MOOT COURT AND INTERNSHIP

2021-2026 SUBJECT CODE: CLAW

SUBMITTED BY

BATHMA PRIYAN . S
JITYA .SP

NOVEMBER DECEMBER 2021

SUBJECT CO-ORDINATOR: PROF.MAMATHA

ALLIANCE SCHOOL OF LAW

ALLIANCE UNIVERSITY

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 Contract Moot Problem

BATHMA PRIYAN S

PROV/BA.LLB7-21/048

JITYA SP

PROV/BA.LLB/7-21/070

BA.LLB (2021-26)

Moot court and Internship )

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF HIND

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

APPEAL NO: ______/2021

UNDER ARTICLE 225 OF CONSITUTION OF HIND

IN THE MATTER OF:

PQR & Ors ……………………..……………………………………APPELLANT

V

State of saradam……………….…………………………............RESPONDED

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELANT

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 Contract Moot Problem-ⅠI

TABLE OF CONTENT Page no

1) INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 3

I. TABLE OFCASES 5

II. STATUTES 5

III. DATABASES 5

2) STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 6

3) BRIEF FACTS 7

4) STATEMENT OF ISSUES 9

5) SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 10

6) ARGUMENT IN ADVANCE
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1. WHETHER THERE IS A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN M/S SENGHAL
AND SENGHAL AND MR. SIDD MALHAR?

2. WHETHER THE JUDGEMENT PASSED IN MOHORI BIBEE V. 13

DHARMODAS GHOSE NEEDS RECONSIDERATION ?

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3. WHETHER THE CIVIL COURT OF SARDAM WAS CORRECT IN 17
REJECTING THE PLEA OF RESTITUTION ?

7. PRAYER 19

Contract Moot Problem-Ⅰ

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I. TABLE OF CASES

Derry v. Peek
(1889) LR 14 App Cas 337
,,UKHL 1

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Mohori Bibee vs. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) ILR 30 Cal 539
(PC)

T.R Appaswami Aiyangar vs Narayanaswami Aiyar And (1931) 60 MLJ 117

Ors.

Ajudhia Prasad And Anr. Vs Chandan Lal And Anr AIR 1937 ALL 610

Statues :
1. Constitution of India, 1950
2. Indian contract act ,1872

II. Database:

1. www.casemine.com

2. www.scconline.com

3. www.indiankanoon.com

Contract Moot Problem-Ⅰ

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The current case has been filed by the counsel representing the appellants under this jurisdiction
by the virtue of Article 225 of the Constitution of India 1950.Subject to the provisions of this
constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate legislature made by virtue of

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powers conferred on that legislature by this constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law
administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the judges thereof in
relation to the administration of justice in the Court , including any power to make rules of Court
and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Divisions
Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this constitution.
[Provided that any restriction to which the exercise of original jurisdiction by any of the High
Courts with respect ton any matter concerning the revenue or concerning any act ordered or done
in the collection thereof was subject immediately before the commencement of this Constitution
shall no longer apply to the exercise of such jurisdiction].

Contract Moot Problem-Ⅰ

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.sidd Malhar, a sixteen- year prodigy, citizen of Indiana was the recipient of the “sensational
voice of the Nation” award. He was an astounding singer, extremely talented not only in rap,
rock, HipHop and jazz but also in classical and folk. he wanted to develop his musical career by
releasing fusion albums combining different genres and by engaging himself on world music
tours.so, he wanted a multipurpose, ultra- modern, architectural marvel where he could have his
recording studio, theatre- for live musical performances and a roof top pool for hosting parties.
He misrepresented himself as a major and put the task out to tender.

2. M/s Senghal&senghal was a leading building constructor and infrastructure provider. They
offered to do the entire work for Rs.10,00,000/-. Both the parties knew that this was an

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unrealistically low-price contract and the amount will be paid in installments in order of the
completion of different phases of the assigned work.

3. Sidd accepted their offer and entered into a contract for construction of the multi-purpose
building and for providing all amenities therein. According to the contract, the ground floor was
for parking, the first floor for the roof top pool.

4. M/s. Senghal&Senghal completed the construction of the ground floor and the first floor and
ran out of money and materials for further construction. they informed Sidd that they could not
complete the construction unless further capital was made available to them.

5. Sidd had arranged a poolside party to which he had invited top music directors, producers and
other renowned individuals in the music industry whom he believed would fund for his dream
music albums and music tours.

6. So he was desperate to have the construction of the roof top pool completed as stipulated. He
had requested for the continuance of the construction work and further requested to spend the
remaining amount of Rs 7,00,000/- on the work out of their own funds and assured them that the
money would be paid to them as soon as his album is released.

7.The roof top pool was completed and the party was a success. Sidd entered into a contract with
Veenaghaana Producers who agreed to fund for the fusion albums and world tours. Sidd told Ms.
Asha Senghal, the manager of M/s Senghal&Senghal “Madam, you have saved my career. Don’t
worry about Rs. 7,00,000/-.” Having this promise, M/s Senghal&Senghal started a new project.

8.However, Sidd’s new fusion music album was a disastrous flop. Social media enthusiasts and
meme pages massively trolled him for his raucous and bizarre fusion music. He then found
himself unable to pay the amount of Rs.7,00,000/- to M/s Senghal&Senghal.

9. Ms. Asha Senghal compelled Sidd to render a music performance in her daughter’s birthday
party. Apart from relatives and friends she had also invited rich people, in order to secure
contracts regarding building, construction etc. And in return she agreed to release Sidd from
paying the debts of Rs. 7, 00, 000/-. Sidd agreed on this point and was ready for the music
performance in the party.

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10. he also wanted to get back his lost reputation and start his career afresh. however before the
party, he suffered from a severe sore throat due to over-repetition of rehearsals. Then he did not
perform in Ms. Asha’s party on the advice of his doctor.

11. On Sidd’s eighteenth birthday, both the parties, on grounds of humanity, decided to alter the
contract. Sidd acknowledged the dept taken from M/s. Senghal&Senghal for rendering past
services and further both agreed on the same point that Sidd would pay the debt through easy
monthly installments (EMIs) of Rs.20,000/- per month till the repayment of the amount of Rs.
7,00,000/-.

12. Sidd, later on, felt that the work done by M/s. Senghal&Senghal was not performed as he
had specified. He further pointed out that the material used for constructing was substandard and
not satisfactory. He estimated that this would have cost them Rs.3,00,000/- only. He claimed that
he had paid the money already.

13. Sidd then decided to dispose off his property, without paying a single time to M/s.
Senghal&Senghal. When all this foul play came to their knowledge, they tried to restrain him by
putting enormous pressure in order to recover their money amounting to a total sum of
Rs.7,00,000/- which they spent on the construction and amenities.

14.even after such prolonged period and altered mode of payment, M/s. Senghal&Senghal could
not recover the debt from Sidd. As a last resort, they sent him a legal notice, stating that the
money shall be repaid within 15 days. However, sidd did not send any correspondence or reply
to the said notice.

15.In this context, M/s Senghal&Senghal finally decided to seek remedy from the court of Law
in this regard . the suit was field by M/s. Senghal&Senghal before the civil court of Sardam, in
the state of Indiana on the ground that they had constructed the building as per the terms of the
contract and had taken all the diligent steps to recover the loan made available to Sidd Malhar for
Rs.7,00,000/-but now he refused to pay the said amount and alleged fraud against him. They also
prayed for injunction restraining Sidd from selling the property until the suit was disposed off.

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16.the civil court of Sardam heard the matter and held that a minor’s contract is void ab initio
and thus set Sidd free from all his liabilities towards M/s Senghal&Senghal by upholding the
judgment passed in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose.

17.The plea of restitution raised by the Plaintiff was rejected and injunction was not granted.
M/s Senghal&Senghal preferred an appeal before the High Court granted injunction and decided
to hear the case on merits.

Contract Moot Problem-Ⅰ

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Issue one

WHETHER THERE IS A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN M/S SENGHAL AND

SENGHAL AND MR. SIDD MALHAR?

Issue two

WHETHER THE JUDGEMENT PASSED IN MOHORI BIBEE V. DHARMODAS GHOSE

NEEDS RECONSIDERATION?

Issue three

WHETHER CIVIL COURT OF SARDAM WAS CORRECT IN REJECTING THE PLEA OF

RESTITUTION?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

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 ISSUE ONE: WHETHER THERE IS A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN M/S
SENGHAL& SENGHAL AND MR. SIDD MALHAR ?

Yes, there is a valid contract between M/s Senghal&Senghal and Mr. sidd Malhar.Contract
should be in free consent but here it is not free consent. Misrepresentation is defined under
section 18 of the Indian contract Act, 1872 which says misrepresentation is a form of a statement
made preceding to the contract being completed. According to section 19 when consent to an
agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable
at the option of the party whose consent was so caused.

ISSUE TWO : WHETHER THE JUDGEMENT PASSED IN THE MOHORI BIBEE VS

DHARMODAS GHOSE NEEDS A RECONSIDERATION ?

There is a need of the reconsideration in judgement passed in the Mohori Bibee vs. Dharmodas
Ghose because the appellant was not aware of the age of the respondent.As there was damage
according to Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act deals with Direct Damages. It means damages
which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew
(when they made the contract) to be likely to result from the breach of it. Special damages arise
on account of the unusual/ special circumstances affecting the plaintiff and resulting into the
consequential damage. They are not recoverable unless the special circumstances were brought
to the knowledge of the defendant, so that the possibility of the special loss was in contemplation
of the parties

ISSUE THREE: WHETHER THE CIVIL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REJECTING

THE PLEA OF RSETITUTION ?

The English law however applied the law of restitution in the case where a minor misrepresented
his age when he entered into a contract. Under the common law, if a minor misrepresented his
age and received any money or benefits from the contract, he must restore it to the person whom
he received it provided that it is still identifiable and within his possession.

Contract Moot Problem-Ⅰ

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE ONE: WHETHER THERE IS A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN M/S

SENGHAL &SENGHAL AND MR. SIDD MALHAR ?

Yes, there is a valid contract between M/s Senghal&Senghal and Mr. sidd Malhar.Contract
should be in free consent but here it is not free consent. Misrepresentation is defined under
section 18 of the Indian contract Act, 1872 which says misrepresentation is a form of a statement
made preceding to the contract being completed. According to section 19 when consent to an
agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable
at the option of the party whose consent was so caused.

As per Indian contract Act 1872. Any person, a domicile of India, who is not yet 18 years old, is
called a minor. A minor is a person who does not reach the age of 18 and everyone who gets
into a contract has to attain 18 years of age. According to the Indian contract act, a child’s
contract is void meaning it has no legal standing. Although a minor is not eligible to enter into a
contract, he or she can be a beneficiary. Section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, also
states that while a minor may not be a partner in a partnership company, the company's benefits
may be provided to him.

The contract with minorities can, therefore, be extended further for the benefit. However a minor
cannot contract, there is nothing in the Constitution Act that prevents him from making another
party tied to minors. Therefore, a self-made note that is sufficiently useful for the child is useless
and can be blamed. The minor is not allowed to be a partner in a joint venture company.
However, an unauthorized person may agree to all parties involved, may be allowed to benefit
from the partnership. With some exceptions, a contract made by a minor is voidable.  The minor,
in other words, may avoid the legal li 1ability under a contract.  Upon reaching the age of

1
Derry v. Peek (1889) LR 14 App Cas 337,, UKHL 1

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majority, a minor may affirm or ratify the contract and therefore make it contractually binding on
him.

Any expression of the minor’s intention to avoid the contract will accomplish avoidance.A minor
can only avoid a contract during his minority status and only for a reasonable time after he
reaches the age of majority.  After a reasonable period of time, the contract is deemed to be
ratified and cannot be avoided. When a minor avoids a contract, there are certain rules of law
regarding the effect on any property received by the minor under the contract.  If the minor still
has what he received from the other party, he must return it to the other party upon seeking to
avoid the contract.  If he does not return the property in such a situation, he cannot avoid the
contract. 

If the minor cannot return what he has received pursuant to the contract because it has been
spent, damaged or destroyed, he still can avoid the contract.  He can avoid the contract and is
only required to return that part of the consideration he still has.  Even if he has nothing left, or
what he has is damaged property, he still can avoid the contract .but in situation of the case mr.
sidd was the major when he paid upto Rs20,000/- in (EMI) upto 15 days.Later by presenting the
false statement about the construction by the M/s Senghal&Senghal. And refuse to pay the Rs
7,00,000/-.

Derry v. Peek:

 In the prospectus released by the defendant company, it was stated that the company was
permitted to use trams that were powered by steam, rather than by horses. In reality, the
company did not possess such a right as this had to be approved by a Board of Trade. Gaining
the approval for such a claim from the Board was considered a formality in such circumstances
and the claim was put forward in the prospectus with this information in mind. However, the
claim of the company for this right was later refused by the Board. The individuals who had
purchased a stake in the business, upon reliance on the statement, brought a claim for deceit
against the defendant’s business after it became liquidated. The issues in the Derry v. Peek was
the important to note that the law regarding false misrepresentation was still developing and this
was an important case in doing so. In this case, the court was required to assess the statement
made by the defendant company in its prospectus to see whether the statement was fraudulent or

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simply incorrect.Decision of Derry v. Peek is the claim of the shareholders was rejected by the
House of Lords. The court held that it was not proven by the shareholders that the director of the
company was dishonest in his belief. The court defined fraudulent misrepresentation as a
statement known to be false or a statement made recklessly or carelessly as to the truth of the
statement. On this basis, the plaintiff could not claim against the defendant company for deceit

ISSUE TWO : WHETHER THE JUDGEMENT PASSED IN THE MOHORI BIBEE VS.
DHARMODAS GHOSE NEEDS RECONSIDERATION ?

There is a need of the reconsideration in judgement passed in the Mohori Bibee vs. Dharmodas
Ghose because the appellant was not aware of the age of the respondent.As there was damage
according to Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act deals with Direct Damages. It means damages
which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew
(when they made the contract) to be likely to result from the breach of it. Special damages arise
on account of the unusual/ special circumstances affecting the plaintiff and resulting into the
consequential damage2. They are not recoverable unless the special circumstances were brought
to the knowledge of the defendant, so that the possibility of the special loss was in contemplation
of the parties. Special damages do not mean serious damage in the sense of irreparable loss but
damage affecting the plaintiff individually (or damage peculiar to the plaintiff) or beyond what is
suffered by him in common with orders. n contract law, consequential damages are commonly
referred as special damages or expectation damages. Unlike normal losses which are losses
which every plaintiff will suffer such as general damage, consequential losses are anything above
the normal losses such as profits lost or expenses incurred through the breach and are
recoverable if they are not remote. Consequential damages do not flow directly and immediately
from the act of the party but as a consequence of a wrongful act which are so proximate as to be
recoverable. Only such damages that are sufficiently proximate to the course of action as to be
the natural consequence of the wrongful act, though even of an interim nature, are recoverable.
Unlike, direct damages which focus on the costs associated directly with the contract itself,
2
Consequential damages: The losses that do not flow directly and immediately from an injurious act but that result
indirectly from the act.

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consequential damage focus on the costs outside of the contract. Examples of consequential
damages: lost profits, lost products, lost revenues, lost time, damage to reputation, reduction in
value, etc. since Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas case was the precedent for all minor cases and
there was since there was no plea of restitution for the plaintiff.

MOHORI BIBEE VS. DHARMODAS GHOSE :

Dharmodas Ghose a minor was the respondent in the case. He was the sole owner of his
immovable property. Dharmodas Ghose’s mother was authorized as his legal custodian by
Calcutta High Court in the MOHORI BIBEE VS DHARMODAS GHOSE case. When he went
for the mortgage of his immovable property which was done in the favor of Brahmo Dutta (the
appellant) he was a minor and he secured the mortgage deed for rupees 20000 at an interest of
12% per annum. The appellant was a moneylender whose attorney was Kedar Nath. The
respondent’s mother notified the appellant regarding the minority of the respondent on the date
on which the mortgage deed was commenced.

On 10th September 1895, the respondent and his mother brought legal action against Brahmo
Dutta by claiming that the mortgage was executed by the respondent when he was a minor as a
result of which such a mortgage was void and improper. Consequently, such a contract should be
rescinded. During the proceedings, the appellant died, and then further the appeal was indicted
by his executor’s. The appellant argued that no relaxation or any sought of aid should be
provided to them because he felt that the defendant had deceitfully or dishonestly misinterpreted
the fact about his age3

The trial court in the MOHORI BIBEE VS DHARMODAS GHOSE case held that such a
mortgage deed or contract that was commenced between the plaintiff and the defendant was void
as it was executed by a person who was a minor at the time of execution of the mortgage.
Consequently, Brahmo Dutta not being satisfied by the trail’s court judgment filed an appeal in
the Calcutta High Court. The Calcutta High Court in the MOHORI BIBEE VS DHARMODAS
GHOSE case appeal reaffirmed the Trail’s court verdict and dismissed the appeal.

3
Mohori Bibee v/s. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) ILR 30 Cal 539 (pc)

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The trial court in the MOHORI BIBEE VS DHARMODAS GHOSE case held that such a
mortgage deed or contract that was commenced between the plaintiff and the defendant was void
as it was executed by a person who was a minor at the time of execution of the mortgage.
Consequently, Brahmo Dutta not being satisfied by the trail’s court judgment filed an appeal in
the Calcutta High Court. The Calcutta High Court in the MOHORI BIBEE VS DHARMODAS
GHOSE case appeal reaffirmed the Trail’s court verdict and dismissed the appeal.4

It can be concluded that any agreement or deed in which minor is a party such agreement shall be
declared null and void because such agreement is void ab initio. Any agreement with a minor
cannot be enforced against him. In cases where the minor has done dealings without the consent
of parents or guardians, they cannot be held liable for the breach. No action lies against them. If
a minor has derived any profit from such a contract then he or she cannot be forced to reimburse
it back or give compensation for the same.

T.R. APPASWAMI AIYANGAR VS NARAYANASWAMI AIYAR AND ORS.

The plaintiff's claim to compensation rests, not on any principle or formula of English Law, but
on the words of this section, and it has to be seen whether the facts of this case come within its
scope. The section deals with (a) agreements, and (6) contracts. The distinction between them is
apparent from Section 2. By Clause (e) every promise and every set of promises forming the
consideration for each other is an agreement, and by Clause (h) an agreement enforceable by law
is a contract. Section 65, therefore, deals with (a) agreements enforceable by law, and (6) with
agreements not so enforceable. By Clause (g) an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be
void. An agreement therefore discovered to be void is one discovered to be not enforceable by
law, and, on the language of the section, would include an agreement that was void in that sense
from its inception, as distinct from a contract that becomes void. The agreement here was
manifestly void from its inception and it was void because its subject-matter was incapable of
being bound in the manner stipulated. Though this aspect of the case has not been satisfactorily
presented or developed in the pleadings and the proceedings before the Lower Courts, their
Lordships think there are materials on the record from which it may be fairly inferred in the
peculiar circumstances of this case that there was a misapprehension as to the private rights of

4
T.R Appaswami Aiyangar vs Narayanaswami aiyar and ors. 1931 60 LMJ 117

15
Indar Singh in the villages which he purported to sell by the instrument of January 2, 1880, and
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that the true nature of those rights was not discovered by the plaintiff or Rachpal Singh earlier
than the time at which his demand for possession was resisted, and that was well within the
period of limitation. It was thus that the agreement was discovered to be void, and the discovery,
in their Lordships' view, was one within the words and the meaning of Section 65 of the Contract
Act. The plaintiff, therefore, though not entitled to recover possession of the villages, is entitled
to recover compensation, and in assessing that compensation their Lordships consider it should
include the sum of Rs. 25,000 found by both Courts to have been paid to Indar Singh and also in
the circumstances, of this case, interest, not at the rate or for the period claimed by the plaintiff,
hut at 6 per cent, from the date of the institution of this suit.

ISSUE THREE: WHETHER CIVIL COURT OF SARDAM WAS CORRECT IN

REJECTING THE PLEA OF RESTITUTION ?

Civil court of Sardam was not correct in the rejecting the plea of restitution. Civil court of
Sardam reconsider the plea of restitution of M/S Senghal&Senghal as there was Consequential
damages on their reputation on the judgement passed in the civil court of sardam. The English
common law however applied the law of restitution in the case where a minor misrepresented his
age when he entered into a contract. It is the general principle under the common law, if a minor
misrepresented his age and received any money or benefits from the contract, he must restore it
to the person whom he received it provided that it is still identifiable and within his possession
(Rosli,2012)6. In the case of misrepresentation of age by a minor, it looks like to cause injustice
to the major party who deals with the minor’s contract. Although the intention of the law is to
protect the interest of the minor, but it seems that the new generation now is different. It is not
impossible that the minor who entered into the contract with the intention to fulfill their needs
and interests. If the law still continues to give the opportunity to the minor to enter into the

5
Rosli, R.A .(2012), Parties of contract, In Ishan Jan, M.N. (Eds).
6

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contract in the case of misrepresentation of age, then this will continue to give injustice to the
major party who deals with him.

AJUDHIA PRASAD AND ANR. VS CHANDAN LAL AND ANR.

Where, therefore, one of the parties is a minor and is incapable of contracting so that there never
is and can never be a contract, Section 65 can have no application to such a case as that section
starts from the basis of there being an agreement of contract between competent parties. This is
as clear a pronouncement as can be, and it is impossible to whittle down its effect either by
suggesting that it was not necessary in that case to go into that question or that their Lordships
meant to refer to only a portion of Section 65, namely, "where the contract becomes void" and
not to the portion "where the agreement is discovered to be void", in laying down its
inapplicability. The clear rule laid down is that neither Section 64 norSection 65 deals with a
case where a party is incompetent to enter into a contract at all, and that in such a case, therefore,
there would be no question of ordering him to restore the advantage which he has received or to
make compensation for what he has received. The rule so laid down has, of course, been
followed unanimously by all the High Courts in India for the last 35 years. The learned Counsel
for the respondents has not been able to sho 7w a single case of any High Court in India where
Section 65 has been applied against a minor and a decree passed against him when he is a
defendant on the ground that his contract had been void. Indeed, if such a view were to prevail,
the result would be that all agreements by minors would have to be enforced indirectly against
them, no matter whether there had been any mistake, misrepresentation or fraud or not; and a
decree passed for restoration of the money advanced to a minor would be almost the enforcement
of his liability to pay. And the decree would have to be a personal decree. This would amount to
nullifying the effect of the protection which the Legislature has given to minors. It would make a
minor personally liable for restoration of the advantage and payment of compensation, although
Section 68, which provides for the special case of liability for necessaries, confines such liability
to the minor's property and exempts his person. If we were to enforce directly the supposed
liability of the minor to restore the advantage, a wide door would be opened for mischief, and
persons would be free to deal with minors with the full confidence that even if the worst comes
to the worst, they would get back full compensation for what they were risking. Such an inter,

7
Ajudhai prasda and anr. Vs. Chandan lal and anr. AIR 1937 ALL 610

17
predation of the section would involve drastic consequences, which could not have been the
intention of the Legislature. It may be noted that the Contract Act has been amended since 1923
from time to time and various amendments have been introduced. The Legislature must be
deemed to have been aware of the inter, predation put on Section 65 by the Lordships of the
Privy Council, which was followed loyally and consistently by all the High Courts in India. The
fact that it has not thought fit to amend the section is an indication that the Legislature has seen
nothing in this interpretation to disapprove of. Even the learned Judges of Lahore in the Full
Bench case Khan Gul Lakkha Singh A.I.R. 1928 Lah. 609, which is the sheet anchor of the
plaintiffs, did not think it proper to rely on Section 65 of the Act, although they took pains to
discover a ground for decreeing the claim. Indeed it appears that the learned Counsel at the Bar
did not even venture to urge that Section 65 was applicable.

Contract Moot Problem-Ⅰ

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, it is most humbly prayed before this Hon’ble High court of Hind that it may be
pleased to:

1. To hold the contract between M/s Senghal&Senghal and Mr. Sidd Malhar as
valid.

2. To uphold the judgement passed in the Mohori Bibee and Dharmadas Ghose
case.

3. To allow the plea of restitution of appellant.

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 4. To uphold the judgement passed in the civil court of Sardam.
AND/OR
Pass any other order, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in light of justice,
equity and good conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted

PQRS & Ors (Appellant)

Bathmapriyan. S

Jitya.sp

(Counsel for the Appellant)

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