Confidential to Members of EPSC Report No 14

IMPROVING PLANT RELIABILITY BY

RISK BASED INSPECTION
 Gert Koppen
paper presented at
Global Technology Forum Reliability Conference
OIL PETROCHEM POWER
15 - 17 September 1999 Amsterdam Hilton Hotel
The Netherlands
and
published in
Petroleum Technology Quarterly Summer 2000

Det Norske Veritas

P.O. Box 9599
3007 AN Rotterdam
tel: 010 - 292 26 23
fax: 010 - 479 63 02
www.dnv.nl

IMPROVING PLANT RELIABILITY BY RISK BASED INSPECTION

Gert Koppen
Det Norske Veritas
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
E-mail: gert.koppen@dnv.com SCOPE

© EPSC 2012
The information held in this report is given in good faith and belief in its accuracy, but does
not imply the acceptance of any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever by the
European Process Safety Centre or by the authors, for the consequence of its use or
misuse in any particular circumstances.
Any enquiries about this report, or other EPSC matters, should be addressed to Mr Lee
Allford, Manager – EPSC Operations
The European Process Safety Centre
Objectives

1. Information
To provide advice on how to access safety information and whom to consult, what
process safety databases exist and what information on current acceptable practices is
available.

2. Research and Development

To collect European research and development (R&D) needs and activities in the safety
and loss prevention field, to inform members accordingly, to act as a catalyst in
stimulating the required R&D and to provide independent advice to funding agencies
priorities. “R&D” here includes experimental research and the development and review
of models, techniques and software.

3. Legislation and Regulations

To provide technical and scientific background information in connection with
European safety legislation and regulations, e.g. to legislative bodies and competent
authorities.

4. Know How Exchange

To provide a platform for development of process safety knowledge for its members
and to act as a focal point for dissemination of that knowledge to the European process
safety community. Involvement in the Centre’s groups gives organisations and
individuals the opportunity to meet safety professionals from other companies, to
discuss areas of common interest and to share knowledge and experience, thus
enabling informed comparisons of safety management systems and practice.

Benefits of Membership

 Improved cross-European co-ordination on safety standards

 Identification of areas where manuals and guidelines could be produced
 Improved co-ordination of safety R&D and handling of complex technical research
programmes
 Stimulation of R&D in areas where there are gaps in knowledge
 Transfer of knowledge from elsewhere to Europe and between European countries.
 Technical input to legislators and standard makers to ensure more realistic legislation
 Sharing and dissemination of information on safety technology and accident prevention
 Access to information from a single source
IMPROVING PLANT RELIABILITY
BY
RISK BASED INSPECTION

Gert Koppen

paper presented at
Global Technology Forum Reliability Conference
OIL PETROCHEM POWER
15 - 17 September 1999 Amsterdam Hilton Hotel
The Netherlands
and
published in
Petroleum Technology Quarterly Summer 2000

Det Norske Veritas

P.O. Box 9599
3007 AN Rotterdam
tel: 010 - 292 26 23
fax: 010 - 479 63 02
www.dnv.nl
 IMPROVING PLANT RELIABILITY BY RISK BASED INSPECTION

Gert Koppen
Det Norske Veritas
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
E-mail: gert.koppen@dnv.com

ABSTRACT

This paper presents the development and application of the Risk Based Inspection (RBI)
Methodology by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and its effectiveness in improving Plant reliability based
on studies DNV conducted in over 100 process industry units world-wide. The methodology allows
risk to be measured in terms of personal safety, damage to equipment, environmental damage and
business or financial impact. The influence of inspection on risk is quantified and risk reduction can be
evaluated in terms of inspection options, improving the reliability and profitability of process plants.

SUMMARY

Given the statistical reporting by many process industry companies of cost associated with
equipment failure and its trending analysis, one finds a disproportionate amount of expenditure for
inspection and maintenance vs. the potential risk and loss of the majority of the losses. RBI was
developed with the aim to assess the factors contributing to failure and the range of potential
consequence scenarios by employing an integrated method which:
a) identifies the driving parameters for both likelihood and consequence of failure (leak or loss of
containment),
b) identify how much (sensitivity) each parameter (temperature, pressure, inspection
effectiveness, flow rate, leak detection, etc.) contributes to the risk failure,
c) rank risk of all pieces of equipment included in the study,
d) provide an inspection plan guideline and specific equipment inspection plan.
Several DNV RBI studies which utilised the methodology described in this paper, including the
applications of the DNV developed software, ORBIT™, and other software DNV developed in co-
operation with API, to over 100 process units representing over 30,000 pieces of equipment showed

page 2
plant reliability improves and cost is reduced as a result of better understanding of plant equipment
failure mechanism and the risk associated with this.

BACKGROUND

In 1994 DNV in Houston, TX was awarded a project for a sponsor group through the American
Petroleum Institute (API) to develop a Base Resource Document for Risk Based Inspection. The
Base Resource Document (available through the API) and the method is the basis to the soon to be
published API RP 580, Recommended Practice for Risk Based Inspection. The ongoing
development is sponsored by 22 companies, represented on a special committee on Risk Based
Inspection, under the API Committee on Refinery Equipment.
With the API methodology primarily geared to serve the needs of the US based refineries, DNV
embarked on a further development of the methodology and the supporting software associated with it
to cater to the needs of the petrochemical industry world-wide. This culminated with the development
of the DNV supporting software ORBIT™.
Over the last few years RBI projects are conducted in The Netherlands at almost all major
refining- and petrochemical multinationals companies. At the same time RBI software for use in
conjunction with the projects has been developed to support the inspection assessment and decision
making process. The application of RBI is relatively new and the development of the methodology,
software, training and certification is still ongoing.

INTRODUCTION

Risk Based Inspection (RBI) is a method for using risk as a basis for prioritising, where risk is
defined as the product of the likelihood of failure and the consequence of that failure. One of the
avoidable risks that the process industry faces is the failure of equipment due to degradation that could
be detected before failure. RBI determines the risk of failure due to such damage mechanisms by
examining the rate of progression of the damage, the tolerance of the equipment to damage, and the
amount and type of inspection activities that have been performed in the past. Also determined is the
consequence if failure should it occur. RBI covers pressure-containing equipment like vessels,
reactors, exchangers, columns, tanks and piping. If an equipment item is subject to damage by (for
example) corrosion, and if no inspections have been performed, then the likelihood of failure may be
high. If, however, many inspections of sufficient quality have been performed then the likelihood of

page 3
failure will be quite low, even if there has been significant corrosion. Inspections increase the
knowledge of the amount of damage and assure that such an event does not occur. Also, since
damage is time based, future inspections can be planned based on the amount of damage expected at
some point in the future. Thus, RBI establishes a proper balance between advancing damage and
increased knowledge of the amount of damage to assure that the equipment is always safe to operate.
Another advantage of Risk Based Inspection is that equipment is prioritised by the combination of
likelihood of failure and consequence of failure so that economic optimisation of inspection activities is
possible while maintaining acceptable levels of safety.
The risk based inspection methodology is flexible and can be applied at several levels. The
qualitative method has been developed to quickly prioritise the equipment from Low to High risk,
identifying areas of potential concern. Limited data will be required for this activity and is far less time
consuming. From this screening level recommendations will be provided for Higher Risk items,
requiring more data for detailed analysis. The detailed or quantitative RBI method has been developed
to prioritises the process containing equipment, by calculating separate likelihood and consequence
values for each piece of equipment, where the overall risk can be expressed in safety, environmental
or business terms. The influence of inspection on risk is presented and risk reduction is modelled,
based on inspection options.
In an operating plant, a relatively large percentage of the risk is usually associated with a small
percentage of the equipment items, and this has been confirmed by the projects carried out in the
Netherlands. Therefore, inspection efforts can be focused on those few equipment items that will
result in the greatest risk reduction, allowing a shift of inspection and maintenance resources to provide
a higher level of coverage on the high risk items and an appropriate effort on lower risk equipment,
resulting in not only improvement of plant reliability but also substantial cost savings.

METHODOLOGY

Risk Analyses Fundamentals

The Risk Based Inspection methodology is a hybrid technique that combines the two disciplines of
risk analysis and mechanical integrity. In its elementary form a risk analysis is comprised of five tasks
and when translated to RBI gives the following five steps:
1. System definition -Define the process plant pressure boundaries
2. Hazard identification -Define the degradation mechanism within the boundary

page 4
3. Likelihood analysis -Determine the probability of occurrence of failure or damage
4. Consequence analysis -Determine the magnitude of the expected effects of that failure
5. Risks results -Combine the results of likelihood and consequence and present
The overview of risk analysis is shown in figure 1 below.

SYSTEM DEFINITION

HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION

LIKELIHOOD CONSEQUENCE

RISK $
L
I
K
E
$

FIGURE 1. RISK ANALYSIS OVERVIEW

Risk
Given the RBI definition for risk as the product of the likelihood and the consequence of failure, in
mathematical terms, the risk for a scenario is:
Risk s = C s • F s
where, S = scenario number
Cs = consequence (area in m2 or $) for scenario, s
Fs = failure frequency (per year) for scenario, s
For each equipment item, the risk is the sum of the risks for all of that item's scenarios. The units of
risk depend on the consequence of interest. In the RBI approach, m2 per year is used for flammable
or toxic consequences, and dollars per year is used for major environmental or business interruption.
The risk for an equipment item is:

Risk item = ∑ Risk s

s

where: Risks = risk for a scenario (m2 or $ per year)

Riskitem = risk per equipment item (m2 or $ per year)

page 5
Risk Matrix
The analysis defines the risk of operating equipment as the combination of two separate terms; the
likelihood of failure and the consequence of failure. An easy to view approach is to place all equipment
in the study in the five-by-five Matrix as shown in figure 2. The approach shows at a glance the
number of equipment items that are high or low risk, as well as whether the risk is dominated by
likelihood of failure or consequence of failure, or both.

5 Medium-High Risk High Risk

4
LIKELIHOOD
CATEGORY

2 Low Risk
Medium Risk
1

A B C D E

CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

FIGURE 2. RISK MATRIX

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The RBI procedure includes both the qualitative and quantitative RBI methodologies or in
combination. The qualitative analysis allows operating units or sections of a unit to be quickly
prioritised to determine needs for further risk analysis. The qualitative approach uses the same
concepts of likelihood and consequence as the quantitative analysis, except that it requires less detail
and can be conducted fairly quickly. This screening level requires less data and time, but does require
considerably more expert input than a more detailed level of analysis.
The analysis provides a qualitative factor for the consequences of failure and the likelihood of
that failure. Consequence is assessed for Damage, Health (injury), Environmental Impact and Business

page 6
Interruption. The likelihood of failure is representing a factor of the condition of the equipment. The
two are then combined in the five-by-five risk matrix.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

A more comprehensive approach is the quantitative analysis. The likelihood analysis for an
equipment item is based on a generic database of failure frequencies by equipment types, which are
then modified by two factors that reflect identifiable differences from "generic" to the equipment item
being studied. One of the factors is specific to the operating conditions of each equipment item, and
the other factor is a measure of management practices that impact the mechanical integrity of the
equipment. The likelihood analysis includes a series of Technical Modules that assess the effect of
specific failure mechanisms on the likelihood of failure.
The consequences of releasing a hazardous material are calculated by applying effect models to
estimate the consequences. The failure of pressure-containing equipment and subsequent release of
hazardous materials can lead to many undesirable effects. The quantitative RBI program has
condensed these effects into four basic risk categories:
• Flammable & Explosion Events
• Toxic Releases
• Environmental Risks
• Business Interruption
The table below summarises the differences between the to methods.
Quantitative Qualitative
Reproducible, traceable, transparent, auditable. Deploys expert knowledge but is generally not
reproducible.
Calculated results. Opinion based results.
Can be used to demonstrate cost benefit. Cannot be used to demonstrate cost benefit.
More time consuming than qualitative for initial set- Can process large numbers of equipment items
up thereafter quicker. relatively quickly.
Easy to run asset sensitivity cases e.g. to Very useful as an initial screening to a
investigate new process conditions/feedstocks. quantitative study or for low hazard plants.
Readily demonstrates risk change with time. Have to redo complete analysis each time.
More cost effective than qualitative in the long Cheaper for a one off study.
term.
Easier to verify to internal and external regulators. Not easily verified.

page 7
Likelihood Analysis
The Likelihood Analysis begins with a database of generic failure frequencies for refining and
chemical processing equipment. These generic frequencies are then modified by two terms, the
Equipment Modification Factor (FE) and the Management Systems Evaluation Factor (FM), to yield an
adjusted failure frequency as follows:
Frequency adjusted = Frequency generic · FE · FM ( see figure 3)

Equipment Modification Factor. ( FE )

The Equipment Modification Factor identifies the specific conditions that can have a major
influence on the failure frequency of the equipment items. The most important contributor to the
equipment modification factor is the Technical Module Subfactor which is the key to the linking of
inspection and risk. Technical Modules are intended to support the Risk Based Inspection
methodology by providing a screening tool to determine inspection priorities, and to optimise
inspection efforts. Technical Modules have been developed for Thinning, Corrosion under Insulation,
Cracking, High Temperature Hydrogen Attack, Brittle Fracture, Fatigue, Furnaces etc with
appropriate specific sub-damage mechanisms. The second most important part is the determination of
the confidence level in the damage rate by quantifying the effectiveness of the inspection expressed as
the likelihood that the observed damage state is actually representing the true state. Experience
together with expert opinion can classify the inspection into categories, from highly effective to
ineffective ( see table inspection planning).

Management System Evaluation Factor. ( Fm )

The second adjustment, the Management Systems Evaluation Factor, adjusts for the influence of
the facility's management system on the mechanical integrity of the plant. This adjustment is generally
applied equally to all equipment items, unless the management systems are different for different units
or areas of the plant. The subject areas cover each of the major paragraphs in API RP 750,
Management of Process Hazards. The emphasis of the evaluation is on mechanical integrity issues, and
most of the questions in the other subject areas are either closely related to mechanical integrity or they

page 8
have a bearing on total unit risk. The Mechanical Integrity section draws on practices described in the
API inspection codes.

Management Systems
Generic Failure Frequency
X Equipment Modification Factor
X Evaluation Factor

(FE )
(FM )
Generic Equipment Failure Frequencies
Management Systems Evaluation Factor (F m)
Equipment Technical Module Subfactor 100
Type Source 1/4" 1" 4" Rupture

Centrifugal Pump 1 6X10**- 3 5X10**- 4 1X10**-4 -------

Damage Rate
Column 2 8X10**- 5 2X10**- 4 2X10**-5 6X10**-6
Inspection Effectiveness 10
Filter 1 9X10**- 4 1X10**- 4 5X10**-5 1X10**-5
Heat Exchangers 1 4X10**- 5 1X10**- 4 1X10**-5 6X10**-6
Piping (8") 3 3X10**- 7 3X10**- 7 8X10**-8 2X10**-8
Universal Subfactor
Pressure Vessels 2 4X10**- 5 1X10**- 4 1X10**-5 6X10**-6
1
Storage Tanks 5 4X10**- 5 1X10**- 4 1X10**-5 2X10**-5
Plant Condition
Cold Weather
Seismic Activity 0.1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Management Systems Evaluation Score (%)
Mechanical Subfactor

Equipment Complexity
Construction Code
Life Cycle
Safety Factors
Vibration Monitoring

Process Subfactor

Continuity
Stability
Relief Valves

FIGURE 3 OVERVIEW – LIKELIHOUD CALCULATION

Consequence Analysis
A given equipment item may lose containment in many different ways. The size of the release can
be anything between a pinhole leak up to catastrophic rupture, and after the material has been
released, it may give a variety of effects depending on the time and strength of ignition. Each release
size and subsequent development will produce a different measure of consequence. For each failure
case, consequence models can be used to calculate the effect-range of fires, explosions and toxic
clouds. The given Failure Case may be able to produce several types of hazardous effect, depending
on the way the release develops, and each type may contribute to the consequence results for the
Case. For each equipment item the effected consequence area have to be calculated:
• Equipment Damage Area: The area within which equipment may be damaged.
• Potential Fatality Area: The area within which fatalities may occur.

page 9
 • Toxic Area: The area above a critical toxic concentration.
• Financial consequence: Business Interruption, Environmental Costs,

Fluid Properties: Range of Hole Sizes:

in Equipment and 0.25”, 1”, 4”, Rupture
at Ambient
Conditions
Release Rate
Total Mass Available
for Release

Determine
Type
CONTINUOUS INSTANTANEOUS
use flow rate use total mass

Determine Determine
Final Phase Final Phase

Continuous/ Continuous/ Instantaneous/ Instantaneous/

Liquid Gas Liquid Gas

MITIGATION

Flammable Toxic Environmental

Consequence Consequence Consequence

Business Interruption
Consequence (typical of a type/phase release)

FIGURE 4. OVERVIEW - CONSEQUENCE CALCULATION

APPLYING RBI METHODOLOGY

The method has been successfully applied as pilot studies and several more projects have been
completed in the Netherlands. A first part of the RBI program is to collect the required data into an
equipment data file. Typical data collection requires among other things: hazard information, design
data, operating conditions, corrosion data, historical data from previous inspection- and maintenance
programs, the inventory released when a leak or rupture occurs. After data collection the next step is
to prioritise each equipment item based on risk. Once the risk analyses is performed the inspection
planning can be prepared and actual inspection work performed. The inspection results will be fed
back to optimise the program.

page 10
 The primary intent of RBI is to improve the inspection program. However risk can also be
managed by improving the process safety management or consequence mitigation which will result in
improving the plant integrity and reliability.

Project team
On the basis of the experience in developing and implementing RBI, it is recommended that an
integrated team of both the plant and DNV to be formed of appropriate disciplines sources. The
experience is that the integrated team approach produces the best overall results, with the advantage
that, as well as sourcing the best available expertise, there is ample Technology Transfer to the plant’s
personnel. A team of specialists, among Project Manager, Inspection Specialist, Process
Technologist, Corrosion Specialist and Safety Engineer is assembled and properly instructed for data
collection work among inventory determination and corrosion study. The multi-disciplinary team of
works in parallel to reduce project time.

Software Support Tool

The RBI study often requires the assessment of hundreds of equipment items, necessitating
substantial calculating work. The RBI method therefore calls for a computer program that should have
the following features:
• Provide an electronic database
• Analyse and calculate the risk of each equipment item of the plant
• Analyse various scenarios to determine the most effective inspection method per item
• Provide sophisticated reporting functions
The DNV software program uses techniques to evaluate the statistical likelihood for each damage
mechanism given the amount of appropriate inspection activity that has been performed. The optimum
inspection frequency can be calculated per damage mechanism, as well the most effective inspection
method. Consequence information is available per representative fluid for flammability, toxicity and
financial effects. Several reports are available with several layers of filters to provide any required
combination.
DNV has various options available, both the software ORBITTM, designed to support the analysis
work related to RBI, for Refineries, Gas Processing, Petrochemical and Chemical plants and software

page 11
developed on behalf of the API Sponsor Committee designed for Refineries. The ORBITTM software,
in which both the pre-screening (qualitative) and detailed (quantitative) analyses are present and used
separate or in combination, allows prioritisation, inspection planning and also the cost benefits of
inspection activities to be calculated.

RBI Results
The RBI Program of a process plant with 451 equipment and piping items, have evaluated the risk
associated with the operation of each of the items, by first evaluating the likelihood of failure, then the
consequence that would result should a failure occur. The results are reported in the five- by-five risk
matrix shown in figure 5. The matrix was generated by the software program and is a dynamic model
where the likelihood of failure will increase with time.
The matrix shows the number of equipment items that are high or low risk, as well as whether the
risk is dominated by likelihood of failure or consequence of failure. The likelihood category 5 is good
candidates for inspection and the consequence category E is good candidates for mitigation devices.
Focusing on the high risk items contributes to the reduction of risk and improves the safety and plant
integrity. From C4 and D4 a part can be inspected. Inspection of category 1, almost 30 % of the
items, does not contribute to lowering the risk. Performing expensive inspections on these low risk
equipment may not make sense from an economic or safety point of view. The results reveal which
activities generate little real benefit and enlarging of the inspection intervals will generate substantial
cost savings.

page 12
 FIGURE 5. – RISK MATRIX OF PRIORITISATION

Pareto Principle
From the process plant the contribution of equipment to the total risk is shown in figure 6. It is
clearly demonstrated that at least 80% of the total risk is due to at most 20% of the equipment items.
Virtually every study performed confirms the Principle. Most studies show even closer to 90 - 10 %.
The “Pareto Principle” reveals that the most of the total risk are present in a relatively small amount of
equipment. Focusing on these and using risk management principles, the integrity of the plant will be
increased.

page 13
 Process Plant of 451 items
100%

90%

80%

70%

% of Total Risk
60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

% of Equipment Items

FIGURE 6. CONTRIBUTION OF EQUIPMENT TO TOTAL RISK

IMPROVEMENT IN RELIABILITY

A measure for reliability is the expected number of failures. The RBI Program shows the risk
profile of the process plant in time and gives a picture of the expected number of failures. Some
otherwise overlooked systems can have an unexpectedly high risk. Reducing high risk by taking
actions to alleviate this will reduce the number of failures, resulting in improvement of overall plant
reliability. Inspection Planning will reduces the likelihood of failure.

MANAGING THE RISK

Once the distribution of risk on the plant is known, methods of managing the risk can be chosen. In
principle, reducing either the consequence or the likelihood can cut the risk for a given event. In
practice, it is difficult to reduce the consequence without a significant redesign of the process, and this
may not be feasible for a plant that is already in operation. This means that risk management usually
concentrates on reducing the likelihood of events, with the inspection program as one of its most
important tools. An investment of resources in inspection can reduce the probability of unexpected
failure, and thus reduce the business interruption risks. For each equipment item there is an optimum
investment which gives the best balance between the cost of inspection, and the remaining business
interruption risks and subsequently the reliability.

Inspection Planning

page 14
 The purpose of an inspection program is to define and perform those activities necessary to detect
in-service deterioration of equipment before failure occurs. Part of the inspection program is
Inspection Planning. The output of the Risk Based Prioritisation Program provides the input for this
Inspection Planning, based on a set of rules (the inspection planning guidelines) to determine what to
inspect, when to inspect it, where to inspect it and how to inspect it. The Inspection Planning analyses
which equipment gets thorough inspection and which gets little or none. From a risk-based point of
view, inspection planning is a matter of having enough knowledge about the equipment through
inspection that can predict when equipment must be replaced. This usually results in a reduced
inspection time and increased interval between inspections leading to increased plant availability.

Personnel Training and Qualification (Certification).

The training of RBI project staff is a key part of the RBI quality process. Within a RBI project a
combination of knowledge, skills and experience is needed to assure successful completion. The RBI
services require a multi-disciplinary approach and currently DNV defines eight different functions with
associated skill sets and per function a job description is present. The process of training involves the
following steps, classroom training, exam based on training to demonstrate understanding of RBI
themes, assessment of the individual based on the function description and demonstrated competence
during the execution of projects.
The training is based around a set of modules which cover the technological aspects, hands on
periods which provide familiarity with then software and case studies which challenge the
understanding of the process. On successful completion of the training scheme staff will be certified.

BAP RBI TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION SCHEME PROGRAM

Intermediate
Introductory
course

course
Seminar

Seminar

Seminar

On the Job Training Period

Assessment &
Observation Guided work Independent work Certification

Timeline Estimated time to achieve

Entry
certification as RBI Engineer 4 to
6 months.

page 15
Figure 7 below shows the scheme.

FIGURE 7. RBI TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION OF PERSONEL

Technology Transfer
Multinational Companies, who have decided to perform their own RBI analyses and to have
ORBIT at their global sites, have been provided with a Technology Transfer Project. The project
consists of several steps, such as site assessment, site implementation plan, installation of software and
training and certification of staff. Through the Technology Transfer a level of consistency in standards
and approaches will be maintained world-wide.

CASE STUDIES RESULTS

1. Chemical Plant
3-week study of 180 pieces of equipment (not including piping):
The results of study, utilising all aspects of RBI, supported the shortening of the planned turnaround by
half the time originally allocated. Furthermore, the risk management system was introduced ni the
plant, and personnel enhanced the understanding of their operational actions on plant safety, resulting
in optimisation of the operation.
An interesting outcome was RBI pointing to the risk of external Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
to austenitic stainless steel equipment. Initially, this was perceived by plant to be quite dubious.
However, further study shows that since equipment was insulated, it was rarely been examined for
external SCC, and indeed, further samples of dye check confirmed the results of the study.

2. Refinery – Unit Turnaround Timing

Turnaround frequency was examined. RBI study isolated the few equipment which critically
affected the risk of the unit. Furthermore, it showed that increasing the interval on the majority of
the equipment did not adversely affect their risk. As such, the study assisted in developing an on-
stream inspection of the few critical pieces of equipment by utilising a ‘what if” analysis for the
levels of inspection effectiveness and intervals. The outcome was a reliable increase of the
inspection interval by 2 years and an overall forty-fold decrease in risk such as injury, business
interruptions and equipment damage area cost.

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 Initial annualised savings were in the order of $100,000/year while the greater long-term
benefits include more effective management of risk. The latter includes among others a more
quantitative feedback to the HAZOP group in the refinery, awareness and learning about damage
mechanism and inspection effectiveness and ability to measure and communicate risk.

CONCLUSIONS

• The Risk Based Inspection Methodology in conjunction with the Risk Based Software has
demonstrated to be a dynamic and systematic support tool, to assist in making decisions to extend
intervals between unit turnarounds and inspections.
• The RBI projects in the Netherlands have also confirmed the Pareto principle, that in process
plants a large percentage of the risk is associated with a small percentage of the equipment items.
• Optimising inspection and maintenance is enabling plants to apply their resources to area that need
the most attention while accomplishing more with less.
• Inspection focused on high risk items will reduce the failure rate and increase plant reliability,
availability and operational safety.
• Training of competent staff is a key part of the RBI quality process.
• DNV Global studies confirm the effectiveness of RBI in improving process plants reliability at a
reduced cost of a more effective and efficient inspection

Reference:
• Base Resource Document on Risk Based Inspection API 581; Prepared by DNV Houston,
Texas, 1998.
• Lynne Kaley, Greg Alvarado, DNV Houston: Risk Base Inspection Implementation and results,
paper presented at the International Conference and Workshop on Reliability and Risk
Management, San Antonio, Texas, September 15-18, 1998
• Dave Tabener, DNV Houston: RBI Training and Certification Scheme, 1998

page 17