Political Science 431

Assignment: Why did Social

Credit Succeed in Alberta
but Fail in Saskatchewan?
Name: Thomas James Caulfield
UCID: 30037995
Due Date: November 27th, 2019

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Introduction:
Both Alberta and Saskatchewan were officially created as provinces in 1905 by

the Canadian Parliament[CITATION Smi93 \p 22 \l 4105 ]. At their inception, the two shared

many similarities and were commonly referred to as “twin” provinces [CITATION Smi10 \p 8 \l

4105 ]. However, both went in different directions politically [CITATION Bry78 \p 346 \l 4105 ].

In 1935, Alberta saw the Social Credit Party form a majority government led by William

Aberhart[CITATION Sha12 \p 2 \l 4105 ]. In Saskatchewan, the Co-operative Commonwealth

Federation or CCF won the province’s 1944 election [CITATION Bur77 \p 174 \l 4105 ]. Why

had the two seemingly similar provinces[CITATION Eme08 \p 420 \l 4105 ] taken such

different political paths? The CCF had been founded in Calgary in 1932 [CITATION

McH49 \p 365 \l 4105 ], and Aberhart believed the social credit movement in Saskatchewan

would be victorious over the CCF[CITATION And82 \p 59 \l 4105 ]. Furthermore, the

provinces have shared a close connection through immigration [CITATION Smi10 \p 12 \l

4105 ]. Both Saskatchewan and Alberta relied on migrants from each other to supply

their respective workforce[CITATION Smi10 \p 12 \l 4105 ]. Scholars have tried to understand

why two seemingly comparable entities ultimately elected different political

parties[CITATION Sin73 \p 430 \m And82 \p 67-72 \m Bry78 \p 346 \m Eme08 \p 421-427 \l 4105 ] .

Drawing from this body of research, this paper will argue that the early social and

economic differences between Saskatchewan and Alberta formed their respective

political outcomes.

The Ideology of Social Credit:

The political doctrine of social credit was created by Scottish engineer Major

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Clifford Hugh Douglas[CITATION Irv48 \p 323 \l 4105 ]. The core concern for Douglas was

that the goods produced in massive quantities by the industrial system could not be

accessed by the people[CITATION Fla72 \p 40 \l 4105 ]. Douglas presented an A plus B

theorem which he argued illustrated purchasing power and income were not

equivalent[CITATION Sch00 \p 459 \l 4105 ]. Douglas went on to posit that this imbalance can

be redressed by providing the public with more money, a scheme he referred to as

social credit[CITATION Sch00 \p 459 \l 4105 ]. The state would also adopt the responsibility of

setting the appropriate prices for goods[CITATION Irv48 \p 324 \l 4105 ]. He also attacked

parliamentary democracy, portraying it as ineffective and working to advance the

interests of the financier class[CITATION Mac49 \p 380 \l 4105 ]. The Westminster form of

government was to be replaced by a system in which experts would be responsible for

implementing the desires of the electorate [CITATION Mac49 \p 380 \l 4105 ]. Douglas had a

low opinion of democracy and thought suffering would be best alleviated if the

appropriate officials were entrusted with the authority to run the social credit

system[CITATION Fla72 \p 40 \l 4105 ]. Under this model, voters would have the ability to

vote on what outcome they wanted the experts to work towards [CITATION Fla72 \p 40 \l

4105 ].

Social credit thinking directs intense ire towards those involved in financial or

monetary institutions[CITATION Ell78 \p 44 \l 4105 ]. Bankers were accused of manipulating

the credit system to gain control of society[CITATION Irv48 \p 324 \l 4105 ]. In order for the

liberty of the people to be preserved, the state would have to nationalize monetary and

financial institutions[CITATION Irv48 \p 324 \l 4105 ]. Douglas’s belief that a cabal of

financiers was working to take over the world soon morphed into an overtly anti-Semitic

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conspiracy theory[CITATION Ell85 \l 4105 ]. The Soviet Union, President Roosevelt, the

Nazis and others were all perceived to be part of the same plot [CITATION Sti99 \p 79-83 \l

4105 ].

The Rise of Social Credit in Alberta:

Alberta was created as a province from a portion of the Northwest Territories in

1905[CITATION Eme08 \p 420 \l 4105 ]. From the outset, Alberta and federal authorities

came into conflict over the province’s resources [CITATION Fla01 \p 625-626 \l 4105 ]. It wasn’t

until 1930 that Ottawa handed over control of natural resources to Alberta [CITATION

Eme08 \p 422-423 \l 4105 ]. The tension between the federal government and Alberta over

this and other issues fostered resentment in Albertans toward national political

parties[CITATION Fla01 \p 626 \l 4105 ]. The culmination of this frustration was seen in the

United Farmers of Alberta or UFA[CITATION Smi69 \p 22 \l 4105 ]. The UFA was a political

party that gained control of Alberta’s government in 1921 [CITATION Smi03 \p 51 \l 4105 ]. It

maintained power for 14 years, but was ultimately replaced by William Aberhart’s Social

Credit Party[CITATION Bry78 \p 345 \l 4105 ].

William Aberhart was a Calgary high school principal who used the radio to

preach his religious beliefs[CITATION Ban14 \p 83 \l 4105 ]. During the great depression,

Aberhart was greatly affected by the suffering he witnessed in his students [CITATION Irv48

\p 322-323 \l 4105 ]. After being exposed to the writings of C.H. Douglas while traveling to

Edmonton to mark exams, Aberhart became a social credit devotee [CITATION Irv48 \p 322-

323 \l 4105 ]. His radio program, Back to the Bible Hour, began to mix religious sermons

with social credit political views[CITATION Ell78 \p 47-48 \m Ban14 \p 84 \l 4105 ] . The

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depression had hit Alberta’s farmers hard, and the ruling UFA was losing

popularity[CITATION Ban14 \p 77 \m Sin75 \p 12 \l 4105 ] . Espousing the virtues of social

credit, Aberhart’s party won Alberta’s 1935 provincial election, attaining 89 percent of

the seats[CITATION Fla01 \p 634-635 \m Bel89 \p 53 \l 4105 ] . To achieve this victory, Aberhart

and his followers played on the disdain for eastern Canada and the immense suffering

brought on by the depression[CITATION Fla72 \p 41 \l 4105 ]. Financiers, the scapegoat built

into the social credit ideology, were a convenient enemy to provide voters [CITATION

Ell78 \p 49 \l 4105 ]. The unforgiving economic conditions, perceived failure of the UFA,

and Aberhart’s effective messaging through the radio all factored in to the Social Credit

Party’s victory at the ballot box[CITATION Fla01 \p 41 \m Ban14 \p 84 \m Sin75 \p 12 \l 4105 ] .

The CCF had been founded in Calgary[CITATION McH49 \p 365 \l 4105 ], so why

didn’t Albertan’s elect a left-wing party to tackle the problems of the depression? The

CCF’s 1933 Regina Manifesto laid out the policy goals of the party [CITATION McH49 \p

366 \l 4105 ]. Some of the objective’s laid out in the manifesto were the nationalization of

land and heavy industry[CITATION Sin73 \p 425 \l 4105 ][CITATION McH49 \p 390 \l 4105 ]. In his

radio preaching, Aberhart argued that socialism threatened a Christian’s spiritual

salvation [CITATION Ban14 \p 87 \l 4105 ]. The CCF also claimed that the federal

government would have to be strengthened in order to nationalize Canadian industries

[CITATION Fla01 \p 629-630 \l 4105 ]. Social credit promised to restore economic wellbeing,

respect the right to private property [CITATION Sin75 \p 4-5 \l 4105 ] while maintaining a

confrontational posture towards Ottawa[CITATION Fla01 \p 630 \l 4105 ].

A common narrative put forward to explain social credit’s rise to power in Alberta

was that it was driven by the interests of farmers[CITATION Bel90 \p 520 \l 4105 ]. The

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argument goes that farmers sought to protect themselves from the encroachment of big

business. However, statistical analysis of this claim shows that the largest group of

social credit supporters were not farmers. A study of Alberta’s 1935 provincial election

conducted by Edward Bell consistently found that voters from the urban working class

were the strongest supports of social credit [CITATION Bel90 \p 524-529 \l 4105 ]. What

explains the overwhelming support the working class showed to the Social Credit party?

Research still needs to be done to explain why the working class showed such strong

support for Aberhart. Clark Banack argues that the religious outlook of Albertans played

a central role in the province’s political development [CITATION Ban14 \p 91-93 \l 4105 ]. Peter

Sinclair has also pointed out that the UFA had kept Alberta’s urban population out of the

party[CITATION Sin75 \p 12 \l 4105 ].

Once in power, Aberhart found that he was unable to implement many of the

policies he had promised. The division of powers between the federal government and

the provinces legally constrained the ambitions of the Social Credit Party [CITATION McH49

\p 378 \l 4105 ]. Aberhart was not permitted to nationalize monetary institutions as he had

planned[CITATION Fla72 \p 42-43 \l 4105 ]. His plan to implement a social credit system via a

monthly 25-dollar dividend also proved to be impossible [CITATION Sha12 \p 2 \l 4105 ].

Aberhart also attempted to take control of the province’s newspapers in 1937 with bill

9[CITATION Sha12 \p 4 \l 4105 ]. The Bill gave social credit the power to change reporting it

defined as incorrect, but the legislation was struck down by Canada’s supreme court as

unconstitutional[CITATION Sha12 \p 4 \l 4105 ]. The failure of social credit beliefs to work in

reality blunted the party’s chances of taking off in Saskatchewan [CITATION Bry78 \p 346 \l

4105 ]

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The Failure of Social Credit in Saskatchewan and the Rise of

the CCF

In 1944, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation came to power in

Saskatchewan[CITATION Sim12 \p 271 \l 4105 ]. Like Social Credit in Alberta, the CCF has

been understood as a populist party that challenged the policies of the federal

government[CITATION Sin75 \p 2 \l 4105 ]. At one point, the CCF was radical enough to

recommend nationalizing the land of farmers[CITATION Bur77 \p 177 \l 4105 ]. How could

such a party ultimately gain control of Saskatchewan? Ultimately, the failure of the

Social Credit party in Alberta and the CCF reforming its platform were key to the

province’s political trajectory[CITATION Bry78 \p 346 \m Sin73 \p 427 \l 4105 ] .

Saskatchewan’s 1934 provincial election proved to be catastrophic for the CCF,

which only attained 5 out of a total of 55 seats [CITATION And82 \p 59 \l 4105 ]. Like Alberta,

Saskatchewan has often found itself at odds with the federal government. After its

formation, the people of Saskatchewan were faced with high tariffs and other policies

designed for the benefit of eastern Canada [CITATION Bry78 \p 341 \l 4105 ]. But while

Alberta responded with the election of the UFA [CITATION Smi69 \p 22 \l 4105 ], Canada’s

national political parties retained control of Saskatchewan [CITATION Smi69 \p 18-23 \l 4105 ].

A central factor in the CCF’s failure to come to power was its policy on land

nationalization. Farmers feared losing ownership of their land, and the specter of

communist tyranny was invoked by the CCF’s opponents [CITATION Sin73 \p 423-424 \l

4105 ]. Understanding that their more radical positions were scaring away voters, the

CCF dropped land nationalization and various other socialist policies in 1936 [CITATION

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Sin73 \p 427 \l 4105 ]. After this, the electorate saw the CCF as more viable, illustrated by

the fact the party became the opposition in the 1938 provincial election [CITATION And82 \p

70 \l 4105 ]. The Liberal party maintained a hold on the province until 1944, but more and

more people were migrating to the CCF [CITATION Smi69 \p 17-24 \l 4105 ].

While the CCF gained power, the social credit movement attempted to extend its

influence into Saskatchewan[CITATION And82 \p 59-62 \l 4105 ]. However, numerous factors

worked to impede these ambitions. Thomas Flanagan argues that William Aberhart had

a personal charisma, which was not replicated in Saskatchewan [CITATION Fla72 \p 41-42 \l

4105 ] Aberhart had the advantage of being known throughout Alberta from his religious

radio program[CITATION Ban14 \p 84 \l 4105 ]. By combining his evangelical messaging with

his political messaging, Aberhart could effectively spread his views to the

electorate[CITATION Irv48 \p 325 \m Fla72 \p 42 \l 4105 ] .

Another important part of why social credit did not take hold in Saskatchewan

was its visible failure in Alberta[CITATION Sin73 \p 430 \l 4105 ]. Ottawa scrapped the

majority of Aberhart’s social credit policies and the supreme court struck down several

of his laws[CITATION Ell78 \p 58 \m Sha12 \p 4 \l 4105 ] . The failure of Alberta’s government to

impose the promised 25 dollar a month dividend nearly threatened the confidence of

Aberhart’s government[CITATION Irv48 \p 333 \l 4105 ]. Aberhart’s instance on combining

political and religious views proved to dissuade many social credit followers, with many

moving to the ranks of the CCF[CITATION Irv48 \p 335 \l 4105 ].

In the 1930s, farming was the dominant occupation in both Saskatchewan and

Alberta[CITATION Sin75 \p 7-8 \l 4105 ]. However, Alberta enjoyed an advantage in its

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manufacturing industry and its mineral resources [CITATION Eme08 \p 434-435 \l 4105 ]. By

1929, Alberta enjoyed a per capita income one third greater than that of

Saskatchewan[CITATION Eme08 \p 432 \l 4105 ]. Emery and Kneebone posit that this initial

economic disparity was key in the different political approaches of Alberta and

Saskatchewan[CITATION Eme08 \p 431-435 \l 4105 ].

Summary and Conclusion

Saskatchewan and Alberta were very similar provinces which adopted unique

political parties[CITATION Eme08 \p 421-434 \l 4105 ]. In Alberta, William Aberhart brought the

Social Credit Party to power in 1935 while Saskatchewan saw a CCF victory in

1944[CITATION Fla01 \p 634-635 \m Sin73 \p 419 \l 4105 ] .

Numerous factors contributed to the success of the Social Credit Party in Alberta.

As the great depression hit Alberta while the UFA was in power, a left-wing solution to

the province’s economic woes was perceived as unviable [CITATION Ban14 \p 77-80 \m

Sin75 \p 12 \l 4105 ]. William Aberhart’s Social Credit Party provided a solution which

promised to alleviate the hardship of the depression without resorting to

socialism[CITATION Sin75 \p 4-5 \l 4105 ]. Aberhart’s utilization of the radio to broadcast his

faith and his politics was key to the electoral success of social credit [CITATION Ban14 \p

84 \l 4105 ]. An important part of this story was the intense amount of support the working

class provided to the Social Credit party[CITATION Bel90 \p 524-529 \l 4105 ]. This data

clashes with the standard narrative explaining the rise of social credit [CITATION Bel90 \p

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520 \l 4105 ]. Lastly, Aberhart’s social credit ambitions for Alberta largely failed to

materialize[CITATION McH49 \p 378 \m Fla72 \p 42-43 \m Sha12 \p 2-4 \l 4105 ] .

In Saskatchewan, the CCF’s Regina Manifesto proved to be too radical for voters

in the 1934 provincial election[CITATION Sin73 \p 423-424 \m McH49 \p 366 \l 4105 ] . After

moving closer to the political center, the CCF started to see its popularity increase and

became Saskatchewan’s opposition after the 1938 provincial election [CITATION And82 \p

70 \l 4105 ]. In 1944, the CCF became Saskatchewan’s government [CITATION Sim12 \p

271 \l 4105 ]. Saskatchewan’s social credit movement lacked a well known, popular figure

like radio evangelist William Aberhart to lead it [CITATION Fla72 \p 41-42 \m Ban14 \p 84 \m

Irv48 \p 325 \l 4105 ]. The failure of Alberta’s Social Credit government to achieve its goals

helped thwart the social credit movement in Saskatchewan [CITATION Sin73 \p 430 \l 4105 ].

Lastly, Emery and Kneebone suggest that the different economic histories of the two

provinces affected the political direction each took [CITATION Eme08 \p 431-435 \l 4105 ].

A complex series of economic and social variables worked together to produce

the different political paths of Saskatchewan and Alberta. No one factor fully explains

why two highly alike provinces[CITATION Smi10 \p 8 \l 4105 ] elected different

governments[CITATION Bry78 \p 346 \l 4105 ]. This paper has presented the arguments and

analysis of various scholars who have emphasized different factors to explain this. The

questions surrounding the issue warrant further investigation. Of particular interest

would be the immense support Alberta’s working class showed towards the Social

Credit Party in the 1935 provincial election[CITATION Bel90 \p 524-529 \l 4105 ].

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