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There is a genuine tension, not just in Aquinas but in Church teaching more
generally, between claims about the intrinsic goodness, sanctity, and
inviolability of human life, and claims about political authority to kill. The
second in a two-part series.
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28/01/2020 Doubting Thomas (Aquinas) on Private and Public Killing - Public Discourse
Why did Aquinas think this? Surely his thought tracked much of the
argumentation used in the case against capital punishment. Aquinas
believed that human life is a basic good (ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2c), and that action
contrary to that good is contrary to charity (ST II-II, q. 64, aa. 5-6). He
believed as well that all human beings are persons, made in the image and
likeness of God (ST I, q. 93, a. 6) and possessed a kind of dignity, a dignity
similar to, though not as excellent as, the dignity of God (ST I, q. 29, a. 3.).
Such considerations generate a strong immunity from intended harm. No
intentional killing of human beings is thus the default position that Aquinas
starts from.
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organism to the whole, and thus may be excised for the good of the whole,
is also false: the state exists for persons, and not persons for the state.
Moreover, Brugger has shown that the Scriptural warrant for thinking
public authorities should be granted the exception is not as strong as St.
Thomas thought.
But I am here concerned with the reductio o ered by Feser and Bessette: if
public authority is lacking for capital punishment, then why not for
con scation of property and reduction of liberty? Implicit in the argument
is the suggestion that Aquinas is the coherent one on this topic, and not
me, since Aquinas allows all three forms of taking: life, liberty, and
property, whereas I allow two but not the third.
But public authority can justly limit property and liberty because both
liberty and property are merely instrumental goods. Unlike human life,
neither is a constitutive aspect of human well-being, though each is, of
course, of great instrumental value in human life. And there can be no
universal prohibition on private persons’ treatment of instrumental goods,
for the basic goods of persons take precedence over the value of merely
instrumental goods in cases of genuine con ict (as, for example, when a
person will starve if she does not steal).
The same is true with respect to the exercise of liberty. Aquinas believes
that private citizens may constrain or restrict the liberty of others.
Aquinas’s treatment of slavery perhaps does not show that he accepts it as
morally permissible, though, as John Finnis says, he “disconcertingly”
passed up opportunities to condemn it. But Aquinas does believe that a
form of servitude similar to serfdom is morally permissible and that private Privacidade - Termos
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28/01/2020 Doubting Thomas (Aquinas) on Private and Public Killing - Public Discourse
persons may sell themselves into such servitude. And he recognizes also the
“quasi servitus of those who, in utmost freedom, have made religious vows
or exchanged the promises of marriage, thereby giving up their libertas
faciendi quodlibet, their freedom to do what they will.”
There are, of course, very good reasons to limit some or most such taking
or restraining as engaged in by private persons, and reserve it to those
with political authority. Unregulated, such taking will often be unfair and
improperly motivated; claims of starvation, for example, can easily serve as
a pretext for theft. Similarly, the taking of property or liberty as
punishment is almost entirely left to those with political authority, since it
cannot be carried out fairly by private persons. But this limiting of the right
to take is not an exception; political authority in depriving persons of liberty
or property does not do anything absolutely ruled out to private persons.
The reservation to those with public authority of the right to punish by
taking liberty or property is justi ed, and politically prudent; but it is
radically di erent from the reservation to political authority of the right to
kill.
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28/01/2020 Doubting Thomas (Aquinas) on Private and Public Killing - Public Discourse
A Serious Tension
Now if one starts from an assumption that divine authority to kill has been
granted to temporal rulers, one is likely to miss this tension. But if one
starts instead from the di erences between Aquinas’s treatment of killing,
on the one hand, and his treatment of liberty or property, on the other,
then one will rather think, as I do, that the arguments for an exception to
the norm against killing had better be very strong to justify allowing to
political authorities what is allowed to no private person. And, as I have
noted, Aquinas’s arguments for this exception are just not very strong.
Neither, it seems to me, are Feser and Bessette’s. They write, in the three
paragraphs they devote to answering the challenge regarding authority to
kill, “Now, God certainly has the right to take the life of an o ender, and
given the principle of proportionality and the purposes of punishment,
there is no reason whatsoever to think that the power to in ict the penalty
of death is any less delegated to the state by God than is the power to
in ict lesser punishments.”
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God intends are surely also relevant: even for those God punishes, “God
does not will death as per se intended” (ST I, 49, a. 2).
CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN
Christopher O. Tollefsen is College of Arts and Sciences
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of
South Carolina.
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