1

DR. RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

ACADEMIC SESSION: 2015-16

Administrative Law: FINAL DRAFT

“DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES AS JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER
DELEGATED LEGISLATION IN INDIA”
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................3

NEED FOR JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER DELGATED LEGISLATION..................................5

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:..............................................................................................6

DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES: MEANING...............................................................................7

Substantive ultra vires..................................................................................................................8

Procedural ultra vires...................................................................................................................8

GROUNDS OF INVALIDITY........................................................................................................9

That the enabling Act is ultra vires the Constitution of India. (Constitutionality of the Parent
Act)...............................................................................................................................................9

That the delegated legislation is ultra vires the Constitution of India. (Constitutionality of the
delegated legislation).................................................................................................................10

That the delegated legislation is ultra vires the enabling Act....................................................11

THE QUESTION OF REASONABLENESS...............................................................................14

CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................16

BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................................17
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INTRODUCTION

The issue of delegated legislation has been one of the most debated issues in the domain of legal
theory because of its various implications. Scholars have consistently presented differing and
even contradicting views about delegation of power to legislate and have thus taken different
stands on the issue. While Delegated Legislation has been a widespread practice in modern times
and is almost an accepted norm, there have been contrary views.

The Indian Constitution has established a Welfare State 1 which mandates that the State shall
legislate on innumerable activities touching human lives in order to promote the ‘maximum
happiness of the maximum number of people’.2 Consequently the State has to undertake
legislation on a variety of subjects. In view of this increasing legislative activity, the legislatures
would not have found adequate time to legislate on every minute detail and thus, they limit
themselves to ‘policy matters and leaving a large volume of area to executives to frame rules to
carry out the purposes of legislation. Thus, the need for delegation became indispensable and it
was sought to be justified on grounds of ‘speed’, flexibility and adoptability’.3

The application of law to changing circumstances was made feasible through the instruments
of ‘rules’ framed by the executive. It is not a surprise to find that during the years 1973-77
spanning a period of 4 years, the Parliament enacted 300 statutes but the rules framed by the
executive exceeded 25000. This has been observed by the apex court in the Avinder Singh v.
State of Punjab.4 Delegated legislation is essentially a bureaucratic legislation and it involves a
shift of legislative power from the legislature to the administration. Since there are no
democratic safeguards present in administrative rule-making as in the case of legislature,
therefore a control mechanism becomes necessary so that the powers which are conferred on
the administration are not misused. This control mechanism basically involves judicial control,
legislative control, and procedural control.

This project aims to deal with the first and the most important kind of such control i.e. judicial
control with special reference to the doctrine of reasonableness. There are various grounds on

1 Mukherjee J. in Bharat Bank vs. Employees of Bharat Bank, AIR 1950 SC 306.
2 Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, available at <http://www.iep.utm.edu/bentham/> last accessed: 03/03/2016.
3 Mark Hutton & Ors., “Erskine May: Parliamentary Practice”, 24th edn., 2011, Lexis Nexis, p.669.
4 AIR 1979 SC 321.
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which the judiciary can exercise control over the delegated legislation like the lack of
legislative competence to make the sub-ordinate legislation, violation of Fundamental Rights
under the Constitution, violation of any provision of Constitution of India, failure to conform
to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the
enabling act, repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment and manifestation of
arbitrariness or unreasonableness.

The project would firstly elaborate upon the need for judicial control over delegated
legislation, after which it would discuss the doctrine of ultra vires. Thereafter, factors which
make delegated legislation subject to judicial review would be looked into, also explaining in
brief the grounds on which the same can be held ultra vires the enabling Act or the Constitution
of India. Towards the end of the project, emphasis has been laid upon unreasonableness of
rules made by administrative authority throwing light on the extent to which they are prone to
judicial scrutiny.
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NEED FOR JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER DELGATED LEGISLATION

Today the institution of delegated legislation has come to stay as a part of the modern
administrative process. The question no longer arises whether delegated legislation is desirable
or necessary or not, but what controls and safeguards can and ought to be introduced so that the
rule-making power conferred on the administration is not misused or misapplied. Legislatures,
having delegated their powers, have to bear the responsibility to ensure that the delegatee shall
not over-step the legitimate domain and commit a violation by exceeding or abusing the powers
delegated. Thus, the legislatures have to control the delegated legislation and if not, executives
may exercise the delegated power to become a potential dictator or even becoming a parallel
legislature. This legislative control over delegated legislation has become a ‘living continuity as
a constitutional necessity’.5

The rule of majority in democratic systems has virtually made legislative controls ineffective. A
more serious observation has been made by Mr Lloyd George to the effect that ‘legislatures have
no control over the executive”. All these observations are pointers to the view that had the
Parliamentary control over delegated legislature been effective, the need for judicial control
would not have arisen or probably reduced to the minimum. This has not been so, hence, judicial
control has become an inevitable necessity to prevent executives acting as super-legislatures or
potential dictators.6

Pre-constitutional control to post-constitutional judicial control found a big shift from the
scrutiny of delegated legislation confined to the area of sub-delegation from British Parliament to
Indian legislature7 and laying down a fundamental principle of delegation in the post-
constitutional era8 which can be stated as follows:- “Legislatures cannot delegate their essential
legislative powers. Essential legislative powers relate to the determination of the policy of the
legislature and of rendering that policy into a binding rule of conduct”.9

5 Krishna Iyer J. in Avinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 321.
6 C.K.Takwani, “Lectures on Administrative Law”, 5th edn., 2012, Eastern Book Company, p.172.
7 Empress vs. Burah (1877) 3 Cal 63; Jitendranath Gupta vs. Province of Bihar, AIR 1949 FC 175.
8 In Re Delhi Laws Act, AIR 1951 SC 332.
9 Ibid.
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In other words, delegation of legislative power can be confined to ‘non-essentials’ or subsidiary

matters. Delegation of legislative powers of essential nature would be invalid. This has come as a
first principle laid down in the area of judicial control and subsequently expanded to a number of
rules laid down by the judiciary. In Indian Express Newspapers (Bom) (P) Ltd. v. Union of
India,10 the grounds on which subordinate legislation can be questioned were outlined by the
Supreme Court. E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, J. observed thus:

“75. A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is
enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. Subordinate legislation may be
questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition it may
also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made.
It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. That is
because subordinate legislation must yield to plenary legislation. It may also be questioned on
the ground that it is unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in
the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. In England, the judges would say ‘Parliament never
intended authority to make such rules. They are unreasonable and ultra vires.”

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:

While considering the validity of delegated legislation, the scope of judicial review is limited but
the scope and effect thereof has to be considered having regard to the nature and object thereof.
The nature of delegated legislation can be broadly classified as:

(1) rule-making power, and

(2) grant of exemption from the operation of a statute.

In the latter category, the scope of judicial review would be wider as the statutory authority while
exercising its statutory power must show that the same had not only been done within four
corners thereof but otherwise fulfills the criteria laid down therefor.11

10 (1985) 1 SCC 641.

11 Vasu Dev Singh vs. Union of India, (2006) 12 SCC 753 in M. P. Jain & S. N. Jain, “Principles on Administrative
Law”, Vol. 1, 7th edn, 2013, Reprint 2016, LexisNexis, p.130.
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DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES: MEANING

The doctrine of ultra vires is the basic doctrine in administrative law. The doctrine envisages
that an authority can exercise only so much power as is conferred on it by law. An action of the
authority is intra vires when it falls within the limits of the power conferred on it but ultra vires
if it goes outside this limit12. The simple proposition that a public authority may not act outside
its powers (ultra vires) might fitly be called the central principle of administrative law. ‘The
juristic basis of judicial review is the doctrine of ultra vires.’ To a large extent the courts have
developed the subject by extending and refining this principle, which has many ramifications
and which in some of its aspects attains a high degree of artificiality.13

When a power vested in a public authority is exceeded, acts done in excess of the power are
invalid as being ultra vires. The ultra vires doctrine serves to control those who exceed the
powers, which an Act has given. Eg., where a local council whose capacity to act and to
regulate private activities is derived from statute, acts outside the scope of that authority. In
many fields parliament has provided no right of appeal against administrative decisions.
Nonetheless the superior courts still exercise a supervisory jurisdiction on matters such as
limits of an authority's powers, which affect the legality of official decisions. In exercising this
jurisdiction, the courts take account of the principles of administrative law that have developed
from judicial decision, and also the specific legislation that applies to the subject matter.

When a piece of delegated legislation is declared to be ultra vires it is void and becomes
unenforceable. It cannot affect the rights and duties of any person. The validity of a rule can be
challenged in a court either directly or collaterally, or by way of defence to a civil claim based
on the impugned rule, or as a defence in a prosecution for infringing the rule. A person can
challenge the validity of administrative action by challenging the validity of the relevant rule.
A person whose interest is affected adversely by a piece of delegated legislation can directly
challenge its vires in a court.

12 “Halsbury’s Laws of India”,Vol. 1 on “Administrative Law”, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, New Delhi, Reprint
2006 at p. 55.
13 H.W.R. Wade & C. F. Forsyth, “Administrative Law”, 9th edn, 2004, Oxford University Press, p. 35.
 8

The doctrine of ultra vires has two aspects: substantive and procedural.

Substantive ultra vires means that the delegated legislation goes beyond the scope of the
power conferred by the parent statute, or it is in conflict with the delegated statute, and hence,
it is invalid. The doctrine refers to the scope, extent and range of power conferred by the parent
Act on the concerned authority to make rules. A rule has to yield to the statutory provision. The
rule must also come within the scope and purview of the rule making power of the authority
framing the rule.14 While applying the doctrine of substantive ultra vires to delegated
legislation, the courts do not look merely at the express words of the enabling provision in the
parent statute, but go beyond them and also imply certain restrictions therein. The idea is that
the courts do not want the executive to do certain things by using its general rule-making
power without being specifically authorised by law to do so. This approach, to some extent,
helps in preservation of individual liberty, strengthening of judicial control over delegated
legislation, and giving a somewhat broader dimension to the doctrine of ultra vires.15

Procedural ultra vires comes into play when the Parent Act prescribes certain procedures
which the delegate has to follow. It is the basic principle of law long settled that, if the manner
of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or
not at all.16 A question arises whether the rules made without following the prescribed
procedure are to be regarded as valid or not. The answer to this question depends upon whether
the specific procedural requirement is regarded as directory or mandatory. A statute may lay
down some procedural requirement for exercising discretionary power conferred by it. An
exercise of discretionary power may be invalid because the concerned authority has failed to
comply with the statutory procedural requirements as mandatory or directory. Non-compliance
with a mandatory requirement makes the discretionary decision ultra vires.17 This is known as
procedural ultra vires.

14 Id 12, p. 56.
15 M. P. Jain & S. N. Jain, “Principles on Administrative Law”, Vol. 1, 7 th edn, 2013, Reprint 2016, LexisNexis,
p.161.
16 Babu Verghese vs. Bar Council of Kerala, AIR 1999 SC 1281.
17 Id 15, p. 1117.
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GROUNDS OF INVALIDITY

The various grounds based on which a delegated legislation may be held invalid by the courts
can studied under the following heads:

I. That the enabling Act is ultra vires the Constitution of India. (Constitutionality of the Parent Act)

If the enabling Act is ultra vires the Constitution which prescribes the boundaries within
which the legislature can act, the rules and regulations framed thereunder would also be
void. The enabling Act may violate either the implied or express limits of the
Constitution.18 In pronouncing on the constitutional validity of a statute, the court is not
concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom, the justice or injustice of the law. If that which is
passed into law, is within the scope of power conferred on a legislature and violates no
restrictions on that power, the law must be upheld whatever a court may think of it. 19 In the
case of Re Delhi Laws Act,20 the implied limits of the Constitution were laid down. These
are the laying down policy and enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct. The
legislature cannot delegate its essential power to any other agency and if it so delegates, the
enabling Act will be ultra vires the Constitution. In the case the Court held the later part of
clause 2 invalid because it authorised the administrative agency to repeal a law which, in
the opinion of the court, is an essential legislative function. Further in the case of Hamdard
Dawakhana vs. Union of India,21 the court held Section 3(d) of the Drug and Magic
Remedies Act as ultra vires the Constitution because the legislature had not provided
sufficient guidelines for the exercise of the administrative discretion in matters of selecting
a disease to be added in the schedule.

The other ground on which the constitutionality of the parent Act may be challenged is
where the statute is well within the legislative competence but violates the provisions of
Part III of the Constitution by placing what may be called an unreasonable restriction on

18 I.P. Massey, “Administrative Law”, 6th edn., 2005, Eastern Book Company, p. 118.
19 Karnataka Bank Ltd. vs. State of A.P., (2008) 2 SCC 254.
20 AIR 1951 SC 332.
21 AIR 1960 SC 554.
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the exercise of fundamental rights. In case of Chinataman Rao vs. State of M.P., 22 the court
held the CP Regulation of Manufacturers of Bidis Act, 1948 and the rules framed there
under as ultra vires Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution which guarantees freedom of trade
and profession. The impugned Act had given wide discretionary powers to the Deputy
Commissioner to fix the agricultural season and prohibit the manufacture of Bidis. The
Deputy Commissioner imposed a total ban on the manufacture of Bidis. According to the
Supreme Court this amounted to unreasonable restriction on the exercise of fundamental
right and hence both the Commissioner's order and the Act were held ultra vires the
Constitution.

II. That the delegated legislation is ultra vires the Constitution of India. (Constitutionality of the
delegated legislation)

There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality of statutes as well as delegated

legislation and it is only when there is clear violation of constitutional provision (or of the
parent statute, in the case of delegated legislation) beyond reasonable doubt that the court
should declare it unconstitutional.23 The constitutionality of the delegated legislation, thus,
may be in question itself.
In case of Labh Chandra vs. State of Bihar,24 the Patna High Court held that the rule
providing for the management of Jain temples to be discriminatory and hence, violative of
Article 14. The impugned rule had restricted the voting right to persons who had attained
the age of 21 and had made a donation of not less than Rs. 500 to the temple and were also
living within the State for the last ten years. In Dwarka Prasad vs. State of U.P.,25 Section
3(1) of the U.P Coal Control Order issued under Section 3 of the Essential Supplies
Temporary Powers Act, 1946 provided that no one can carry on business in coal except
under a license. Rule 3(2)(b) further laid down that the State Coal Controller can exempt
any person from the license requirement. The court held the rule as ultra vires Article 19(1)
(g) as it placed unreasonable restriction by giving arbitrary powers to the executive in
granting exemptions.

22 AIR 1951 SC 118.

23 Hinsa Virodhak Sangh vs. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat, (2008) 5 SCC 33.
24 AIR 1969 Pat 209.
25 AIR 1954 SC 224.
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Even in case where the parent Act cannot be challenged before the court because of the
protection of Article 31-B of the Constitution on account of its placement in the Ninth
Schedule, the rules and regulations framed thereunder can still be challenged if they violate
any provision of the Constitution. This was decided by the Supreme Court in Prag Ice and
Oil Mills v. Union of India26, wherein the Supreme Court held that Article 31-B saves alone
the Act and not the administrative rule making under it.
However it can still be argued that if the Act has been placed under the protective shield of
the Ninth Schedule the very purpose of the protection would be destroyed. The rule framed
under the Act could still be challenged on the ground of unconstitutionality.27

III. That the delegated legislation is ultra vires the enabling Act.

The constitutionality of administrative rule making can also be challenged on the ground
that it is ultra vires the parent Act. There can be various reasons for the same.
 That it is in excess of the power conferred by the enabling Act.
The question whether the delegated legislation is in excess of the power conferred on the
delegate has to be determined with reference to the specific provisions contained in the
statute and also the object and purpose of the Act as can be gathered from the various
provisions of the enactment. So long as the rules have a rational nexus with the object and
purpose of the statute, it is not within the domain of the court to determine whether the
purpose of a statute can be served better by adopting a policy different from that what has
been laid down by the legislature or the delegate.28
The Supreme Court in case of Additional District Magistrate v. Siri Ram29 held that the
conferment of rule-making power by an Act does not enable the rule making authority to
make a rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which is inconsistent
therewith or repugnant thereto. In this case the Delhi Land Revenue and Delhi Land
Reforms Act did not empower the rule making authority to classify land or to exclude any
area from preparation of record of rights and annual register. However the rules framed
under the Act classified land into six categories and provided that the name of a tenure
26 AIR 1978 SC 1296.
27 Vasanlal Maganbhai vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 4 in I.P. Massey, “Administrative Law”, 6th edn., 2005,
Eastern Book Company, p. 122.
28 Id 18, p. 125.
29 (2000) 5 SCC 452.
 12

holder or a sub tenure holder occupying land in 'extended abadi' and in the prescribed six
cases of land categories will not be reflected in the record of rights and the annual register.
The court held that the rules are ultra vires the enabling Act.
 That it is in conflict with the enabling Act.
Administrative rule making can also be declared invalid if it is in direct conflict with any
provision of the enabling Act. Conflict with the enabling Act may also arise with reference
to the objects and purpose of the enabling Act. Because the delegation is often effected by
the use of wide formulae, it does not mean that it will authorize the making of regulations
which do not relate to the objects and purpose of the enabling Act. What are the objects and
purposes will involve an assessment by the Court not only of the provisions of the Act but
also of the inferences which can be drawn from those provisions and from the surrounding
circumstances in which the Act operates.
The Supreme Court in case of Kunj Bihari Lal Butail v. State of HP30 held that an
administrative authority cannot bring within the net of the rules what has been excluded by
the Act itself. In this case the HP Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, had delegated to the State
Government the power to make rules for the purpose “for carrying out the purpose of this
Act”. The Act by section 5 had exempted 'Tea Estates and land subservient thereto' from
the operation of the Act. However rules framed by the State Government had put embargo
on the transfer of the land subservient to tea estates. Thus the rules were held ultra vires the
enabling Act being inconsistent and repugnant thereto.
 That it is in conflict with the prescribed procedure of the enabling Act.
If the procedure that has been laid by the enabling Act, to be followed by the administrative
authorities is violated the rules may be declared void. The Court looks to the spirit rather
than the letter of law.

 That it is mala fide.

Administrative law making can be challenged on the grounds of bad faith or ulterior
purpose. It has been asserted by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Union of
India31, that a presidential proclamation under Article 356 of the Constitution can be
challenged if power is exercised mala fide. As Bhagwati, J. has observed, “If satisfaction is

30 (2000) 3 SCC 40.

31 AIR 1977 SC 1361.
 13

mala fide or is based wholly on extraneous and irrelevant grounds the court would have
jurisdiction to examine it...”32
 That it is in conflict with the terms of some other statute.
In many cases it may happen that the delegated legislation conflicts with the provisions of
some other statute. There are many examples of statutes which have explicitly given power
to override statute law. In these cases power is given to amend even the parent Act or any
other Act for the purpose of bringing the parent Act smoothly into operation. In India the
conflict of delegated legislation with a statute law may be a ground of invalidity even in the
face of any statutory authorization. Courts have held that the power to repeal or amend a
statute law is unconstitutional.
 That it is unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory.
All powers are exercised by public authorities are liable to be misused. Work constitute of
misuse of public power is the subject matter of the judicial review and the Courts intervene
in case of such misuse of power. Ultra vires doctrine confines public authorities to those
powers granted by the parent Act. But the courts are also concerned to see that not only
whether power exercised exists but also whether it has been exercised reasonably.33

While applying the doctrine of substantive ultra vires to delegated legislation, the courts do not
look merely at the express words of the enabling provision in the parent statute, but go beyond
them and also imply certain restrictions therein. The idea is that the courts do not want the
executive to do certain things by using its general rule making power without being
specifically authorized to do so by law. This approach to some extent helps in preservation of
individual liberty, strengthening of judicial control over delegated legislation and giving a
somewhat broader dimension to the doctrine of ultra vires.34

THE QUESTION OF REASONABLENESS

32 M.P. Jain & S.N. Jain, “Principles of Administrative Law”, 6 th enlarged edn., 2007, Wadhwa and Co. Law
Publishers,p.146.
33 Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee & Bhaskar Prosad Banerjee, “Judicial Control of Administrative Action”, 1 st edn.,
2001, Wadhwa and Company Law Publishers, p. 120.
34 Id 32, p.147.
 14

The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. vs.
Wednesbury Corporation,35 which is often referred to as 'Wednesbury' is a leading case on the
question of reasonableness. The subject matter of the controversy was that the Sunday
Entertainment Act, 1932 gave the local authority the power to allow Cinema to open on
Sunday “subject to such condition as the authority thinks fit to impose”. The Wednesbury
Corporation gave the plaintiff permission subject to condition that no children under 15 should
be allowed in with or without an adult. The plaintiff brought an action declaring that condition
was ultra vires. In this case LORD GREEN M.R., observed that even if a decision maker has
not ostensibly breached the irrelevancy principle, yet it may still be possible to say that
although the local authority has kept within the four corners of the matter which they ought to
consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable
authority could have come to it. In such a case the court can interfere.

Warrington LJ, in Short vs. Poole Corporation36 gave the example of the red haired teacher,
dismissed because she had red hair. That is unreasonable in one sense being 'absurd'.37

It is important to note that the Court cannot strike down an administrative rule on the ground of
unreasonableness merely because court thinks that it goes farther than is necessary or that it
does not contain certain provisions which in the opinion of the Court would have been fair.
Judges cannot substitute their wisdom with the wisdom of the administrative authorities.
Unless a rule is manifestly unjust, capricious, inequitable or partial in operation it cannot be
invalidated on the ground of unreasonableness.

In case of G.B. Mahajan vs. Jalgaon Municipal Corp.38, the Supreme Court observed that the
test for reasonableness as applied to administrative actions is different from the test as applied
in the law of torts. In torts the test is that of a 'reasonable man'. In administrative law this is not
the test because then the judges can substitute their own judgment with the judgment of the
administrator. Therefore in administrative law, 'reasonableness' is the standard indicated by the
true construction of the Act which distinguishes between what the statutory authority may or
may not be authorized to do. It distinguishes between proper and improper use of power.

35 (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA).

36 (1926) Ch 66.
37 Id 33, p. 120.
38 (1991) 3 SCC 91.
 15

By unreasonableness the Court meant that it must be manifestly arbitrary 39. While examining
whether delegated legislation is arbitrary so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution, the test is
whether it is manifestly arbitrary such as could not be expected from the authority. The Supreme
Court pointed out that where arbitrariness is alleged against delegated legislation, the
presumption of validity is stronger than where arbitrariness is alleged against an executive
action.40 It is often expressed by saying that the decision is unreasonable if it is one to which no
reasonable authority could have come, the essence of what is now commonly called 'Wednesbury
Reasonableness'.

The test has been regarded as principle of last resort, in the Wednesbury case itself, by Lord
Greene, to be relied on only in certain limited circumstances. Basically, it can come into play if
other principles of review fail for judicial review purposes. In this sense, it is a doctrine of
judicial restraint. The test becomes a real extension of the ultra vires doctrine, since
unreasonableness is most inevitably concerned ultimately not just with vires, but with the quality
and merits of the decision.41

CONCLUSION

39 Indian Express Newspaper vs. India, AIR 1986 SC 515.

40 S.P. Sathe, “Administrative Law”, 7th edn., 2008, Wadhwa and Company Law Publishers, p.108.
41 Peter Leyland & Terry Woods, “Textbook on Administrative Law”, 4 th edn., 2002, Oxford University Press, p.
324.
 16

The doctrine of ultra vires, therefore, envisages that an authority can exercise only so much
power as is conferred on it by law. An action of the authority is intra vires when it falls within
the limits of the power conferred on it but ultra vires if it goes outside this limit. The simple
proposition that a public authority may not act outside its powers (ultra vires) might fitly be
called the central principle of administrative law. The juristic basis of judicial review is the
doctrine of ultra vires. To a large extent the courts have developed the subject by extending and
refining this principle, which has many ramifications. On the question of reasonableness, we
have seen that the Court cannot strike down an administrative rule on the ground of
unreasonableness merely because court thinks that it goes farther than is necessary or that it does
not contain certain provisions which in the opinion of the Court would have been fair.

Judges cannot substitute their wisdom with the wisdom of the administrative authorities. Unless
a rule is manifestly unjust, capricious, inequitable or partial in operation it cannot be invalidated
on the ground of unreasonableness. Basically, the test of reasonableness can come into play if
other principles of review fail for judicial review purposes. In this sense, it is a doctrine of
judicial restraint. The test becomes a real extension of the ultra vires doctrine in so far as
unreasonableness is most inevitably concerned ultimately not just with vires, but also with the
quality and merits of the decision given in the case and whether or not the ends of justice are
actually met with.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 17

BOOKS:
 Mark Hutton & Ors., “Erskine May: Parliamentary Practice”, 24 th edn., 2011, Lexis
Nexis.
 C.K. Takwani, “Lectures on Administrative Law”, 5 th edn., 2012, Eastern Book
Company.
 H.W.R. Wade & C. F. Forsyth, “Administrative Law”, 9 th edn, 2004, Oxford University
Press.
 M. P. Jain & S. N. Jain, “Principles on Administrative Law”, Vol. 1, 7 th edn, 2013,
Reprint 2016, LexisNexis.
 I.P. Massey, “Administrative Law”, 6th edn., 2005, Eastern Book Company.
 M.P. Jain & S.N. Jain, “Principles of Administrative Law”, 6th enlarged edn., 2007,
Wadhwa and Co. Law Publishers.
 Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee & Bhaskar Prosad Banerjee, “Judicial Control of
Administrative Action”, 1st edn., 2001, Wadhwa and Company Law Publishers.
 S.P. Sathe, “Administrative Law”, 7th edn., 2008, Wadhwa and Company Law
Publishers.
 Peter Leyland & Terry Woods, “Textbook on Administrative Law”, 4th edn., 2002,
Oxford University Press.

ENCYCLOPAEDIAS:
 “Halsbury’s Laws of India”,Vol. 1 on “Administrative Law”, Lexis Nexis Butterworths,
New Delhi, Reprint 2006.
INTERNET SOURCES:
 Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, available at <http://www.iep.utm.edu/bentham/>
last accessed: 03/03/2016.