Journal of European Studies

The Role of Turkey–EU Relations in the Formation of the

“New” Turkish Foreign Policy

Cagri Erhan

Nature of Turkey’s relations with

the European Union
Turkey, has been waiting for entry into the European Community /
Union for more than half a century. Although Turkey entered into
accession negotiations with the EU in 2005, it has only been able
to fulfill 12 chapters of the acquis communitaire out of 35 so far.
There is a permanent state of uncertainty about the success of the
ongoing negotiations process. The outstanding issues on the
Turkish and the EU side, have slowed down the accession process,
creating new obstacles in Turkey‟s path to the EU. It is true that
many Turks and Europeans have become quite sceptical about
Turkey ever becoming an EU member.

However, Turkey‟s prolonged courtship of the EU has had an

immense impact on its foreign policy. Turkey, on the one hand,
used its closeness with the EU to set up a new and sustainable
foreign policy architecture, and on the other hand, as a “reaction”
to EU‟s hesitancy in accepting Turkey in the EU fold, Ankara has
begun to establish multidimensional relations with countries in and
around its region. Its aim is to become a leading power in the
region.

To understand Turkey‟s position – vis-à-vis the EU and the new

Turkish activism in the Middle East and beyond, one has to briefly
glance at the country‟s historical background, geopolitical location
and its socio-economic dynamics.

A sense of confusion dominates the discussion both abroad and

within the country about the exact nature of Turkey, its people and
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 Journal of European Studies

its foreign policy priorities.1 This is only too natural, as it is very

difficult to place Turkey into any specific geographical, cultural,
political or economic category. About 97 percent of its land mass
lies in Asia, yet the country considers itself as being part of
Europe. About 98 percent of its population is Muslim, and yet
Turkey is a secular state by choice, and its religious development
has taken a different path from that of other Muslim countries.
Culturally, most of the country reflects the peculiarities of the
wider Middle Eastern culture, and yet it participates, persistently,
in European cultural events. It professes to have a liberal economic
system, but the remnants of planned economy hamper the
country‟s development. As far as religion, history, and geography
is concerned it is a Middle Eastern country, yet any development
disturbing the status quo in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Caspian,
the Black Sea and the Mediterranean regions directly affects
Turkey.2

Turkey’s identity: European or Asian?

As pointed out above, Turkey is the only pluralist secular
democracy in the Muslim world and has always attached great
importance to developing close relations with European countries.
Turkish culture has had a profound impact over much of Eastern
and Southern Europe. This is a legacy of the vast multi-cultural
Ottoman Empire which ended some years after the end of the First
World War.

Turkey began the “westernization” or “modernization” of its

economic, political and social structures in the 19th century.
Following the First World War and the proclamation of the
1
David Barchard, “Turkey and Europe”, Turkish Review Quarterly Digest 3, no.
17 (1989): 5 -13.
2
Mustafa Aydın, “The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's
European Vocation”, The Review of International Affairs 3, Issue 2
(December 2003): 306 – 331.

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 Journal of European Studies

Republic in 1923, it chose West Europe as the model for its new
secular structure.

Turkey has ever since closely aligned itself with the West,
becoming a founding member of the United Nations, a member of
NATO, the Council of Europe, the OECD and an associate
member of the Western European Union. During the cold war,
Turkey was a part of the Western alliance system, aimed at,
defending freedom, democracy, human rights and the market
economy. Turkey continues to play a vital role in the defence of
the European continent. In this context in particular, the basic
elements of its foreign policy converge with those of its European
partners.

It was therefore only natural for Turkey to want to complete its

close political and security cooperation with western Europe by
extending it to the economic area. Turkey‟s close cooperation with
the fledging European Economic Community (EEC) began in
1959.

A very important step towards close cooperation between the EEC

and Turkey was the partnership regime established by the Ankara
Agreement which was signed on September 12, 1963. The
Agreement entered into force on December 1, 1964. The Ankara
Agreement envisaged a gradual process for Turkey‟s integration
with the Community. As a first step trade was liberalized and then
a Customs Union formed which was completed on December 31,
1995.

Over the years economic integration between the two sides has
reached an advanced level and consequently, Turkey has applied
for full membership as the next step foreseen in the Ankara
Agreement.

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 Journal of European Studies

Besides this, Turkey is a country which has a unique historical

experience, for it is successor to the ancient civilizations, which
thrived on its territory. Turkey‟s historical development has
culminated in the present day modern, democratic, secular state.
The country‟s strategic position, emanates from its history, culture,
and physical location, conferring on it inherent and unique
capabilities.

Lord Kinross, in his Ottoman Centuries, makes an interesting

observation: at a time when the Balkans and Central Europe were
ruled by mostly incompetent aristocrats who had acquired
positions through family connection, the Ottomans had developed
a system in which men rose through the ranks by passing through a
fair test of their competence. Lord Kinross calls this system, which
functioned from the 15th to the 18th century, a “meritocracy”3. This
meritocracy, based on an equitable approach towards diverse
groups in the empire was the most important element which helped
establish peaceful relations between the state and a wide variety of
ethnic and religious groups.

This historical phenomenon contributed to better understanding

among peoples of all races and religions in the empire and the
positive relationship, which lasted for centuries, in turn provides a
favourable background for contemporary Turkish foreign policy in
the region which once comprised the Ottoman polity.

The breakthrough in Turkish foreign policy since 2002 is owing to

the conscious addition of the historical dimension to bilateral
relations with these states which share a common Ottoman past
with Turkey. We are now witnessing the practical benefits of the
inclusion of this decisive dimension to Turkey‟s foreign policy.
Focusing on historical and cultural affinities has provided
3
Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish
Empire (New York: William Morrow Quill, 1977).

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 Journal of European Studies

additional impetus to its relations with countries in the Balkans, the

Middle East, Central Asia, North and East Africa.

From this perspective, as described in the beginning of the article,

Turkey is already European and has been so for seven centuries.
Also, Turkey is at the same time Asian, Middle Eastern, Balkan
and a part of the Mediterranean world. This is its privilege and its
asset. Turkey is not under any obligation to prove to others that it
is European.

Europeans and Turks have been in close contact, at times as

adversaries, since the fifteenth century. This has contributed to the
formation of their respective modern identities. While the
perception of “the Turk” as „the other‟ is more clearly discernable
in modern European identity, the modern Turkish identity, too, has
been formed in relation to modern Europe.4

During the zenith of the Ottoman Empire, Europe was considered

as the enemy against which the Turkish / Ottoman identity was
affirmed. Although Europe, as a result of its growing power and
influence, has assumed a somewhat positive connotation in
contemporary Turkish consciousness, the negative perception,
evoked by the memories of intervention in Ottoman affairs has also
not been erased from the Turkish mind.

Despite close contact and mutual influence, the Ottomans were not
considered as part of Europe until the late eighteenth century, „for
Europe was still defined in terms of religion and the “Turk” had a
different religion‟, the “heresy of Islam”.5 Despite the Treaty of
Paris, which accepted the Ottoman Empire as part of the European
4
Aydın, “The Determinants of Turkish”, 326 – 327.
5
Nuri Yurdusev, “Perception and Images in Turkish (Ottoman) – European
Relations”, in Tareq Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (eds.), Turkey’s Foreign
Policy in the Twenty-First Century: A Changing Role in World Politics
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), 69 – 92.

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 Journal of European Studies

state system, the Turks were still not considered as Europeans

since the European identity in the nineteenth century was
synonymous with being “civilized”, which the Turks in the eyes of
the Europeans were apparently not.6

On the other hand, it is clear that Turkey and Europe have been
highly engaged with each other throughout history, and not always
in the negative sense. A re-reading of history:

“(…) reveals that the confrontations between the

Turks and the Europeans were no more belligerent
than those among the European nations. The so-
called religious difference, too, reflect a one-sided
reading of the texts and history…. Historically,
conflicts between the Muslims and the Christians
have not been bloodier than the internal conflicts of
these religious groupings”7.

With this wide ranging interaction involving both cooperation and

confrontation, the Turks and the Europeans may yet reach a higher
level of understanding and move beyond existing prejudices on
both sides. Only then might we see a move towards integration
between Turkey and the European Union, and perhaps eventually
the fulfillment of Turkey‟s long-standing wish to be seen as part of
the “European civilization” as it is understand today. However, as
pointed out by Andrew Mango an identity crisis between Turkey
and the EU may continue: “for the question of whether the Turks
are European or not does not admit a clear answer, since the
concept of the European itself is vague.”8

6
Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 14 – 15.
7
Yurdusev, “Perception and Images”, 88.
8
Andrew Mango, “European Dimensions”, Middle East Studies 28 (1992): 398.

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 Journal of European Studies

If “being European” stems from a geographical definition, then it

must not be forgotten that the scene of Turkey‟s history was a vast
area of Europe; also a significant part of today‟s Turkey is located
in the European continent.

If “being European” is based on common values, Turkey upholds

the values of democracy, pluralism, secularism, human rights, and
gender equality: all of which constitute the basis of contemporary
European culture as defined by the Council of Europe. Turkey
should therefore have no need to convince others to accept its
“Europeanness”. In other words, Turkey‟s European dimension
does not require a scrutiny of credentials: it is a historical,
geographical and cultural fact.9

Seen in this perspective, EU membership for Turkey may be

considered as a means to achieve higher standards of living and the
aims set out decades ago by the founder of the Republic of Turkey,
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. These aims are still relevant for
contemporary Turkey. Therefore, full membership in the EU is
what Turkey wants to achieve. In this perspective however,
Turkey‟s membership in the EU is a goal, but not an obsession.
Furthermore, Turkey‟s goal in the 21st century is not just to
become a member of the EU but also to play a vital role in the
heart of Eurasia.

European Union-inspired reforms in Turkey

In Turkey, the significant domestic reforms and extensive revisions
of the constitution since the late 1990s, aimed at creating a more
conducive environment for further democratization, respect for
human rights, the rule of law and participation of the civil society
in general, are inspired by Turkey‟s desire to join the EU. After the
recognition of Turkey as a candidate for accession at the Helsinki
European Council in December 1999 a new era in relations
9
İsmail Cem, Turkey in the New Century (Mersin: Rustem Publishing, 2001),
22.
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 Journal of European Studies

between Turkey and the EU has begun. For both sides, Helsinki
marks a qualitatively new beginning and a process of
transformation of mutual perception. It was Turkey‟s high
performance with regard to fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria
between 1999 – 2003 which led the EU to contemplate opening
accession negotiations with Ankara. Accession negotiations were
thus launched on October 3, 2005 with the adoption of the
Negotiation Framework by the Council of the European Union.

The „rigorous‟ negotiating framework10, rests on the following

elements:

The underlying and shared objective of the talks is Turkey's

EU accession. However, the negotiations are "open-
ended", which means that their outcome is not guaranteed
beforehand.
At the end of the talks, should Turkey fail to satisfy
fully all the obligations of EU membership as specified in
the Copenhagen criteria, EU member states would still
ensure that Ankara is "fully anchored in European
structures through the strongest possible bond".
The accession negotiations are being conducted in the
framework of an Inter Governmental Conference with the
participation of Turkey and all EU member states. The
policy issues are broken down into 35 policy areas (so-
called 'chapters') and all decisions require unanimity.
The EU may consider introducing long transition periods,
derogations, special arrangements or permanent safeguard
clauses on each chapter.
Membership talks with candidates "whose accession could
have substantial financial consequences" (such as
Turkey) can only be concluded after 2014, the scheduled
10
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf
(11 February 2010).

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 Journal of European Studies

date for the establishment of the EU's new financial

framework.
Accession negotiations can be suspended in case of a
"serious and persistent breach […] of the principles of
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is
founded". Suspension would require a Commission
initiative or a request to that effect by one third of the
member states. The final decision would be made by the
Council by qualified majority vote, and the European
Parliament would be informed.

Under a compromise formula agreed at the December 2004 EU

Council, Turkey was obliged to sign a protocol before October 3,
2005 for the 1963 Ankara Treaty to be adopted by ten new member
states of the EU, including the Greek part of Cyprus. This would
amount to implicit recognition of the Greek Cypriot government
by Ankara for the first time since the island's division in 1974.
"The adoption of this protocol is in no way recognition, and I've
put this on the record," Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan clarified. The latter added that the deal did not include a
commitment from Ankara for ratification of the protocol by the
Turkish parliament before October 2005. Regarding the other key
condition, Turkey on June 1, 2005 enacted a revised penal code.

October 2005 was an important milestone for European Union-

Turkey ties, not only because of its historical or political
significance, but also for its potential to contribute to a new and
more realistic approach to Turkey‟s membership of the EU. Debate
on EU membership has become one of the main dividing lines in
Turkey‟s domestic politics, especially after Turkey was accepted
as a candidate country at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. The
traditional dividing lines of “left/right” or “secular/Islamist” in
domestic politics had apparently lost significance, and new
political groups and coalitions emerged on the basis of support or

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 Journal of European Studies

opposition to EU membership. The fierce debate about the EU

membership process is continuing and two opposing groups are
leading these discussions.

One group strongly favours EU membership for Turkey,

perceiving it as a “magic wand” that may solve all the problems of
the country. Since the country lacks strong internal dynamics to
achieve on its own, its socio-political and economic transformation
to address the challenges of the 21st century, inclusion in the EU is
for them the only hope. Nothing else, therefore matters. The other
group, on the contrary, portrays the EU as a great devil which is
believed to have a hidden agenda to divide and weaken the
country. This group is convinced that the EU will never accept
Turkey as a member, but will pressure it to make more
concessions. Meanwhile, it will foment ethnic and religious strife
in the country.11

Although the two groups appear poles apart, we would rather put
them in the category of “Romantics.” It may seem to be a
simplistic approach, but it helps to better understand the narrow
and shortsighted discussions on EU membership in Turkey today.
Looked at from this angle, the two groups show many similarities.
They do not derive their arguments from an analysis of the facts
and developments either in Turkey or Europe, but build their ideas
on emotions, biases and fixations. While the first group raised
expectations among the Turkish people which only led to greater
frustration, the second group engendered a very wrong image of
the EU. It even projected the EU as an enemy of the Turkish
people. What Turkey urgently needs today is a new realistic and
unemotional approach towards the EU. It is interesting to note that
recent developments in the EU and the start of accession talks, are
pushing Turkey to adopt this approach.
11
Ayhan Şimşek, “Debating Turkey‟s EU Membership: Realists vs.
Romantics”, October 3 Turkey’s EU Moment of Truth, The New Anatolian,
October 3 2005 Special Issue, October 2005, 21.
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 Journal of European Studies

The current stage in accession negotiations

To date 12 chapters have been opened (4 - Free Movement of
Capital, 6 - Company Law, 7 - Intellectual Property Law, 10 -
Information Society and Media,16 - Taxation, 18 - Statistics, 20 -
Enterprise and Industrial Policy, 21 - Trans-European Networks,
27 - Environment, 28 - Consumer and Health Protection, 32 -
Financial Control) and one of them (25- Science and Research)
has been closed for the time being.

Under the decisions made by the EU‟s General Affairs and

External Relations Council of December 11, 2006 and the
European Council of December 14, 2006, Turkey‟s fulfillment of
commitments under the Additional Protocol to the Ankara
Agreement has become a benchmark for the opening of
negotiations on another 8 chapters (chapter 1 - Free Movement of
Goods, chapter 11 - Agriculture and Rural Development, chapter 3
- Freedom to Provide Services, chapter 9 - Financial Services,
chapter 13 - Fisheries, chapter 14 - Transport, chapter 29 -
Customs Union, chapter 30 - External (economic/trade)
Relations.It has also become a benchmark for the provisional
closure of all chapters.

It is noteworthy that the impetus for reform has been waning in

Turkey as a result of the increasingly negative stance of key
players like France and Germany, which are highly sceptical of
Turkey's credentials as a European country and its ability to fulfill
the accession criteria.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy is firmly opposed to Turkish

membership of the EU. He claims that "Europe has been lying
about its borders. Turkey is in Asia Minor and not in Europe".
Sarkozy has even expressed the belief that Europe should

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 Journal of European Studies

discontinue accession talks with Turkey and instead work towards

a "privileged partnership"12.

Germany too, is doubtful about the idea of taking Turkey into the
EU. Chancellor Angela Merkel stated "accession is not a one-way
street" and Turkey must fulfil the criteria. During the 2009 EU
election campaign, she said she would prefer Turkey to be given a
privileged partnership13 in the EU, rather than full membership.
After the September 2009 federal elections Merkel's stance gained
more adherents in Germany. The new coalition partner of the
CDU, the liberal FDP, is critical of Turkish accession, unlike the
former 'grand coalition' partner, the SDP.

A plenary session of the European Parliament approved the report

on Turkey on February 11, 201014. The report evaluates political
and legal reforms in Turkey, and defines the EU‟s stand on the
Cyprus issue. This has provoked a strong reaction from Turkey in
both national and international platforms. The EU has asked
Turkey to immediately withdraw its soldiers from the island,
address the twin issues of the settlement of Turkish citizens on the
island and the properties of these immigrants. It has kept quiet on
the other parties‟ role and responsibilities regarding the issue15.

While negotiations between the Cypriot leaders continue and there

are predictions that in 2010 the problem would be finally resolved,
it is apparent that the institutions of the European Union need to
approach the matter with a fair and multi-dimensional perspective.

12
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6041404.ece
(14 February 2010).
13
http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/080304-beschluss-tuerkei.pdf
(15 February 2010).
14
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P
7-TA-2010-0025+0+DOC +XML+V0//EN (11 February 2010).
15
http://www.abhaber.com/ozelhaber.php?id=5341 ( 11 February 2010).

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 Journal of European Studies

In the on going negotiations on Cyprus, it is not possible for

Turkey to agree to an unfair and adhoc peace, even though it is the
Turkish side which is more keen to find a solution to the problem.
The European Parliament‟s report on Turkey for the year 2010 is
worded in a harsher style than in the past years, and this is widely
resented in the country. This attitude will only serve to destroy
chances of a compromise solution on the Cyprus issue. With
Turkey‟s positive attitude, if a solution cannot be found by the end
of 2010 the fault will not lie with Ankara. The Greek side has been
happy to see the EU‟s decision making institutions being used as a
platform for projecting the Greek Cypriot viewpoint and there are
some European Union member states which are using this situation
to promote their national interests. The negotiation process, whose
boundaries have already been defined, needs flexibility rather than
pressure for a permanent solution, which has the potential to
engender future conflict.

The international community is aware of the fact that the Turkish

side, which was amenable to the Annan Plan16 under UN
leadership, has been punished and ignored by the European Union
since 2004. The perception prevalent in the EU, Greece and South
Cyprus that a solution can be arrived at by putting more pressure
on Turkey is an erroneous idea that could prove costly. The
tendency in the European Union is to ignore the broad issue and
reduce it to the presently irrelevant technical details. The EU has
lost its credibility as a mediator in the Cyprus issue for it openly
endorses the Greek Cypriot stand while ignoring the Turkish view.
If the EU wants to become a leader in the global context it must
stop approaching problems with narrow and short term plans and
take into account the broader issues.

If a major aim of the EU and its member states is to turn the EU

into a truly global actor, member states should stop using the
Cyprus issue as an excuse to keep Turkey out of the EU, and weigh
16
http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html (13 February 2010).
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 Journal of European Studies

the political and strategic benefits of granting EU membership to

the country.

Support for the EU and public opinion in Turkey

In recent years, domestic support for EU membership has declined
as the issues seem increasingly difficult to resolve. The Turkish
public is growing more and more weary of the negotiation process.
A recent survey which was conducted by the Ankara University‟s
European Research Centre (ATAUM) showed that 55.3 % of
Turks support EU membership for their country. A very important
trend is that 83.9 % of Turks do not find the EU as reliable and
sincere. The other interesting result is, that 32.8 % of Turks feel
that Turkey will never become a full member of the EU17.

The survey titled “Public Opinion and Turkish Foreign Policy”

aimed to gauge the public‟s attitude and level of knowledge about
Turkish foreign policy together with the reasoning behind these
attitudes. The project adopted a descriptive approach combined
with field work and data collection. The survey was carried out in
cities such as Ankara, İstanbul, Adana, Erzurum, Artvin, Nevşehir,
Diyarbakır, Konya and İzmir. Within this framework, 1032 people
were interviewed.

More than one fourth of the participants (28.9%) stated that Turkey
was a European country, 22.6% saw Turkey as one of the Turkic
Republics, 15.5% viewed Turkey as an Islamic country, 11.4%
said that it was a Middle Eastern country, 8.7% thought of Turkey
as a Mediterranean country while 8.6% stated that Turkey was an
Asian country.

More than half of the participants (55.3%) responded positively to

the question “Do you want Turkey to be a member of the European
Union?”. Of the survey participants 25.2% replied in the negative
on the question. Among those voting negatively, those saying
17
http://ataum.ankara.edu.tr/d9.htm ( 10 February 2010).
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 Journal of European Studies

simply „no‟ were 16.5%, those who responded with an emphatic

“definitely no” were 8.7%. While those indifferent, saying “It
doesn't matter” were 16.1%. However, the response of 3.4% of the
participants was “I have no idea”.

Interestingly 32.8% of the participants in the survey opined that

full membership of the EU for Turkey would “never” be realized.
Of the participants, 20.5% predicted that Turkey might probably be
given membership “11-15 years later”; 15.2% said it could take
“more than 20 years”, 9.5% predicted EU membership for their
country “16-20 years later”, while 4.8% predicted the country
would become a member in “less than 5 years”.

When the participants were asked; “Do you think that the EU treats
Turkey as an equal? 83.9% said “no” to the question. Almost one
third of the participants (32.4%) identified “difference of religion
and identity” as the main problem in EU-Turkey relations. To the
question, “What is the biggest issue in Turkey- EU relations?”,
15.8% opined that it was the Cyprus dispute while 14.4% said the
economic problems of Turkey were the biggest obstacle in closer
EU-Turkey relations.

Turkey’s new foreign policy approach

The EU‟s reluctance to accept Turkey as a member, and Turkey‟s
enthusiasm to become a regional super power, inspired the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) government to recently launch a
new Turkish Foreign Policy Approach. The main principles of the
new approach were shaped by Professor Ahmet Davudoglu, who
was Prime Minister Erdogan‟s chief foreign policy advisor
between 2002-2009 and became the Turkish Minister of Foreign
Affairs in 2009.

The following six principles are currently underpinning Turkish

foreign policy.

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 Journal of European Studies

(i) The first principle is to strike a balance between freedom

and security. The new Turkish approach asserts that,
“security should not be upheld to the detriment of freedoms
and vice-versa. Thus, an appropriate balance between the
two has to be found.”

(ii) The second principle envisages close ties with countries in

Turkey’s vicinity. Such a policy would secure Turkey‟s long
term strategic interests, making it a major player in its
region and beyond.

(iii) The third principle which is closely related to the first one
is effective diplomacy towards neighbouring regions.
Turkey‟s goal is to establish conflict-free and firendly
realtions with all of its neighbours. Turkey has thus decided
to promote security for all˝, ˝political dialogue˝, ˝economic
interdependence˝ and ˝cultural harmony and mutual
respect˝.

(iv) As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council

and a major regional power which has to deal with wide
ranging issues, the fourth principle of Turkey‟s new foreign
policy is harmony with global actors. These would of
course include the US, the EU, and the Russian Federation.

(v) The fifth principle is the effective use of international fora

and new initiatives to achieve Turkey‟s foreign policy
priorities. Thus a conscious effort would be made to further
enhance Turkey‟s growing influence in international
organizations such as the UN, NATO and the OIC and
many other international and regional organizations.
Turkey, it must be noted has acquired observer status in the
African Union, the Arab League, the Association of
Caribbean States (ACS) and the Organization of the
American States (OAS).

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 Journal of European Studies

(vi) Based on the above principles the sixth and final one is to
create a ˝new image of Turkey˝ through international
diplomacy.

In essence, Turkey‟s new foreign policy approach aims to end

conflicts and increase stability in its surrounding regions through
innovative mechanisms, by encouraging positive change and
building cross-cultural bridges of dialogue and understanding.

To sum up, Turkey‟s current foreign policy has three main

characteristics: it is vision-oriented, not crisis-oriented; it is
proactive, not reactive; and it is integrated and systematic.
Turkey‟s axis is Ankara and its horizon is 360 degrees.

Myths and realities about Turkey’s possible

EU membership

Population
One of the main arguments which some populist politicians in
Europe use in their political campaign against Turkey‟s
membership is the country‟s relatively large population. Turkey‟s
population is currently about 70 million, 10 million less than
Germany‟s 82 million, and accounts for about 15.5% of the EU‟s
total population. However as the “impact analysis report” of the
European Commission published in October 2004 points out, fears
about a boom in Turkey‟s population are baseless. On the contrary
there is a consistent tendency towards a decline in the population
growth rate. The Commission‟s study further underlines that
Turkey‟s young population can be an asset for Europe, for it could
mitigate the possible reduction of the EU work force due to an
ageing population18.

18
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/issues_pap
er_en.pdf ( 16 February 2010).
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 Journal of European Studies

Migration
Some Europeans fear that with Turkey‟s membership, there would
be a massive migration of Turkish citizens to EU countries,
resulting in job losses for the EU citizens. This fear is baseless for
the decisions of the EU regarding Turkey already include strong
permanent safeguard measures. Long transition periods give each
member state the right to prevent immigrant flows from Turkey for
several years after membership is granted. Furthermore, data
shows that European countries are most likely to suffer from lack
of workforce in the coming decades, owing to an ageing
population. The experience of Spain shows that, immigrants can be
of great benefit to a country. Spain‟s foreign population rose from
637,000 in 1998 to 3.1 million in 2004, which accounted for 7% of
overall population. And over this period unemployment was
substantially reduced, because as is the case in many European
countries immigrants are doing many of the jobs that Spaniards are
no longer prepared to do. Academic studies on possible Turkish
migration towards Europe also show that fears about a mass
migration from Turkey are baseless. According to a study based on
a model developed by German DIW Institute, if Turkey becomes a
member migration flows would be less than 250,000 for one
year19. Turkish authorities also emphasize that EU accession would
help Turkey to attract foreign investment and create employment
inside the country, while keeping Turkey out of the EU would have
a negative impact on the Turkish economy and encourage Turks
more to look for ways to migrate to Europe.

Geography
For some conservative European politicians, only a small part of
Turkey is in Europe, most of the country they say is in the eastern
part of Asia. So Turkey‟s place is not in European structures but in
Asian ones. However this argument lost its meaning, when Greek
Cyprus acceded to the EU in May 2004. A major part of the island
19
Hans-Werner Sinn, “Immigration Following EU Eastern Enlargement”,
CESifo Forum 2, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 40-47.
18
 Journal of European Studies

is located east of Ankara. In fact, when Turkey became an

associate member in 1963, the President of the Commission,
Walter Hallstein declared that “Turkey is part of Europe20.
Hallstein, used this expression in his speech when the Ankara
Agreement was signed between Turkey and European Economic
Community on September 12, 1963. He stated “it confirms in
incomparably topical form a truth which is more than the summary
expression of a geographical concept or of a historical fact that has
held good for several centuries.” Moreover, the idea of Turkey‟s
EU membership is not a new phenomenon. Turkey first applied for
membership of the European Community in 1959. The two parties
signed an Association Agreement in 1963. Turkey applied for the
second time in 1987, and in 1999 it was given candidate status. As
the Independent Commission on Turkey points out, “No
government can claim that these decisions, including the
conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council of 2002 on
accession negotiations, were not taken in full knowledge of all
circumstances.”21

Culture
What constitutes the “European identity” is a continuing discussion
among Europeans. However, as the discussions during the
European Convention on the Constitution showed, it is not religion
but certain common values that constitute the basis of the
European Union. These are the common values rooted in
Enlightenment, including democracy, pluralism, freedom of
thought and humanism. Turkey has been part of the European
structures upholding these values, including the Council of Europe
and NATO that were established in 1949. Turkey has the longest
20
William Chislett, “Turkey‟s EU Membershıp: The Moment of Truth”, Real
Instituto Elcano Working Paper, no. 17 (October 2004): 1 – 36.
21
“Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?”, Report of the Independent
Commission on Turkey, September 2004. Available from
http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/2004_english.pdf (14
February 2010).

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association with the EU of all the candidate countries that have

now got membership. It has been knocking at the EU‟s door since
1959.

That Turkey‟s European credentials cannot be doubted is proven

by the fact that Mevlut Cavuşoglu was elected President of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).22
Cavuşoglu is the first Turkish president of PACE in the body‟s 61-
year history. He will be urging EU leaders to adopt a more
balanced approach towards Turkey.

If taken into the EU, Turkey will contribute towards enhancing the
latter‟s economic power on the global scene. With a population of
over 70 million, a steadily increasing gross national product
(GNP), a young and enterprising population, an export oriented
industrial economy and rapidly developing information society,
Turkey‟s accession will increase the size and competitiveness of
the European internal market. Given the country‟s skilled labour
force, high-absorption capacity, tourism potential and location at
the crossroads of Eurasian markets and energy networks, EU
membership would boost its economy by attracting even more
foreign investment.

Turkey‟s progress towards EU membership is an important factor

in empowering women. Turkish women‟s participation in the
workforce in banking, engineering, and the legal and medical
sectors is among the highest in Europe, although socio-economic
problems persist in urban and rural areas. Turkey‟s engagement
with the EU will help in the further improvement of women‟s
rights in Turkey and also have a positive effect on the status of
Muslim women in Europe and beyond.

As a reliable NATO ally, Turkey‟s membership would consolidate

both the military and the civilian aspects of the EU‟s Common
22
http://www.coe.co.me/eng/news_cg_eng/?conid=1618 (15 February 2010).
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Foreign and Security Policy. An EU which includes Turkey would

be more effective in tackling political problems and crises,
particularly threats from undemocratic regions.

Conclusion
If Turkey is taken into the European Union, it would demonstrate
to the world that the EU is an entity which without prejudice, can
comfortably accommodate a different culture and that it practices
what it preaches – democracy, humanism and tolerance for
diversity. This would have a positive impact on the whole of the
European continent and the rest of the world.

Bringing together the Christian and Muslim and the European and
Turkish identities is a historical chance. Giving Muslim Turkey
membership of the EU would make Europe more powerful, and
extend its influence to the Muslim world. Europe can then prove
that a „clash of civilizations‟ is not the inevitable fate of mankind.
It will promote mutual tolerance and understanding between
Europe and the Muslim world, making the former a more credible
mediator in long-standing conflicts such as that between the Arabs
and Israel, which threatens peace and stability in the Middle East.

However, time is running out and the Turkish public‟s support for
EU membership is gradually decreasing. The Turkish government
is looking elsewhere to enhance Turkey‟s potential. That is not a
„tactical‟ shift, but a clear sign that Turkey does not want to remain
an “EU dependent country” in future. The new Turkish foreign
policy approach can also be seen as a pragmatic step towards
preparing the country for failure of the accession negotiations.
Nowadays, Turkey is trying to find feasible diplomatic
alternatives, and it has the right to do so.

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