, between Da-sein a n d
Lichtung: "the D a i s the Lichtung and the opening of the being, which m a n
bears." Man's torch in the night is the taking of a relationship by Dasein
towards the totality of the being. This is again the problem of Fragment 10:
"conjoinings are entire/not entire, in agreement/not in a g r e e m e n t ,
harmonious/inharmonious, and from all things one and from one all
things": here the Grund-Begriff is the concept of owdtyies (conjoinings,
connections), behind which Heidegger glimpses the possibility of a
connection between fire-foundation-Being and /tfgos-foundation-thought: "I
do not translate it," Heidegger says, referring to the concept of auvat|n.€s\ "by
'taken together' [Zusammengefaßte], but by 'to let co-belong'
[Zusammengehörenlassen]."65 The 'co-belonging' of thinking and Being first
established by Parmenides is at stake here. The last step in this direction,
along the path that determines the core of the foundation, is the connection
between fire and logos.
According to Heidegger, Heraclitus' theory of the logos is condensed in
F r a g m e n t 9 3 : 6 ava^y 6u TO \iavT€iov <EO~TI TÖ kv A€Äcj)ois\ 6UT€ Aeyei OUT€ Kpmnei
äxxä GTjiiaivei: "the lord, whose oracle is at Delphi, neither says nor hides, b u t
indicates." Even Heidegger's proposed translation reveals that it contains
also a central part of Heidegger's conception of logos: "the high, whose place
is the hinting saying that is at Delphi, neither (only) unveils, nor (only)
hides, but gives signs." 66 Already in Fragment 1 the generating power of
logos is evoked: "everything happens on the basis of this logos." Heidegger
here finds the idea of the movement from which Being is born a n d
manifests itself. Being is that sudden, lightning-like dynamism, like t h e

62
HGA 15, p. 196.
63
Ibid., p. 208.
M
Ibid., p. 211.
65
Ibid., p. 217. "Letting co-belong" is also the meaning of the Greek opia^og, w h i c h
Heidegger dwells on in his reflections dedicated to Parmenides in the course of h i s
last seminar (Zähnngen 1973); cf. HGA 15, pp. 396-407.
66
HGA 55, p. 177.
30 The Foundation

shining and striking of the thunderbolt, that explosion of energy that left
him amazed one day in Greece: "I remember one afternoon during my stay
at Aegina. Suddenly I perceived a single flash of the thunderbolt, followed
by no other. My thought was: Zeus." 67 But perhaps, immediately after
thinking of Zeus, he thought: Being. Indeed, all his work concerning
Heraclitus and all the early thinkers flows in this direction. Through t h e
fire and the thunderbolt Being shines bright; but not merely this: it is in
the fire and in the lightning that Being shines out. But Being also appears in
logos. Logos names the Grund; logos "names Being. But 'logos', as that which
is present, as the model, is at the same time that on which otherness r e s t s
and is based. We say: the ground, the Grund. 'Logos' names the Grund.
'Logos' is both presence and Grund."6S In Fragment 1 Being is led to
manifest itself in the word yivo^'vwv (from genesis): "happens" means to
reach Being, to manifest oneself in presence. Not only fire but also logos
lets Being manifest itself. But, as regards fire (or the thunderbolt),
"manifesting itself" means that the illuminating flash of lightning gives not
only light but also darkness: that is, fire manifests Being in its double
nature as unveiling and concealing. Also as regards logos the double n a t u r e
of Being is affirmed; logos not only reveals but also conceals; through logos
Being not only speaks but is also silent.
Heidegger says that in Fragment 93 "we have the simple confirmation of
our interpretation of the fundamental meaning of the word \4.yeiv in t h e
sense of 'reading' [lesen] and 'joining' [sammeln]; to join means, w h e n
thought in Greek, to allow to appear, i.e., to let appear the One, in whose
essencing-gathering into itself is the whole and it is re-joined [ver-
sammelt] by itself. 'Rejoined' here means: to remain kept together in t h e
original unity of the harmony [Fügung]. Since the naming and saying word
has, as a word, the basic trait of making manifest and allowing to appear,
for this reason the saying of the words of the Greeks can be called a
reuniting, a \4yew."69 Being, beginning and Grund are all summed up in
logos, as in a covalent and co-original whole. There is a tangent, t h a t
Heidegger wants to identify, which connects the various moments a n d
prevents them from being dispersed; this line is co-belonging, by which
Being and thought, Being and the foundation are joined. Logos is t h e
gathering foundation onto which generation is grafted and in which t h e
sense of Being is preserved. Logos and fire entail one another in Being:
Heidegger sees this intertwining in Heraclitus and, in clarifying the
difference between his interpretation of Heraclitus and that of Fink, h e

67
HGA 15, p. 15
68
SG, p. 179.
69
HGA 55, p. 178.
 The Foundation as Fire and "Logos" 31

said, addressing the latter: "your path of interpretation of Heraclitus s t a r t s

from fire and arrives at Aoyos-; my path of interpretation of Heraclitus s t a r t s
from Aoyos- and arrives at the fire." 70
From logos to fire the passage illuminates the presence of Being: Being
needs logos, understood as the Grund that gathers together the elements of
the hidden harmony. The identity between logos and Being is said to derive
from Fragment 50: "Listening not to me, but to logos, it is wise to agree t h a t
all is one." Here, Heidegger comments, "Heraclitus says that Being is Aoyos-,
and he says it while saying at the same time what Aoyos- is, i.e., the Ev a n d
as such it is also at the same time -udvTa. Aoyos* hides all as being, so that in
this concealing it lets the being be only as being. This concealing is t h e
original re-joining. This is that uplifting concealing that hides all in the aut-
aut of unveiling and concealing." 71 But disclosing and concealing are co-
ordinated, not so much by excluding each other in the aut-aut, as b y
harmonizing disjunctively in a sort of et-et. The same mechanism r e l a t e s
logos and nous, which are mutually responsive also in Parmenides, for
whom yoeiv, that is, the perception of the One and of all, is accompanied b y
Aeyeiy.
Therefore, having established the correspondence between logos a n d
nous, we may arrive (always passing by way of Parmenides; thinking a n d
Being are the same thing) at the union of logos and Being. Also the concept
or word of aletheia, meaning the disclosing of the foundation, the
fluidification of substance and the genesis of reason, enters into this
relation. In the concept of truth as aletheia all the peculiar traits of Being
are concentrated; Being discloses itself in the aggregate gathered by logos.
Logos then names the truth of Being.
With regard to our problem, i.e., the search for the foundation and t h e
formation of the principle of reason, the comparison (which I would like to
call harmonious) between foundation and fire-logos is decisive, because it
enables us to make the equation, which will prove to have many i m p o r t a n t
consequences, between foundation-reason and Being. Our investigation
concerning logos has thus shed light on the fact that Being and t h e
foundation-reason belong to the same basic field of discourse. By means of
logos we have come out into the clearing where the truth of Being shines

70 HGA 15, pp. 181-182. Cf. also E. Fink, Zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von Raum,
Zeit, Bewegung, Nijhoff, Den Haag 1957. The works by H. Boeder, Grund und
Gegenwart als Frageziel der frühgriechischen Philosophie, Nijhoff, Den Haag 1962,
and K. Held, Heraklit, Parmenides und der Anfang von Philosophie und Wissenschaft,
de Gruyter, Berlin 1981, are inspired by Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus and
the Pre-Socratics.
71
HGA 55, p. 379.
32 The Foundation

(or at least is not totally obscured): "Being and Grund belong to each o t h e r
in logos. Logos names this co-belonging of Being and Grund"12 It is from
this intersection that the path for the foundation sets forth.

72
SG, p. 179. For the concept of aletheia, see the entire course of 1942-43 on
Parmenides, in HGA 54.
 3.
"ERÖRTERUNG" OF THE FOUNDATION:
THE PLACE, THE END

"The Erörterung of the principle of reason seeks out a p a n o r a m i c

view about what in the principle is said, without being e x p r e s s e d ,
regarding Being." 71 The search for the unexpressed requires a field of
reflection which can question all of metaphysics and, above all, can
cause to emerge the problem that, in terms of simplicity,
fundamentalness, and obviousness takes its place beside that of t h e
principle of reason: i.e., the question of Being. Even if one must not
forget that this is the absolutely typical Heideggerian problem, s o m e
aspects of it can be found in the investigation about the foundation. It is
no accident that Heidegger always repeats: "Sein and Grund: the s a m e
thing."
In preparing to grasp the "true nature" of the principle, we should
orient our thought towards a given place and set out on a certain p a t h .
This hermeneutic movement is Erörterung. With this particular form of
understanding, which is both dynamic and descriptive, and is s i t u a t e d
on the very same terrain as the thing itself, and proceeds with it, w e
shall manage to illuminate the primeval and hidden area of t h e
principle: the Ort, the situs that defies any quantitative and geometrical
specification because it is not a place in the ordinary sense, as it is not
spatial and historical. The place of the principle of reason is the original
provenance (Herkunft) of its saying, hence "the path [Weg] that m u s t
lead to this place [Ort] and that must allow a preliminary exploration of
it: this path we call the Erörterung of the principle of reason." 74
We must therefore set out to question the history of philosophy, in
order to understand the mystery hidden in this basic proposition. But in
this perspective we must immediately reject the common and traditional
solutions. For example, we must ask ourselves: is it true that t h e
principle of reason is a proposition, as we have just said? Or is it not
rather to be compared to an action that happens in the realm of beings
and that makes possible the event of the Geviert, the Fourfold which
encloses the cosmological riddles of the world? We must certainly
proceed in this latter sense: we must first of all develop a dialogue t h a t
can prepare a new beginning of thought, thanks to which one can g r a s p
that which the principle of reason speaks of, thus grasping the "very
thing" of thinking: "if we try to erörtern (discuss, but not only that) t h e

73
Ibid., p. 83.
14
Ibid., p. 106.
34 The Foundation

principle of reason, this attempt, like every other, is possible only as a

dialogue within and with the tradition." This tradition is not dead a n d
inert, nor exhausted and made obsolete, as happens in Hegel, by t h e
dialectical advent of absolute spirit, 75 but is always "present, p r o v i d e d
we go and seek the handed-down thoughts in the place from which t h e y
take us farthest beyond ourselves and at the same time integrate us
properly into the tradition. This is the one and only reason why w e
follow the circular routes of the paths that revolve around the principle
of reason." 76
But in this case we do not only reach the place where the principle
speaks of the foundation as Being, but we reach the place where Being
itself speaks in the principle of reason. This should be the final aim of
the Erörterung of the principle and, apparently, of any philosophical
investigation: namely, to see how and in what guise Being manifests
itself in thought and in the various moments which link thought a n d
Being. The question is, therefore, to discover in what way the principle is
an expression of Being, or, as Heidegger says, a "speaking [Sage] of
Being." In what way is the ratio evoked by the principle both Grund a n d
Reason? Thus, in what way do "Grund and Reason [Vernunft] (ratio) on
the one hand and Being on the other belong to each other?" 77
All Leibniz's thought revolves around the phenomenon of the Grund,
and hence Heidegger's Erörterung of this phenomenon discloses a n d
manifests the overall interpretative dimension. The Erörterung of t h e
Grund is presented as a key, or rather as a path by which to pass
beyond the modern philosophy of subjectivity and traditional
metaphysics. But we must add that this "passing beyond" is at the s a m e
time a new beginning and an act of resignation-acceptance-exploration
of metaphysics. With this double juncture the dynamics of t h e
Erörterung leads us from the foundation to metaphysics and from
metaphysics back to the foundation: but in this journey we have both
lost and discovered something. We have left aside the objectivist method
typical of much modern philosophy (Husserl, despite Heidegger's
criticisms of him, seems to be outside this line of thought: Heidegger
seems to keep him apart, never accusing him of objectivism), in order to
find the track of another beginning. We might say that the essence of
the foundation hurls us into the core of metaphysics; but another leap
follows it, taking us back from metaphysics to the Grund of the essence

?ii
With regard to Heidegger's interpretation of Hegel, see HGA 28, and especially
HGA 32. Other important essays are: Hegel und die Griechen, in HGA 9, pp. 427-444,
and Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung, in HGA 5, pp. 115-208. See too the important
essay by H. G. Gadamer, Hegel und Heidegger, in Hegels Dialektik, Mohr, Tübingen
1971, pp. 83-98.
76
SG, p. 83.
11 ii. : 1 .. nc
 "Erörterung" of the Foundation 35

of thought. We go from the foundation of metaphysics to the ground of

the essence of what is to be thought.
The Erörterung is therefore not simply an analysis or a discussion of
a problem or a concept; already in his commentary on Trakl, Heidegger
put forward his original hypothesis: the Erörterung, he said, "considers
the Ort: the place." To consider the Ort, i.e., erörtern, means "first of all:
to point out the place. And then it means: to observe the place. Both
things: to point out the place and to observe the place are t h e
preliminarily necessary steps for an Erörterung." This Erörterung
accompanies us in our philosophical explorations, leading us to the point
where we see the shining of the original place both of the reflections
analyzed on various occasions and of thought in general. Hence, "the
outcome of this Erörterung is, as is fitting for the progress of thought, a
question. This question asks where that place is located." The Erörterung
shows and simultaneously winks; it says and alludes, but above all it lets
us see and hear. It lets us see the place from which thought speaks a n d
lets us hear what thought says. It is not, however, like seeing a n d
hearing with our senses: the place and the saying are manifested in t h e
metaphorical equilibrium of thought. Keeping the double profile, "the
Erörterung that thought is undertaking can at most make listening a
problem and render it, in the best of cases, more thoughtful." It is as if
we were to find ourselves walking down a path: the place it will lead us
to will be disclosed in the metaphorical combination of sight a n d
hearing.
The procedure of the Erörterung (yet the word "procedure" s e e m s
inadequate to express the meaning of walking down a path t o w a r d s
something, which is the idea of Erörterung) provides us with a n e w
image of the Grund, one that is different from the image we started w i t h
and yet always the same. It almost seems as though the s a m e
phenomenon has been modified after having been thought in t w o
opposing ways, even though in this transformation the result of an
objectivating theoretical process is not seen. For Heidegger the
Erörterung must be opposed precisely to the transfiguring activity of a
constituent scientific subject in Kant's sense or a cogitating subject in
Descartes' sense. Moreover, it must be opposed to any activity of a n y
subject as traditionally understood. But can the subject be different from
how it is traditionally conceived? An answer in the affermative, precise
and unhesitant, comes for example from Husserl, who is certainly
considered by Heidegger to be the apex of the philosophy of subjectivity,
but also undeniably the creator of an image of the subject that is
integrated into a dimension it shares with the object. Husserl certainly
refined Kant's transcendentalism (suffice it to think of the very original
concept of "categorial intuition"), but he also exposed the subject to t h e
"enigma of the paradox," making the transcendental persistence of t h e
36 The Foundation

ego problematical, as this ego is constantly forced to question itself

about its dependence on the Lebenswelt.1*
Heidegger certainly started from this "knot" of Husserl's to lay out his
destruction of metaphysics, in order to take philosophy to its end and,
therefore, to organize in thinking the advent of another beginning of
thought. To rewrite subjectivity also means to prepare another "who" of
the meditative exercise and, finally, to find oneself facing a new way of
thinking. The Erörterung would help us to verily this hypothesis,
allowing us to focus our attention on the thing itself, i.e., on Being a n d
hence on the foundation. In this decline and radicalization of
phenomenology, Husserl's expression "zur Sache selbst" becomes "zur
Sache des Denkens"; things themselves become the thing to be thought.
The meaning of the "turning" could not be clearer. On the plane of
Heidegger's aggression of Leibniz's basic concepts (Grund-Begriffe), we
see a turning-point within the notion of Grund. On going towards t h e
thing itself (in our case towards the foundation) the phenomenon is
transformed. In Husserl phenomena in general lose their patina of
psychologism, of pure conceptuality and also of fallacious empiricism, in
order to reveal themselves in their immediate manifestness. In
Heidegger phenomena lose all reference to beings and are i n t e r w o v e n
with Being. As applied to the principle of reason, this transformation
introduces a novel way of understanding the foundation, which is
translated into the equation of Sein and Grund. But Heidegger goes e v e n
further: he not only equates Being and the foundation, but in r e t h i n k i n g
the latter he leads it back to its original form, which is not t h e
predictable Ur-grund, or primeval Grund, but Ab-grund, absence of
Grund, a breaking through the foundation, an abyss. To reach the thing
itself we have to follow a winding path, which is not easy to do. That is,
we have to put ourselves in the condition of seeing the principle of
reason in its being (Sein-Grund) and travel back to the place (this is t h e
Erörterung) where Being (Grund) speaks and is found in its authentic
and original form: the place where the Grund is finally revealed as Ab-
grund, the extreme absence of foundation-reason.
Sein and Grund: the same thing. Then the foundation will become
Abgrund, which is the same as thinking, in the sense that it is t h e
essential being of Being (das Wesen des Seins), and is commingled with
thought, which is the same thing (das Selbe) as Being. To clarify t h e
problem of the "thing itself" in Leibniz we do not have any expressions

78
See especially the last work by E. Husserl, Die Krisis der Europäischen
Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie, ed. by W. B i e m e l ,
Husserliana vol. VI, Nijhoff, Den Haag 1954. For the concept of categorial i n t u i t i o n ,
see E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, 2 Vols., Niemeyer, Halle 1901-02
(Research VI, Chapter VI). The concept of the paradox of subjectivity and of
epoche has been dealt with systematically by Husserl in a group of u n p u b l i s h e d
 "Erörterung" of the Foundation 37

that enable us to make a direct parallel: for Leibniz the thing itself is
substance. This is certainly an object of analysis and deeper
investigation, but it does not conceal within itself any essence other t h a n
its definition. To determine the substance (for which Leibniz coined t h e
original term Selbstand), for Leibniz means to penetrate into the "ground
of things." The thing itself or essence, which for Husserl was a point of
arrival, albeit never fixed once and for all, and which for Heidegger is a
signal along the path that leads to Being, for Leibniz is the starting point
of metaphysics. Whereas he at once establishes the basic concept of logic
and ontology, Heidegger slides towards an absent foundation, which
cannot manifest itself to the scrutiny of metaphysics because it is
metaphysics that hides it from view; it can only come out into the light
beyond metaphysics, in coincidence with meditating thought. For Leibniz
substance is the foundation of thought; for Heidegger Being is thinking of
the foundation.
We may say that, if in Leibniz the principle of reason is the horizon
in which thought and Being start to move and within which they m u s t
remain, with Heidegger there is a radical inversion, since the co-
originality of thought and Being is the locus from which the principle of
reason or the foundation arises and in which it is resolved. This
withdrawal of the Grund, together with the fact that Being does not
manifest itself, is made clear by the Erörterung, which comes to b e
increasingly seen as a dynamism rather than as an act of "grasping,"
more like an energy that liberates the thing in its being than like t h e
fixing of a concept. Over this dynamic image, we can graft the
development of the problem of the principle of reason within
Heidegger's idea of the history of metaphysics. The Erörterung leads us
back to the path which we take to reach the thing we are to think. It is
itself the path we have to travel down. The goal is the abyssal
foundation-reason that gathers together Being and thought. But to
approach the essence of thought we first have to arrive at the end of
traditional philosophy. With this act of meditating disposition, we call
into play the entire spectrum of Heidegger's thought. With regard to
Leibniz, this attitude marks a distance that it is not easy to bridge: it is
the very epoch of Being that takes on different, and almost opposite,
characteristics in the two thinkers. While Leibniz, for the first time in
the history of philosophy, gathers up the previous results and r e s h a p e s
them in a personal form, to start the modern phase of m e t a p h y s i c s ,
Heidegger thinks and, by thinking, prepares the end of metaphysics, as
another beginning of thought. Here we need to pin down the relation
between the principle of reason, the end of philosophy, and t h e
beginning of thought.
Heidegger states very frankly: "Philosophy ends in the present age. 11
has found its place in the scientific nature of man's social action." To
38 The Foundation

speak of the end of philosophy does not mean, however, to draw up its
death certificate; philosophy ends in fulfilling itself in metaphysics, e v e n
though in this fulfilling itself it reaches no completeness in the sense of
perfection. The end of philosophy is made manifest as the conclusion of
an Erörterung: if "the ancient meaning of our word Ende [end] is t h e
same as that of the word Ort [place]," the path that leads down t h e
Erörterung to the Ort is a path that ends up in an Ende, i.e., an end.
Therefore "the end of philosophy is that 'place' in which the totality of
its history is gathered together in its last possibility. The end as
fulfillment means this gathering together." 7 9 Thus the word "end" does
not mean cessation, nor is it "something lacking or uncertain"; it "says
the equivalent of place [sagt so viel als Ort]."*l)
But this place is not given to a direct and unambiguous vision: "the
end of philosophy is twofold. On the one hand, it means the fulfillment
of a thought, philosophical thought, to which whatever is present shows
itself in the nature of employability [Bestellbarkeit]. On the other hand,
it is just this form of presence that contains a reference back to t h e
power of putting [Stellen], in the sense of the provocation that, in o r d e r
to be able to be determined, requires another thought, for which t h e
presence as such becomes worthy of being interrogated. For it still
brings with it something that is unthought, something whose peculiarity
escapes philosophical thought." 8 1 Reflection on the end of philosophy
includes research regarding what philosophy has neglected and not-
thought. This "unthought something" is, properly speaking, the Ort
where the path that leads to the Abgrund ends. This place, which holds
both the extreme possibilities and the non-thought matter of philosophy,
is ambiguous, as foreign to the conceptual tradition of metaphysics as
metaphysics is to the word Lichtung. Such ambiguity absorbs also t h e
problem of the foundation, since it deprives it of its metaphysical roots
and plants it in the terrain of thought, located in the opening of t h e
Lichtung, which is both the end and another beginning.
The end of philosophy both hides and reveals the essence of
philosophy, that is "it hides another beginning of thought." Ende is
equivalent to Or/, end and place are the same thing: "by end [Ende] w e
mean [...] the place [Ort] where something is gathered in its e x t r e m e
possibility, and in which it completely terminates [vollendet]."*2 We
could thus advance the hypothesis that the Er-orterung is like a
harvesting, a concentration of the essence of what must be thought,
bringing it to a fin-ish in its most appropriate possibilities: de-fining it.
If the ultimate (and original) sense of the word Ende (end) is identical to

V)
ZSD, p.63.
80
FB, p. 7
81
Ibid., p. 15.
82
Ibid., p. 6.
 "Erörterung" of the Foundation 39

that of Ort (place), we could solve the problem of the meaning and t h e
translation of the term Erörterung by trying to use the word de-finition.
The path of Erörterung takes shape as the way of de-finition, not in
the rather limited and precise sense of Bestimmung, i.e., a logical a n d
conceptual determination, but rather in the sense of a topological
approximation that locates the place/end of philosophy. Erörterung is
thus the same as de-finition. This identity, together with the
Heideggerian analysis that inspires it, aims to put the Ort of philosophy
in the very point where it ends as a metaphysical tradition; that is, it
aims to reduce the power of modern metaphysics by restricting its
technical extension. There is no doubt that the de-finition of t h e
principle of reason aims to compress its calculating power, ratio, in o r d e r
to exalt its meditating tone, which is also present in reflection about t h e
Grund.
It therefore seems obvious that here Heidegger wants to attack
Leibniz; but if we take Erörterung in the sense of de-finition, he s e e m s
almost to be quoting Leibniz, as when he says in an etymological
passage: "one says place [Ort] and end [Ende], one says er-örtern, but few
people know the reason for this; however, we can understand it b y
reference to the language of mining people, for whom the place is t h e
same as the end [Ort so viel als Ende], [...] one says, for example: this
miner works in front of the place [Ort], that is, where he stops work;
therefore erörtern is nothing but ending [endigen] (definire)."^ For
Leibniz erörtern corresponds to the Latin definire', place and end a r e
coupled as along Heidegger's path: "Orth is a term of the ancient
Germans and of today's miners. In front of the place [Vor dem Orth]
means: where the tunnel ends. Hence erörtern, place and end [orth und
ende]."*4 The analogy between Leibniz's proposed etymology and
Heidegger's is surprising, not so much in view of the linguistic result, as
in the theoretical outcome that derives from it. The de-finition leads us
to the place where the thing has reached its fulfillment. This shows how
the path of the foundation, the path of reason, has led us to the place
where reason is fulfilled, where it is finished, giving rise to a different
type of reason. The path and reason have merged in the initial
profundities of the thought of Being, of meditation within the Lichtung
of Being.
By indicating the unthought-of side of metaphysics, the de-finition
also reveals the principle of reason in its most open form. In Leibniz's
version, viz., in the abbreviated form, the principle sounds like this: nihil

s* G.W. Leibniz, Unvorgreijliche Gedanken, betreffend die Ausübung und

Verbesserung der deutschen Sprache, in DS I, § 54, p. 37.
S4
G W . Leibniz, Collectanea Etymologica, m Dutens VI, part II, p. 178. See also t h e
passage on p. 163: Metallariis nostris hodieque Orth est terminus. Vor dem Orth
arbeiten significat in loco, ubi cavitas in terrae viscera acta definit."
40 The Foundation

est sine ratione. Heidegger points out that here the accent falls on t h e
words nihil and sine, giving the proposition a meaning of ontological
exclusiveness: nothing without Grund. The verb "is" seems to disappear,
or to be present only as an auxiliary. Instead, according to Heidegger, it
is just this little word that attention should be paid to, because it
represents the linguistic manifestation of Being, the signal that indicates
Being in its concreteness. To lay stress on nihil and sine also means to
put the force and necessity of the principle in the word reddere, to give
back or restore. This means to give the logical interpretation priority
over the ontic one. Reddere rationem is to evaluate and calculate t h e
possibility that a being is able to adduce the reasons for its subsistence
or existence. But if we now try to conceive the structure of the principle
on the basis of another expressive tonality, by laying stress on the t e r m s
est and ratione, the principle speaks to us of something completely
different. Heidegger suggests this second tonality in order to free t h e
principle of the claim and grip of metaphysics and technology-science,
which would like to use it for their processes of objectivation and t h e
stripping away of factuality, which is reduced to mere calculation,
formula, object. Now instead the principle says: est -ratione, (Being) is
Grund/Ab-grund. Nothing more and nothing less: almost a tautology.
More precisely, he states that "Grund belongs to Being." On this n e w
reading, the principle speaks of its most authentic task, which is that of
letting Being speak in the Grund, videlicet in the metaphysics of t h e
foundation and in the modern theory of knowledge. Now the Satz vom
Grund is revealed as being the Satz vom Sein. Consequently, having d e -
fined the principle of this concord with Being, "we move in the sphere of
what, with a generic term, we may call the 'problem of Being'." Being
enters the scene; Heidegger takes the hermeneutic situation in hand,
with all the energy and with all the straining of the text's meaning he is
capable of unleashing. But the foundation does not disappear: "from its
co-belonging to Being as such, the Grund receives its essence. Grund a n d
Being ('are') the same [das Selbe], not equal things [das Gleiche]."*5
The phrase does not vanish, but now it has a different structure from
the one established by Leibniz and traditionally repeated, and e v e n
deformed, by the development of science. But "is it rational to deal with
reason and its principle?" Derrida has wondered in this connection. 8 6 I n
other words: is it rational to define Grund and the principle that w a n t s
to find it in the entity, providing the latter with its reason for existence?
We agree with Derrida: "simply no." But, he adds, "it would be too
precipitous to exclude this relation, and to attribute obscurantism and
nihilism to their irrationalism. Who is more faithful to the call of reason,
who hears it with a more acute ear, who better sees the difference: one

85
SG, pp. 92-93.
86
Cf. J Derrida, The Principle of Reason, in "Diacritics," Ithaca 1983, pp. 3-20.
 "Erörterung" of the Foundation 41

who proposes questions as an answer and tries to delve down to t h e

bottom of the possibility of that call, or he who does not want to h e a r
any question regarding the reason of reason? All this ends up, along t h e
path of Heidegger's question, in an indefinable difference of tone a n d
tension, in conformity with the particular discourse highlighted in t h e
formula nihil est sine rationed1
We must therefore treat of the principle, but we can only do so after
we have transformed the previous tonality. Before, the dominant k e y
was: Grund as reddere rationem of entities, while now it runs: Grund as
letting Being manifest itself. Here the choice of the musical m e t a p h o r
"dominant key" has not been made at random, because it is in h a r m o n y
with a precise reference made by Heidegger, who justifies and reinforces
the use of words such as key, assonance, consonance, intonation, ear (in
the musical sense). The principle (Satz) must lose its meaning as
utterance and proposition, and take the shape of a Satz, in the musical
sense: at that point we will have understood the true relation obtaining
between us and the principle of reason. In the word Satz, the meaning of
musical tempo, which is given to it even in ordinary language, m u s t
emerge. In musical composition, the Sätze are, for example, t h e
movements of a symphony, what expresses the intimate c o n n e c t e d n e s s
of a score, the essence of musical language. But up to this point we still
remain within a structure, be it logical or emotional. The Satz as
principle or as musical tempo is not a decisive question for its
transformation. Heidegger therefore proposes to turn upside down t h e
opinion that the musical rhythm is conducted, kept up, and i n t e r p r e t e d
by an orchestral conductor or a musician. On the basis of a passage b y
Bettina von Arnim, he suggests thinking of the rhythm as a guide for t h e
musician. Von Arnim writes, "The rhythm leads the musician; t h e
rhythm so disposes itself and develops, so tightly concentrates itself t h a t
the spirit is completely resigned to it." 88
Heidegger takes care in choosing the references that evoke, also from
a linguistic point of view, the profiles of his main problems. To resign
oneself to the rhythm, to resign oneself to the Satz, is an echo of t h e
resignation, the Verwindung, with which he recommends looking at
metaphysics. To resign oneself to the Satz as the rhythm of Grund m e a n s
to dwell in the harmony between Grund and Being, once again letting
that harmony speak. As happens a propos of language (it is language
that speaks, not ourselves; we are "spoken" by language), so too w i t h
regard to the principle of reason: it is not we ourselves who express a n
utterance about Being, in speaking of it; rather, it is Being, as Grund/Ab-
grund, that speaks and that, in speaking, originally names, in the Sage,
Being. In this relation, we come in as ones "spoken" by Being; that is, it is

87
//>/</., p. 9.
88
Cit. in SG, p. 151
42 The Foundation

not we who construct and hold up Being, providing it with a sufficient

reason, but it is we who are held up and supported by the abyss of
Being. Grund and Being: the same thing. The dominant key of t h e
principle is now Being, which announces itself through the abyssal
foundation. The Weg zum Grund, viz., the path to the foundation, m u s t
wend its way upwards until it reaches a paradoxical altitude, until it
becomes Weg zum Abgrund, the path to the abyss.
 4.
THE PATH: FROM THE FOUNDATION TO THE ABYSS

To proceed along this path, first of all we have to identify the way in
which we should set about the task of thinking; then we shall have to focus
our gaze on the play of darkness and light in which the principle can show
itself in its authentic essence. The way to understand the principle consists
in abandoning the logical and grammatical operativity of the principle
itself. According to Leibniz, a proposition is true if the predicate belongs to
the subject. Praedicatum inest subjecto: i.e., nihil est sine ratione. This
twofold theorem of Leibniz's has determined the forms and d e v e l o p m e n t s
of all modern scientific thought; but in Heidegger's opinion, this influence is
nothing but proof of the greatness and functional power of the principle,
which still remains unexplored in its ontological content.
Heidegger's reformulation of the twofold theorem could sound more or
less like this: predicate and subject co-belong to each other; hence Being
itself is ratio, Grund. The co-belonging of subject and object, the s a m e n e s s
of Being and Grund force upon us a sharp change of direction in t h e
logicistic orientation of thought: to define this new approach, Heidegger
creates the expression "meditating" or "remembering thought," besinnendes
or andenkendes Denken. Freed from the bonds and constrictions of
tradition, reflection is now opposed to the classifying and objectivizing
process of the form of thought that, by antithesis, is called "calculating
thought." This new theoretical outcome claims to respond to the call of
Being without appropriating it for itself or making it subservient. The call
sounds like this: "to think Being as Being"; that is, "to explain Being w i t h o u t
having recourse anymore to any actual essent."
One can therefore reflect about the principle of reason only after h a v i n g
answered the question: what does it mean to think? In Heidegger's
dimension, the concept of thought is removed from the basic, c e n t u r i e s - o l d
uniformity that has always viewed it as being linked to theory, to t h e
assurance of a stable, observable and determinable objectivity. As Gadamer
points out, ever since the 1920s Heidegger's teaching has unveiled a
mystification inherent in the notion of thought: "We had learned," G a d a m e r
writes, "that to think means to put things in relation: it truly seemed r i g h t
that by thinking one put one thing in a certain relation and, with regard to
this relation, one expressed an utterance, called a judgment. Thus t h o u g h t
seemed to proceed from relation to relation, from judgment to j u d g m e n t .
44 The Foundation

Now, however, we were experiencing something else: to think means to

show and to lead-something-to-show-itself." 89 To think, therefore, does not
mean to fix something conceptually, to guarantee the primacy of t h e o r y
qua vision, but it becomes a sort of play between the temporality a n d
spatiality of Being, in which the thinking subject is incessantly referring to
Being and does not dominate it.
Deprived of its constitutive presupposition, the sub-jectum, thought
finds itself at a crossroads: on the one hand, the method of objectivation,
which makes possible quite appreciable results from the scientific
standpoint and as regards beings; on the other, the attempt to let Being
itself come to thought, without any outcome in terms of empirical or
rational verifiability. In lieu of a thought that starts from itself and reaches
its certainty by means of controlling its object, Heidegger seems to p u t
forward a concept of thought that starts from its co-belonging with Being
and merely leads to a tautology: thought thinks the Being which is, viz.: to
think Being as Being. It is a thought that starts from logos, the union of
nous and physis, to return to its own foundation: a thought that thinks only
its own Grund (which is Being, i.e., the abyss and the same thing as
thought). It is a kind of thought that rejects the unilateral priority of
theory, of theorein and hence of seeing, and is characterized rather as
hearing and looking together.
We should not, however, insist on a radical polarization between
"listening" and "seeing," although our aim of contesting the u n q u e s t i o n e d
monotony of tradition would naturally cause us to give priority to listening.
In short, we must not define the difference between listening and seeing in
so clear-cut a way as to cause a definite break between them, a point of no
return which would impoverish rather than augment the reach of thinking.
Heidegger seems to warn us not to fall into the opposite excess, which is
once again a victim of modern metaphysics. To escape the control of
metaphysics, we must therefore recognize a role for what Jonas has called
"the nobility of vision," or even for that essential "glance" that Husseii's
phenomenology has taught us. 9 0 It is just a question of defining and
calibrating the scope of its role. There is an urgent need to think the two
metaphorical forms together: "it is just the hidden unity between grasping
with a glance [Er-blicken] and grasping with the hearing [Er-hören] t h a t
determines the essence of thought." 91 Thought is a listening and a seeing at
the same time, not in the usual sense of synaesthesia, i.e., an association of

89
H. G. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, Mohr, Tübingen 1983, p. 55.
90
Cf. H. Jonas, The Nobility of Sight, in "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,"
1954, pp. 507-519.
91
SG, p. 118.
 The Path: From the Foundation to the Abyss 45

two sensitive perceptive channels, but as the metaphorical radicalization of

two receptive organs. It is not by means of the eye and the ear that we a r e
able to er-hlicken and er-hören: the medium is something like Bergson's
mental ear, devoid of any reflexive processuality inherent in self-
consciousness. Though he uses two concepts linked to the interior being of
the subject, Heidegger leads them out into the exterior world of
transcendence. As the universe of thought in which they are inserted h a s
been changed, these metaphors are completely transformed. If in t h e
tradition that goes from Descartes to Husserl sight and hearing are,
according to Heidegger, characterized with an original expression as
Reszendenz. (rescendence), in meditating thought they are seen as
Transzendenz (transcendence). Their combination opens up a field in which
Dasein (being-there), dwelling in the convergence where Being shows itself
and speaks, can transcend itself and lose itself in the Open and in t h e
Lichtung.
The path that leads to the essence of the principle of reason is the s a m e
as the one that leads to the essence of thinking. But on this way we do not
find any certain and solid foundation; the Grund gapes open wide, causing
us to fall headlong or leading us to a crossroads: "ratio as reason [Vernunft]
and ratio as foundation [Grund]." The fork in the way allows us to e s c a p e
the univocal grip of a thought that winds along as the grasping of vision,
determination, possession: in this ambiguous perspective the principle of
reason does not speak only of ratio as calculation, but also makes appeal to
ratio as foundation, Grund, Being. Should we not therefore ask ourselves:
why does something exist rather than nothing? Or rather: Why are ratio,
that is Grund, and Sein the same? This is the question that the principle
should answer. Thus directed, the principle becomes subservient to t h e
needs of meditating thought, opening up a route that goes from rational
limpidity and logical clarity towards the reason of Being, badly i l l u m i n a t e d
and quite well concealed. The productivity of the crossroads b e t w e e n
reason and foundation is affirmed also on the linguistic plane. The
crossroads is the Zwiesel: the fork in the way "that we often find among t h e
ancient firs, straight and tall, in the Black Forest." The image of the t w o -
trunked tree is significant: the identity between ratio and foundation/Being
is kept in the trunk of thought, but also their internal difference is found in
it; ratio is foundation and reason. The Zwiesel conserves the sense of
identity between Sein and Grund: they are das Selbe, the same, but not
equal. They are entwined in an indissoluble co-belonging, but c a n n o t
replace each other, as if they were a single thing. In the Zwiesel g r e a t e r
importance is given to the possibility of interpreting the principle of r e a s o n
according to the ontological modulations of a thought that constantly
46 The Foundation

remembers (An-denken) its own identity/difference with Being, i.e., with

the Grund/Ab-grund.
But we also need to clarify the role and meaning of the word Ab-grund.
The Abgrund is the precipice, the chasm, the abyss. What importance can it
have in an investigation into the Grund, which is the foundation, t h e
ground, the concrete thing? Once again the answer may come to us only
from the sense of Being: it is Being that has the task of offering and at t h e
same time taking away the solid ground for the formation of any
transcendent objectivity, of any phenomenon. With relation to the research
into the principle of reason, we must consequently direct our attention to
the manifestation of Being within the principle. In fact, to grasp its essence,
we must interpret it as the principle of Being. We should not dwell so much
on its relation with beings (cause and effect, the reason for a given thing,
the origin of an object) as on experiencing its basic scope within t h e
springing up of Being: here the recognition of the ontological difference
almost functions as a guarantee of the urgency of displacing the principle
onto the plane of Being. If then we co-ordinate the fact of starting down
new paths within the labyrinth of the principle, leaving aside the usual
ways of causalism, to face a new and radically different structure of
thought from that of the tradition, Being will break into the Grund like t h e
breaking down of any representation. If we then modify the gnoseological
and objectifying tonality of thought to bring to light meditating thought, w e
shall approach the luminous opening which is Lichtung, Offenheit, but also
Zwiesel, in which the Grund is con-fused with Being. Then the Ab-grund,
the lack of foundation, is no longer only something negative, privation,
determined negation, but becomes reinforcement, reduplication of t h e
ground, Boden, soil, ground of Being: abyssal foundation.
The difference with respect to Leibniz's reflection seems to become
considerable. Leibniz looks for the reason on which all things (all beings)
depend, the universal reason that determines every least detail. From this
point of view, it is necessary for ratio to be able to be found "in aliquo Ente
Reali" Its power proceeds mightily forward: the principle that accounts for
things also indicates their foundation. Leibniz defines as entia w h a t
Heidegger calls Being; therefore the expression "reason for things" must be
understood in Heidegger's sense as "reason for Being." But this formulation
is contradictory within Heidegger's system of reference, because one can
give no reason for Being; one can only understand the oscillation b e t w e e n
latency and unveiling, nothing more. To suggest a reason for Being would
mean, for Heidegger, to arouse a scandal of reason, an unjustified and
mystifying will to cover Being by depriving it of its essence. It would, in
fact, be senseless to seek the ratio of Being and consequently it is
 The Path: From the Foundation to the Abyss 47

misleading to reduce Being, as Leibniz does, to a foundation understood as

a being, even though it be the supreme being. Hence to affirm that "est
scilicet Ens lllud ultima ratio Rerum, et uno vocabulo solet appellari
DEUS"?2 would mean to claim to find the "primal Grund for Being, in a
being." 9 3 Instead, Being has no Grund; Being is Grund and remains w i t h o u t
any ulterior foundation: "Being 'is' the Ab-grund inasmuch as Being a n d
Grund are the same. For Being 'is' to found [gründen], and only for this
reason Being has no other Grund. [...] The Grund, as that which first of all
should found Being, remains far away and without any contact w i t h
Being." 94 To think of Being as the abyss does not mean to reject the a b o v e
equation (i.e., Being=foundation), since in this second version we do nothing
but highlight the "otherness" in the principle of reason and the "otherness"
in Being.
Thought must therefore not be afraid when faced with the Ab-grund: a
horror of the abyss is only a false presupposition of calculating thought,
namely an exorcism to ward off the risk of weakening objectivation. T e r r o r
of the abyss resembles the horror vacul: a vacuum arouses fear in u s
because we cannot perform the normal operations of our d e t e r m i n i n g
categories. The chasm upsets us because it shows us, inexorably, t h e
possibility of endlessly sinking further down. To be sure, also Leibniz's
thought is aware of the mysterious presence, the incomparable anguish
that comes over us when we come face to face with the lack of a n y
consolidated and substantial foundation, but it takes shelter in the s t a b l e
definition of substance via the principle of the foundation: there must be a
reason/foundation for everything that exists. But, Heidegger objects, in this
way we are still on the plane of the essent, of that objectivity that can h a v e
a foundation: we need only to recognize that its foundation is not in its t u r n
a being, but Being and, in fine, accept the fact that Being has no f u r t h e r
foundation. The refusal to recognize this ontological truth is an
unmistakeable trait of traditional thought, within whose confines also
Leibniz's philosophy was developed.
Being is therefore foundation, but in its essential form it is by now only
abyss. There is no contradiction, because the essence of Being, i.e., Grund, is
not in its turn a Grund, but something like an abyssal intensification. Being
cannot be founded: "the Grund remains far from Being. The Grund r e m a i n s
detached from Being. In the sense of this remaining-detached of Grund
from Being, Being 'is' the Ab-grund. Inasmuch as Being as such is in itself

1)2
GPh VII, p. 289.
lH
SG, p. 205.
94
Ibid., p. 185. On Being as foundation and abyss, see also HGA 51, pp. 62ff.
48 The Foundation

founding, it remains devoid of foundation [grundlos]. 'Being' does not fall

into the domain of the principle of reason; only beings do." 95
But if Being does not fall into the domain of the principium, why did
Heidegger posit as an indispensable condition for understanding this
principle, and hence metaphysics itself, the discovery of Being in t h e
principle? The solution lies in the variation of tonality of the principle, a
change that goes through four stages: (1) in Leibniz's formulation, t h e
principle is a principle of beings; (2) Heidegger's change of p e r s p e c t i v e
makes Being speak in the principle; (3) Being, however, cannot manifest
itself through a pure principle; (4) hence also the essence of the principle
must be transformed. The principle of reason can speak of Being only after
a change of tone: at that point the principle will be Being itself and will
utter the foundation, speaking now exclusively of the abyss.
Being is both that which is closest to man and that which is farthest
away: "Being is that which is most trusted, which never disquiets us with a
doubt [...] and yet Being does not offer us a Grund and a soil like beings, to
which we turn, on which we build and to which we hold fast. Being is t h e
re-nunciation of the role of such founding [gründen], it rejects e v e r y
founded thing, it is abyssal [ab-gründig]."l)6 Here, to the subject of t h e
difference between Being and being, there is the additional problem of
Being as abyss and yet also as foundation. Its character is completely
different from that of any traditional foundation: this refinement of t h e
ontological difference is the path that leads us to the relation of man with
Being. It is in the essence of this relation that the essence of philosophy
and the most hidden ground of metaphysics are manifested. With
Heidegger, the path of the principle takes a detour: "if thought goes d o w n
the path that leads to the Grund, then it will have to fall headlong into t h e
Groundless (Grundlose)."97 Therefore, when we say: Sein and Grund are t h e
same, we must also think: Sein is Ab-grund. These two identities must be
grasped simultaneously, because in order to escape the entifying power of
the principle of reason and to interpret it as a principle that corresponds to
Being, we must think "the consonance of these two 'principles', which a r e
now no longer 'principles.'" 98 But to think the concordance between the two
equations and no longer interpret them as principles means "nothing less"
than to change our way of thinking, seeking out new ways by which to
arrive at the thing to be thought.

"Ibid., p. 93.
96
HGA 48, p. 328.
97
SG, p. 28.
™ Ibid., p. 93.
 The Path: From the Foundation to the Abyss 49

In the case of the principle of reason, we must arrive at a change in

style, which can be done only if "we walk down a path, if we open up a
path that leads to the vicinity of the relation-with-the-thing." We shall
then see that "these paths themselves belong to the r e l a t i o n - t o - t h e - t h i n g .
The closer we come to the thing, the more im-portant the path becomes."
The metaphor of the path makes it possible (and not only apropos of t h e
principle of reason) for the thing itself to come into language.
We may try to interpret these passages: to proceed along a path is not
to follow a method, but to let the path come out into the clearing and, at
the same time, to retread, in rethinking it, a path that thought has a l r e a d y
outlined. In other words: it means to abandon oneself to the "sending"
destiny of Being and, simultaneously, to rethink the way originally t r a c e d
by the philosophical tradition. This meditative and intent disposition
enables us to understand why "the de-finitions of the path are not at all
mere reflections on method; they are not a mere sharpening of a pencil
that is never used to make a drawing. Rather, it is a question of reaching
the zone of that relation-with-the-thing that utters the principle of r e a s o n
as the principle of Being." 99
The pathway of Being therefore leads to a continual retreat and r e t u r n ,
from the foundation to the abyss and from the latter to the pure Open of
Being. The foundation is inserted into an ontological plot that links it to its
negation, to the chasm, in a dynamic harmony between the provision of
solid ground and the lack of any footing at all, between the exposure a n d
the suppression of the ground. Reason is rendered precarious; the
foundation is the abyss to the extent that it is not a conceptual a n d
categorial substratum on which to erect the edifice of metaphysics. I n d e e d ,
it causes every philosophical construction to collapse and fall headlong into
the uncertainty and instability in which Being offers itself by w i t h d r a w i n g
itself. The gleaming of the precipice is therefore the reflection of t h e
earthliness of the foundation: to think reason and causes therefore m e a n s
to immerse oneself in the exploration of the abyss. Consequently, a n y
research concerning logos and reason must call into play an abyssal ground,
where one faces the horror and the fascination of the chasm: "turning itself
to reason, the look falls into the depths of an abyss. [...] We speak of t h e
abyss when, having been separated from a basis of support and having lost
a point of support, we go looking for one on which to rest our feet." 100 The
abyss is the risk that must be run, the danger that can paradoxically s a v e
us.

Ibid., p. 94.
> HGA 12, p. 11.
50 The Foundation

Fink has described the abyss and its mystery precisely in terms of t h e
necessary risk of falling: "the Open of the abyss is the dangerousness t h a t
puts one in danger. The earth that supports, as that which offers t h e
ground, as that which ensures a reliable situation, is the power opposed to
the Open of the abyss. The Open appears in the mode of the abyss. Danger
is the Open of the abyss, into which one may fall." 101 Heidegger, however,
does not seem to fear the chasm overmuch: although we sink into it "we do
not fall into nothingness. We fall into a height, whose altitude opens up a
depth. Both of these constitute the space and the substance of a place in
which we would like to feel at home in order to find a dwelling-place for
the essence of man." 102
Falling into the abyss would thus correspond to dwelling in the most
intimate stratum of Being: to sink down becomes a cosmic game in which
we are both played and players. The thought of the abyss is not a thought
of marginal and unknown obscurity, but rather expresses the opening
inherent in Being in its totality. The abyss therefore becomes t h e
incommensurable ground of Being and the place of the original speaking of
meditative thought, setting itself up as the beginning of thought t h a t
meditates Being. It takes its place in a game of covering over and unveiling
Being; and, as Jean Wahl says, it is "starting from the essence of the g a m e
that we must think Being and the foundation, and Being as non-foundation,
Being as the abyss." 1 0 3 For Wahl, the abyss is a dwelling-place, a s t r a n g e
inhabiting of the most profound folds of existence, a lingering that, from
this perspective, shows the priority of dwelling over even Being: "the ideas
of inhabiting and of world are deeper even than the idea of Being." 104 But
any inhabiting is being-in-the-world, as a projection of Dasein onto t h e
azimuthal plane of Being: therefore the abyss, though it is not a total
dislodging of Dasein, is not pure dwelling without Being, but the locality of
weilen, that sojourning in the "reasonlessness" of Being, in its game "that
is."
The abyss as an original expanse that permits repose and rest in t h e
reasonless game represents the expulsion of causality. This nature of

101
E. Fink, G. Baumann, Seminar. Zu Hölderlins Hymne "Patmos" (1967), unpublished.
I thank Susanne Fink for kindly having allowed me to use and quote from this
unpublished manuscript, preserved in the Fink Archives of Freiburg.
102
HGA 12, p. 11.
m
J. Wahl, Sur des ecrites recents de Heidegger et de Fink, "Revue de metaphysique et
de morale," 63, 1958, p. 480.
104
Ibid., p. 482. Cf. the essay by F.W. von Herrmann, Bewußtsein, Zeit, und
Weltverständnis, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1971, which presents the problem
of the world in a composite perspective composed of reflections by Heidegger,
Husserl, and Fink. Heidegger's 1929-30 course (now in HGA 29-30) is fundamental.
 The Path: From the Foundation to the Abyss 51

beginning had already been expressed by Hölderlin: "Vom Abgrund

nemlich haben/Wir angefangen und gegangen," i.e., from the abyss w e
have begun to proceed, of the abyss we are the continual and continually
broken echo, whose purity is reproduced only in the vicinity of the chasm,
in the proximity of man to the incalculable ground of Being. On the p a t h
that leads to the precipice occurs the slow blooming (slow, but with a leap
as regards the metaphysical will) of thought of the abyss, a thinking
composition of Grund and Ab-grund as a layer on which the logos, qua
harmony between reason and the abyss, develops and grows. Turning o u r
gaze to the chasm, we see the depths of the sky, in a cross-like s t r u c t u r e
where abyssal depth and height, darkening and lightening meet in t h e
ancestral barring of Being: Seyn, abyss and foundation, earth and sky. This
embrace leads us back to the words of Hölderlin in the poem Mnemosyne:
"Denn nicht vermögen/Die Himmlischen alles. Nemlich es reichen/Die
Sterblichen eh' an den Abgrund. Also wendet es sich, das Echo/Mit diesen.
Lang ist/Die Zeit, es ereignet sich aber/Das Wahre."105 Truth manifests itself
in the echo of the sky, in the echo that connects it to the abyss, that links
gods and mortals. Truth is in the sky (the "measure," Hölderlin says, is not
on the earth but in the sky), and the sky is also an expression of depth. The
truth slides between latency and manifestness, and along with it t h o u g h t
fluctuates between a solid and unshakeable foundation and a vague a n d
abysmal one. The enigmatic light of truth is mirrored in this l a t t e r
foundation; it is towards it that the path leads.
The passage from the foundation to the abyss does not mark only t h e
peculiar instability and precariousness of human Dasein in its finitude, in
its finite facticity, but also aims to show the way of thought in an oscillation
from the "first beginning" (the thought of Grund as thought of t h e
beginning and as the beginning of thought) to the "other beginning"
(thought of the Ab-grund as a sliding from the ground of m e t a p h y s i c s
towards an overcoming of it which is rooted in the profoundest depths of
the abyss from which metaphysics has arisen).
The thought of the abyss therefore takes shape as a progression
towards the essence of philosophy, towards the meditating dimension in
which thought and poetry are situated on the same foundation, and belong

I0S
F. Hölderlin, Mnemosyne, II Fassung, Stuttgarter Ausgabe, 2, I, p. 195. The image of
the Geviert, of the Fourfold, is not intended to refer to a traditional horizon such as
the one Heidegger calls onto-theo-logical; as regards this matter, see ID, second p a r t
("Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik"), pp. 37-73. Cf. also R. Boehm,
Was heißt theologisch denken? Zur Onto-Theo-Logik, in Sein und Geschichtlichkeit
(edited by I. Schüßler and W. Janke), Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1974, pp. 257-
273.
52 The Foundation

to one another. Here the mark of the abyss is not an unfathomable

obscurity, but a reflection of the shining of the original correlation from
which all the possibilities and modes of human thought have been drawn:
the thinking-poetizing connection that is the essence of philosophy in its
other beginning.106

io6 On the question of the other beginning of thought, see the reflections in the
Beiträge zur Philosophie, HGA 65, pp. 171 ff. There it is specified that the other
beginning is "the return to the first and viceversa," or the passage that follows the
"return to the ground of metaphysics" of which Heidegger spoke as early as the 1920s.
"The other beginning, from a new originality, helps the first beginning to obtain the
truth of its history and thus its inalienable and absolutely peculiar diversity, w h i c h
becomes fruitful only in the historical dialogue among thinkers" (HGA 65, p. 187).
PART TWO

THOUGHT
 5.
ON THE WAY TOWARDS THOUGHT

The shift in tone of the principle is decisive for placing in a new light
the relation between the principle itself and the epochal dimension of
thought. We must also ask ourselves if the principle that is thus being d e -
fined is still a principle in a grammatical and logical sense, or if we are n o t
here dealing with something that is absolutely different from all this. W e
should indeed ask ourselves what is the effect caused by the de-finition of
the principle in its essence, in reference to the modes of its essence, and to
the modes of thought. The de-fining work which has led to an
understanding of the Grund as Being and as abyss is the result of a
theoretical analysis made by Heidegger, or perhaps we should call it a
reflection. Now, however, we need to understand the peculiar nature of this
meditation, in order to see how and to what extent it differs from t h e
meditation of Leibniz. This problem raises some far-ranging and difficult
philosophical issues. Let us try to list them: first of all, the question of t h e
differences that mark the various kinds of thought; secondly, the relation
between thought and the language by which it is expressed; then t h e
hermeneutic situation that differently characterizes every single vision of
the history of philosophy; and, finally, the way each philosopher has of
understanding himself and the objective of his thought. Within this list of
problems, provisional and full of gaps though it may be, it must b e c o m e
clear that a hypostatic and self-fulfilling thought is untenable (as in t h e
case of, for example, Hegel's phenomenology of the idea). At the same t i m e
it must be clear that the thesis of ego cogito is problematical, i.e., the idea
of an exclusively subjective creativity on which thought depends. This
entire set of issues finds its full expression in Heidegger's question: "What
does it mean to think?" The path that surrounds and penetrates the
principle of reason can serve as a paradigmatic case for understanding t h e
question and seeing the answer that Heidegger (more directly) and Leibniz
(only indirectly) give to this basic query. In all likelihood it is impossible to
decide about the fate of the principle of reason, as of any o t h e r
philosophical proposition, without first facing and solving the decisive
problem.
56 Thought

Heidegger's text on the principle of reason thus becomes a microcosm

that contains the essential elements of his philosophical itinerary, although
they are not all equally developed. Instead, to grasp the meaning of
Leibniz's thought, we are actually less well equipped, very p r o b a b l y
because Leibniz's degree of self-understanding is inferior to that of
Heidegger or, at the very least, it is more implicit and unexpressed. As
applied to Leibniz, Heidegger's habit of discovering the non-thought in
previous thinkers and in metaphysics in general (which is a recurring
theme in his reading of tradition) proves to be extraordinarily precise and
responsive, and leads to absolutely original results. Perhaps with no o t h e r
philosopher does Heidegger's deconstructive and unveiling art reach such a
level of validity, or coincide so felicitously with the nature of the thought
that is being interpreted. Now, we should not think that Leibniz did not
realize what he was working out mentally or that the margin of
unawareness had overcome the barriers of his self-awareness. Rather, w e
wish to point out that, within his extremely complex philosophy, full of
overtures to other sciences and reaching out towards a metaphysics aimed
at grasping the man-God relation in a universalistic way, direct questioning
concerning the meaning of thinking (or doing philosophy) is not v e r y
important.
With his operation of "excavation," Heidegger seems not only to h a v e
approached the model of hermeneutics, according to which an i n t e r p r e t e r
can manage to understand an author better than the author u n d e r s t o o d
himself, but he also seems to hark back to the peculiar features of Husserl's
reading of the philosophical tradition: i.e., the art of arriving at the thing
itself, the essence, tearing away and even destroying everything t h a t
prevents this Wesensschau. In doing this Heidegger, like Husserl, pays little
attention to the historical connections that entangle the different
philosophical systems. But, as we have already remarked, this neglect is
perhaps a necessity of the phenomenological approach. For Heidegger,
history is only the historicity of Being, the chronology of the phases of
Being. "Every philosophical interpretation is, in itself, destruction," h e
proclaimed in the early 1930s, echoing some fiery passages of Husserl's
manuscripts. 1 Though he kept intact this destructive and "overpassing"

1
HGA 31, p. 168. Heidegger's radicalism in the 1920s and early 1930s must assuredly be
related to the piercing and penetrating intervention of Husserl's phenomenological
glance. Husserl's 1923-24 lessons on the history of philosophy and the manuscripts i n
which Husserl outlined "The relation of the phenomenologist towards the history of
philosophy" (1917) are one of the sources of Heidegger's idea of the destruction of
metaphysics. The 1923-24 lessons have been published in E. Husserl, Erste
Philosophie, edited by R. Boehm, 2 vols., Husserliana VII-VIII, Nijhoff, Den Haag 1956-
59. The manuscript cited is now found in E. Husserl, Aufsätze und Vortrüge (1911-
 On the Way Towards Thought 57

attitude throughout his whole development as a thinker, without becoming

any less radical, yet it was also accompanied by a complementary and, so
to speak, more serene attitude, one aware of the indissoluble link b e t w e e n
the destruction and the acceptance of metaphysics. This double m o v e m e n t ,
which is only apparently a simple sum of action and inertia, criticism a n d
approval, makes it possible to maintain both distance and identification
between author and interpreter. It is like an oscillation between difference
and Einfühlung, in which concepts such as proximity and distance a r e
rethought and given a radical revision.
It is therefore an approach to the real meaning of the thought being
interpreted, viz. to Leibniz himself, coming close in this journey to the t r u e
experience of philosophy: the basic experience of thought, the basic
experience of Being. Although Heidegger has exposed himself to criticisms
regarding the excessive "energy" of his interpretations, which often show
traces of brusque and violent distortions, he nevertheless deserves
recognition for having always managed to make the thinkers he deals w i t h
speak about his decisive question, highlighting its presence in their work or
discovering some traces of it in hidden aspects of their thought or else
pointing out its absence. What Gadamer calls Heidegger's great Einseitigkeit
(univocalness) is the characteristic mark of his questioning, his
Einzigartigkeit (uniqueness). The inevitability of it is shown, however, b y
the singular nature of the task Heidegger set himself: to think does not
mean to analyze or to create conceptually, or to produce d e m o n s t r a t i o n s
that confirm a hypothesis or explain the structure of beings. To think is to
think Being. To think, by virtue of the ancient analogy, is a tautology: to
think Being means to think thought, since "thinking and Being are one a n d
the same." It therefore seems possible to maintain that Being and Grund
are the same thing, just as thinking and Grund are.
The disarming simplicity of this tautology makes it impossible to
describe Heidegger's itinerary as a body of theory developed according to
the usual criteria; rather, we are forced to follow it as if it were a p a t h ,
leading to one single place, i.e., the Lichtung in which Being manifests itself.
We must therefore not try to decompose his thought into simple e l e m e n t s
or reduce it to central categories, but we should look to find along the w a y
the words with which Being gradually makes itself known. Thus our t a s k
becomes very difficult: it is nothing less than explaining a tautology which

1921), edited by Th. Nenon and H.R. Sepp, Husserliana XXV, Nijhoff, Den Haag 1986, pp.
206ff. For the concept of "destruction", cf. HGA 24, pp. 26ff., and in general all t h e
courses of the Marburg period (cf. HGA 21, 24, 25), which revolve around Sein und
Zeit (HGA 2) and the relation with phenomenology.
58 Thought

is unsayable because it hides itself in fundamental words (Grundworte)

that are scattered along the arduous path towards thought.
Another typical feature of Heidegger's reflections is the insistence with
which the image of the path, the Weg, is reiterated; as we have seen, this
insistence conceals a very important theoretical point: the possibility of
reaching Being by circling around it, letting oneself be guided by its gleams
of non-latency. This would thus be the meaning of the slight surrounding,
which Heidegger identifies as an essential trait of Greek thought in
opposition to grasping-comprehending, begreifen, towards which all
modern scientific philosophy tends. In he-greifen one takes possession,
whereas by way of the path we reach the being without conceptual
determinations. In order to keep at a distance from conceptual thought, it
was necessary to fall back on a language that could render concepts fluid
and make them flow: the path then becomes something more than a
metaphor; it becomes the movable place, the in-topia, where thought and
Being are said.
Abandoning method as a philosohical question, Heidegger takes refuge
on the path as a questioning of Being. In his thought, the method can be
found (transformed so much as to be almost unrecognizable) in the path, in
this metaphor that translates and makes concrete the itinerant sense of
Erörterung. "Everything is on the path," he tells us: "this means two things.
On the one hand, it means that everything depends on the path, on finding
it and remaining on it. This means to stay 'on the way.' [...] Everything is on
the path; this also means: everything that has to be noticed always shows
itself only while moving along the path. What is to be observed lies on t h e
path." 2 Along the path one encounters the world and history, nature and
the spirit, Being and thought. Because it has this not merely metaphorical
function as a catalyst, the path is of paramount importance, even from a
theoretical point of view, in Heidegger's discourse. But how can one
recognize a path? How can one distinguish a path from a well-consolidated
and logically structured methodology? "Only one who walks together
knows that it is a path," Gadamer has replied.
In gnostic allegory the image of the path indicates the way by which
one can reach the truth. In Platonic dualism the path is analogous to a
concept, a way for the One to overcome the manifold, for Being to overcome
non-being. This path is the "way towards the One," which is both a starting-
point and an end, both the cause and place of being, and thus approaches
Grund in Leibniz's sense. We can therefore say that the idea of a path that
leads to the Grund dates from the dawn of western thought. In reality,

1
SG, p. 106.
 On the Way Towards Thought 59

however, the transformations that this concept has undergone have led to a
substitution of the idea of itinerary by the more scientific concept of
objectivation. In modern thought the Grund, like any concept and a n y
being, is objectified, as something that is opposed, as a Gegen-stand, to t h e
subject. Descartes' ego cogito replaces what, for the Greeks, was still only an
itinerary, with the notion of method: the almost mythical image of the 6669
is modernized in the assumption of iit'eoöos- as the rule of thought. In this
sense the exercise of thinking has taken over the Greek heritage b u t
deprived it of its mythological content, emphasizing its scientific a n d
objectifying aspects, which in the Greek tradition were actually not v e r y
important. In Heidegger's reflections on the term Weg all these historical-
theoretical aspects come together and take their focus around the critique
of the objectifying core of modern philosophy: Heidegger's criticism of t h e
cogito as a privileged subject which is consequently able to manipulate a n d
dominate the res ex tens a. For Heidegger, the image of the path seems to
preserve a certain aura of the unknown, of unknowability, which the royal
path of method had rapidly swept away. It is a problem of language, which
must find its own proper tonality in order to correspond to that of thought.
It is a matter of finding expressions that are able to let the thought of
Being come into words.
The metaphor of the path contains an ontological sense that marks both
the profile of human being-there and the traits of Being. It seems to join
existence to essence: "being-there (Dasein) is always on the move. To stop
and to stay still are simply limiting cases of this being 'on the move.'" Being
itself forces Dasein to follow along the path: "those who are 'on the m o v e '
must reach home and table, wandering through the darkness of t h e i r
paths. , n "Everything lies on the path": on the path we are as close as
possible to what must be thought and grasped. No dialectic of concepts
seems to equal the agility of thought that stems from following along t h e
path: it gathers together both difference and identity; on it the cosmological
opposites of the Geviert and the metaphorical simplicity of the event of
Lichtung can set off together. It is not by means of a topographical
operation (i.e., by calculating the location of coordinates) that the p a t h
manifests itself, but rather by means of an adventurous exploration, in t h e
field, of the thing itself. The experience of Being can take place only b y
accepting "the path-character [Wegcharakter] of thinking, the only w a y
that could ensure an experience of the forgetfulness of Being," namely a
look at our age which, by means of technology, hides and forgets Being.

* HGA 12, p 20.

60 Thought

This Wegcharakter opens up the possibility of throwing a "look at what is,"

revealing the ontological situation of our time.
But "it is difficult to grasp the path-character of thinking on account of
the dominant habit today of representing things. In fact, the path-character
of thinking is too simple and therefore inaccessible for the dominant 'way
of thinking', which is entangled in an infinity of methods." 4 If thinking as a
path is the only way to come to Being, and if to understand Being today
means to understand the age in which we live, we may reasonably think
that the path towards Being is the greatest philosophical effort of
penetration into actual reality. For this reason it seems possible to see, in
the listening to Being, which is a dominant theme of meditation for t h e
"later" Heidegger, a variation on the existential analysis regarding t h e
facticity of Dasein, the theme of Being and Time. The two phases are united,
symbolically and actually, by the Wegcharakter, which runs through all
Heidegger's works, including the "turning." The "look at what is" is s h a r e d
by both the beginning and the other beginning, the two phases that m a r k
this itinerary. It is in this sense that we should interpret, and share,
Gadamer's provocative remark: "the only path of Martin Heidegger." 5
The sayability of the path is manifested in the search for an a d e q u a t e
language; the path comes out into language, the path is language: "path and
balance/lane and saying/meet on one and the same path." 6 Language
becomes the path: "path is path on the way,/which leads and
illumines,/which bears, because it is a poet." 7 Heidegger thus received from
the poets, and particularly from Hölderlin, a "loosening up" of language, a
help in his rush towards the dawning moment of thought, towards t h e
sayability of the foundation. In this interweaving of thought and poetry the
tradition of modern philosophy is neglected and replaced with a thought
that stems from another beginning: in the semantic terms of the path, w e
may say that methodology becomes odology, a discourse of the path and on
the path. The path-character of thinking opens up a space where thinking
and poetry can communicate, but this dimension must necessarily b e
opposed by modern rationalism: "since we are prisoners of the ages-old
prejudice that thinking is the task of ratio, i.e., of calculation understood in

4
HGA 13, p. 235. In this same essay, entitled Der Fehl heiliger Namen, written in 1974,
he writes: "are method and the path of thought the same? Or is it not perhaps time,
right in the technological age, to meditate on the peculiarity of the path and its
difference from method? [...] The path (is) never a procedure" {ibid., p. 233).
s
Cf. H.G. Gadamer, Der eine Weg Martin Heideggers, in Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke,
Vol. Ill, Mohr, Tübingen 1987, pp. 417-430.
ft
HGA 13, p. 75.
7
Ibid., 13, p. 234.
 On the Way Towards Thought 61

the widest sense, we are immediately suspicious when we hear a n y o n e

speak of a closeness between thought and poetry." 8
The path that connects thought to poetry is the same one that leads
from the principle of reason to the principle of Being; it is the same o n e
that connects Being and the abyss, the foundation and reason. As Heidegger
was to define it in a reflection on the link between oriental thought and t h e
essence of language, the path is Tao, Weg is Tao. Tao is "the Weg that be-
wegt everything; that by which, in moving from it, we are enabled to t h i n k
the authentic meaning of Reason, Spirit, Sense, Logos, i.e., the meaning t h a t
emerges from their very essence. Perhaps in the word Tao the mystery of
all mysteries of philosophical saying is hidden, if (provided we are c a p a b l e
of it) we let these words sink down again into what remains unsaid in
them. It may be that even the enigmatic power of the dominion that t o d a y
method exerts also derives from the fact that methods (and in saying this I
do not want to belittle their capacity for actualization) are n o n e t h e l e s s
nothing but the overflowings of a great hidden river, of the Weg that be-
wegt all and opens the way to all with impetuous force. All is Weg"9
Everything lies on the path, all is the path, even the straying from t h e
original discourse in ratio is an outcome of the path. What matters is t h e
direction of the path, the way towards the Lichtung, towards the t h i n k i n g -
poetizing speech of meditative thought.
The path unites reason and logos, calculation and meditation, Rechnen
and Andenken, just as it closely connects metaphysics and the o t h e r
thought. When, then, the notion of leap {Sprung) appears along the p a t h ,
we find ourselves faced with an authentic contradictoriness of t h e
proceeding. Heidegger tells us that the leap is necessary in order to j u m p
from a dimension of forgetfulness of Being to the Openness of the t r u t h
(like aXiieeia, a non-concealment) of Being. This leap is the act of going
beyond the fences that hide the phenomenon of Being. In the terms of t h e
existential analytics of Being and Time, it is comparable to the p a s s a g e
from the inauthentic to authenticity, from idle talk to logos, from s i m p l e
presence to existence. If, on the plane of basic ontology, the leap is w h a t
determines the difference between Being and being, determining us in o u r
most proper being-there, with all its related characteristics, on the plane of
the problem regarding Being, as it has come to be posed in the second stage
of the Denkweg, the leap marks the boundary between traditional t h o u g h t

8
HGA 12, p. 163.
9
Ibid., p. 187. For the use of the concept of path (or way) in Greek thought, cf. Q
Becker, Das Bild des Weges und verandte Vorstellungen im frühgriechischen Denken,
"Hermes," Einzelschriften 4, Berlin 1937 (Chapter IV is devoted to the philosophers,
pp. 139-150).
62 Thought

and thought of the destiny of Being, announcing and indicating t h e

possibilities of an odology.
But the leap cannot be posited as the antithesis of the path; it is only a
modality of odology. As an odological modality, it is properly the oscillation
between the near and the far sides of the nihilistic-metaphysical "line." The
leap changes the standpoint for listening to metaphysics, but at the s a m e
time it causes us to remain in the essence of metaphysics. From this
oscillating viewpoint we discover that "an adequate and continuous
meditation manages to see that metaphysics, by virtue of its very essence,
never allows human dwelling to settle properly in the locality, i.e., in the
essence, of the forgetfulness of Being. Therefore it is necessary that
thinking and poetizing return to where, in a certain sense, they h a v e
always been, without ever having yet built it. It is indeed only by building
that we can prepare our dwelling in that locality. This building process can
hardly already think of erecting the house for God and dwelling-places for
mortals. It must be content to build the path that leads back to the locality
of the Verwindung of metaphysics and lets pass what by destiny is
assigned to an Überwindung of nihilism." 10
A similar situation governs Heidegger's relation with the principle of
reason: we are constantly moving towards the foundation, towards reason
and towards the abyss, both in our daily awareness of the power of t h e
principle and in the scientific proofs of its validity. The Harz miner felt the
impending force and necessity that links an event to a cause with the s a m e
intensity with which Leibniz had transferred the naive consciousness of
this relation onto a refined rational plane: nihil est sine ratione. Neither,
however, had identified the ontological tonality of the principle. To be on
the way towards it means to approach nearer to its second intonation, to
the voice of Being. By identifying ratio (or Grund) and Being, Heidegger
underlines the difference in the principle itself: ratio is reason a n d
foundation. This double meaning is a splitting and a co-belonging:
Heidegger maintains that Leibniz was unable to recognize the importance
of this and accuses him of having rationalized Being, i.e., of having
reductively identified it with reason alone.
Heidegger's criticism regards the concepts of ratio and subjectum, which
are strong points of what we have defined as the double theorem of
Leibniz's rationalism. To give a reason for things would mean, for
Heidegger, to begin a process of pure calculability, which would therefore
proceed to measure both the internal structure of beings and the causes
that give rise to them. Consequently, when Leibniz aims to d e t e r m i n e

10
HGA 9, p. 423.
 On the Way Towards Thought 63

perfectly the logical criteria for the validity of propositions and j u d g m e n t s

and the ontic motives that lie behind the form and evolution of beings, in
that moment he is founding science in the modern sense. His construction
contains and displays all the cardinal themes of technology and science,
whose action typifies the period we live in. There can be no doubt t h a t
Heidegger has grasped an actually existing link between Leibniz's
discoveries and the current procedures of science, but his attribution of
responsibility goes beyond Leibniz's real contribution to the d e v e l o p m e n t
of technology and science, which now have effective control of t h e
production of world images; that is to say, they dominate any form of
thought that tends to create a Weltanschauung. On this interpretation, also
philosophy would fall under the power of science, and its c r e a t i v e - i n t u i t i v e
freedom would be subjugated to games of objectivation. In this sense,
Leibniz would be the true father of our age, for good and for ill. Although
there is much truth in this, I think that Heidegger's hypothesis is
excessively critical, too punitive and quite out of proportion. Moreover, t h e
doubt is suggested by Heidegger himself, who does not pronounce an
overall negative verdict, oscillating as he does between a rejection of
Leibniz's logic and an appreciation of some aspects of his metaphysics. Let
us take a look at some passages of what could be considered Heidegger's
"trial" of Leibniz.
In the term ratio Heidegger discovers the original phantom of t h e
decomposition of thought into infinite units of calculation, in calculating
and in language machines. By uttering the sentence: Cum Deus calculat et
cogitationes exercet fit mundus, Leibniz, in Heidegger's view, i n a u g u r a t e d
an era, creating, perhaps even without being aware of doing so, t h e
premises for fetishistically ascribing divine characteristics to t h e
simulacrum of calculation. It seems reasonable to assert that at p r e s e n t
scientific reason is being idolatrized, even though there is an increasing
awareness of the risks inherent in such trust and submission. But what is
the true relation between Leibniz's researches and the power of science
and technology? What is the real meaning of Leibniz's thought? Heidegger
seems to have no doubt: in Leibniz "ratio means calculation [Rechnung]"
This mathematical version of reason opens the way for the
transcendentalism of reason and of the rational subject: "in Leibniz t h e
reddere is referred to and realized by the representing self, which is
determined as the subject conscious of itself."11
According to Heidegger, the subjectivist and representative
degeneration started with the conceptual warping that Roman thought gave

SG, pp. 168-169.

64 Thought

to pre-existing Greek philosophy. The human being becomes a suh-jectum

only by means of a Roman linguistic coinage. 12 In any case, the decisive
subjectivistic pressure occurred at the beginnings of modern philosophy.
The period which, according to Koyre, positively marks the passage "from
the world of more-or-less to the universe of precision" is, for Heidegger, a
strikingly negative turning point: Descartes and Leibniz are to be thought
of as the founders of modern nihilism. Descartes' and Leibniz's project of a
mathesis universalis becomes, in his eyes, the germ of the reduction of t h e
world to calculation. The sense and essence of the computer and of atomic
energy are thus the ill-begotten fruits of this generation. With his mathesis
universalis, Leibniz "anticipated the foundations of what is today not only
used as a thinking machine, but indeed determines our way of thinking." 1 3
Heidegger's accusation intends to go back to the origins of this type of
thought in order to understand its essence and, at the same time, to lay
bare the philosophical concepts that have nourished it; his manifest aim is
to intervene philosophically on this theoretical framework.
From this point of view, we may provisionally say that Heidegger's
reflection is one of the most radical attempts to make a dent in t h e
persistent veneer of total rationalization. His is not a mere denunciation of
the evils of modern science, nor a romantic evocation of previous societies
that were free of technocracy. Heidegger wants to contest the dominion of
science on the very ground of its theoretical pretensions, thus digging down
into the axioms on which it is based. On the one hand, he carries out a
critique of modern objectivism, together with its complementary opposite,
subjectivism; on the other, he takes science back to its original course, i.e.,
to philosophical thought, depriving it of the autonomy on which it has
managed to erect its power base. The difference between science and
philosophy would thus consist in the fact that in science it is "the
stimulating and exciting vista of ever new things and successes" that holds
sway, whereas philosophy is dominated by "the stupefying view of
simplicity itself, which allows of no success; in it nothing can follow, for
thought, insofar as it meditates on Being, rethinks of Grund, that is, it
rethinks of its essence as the truth of Being." 14 In the present situation,
philosophy has lost its force, not only, and not even mainly, because science
has uprooted itself from the philosophical terrain it was born in, but a b o v e
all because it has been gradually absorbed by the assault of science, which

12
With regard to the Romans' transformation of Greek thought, see HGA 54, pp. 57ff.,
where the essence of Roman thought is said to express itself with a "modification of
the essence of truth and Being" {ibid., p. 62).
13
SG, p. 170.
"Ibid., p. 155.
 On the Way Towards Thought 65

has made philosophical reflection useless. Faced with this decadence,

Heidegger speaks of the end of philosophy. "Philosophy becomes
superfluous [...] the end of philosophy is characterized by the dissolution of
its disciplines into autonomous sciences, whose new unification is being
achieved in cybernetics." 1 s
On this occasion Leibniz is not named, but it seems undeniable t h a t
when Heidegger speaks of cybernetics and the dissolution it has caused in
philosophical thought he has in mind Leibniz as its forebear. Without
stopping to dwell on Heidegger's judgment regarding cybernetics, we h a v e
to admit that the view of Leibniz as a forerunner of this "dangerous"
science is difficult to budge. In fact, the image of Leibniz as a scientist
devoted exclusively to the combinatoria and to the design of calculating
systems and machines is very strong. Both the supporters and the critics of
Leibniz have taken over this rather narrow and superficial image of him.
For example, the simplistic interpretation of the real founder of m o d e r n
cybernetics as an independent branch of science, i.e., Wiener, is revealing.
He makes an exemplary comparison: "If I had to choose a patron saint of
cybernetics [...] I would choose Leibniz. [...] Just as arithmetical calculation
lends itself to increasing mechanization, from the abacus to today's
ultrarapid calculating machines, so too Leibniz's Calculus Ratiocinator
contains the germ of the Machina Ratio cinatrix, the thinking machine. [...] 11
is therefore not at all surprising that the same mental impulse that led to
the development of mathematical logic simultaneously led to t h e
mechanization, whether ideal or real, of the process of thinking." 16
Although his premises might lead one to suppose the contrary,
Heidegger does not completely belong with these unilateral interpreters of
Leibniz; his criticism, lucid and in some ways drastic, is n o n e t h e l e s s
rounded out with a careful look at those features of Leibniz's m e t a p h y s i c s
that can reveal theoretical issues to be set against the subservience of
philosophy to science. Heidegger's position is therefore quite complex, e v e n
if his basic assessment of the essence of Leibniz's efforts substantially
tends to highlight the calculating aspect. Does this image, though,
correspond to the authentic meaning of the object it refers to? Can w e
accept Heidegger's hermeneutic reading or is it necessary to revise it a n d
complete it with further observations? In other words: does the p i c t u r e
painted by Heidegger, which can certainly not be called simplistic or
deliberately deceptive, really correspond to the nature of Leibniz's

15
FB, p. 9. See also SG, pp. 202ff.
16
N. Wiener, Cybernetics: or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the
Machine, 1948.
66 Thought

thought? Or may we perhaps sketch a different outline, adding some

elements that can complete and rectify his interpretation?
 6.
THE ABACUS AND THE MIRROR

As we have already mentioned, the problem regarding the i n n e r m o s t

meaning of Leibniz's thought is very difficult to solve. Over and b e y o n d
any comprehensive reconstruction of his thought, I would like to dwell on
the definitions of "calculating thought" and "meditating thought," to find in
Leibniz the dimension and the modes within which this polarized field is
made manifest. If there is no question about the unified nature of Leibniz's
thought, we may still point to some themes that are quite far r e m o v e d
from one another, and thus reveal the breadth of range and c o n s e q u e n t
internal multiplicity of meanings of his philosophy. The themes of t h e
calculus, of the combinatorial of mathesis and the characteristica
universalis are all reflections of Leibniz's mathematical spirit. Starting from
the years 1669-1670, Leibniz elaborated scientific projects of a logical-
mathematical nature, which led him to study physical and n a t u r a l
phenomena in general. We can outline a precise itinerary, going from t h e
preparatory studies for the Theoria motus ahstracti (1669-70), and t h e
Specimen Demonstrationum de Natura Rerum corporearum (1671), to t h e
Summa Hypotheseos physicae novae (1671), and some preparatory tables
for the study of the universal characteristic (1671-72), thus realizing at
once the importance of mathematics for him. In his years in Paris ( 1 6 7 2 -
1676) he developed these scientific interests further, obtaining e x t r e m e l y
important results. 17 The application of logical and mathematical methods to
the physical sciences enabled him to investigate in depth into problems of
geometry, algebra and mechanics. The results of his scientific reflections
and the impulse they gave to the evolution of science are u n i v e r s a l l y
known. His interest in questions that we may call metaphysical is e q u a l l y
well known. He devoted immense theoretical efforts, throughout his w h o l e
career, to theological subjects and topics regarding the human spirit. These

17
On the importance of the Parisian period, cf. W. Kabitz, Die Philosophie des jungen
Leibniz, cit.; L. Daville, Le sejour de Leibniz ä Paris, in "Revue des Etudes historiques,"
78, 1912; and the more recent essay by H. Poser, Leibniz' Parisaufenthalt in seiner
Bedeutung für die Monadenlehre, "Studia Leibnitiana", Supplementa XVIII (1978),
Symposion Chantilly 1976, Vol. II, pp. 131-144. The chronology of the life and works of
Leibniz is contained in the book by K. Müller and G. Krönert, Leben und Werk von
G.W. Leibniz, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1969.
68 Thought

speculations, although extremely various, may all be grouped under t h e

heading of Leibniz's metaphysical (as opposed to mathematical) interests.
The presence and co-existence of these two tendencies in Leibniz's
thought is well known and, for our purposes, not very important. Just as it
matters little which of the two takes precedence over the other: all t h e
secondary bibiography about Leibniz is full of fundamental studies on this
problem. Whether the question has been solved more or less convincingly,
there is no justification for another such discussion here, since it lies
outside the scope of this book. The issue is rather to see how Leibniz's
works as a whole can react to Heidegger's provocative question: What does
it mean to think? It is not so important to define the relation b e t w e e n
metaphysics and mathematics, which in any case is bound to remain open
and problematical, as it is to grasp those moments in which Leibniz's
thought "comes out into the open," outside all propositions, axioms a n d
logical concatenations. The task is to question this thought in a radical way,
using Heidegger's investigative art; perhaps this art is unreachable in its
full depth, different as it is also from Socrates' maieutic system, because it
is capable of bringing to light not only what the person questioned t h i n k s
or has within himself, but also the unthought dimension that in him
regards the problem of Being.
If we therefore let Leibniz's thought speak for itself, we must first of all
observe that the interweaving of scientific and metaphysical motifs
responds to Leibniz's primary need to comprehend the different forms of
knowledge in divine omniscience. But this double link does not p r e s u p p o s e
any slackening of the autonomous dynamics of each of the two disciplines:
the fact of depending on God and referring to Him does not imply
obedience to a pre-ordained and "shockproof" mechanism, which would
abolish the free development of thought in an absolute and indistinct
necessity. The scientia Dei is not, for Leibniz, a limitation imposed on
knowledge. In this sense Leibniz is far removed from Kant's position
regarding the unknowability of the thing in itself or the impossibility of
knowing metaphysical problems. In fact, the idea of a rational theology also
releases the sciences from any transcendental bond; such sciences t h u s
become independent structures and the object of investigation i m m a n e n t
in thought itself.
We spoke earlier of the degree of self-understanding with which
Leibniz's reflections proceed. However, in order to evaluate the scope of
this self-understanding, it is best to examine some particularly significant
passages in this connection. As early as 1668-69 Leibniz gives p r i m e
importance to the relation between knowledge and moral action, in view of
 The Abacus and the Mirror 69

a higher synthesis in amor Dei.ls In this relation we can recognize a sort of

profession of faith, by which the author transfers general problems (those
very problems that in the terminology of scholastic philosophy could b e
called universalia) into his own spiritual and cognitive sphere, while at t h e
same time these universal problems constitute an expression of t h e
individual's psychophysical identity, in which the elements that we m i g h t
call existentialia are concentrated. In this cosmic junction the human a n d
divine planes intersect, interacting in a co-ordinated way, aimed at t h e
preservation of a superior concord. This is how philosophical reflection,
though rigorously individual, belongs to a higher-order reality, in which it
recognizes itself right from the start, and which contains it w i t h o u t
depriving it of its freedom: this is the immanent order of p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d
harmony. Though a part of, this universal synthesis, human thought
possesses its own domain, and is indeed absolutely autonomous in its
development. In noting its absolute independence and at the same time its
essential belonging to the harmonious organism, 1 9 we at once possess an
element that distinguishes Leibniz's idea of thought from that of Descartes,
Spinoza, Malebranche or Pascal. None of these predecessors or
contemporaries of Leibniz can bear comparison with him as far as t h e
universal-individual relation is concerned. The invention, but we could
very well also speak of the fiction, of a pre-established harmony
immediately takes its place beyond dualism, beyond substantial monism,
beyond occasionalism and the suspension of judgment which characterize,
respectively, the theoretical systems of the four thinkers mentioned as
examples.
With regard to the strict link between thought, or the art of reasoning,
and the overall vision of the theological-moral bond with which t h o u g h t
must be harmonized, in 1676, towards the end of his stay in Paris, Leibniz
was planning a comparison with Descartes; he prepared a series of excerpta
from Descartes' writings in order to clarify Descartes' position. He collected
many quotations under the title De vita beata; they were to serve as a
preparation for a critique and the development of a personal theory. The
fact that he then decided to translate into German the manuscript he h a d
initially written in Latin shows once again the importance he attached to

18
The Disputalio metaphysica de principle) individui of 1663 is too juvenile a work, and
too closely linked to the Scholastics. Ct\ GPh IV, pp. 15-26.
19
The biological metaphor of the organism makes it possible to avoid the t e r m s
"system" and "mechanism." The latter term should be avoided because it is in c o n t r a s t
with Leibniz's hypothesis, while the former is, in my view, inadequate to express t h e
vitality and "openness" of this hypothesis, even though Leibniz often speaks of h i s
"system of pre-established harmony." For the concept of organism in Leibniz, cf. M.N.
Dumas, La pensee de la vie chez Leibniz, Vrin, Paris 1976.
70 Thought

this work. It was to be a little manual of ethics, in which the problem of the
good and the search for morality would be interwoven with the subject of
the use of the spiritual and intellectual faculties. These first two collections
of notes were revised and reworked several times; they were finally
completed with four other outlines, one in German and three in French,
which clearly reveal Leibniz's outlook. 20 This group of manuscripts, which
remained rough and incomplete, seems to be of great importance for our
topic, both owing to their content, which deals with theological and
individual speculation (Heidegger defines it negatively as "onto-
theological"), and because it belongs to a crucial phase in Leibniz's career,
when he was making great progress in the exact sciences. It is important to
note that in the same period when he was developing cubic and algebraic
equations, the measurement of the curve of the hyperbole and the cycloid,
Leibniz also felt the need to meditate on metaphysics and ethics. For
example, just as he was presenting his calculating machine to the Academie
des Sciences in Paris, he was writing to Foucher about the existence of
thought and feelings: "there are two general absolute truths, which speak
of the actual existence of things; one is that we think; the other is t h a t
there is a great variety of our thoughts. From the former it follows that w e
exist, and from the latter it follows that there is something else besides us,
that is to say, something different from that which thinks, which is t h e
cause of the variety of our appearances. Now, the former of these two
truths is incontestable, and as independent as the other; and Mons. des
Cartes stopped only at the former and in the order of his meditations he
failed to reach the perfection he aimed at. If he had followed exactly w h a t
I call filum meditcindi, I believe he would have accomplished the first
philosophy." 2 1

20
The six writings that compose this single manuscript were composed between t h e
spring and autumn of 1676 and were partly revised up until the 1690s, although they
did not achieve a definitive form. A first, incomplete edition is found in GPh VII, p p .
77-104, while the complete critical edition is found in Ak VI, III, pp. 635-673. As
regards the relations with Descartes, see the writing Aniniadversiones in par tern
generalem Princ ipiorum Cartesianorum,in GPh IV, pp. 350-392. On this matter cf. H.
Heimsoeth, Die Methode der Erkenntnis bei Descartes und Leibniz, 2 vols., T ö p e l m a n n ,
Gießen 1912-14, and Y. Beiaval, Leibniz critique des Descartes, Gallimard, Paris 1960.
21
G.W Leibniz, Letter to Abbot Foucher (1676), in GPh I, pp. 370-371. L e i b n i z
presented the calculating machine to the Academy of Sciences on 9th January 1675,
but the model (which had been finished in July 1674) had already met with s o m e
success During the summer of 1674 Etienne Pener, Pascal's nephew, wanted to s e e
the calculating machine and said he was willing to show Leibniz Pascal's still
unpublished mathematical manuscripts. These scientific interests, which also f l o w e d
over into the technological field (in 1675 Leibniz presented an essay on t h e
"principle of exactness of portable clocks" and even showed a clock he had had m a d e )
 The Abacus and the Mirror 71

One of the differences between Leibniz and Descartes lies just in this
apparently insignificant or casual metaphor of the filum meditandi or filum
cogitandi. With this image Leibniz expresses the concept of method, a
concept which actually turns up rather often in his writings, but for t h e
most part with an ordinary, everyday meaning: it seems that the a u t h e n t i c
sense of the notion of method as a terminus technicus is left to a figure of
speech. We can better see the connection if we put this image alongside
that of the labyrinth, which is a very frequent metaphor in Leibniz
(according to Couturat, it is his "favourite metaphor"). If we compare t h e
soul to a labyrinth, we then need a special shrewdness to manage to
understand its structure and life, and to account for it. We shall have to
trust in some clue that will help us to unravel it, something like an
Ariadne's thread of reflection: a thread that will help us to find our w a y
out of the labyrinth of reason, out of the inextricable ground on which
thought depends and which contains the two labyrinths of the c o n t i n u u m
and of freedom: "filum autem meditandi semel datum efjiciet" as Leibniz
writes to Oldenburg. 2 2 The search for the ratio is necessary because it
seems to lead us to the very centre of the labyrinth and enable us to get
out of it, as the man in Plato's myth got out of the cave, triggering t h e
process of the reversibility of thought: from the foundation as individual
substance (monad) and divine substance to the phenomenon as expression
and dispersion of substance. This weakening of the concept of method in
favour of an ontologicai-substantial dimension has often been noted b y
exegetes, who have produced both objective and excessively unilateral
interpretations. Heimsoeth's remark, however, remains valid; he has s t a t e d

do not cancel out his metaphysical bent. See, for example, the letter to Duke J o h a n n
Friedrich of 21st January 1675, in which the pressure of metaphysics and o n t o l o g y
even seems to mitigate the power of the principle of sufficient reason: "we think a n d
there is a great variety in our thoughts; now this variety of thoughts could not h a v e
come from what thinks, because one and the same thing could not be the cause of t h e
changes that occur in it [...] we shall always be obliged to admit that there is n o
reason at all for this variety which has from all eternity been found in our t h o u g h t s ;
for there is nothing in us that drives us to this rather than to something else.
Therefore there is some cause of the variety of our thoughts that lies o u t s i d e
ourselves." Cf. Ak, I, p. 492.
22
GPh VII, p. 14. On the two labyrinths (that of freedom or p r e d e s t i n a t i o n , and that of
the continuum) see the Essais de Theodiceee, §§ 24-25 and passim, in GPh VI, pp. 6 4 - 6 5 ,
129, 290, 323, 333, 343. The expression filum meditandi or plulosophandi is found i n
GPh I, p. 371, II, p. 492; IV. pp. 212, 313, 469; VII, pp. 14, 22. For a g e n e r a l
histonographical treatment see the study by E. Heintel, Die beiden Labyrinthe der
Philosophie, 3 vols., Oldenburg, Wien und München 1968.
72 Thought

that "philosophy before Leibniz is pure ontology. It begins with t h e

definition of substance, not with a cogito."23
Still, subjectivity is neither completely absorbed by the substantial
cosmos nor canceled out, but presents itself, in monadological terms, as one
of the poles. We should not forget that the philosophy of subjectivity took
impetus also from Leibniz, as Husserl noted with satisfaction and Heidegger
with disgruntlement. In monadology the cogito becomes substance, but in a
different way from Descartes' res cogitans, seperated from the res extensa.
The ontological fusion of corporeal and meditating substance,
corresponding to the concord between substance and phenomenon, which
are distinct yet harmoniously linked together, projects Leibniz's philosophy
into a sphere where thought and the essent tend to merge.
The theory of substance decidedly distances Leibniz from Descartes, and
opens up the possibility of a comparison with Heidegger. Indeed, if we start
from the theory of the monad it is easier to understand the connection
between the problem of mathesis universalis and that of metaphysics. The
dissociation that, as we have seen, is remarked between the study of p u r e
and applied mathematics and a sensitivity to ethical and theological
subjects is only an apparent rupture. More precisely, it is a difference t h a t
is also an identity. Now, however, after having identified the differences,
let us try to determine what the identity consists of.
The symmetry between scientific and metaphysical investigation is t h e
implementation of a basic need, which can be summed up by a passage in a
letter Leibniz wrote to Johann Friedrich, duke of Hannover, in 1679: "it is
necessary to push metaphysics much farther forward than has been done
up to now, to obtain the true notions of God and the soul, of the person,
substance and accidents." 2 4 This metaphysical drive seems to be the t r u e
character of Leibniz's meditation; the questions of ethics, of logic, of t h e
good, and of algebra all find the unwinding of their threads in this p r i m a r y
source. However, this is just a hypothetical interpretation, a direction for
inquiry, whose validity can be supported by the texts themselves. But the
same texts can also justifiably be used to support the opposite
interpretation, i.e., the thesis that the need for metaphysics originates in
the mathematical need and the consequent domination of logic. Both those

21
H. Heimsoeth, Die Methode der Erkenntnis bei Descartes und Leibniz, cit., Vol. II, p .
195. The problem of substance is developed by Leibniz especially in his
correspondence with Arnauld (GPh II, pp. 1-38) and with de Voider (GPh II, pp. 139-
283). On this subject cf. J. Jalabert, La theorie leibnizienne de la Substance, P.U.F.,
Paris 1947; W. Stegmaier, Substanz, Grundbegriff der Metaphysik, F r o m m an n-
Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1977, pp. 147-214.
24 Ak II, 1, p. 489.
 The Abacus and the Mirror 73

who derive Leibniz's metaphysics from his logic and those who t e n d
instead to fit his logic into the domain of metaphysics see something that is
actually present in Leibniz. It is not possible to trace a precise genealogical
line that enables us to identify the real dependence that links the t w o
spheres. Metaphysics and mathematics interweave unceasingly and form a
single identity. Metaphysics and mathematics are the same thing. In t e r m s
of the search for the Grund, the problem is rather one of seeing t h e
ontological relation, i.e., the presence of Being in the two dimensions, and of
seeing how the second aspect of the principle of reason speaks in Leibniz.
One of Leibniz's definitions of the sense and activity of meditating is: "to
make general reflections on what one is, and on what one will become; to
make, so to speak, a general confession of one's life to oneself." 25 In this
sense, to meditate is to delve into one's own soul: we are on a plane of
introspection that recalls Plato, in whose works the soul conducts a
dialogue with itself, or Descartes, for whom thought is self-reflection. But
here we are still at a preliminary stage, on a simple plane that precedes the
stratification of which the multiple plane of thought in its fullest sense is
composed. The shift from a pure introspective investigation, from a
founding of the world on the self-certainty of the ego, and from a m a n i f e s t
superiority of the consciousness at its highest level, i.e., that of
consciousness of self, to a network of relations between the subject and t h e
world is initiated by Leibniz with a very simple ontological move: t h e
individual monadic substance represents and expresses the entire u n i v e r s e
from its own point of view, but in this activity it also creates the tension
(conatus, appetitus) needed to transcend itself, so as to mirror and at t h e
same time to be the entire universe. By this move Leibniz obtains t w o
complementary results: on the ontological plane he realizes the s y n t h e s i s
between macrocosm and microcosm, which is an improvement over
previous attempts, in particular that of Cusano; while on the plane of logic
(here understood in the sense of pertaining to logos, or thought) an
interactive dynamics is set up between the processes of self-reflection, of
representation, of certitude and of the serenity of soul that would be t h e
outcome of a harmonious convergence between the realms of thought a n d
the world of beings. Where Descartes identifies and expresses a r u p t u r e ,
Leibniz discovers a connection, absorbing the persistent and ineliminable

2S
GPh VII, p. 78. Leibniz found a moment of self-understanding and elucidation of his
own thought in the dialogue entitled Confessio philosophi (1673), now in Ak. VI, III,
pp. 115-149. There is an important edition of this work by O. Saame (G.W. Leibniz,
Confessio philosophi, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1967), containing
an introduction and many explanatory notes.
74 Thought

difference between thinking subject and the thing thought into a "constant
and regulated relation": i.e., into the pre-established harmony.
We are thus able to define another image of Leibniz's idea of thought,
adding a further element to our investigation: thought tends toward t h e
foundation and, projecting itself into Being, expresses the vinculum
substantiate that runs through matter and spirit. Now Leibniz really seems
to have overcome the dichotomy between realism and nominalism,
preparing the way for Kant's critique of reason and also for Husserl's idea
of transcendence in immanence. It is therefore not unreasonable to
recognize in Leibniz a crucial point in metaphysics according to Heidegger;
indeed, it is a point which, like an unsolved problem, insistently urges
Heidegger to subject it to the verification of Seinsdenken. This cruciality is
also due to the special position Leibniz occupies with respect to Kant a n d
Husserl, who are some of the decisive reference points for Heidegger's
treatment of modern and contemporary philosophy.
Leibniz's idea of reflection is connected to that of representation: both
ideas make reference to the metaphor of the mirror, whose action must be
given an almost ontological value. Splitting into perceptio-adperceptio and
appetitio, reflection branches out respectively towards pure knowledge and
towards Being. In relation to knowledge it is self-consciousness and
apperception of the intelligible, while in relation to Being it is agere in se
ipsum and tension towards the transcendent.
Reflection is therefore never simply introjection, absorption,
subsumption, but is also accompanied by expressing, projecting,
expounding. One of the reasons that caused Heidegger to be attracted to
Leibniz's concept of conatus, the main feature of monadic activity, can b e
traced precisely to the ek-static role of representation. 2 6 In this
perspective, reflection is impulse, drive, pro-ject. To be sure, it is still a
pro-ject in the sense of putting-before-oneself, of Gegen-stellen, and hence
still entangled in aggressive objectivism. But in reflection, as it appears in
26
Appreciation for Leibniz's conception of the conatus inherent in the monads
(Heidegger translates conatus with the term Drang) is shown in a bringing t o g e t h e r
of the appetitive drive of the vis activa and the concept of transcendence. The
ontological interpretation of conatus is interwoven with an existential reading of t h e
monad's representative force. Cf. HGA 26, pp. 102ff. For Heidegger's 1928 lectures, t h e
reader is referred to my article Logique on metaphysique? En marge des lecons
heideggeriennes de 1928 sur Leibniz, "Etudes phenomenologiques", n. 5-6, 1987, pp.
171-192, and to the paper by O. Saame, Leibniz-Rezeption in Heideggers Vorlesungen,
IV. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Hannover 1983, pp. 929-935. Cf. also W. Janke,
Die Zeitlichkeit der Repräsentation. Zur Seinsfrage bei Leibniz, in Durchblicke.
Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1970, pp. 255-
283; K. Sakai, Zum Wandel der Leibniz-Rezeption im Denken Heideggers, "Heidegger
Studies," Vol. 9, 1993, pp. 97-124.
 The Abacus and the Mirror 75

Leibniz, we also find (albeit in a crude form) the problems of

transcendence and memory, of projection and Care, in short of e k - s i s t e n c e .
Even though in Leibniz we see the persistence of a vice of thinking in terms
of infinity, which does not allow him to think of reflection in terms of
existentive finitude, as Heidegger proposes, still the roots of this concept
seem to sink directly into the ground of the principle of reason, more t h a n
into that of the principle of identity or of non-contradiction. It thus s e e m s
possible to cultivate, in Leibniz's idea of reflection, what Robinet has called
"the root of existence," viz., the original and fundamental power of
existence "experienced as affectivity, absence, waiting, desire, project." 2 7 I n
other words, it seems feasible to investigate thoroughly the ontological
aspect of Leibniz's thought by using the conceptual plexus that joins
together the questions of metaphysics, the principle of reason and
meditation. Moreover, Leibniz himself seems to encourage such
perspectives, insisting on the need to overcome mechanistic conceptions of
the universe and the urgency of making metaphysics advance. There is
only an apparent contradiction between the idea of developing
metaphysics and that of focusing attention on the relations between
thought and existence. We could perhaps even dare to use the t e r m
synthesis in defining this state of interweaving, if we also add the adjective
"disjunctive," so as to highlight the gap or difference that becomes part of
this union of metaphysics and existence.
Let us now take a look at the group of writings composed between t h e
spring and autumn of 1676 and revolving around the topics of the m e a n i n g
of life and philosophizing. In these pages (which, on account of their being
almost a confession, we might call "hidden papers") Leibniz reveals a basic
difference between his approach and the gnoseological impulse of t h e
philosophy of science which, from Bacon to Descartes, marked the
beginning of modern thought. Whereas the scientific vocation of t h e s e
thinkers, though pretending to be universal, does not manage to o v e r c o m e
the barriers that separate empiricism and metaphysics, applying to t h e
latter those limitations that Kant was later to perfect, Leibniz's image of
science is incomparably more complex, more subtle, and more open to a n d
projected onto a metaphysical background. The "use of meditation" which

27
A. Robinet, Leibniz et la racine de I'existence, Seghers, Paris 1962, p. 25. The
possible existentialist interpretation of monadology is quite noticeable also in t h e
study by W. Janke, Leibniz. Die Emendation der Metaphysik, Klostermann, F r a n k f u r t
am Main 1963, especially Chapter V, pp. 179-234. Cf. also the work by H. Ropohl, Das
Eine und die Welt. Versuch zur Interpretation der Leibniz'schen Metaphysik, Hirzel,
Leipzig 1936; already in the 1930s he suggested a comparison and a rapprochement
(on the subject of concrete existence and "worldness") between Leibniz and
Heidegger.
76 Thought

Leibniz recommends and whose criteria and objectives he defines goes

beyond the restrictions that a rigorously empirical science sets itself. For
example, when he speaks of a clear, intuitive or most perfect knowledge, as
opposed to one that is confused and blind, he does not merely long for
objectivity, with absolute proofs and certainty, as Descartes does, but h e
hints at a comprehensive meaning in which the apodeictic knowledge of
the cogito is merged with the visio mystica, viz., an overall meaning in
which, however, sectorial differences are maintained. The boundaries of
the search for knowledge, happiness and the good are moved forward:
"only wisdom is capable of making us perfectly happy"; but here we a r e
dealing with a basic philosophical disposition in which the barriers of
experience are beaten down and replaced with harmonic fields, w h e r e i n
the novel and only apparently contradictory space of a metaphysical
experience can be found. We can subdivide Leibniz's reflections in this
sense into three areas: a) meditation; b) wisdom; c) happiness.
a) Thought, in the form that Leibniz calls meditation, is not a dimension
lying outside our ontic existence; it is not a method that the human intellect
arrives at by applying an agnostic exclusion and an antimetaphysical
barricade. There is "a light born with us," 28 a luminosity of thought t h a t
not only "goes beyond the senses and matter" but also surrounds a n d
involves the concrete monad. Thought does not manifest itself as an
hypostasis that separates and distracts the intellect from the sphere of
substance to which it is originally tied. The vinculum substantielle does not
permit rationalistic caesuras, or more precisely it does not e n g e n d e r
eccentric progressions of reason: thanks to it a dangerous miscegenation of
the empirical limitation of knowledge and the rationalistic abstraction of
the faculty of representation is avoided. The harmony of thought is an
innate lumen that is different from any mentalistic solution and that moves
beyond the pillars of Hercules represented by realism and idealism.
For Leibniz, philosophy is meditation. Philosophizing is understood as a
preparation of the spirit to receive metaphysics. Philosophy is
contemplation and turning one's thoughts towards the Grund of the essent.
The vinculum that in the first place determines the essence of meditatio is
composed of the representative relation that the supreme monad
establishes with individual monads: thinking is, as a first approximation
and in a general sense, realizing one's vision in God, i.e., intuition (a "most
perfect" type of knowledge) of the divine essence. If, first of all, we note
that this conception reaches back in time to Cusano's idea of the intuition of
essences and also looks forward, in some way, to Husserl's related idea of

28 GPh VI, p. 496.

 The Abacus and the Mirror 11

Wesensschau, we do not intend to propose only a historiographical

excursus, but we also wish to make explicit a twofold problem that can
help us to answer the question: what does "thinking" mean for Leibniz? The
parts of this problem are arranged symmetrically, in an antithetical b u t
(for Leibniz) complementary position. They are the metaphysical (indeed,
almost mystical) impulse to pursue knowledge as a visio beatifica, and t h e
logical aspiration for a clear and indubitable knowledge of beings as
possession of the mathesis universalis. Cusano and Husserl here stand for
the two possible aspects of this twofold structure; indeed, they i n c a r n a t e
not only the customary and irreducible contradiction between the t w o
extremes, but also (particularly Husserl, since he comes later in history) an
example of an unwonted approaching of the poles. The thesis I wish to
establish here is that this juxtaposition of contraries has in Leibniz a
paradigmatic and, perhaps, unsurpassed outcome. 29
The activity of representation is the basic moment of thought, the u n i o n
of individual and universal, the fusion of perspectives, the intersecting of
microcosm and macrocosm. To think thus means to recognize the cosmic
harmony that governs the existence of the monads and of all the o t h e r
beings. In this sense, thought acquires vitalism, becoming part of t h e
harmonious whole. The access of thought to life is consolidated in an
interpenetration of the two realms: in truth, if "existere nihil aliud esse
quam harmonicum esse", and if universal harmony represents the infinite
plateau of being and of cogitare, then thought and being are linked in
harmony. It is obvious that, from this point of view, to think means to

20 The presence of Husserl in the evolutionary history of Leibniz's monadology must

be accepted, in the first place if only because Husserl took up the conception of
monadology in his Cartesian Meditations. Even a well-known student of Leibniz s u c h
as Belavel includes Husserl's phenomenology (as well as Heidegger) among t h e
"transformations" of monadology. Cf. Y. Belaval, Etudes leibniziennes, Gallimard, Paris
1976, p. 170. The importance of this relation is seen both in Husserl's published works
and in his unpublished manuscripts; it did not escape the attention of a
phenomenologist such as E. Paci, who dedicated his last university course to t h e
Problem of Monadology from Leibniz to Husserl (Problema della monadologia da
Leibniz a Husserl, Cuem, Milano 1976; reprinted by Unicopli, Milano 1978). Cf. also H.L.
van Breda, Leibniz' Einfluß auf das Denken Husserls, in Akten des Internationalen
Leibniz-Kongresses (14-19 Nov. 1966), 5 vols., Steiner, Wiesbaden 1967, Vol. V, pp. 124-
145. This relation was pointed out also by A. Robinet, Leibniz und wir, Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, Göttingen 1967. See also the study by D. Mahnke, Eine neue Monadologie,
"Kantstudien," Ergänzungsheft, Bd. 39, 1917, who hypothesizes a development of
phenomenology in a monadological sense. Also the book by A. Gurwitsch, Leibniz.
Eine Philosophie des Panlogismus, de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1974, is devoted to this
subject.
78 Thought

correspond to the principle of reason: one can account for everything that
is, and if we know the pre-established harmonious agreement that governs
everything that is, we activate in thought the principle of reason.
Therefore, if "the axiom that nothing is without reason must be considered
the most important and the most fruitful in all human knowledge, and [if]
much of metaphysics, physics and moral science is based on it," if
"everything that has no mathematical necessity must be related to it," 30
then thought seems to be exactly the substantial form of the Satz vom
Grund.
But down which route does the path unwind to lead us to the
completeness of the principle of reason in thought? In one way, the p a t h
leads us through the logical and formal stages of knowledge; in the
Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis of 1684, Leibniz traces the
outline of knowledge, divided into an ascending series of pairs: from
cognitio clara, whose opposite is obscura,to distincta (opposite: confusa), to
adaequata (opposite: inadaequata), up to intuitiva (opposite: symholica)^
The formal gnoseological progression has a priori intuitive knowledge at its
summit. And it is also on these logical and conceptual structures t h a t
Leibniz's thought finds its complete extension. But there is, besides, b e y o n d
and above the formal determinations, a sphere that is no longer operative
but creative, where thought thinks. This is the sphere where the "internal
experience" of the individual takes place, where the individual frees
himself of the pensees sourdes and attains to a knowledge more
mathematico, which is of a superior nature because it is no longer tied to
the world of sensation. Here the quest is undertaken for a science that is, so
to speak, exact, endowed with "infallible laws," which Aristotle (in Leibniz's
view) was the first to grasp in a non-sensory, and at the same time non-
rational, sense, "so that he was in reality the first to write mathematically
outside mathematics." 3 2 But this indubitable knowledge also thinks in a
strictly metaphysical sense: that is, it founds an ontology as a synthesis of

M)
GPh VII, p. 301. The text quoted here presents one of Leibniz's formulations of the
principles of sufficient reason and of contradiction; as H. Büchner relates, it was read
with attention by Heidegger. In 1954 Büchner and his friend H. Boeder, students of
Heidegger's, received from their master the suggestion to translate and study this text
by Leibniz, which begins with the words: "Cum animadvertem plerosque omnes de
principiis meditantes aliorum potius exempla quam rerum naturam sequi, et
praejudicia etiam cum id maxime profitentur, non satis evitare, de meo tentandum
aliquid altiusque ordiendum putavi." Heidegger added that this first sentence of
Leibniz's text had for some time been the epigraph of his manuscripts. Cf. H. Büchner,
Fragmentarisches, in Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, edited by G. Neske, Neske,
Pfullingen 1977, p. 48.
u
GPh IV, pp. 422-426.
u
G.W. Leibniz, Letter to G. Wagner (1696), in GPh VII, p. 519.
 The Abacus and the Mirror 79

the oppositions of thought. "In every infallible science, if it is d e m o n s t r a t e d

with precision, the higher logical forms are, so to speak, i n c o r p o r a t e d
[einverleibt]."**
Metaphorically endowed with a body (Leib) of its own, t h o u g h t
manifests itself in its essence as a metaphysical experience. This is a d d e d
to the logical and formal degrees of knowledge, which mark the phases in
the search for truth, gradually moving towards a "first philosophy" as a
perfect fusion of ontology and ethics, that is to say of metaphysics a n d
logic. For Leibniz, first philosophy means an intuitive knowledge of God, of
the soul and of happiness. He makes complete use of the traditional
structures of philosophy; the threefold division of first philosophy in
reality represents a distinction of metaphysica generalis into special
domains: theology, gnoseology, and ethics. To make progress on the w a y
from first philosophy means to tend towards perfection, towards a s p h e r e
where thought will constantly be in fieri, orientated towards a fulfillment
that is always being perfected. For Leibniz the search for principles is not a
static epistemology, but rather a dynamic revelation. The stages that lead
to the dimension of incessant appetition, to the sphere of thought as a flow
of conatus, follow a gradual ascent, which lifts thought from the simplest
level to the most complex.
In an almost pedagogical tone (appropriate for expounding p r e c e p t s
that Descartes would have called "rules to guide the intellect," but which
Leibniz interprets as suggestions for understanding and accepting t h e
harmony between thought and the universe), the essay De Vusage de la
Meditation indicates propaedeutically the steps of increasing difficulty t h a t
thought has to climb up. First of all, "whoever wants to meditate on t h e
elevated things on which his happiness depends must above all e x e r t
himself for some time on the easy problems where there is no danger of
being wrong and it is not difficult to open one's eyes." This point is
translated into a cognitive scheme: "in the questions of a b s t r a c t
mathematics dealing with numbers and lines it is not dangerous to b e
deceived nor is it difficult to open one's eyes. In matters of applied
mathematics (regarding movement, law, etc.) it is not dangerous to fail, b u t
here the difficulty of climbing up properly begins, though the p r o b l e m s
seem rather simple. On questions of true metaphysics and morals, based on

"Ibid. Perhaps it is useful to note that Husserl, in his own copy of Leibniz's works ( i n
the Erdmann edition) underlines the passage quoted, adding "N.B.," precisely with
reference to the term einverleibt, in which perhaps he found his own concept of
Leib (one's own body) as the real incarnation of formal ontology and t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
logic. The works of Leibniz annotated by Husserl are to be found in Husserl's p e r s o n a l
library, conserved at the Husserl Archive of Louvain.
80 Thought

clear demonstrations and established revelations, it is extremely i m p o r t a n t

not to fail and extremely difficult to succeed well. This explains why one
must begin with the first type of questions and proceed upwards, by way
of the second type, to the third. The reason for the degrees of happiness is
that in the first type experience and imagination can accompany reasoning
step by step [...] in the second type experience can help to examine, b u t
cannot guide [...] in the third, one would not know how to reach experience
in the course of this life."34
The lifting of the spirit to the problems related to metaphysical t r u t h s
seems to be a response to a basic orientation that Leibniz intends to give to
his philosophy, and which is almost a teleological need, urging him to bring
meditation to the fundamental and, in itself, primary sphere, which gathers
together reason, the modes and meanings of individual existence and
universal being. It seems that in this division the sciences are structured in
order by importance: mathematics, algebra, physics, and logic have their
foundations in metaphysics. In what may be considered one of Leibniz's
few sketches of the history of philosophy, he establishes a ranking order of
the sciences: science must be made to agree with pietas (concordia scientiae
cum pietate), so as to disclose the priority of the final cause over t h e
efficient cause. On the basis of this primacy, it is established that "principia
ipsa rei Mechanicae et totius Physicae non esse Mechanica sive
Mathematica, sed Metaphysical7,5 Physics and mathematics seem not only
to be comprehensible on the basis of metaphysics, but also to depend on it.
In their preparatory role, the other sciences start the spirit on its way to
understanding the supreme verities, which are then unveiled to thought in
metaphysical meditation; only in such meditation is knowledge revealed to
man: " neminemque ad summam veritatis arc em perventurum qui non in
ipsa Metaphysica sit versatus"™ All the sciences are traced back to
metaphysics, and all are its handmaidens: "it must be admitted t h a t
Metaphysics, or natural Theology, which deals with the immaterial
substances [...] is the most important of all." 37
On the one hand, Leibniz seems to structure his reflections in a
visionary knowledge, in a philosophy of revelation with initiatory a n d
quasi-mystical overtones, designed as a meditative esotericism, while on
the other he goes in the direction of an almost practical exoteric series of
precepts, a sort of teaching manual containing rules that should b e

34GPh VII, pp. 79-80.

™ Ibid., p. 136.
36
Ibid., p. 137.
n
Rommel II, p. 99 (letter to Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels of 28th November-8th
December 1686).
 The Abacus and the Mir rot- Si

observed by anyone who wishes to follow it in the gnoseological

ascension.™ Leibniz's scheme should be read in this twofold, inextricably
linked way; it is a sort of "how-to" list for thought: "(1) One must begin
with the mathematics of numbers and lines. (2) One must try to a p p l y
them to examples, that is to say to the laws of movement, to the estimation
of cases, to jurisprudence, in a word to rather subtle and delicate q u e s t i o n s
that are in our power, but which require precautions that are far m o r e
essential than in pure mathematics, because the attempts and figures t h a t
help and serve us as confirmation in arithmetic and geometry begin to
abandon us in this kind of questions regarding semi-incorporeal things,
such as movement, force, pleasure, degrees of probability, and law: this will
lead us up to entirely abstract things, for which there is no way to achieve
certainty by means of attempts. (3) For from this level one must reach first
philosophy or the knowledge of God and the soul. And add to it w h a t
suffices starting from antiquity to give an adequate foundation to belief
regarding the revelations. (4) On this basis one must establish a good
morality. (5) One can divide the rest of the time between the duties of life,
conversations, sensual pleasures, experiences, imaginings, and a b s t r a c t
meditations. (6) Finally, having by now taken steps for the future [...] o n e
will become used to putting continuously into practice the rules a g r e e d
upon with oneself. (7) And in this way one will spend the rest of one's d a y s
in profound tranquillity, with a contentment that surpasses everything this
world holds that is sweet. N.B. A few sufficiently strong spirits could begin
with the third point, especially if they are lucky enough to be able to u s e
the completely founded demonstrations of others. For, however
extraordinary a man may be, it will be difficult for him <to find them b y
him>self <without the> help <of mathema>tics." 39
Consequently, with its almost pedagogical aim, as well as an eye on a
more profound level of revelation, this scale is not only a gnoseological
ranking, but also a spectrum of ethical values. Leibniz's hope that a vision
of the foundation of the universe will coincide with tranquillity of t h e
human soul is the expression of a full awareness that resolves
harmoniously (i.e., monadologically) the problem of the unhappy
consciousness that Hegel was later to resolve dialectically. Philosophy as
meditation absorbs and annuls any opposition between the subjective
consciousness (conscientia) and divine providence (praevidentia). Thus for
Leibniz to think means to re-present the harmony. But the peaceful n a t u r e

38
Cf. K.R. Wöhrmann, Die Unterscheidung von Exoterik und Esoterik bei Leibniz, i n
"Studia Leibnitiana," Supplementa, Vol. XXI (1980), Akten des internationalen Leibniz-
Kongresses 1977, Vol. Ill, pp. 72-82.
39
Ak VI, III, pp. 666-667.
82 Thought

that transpires from the last stage of the meditative journey is not to be
confused with a quietistic inertia, against which Leibniz argued repeatedly.
In this case, Leibniz's concept of meditation, on account of its active
character (corresponding basically to the nature of substance and of t h e
monads) indirectly retraces the concept of mysticism of Ugo di San Vittore:
meditatio as a concept is opposed to contemplatio. There is no falling off
into passivity and inaction: even thinking, for Leibniz, remains a matter of
conatus (Drang, in the translation proposed by Heidegger). It is an
appetitive impulse which, besides urging the monad to pass from one
perceptive situation to another, also exerts pressure to cause knowledge to
arrive at ever newer levels. In the final analysis, the goal of the itinerary
that Leibniz assigns to the human spirit is to be sought in the concept of
newness. Thinking is, therefore, not an activity that tends toward a state of
quietness, a definitive immobility; rather, it tries to reach, and spurs the
thinking and living subject to try to reach, a condition of inexhaustible
motion. It is as if thought had to become dynamic, even attaining a state of
perpetual tension, destined to be conserved and to have repercussions on
scientific discoveries, on moral action, and on metaphysical illumination.
Whoever follows the stages outlined by this programme of Leibniz's
"will find himself transformed in a moment, and will himself be able to
observe the difference between his past and present judgments. His
feelings will no longer be vacillating; his anxieties will be transformed into
a true repose: and the moment he begins to take delight in logical t r u t h s
will be the hour of his conversion." 4 0 The expression "repose" should not
induce us to think that the conversion Leibniz speaks of leads to a sort of
quietistic version of the separateness typical of Descartes' res cogitans.
Tranquillity of mind (Gemüthsruhe) is the fulfillment and achievement of
the maximum intensity of the thinking conatus. The moment of conversion
is the attainment of this level, which is indispensable for activating
thought; but the conversion is not only a cognitive aim, but also an ethical
one, or rather it is the ethical aspect of the meditative impulse. This
affinity is a response to the proposition that "Moralis scientia proles
Metaphysicae est. " 4 '

40
Ibid., p. 665.
41
GPh VII, p. 149. Leibniz's ethics rejects the excessive forms of "quietism" (cf. GPh
VI, pp. 55ff.; 530) and "enthusiasm" (GPh V, pp. 30-36; 487ff.). The repose or
tranquillity of the soul {resignatio, Gelassenheit), preached by the quietism of Miguel
de Molinos, is re-interpreted (but not completely rejected) by Leibniz in an active
sense, which is a consequence of his own theory of substance (a substance c a n n o t
cease to act). Cf. GPh IV, p. 429; Ak VI, III, p. 142; Dutens II, p. 225 (letter to Hansch of
25th July 1707); Rommel II, pp. 132-133; 193-196; GPh II, p. 577 (letter to Nicaise of 9th
August 1697).
 The Abacus and the Mirror 83

b) Meditative conversion procures wisdom, understood as a means for

leading an existence oriented towards the primae veritates and as the e n d
of a correct (i.e., harmonious: obedient to the principle of reason) use of t h e
capacity of reflection. This wisdom is an echo of the sapientia transmitted
by God to men, which is made manifest in theology and philosophy, and in
their history through the centuries. Leibniz's concept of wisdom seems t h u s
to be linked to that of Philosophia perennis, which Leibniz himself used on
one occasion; this concept is a synthesis of "repose" and theoretical
appetition, as an ethical point of arrival and a metaphysical point of
departure, i.e. as a subjective-monadic reflection of the d i v i n e - u n i v e r s a l
panlogism. The acquisition of wisdom seems to be a procedure similar to
the perennialness of philosophical research: it is never settled once and for
all, but is always in quest of the meta-physical. As the outcome of an
attitude in compliance with the dictates of the above table, wisdom is also a
heuristic fragment of the cosmic harmonization; it enables us to discover
the traces of truth without rendering it rigid in a definitive system. By this
incessant operation "gold will be extracted from the mire, the d i a m o n d
from its mine, light from the darkness, and this will be in effect perennis
quaedam Philosophia/142
Resulting in wisdom, Philosophia perennis takes shape as an ethical
drive towards metaphysical perfection (in a progressive, and not i m m o b i l e
sense); in this way philosophy is interwoven with the honum
metaphysic urn .47> "Wisdom is a perfect knowledge of the principles of all
the sciences, and of the art of applying them. [...] The art of applying t h e s e
principles as needed contains within itself the art of judging or r e a s o n i n g
well, the art of inventing unknown truths and finally the art of
remembering what one knows." 4 4 One must achieve a perfect mix of t h e s e
three dimensions if one wants to fulfill the task of Philosophia perennis.
One must also interpret the particular sciences in a generic unity: "the
entire body of the sciences may be viewed as the ocean, which is

42
G.W. Leibniz, Letter to Remond of 26th August 1714, GPh III, pp. 624-625. On t h e
meaning and use made by Leibniz of the concept of philosophia perennis, cf. HJ. de
Vleeschauwer, Perennis quaedam Philosophia, in "Studia Leibnitiana," Supplementa I
(1968), Akten des internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses 1966, Vol. I, pp. 102-122; R.
Meyer, Leibniz, und die Philosophia perennis, in Tradition und Kritik, Festschrift für
Rudolf Zocher zum 80. Geburtstag, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1967,
pp. 223-254. For a histonographical view, cf. C.B. Schmitt, Perennial Philosophy: from
Agostino Steuco to Leibniz, "Journal of the History of Ideas," XXVII, 1966, pp. 505-532.
43
Cf. A. Heinekamp, Zu den Begriffen realitas, perfect um und honum metaphy sicum,
in "Studia Leibnitiana," Supplementa I (1968), Akten des internationalen Leibniz-
Kongresses 1966, Vol. I, pp. 207-222.
44
Ak VI, III, pp. 669-670.
84 Thought

continuous everywhere, and without any division into parts, even if m e n

conceive of it as having parts and give them names for their own
convenience. And just as there are unknown seas, or ones that have b e e n
sailed on only by the rare vessel that chance has driven that way, so too
one can say that there are sciences of which something has been learned
only by accident and without design." 45
On the plane of method, this sea of knowledge is investigated by
following the three ways indicated above: reasoning, inventing (ars
inveniendi), remembering. To reason means to make the logical plane
correspond with the metaphysical one, i.e., to make the basic axioms of
thought (the principle of identity or non-contradiction, the principle of
sufficient reason, the principle of the identity of indiscernibles) coincide
with the first metaphysical principles (e.g., unity, the substantiality of the
monad, harmony) so as to ensure the existence of all the presuppositions
for an authentic philosophy. To invent means, above all, to discover: ars
inveniendi is the art of discovering the principles of reasoning and of
things. To invent is, to some extent, to systematize the sciences in an
adequate fashion, after having revealed their internal structures: this
ordering is necessary, Leibniz says, because "at present human knowledge
of nature seems to me to be like a warehouse filled to brimming with goods
of all sorts, but devoid of order and inventory." 46 To invent then means also
to make an inventory of knowledge, hypotheses and the possibiities of
their reciprocal combinations. The ars inveniendi is therefore linked with
the combinatoria, in which the relations between basic and derived ideas,
between logically necessary structures and factually existing ones are laid
out. Remembering is a synonym for calling to mind what is needed for
thought. Let us take a look at some suggestions for activating this faculty: it
is necessary to be always present to oneself, viz., ready to "meditate in t h e
tumult, at any occasion, in danger, in one's own study." That is, one should
be able to reflect in any circumstance. Then it is necessary to become
accustomed to considering the number, the differences, and the analogies
between things, and to create mnemonic devices that enable one to
remember bits of knowledge whose connection with logical principles is not
immediately comprehensible. Lastly, one can and must compile a sort of
"portable manual" of the things that it is more or less important to
remember. But, aside from this basically practical value, memory is a
structure connected with that of the monad. The function of memory is
grafted onto the monadic substance. As always in Leibniz, the functional

45
BH, p. 123.
46
GPh VII, p. 296.
 The Abacus and the Mirror 85

element, which we could recognize in the logical and operative one (in t h e
case of memory, it is the comhinatoria that plays this role), is grafted onto
the substantial element, i.e., onto the metaphysical and theological e l e m e n t .
Remembering is self-consciousness, in Leibniz's sense: a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
expression of the world according to the point of view of the m o n a d .
Leibniz's concept of memory is a mixture of reflection and i n v o l u n t a r y
memory, of mnemotechny and the unintentional manifestation of the p r e -
established harmony. By means of memory one can uncover the u n i t a r y
nature of knowledge, a mirror of the fundamental unity of being. To
remember is to mirror; to reflect on memory may mean to illuminate "the
idea of continuity in the substantial interiority of the thinking monad." 47
Reasoning, inventing and remembering make up a psychological a n d
ontlogical whole that represents the activity of the individual conscience. 11
is through these phases that the personal identity of the subject is
established: an internal identity (the monad recognizes itself as the s a m e
monad) and an external one (the monad is perceived in its identity b y
other monads). To become aware of this overall identity means to r e a c h
wisdom as a moral identity: viz., an identity of reason (corresponding to the
foundation of extra-individual or divine truths) and an identity of fact
(related to the principle of sufficient reason, which governs the truths of
existence). Identity is a "sentiment of self," "thinking and i m m e d i a t e
reflection," inner experience brought alive by all the apperceptive relations
with the world. There is thus no place of consciousness, understood as a n
extended area in which consciousness is located; consciousness is a l w a y s
movement, a "becoming aware," an act of recognizing something. It has no
extension because it is pure flowing, a synthetic stream of perception a n d
apperception: if "the continuity and connection of perceptions in actual fact
constitute the same individual [...] the apperceptions (i.e., the a p p e r c e p t i o n
of past feelings) prove the moral identity and reveal the real identity." 4 8
"Consciousness always accompanies thought," Leibniz affirms, with a
transcendental tone that looks forward to Kant's connection between t h e
self and its representations; but this does not always occur with a vigilant
re-cognition: "consciousness may be silent, as in forgetfulness." Thus t h e
safekeeping of identity is entrusted to infinitesimal perceptions, the petites
perceptions.,49 Whether an actual or a virtual presence, consciousness exerts

17
Cf. E. Naert, Memoire et conscience de soi selon Leibniz, Vrin, Paris 1961, p. 11.
48
G.W. Leibniz, Nouveanx Essais, Book II, Chapter XVII, in GPh V, p. 222. This is t h e
important chapter on identity and diversity.
4(
Ibid., p. 220. The petites perceptions are almost unconscious perceptions, which t h e
subject is aware of in a discontinuous way. On this subject see H Strahm. Die "petites
perceptions" im System von Leibniz, Bouvier, Bonn 1930, and R. Herbertz, Die Lehre
86 Thought

apperception-perception and at the same time memory of itself; when w e

notice something, we remember having noticed it; that is, "consciousness is
the memory of our actions," since "it is the memory or the knowledge of
the Self that makes it [consciousness] capable of punishment and reward." 5 0
To point up the difference between the general meaning of the t e r m
"consciousness," as being equivalent to spirit or soul, and the restricted
meaning, related to the awareness that the self has of itself, he coins t h e
term consciosite, which is something like the relais between intentionality
and petites perceptions. The untranslatability of this term does not p r e v e n t
us from grasping its innermost meaning, approaching it at least by m e a n s
of a group of words that is present in or near to this term: reflexive
submission (conscia sui) balanced between certainty (conscience; Gewissen)
and a scrupulous attempt that has not yet taken possession of the t r u t h
(conscientiositas).51
c) Happiness is not a state of mind produced by external circumstances
and independent of the self's states of consciousness and knowledge. The
increase and the perfection of knowledge procure a proportional
consolidation of happiness of the spirit. In this sense it is true, as t h e
saying goes, that "wisdom is nothing but the science of happiness."
Gliickseeligkeit is the word used by Leibniz: it means happiness, but also
blessedness; but like all the other concepts we have examined, it must not
be taken statically, as if knowledge and wisdom were transformed into an
unshakeable ataraxia. The blessed life (vita be at a) is therefore not t h e
absence of needs and will, but a re-signification of theoretical and moral
needs within the ontological concatenation of harmony. When he writes
that "the happy life on earth consists in a completely content and tranquil
soul," Leibniz is not at all thinking of a situation of blessed expectation of
the will of providence; rather, he locates in Gemiithsruhe the optimal
condition for putting into practice one's freedom, volition and theoretical
faculties, in perfect harmony (this, indeed, seems to be the true sense of
Volkommenheit, the concept of perfection) with the intermonadic whole.
Happiness, too, is internally subdivided into stages that gradually
approach the full and complete idea of it. To reach it, we should follow
these rules: (a) it is necessary to understand what is to be done and what is
not to be done, thus learning what is established by reason; (b) one m u s t
apply in practical life what reason has taught us in theory; (c) t h e
combined action of these two rules will persuade us that everything w e
have not obtained, even though we have scrupulously followed these rules,

vom Uiibewussten im System des Leibniz, Niemeyer, Halle 1905, especially pp. 6Iff.
so
G.W. Leibniz, Discours de metaphysique, § 34, in GPh IV, p. 460.
S1
Cf. GPh V, pp. 218ft.
 The Abacus and the Mirror 87

should not be considered an authentic good. In this way we e l i m i n a t e

useless doubts and aspirations.
a) In this first phase, the activity of discerning between good and evil,
between truth and appearance, is almost a hermeneutical exercise in
understanding the essence of life. Wisdom, besides being an element of
thought, is here also a part of happiness. Each individual's pursuit of
happiness of the soul is also an attempt to interpret the structures of
human existence, thus corresponding to the demand for factual truth a n d
the energy of the existentificans. b) This hermeneutic task is in its turn t h e
presupposition and outcome of a thorough mastery of the art of reasoning.
The journey towards happiness also passes through an adequate use of
theoretical and rational categories in practical affairs, in the realm of facts,
practical life and ethics. Leibniz calls this stage virtue, a habit of
truthfulness as a good interpretation of reason, both human and universal.
c) Therefore, "after having done everything possible to know the true good
and to attain it [...] one must always keep one's spirit calm, w i t h o u t
complaining about anything." 52
Happiness is directly connected with the infinite, because it has no
limits imposed from the outside, but is only achieved in a yearning towards
the unlimited, taken as a hypothesis of "reachableness," of t h e
inexhaustible perfectibility of moral completeness. He states that "our
happiness will never be, and should by no means ever be, a state of
complete joy, in which there is nothing more to desire f...], but rather it
should be a perpetual progress towards new pleasures and new
perfections."^ Happiness is therefore conceived of as a metaphysics of t h e
extreme state, as a metaphysics of the infinitesimal, but also as an
existential projection of the harmonic link which, according to Leibniz,
characterizes Being. And Being must be understood as the totality of b o t h
the essent and the possible, in a fusion of what is actual with what is
virtual.

With this return to the thought of Being, Leibniz's concept of m e d i t a t i o n

completes its parabola. Alongside its obviously scientific traits, apparent in
the nominalistic and didactic approach based on "positive" prescriptions,
rules and methods of investigation, one cannot help but notice a
metaphysical outine, from which the essential aspects of a pure ontological
foundation of thought clearly emerge; this foundation is prior to t h e

^2 Ak VI, III, p. 668.

^ G.W. Leibniz, Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, fondes en raison, § 18, in GPh VI,
p. 606.
88 Thought

scientific and operational part. This twofold background may be m o r e

disturbing and disconcerting than the mere juxtaposition of the two
spheres: it may help us to discover (i.e., bring to light, but also hypothesize)
that Leibniz's answer to the question "What does it mean to think?" does
not lie completely within the sphere of calculation, but proves to be a
mixture of calculation and meditation (in Heidegger's sense), developed to
an extent found nowhere else in modern and contemporary thought, a n d
perhaps equal in profundity only to the dawning moment of Greek thought.
Schneiders has spoken of a "twofold point of view," giving us to u n d e r s t a n d
that there is no one, single answer to the question of priority. 5 4 But it
hardly seems sufficient to point out the oscillation between metaphysics
and science if we wish to grasp the real "quiddity" of Leibniz's thought,
which seems to take root in a form of vis meditandi that releases
surprising reflections of a thought of Being like that sought after b y
Heidegger. The scarcity and brilliancy of these reflections show that we a r e
dealing with analogies that are at times very clear, yet they are insufficient
for us to trace complex and organic parallels.
In analyzing the ontological implications of the principle of reason,
Heidegger was looking for the presence of Being in the principle itself. At
bottom, he was seeking Being in the whole of Leibniz's thought, noting a
widespread omission of Being as such, a forgetfulness only broken by v e r y
rare flashes of non-latency, which (albeit often unconsciously) illumine t h e
essence of Being. If we now follow a precise itinerary through Leibniz's
philosophical design, we can try to identify in our turn further evidence of
Seinsdenken in a sense very close to that of Heidegger.
From a theoretical point of view, the first and most important move in
this direction is Leibniz's rejection of Descartes' isolation of the cogito.
Leibniz replaces the rigid separation of thinking substance from e x t e n d e d
substance (that which is thought of), a pivotal doctrine in Descartes'
concept of philosophy, with a relationistic version of the connection
between subject and object. The individual thinking substance is connected
with the accidental element, forming a monad-accident structure that,
leaping over all the scientific and rational thought developed until that
time, takes us back to the ontological fusion of the Greek thinkers, Aristotle
included. The thinking substance is therefore not only not separated from
its own body, but is even connected with transcendent objectness. Leibniz
proceeds along these lines so far as to posit a co-belonging b e t w e e n
"thinking self" and "things thought": he goes so far as to describe this

S4
Cf. W. Schneiders, Leibniz' doppelter Standpunkt, "Studia Leibnitiana," 3, 1971, pp.
161-190.
 The Abacus and the Mirror 89

relation as "co-originality", thus announcing an ontological rediscovery of

Pre-Socratic themes (especially those of Parmenides) which was later to
reach its full development in Heidegger. Co-originality has a m a i n l y
cognitive importance: "prima Experimenta nostra constat esse ipsas
internas perceptiones, nempe non tantum me esse qui cogitem, sed e t
varietatem esse in meis cogitationibus (quae due a se invicem
independentia et aeque originaria judico)."55 To conceive of the cogito a n d
the varia a me cogitantur as being "aeque originaria" means to prepare t h e
groundwork for a reformulation of the basic relation of thought, which w a s
later to find in Husserl's phenomenolgy and in Heidegger its s t a b l e
philosophical foundation. 56
Once this theoretical platform has been reached, philosophical r e s e a r c h
no longer risks sliding towards separation from the totality of the essent.
On the basis of this still precarious guarantee, the comparison that (from
the point of view of the very meaning of thinking, i.e., of the fulfillment of
the possibilities of human thought) is established between the logical-
mathematical and metaphysical spheres is left behind in moving towards a
particular co-originality. It is as if the plane of thought were multiple,
stratified, and yet belonged to the sole domain of what is. It is on this plane
that the two "souls" of Leibniz's philosophy take their positions. But this
comparison does not take place on mellowed registers, which let us catch a
glimpse, while we are yet far away, of the outcome of the reconciliation: on
the contrary, co-originality is both a point of departure and a point of
arrival, which passes through a radical difference between the two fields.
The harmony created is much stronger than any reconciliation: it is an
outlet of identity to which the difference between thought and calculation
comes after a clear opposition. In this light, co-originality in Leibniz is
presented as a condition that must be constantly protected, though w i t h o u t
deforming the peculiar nature of the two poles.

' s GPh IV, p 327.

"^ Leibniz's concept of aeque originaria shows strong r e s e m b l a n c e s with the r e l a t i o n
that Fichte establishes between subject and object. In the tradition of the p h i l o s o p h y
of subjectivity, Husserl reproposes this relation, calling it Gleichurspriinglichkeit
(co-onginality); this concept was taken up by Heidegger, who transferred it onto t h e
ontological plane (co-originality of thought and Being). This notion brings to l i g h t
close affinities between p h e n o m e n o l o g y , ontology and monadology. For the r e l a t i o n
between Leibniz and Fichte, see M. Zahn, Fichte und Leibniz, "Studia L e i b n i t i a n a " ,
Supplementa V (1971), Akten des i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n L e i b n i z - K o n g r e s s e s (1966), Vol. V I ,
pp. 105-115. For the relation between Fichte and Husserl, see H. Tietjen, Fichte und
Husserl, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1980. For a comparison of Fichte a n d
Heidegger, see F.W. von Herrmann, Heidegger und Fichte, in Der Idealismus und seine
Gegenwart, Festschrift für Werner Marx zu seinem 65. Geburtstag, Meiner, H a m b u r g
1976, pp. 232-256.
90 Thought

With regard to the importance of calculation, he seems to leave no room

for doubt: "modum ergo trader e aggredior, quo semper homines
ratiocinationes suas in omni argumento ad calculi formam exlihere
controversiosque omnes finire possunt, ut non jam clamoribus rent age re
necesse sit, sed alter alteri dicere possit: calculemus."51 To resolve any
controversy, it is enough for one party to say to the other: let us calculate.
In this way both ethical disputes and philosophical misunderstandings can
be settled: "sufficiet enim calamos in manus sumere sedereque ad abacos,
et sibi mutuo [...] dicere: calculemus."™ Here Leibniz's images are all of a
mathematical nature: ratiocination (we should not forget that Heidegger's
etymological research has connected ratio to reor: to compute, to calculate),
the abacus, calculation. In this case, to use mathematics means to h a v e
mastery of a sort of universal language, characteristica,which is applicable
to any circumstance and to any problem.
But, as we have seen, the use of mathematics is only an i n t e r m e d i a t e
stage on the way to meditation in the full sense. It is in this qualitative
sense that the value of the difference and of the relation b e t w e e n
mathematical thought and metaphysical thought lies. The introduction of
calculation into philosophy must not be understood as a "technifying" of
thought: Leibniz does not hold two different philosophies, but he is
thinking of a scientia generalis as the epistemological aspect of t h e
metaphysical intuition of the essence of the universal harmony. We m a y
point out, by the way, that, when viewed in terms of Seinsdenken, this
metaphysical slant seems to be only linguistically distant from Heidegger's
phenomenology of Being. This impulse towards ontological abstraction has
led people to speak also of an "integrating force" in Leibniz's philosophy: a
force that tends toward the fullness of metaphysics, not as "a mass of
univocally true or false principles, not a doctrinal edifice, but meditatio, i.e.,
the realization of reflection, a life based on the knowlege of truth." S 9 This
reflection is the root of existence, which cannot be torn from the ontological
terrain; it resembles the roots of the tree of philosophy described by

^7 GPh VII, p. 125. The role and meaning of the mathematical element are spelled o u t
in the study by M. Serres, Le Systeme de Leibniz, et ses modeles mathematiques, 2 vols.,
P.U.F., Paris 1968.
™ GPh VII, p. 200.
v;
Cf. A. Heinekamp, Die Rolle der Philosophiegeschichte in Leibniz' Denken, in
Leibniz als Geschichtsforscher, edited by A. Heinekamp, "Studia Leibnitiana,"
Sonderheft 10, Steiner, Wiesbaden 1982, pp. 137-138. A similar direction, in the s e n s e
of an affirmation of the spiritual and metaphysical role of the activity of L e i b n i z ' s
thought, is taken by the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of G.E. Barie, La spiritualita dell'essere e
Leibniz, CEDAM, Padova 1933 (see in particular pp. 377ff.).
 The Abacus and the Mirror 91

Heidegger in What is Metaphysics?, where Descartes' tree does not sink its
roots into the soil of metaphysics in order to reproduce the latter, but loses
its own roots in the ground-less, in the Abgrund where even m e t a p h y s i c s
sinks into the abyss.
In searching for a linguistic form capable of expressing the m a r r i a g e
between knowledge and existence, between mathesis and m e t a p h y s i c s ,
Leibniz is faced with the problem of finding a language in which
philosophy can make itself known. For example, in tackling a study of t h e
physical properties and characteristics of mirrors and refraction, 6 0 t h e
terminology he uses will necessarily have to take its place in the context of
scientific language. The analysis of the derivation of the laws of reflection
and refraction cannot escape the codes and technicalities of science. Still,
when he reflects on the relation between human existence and d i v i n e
eternity and speaks in metaphors, fielding expressions such as "inner light,"
"natural light," "reflection of monads," or mixing images of the living
mirror, of the bright thunderbolt, and creation with the problems of atoms,
physics and the infinitesimal, he poses a question of linguistic p e r m e a b i l i t y
between opposing fields. 61 Mathematical studies and their applications to
the natural sciences, as in the case of the refraction and reflection of light,
are certainly independent of and separate from metaphysics, at least as far
as their methodologies and procedures are concerned. Yet it is impossible
to think that Leibniz completely separated the two sectors and passed from
one to the other without taking with him in these shifts of a t t e n t i o n
anything from the opposing sector. It is not likely that a universalistic a n d
harmonizing mind such as his did not transfer elements of the exact
sciences into metaphysics and vice versa. This mixture should not,
however, be used to strengthen interpretations such as Russell's, w h o
reductively deduces metaphysics from logic and mathematics. The
exchange of expressions we have hypothesized and identified might i n d e e d
seem to justify the logician's thesis, but in that case we would neglect a n d
underestimate some parts of Leibniz's work in which he e x p o u n d s
theoretical tendencies that may not be very obvious but that are, precisely
for that reason, fundamental.
The hypothesis that metaphysics is prior to mathematics may seem no
more valid than the contrary idea, but there is one area of philosophy t h a t

f,
° Cf. G.W. Leibniz, Unicutn opticae, catoptricae et dioptricae principium (1682), quoted
in E. Ravier, Bibliographie des Oeuvres de Leibniz, Paris 1937, pp. 85ff. (anastatic
reprint: Olms, Hildesheim 1966).
61
Cf. DS II, pp 323ff On the problems involved in the relation between language and
logic, and between natural and artificial language, cf. M. Mugnai, Leibniz' Theory of
Relations, Studia Leibnitiana, Supplementa 28, Meiner, Stuttgart 1992.
92 Thought

Leibniz clearly wishes to free from this equalizing indifference, and that is
the sphere of first philosophy or thought in itself, in which m e t a p h y s i c s
comes face to face with theology. From this vantage point he undertakes a
philosophical reflection that, while taking God into consideration, does not
repeat the route taken by scholastic theology, but rather thinks of a
theodicy that falls outside the traditional canons; Leibniz assembles forms
of visio mystica for the study of the ens qua ens, combining perspectives
for the renewal of theology with backward glances towards ancient
ontology. This whole wide field, which is not easily classifiable, is kept b y
Leibniz outside the equation of logic and ontology.
It is true that Leibniz states that he has discovered that "true
metaphysics is no different from true logic, that is to say, from the art of
inventing in general," but it is precisely because "metaphysics is n a t u r a l
theology," and therefore God is the source of all knowledge, that the area of
the "absolute Being" must be removed from the equation; there must be no
possibility of affirming or motivating the priority of logic. As he writes to
the countess Elisabeth von der Pfalz (1678), "I have only been attracted to
mathematics because I have found in it traces of the art of invention in
general. [...] I do not want to stop at physics [...] but I want to reach
metaphysics." 6 2 We might therefore use the expression "sphere of absolute
Being" to characterize the field about which Leibniz says programmatically:
"nihil autem calculi hie miscebo"^ Within the confines of this area Leibniz
will not mix calculations and metaphysical intuitions: in the language t h a t
he plans out, and will later develop, to express his thought, calculability
comes into it only in part. At the most one can glimpse the terminological
influence of the analisis situs, of topology, of projective geometry, besides
the presence of logical thinking. In Leibniz's philosophical grammar, t h e
complexity of thought weighs upon the style, at times suppressing
expressive nuances that could have been very suggestive, though in
general a high level of narrative and linguistic charm remains. To some
extent "Leibniz deliberately sacrifices the elegance and brevity of language
in favour of the precision and concision of thought." 6 4 The self-
understanding of Leibniz's thought is thus completed with a conscious
linguistic choice: the lingua characteristica, which, as Leibniz wrote to
Oldenburg during his Paris sojourn, is a "filum meditandi," a
"characteristica rationis" a fruit of absolute being, and which approaches

62
Ak II, I, p. 434.
61
C, p. 152. This is a manuscript of 1680 (a short fragment) entitled Linguae
philosophicae Specimen in Geometria edendum.
64
L. Couturat, La logique de Leibniz, d'apres des documents inedits, cit., p. 76.
 The Abacus and the Mirror 93

its own absolute Grund to the highest degree precisely because it directly
reflects the light of the pre-ordained harmony.
Leibniz's language, though it is influenced by the sciences and directly
contributes to their development, is neither the language of the microscope
nor that of the telescope, but rather resembles a language that indicates,
that signals, that shows the organism of harmony: it is the language t h a t
makes manifest the set of monads and of phenomena; it is the language of
monadology. It is the language of the monad as a living mirror of t h e
universe, which explains nature with the abacus only after having
understood it with the mirror. It is the language of metamorphosis, of t h e
continuum, which is also transformation. It is a language that only in a
preliminary way investigates the opposing poles of the microscopic and t h e
infinitely great with mathematical tools and concepts, in order to a r r i v e
later at the language of relation, of the bond between monads, p h e n o m e n a
and absolute being. Monadological thought eliminates any linguistic
reductionism, raising the problems of knowledge, in their scientific a n d
theological sense, to the plane of a theoretical differential that causes a n d
facilitates shifts from one discipline to another, regulating them by t h e
register of first philosophy. 65
Leibniz wants to keep this philosophical aggregate away from excessive
scientific influences, reserving for it a metaphysics of mixtures and
nomination, a pluralistic and multiple monadology that in the theodicy
finds no limit or revocation, but rather a cosmogonic impulse from which
the monads absorb the energy that synthesizes existence and
representation, being and reason. Studied in relation to the principle of
reason, this sector presents itself as the theological completion of the axis
monad-Grw/iJ-Being. Here the thought of principles boils down to t h e
thought of the original; it differs from Heidegger's research into the origin,
but is engaged in a terrain that is, in many respects, similar: the field of t h e
totality of Being.
Heidegger's thinking about Being regards a totality, almost an absolute:
ontological metaphors such as Ereignis and Geviert represent a total
horizon. The appropriating event is the field of "manifestingness" of Being:
the return to a cosmological structure typical of early Greek t h o u g h t
accompanies and motivates the use of a topology of Being as the de-finition
of the original and absolute (the Topologie des Seyns and Seyn with a cross
over it mark a fusion between original language and the total perimeter of
Being). This focus on the totality of Being is even clearer in Leibniz: t h e

6S
For the subject of monadology as differential thinking, cf. G. Deleuze, Le pli. Leibniz
et le Baroque, Ed. de Minuit, Pans 1988.
94 Thought

whole set of relations between the monads and the monas monadum
sketches the original ontological plane, which corresponds to authentic
monadological thought. There is, without any doubt, a similarity b e t w e e n
Leibniz and Heidegger from this point of view: for Heidegger, to t h i n k
means to think Being that is (a supreme degree of tautology), while for
Leibniz to think means to represent the harmony. To think the h a r m o n y ,
one must retain all the particular truths in the gravitational field of t r u t h
as such, sucking up the individual forms of thought into the p r i m a r y
metaphysical thought. This need for metaphysics is also manifest to some
extent in Heidegger, precisely in the split between the truths of the essent
and the truth of Being or essence of the truth, the exclusive field of
Seinsdenken.
To come back to Leibniz, the thought of the original approaches a sort of
theological thought, but with the decisive difference that this thought does
not originate from the divine point of view, but from that of intermonadic
harmony. In this way of thinking, the absolute is not the monas monadum,
but monadology. In this perspective, the principle of reason is lifted u p
from material causality, from the fragmentation of the positive sciences, to
rise to be the synthesis of scientia Dei. It is in this sense that we m u s t
interpret the sentence: "Deus nihil vult sine rationed The standpoint of the
principle of reason as a cornerstone of monadology is theological, not
theocentric: attention is not fixed exclusively on God, but embraces an
ontological unity. Similarly to what happens with regard to the link
between cogito and varia, here the monadological project outlines a surface
of co-originality between God and the harmony of the monads. Leibniz
seems to bear witness in favour of a qualitative leap from ontology
(principle of reason) to theology (final cause): "one of my great principles
is that nothing happens without reason. It is a principle of philosophy.
Nevertheless, at bottom, it is nothing but a recognition of divine wisdom,
although at the beginning I do not speak about it." 66 This is not a
theological version of the principle of reason, though it makes the principle
more complex, as it now includes the level of original co-belonging.
An example of this theoretical growth and of the "turning point" m a d e
by Leibniz can be found in a manuscript, dating from the last period of his
life, in which this sort of asceticism is described as the account of a d r e a m .
"Leibniz's philosophical dream," transcribed by the librarian Gruber, begins
with these words: "I am content with what I am among men, but I am not
content with human nature." Leibniz recounts his reflections on h u m a n
nature, on good and evil, on freedom and providence: "one day, as I w a s

BH, p. 58.
 The Abacus and the Mirror 95

fatigued with these thoughts, I fell asleep and found myself in a dark place
[...]." In this descent to Hades, only a feeble light allowed him to come
before a very handsome youth, an angel, who showed him the meaning of
human life, man's duty and destiny, what he had been, what he was a n d
what he would be, in a temporal and moral synthesis that more r e s e m b l e d
a beatific vision than a rational theology. "You will be one of our c o m p a n y ,
and you will come with us from world to world, from discovery to
discovery, from perfection to perfection. With us you will pay court to t h e
supreme substance, which is beyond all the worlds and which fills t h e m
without being itself divided. [...] Therefore lift your spirit above all that is
mortal and perishes, and fix your gaze only on the eternal truths of t h e
light of God.**67
Aside from the narrative strangeness of the exposition, this
philosophical dream presents at least two important theoretical features:
the complex relation between man's freedom of action and d i v i n e
preordination; and the absorption of the degrees of positive k n o w l e d g e
within the highest level of absolute truth. This second aspect is the one w e
are more interested in here, because we can see in it, in filigree, Leibniz's
shift from the logic of the principle of reason to metaphysics. According to
Jean Baruzi, in such shifts "the logical notion tends toward mystical
intuition." 6S
Indeed, we can notice a sort of mystical extension of logic, though it
seems excessive to cut out an exclusively mystical space for this operation.
That is, we should take care when interpreting Leibniz's p e r e m p t o r y
sentence: "I begin as a philosopher, but I end as a theologian." 6 9 Along his
speculative itinerary, Leibniz does not abandon the habit of t h e
philosopher to don the less wonted garments of the mystic. He simply
wants to mark out the borders of what must be considered his a u t h e n t i c
thought: in the oscillating conversion from philosopher to theologian h e
gradually reveals the basic tonality of his thought.
In this case, too, we should not ignore an analogy with the evolution of
Heidegger's thought: at the beginning of his theoretical career, Heidegger
often stated his nearness to religious thinking, which he said was g r e a t e r
than his proximity to philosophizing; he even wrote to Löwith in 1 9 2 1 ,
61
Ibid., pp. 108-111.
68
J. Baruzi, Leibniz. Avec de nomhreux textes inedits, Blond, Paris 1909, p. 131. Baruzi
sees the hinge of Leibniz's philosophy in religious feeling, on the basis of which it is
possible to explain all his passages, even the most scientific ones. In this sense h e
speaks of "mystical irrationalism" (ibid., p. 116). But Leibniz's oscillation between
logical reason and mystical reason cannot be taken unilaterally, as I try to explain i n
Chapter 8 of this book (cf. note 113 below).
69
BH, p. 58.
96 Thought

asserting, "I am a Christian thzo-logian."10 Whereas Leibniz thus began as a

philosopher and ended up as a theologian, Heidegger began as a theologian
and ended up as a philosopher, stating that "philosophy must b e
atheistic/'11 Their journeys take place in opposite directions, but j u s t
because the internal separations of these itineraries are not so sharp as to
cause a definitive split, it is possible to find frequent points of contact
between the two paths. In Heidegger the intertwining of nominally
atheistic philosophy and theological thinking is manifested in
an exemplary way in the reflections on the "last God" contained in t h e
Beiträge zur Philosophie: an aporetic and enigmatic manuscript, in which
"the last God is not the Ereignis itself" that drives the thought of Being
towards the boundaries of the "otherwise" from Being.
In conclusion, if the sense of Leibniz's thought remains in the slippery
terrain of a shift towards what can neither be defined as truly theological
nor as logical and scientific, but is rather marked by a metaphysics of
harmony, inspired by a sort of mystical reason, then we may find along
this path some forms of thought that are able to sketch an outline of
Leibniz's philosophy that is not merely "calculating," as it seems to be on
Heidegger's interpretation, but indeed extends in full relief right up to t h e
margins of Heidegger's "meditating" thought.

70
This passage from the letter of 1921 to Löwith is quoted by Löwith himself, in Mein
Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933, Metzler, Stuttgart 1986, p. 30.
71
HGA 61, p. 197. Cf. also p. 199: "philosophy itself is, qua philosophy, atheistic, if it is
understood in a radical manner." We should not forget that the lesson quoted dates
from 1921, and hence does not belong to Heidegger's last phase.
 7.
"AS IF WE WERE CHILDREN..."

In identifying as the core of Leibniz's thought the problem of

calculation, Heidegger grasps something that is actually true, but at t h e
same time he allows room for misunderstandings. We must, indeed,
explain: what does calculation really mean for Leibniz? And what does
Heidegger mean by the expression "calculating thought"? In a p r e l i m i n a r y
way, calculation represents the polnte of Leibniz's reflections: the l a p i d a r y
nature of the sentence "Cum Deus calculat [...] fit mundus" is a direct
confirmation of this, but it also shifts the meaning of calculation from t h e
plane of mathematical operations to the more original sphere of a
metaphysics of calculation, as part of the set of harmonious activities of t h e
monadological cosmos. The image of calculation must be absorbed in a
linguistic aggregate that aims at unifying scientia and pietas, mathematical-
natural knowledge and the intuition of the monadological order of t h e
world. Calculation is overturned in the combinatorial, which is one of t h e
pillars of Leibniz's thought; mathematics relates to imagination, a n d
metaphysics regards the most abstract things. The point of arrival of
monadology is, in fact, a reflection (the opposite of deduction) of God in t h e
monads. This theoretical conversion affects the linguistic p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s
and the traditional limits of general metaphysics. Here natural theology
comes into contact with themes derived from the number mysticism of
Greek and medieval origin, with elements of Aristotelian physics and t h e
recently established exact sciences. On this platform of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n
Leibniz's concepts of thought, meditation and reason can be interpreted in
a less calculating sense, one closer to the forms of a "corresponding," i.e.,
letting Being manifest itself.
The best proving ground on which to verify whether this h y p o t h e s i s
holds true seems to be the theoretical discussion around the problem: "Why
does something exist rather than nothing?" 7 2 The hermeneutic pressure of
the principle of reason is exerted on this question: something exists
because it has a reason to exist. If we bracket the logical implications of t h e
problem and concentrate on its ontic sediment, we see that the flux of
Being brings being to the surface and leaves nothingness inactive and n o n -

72
GPh VII, p. 602. On this question see also the reflections contained in HGA 40, pp.
22ff.
98 Thought

essent. If, then, we remember that, according to Leibniz, God o p e r a t e s

according to the principle of what is best and simplest, we observe an
incoherence in this syllogism, for although "nothingness is simpler and
easier than something," something exists, while nothingness does not. If,
finally, we take this paradox to its extreme consequences on the plane of
thought, we note a sense of amazed acceptance of the fact that something
more complex than nothingness exists. Faced with the world, Leibniz
reveals a twofold attitude: everything that is irresistibly calls upon him to
give a reason for it, while reason (God) exhorts him to behold Being without
asking himself anything, since the harmonia rerum is both the beginning
and the end of the question.
This is a particularly problematical passage; we can try to solve it b y
hypothesizing that there is no reason, no Grund, for this harmony; it just is.
In a letter of 1671 to Wedderkopf, Leibniz writes: "There is no reason for
the harmony [...] One can give no reason for the fact that the ratio of 2 to 4
is equal to the ratio of 4 to 8, not even by searching for it in the will of God.
This depends on the very essence or idea of things. In fact, the essences of
things are numbers and they contain the same possibility as the beings;
this possibility is not created by God, who instead creates the existence of
it, since these same possibilities, that is to say, the ideas of things, coincide
indeed with God himself." 71 The reason for the harmony is thus t h e
harmony itself; this modulation reminds one of Heidegger's hypothesis
concerning the foundation: Being is the foundation and reason (Grund) and
remains without Grund, as it is Ah-grund. Thus the harmony is itself
reason and foundation, and remains without any further Grund: t h e
harmony is Ah-grund, the abyssal depth of the harmonia perfectissima.
The convergence of the manifold nuances of causality in the realm of final
causes, in what Husserl calls universal teleology, involves a weakening of
the investigation occasioned by the principle of reason. But this is not an
actual limitation placed on knowledge; on this score Leibniz will n e v e r
agree with Kant and his definition of the limits of metaphysics. For Leibniz
the limits of knowledge are the very boundaries of the universe; the limit
exists, but it is infinite. In the version that we are trying to make manifest,
the problem of knowledge in terms of the principle of reason receives a
shock, a change of wavelength in the imagination and in the disposition of
the spirit.
There is a passage in Husserl that pushes us in the direction of this
hypothesis: "The idea of an ontology of the world, the idea of an objective,
universal science of the world based on a universal a-priori, according to

7
" Ak II, p. 117.
 "As If We Were Children..." 99

which the knowledge more geometrico of any possible factual world is

possible (an idea that still seduced Leibniz) would be non-sense." 7 4 Here
the pupil of Weierstrass and Brentano does not reject the m a t h e m a t i c i a n ,
but he makes a metaphysical or, more precisely, phenomenological
distinction: knowledge linked to numbers and logic is not rejected, but it
becomes useless when faced with the teleological-intentional structure of
the world. Although, as Husserl observes, Leibniz was fascinated by t h e
idea of exact knowledge, we find a similar metaphysical area in which t h e
mechanism of calculation becomes inoperative. This marginal zone g a t h e r s
together the potentialities of finalism, understood as an answer to t h e
question about the existence of the essent and as an obstacle to any f u r t h e r
research about the reason for reason. The monadological principle
expresses and establishes the boundary between natural knowledge a n d
metaphysical intuition. Not only does it enclose within itself the traces of
what has been called the "new continent of philosophy, which is t h e
dominion of the inconstant and the variable, that is to say, of what cannot
be logically reduced to schemes and constants," 7 5 but it responds, also with
philosophically unprecedented words, to the need to give a name to t h e
relation between God and beings. If the ultimate foundation defies
explanation in terms of the principle of reason, thus confirming both t h e
importance of Heidegger's reflection on the abyss and on the reason for
Being, and the close affinity between this idea and Leibniz's idea of t h e
impossibility of reconstructing the ultimate features of divine choice, a
field is opened up in which statistics, invention, logic and the comhinatoria
yield sway to the decision in favour of the best of all possible worlds.
Monadology is then seen to be "the ontology of the creatio."16
A shift of tone is underway that manages to touch and activate a n e w
level of knowledge, a qualitative plane that Leibniz inherits from t h o s e
"religious sources" of medieval and Renaissance mysticism which, according
to Heimsoeth, nurture "the new love of nature and the passion for r e s e a r c h
that lead to the natural philosophy of the period of transition and to t h e
natural science of the modern age." 77 In this way we can identify t h e
arriere plan, the underlying thought that drives and inspires monadology

74
E. Husserl, Die Knsts, cit, § 72.
75
R. Franchini, Intorno alia domanda di Leibniz: "perche esiste qualcosa anziehe
niente9" in La cultura del secolo XVII net mondo di lingua italiana e di lingua tedesca,
2 vols , Istituto Culturale Italo-Tedesco, Merano 1970, Vol. II, p. 179.
7c. H. Rombach, Substanz, System, Struktur, 2 Vols., Alber, F r e i b u r g - M ü n c h e n 1965-66,
Vol. II, p. 364.
77
H. Heimsoeth, Die sechs großen Themen der abendländischen Metaphysik,
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1952.
100 Thought

as a science: a mystical and religious current that goes from the t h i r t e e n t h

century right up to Leibniz, announcing Leibniz's theory and finding in it a
relative rationalization which, instead of surfeiting and smothering it, gives
it new life. The metaphysical need here makes its voice felt on a very high
level indeed. Knowledge approaches ever closer to a wonder-felt
recognition of the universe. To think means not only to know the reason,
but also to participate and to let what is be. It means to interpret our task
as philosophers as being that of expressing raptness, wonder, tolerance,
and participation towards the world of beings, with an attitude of
abandonment, "as if we were children." Whereas in the Sophist Plato
compares the first philosophers to children ("Each of them seems to me to
be telling us a fabulous tale, as if we were children...", Sophist, 242c) and
criticizes their naive views of the cosmos, we could take this s a m e
expression in a positive sense to define the essence of that u n d e r l y i n g
thought from which monadology takes its origin. It is not that one should
return to a childish stage of humanity, in the sense envisaged by Vico,
Rousseau, historicism or romanticism, as a state of innocence, purity and
naivety, but as a re-evaluation and concrete testing of the cognitive
possibilities of that disposition of the soul that Heidegger, following in t h e
wake of the mystics, calls Gelassenheit. Still, the terminological similarity
must not induce us to identify the two conceptions of the same idea;
indeed, Angelus Silesius writes: "What is Gelassenheit! I say w i t h o u t
duplicity/That it is the will of Jesus in your soul." 78 For Heidegger, on t h e
other hand, it is not a question of the individual's submission to the divine
will, but the submission of the subject to the destiny of Being. In o t h e r
words, one cannot load this perspective with such a strong theological
meaning as that with which mysticism burdens the metaphor.
We are not here dealing with a simple emotional tonality, nor a peculiar,
accidentally-caused mood, but with a reformulation of the logic of t h e
principle of reason. The "why" of things precipitates headlong into t h e
"what is"; the upward climb of reason towards the first causes deviates into
an infinite transcending towards the event of Being. Seen from this
perspective, Leibniz's principle offers an image of itself that, besides being
connected with and presiding over the existence of things, that is, besides
projecting its light on beings, receives from them an implicit answer to t h e
question about the why. The symmetry of the harmony surrounds t h e
principle of reason with an atmosphere in which knowledge is stratified, as

78
Angelus Silesius, Sämtliche Werke, published by H.L. Held, 3 Vols., Hanser,
München 1949, Vol. Ill, p. 58.
 "As If We Were Children../' 101

happened with regard to the levels of thought, culminating in a cognitive

dis-tension that represents the true pendant of the creative thunderbolt.
Heidegger seems to hit on a just such a line of thought when he suggests
revisiting the nihil est sine ratione with the aid of the mystical vision of
Angelus Silesius. Nothing is without a reason: so goes the a b b r e v i a t e d
version of the principle; but we can also rotate the axis so that t h e
epicentre is not reason (the "why"), but Being (the "is"). "The rose is
without a 'why' [warum]; it blooms because [we//] it blooms," reads one of
Silesius' verses. Heidegger wants to show us that here, in mysticism and in
poetry, the principle of reason is disactivated, put out of commission, m a d e
ineffective or at any rate transformed. The rose is without a why; the rose
has no warum but blooms because (weil) it manifests itself in a lingering
(weilen) that makes any search for a reason superfluous. Here the "why" of
asking about and inquiring into the cause is replaced by the "why" of t h e
acceptance of the state of things: while the "Warum seeks the Grund, t h e
Weil bears the Grund."1"* This rewriting not only echoes mystical thought,
but also reproposes some reflections of Goethe's, who wrote as follows in
Dichtung und Wahrheit: "The what [Was] is in us, the how [Wie] r a r e l y
depends on us; about the why [Warum] we may not ask and therefore w e
are by rights sent back to the Quia [Weil]."*0 Goethe's rejection of t h e
Warum is translated also into a precept: "Keep to the because [Weil] and do
not ask 'why?' [Warum*?]."*1
Within the confines of the principle of reason, Heidegger reproposes his
basic phenomenological idea, which was already central to Being and Time:
the phenomenon (the rose) must show itself by itself; its essence is not
demonstrable in a logical and scientific form, but must let itself b e
observed by itself. Certainly, with this shift Heidegger intends to distance
himself also from Leibniz; he clearly wants to prepare the way for t h e
original thought (Gedanc), "almost more primeval than that reason of t h e
heart that Pascal, a few centuries ago and even then in opposition to
mathematical thinking, tried to recapture." 8 2 Thus is created a free p l a y
between the deposition of the Grund, the phenomenology of the n o n -
apparent, and the advent of Gedanc as meditating thought, the original
form of thinking. If from the phenomenon we take away the Warum, w h a t
remains is the lingering, Weilen, of the phenomenon of Being. On t h e
cognitive plane logical, categorial thought is defeated by an original look,
i.e., one which looks after the essence and refers back to the fate-filled

V)
SG, p. 70. For Heidegger's reflections on the verse of Silesius, cf. SG, pp. 68ff.
80
J.W. Goethe, Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe, Vol. IX, p. 478.
81
Ibid., Vol. I, p. 304.
82
WhD?, p. 92.
102 Thought

origin of thought, to the first Greek philosophers. The strenuous search for
reason slowly fades into a delicate act of surrounding "what the glance
takes into consideration/' and vanishes into the opiauos*. The glance of
philosophy seems to conserve, in this affermation, the same amazed and
timorous intensity as at its dawning: "as if we were children...." Com-
prehending, Begreifen, dissolves into letting-see, letting-be, Ge-lassen.
Ohne Warum, "without why," says Silesius, and in such intuitions
Heidegger believes he can find the step back from metaphysics, the r e t r e a t
from logical objectivation. In a difficult balancing act, he includes mystical
intuition in non-representative thought, trying to join intuition, poetic
words, early Greek philosophy and thought that meditates about Being.
Lastly, there shines out in this constellation what Heidegger calls thought
that thinks the destiny of Being: seinsgeschickliches Denken.*7* The
opposition between mysticism and logic may serve as a symbol to help us
to understand what thinking means for Heidegger. The appreciation of
mysticism found in Der Satz, vom Grund echoes a deep-rooted interest of
Heidegger's thought right from the beginning. When he states t h a t
"extreme acuteness and depth of thought belong to great and genuine
mysticism," he is not venturing into a flight from philosophy t o w a r d s
mythological obscurity; rather, as a philosopher, he is indicating the r o u t e
of an exit from abstract and purely categorial logic to arrive at Being. To
think the "is," to say the "is," requires a shift from Warum to Weil, from
determined Grund to unthought Ab-grund*4
Compared with the philosophical tradition, this retreat represents a
severance from the metaphysics of subjectivity and an attempt to think the
Self starting from the Ereignis, prefiguring the inclusion of the Self in
Gelassenheit, where it becomes selbstlos, selfless. The I-am-I exalted by
rationalism and idealism is replaced by a being-there that is in a state of
flux, dispersing and scattering itself in the Ereignis. This being-there does
not think that the rose is without Grund, but recognizes that the Grund is
its very blooming. Just as, to describe the essencing action of the world

s<
On the thought of the destiny of Being, cf. SG, pp. 108-109, 130ff. Cf. also W . M a r x ,
Gibt es auf Erden ein Maß?, Meiner, Hamburg 1983, pp. 121 ff.
81
Aside from the use of the term Gelassenheit, there are also other reasons for
comparing Heidegger's thought with mysticism: the metaphor of the light and that of
"a god"; the conception of listening and the aversion for r e p r e s e n t a t i v e thinking;
and even the criticism of technology. There are also some aspects that remind one of
Oriental thought, above all Zen Buddhism (cf. HGA 12, pp. 134IT.). For a discussion of
these matters, see J.D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, Ohio
University Press, Athens 1978; R. Schürmann, Trois penseurs de delaissement: M ait re
Eckhart, Heidegger, Suzuki, "Journal of the History of Philosophy," 1974, pp. 455-477;
K. Albert, Mystik und Philosophie, Richarz, St. Augustin 1986, especially pp. 193-202.
 "As If We Were Children..." 103

(Welt), Heidegger said "es weitet" ("it worlds"), releasing the whole force of
the tautology, so now he discovers the Grund in the mere being-such of t h e
rose. There is no difference between Grund and blooming; the rose is its
blooming and its foundation is in the blooming. We may recall the e p i t a p h
dictated by Rilke in his will: "Rose, oh reiner Widerspruch..." ("Rose, oh p u r e
contradiction..."), pure being-gathered-into-itself, purity in itself, indistinct
fusion of cause and effect. Rilke expresses the Grund of the rose in that "oh"
full of amazement, admiration and logical non-deducibility of the cause
from the presence. Condensed in its blooming are the reasons that m a k e
the rose be. 8 5 But the meaning of the relation between causality a n d
blooming does not so much lie in the fact that existence cannot be r e d u c e d
to reason (a theme dear to existentialism) as in the original identity of
Being and foundation, or even Being and reason. The path of reason is t h e
path that climbs up the mountain; it is not the abstraction of a n o t h e r
abstraction (reason), but the ontic foundation that makes reason concrete,
in the yearned-for identity of Being and thinking.
The passage from the Grund understood as accounting-for to the Ab-
grund meant as giving-thanks for what is, is paralleled by the variation of
thought that causes one to "pass from will to abandonment." The recoil t h a t
thought undergoes with this dislocation does not, however, deprive it of its
energy. The latter is simply transformed, and changes its sign; whereas t h e
will of metaphysics is the will to power, to dominate, in a b a n d o n m e n t
action must needs become like a countershock, which recovers the activity
of Being. The will to subjugate the world is replaced by the intention of d e -
subjectivizing Being. It must, however, be pointed out that in this final
form the will undergoes a metamorphosis: to want to release Being m e a n s
to let Being give itself. Gelassenheit means entrusting oneself to Being or, as
Gadamer proposes, being-distanced, giving licence, "con-ceding" to Being its
proper nature: Gelassenheit is therefore tolerance, an ethical value. If t h e
expression "abandonment" may, if not clarified beforehand, give rise to
misunderstandings, causing one to think of a state of total passivity, t h e
idea of tolerance shows that Heidegger wants to preserve the link with
mysticism in an oscillating tension: Gelassenheit is not the c o m p l e t e
absence of any ability to act, but rather an agreement to let Being have its
happening and a harmonizing with it, entrusting oneself to it. Not only does

8
^ In Rilke's poetry the rose is a recurrent image, so much so that Rilke exclaims: "Wir
sagen Reinheit und wir sagen Rose" (May 1923), that is, "We say purity and we say
rose" Cf. R.M. Rilke, Werke, 6 vols., Insel, Frankfurt am Main 1956, Vol. II, p. 252. See
also ibid., p. 575, the verse- "Rose, toi, 6 chose par excellence complete." Heidegger's
interest in the poetry of Rilke has been the focus of many studies- see the recent book
by G. Guzzoni, Dichtung und Metaphysik. Am Beispiel Rilke, Bouvier, Bonn 1986.
104 Thought

the return of thought to the experience of Gelassenheit express a clearly

defined activity, but also the thought that lingers in the Open of
Gelassenheit is not a passive relation with the world. Beyond the limits of
optimism and pessimism, of criticism or resignation, the experience of
abandonment reproduces, even as it inexorably transforms it, the ancient
existential decision of Being and Time: Gelassenheit towards things is not
something that happens by chance; it is the result of untiring thought. It is
not actually an action, nor an undergoing; it is situated outside any
difference between activity and passivity because "it does not come at all
into the domain of the will." 86 It is provided with energy, because it
partakes of that energetic event known as the Ereignis.
Here the mobile nature of thought comes into play; it now harmonizes
with the cosmic "game" that fluctuates between Being and Dasein, b e t w e e n
Being and being. All Heidegger's metaphors that refer back to t h e
cosmological problem (Ereignis, Geviert, Gegend, even Lichtung) are
activated in this correlation. Heidegger wants to give new life to t h e
immense effort made by Greek metaphysics at the dawn of thought in
order to look on the truth of Being; in this revival he re-activates t h e
forms, but above all the essence, of early Greek thought: the essential
nature of thinking and knowing lies in the journey towards proximity to
Being. He picks up, and dares to define, a word of Heraclitus' which, b y
itself and in isolation, resembles a signal along a path: ayxißaoiTj, going-
towards-proximity. Proximity to Being is equivalent to remoteness from
metaphysics. Here distance becomes a place to be lived in, in an
inexhaustible oscillation between flight and return, between a leap forward
and a step backward with respect to the "line" of metaphysics. 'Ayxißaairi is
knowledge of the path, entrusting oneself to its signals, approaching the
proper nature of Being, which is on the path, in the neighbourhood, in t h e
play between space and time that releases the Lichtung. 'Ayx^ßaoix] is the
movement of thought that has transformed Warum into Weil; for this w a y
of thinking, the rose just is, without any "why." Its reason lies in its
blooming. Faced with the world, this kind of thought, in the first place,
keeps silent. That is, it lets the world reveal itself by itself in its arising. It
lets the Weil be affirmed in it, the Weil in which Being and foundation
become the same thing.
While distancing itself from any theory of knowledge, Heidegger's
phenomenology of the path bends thought towards the truth, at the s a m e
time giving it a cognitive tension. But now both the method and the result
of the research are radically modified: it is no longer the expression of a

6
G, p 35.
 "As If We Were Children../' 105

scientific-eschatological project for dominance over Being, but an

ambiguous and inexhaustible mixing of being and Being. This melange, t h e
voice of the ontology of decline, a nuance wherein shines the a n c i e n t
emblem of the phenomenon that Husserl spoke of, is achieved by r e p e a t i n g
and renewing the first beginning of thought, giving it new life t h r o u g h
another beginning. All that is metaphysics can be overcome only in t h e
echo of the first beginning, in the echo of the origin. In this return, w h o s e
outlines we have already seen in the analysis of the foundation as logos, a
natural gnoseology is described, one which takes its attitude t o w a r d s
phenomena from the first thinkers. Heidegger explicitly talks about physics
as the "first" discipline; metaphysics derives from physics. But here physics
possesses its archaic meaning, now unfortunately lost, of ^i/ais as an arising,
as a coming into being, as the opening up of a horizon that is not the w o r l d
as representation, but the cosmic encounter of the Four Elements. Here
physics is the sphere of Geviert, in which some essential elements a r e
liberated; we could call them forces, such as logos, play, lingering,
abandoning oneself. This sphere is and, in its turn, opens up the zone that,
with Hölderlin, Heidegger calls the Sacred. This, therefore, is the essence of
physics: "loving conflict," that is to say play between earth and h e a v e n ,
mortals and gods, time and space: "<|>uais- is the play of arising in hiding
itself; it hides while it frees the arising Open, the free." 87 Heidegger w a n t s
to return to this vision of nature as ^u'ais* that loves to hide. But the sense of
this return is not a nostalgic et in Arcadia ego; it is rather a rediscovery of
the value of salvation and a safeguarding of fyvois itself, which is a v a l u e
inherent in Greek cosmology.
"Time is a child playing at throwing dice: the kingdom of a child"
(Heraclitus, fr. 52 Diels). Commenting on this fragment by Heraclitus,
Heidegger chooses it as the exact opposite of the causalistic vision of t h e
essence of the cosmos. His version runs: "the destiny of Being is a child t h a t
plays with dice; it is the kingdom of a child." This kingdom is "the arche,
the founding that remains founding, the Being of beings." 8 8 In play t h e
child, in a relation full of integrity and purity, meets the world itself. After
having overcome the Grund, after having faced the risk of the Ab-grund,
Heidegger connects the act of founding to the mystery of a game: should we
not perhaps "think of Being and the Grund, Being as Ab-grund, starting
from the essence of play and precisely of the game into which we m o r t a l s
are led, as we are mortals only by virtue of living in the proximity of d e a t h
which, as the extreme possibility of Being, is able to reach the maximum in

HGA 55, p. 139.

SG, p. 188.
106 Thought

the Lichtung of Being and its truth?" 8 9 Here the saying of Heraclitus holds
good, and is achieved: "Man is reputed to be like a child before t h e
divinity" (fr. 79 Diels). In this worldly game Heraclitus' man comes as close
as possible to the essence of mortals as revealed by Heidegger. In this
game, what counts is not the "why" of the world, but its "that it is," w h a t
Parmenides calls (h$ ZOTIV. In the game of the world the rose blossoms; in it
man, a child like the first thinkers (but also like all the Greeks, according to
the Egyptian in the Timeus), abandons himself. The imperious call to Greek
non-conceptuality is combined with a reflection that is opposed to rational
research, opening up an outlook onto a vantage point where the destiny
and march of Being clearly emerge.
Despite its precise and by no means negligible links with mystical
speculation, both western and eastern, this thought of Verweilen, of
Dieweilen, of the lingering of Being also features a penetrating criticism of
contemporary civilization dominated by technology. In his critique,
Heidegger seems to refer back to the lesson of Goethe; some examples of
this may prove enlightening. In describing the blooming of a rose-bush (a
"marvellous event") Goethe complains of the intrusiveness of scientific
research, which in his opinion threatens its existence, its simple Weilen:
"yet research, never weary, moves and turns around the law, a r o u n d
reason [Grund], around the why and the how [Warum und Wie]."90
According to Goethe, the physical sciences investigate only the why a n d
how of things; hence, for example, following their method, "one will not say
that a bull has been given horns in order that [daß] it might give h o r n -
butts, but one will seek out how [wie] it can have horns to give h o r n - b u t t s
with." 91 This criticism of Goethe's seems to be the model for Heidegger's
comments on the principle of reason, an anti-causalistic action aimed at the
free space for play that is time, and at the Zeit-Spiel-Raum of Being in its
simplicity and proximity to the truth. In this analysis, the mystical
dimension is reduced, leaving room for meditating thought in its most
complete array. When this thought appears on the scene of Heidegger's
philosophy, all the references and links with mystical and theological

8<;
Ibid., pp. 1861Y. Heraclitus' image of the child and the conceptual image of play a r e
firmly entrenched in contemporary philosophy, starting at least from Nietzsche. Play
as an element of difference with respect to r e p r e s e n t a t i v e thought is dealt with, i n
the wake of Heidegger's treatment but in an independent and original manner, by E.
Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, K o h l h a m m e r , Stuttgart 1960. Cf. also the monograph by I.
Heidemann, Der Begriff des Spieles, de Gruyter, Berlin 1968.
<>0
J.W. Goethe, Chinesich-deutsche Jahres- und Tageszeiten, in Werke, cit., Vol. I, p .
389.
,;l
J.W. Goethe, Erster Entwurf einer allgemeinen Einleitung in die vergleichende
Anatomie, in Werke, cit., Vol. XIII, p. 177.
 "As If We Were Children..." 107

thinkers become no more than mere meta-hermeneutical relations:

everything is on the path, everything remains in the background, a n d
Heidegger's step is now a making-way into the Lichtung, whose place, situs
and locus, is sacred in the sense of a paganism of <j>u'ais\ possessing the same
magical sacredness as Heraclitus' infinite cosmos.
 8.
THE PATH: FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF REASON TO MEDITATING THOUGHT

In traversing the expanse that leads from the implacable rigour of

logical-rational explanation to the empathetic-intuitive understanding of
Being, Heidegger not only outlines a speculative and historiographic
itinerary within the confines of modern philosophy, but he also constructs
a model of cosmological interpretation with which contemporary t h e o r y
necessarily has to grapple. His profound excavation around the forms of
reason enables Heidegger to come up with a philosophical hybrid, which is
all the more disquieting in that it proves to be able to undermine t h e
methodological certainty emanating from the causalistic version of t h e
principle of reason. The image of the hybrid helps to clarify the nature of
Heidegger's result: it is rooted in the ground of tradition, deconstructing it
and pushing it forward into the abyss of Being, into that abyss that Kant
had glimpsed but from which he drew back in horror. This result t h e r e f o r e
absorbs metaphysics and reshapes it, taking away its representative a n d
logical content, and even creating an opposing front, another philosophical
horizon. We may imagine this process of genetic mutation by means of a
metaphor drawn from the human organism. The organ par excellence
where reason resides is the brain, or in a broad sense the intellect. Ever
since Greek times vovs has been considered the centre of mental activity
and the place where thought is rationally co-ordinated. Without completely
cutting all ties with this traditional vision, Heidegger transforms vovg into
Nase, the olfactory organ: what is conceived of by the intellect is n o w
sensed by the nose. If we free ourselves of this metaphorical scheme, w e
can identify, in this transfer of the site of thinking, a dislocation of t h o u g h t
itself. From being the established value of an intellectual faculty, the action
of thinking now becomes almost an act of perception, of noticing the s e n s e
of Being in the air, of putting into play all one's synaesthetic capability,
without giving undue importance to the organ that has been w r o n g l y
considered to be "noble." One thus passes from a noological conception of
thought to a vision that emphasizes the nature of perception in a b r o a d
sense (ahnen: to have a presentiment).
This leap is directly connected to the shift from thought as method to
thought as a journey. If, in the domain of method, thought represents t h e
Being of beings, objectifying it before itself, on the path thought notes t h e
presence of Being without determining it as pure opposition. In t h e
1 10 Thought

distance between the fixing of the presence of Being and the intuition of
the same presence by observing the shadow of its absence lies, in a
nutshell, Heidegger's philosophical itinerary. In this change of plane, the
"trying" of Leibniz is a critical portrait of metaphysics, the inexorable
transfiguration that the metaphysical picture undergoes along Heidegger's
way. In the odology of meditating thought, there is no longer a polarity
between rational and irrational, but between reason as ratio and reason as
logos, between the system of reason and the path of Being; in short, the
contrast is between the closure of calculation and the openness of the
clearing. If ratio means also to make fast, to fix (from ratis, "moored raft"),
it is the exact opposite of Lichtung as lichten (to leave, to undo the
moorings). The space still remaining in Heidegger's thought for a type of
reason is limited to the persistence of logos between the cliffs of the path
and the chiaroscuro of the clearing. "Everything is on the path," e v e n
reason; but along the path its calculating core (if we can call it that), the
heart of reor, is broken down.
Ours is the task to retrace the stages into which Heidegger's thought in
its meditating structure may be subdivided. Heidegger's reflections on the
principle of reason and its effects, such as technology and the will to power,
show him to be full of repulsion for, but also fascinated by, what we m a y
suppose might become the final phase of metaphysics. Heidegger proceeds
by escaping from and then returning to the tradition condensed in t h e
prlncipium rationis, but he also holds fast to his own idea of philosophical
thought: "philosophy [...] arises only from thinking in thought. But thought
is thought of Being." 92 His powerful attack, which was intended to d e s t r o y
metaphysics, encounters a flexible obstacle: Heidegger has managed to
touch the soft bottom of metaphysics, that foundation made of sand and
water, clay and mud which, in the opinion of Michel Serres, symbolically
supports Rome and all our eternal classicism. And, in contact with the soft
and shifting soil of metaphysics, Heidegger discovers the abyss of Being,
which is a foundation but not a solid and unmoving bottom; it is rather the
disconcerting lapping of a slow and muddy stream, which winds around
upon itself and (as the authentic swamp of an abyss that it is) swallows its
own foundations as well as the tracks of sojourners. The abyss is shown to
be the fatal genetic trait that human thought and being bring with them.
The attraction exerted by this unfathomed depth is manifested in
Heidegger as the exact opposite of the horror vacui\ in him it is t h e
fascination of the abyssal foundation that exerts a real impulse for
exploration. This is the only explanation for an expression such as t h e

w HGA 5, p. 335.
 The Path 11 1

following: "a mortal thought must descend into the darkest depths of t h e
original source in order to see a star at midday." 93
The experience of thought is the experience of the Grund, which can b e
achieved after having made the leap from the circle of Grund as the r e s u l t
of the principle of reason to the vastness wherein dwells the thought t h a t
meditates about the foundation. This shift does not take place gradually,
but is said to stem from a jump {Sprung, Absprung) which projects t h o u g h t
from the metaphysical-rational ground to the other Grund, where it is
reunited with the remembrance of its own beginning, in Grund as Being.
This does not mean that the group of problems revolving around reason is
totally left behind, but one seeks out a point that enables one to make t h e
leap to another idea of reason, which is no longer based on method but on
the path. The leap must be made with a backward glance, so that one can
appropriate for oneself the most important traditional theoretical
connections, in order not to leave behind one the point of departure for t h e
leap, but to take possession of it in a more original way.
The greater originality of the thought that reflects on the foundation
with respect to the evolution of traditional thought leads to a more refined
understanding of the initial essence of thought. Heidegger's chosen point of
departure for this leap along the path is a reflection of thought upon itself,
in line with the traditional philosophical position as reflection on itself: one
has to meditate on thought and try to think about its basic principles. But
in concentrating on the Grundes the core of the Grund-Satz of thought, h e
feels that he can shift the pillars of metaphysics onto an ontologically firm
ground: "perhaps, in this way, we may reach thought in view of its
foundation." 9 4 He thus operates a deformalization of the laws of thought, to
obtain a factual and ontological fluidification. Heidegger's remark, which
lies at the basis of his deconstruction and critical appropriation of
metaphysics, seems rather ambitious and superficial: "the most
considerable thing is shown [...] in the fact that we do not yet think." 95
This statement is, however, not intended to be a denial of t h e
philosophical past, because Heidegger finds, in the tracks of a thought t h a t
had not yet manifested itself, hints and indications that come from t h e
history of philosophy. In the comparison with Leibniz we have seen s o m e
of his moves in the direction of an appreciation of some aspects of
monadology: the dynamic and energetic nature of the monad, its i m p u l s e
towards transcendence, the metaphysical idea that presides over logical

w GD, p 39.
1)4
Ibid., p. 37.
95
VA, p. 130.
1 12 Thought

processes, but also, as a conscious acceptance of the danger and challenge

of modern technology, the representative vision of the monad and its
perspectivism. Heidegger, therefore, is not content merely to destroy
Leibniz's main doctrines; his attack is counterbalanced by positive
assessments of some central features of Leibniz's thought and, in his
concluding and most complex phase, he tries to find some elements that, in
this forerunner of our technological world, may lead to his salvation. That
is, Heidegger tries to find the saving grace within the very essence of t h a t
which is most dangerous: "perhaps, in this way, we may reach thought in
view of its foundation." Even Leibniz is on the path, and, paradoxically, on
the same path that leads to meditating thought, if it is true that the essence
of the principle of reason does not lie in its logical form but pre-exists it, in
an original structure that is not nominalistic but purely ontological.
Heidegger uses the formula "calculating thought" to designate the e n t i r e
tradition of metaphysics, drawing a continuum from metaphysical to
calculating thought, from the essential origin of technology to completely
mature technology. In calculating thought, language is information; it is
fixed by laws that are not only propositional but above all technical; it is an
aggression against logos in the original sense, the meaning it had before it
was transformed into ratio. Taken as a dispenser of information, language
lends itself to a "technification in the sense of the theory of information of
language," eliminating and abolishing any naming and evocative role for
language. "The superiority of calculating thought is felt by man m o r e
decisively every day; he is degraded to an element that can be ordered in
an immense thought by the 'operational' model." 9 6 Technology t h u s
produces a flight from everything that is not calculation, organizing itself in
an institutional and fixed structure. This is the mark of ratio, the trace of
the ancient principle of reason, which thus becomes the principle of
thought sub specie machinae. This mark is a calculating, a counting: "this
'counting' [rechnen] [i.e., to take account of given circumstances, to take into
account, to reckon, to account for] characterizes every thought that is
operative in scientific projects and researches [...] Thought that takes into
account, that reckons with things, is a calculating thought. Calculating
thought chases one opportunity after another incessantly; it never stops to
meditate." 9 7
This, then, would be the sign of the times, which appear to Heidegger to
be ever more times of poverty and danger. This is not the best of all

%
M. Heidegger, Zeichen, in HGA 13, p. 211.
97 G, p. 15. For the expression "thought sub specie machinae", cf. A. Baruzzi, Mensch
und Maschine, Fink, München 1973, pp. 173ff.
 The Path 1 13

possible worlds, as Leibniz believed, even if Heidegger is relatively close to

this idea, since the situation of Being in the age of technology is a direct
consequence of a destiny that had received an original sending (ratio) a n d
that is achieved by fulfilling its own essence, which was a l r e a d y
constituted in the beginning. Thought must dwell on this true reality,
thinking the hidden essence of it and thinking Being in its relation w i t h
destiny (Geschick): thought must now be enriched, passing from reflection
on the history of Being (seinsgeschichtliches Denken) to the u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of its destiny as the destiny of Being (seinsgeschickliches Denken). The
characteristic features of thought that re-thinks the destiny of Being come
out particularly clearly and intensely in the interpretation of Leibniz. The
radically new interpretation that Heidegger gives of the principle stating
that nihil est sine ratione is a good example of this. 9 8 This principle is t o r n
from its logical tonality (in line with the dictates of calculation) and t h e n
transferred to the plane where the analogy between Being and the a b y s s
reigns. Having torn away this shell which hid calculating thought under t h e
camouflage of the obviousness of natural causality, Heidegger can show
that behind every basic thesis of metaphysics lies the bugbear of
calculation and objectivation. And all this started with Leibniz, w h o s e
rational metaphysics "is everywhere present to us men of today, in a n y
object and in any procedure whatsoever." 99
In the history of metaphysics as the history of the destiny of Being,
Heidegger considers Leibniz the father of the forms of German idealism and
flights of metaphysics, which reach their highest point with Nietzsche: "only
in Leibniz's metaphysics does the metaphysics of subjectivity achieve its
decisive beginning. [...] Through Leibniz every being becomes 'subjective',
i.e., in itself representing-tending and hence effective. Directly a n d
indirectly (through Herder) Leibniz's metaphysics gave birth to German
'humanism' (Goethe) and German idealism (Schelling and Hegel). While
idealism was founded on transcendental subjectivity (Kant) and at t h e
same time thought in the mode of Leibniz, in it, for the first time, t h e
essent-ness of the being as objectness and effectiveness was conceived of,
in a peculiar fusion and in a peculiar exacerbation of the unconditioned.
Effectiveness (true reality) is conceived of as knowing will (willing

98
Gadamer relates that he "constantly had in mind" this transformation while he was
developing his own hermeneutical philosophy; cf. H.G. Gadamer, Gibt es auf Erden ein
Maß?, "Philosophische Rundschau", 4, 1984, p. 175. For a complete formulation of
Gadamer's hermeneutics, see H.G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Mohr, T ü b i n g e n
1960.
99
HGA 55, p. 89.
1 14 Thought

knowledge), i.e., as 'reason' and 'spirit'." 100 From the principle that always
wants to give a reason for things and wants Being always to render up its
reason and cause, one passes to the concluding act of metaphysics,
epitomized by the will to power, finally reaching the present situation of
domination by technology. This is a road that leads from Leibniz to
Nietzsche, and even beyond, until one arrives at the faceless and nameless
will, the will to will, that marks our own times.
Here one understands what Heidegger means by the corruption of logos:
from the unfoundable Grund of the Greeks to the modern ratio of Leibniz,
logos has taken on the aspect of a will to dominate, penetrating even into
the most arduous metaphysical theorems of modern philosophers. The
decay is a decline, a retreat, an exhaustion: the logos as a wealth of signals
of the Delphic oracle has been deformed into the multiplicity of information
of ratio. In the course of this transformation something is gained and
something is lost: logos is given a level of logical clarity and univocalness
that facilitates the exchange of messages and understanding among
speakers; on the other hand, the original naming of things is lost, and logos
is no longer in close relation with things and their origin, that is with t h e
essence of things. Heidegger is concerned with the destructive result of t h e
combination between the two moments, which together have given rise to
our present age: the atomic age, the epoch when the motto of Delphi h a s
been transformed into the will to power and in which logos is now only
domination.
Reconsidering the history of Being, Heidegger can thus affirm: "the
opaque appearance of the initial Aoyo? [...] is the hidden Grund for t h e
unfolding of the essence of reason in the thought of Kant and in t h e
speculation of absolute idealism. Reason is conceived of as will (Kant), as
the will of action (Fichte), as the will of the spirit (Hegel), and as the will of
love (Schelling). Reason (ratio, logos), qua such a will, is the will of 'life'.
This will is then manifested in subsequent reversals, which the in-essence
of Being obtains with the force of the thinkers, as the 'will for the negation
of life' (Schopenhauer) which, reversing itself once again, completes t h e
metamorphosis and manifests itself as the 'will to power' (Nietzsche)." 101
The essence of technology is thus to be connected with the degradation
of logos. Technology and will become one; the foundation as freedom is
replaced by the will. The question regarding reason thus seems to make it
possible to elucidate the not-very-conspicuous premises of "what is."

100
HGA 48, pp. 313-314.
101
HGA 55, pp. 384-385. For a comparison between Heidegger and Leibniz on t h e
probem of technology, cf. A. Robinet, Leibniz und Heidegger: Atomzeitalter oder
Informatikzeitalter?, "Studia Leibnitiana", VIII/2, 1976, pp. 241-256.
 The Path 1 15

Wherever the will can be seen, there Grund has been reforged and
transformed as calculation: the metaphysical traces of the will do not
disappear even in Nietzsche, because in his works the basic tenor of t h e
metaphysical understanding of Being is exalted in the voluntaristic
inversion of logos. Nor is it sufficient that he takes a position in favour of
the Pre-Socratics and the Sophists, against the order and reconcilement of
the Platonic system. Despite certain points in common (some of which a r e
important), including, for example, a shared interest in the problem of play
as a pre-metaphysical ontological dimension, or the attention both
philosophers pay to art as the expression of Being and not as a p u r e
application of schemes, Heidegger does not find in Nietzsche the n o n -
metaphysical event of the Lichtung, though he does discover obvious t r a c e s
of the path that leads to the foundation. He thus approves of Nietzsche's
bringing together of philosophy and poetry as a form of thought, w h e r e a s
he expresses a negative judgment regarding the will to power. The essence
of the will, for Heidegger, can be traced back to Leibniz, to whom e v e n
Nietzsche owes a great debt; in Leibniz, the monadic centre of force would
thus contain in itself the forms of representation, of appetition, and ofpro-
spicere: all true primitive forms of the will to power. In Leibniz's
perspectivism, as also in Nietzsche's, the fact of the will is concealed: "in
this still enigmatic essence of the will of Being the essence of willing is also
concealed; it can be recognized as the will of willing only by starting from
the thought that thinks in advance in the truth of Being. In this will, t h e
last and fulfilled counteressence with respect to the dawn of Aöyos is
illumined. It presents itself almost as if in the will of willing every essence
of initial Being had disappeared, because it is also estranged, if the Being
conceived of in modern metaphysics is decisively interpreted only as
will." 102
But is the will really the essence of Being in Leibniz's thought? Is it only
the will to calculate that comes to the fore in monadology? Must we t h e n
recognize in Leibniz only the archetype of thought sub specie machinael
We have already seen some evidence that may lead us to doubt that things
are as simple as this. Now we must see whether meditating thought is a
complex whole connected with tradition or not, instead, a self-sufficient
whole in its own right. That is, we need to see whether there are, in it,
traces of metaphysics and, if there are, what contribution m e t a p h y s i c s
makes to such thought. The way might be cleared for the hypothesis t h a t
meditating thought is mingled with the history of metaphysics and h e n c e

102
HGA 55, p. 385. On the problem of the will, cf. also N II, pp. 96, 235ff., 300ff., 342ff.,
436, 467; SG, p. 115.
1 16 Thought

with the destiny of Being. Indeed, when Heidegger sees the signs of it along
the path of Being, when he sees its "enigmatic signs, inscribed in the most
hidden Grund of our history," he sees an inextricable interweaving of
metaphysics and other thought. Only this commingling thought can produce
the new beginning and poetizing thought, an essence of philosophy that has
not yet begun to bloom: "these signs predict a change of history, which is
found deeper down and acts much longer than any 'reversal' within t h e
spheres of the activity of man, of peoples and their machinations." 1 0 3 But
this change is still always a product of the destiny of Being; it is therefore
not a mere effect of a mere meditating cause, but is once more an outcome
of the great interweaving.
Leibniz, according to Heidegger, provided a decisive contribution to t h e
foundation of modern metaphysics, thanks to "the interpretation of t h e
substantialitas of substantia as vis primitiva, having the basic character of
the doubly-presenting representation: repraesentatio as perceptio and
appetitus."U)4 But in monadology the representative capacity of the m o n a d s
is also the possibility of mirroring the universe; here strength is also
weakness, activity is also passivity. The monadological unity, which as
Heidegger points out is the unity of Being, is also identity in difference and,
especially for our problem, difference in identity. When he sees, in t h e
principle of the identity of indiscernibles, a principle of great significance
for his own thesis of the identity and difference between thinking a n d
Being, Heidegger seems to confirm the hypothesis of an i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e
between meditating thought and calculating ratio. When he exalts Leibniz's
boldness in the formation of concepts (and in their dislocation), as for
example in the case of the word existiturire (impulse to existence, need for
existence), he recognizes a flexible and unstable, but undeniable, plan in
which elements of proximity to Being come into play; these intuitions a r e
opposed to the forgetfulness of Being and hence afford glimpses of t h e
meditating modes of thought. This position expresses the paradox i n h e r e n t
in meditating thought, the paradoxical nature of simultaneously thinking
identity and difference, and both the identity and difference of Being
together. It is the paradox that becomes light in the hypothesis of finding
the path for meditating thought in the midst of the l a b y r i n t h i n e
crisscrossing of the routes of calculating thought. The hypothesis of setting
Heidegger beside Leibniz would therefore result in an odology within t h e

l(M
HGA 45, p. 216. The term here translated as "reversal" also means " o v e r t h r o w i n g "
(Umwälzung) and is a clear reference to Marx and his concept of the o v e r t h r o w i n g
of praxis; but since we are here dealing with a lecture of 1937-38, it seems to be a
reference to the ineffectiveness and negativity of the Nazi upheaval in Europe.
104
N II, p. 25.
 The Path 1 17

maze of metaphysics, and would make it possible to glimpse the b r i g h t n e s s

of the Lichtung from the dense underbrush of calculating thought.
The relation between the two thinkers can be summed up in t h e
relation between the principle of reason as the thesis of ratio and t h e
principle of reason as an echo of the foundation: the event of the Grund is
thus opposed to the sending of the Gestell. In the principle of reason t h e
essence of Ge-stell is operative, i.e., the im-position to which p l a n e t a r y
technology subjects mankind. Or rather, the Gestell essentially achieves t h e
signum rationis, the genome of reason. But also the light, the fulguration,
bears this sign; even the initial Grund is genetically imbued with ratio.
Therefore to look "in Signo anteriore rationis,"105 means to look at ratio a n d
Grund together, in a look that embraces both reason and the path, the will
and abandonment. The origin of technology is contained in the initial tangle
to which calculation and logos co-belong. Leibniz conceives of and lays
plans for the calculating machine, he conceives of and announces t h e
advent of cybernetics, he thinks of and foresees the automaton, but he does
not deal thematically with the autonomy of general metaphysics, except as
method. The relation between mathematics (and the perversion of it t h a t
Heidegger calls calculating thought) and metaphysics is continually being
shifted, in Leibniz, onto a stage of harmony (which Heidegger could call
original) animated by the metaphors of the thunderbolt and the mirror,
natural light and the rainbow, the monad and the echo that r e v e r b e r a t e s
between the monads and throughout the universe.
Faced with the "challenge of cybernetics" that Robinet sees in Leibniz's
thought and that he wants to pick up and take to quite u n e x p e c t e d
consequences, undoubtedly full of implications for philosophy, 1 0 6 we could
try to identify a metaphysical challenge that Leibniz poses for
contemporary philosophy and that would fall within the range of
Heidegger's polemic regarding meditating and calculating thought. This
challenge is to be located in the research round about Grund: the Grund to
which monadology tends is metaphysical, and cannot be experienced b y
means of empirical reflection but only by meditation. The essence of t h e
metaphysical Grund is transferred into the individual monad, w h o s e
process of development and evolution consists both of internal a p p e t i t i o n s

105
GPh VI, p. 346.
106
Cf. A. Robinet, Le defi cybernetique, Gallimard, Paris 1973. The application of
computerized techniques would, in Robinet's opinion, make a great contribution to
philosophy, not only as regards the systematization and lexicographical study of texts,
but also as an impulse for a transformation of philosophical thought itself. Cf. also A.
Robinet, Architectonique disjunctive, automates systematiques et ideal ite
transcendantale dans I'oeuvre de G.W. Leibniz, Vrin, Paris 1986.
1 18 Thought

and of indistinct and confused perceptions, as well as of metaphysical

modifications of the Grund itself. According to Janke, the monad "develops
while it unfolds its world," fulfilling its own principle and participating in
the realization and evolution of the universe. 107
Here Heidegger sees the sign of will and objectivation: the m o n a d
appropriates the world; thanks to perspectivism it absorbs the world a n d
places it before itself as a product. His reading is precise in identifying t h e
locus of strength and will in appetitus and in the repraesentatio of t h e
monad, but he forgets the less voluntaristic (and less one-dimensional)
aspect of the subjective ratio, that less striking side of his thought w h e r e
we find the profile of the mirror and where we hear the harmonious sound
of the universal echo. That is, he seems to forget that for Leibniz the Grund
of the monad is the world, understood as a perimeter, as a circle, as a
meta-physical sphere (for Leibniz metaphysics means Tipo TWV ^uaiKoiv,
before physics). He seems to forget that Leibniz's world is
incommensurable, evasive and intractable of any calculation; it is only at
the level of mathematical abstraction or physical concreteness that one can
determine the world, while the deep layer of metaphysical truth lies
outside any measurement: "nature must be explained mathematically [...]
given that the principles [...] depend on metaphysical reasons." 108
The world as a circle is, moreover, an image that directly connects
Leibniz with Heidegger; it therefore lets the concepts of rationality r u n
from the totally self-conscious type seen in calculating thought to the t y p e
that is content to mirror the fulguration of the original Grund. Without
going into the theoretical mechanisms of the problem of the world in t h e
two thinkers, we can find some common elements and, above all, some
analogies in the use of images that lead to Heidegger's reflections about t h e
world, in the etymological analysis that lies behind the formation of this set
of metaphors. The world is said to be a "play of mirrors," like a "circular
dance of transpropriating making-to-happen," whose essence is the turning
round (das Gering): "the play of mirrors of the world that 'worlds,' like t h e
turning of the ring, frees the Four, united towards the docility that is
proper to them, towards the ductility of their essence. Starting from t h e
play of mirrors of the turning of the turning-into-ring, the 'thinging' of t h e
thing occurs." 109

io7 W. Janke, Leibniz als Metaphysiker, in W. Totok, C. Haase (cds.), Leibniz. Sein
Leben-Sein Wirken-Seine Welt, Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hannover 1970,
p. 385.
108
GPh II, p. 206.
109
VA, p. 179.
 The Path 1 19

Striking analogies can be found in some of Leibniz's etymological

speculations which, like Heidegger's, are not mere searches for the roots of
words, but contain precise (albeit mediated) interpretative and theoretical
levels. The world Welt is associated with the high German Werelt-Werolt,
and hence with Werend-Wereld, something that endures forever. T h e
meaning of the word Welt is that of something that continually moves in a
circle, endlessly. The letter W is said to show the content of almost silent
and calm movement: "mini videtur W minus asperum esse, quam V vel F.
Et sane cum pronuntiatur W, labia minus sibi appropinquant, adeoque
minore vi exprimitur Spiritus. [...] Alioqui winden, wenden, wehlen, w ü h l e n ,
(versare, movere), wollen, weisen, weiss, wissen, wesen, waschen, wage,
wegen, wimmel, et cetera nihil habent per se violenti, sed p l u r i m u s
motus." 1 1 0 Instead, the combination of w and r (Werelt) is said to remain in
the word Welt as the fusion of motion and rotation, where the frenetic
dynamism of turning is added to the idea of calmness. This is how t h e
connection is explained: "putabam ego welt, quod est ab antiquo Werelt,
originem habere ab eadem radice cum werren, wire (Angl.), wirren, gyrus,
wirbel, vertere, etc. Atque adeo werelt esse idem, quod Latinis orbis gyrus;
[...] W generaliter aeris motus, bisbiglio. [...] Si r accedat, violentia m a i o r
exprimitur, ut in wire, gyrus." 111
The world as a circle, an image picked up later by Nietzsche in his
theory of the eternal return of the same, is in this case analagous to
Heidegger's structure Ring-Gering-Ding, to the continual back and forth
movement between thing and world, between thing and circle. The
metaphorical shifting of this imaging continues until we arrive at t h e
metaphor of the Geviert, the Fourfold. Here Heidegger really conceives of
the world, Being, and the thing to be thought in the value terms, q u i t e
upsetting for traditional philosophizing, of the grafting of poetry onto
thought and vice versa. By Geviert Heidegger indicates a place, the locus of
the Grund, giving rise to a form of poetizing-meditating thought: with this
metaphor he not only perfects the cosmogony of Hesiod (earth, day, night,
sky, sea) or that of Empedocles (earth, air, water, fire), but he also r e t u r n s
into the original course of philosophy, in which the difference b e t w e e n
thought and poetry had not yet occurred and thinking was in direct
correspondence with poetic meditating. This conjunction, which helps to
define the horizon of the beginning of Western thought, certainly r e m a i n s ,
at least from a methodological standpoint, foreign to Leibniz's way of
proceeding, whose view of the relation between thought and poetry was b y

ll()
G.W. Leibniz, Collectanea Etymologien, cit., p. 155.
111
Ibid., pp. 178-179.
120 Thought

and large tied to the interpretative schemes developed by historiographical

reflection in the 17th century, wherein poetry is set beside philosophy in a
rather superficial relation.
Leibniz's point of view could be exemplified by an assertion made b y
Daniel Heins (1580-1655), a historian of philosophy, to the effect t h a t
philosophy and poetry must be considered complementary forms of
knowledge: "Poesis est Philosophia tempore antiqua, compositione
numerosa, sensu vero fabulosa. Philosophia autem est Poesis t e m p o r e
recentior, sensu planior." 1 1 2 In the rationalization of mythical thought a n d
mysticism, which reaches a high point in Leibniz, poetry and philosophy
become the forms of thought: "alteram recentem, alteram antiquam."
Leaving aside the academic and Aristotelian vision of early Greek thought
as the site and expression of thought in a poetic, and above all emotional
and myth-related, manner, Leibniz clearly grasps the problem of a relation
between these two ways of thinking, as the probem of a knowledge
directly linked to the mathesis universalis. The idea of the impossibility of
excluding from mathesis the forms of poetry and mystical revelation has
already emerged in the comparison between Leibniz's reflections a n d
mystical discourse. Leibniz himself summarizes his position as follows. In
referring to the mystics, he states: "without the help of a friend w h o
provides me with a succinct key to these authors, I would waste too m u c h
time in studying them, whereas I proceed much better through my own
meditations, which come from this same divine source of light that m a y
have enlightened them, for it is certain that God and the light are in
o u r s e l v e s . " m This is the position of the philosopher who holds t h a t

112
D. Heins, Pindari Phytiis praemissa: in qua ostenditur, quomodo veteres Philosophi
Poetarum scriptis sint usi, in Heins, Orationum editio nova, pnoribus auctior, Ex
officina Elzeviriana, Amstelodami 1657, p. 371.
m
BB, p. 191. Sometimes Leibniz shows an appreciation of c o n t e m p o r a r y or p a s t
mystics, recognizing in them an authentically philosophical and genuinely religious
core ("I believe that there are very fine thoughts in these e x t r a o r d i n a r y theologians,
such as Schwenefeld, Weigelius, Böhme. [...] They help to lead men to a solid piety, i n
lieu of ordinary piety, which is often ceremonious, that is to say, false": letter to Q
Kuhlmann of 3rd April, 1696, in BH, p. 24). Cf. the treatise Von der wahren Theologia
mystica, in DS I, pp. 41 Off. On other occasions, however, he was particularly critical of
them: "the princess Elizabeth of Hervorde told me she held in great esteem the
Christian conversations of Father [Malebranche], but that was at a time when she w a s
beginning not to despise the writings of Jacob Böhme; this should be said, h o w e v e r ,
without making any comparison between that Father and this cobbler" (cf. Ak VI, I,
p. 548). In the final analysis, we could accept Mahnke's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , according to
which Leibniz rationalized the mystical impulse, without ever completely
a b a n d o n i n g it: cf. D. Mahnke, Die Rationalisierung der Mystik bei Leibniz und Kant,
"Blätter für deutsche Philosophie", 13, 1939-40, pp. 1-73. On this matter, see J. B a r u z i ,
Leibniz, et ['organisation religieuse de la terre, Alcan, Paris 1907, and the essay by E.
 The Path 121

mystical theology is to common theology as poetry is to oratory, and w h o

does not conceive of any integration except from the standpoint of
metaphysics.
Metaphysical knowledge, the visio beatifica or intuitio Dei, is imposed as
a doubling of the harmony: from the harmonia rerum to that between m a n
and the world. In the harmonic perimeter of the world, there is no space
for excessively demarcated dissociations and schizophrenias; hence also t h e
problem of a link between the two polarities of thought must find a
harmonious solution. The divine uni-versality is also the univer-sality of
the monadic world; the divine infinity is also mirrored in the subjective
monad. Therefore, Leibniz's thought takes on the connotations of u n i v e r s a l
harmony: the vision of space and time, of Being and nothingness, t h u s
opens up in metaphysical experience to a remembrance of the past in t h e
present and of the future in the present, as in a mirror. There can be no
doubt that Leibniz's vocation for mysticism remained marginal w i t h
respect to his scientific, technical, political and legislative production, a n d
that the drive towards a "reason of the heart" in Pascal's sense w a s
subordinate to his interests in what we may call positive philosophy. It is
nonetheless true that the entire edifice of monadology is built on a
foundation of manifest convergence between the symphonic sonority of
rationalism and the syncopated counterpoint of "mystical reason." 1 1 4 In
Leibniz reason is never merely instrumental, but rather it actuates a
communication of thought; it is never merely calculation, but always also a
mirroring of the universe. As Robinet has commented, in Leibniz "reason is
vertigo, the Grund is Abgrund, abyss," because it is connected w i t h
infinity. 115 The reasons of the abyss are the reasons of general m e t a p h y s i c s
and, if for Leibniz thought is possible only in the union b e t w e e n
apperception and perception, this equation seems to be a confirmation of
the organicistic hypothesis. There is a difference between perception a n d

Colorni, Leibniz, e il misticismo, in Colorni, Scritti, La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1975, p p .

70-98.
114
In trying to clarify his concept of reason, Leibniz states that by the e x p r e s s i o n
"REASON I do not here mean the opinions and discourses of men, and not even t h e
habit that they have acquired of judging of things following the ordinary course of
nature, but the inviolable concatenation of truths" (GPh VI, p. 64). Reason is
certainly the starting and ending point of monadology, as we can see from t h e s e
words: "Ratio ultima rerum, seu Harmonia universalis, id est Deus" (GPh I, p. 61). It is
just a question of not giving too narrow and one-sided an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of it. Cf. t h e
study by K.E. Kaehler, Leibniz.' Position der Rationalität, Alber, Freiburg-München
1989.
115
A. Robinet, Leibniz, et la ravine de I'existence, cit., p. 67. Robinet here c o m p a r e s
reason and the abyss, "the reason of being is a dizzying reason and freedom is a
labyrinth" (ibid.).
122 Thought

apperception that can be reflected also onto thought itself, splitting it. If
apperception refers us back to thinking in the fullness of reflection a n d
awareness, Leibniz's concept of perception makes us run up against
thought devoid of that certainty of itself that positive knowledge m u s t
always make its appeal to.
Heidegger's separation between meditating and calculating thought
could be grafted onto this difference; it is the separation between a kind of
thought supported by rational and logical certainties and one that today w e
could define as "weak," below the threshold of security of ratio. But this
distinction seems narrow and reductive both as applied to Leibniz and as
referred to Heidegger: in Leibniz perception and apperception are
connected and integrated; in Heidegger, it is not true that b e y o n d
conceptual thought lies the realm of the purely irrational. He shifts t h e
theoretical weight decidedly towards the field of meditating thought;
Leibniz, instead, vacillates between the two domains, but both t h i n k e r s
develop an idea of thought that is not limited to a narrow and
monochromatic sphere. Heidegger's "meditating" thought is much m o r e
than a mere irrational sign; monadology is much more than a scientific
description of the world. Not just the theory of the petites perceptions, but
all Leibniz's works reveal at every turn this metaphysical tendency, which
is sometimes explicitly affirmed by Leibniz himself.
An example that documents this explicit self-awareness is a letter of
1679 addressed to Duke Johann Friedrich, in which Leibniz speaks of t h e
relation between the mathematical sciences and metaphysics as he
experienced it during his stay in Paris. This letter is also an autobigraphical
key to Leibniz's spiritual orientation. The text is in the nature of a
description in which the narrator and the person being talked about are
both Leibniz himself: "when in Paris I made the acquaintance of a religious
person, whose worth has been generally acknowledged [...]. He possessed to
perfection what are called the human graces [...] he was reserved w i t h o u t
obscurity, pleasant without tricks. He did not like bright colours, and he
believed that the beauty of any speech must consist in the force of its
reasons. He was thus a master of the art of reasoning. I...] All this lasted
until the age of 25 years, and during this period he had the opportunity to
study the controversies. He was concerned with these matters when t h e
rumour of new discoveries in mathematics and physics re-awakened his
curiosity. [...] This made him turn against all his past studies; he well
understood that an important invention in mathematics is the most certain
sign of a solid spirit. [...] It was in this period that I made his acquaintance
[...] And I was surprised not to recognize in him the traces of what I had
heard about him. But very soon I became aware of my error. I s u r p r i s e d
 The Path 123

him one day while he was reading some books of controversies, and I
expressed to him my amazement, because they had led me to believe h e
was a mathematician by profession, since while he had been in Paris h e
had done nothing else. It was thus on that occasion that he told me that h e
was very amazed, that he had considerably different views, and that his
meditations mainly regarded theology. He said that he had applied himself
to mathematics as he had to scholastic philosophy, that is to say, only in
order to perfect his spirit, and to learn the art of inventing and
demonstrating.""6
Besides being interesting, from the stylistic point of view, as an e x a m p l e
of third-person autobiography, this statement of philosophical self-
understanding shows us a Leibniz who is perhaps not completely new, b u t
is certainly very different from the "scientistic" image that tradition h a s
given us of him. The profile of monadology stands out against a
metaphysical horizon that gathers together the basic questions of
philosophical thought: the problems of the world, of human subjectivity, of
the existence of God, seen through a lens that does not reduce their i m p o r t
or face them with preconceived logical mechanisms, but opens out onto a
play of cosmological mirrorings, of symbols and configurations echoing t h e
relation between the universe and the monad. Only the exact collocation of
the role of mathematical thought in monadology makes it possible to spell
out the basic nature of Leibniz's enterprise. In addition to sophisticated and
solidly structured essays such as the Theodicy, in which Leibniz not only
states his theory of pre-established harmony but also confronts the
meditative side of monadology (which, however, Heidegger interprets as a
fully realized onto-theology), there are documents such as the a b o v e -
mentioned self-presentation or some brief statements that help to explain
the complex relation between mathematics and metaphysics, b e t w e e n
technology and thinking: "I have therefore not studied the m a t h e m a t i c a l
sciences for their own sake, but in order one day to make good use of t h e m
to gain credit for myself by advancing the cause of piety," he wrote to Duke
Johann Friedrich. 117
His criticism of Descartes' mechanistic philosophy seems to put him on a
multiple plane where mysticism and logic, metaphysics and technology
intersect, producing a type of thought free from determinism and open to
meditation: "I have re-established the substantial forms, which t h e
atomists and the followers of Descartes claim to have exterminated. Now, it
is established that, without these forms and without the difference t h a t

1,6
Ak II, pp. 491-493.
117
G.W. Leibniz, Letten of autumn 1679 to Duke Johann Friedrich, in Ak, II, I, p. 490.
124 Thought

there is between them and the accidents of reality, it is impossible to

maintain our mysteries." 1 1 8 In this complex and slightly obscure passage,
we can see the sense of monadology as the logic of existence, as the logic of
the universe, which is "vivum et actuosum"; in monadology the
metaphysical principle is harmonized with subjective sensibility, just as
substance and phenomenon, the infinite and the finite, the abstract and t h e
concrete are made to agree. Though he starts from substance and the
infinite, Leibniz arrives at a philosophy founded on effectiveness, as does
Heidegger, who starts from Being and finitude. 119
Monadology thus understood presents many different aspects, in which
the multiplicity of itineraries is preserved by the plurality of passages,
forming a network of intersecting problems that guarantee the free flow of
different forms of knowledge. This theoretical many-sidedness condenses
within itself a thought of harmony and freedom, whose essence seems to
consist in the free movement of reflection in a metaphysical frame of
reference.

For Heidegger the essence of philosophy lies hidden in the poetic

relation of thought with Being. In the poetizing-meditating solution,
thought renews the auroral understanding of Being of early Greek thought
and absorbs the essence of poetry, the poetic in a strict sense, not as a
literary and expressive form, but as a level of proximity to the sayability of
Being. In poetizing-meditating thought it is Being that speaks: h e r e
"thought, in obedience to Being [Seyn], seeks the word for this." 1 2 0 And t h e
words around which the thinking linguistic opening are gathered are w o r d s
of the origin: to inhabit, to say, to build, to think; essence, language, place,
foundation, abyss, man, Being. These are words that are grafted onto t h e
Greek roots of logos, aletheia, and physis, and give new life to their original
meaning. 1 2 1 Cor-responding to language, man speaks, coming closer to the
essence of Being not by creating artificial images and words, but by letting
the echo of the very language of Being speak and resound in him. Being

118
Ibid.
U9 On the logic and founding of Dasein, see Heidegger's reflections in Beitrüge zur
Philosophie, HGA 65, pp. 293ff.; 159-169 (on Leibniz, p. 308), and the 1923 course, HGA
63. For a hypothesis of comparison in terms of facticity and sensitiveness, w h i c h
involves also Aristotle and Husserl, see F. Volpi, Heidegger e Aristotele, Daphne,
Padova 1984, pp. 75ff.
120
HGA 13, p. 33.
121
On this subject see the study by M. Zarader, Heidegger et les paroles de l'origine,
Vrin, Paris 1986.
 The Path 125

therefore possesses a language of its own, and lives out its own linguistic
adventure, which cannot be mastered either by applying the principle of
reason or by using the formalism of computer language. The language of
Being is a "path and lane between the profundity of the fulfilled sensible
and the elevation of the boldest spirit." ,22 Being, the Seyn that reveals itself
as it conceals itself, does not reach language through a calculation or a
logical derivation, but speaks its own language, which cannot be m a s t e r e d
but only listened to. When Heidegger says that "science does not think," h e
means that not only everything that belongs to calculation does not think,
but also man does not think (yet): "it is not we men who arrive at thoughts,
but thoughts come to us mortals, whose essence is placed in thinking as in
its foundation." To determine the provenance of thought is not the object of
calculation or genetic measurement with the genealogical tools of science,
but is an authentic enigma, an authentic "thing" of thought, of m e t a p h y s i c s
in its destiny-laden path: "from where the basic principles of t h o u g h t
spring, whether from thought or from what thought has basically to t h i n k
or from neither of the two sources that immediately offer themselves to us:
all this remains hidden to our eyes." 1 2 3 It is not the task of intuition to
discover the provenance of thought; truth lies in the polar image of t h e
play of light and shadow, of the darkness that is "the enigma of s h e d d i n g
light," which "keeps with itself the Luminous."
The essence of thought is on the path, on the way that leads to t h e
enigma of truth. Along this path, man encounters the situation of Being in
the world of technology, through which he has to pass to reach thought in
its meditating essence. Heidegger does not establish a code of attitudes a n d
behaviours to be adopted towards technology, but it is clear that he t h i n k s
of an exposition of man to the risks of technology, to an immersion of
thought in the waves of technology, so as to find in it the traces of the p a t h
for meditating thought. It cannot be maintained that the essence of this
thought is found in technology, though the opposite viewpoint may b e
defended: even the essence of technology, which is not something technical,
inheres in the dark and not yet revealed ground of p o e t i z i n g - m e d i t a t i n g
thought. By this route Heidegger manages to discover that which s a v e s
right in the place and moment, in the space and time of greatest risk.
Technology is Gestell, but in it and from it the possibilities of Gelassenheit
are to be made manifest. If the dominion of calculating thought could not
be cracked by reflection on Being, man would lose not only the e x p e r i e n c e
of the foundation and reason, but also his own human essence: "therefore it

22
HGA 13, p. 150.
23
GD, pp. 38-40.
126 Thought

is necessary to save this essence of man." Salvation is also memory of t h e

origin, of the provenance; in remembering, we experience Being by
experiencing its essence and, therefore, also the essence of technology. In
technology there is a mystery that fascinates and at the same time repels
Heidegger, just as happens to him with metaphysics, because the m e a n i n g
of technology belongs to metaphysics. This explains why the way out of
technology, though not passing through technology as such, leads through
the foundation and the reason of technology. It is from the essence of
technology that the path for the other beginning of thought emerges. 124
One should not think, however, that the insistence on the path as a w a y
to escape from technology, on the danger of technology itself and t h e
advent of a kind of thought that is free of its influence is monotonously
archaizing. To understand the dynamic, critical, foundational and
profoundly relevant side of it, suffice it to think of the extent to which t h e
risk described by Heidegger is present in our everyday lives: that is, w e
should think of the possibilities of "applying" poetizing-meditating t h o u g h t
in the context of our world, proceeding along the path that leads to t h e
essence of philosophy. This passage, the Übergang from one epoch of Being
to another, is thinkable only as a decline, Untergang, which "we cannot
conceive of either as an end or as a return to nature." 1 2 S The path t h u s
leads to a waning of the light that "is the source and start of the beginning."
The world of technology is still our horizon, but what presents itself to us
as a sunset is the end of the logical domination of the principle of reason
and the beginning of a new way of looking at the foundation: "we cannot
leap out of the world of technology; it is a necessary condition of m o d e r n
existence. But it is not a sufficient condition; it does not suffice w h e r e v e r
the Being of man can perhaps be saved. This kind of thought should
therefore start with the question: is man's inhabiting today a dwelling in
the concealment of the high?" 126

124
Heidegger suggestively defines Gestell as "the photographic negative of Ereignis"
(Seminar in Le Tlwr 1969, in HGA 15, p. 366). On Gestell and Ereignis, cf. HGA 65, pp.
254ft\; 470ff. Of the abundant literature on the question of technology in Heidegger,
see F.W. von Herrmann, Technik und Kunst im seynsgeschichtlichen Eragehorizont,
in Kunst und Technik, Gedächtnisschrift zum 100. Geburtstag von Martin Heidegger,
edited by W. Biemel and F.W. von Herrmann, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1989,
pp. 25-46; W. Schirmacher, Technik und Gelassenheit, Alber, Freiburg-Munchen 1983;
G. Seubold, Heideggers Analyse der neuzeitlichen Technik, Alber, F r e i b u r g - M ü n c h e n
1986; M. Ruggenini, // soggetto e la tecnica, Bulzoni, Roma 1977.
125
WPh, p. 28.
126
M. Heidegger, Fragen nach dem Aufenthalt des Menschen, in "Neue Z ü r c h e r
Zeitung" of 5th October, 1969, quoted in W. Strolz, Heidegger als meditativer Denker,
Erker-Verlag, St. Galen 1974, p. 26.
 The Path 127

Technology (metaphysics) cannot penetrate to the depths of the Grund;

only one who faces the darkness of the foundation, the disquieting gleams
of ratio and the mysterious announcement of logos can unveil and p r e s e r v e
the essence of being human; only "one who has thought the deepest, loves
in the most alive way," says Hölderlin, the last Heraclitean. Here m e d i t a t i v e
thought is fused with the essence of poetry; Heidegger's lessons on
Hölderlin bear witness to the strenuous search for a bridge between t h e
two: "if the essence of poetry were initially circumscribed as the founding
of Being, then the full essence of poetry and of what is founded in it would
open itself up to us in the revelation of the Being of the founding, that is in
the founding of the foundation of the Being of poetry. Nevertheless, this
Being [...] can be founded only in the essence of Being in its totality. [...]
Being lets poetry arise, to re-find itself originally in it and thus open itself
up in it while it re-closes itself up as a mystery. In this poetry of the Being
of the demigods, that is of the means of Being between gods and men,
Being in its totality must unveil itself for us." 127
Without raising here the problem of the possibility that Heidegger
understands poetry as a "regional" ontology, hence subordinating it to
Being as a whole, what is unmistakeable is the image of the all-
inclusiveness of Being (Seyn) and of the thought that meditates its d e s t i n y
(seynsgeschickliches Denken), which in its vastness embraces also poetizing
thought. This seems, at bottom, to be the meaning of thinking Being: "to
think the essence of philosophy means: to poetize the appropriating e v e n t
starting from a hint of it, as the covering Lichtung happens in accepting
Being. To think this, however, is: to be harmonized, in the poetizing idea,
with Being in its truth. To think the essence of philosophy means: to t h i n k
what for philosophy is what must be poetized; it means: simply to think.
Therefore meditation on the essence of philosophy is not any posterior or
anticipatory reflection on philosophy, but it is the thinking leap into t h e
midst of poetizing thought itself."128
Therefore, to answer the question, "What does it mean to think?", w e
should say, to respect Heidegger's intention: simply to think Being. To t h i n k
means to place oneself in Being: here Heidegger advances along the s a m e
path as traditional ontology, from Heraclitus to Parmenides, from Plato to
Leibniz, from Kant to Hegel. And it is in this light that we should i n t e r p r e t
the link between thought and Being, to the elucidation of which Leibniz's
reflection has made a considerable contribution. Faced with the paradox of

127 HGA 39, pp. 237-238. The other courses on Hölderlin were published in HGA 52 and
HGA 53. See also the collection of essays in HGA 4.
128
WPh, p. 27.
128 Thought

the relation between Being and nothingness, expressed in the question,

"Why does something exist rather than nothing?", Heidegger conceives of
their co-belonging in a sphere never before touched on by W e s t e r n
thought. In giving utterance to the paradoxical nature of the existence of
Being, which is more complex and more difficult than nothingness
("nothingness is simpler and easier than something"), Leibniz challenges
Heidegger to take up again the broken thread of Heraclitus' logos. This
provocation, formulated in the principle of sufficient reason, leads
Heidegger to give new meaning to the logic of Being in an original
phenomenology of Being. Driven by Leibniz, who nonetheless symbolically
represents in a nutshell an entire dimension that extends both before a n d
after him, Heidegger thinks the event of Being in a metaphysical
experience that accepts the tradition while at the same time expunging
from it any trace of will. To think means to abandon oneself to a stratum of
harmonious Being, renewing the ancient nostalgia for harmony b e t w e e n
man and the cosmos, between Being and thinking, following in this way t h e
teaching of Goethe: "never spirit without matter, never matter w i t h o u t
spirit." In contrast with the metaphysics of will, which seeks unstable a n d
derived dialectical syntheses, Heidegger seems to exalt an invisible, yet
solid harmony, one that is basic and yet never tried. The waiting for this
concordance is a waiting for a god who can save man from forgetfulness of
the Grund, a waiting for an angel who can disclose the atmosphere of a
thought that is finally a thought "of Being," both in an objective and in a
subjective sense. But this angel does not resemble the apocalyptic one
drawn by Klee and described by Benjamin, an angel on the verge of
tragicalness and surrounded by ruins, but seems rather to be identified
with the angel Hamann is expecting to come and give him the key t h a t
"opens the abyss" of language. It is not the angel of nothingness whose
advent Heidegger is awaiting, but the angel that announces Being and its
abyss.
The ontological power of the principle of reason defines an impulse for
Heidegger's reflection on Being, a composite and abyssal mosaic forgotten
and hidden by the dust of the "ages," the aim of every thought that w a n t s
to evince the authentic essence of the thing itself: i.e., to think t h e
foundation simply by thinking Being. The metaphysics of the will and of
nihilism can only be overcome on the basis of a meditation on Being, on
what is, linked to a phenomenological investigation of thought. But "when
we venture to reflect on thought, [...] discourse that takes thought as its
object has meaning only if we experience thought mainly and exclusively
as that thought which determines our historical Dasein. As long as we try to
meditate this thought in its main principles, we already find ourselves
 The Path 129

involved in the furrow and network of relations of our history, i.e., of

universal history. Only by penetrating sufficiently deeply into our t h o u g h t
and its essence can we recognize another, foreign kind of thought, a n d
listen to it as to what surprises us in its fruitful foreignness. But t h e
thought that today, even historically, determines universal history, does
not come from today; it is more ancient than the mere past; in its m o s t
ancient thoughts it comes from a proximity whose traces we cannot
observe as long as we think that what concerns us authentically (i.e., in t h e
essence of things) is what is present." 129
The idea of reason that is called into play here is different from t h e
traditional ratio and represents the point of arrival of Heidegger's path. But
to be different does not mean to deny reason, nor is there any absence of
reflection: "meditating thought does not happen without effort, almost b y
itself; in this respect it is like calculating thought. But meditating t h o u g h t
requires an even greater effort." It is an effort of the reason to o v e r c o m e
the limits of rationalism and to reawaken to a new way of thinking: "once
meditating thought is well awake, reflection will go on incessantly." 130
The meaning of this effort lies beyond both the Romantic nostalgia for a
lost natural peace and the haughtiness of Enlightenment reason. Even if
Heidegger's attempt may be, and often is, considered to be arcadian a n t i -
rationalism, his voice preserves, while modifying it, the tone of reason in
the original sense, of logos as part of the event of Being. To include r e a s o n
in Being does not mean to shift philosophical thought into the i n s e c u r e
areas of magic; on the contrary, the contamination between reason a n d
Being seems to be the most satisfying answer to the need for
scientificalness that Heidegger felt and wrote about, phenomenologically, as
far back as the early 1920s ("the idea of philosophy as original science").
Only a project that, more or less openly, aims at making ratio an
absolute value can still fear the phenomenological gaze of Heidegger:
indeed, the new theoretical places defined by his "meditating" reason a r e
the very spaces in which contemporary thought tends to move. In t h e s e
spaces, in retracing the "ways of reason," some scholars have returned to
the founding ideas of classical rationality (for example, the recent r e v i v a l
of Aristotle by E. Berti), while others have transformed from the inside t h e
models of critical rationalism (Feyerabend, but also Kuhn), or radically
revised the parameters of scientific reason (Prigogine, and before h i m
Whitehead), or put forward dislocations on the plane of the "decline" of
traditional ontology (Vattimo, for example). 131
129
GD, p. 41.
130
G, p. 23.
131
The hypotheses of reformulation of the rational paradigm mentioned here (and
130 Thought

These scholars of reason all share the intention of freeing thought from
the preconceived idea of the infallibiity of reason (both scientific a n d
philosophical), to dedicate themselves to a search for the less illuminated
edges of it, whose outlines are more unceitain but not less decisive. Their
eflorts put into practice, albeit in different ways, a criticism of reason,
which is an ancient and noble enterprise; with Heidegger, in the wake of
his master Husserl, such criticism has been neither repudiated nor
distorted, but rather revealed and restored to its most proper essence.
The consequence of this interpretation suggests that the possibilities
inherent in the boldest hypothesis of the ontology of decline are achieved
not only through the breaking down of the barriers of reason, but also b y
retracing and rethinking Heidegger's re-appropriation of metaphysics, in
that free and courageous dialogue that Heidegger entertains with the most
authoritative figures in the history of metaphysics, and with its basic
presuppositions. The path along which Heidegger reaches us, and
penetrates to the very heart of our philosophical thought, is arduous and
dangerous precisely because it bears within itself the impressions of the
entire tradition, without any exceptions. It is the riskiest of all p a t h s
because, while straying far from rationalism, it leads one to think to the
bottom of things, in the phenomenological spirit of a search for the things
themselves, the essence of reason.

these are only a few examples) refer to E. Berti, Le vie della ragione, II Muhno,
Bologna 1987; P.K. Feyerabend, Dialogo sul metodo, Laterza, Roma-Ban 1989; I.
Prigogine, DalVessere al divenire, Einaudi, Torino 1986; G. Vattimo, Le avventiire della
differenza, cit., and Id., La fine della modernita, Garzanti, Milano 1985. For a criticism
of many of the current "crises" of reason, but in particular of Heidegger and post-
Heideggerian thought, cf. the recent book by P. Rossi, Paragone degli ingegni
moderni e postmoderni, II Mulino, Bologna 1989.
 INDEX
Erdmann, J.E., vii, xi, 78
Albert, K., 102
Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfcls, 80
Anaxagoras, 22
Angelus Silesius, 11, 27, 100, 101
Feyerabend, P K., 129, 130
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 12
Fichte, J.G., 89, 114
Aristotle, vin, x, xii, xiv, 11, 23, 24, 28,
Fink, E., 16, 19, 28, 31, 50, 106
78, 88, 120, 124, 129
Fink, S., 50
Arnauld, A., 72
Foucher, S , 70
Arnim, B von, 41
Franchini, R , 99
Aster, E von, 4
Augustine, Saint, 12
Gadamer, H.G , 34, 43, 44, 57, 58, 60, 113
Goethe, JW., 101, 106, 113, 128
Bacon. F., 75
Gruber, C., 94
Bane. G E., 90
Gurwitsch, A , 77
Baru/i, J , ix, xiv, 95, 120
Guzzoni, G., 103
Baruzzi, A , 112
Bau mann, G., 50
Haase, C , 118
Beaulret, J., 9
Hamann, J.G., 128
Becker. O , 61
Hansch, M.G., 82
Beieiwaltes, W , 27
Hegel, G.W.F., vii, viii, ix, xi, xii, xiii, 12,
Beiaval, Y., 8, 70, 77
34, 55, 81, 113, 114, 127
Benjamin, W., 128
Heidegger, M., passim
Bergson, H., 45
Heidemann, I., 106
Berti, E., 129, 130
Heimsocth, H , 70, 72, 99
Biemel, W . 5, 36, 126
Heinckamp, A., 83, 90
Blumenberg, H., 27
Heins, D , 120
Boeder, H., 31, 78
Heintel, E., 71
Boehm, R , 51, 56
Held, K., 31
Böhme, J , II, 120
Heraclitus, viii, xii, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
Bieda, H.L. van, 77
Brentano, F , 99 28, 29, 30, 31, 105, 127
Büchner, H., 78 Herbertz, R., 85
Burnett, T , 18 Herder, J.G., 113
Herrmann, F W. von, 5, 50, 89, 126
Hesiod, 119
Caputo, J.D , 102
Hölderlin, F., 17, 51, 60, 127
Cassircr, E , vn, xi, 6, 7
Horn, J.C., 4
Colorni, E., 121
Hübscher, A., 8
Couturat, L , 6, 7, 71, 92
Husserl, E., 10, 15, 17, 35, 36, 44, 50,
Cristin, R , vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xii, xiii, xv,
56, 72, 74, 76, 79, 89, 98, 99, 124
74
Cusano, N., 12, 73, 77
Jalabert, J., 72
Janke, W., 51, 74, 75, 118
Daville, L., 67
Joachim of Fiore, viii, xn
Deleuze, G., 93
Johann Friedrich von Braunschweig
Derrida, J., 40
Lüneburg, 71, 72, 123
Descartes, R., 35, 45, 59, 64, 69, 70, 71, 72,
Jonas, H., 44
73, 75, 76, 82, 88, 91, 123
Dilthey, W., vii, xi, xvn
Kabitz, W , 8, 67
Dumas, M.N., 69
Kaehler, K.E., 121
Kant, L, 7, 12, 35, 74, 85, 98, 107, 113,
Elisabeth von der Pfalz, Abbess of Herford,
114, 127
92, 120
Klee, P., 128
Empedocles, 22, 1 19
Koyre, A., 64
132

Krönert, G., 67 Schneiders, W., 88

Kuhlmann, Q., 120 Schopenhauer, A., 8, 114
Kuhn, T., 129 Schröter, M., 12
Schürmann, R., 102
Leibniz, G.W , passim Schüßler, I., 51
Löwith, K , 95, 96 Schwenefeld, K., 120
Seneca, L.A., 10
Mahnke, D., 8, 77, 120 Sepp, H R., 57
Malebranche, N., 69, 120 Serres, M., 90, 110
Martin, G., 8 Seubold, G., 126
Marx, K., 116 Seuse, H., 11
Marx, W., 89, 102 Socrates, 68
Mathieu, V., 8 Spinoza, B., 69
Mechthild von Magdeburg, 11 Stegmaier, W., 72
Meister Eckhart, 11 Strahm, H., 85
Meyer, R., 83 Strolz, W., 126
Molinos, M. de, 82
Mugnai, M., 91 Taminiaux, J., 9
Muller, K., 67 Tauler, L, 11
Thomas Aquinas, v. Aquinas
Naert, E , 85 Tietjen, H., 6, 89
Nenon, Th., 57 Totok, W., 118
Nicaise, C , 82 Trakl, G , 35
Nietzsche, F., ix, xiii, 106, 113, 114, 115
Oldenburg, H., 71, 92 Ugo di San Vittore, 82
Ortega y Gasset, J , 9
Vattimo, G., 129, 130
Paci, E., 77 Viti Cavaliere, R., 9
Parmenides, viii, xiii, 31, 32, 89, 127 Vleeschauwer, H J. de, 83
Pascal, B., 70, 101 Voider, B. de, 72
Periander of Corinth, 20 Volpi, F., 124
Pener, E., 70
Pfeiffer, F., 11 Wagner, G., 78
Plato, viii, x, xn, xiii, xiv, 71, 73, 100, 127 Wahl, J., 50
Pöggeler, O., 5 Wedderkopf, M., 98
Poser, H., 67 Weierstrass, C , 99
Pngogine, I., 129, 130 Weigel, V. (Weigelius), 120
Prometheus, 19 Wenzel, U., 9
Whitehead, A.N., 129
Ravier, E., 91 Wiener, N., ix, xiii, 65
Remond, NF., 83 Wittgenstein, L., 7
Rilke, R.M , 103 Wöhrmann, KR., 81
Robinet, A., 75, 77, 114, 117 Wolff, C., 19
Rombach, H., 99
Ropohl, H., 75 Zahn, M , 89
Rossi, P., 130 Zarader, M., 124
Ruggenini, M., 126 Zeus, 30
Russell, B., 6, 7, 19, 91 Zingari, G„ 12
Ruysbroeck, J. van, 11 Zocher, R., 83

Saame, O., 4, 8, 73, 74

Sakai, K., 74
Schelling, F W., 12, 16, 113, 114
Schirmacher, W., 126
Schmitt, C.B., 83