Res Publica (2006) 12: 59–76 Ó Springer 2006

DOI 10.1007/s11158-006-0006-4

DAVID MIDDLETON

THREE TYPES OF SELF-RESPECT

ABSTRACT. According to John Rawls, self-respect is the most important of the

primary goods and is essential for the construction of the just society. Self-respect,
however, remains a concept which is inadequately theorised, being closely linked to
other concepts such as dignity, shame, pride, autonomy and security. Most usually
self-respect is considered to be just the self-reflection of the respect we receive from
others. In this paper I argue that self-respect consists of both a self-evaluative and a
social reflexive element. Using Darwall’s distinction between two types of respect as a
building block, I argue that it is worth considering self-respect as having three
dimensions. Broadly these are human recognition, status recognition and appraisal.

KEY WORDS: Darwall, dignity, justice, pride, respect, self-respect, shame

The possession of self-respect is one of our most treasured personal

attributes. As Rawls would have it, self-respect is ‘the most impor-
tant primary good.’1 This being the case, we might suppose that
most people want this most valued of commodities for its own sake –
and that in constructing a just society, we might expect the construc-
tion and maintenance of self-respect to be paramount. But whilst it
seems clear that self-respect is important,2 it is not entirely clear ex-
actly what it is or how it is constructed. Self-respect is linked with a
number of other concepts including dignity,3 shame and pride,4
autonomy,5 servility6 and security.7 Whilst it cannot be subsumed

1
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 440.
2
David Middleton, ‘Why We Should Care About Respect,’ Contemporary Politics
10 (2004) 227–241.
3
Aurel Kolnai, ‘Dignity,’ in ed. Robin S. Dillon, Dignity, Character and
Self-respect (London, Routledge, 1995).
4
Gabrielle Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
5
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).
6
Thomas E. Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991).
7
David Middleton, ‘Labour Market Flexibility, Security and Self-Respect,’ in
John Edwards and Jean-Paul Revauger (eds), Employment and Citizenship in Britain
and France (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).
60 DAVID MIDDLETON

within these concepts, it seems so close to them that it may be either

derivative or preliminary with respect to them. However, self-respect
is important enough that we should consider it not just another con-
cept in its own right but one of the most important of concepts that
constitute our selfhood. It is for precisely this reason that Rawls re-
gards self-respect as the most important of the primary goods and
why it seems that social justice and self-respect are inextricably
linked. It is for this reason that it is a concept that warrants consid-
eration. If it is as important to justice as Rawls intimates then it
seems obvious that we need to be clearer what it is and how it is con-
structed. One starting point for such an exploration is precisely the
concept of respect, which clearly has a familial link to self-respect.
Respect is taken to be, in liberal thought at least, what one writer
has called the ‘moral desiderata.’8 It forms what we might think of as
a kind of moral infrastructure, an expectation of the way in which
individuals from diverse cultures might relate to one another.9 To be
respected is an expectation of a certain standard of treatment by
others which any self-respecting person can take for granted.
Respect, as we can see in other papers in this collection, is not just
used as a means to show the proper concern for humans, but can also
refer to the way in which we might treat nature, or the environment
(if indeed these are two different things). Respect can be a reparatory
tool as much as a baseline expectation of the way we might expect to
be treated and the way others might expect us to treat them. In
human respect relationships we might regard respect as having a
reciprocal nature. That is to say that respect is something that we are
accustomed to both giving and receiving. Of course, respect can as
easily be absent as present. Indeed, it is the absence of respect which
reminds us of its presence. It is when people are treated disrespect-
fully that the true force of respect as an expectation is powerfully
driven home to us. The destruction of respect for individuals and
groups of individuals can have long-lasting consequences requiring
strategies to rebuild respect. But even in less dramatic circumstances
we intuitively seem to understand that relationships should be struc-
tured by a reciprocal respect, particularly where power relationships
of one sort or another are involved.

8
David Schmidtz, ‘Equal Respect and Equal Shares,’ Social Philosophy and Policy
(2002), 244–274, p. 274.
9
David Middleton, Respect: The Moral Infrastructure of Social Justice,
Unpublished PhD thesis (University of London, 2004).
 THREE TYPES OF SELF-RESPECT 61

What is very clear is that respect plays an important role in

human society. Whether that role realistically extends to the non-
human inhabitants with whom we share the planet, or even to the
planet itself is explored elsewhere in this special issue by James Con-
nelly. For my purposes it is only necessary to note those concerns,
for if the name of the game is social justice, then by definition that
justice will be constructed by human beings, albeit with due regard
for non-human entities.10 My focus here, then, is on respect between
persons and particularly how that respect affects the specific self-
respect of individuals. Clearly, and obviously, there is a relationship
between respect for persons and self-respect. In the remainder of this
paper I should like to explore that relationship. If it is correct that
self-respecting persons expect others to respect them then there is a
sense in which possessing self-respect is itself an object of respect.
But, it would also seem probable that the absence of respect from
others will undermine an individual’s self-respect. In other words, a
failure to receive respect will reduce our self-respect. But although
this seems plausible, it is equally plausible that self-respect far from
being simply a reflection of others respect is also constituted in self-
evaluation. The implication of this is that regardless of the respect
we perceive from others, individuals may be able to maintain their
self-respect based largely on the respect they give to themselves.
To understand the construction of self-respect it seems that we
must first understand the construction of respect. Most of the
papers in this collection have a common starting point in Stephen
Darwall’s notion that there are two types of respect. These he
terms recognition and appraisal respect.11 I take issue with Darwall
in only a minor detail. As the title of this paper indicates, I think it
is plausible to suggest that there are indeed three types of respect
and three types of self-respect which follow from these. What
Darwall brings to our attention is that respect must have an object
to which it is attached. So recognition respect is concerned with a
recognition that a particular object, whatever that object might be,
is the kind of object that is rightly the subject of respect. In the
case of human beings, it might seem like stating the obvious to say
that humans are the type of thing that we might respect and also

10
Andrew Dobson, Citizenship and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), p. 113.
11
Stephen Darwall, ‘Two Kinds of Respect,’ in Robin S. Dillon (ed.), Dignity,
Character and Self-Respect (London, Routledge, 1995).
62 DAVID MIDDLETON

the type of thing we should respect. But to say humans fit into the
class of things that could be respected is to say nothing about why
a particular human should be respected.
Recognition respect is qualitative in nature: it simply says that
an object is worthy of respect. What it does not tell us is why this
class of objects should be respected and another class should not
be. Recognition respect does not allow us to differentiate the
amount of respect which is due to a particular object. If recogni-
tion respect were respect per se, it would not allow us to appraise
the object of our respect vis-a-vis other objects in its class. This, of
course, is counter-intuitive. We do not normally want to think of
all our colleagues, for example, as equally worthy of respect,
although of course as humans they belong precisely to that class of
objects which is worthy of respect.
Darwall’s notion of appraisal respect, on the other hand, is quan-
titative in nature. It suggests that we can have more or less respect
for some objects. It comes closer to that feeling that we often have
that we have a great deal of respect for some people, and very little
for others. Indeed, how often is it said by somebody that ‘I have
lost all respect for X after....’ The suggestion here is that this person
is no longer worthy of my respect at all. But clearly they have not
ceased to be a part of the class of objects that are worthy of respect.
The implication is that appraisal respect is an appraisal of some
particular qualities of a person, whilst recognition respect is simply
a means by which we decide between classes of objects which are
worthy of our appraisal and which are not.
In effect, the two types of respect described by Darwall appear
to be cumulative in nature. That is, first we must recognise an
object as worthy of respect, and only then is it possible to appraise
how worthy the object is of our respect. Thus far I have no argu-
ment with Darwall. The sense that respect is cumulative, although
not explicitly stated in his paper, seems sensible and intuitive. It is
probably worth stating however that this distinction is more
analytic than empirical. We do not normally differentiate between
the recognition of an object and its appraisal, the recognition and
appraisal are coterminous. Appraising an object implies that it is
recognised as an object that can be appraised. Very often what we
are actually appraising in people is not respect, but the qualities
that might be worth respecting. Now clearly it could be said that
this is also what we are recognising, but that seems less plausible.
 THREE TYPES OF SELF-RESPECT 63

Recognition respect is not concerned with appraising in anything

other than a broad sense – is this object the type of object that can
be respected? Appraisal respect tells us that the answer to that
question is positive and leaves us the possibility of placing the
object on some continuum.
The question of respect as a quantitative concept then turns on
what it is about an object that is deemed worthy of more or less
respect. Here I want to suggest that Darwall’s typology could take
account of the different qualities that we do indeed respect in others.
In essence, as far as humans are concerned we respect others for their
particular qualities or merits. But in most societies there is also a very
strong sense that certain offices should bring respect for their holders.
For example, we might feel that – regardless of our views of Bill
Clinton or George Bush – the Office of the President of the United
States is entitled to expect respect. This would appear to be a form of
recognition respect in that it is not strictly speaking concerned with
qualities that the incumbent holds but a respect for the office per se.
The office represents a form of status and it is the status rather than
the qualities of the holder of the status that is accorded respect. So
the President might, in theory, be a philandering womanizer or a
monosyllabic idiot, but would still receive the respect due to the office
of the President.
This suggests that respect for and between persons is structured
along three distinctive aspects: human recognition respect, status
recognition respect and appraisal respect. These same aspects (or
dimensions) of respect are at play in the construction of self-respect.
But self-respect is also a form of appraisal we make upon others.
Certain individuals are said to lack self-respect. This is important
because it is perfectly plausible that Rawls is correct to argue that
the just society requires self-respecting citizens to construct it. Not
least, because the ability to construct justice is partly the ability to
respect others.
It seems self-evident that a person who lacks respect for them-
selves is likely to lack the ability to respect others. They may well
confuse their subservience for respect but a subservient individual
seems to be a person lacking self-respect.12 What does it take for a
person to be self-respecting? Firstly, a person must possess a sense
of their own moral worth. As Gabriele Taylor suggests, we must be

12
Hill, op. cit.
64 DAVID MIDDLETON

able to value ourselves as persons before we are able to value

ourselves as particular persons, with talents and abilities.13 This is
human self-respect. Of course to respect humans simply because
they are human begs questions. What is it about humans that
deserves respect? Should we respect one another simply because we
managed not to be trees or insects? Alternatively, perhaps human
respect has its corollary in tree respect or insect respect? Or, per-
haps the term ‘human respect’ should be replaced by the term ‘spe-
cies respect?’ There are, of course, candidates for what makes
humans uniquely objects of respect. Rationality, morality, con-
sciousness might all be invoked. Most of them unfortunately do
not hold up to intense scrutiny.
Whilst there may be other sentient beings who deserve respect as
far as we know at the moment the universe is, from a human per-
spective, a human one. We are the dominant species and the only
one with an advanced cognitive system capable of developing a
moral code. The world of morality, politics, and literature is a
human one. Human respect is, therefore, an ontological position in
which we, rightly or wrongly, privilege the existence and actions of
humans over non-human entities. This is not to say that trees,
insects or great apes do not matter. They do, but they matter for
human beings only as their existence (and their needs and wants)
are filtered through the human consciousness. They may well pos-
sess qualities equal to or even better than humans but morality and
justice are concerns of humans and we therefore regard the onto-
logical reality of human-ness as sufficient reason to privilege
humans as a discrete object of respect. Most importantly we regard
humans as possessing moral worth and an inherent dignity which is
worth defending.
But whilst being human provides the basis of self-respect, a
self-respecting person is going to be a person who is also aware of
their own capabilities and their achievements. We gain some of our
self-respect from the knowledge that there are some things we do
well. This means that we are aware of what Dillon calls our ‘concrete
particularity.’14 This is appraisal self-respect. But, beyond the recog-
nition of ourselves as morally important – and as a person capable
of acting on the world, rather than just being acted upon – is a form

13
Taylor, op. cit., p. 50.
14
Robin S. Dillon, ‘Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-respect,’ in her (ed.),
Dignity, Character and Self-respect (London, Routledge, 1995), p. 299.
 THREE TYPES OF SELF-RESPECT 65

of self-respect which is related to our membership of certain groups.

This is the basis of status self-respect, which consists of a recognition
of our difference from other humans and our similarity with those
with whom we share some essential traits providing the basis of sta-
tus recognition.

HUMAN SELF-RESPECT

At the base of our self-respect is the sense that we are a person of

worth. In a society founded upon just principles it seems imperative
that all persons are treated as of equal moral worth. That is to say
that all persons are entitled to expect human respect. The most
obvious way in which people’s moral worth is undermined is by
allowing their dignity as humans to be undermined. This is done
when we treat people as means only, slaves for example. But it is
also done when we allow people to live degraded lives: the home-
less or those in violent domestic relationships. People’s dignity is
also undermined by racism and chauvinistic attitudes toward
women. Moreover, workers are often treated as if expendable.
They are often seen by employers not as unique individuals, but as
functionaries who are easily replaced.15 We experience our moral
worth through the respect which we receive from others. But, as
already noted, in order to perceive respect from others we must
first recognise ourselves as morally worthy. This is the ontological
reality of human self-respect. Humans have intrinsic moral worth
regardless of how unworthy they might be in other ways.
The way others treat us can clearly affect our self-respect. But, if
others treatment constituted our self-respect we would become
dependent upon others’ actions toward us. But the construction of
self-respect is not simply a reflection of others respect for us. It
seems to have two aspects, which we might respectively call ‘evalua-
tive’ and ‘reflexive.’ Reflexive self-respect is the way in which others
treatment of us affects the way we feel about ourselves. This can be
very powerful and its effect on our well-being should not be under-
estimated. To be treated as worthless, as a means and not an end, as
an object not a subject conveys powerful symbolic and material

15
Had I, during my days as a labourer, received payment every time I was told ‘if
you don’t want this job there are thousands on the dole who do,’ I would probably
be very wealthy by now.
66 DAVID MIDDLETON

messages. In undermining our autonomy it makes us the instrument

of others actions. Sometimes this may well be inherent within a
social relationship: workers and bosses, rich and poor, husbands
and wives, parents and children. The fact is that in these relation-
ships there are power imbalances, some greater than others, but
imbalances nonetheless. To be in an inherently unequal relationship
must affect an individuals self-respect. To be constantly under an-
other’s dominion is to be reminded of one’s own powerlessness and
this must undermine the sense of our own moral worth. Of course,
these relationships can also provide the foundation for our self-
respect. I am thinking particularly, but not exclusively, of the
parent–child relationship. It goes without saying that there are no
simple causal explanations which adequately describe the construc-
tion of self-respect. It is a complex socio-psychological concept.
Self-respect is not simply a reflection of the respect we receive
from others, although of course that is important. It is also about
how we feel about ourselves. It is partly about maintaining a set of
standards.16 These standards allow us to construct ourselves as
persons worth respecting. This is what I have in mind with the
notion of evaluative self-respect. The standards we aspire to are
those moral standards by which we live our lives. It is this which
ties our self-respect to shame, for in feeling shame we know that
we have failed to uphold our own standards. If, for example, we
saw a person in difficulty and being able to help did not do so, we
should feel shame. According to Taylor’s account the ability to be
shamed is what upholds our self-respect.17 It sets limits on the type
of activities which we consider appropriate for ourselves, and in the
first instance it sets limits on what we consider to be appropriate
ways of acting for human beings. As Taylor says:
To respect the self, then, is not to think either favourably or unfavourably of the
self, but is rather to do that which protects the self from injury or destruction, just
as to respect others is not to think well or badly of them, but is at least to abstain
from injuring or destroying them, whether physically or morally.18

‘Shame,’ in this context, is a protective emotion. It protects the

basis of our human dignity, it proclaims us as a person able to feel
human self-respect. Of course human self-respect is not just about

16
Hill, op. cit., p. 23.
17
Taylor, op. cit., p. 80.
18
Ibid., p. 81.
 THREE TYPES OF SELF-RESPECT 67

feeling shame, but is about not allowing others to shame us. It is

that feeling that one has when we declare to ourselves ‘I will not
allow X to treat me like that.’ It says that we regard ourselves as a
person of moral worth. It is not unaffected by what others think
about us, but because it is self-respect, it really resides in our sense
of self.
A self-respecting person is one who not only expects to receive
respect from others but has the basis of respecting themselves. In
other words, the assertion of moral worth is precisely a recognition
of our selves as a proper object of respect. As Boxill says, failing to
protest when we are wronged is to fail in our duty to protect our
self-respect. As he makes clear ‘self-respect is valuable, it contrib-
utes to an individuals worth.’19 The self-respecting person, then,
acknowledges their own value, their own worth and their own
humanity. But, of course, if our self-respect is solely dependent
upon our protesting our rights this means that our rights must first
be violated. Which would mean that many people would not have
the opportunity to affirm their self-respect. As Dillon remarks:
‘I used to wonder whether I had self-respect, since my rights had
never been trampled and I therefore never had the chance to prove
my self-respect in defending them.’20 In the absence of the opportu-
nity to express our indignation at the affront to our dignity, how
do we affirm our self-respect? Partly, it seems, through others
affirming our dignity. But in most societies this is a negative affir-
mation. That is human respect from others is predicated upon their
not doing anything rather than on any palpable actions. But, self-
respect cannot be based on inaction, we also need a means of
affirming our self-respect which announce to ourselves that we are
a person of worth. This must mean that our self-respect is based on
our actions as well as our being.

APPRAISAL SELF-RESPECT

Self-respect, as far as Dillon is concerned, cannot be abstracted

away from real persons living real lives. Appraisal self-respect is a
way of conceptualising the way in which we celebrate the person

19
Bernard R. Boxhill, ‘Self-respect and protest’ in ed. Dillon, op. cit., 99
20
Dillon, op. cit., p. 308, n. 18.
68 DAVID MIDDLETON

we are. Not to others, but to ourselves. That is not to say that

others will not notice. A self-respecting person tends to have a look
of confidence about them which encourages respect from others.
Saying that we are a person that matters is not just a matter of
recognising ourselves as of worth, but also in the taking of pride in
our achievements. Pride is, in Taylor’s view, related to self-respect
because we can only be proud of our own actions which, she says,
must be based on some set of standards to which we adhere.
Taylor argues that we feel pride in our achievements. Of course to
feel pride in our achievements means that we must have some
achievements to be proud of. We might observe that the sum of
one person’s achievements is far greater than another’s. Indeed, we
might note that some people have no ‘notable’ achievements at all.
They might therefore appear to have nothing to feel pride in.
This might seem to suggest that some people are entirely lack-
ing in appraisal self-respect. The difficulty here is in deciding
what counts as an achievement. In our usual usage of the term
it means something which is the person’s own doing and some-
thing which is, to some extent, out of the ordinary. Appraisal
self-respect does not however require individuals to perform
outstanding acts.
Our pride in what we do, does not require that what we do is
necessarily exceptional. As Oakley points out in relation to house-
wives, although the work may be intrinsically trivial, women devise
standards for themselves.21 Housewives are very often their own
judges. Nonetheless, the proud, self-respecting housewife, would
not allow her home to fall into a poor state. She would feel
ashamed if this was the case. But, does this mean that people who
are ‘self-employed’ with no referent but themselves can take pride
in the work regardless of its social meaning? The Oakley example
clearly indicates that our self-respect is constructed not just in the
public presentation of our self, but in our self-evaluation. But, the
obvious riposte is if nobody is going to see the house, then why
bother? Of course, our own well-being may be connected to a love
of cleanliness, but where does this idea come from? Provided the
house is functional, why should a housewife set standards for her-
self? Oakley suggests that most housewives have a vision of a
generalised other who would judge them badly if they failed to

21
Ann Oakley, Housewife (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), pp. 94–95.
 THREE TYPES OF SELF-RESPECT 69

maintain a certain standard. This generalised other is often their

own mother from whom the ideas about what are appropriate
standards have been learned. In the same way we all have general-
ised others, often parents of course, to whom we imagine a judge-
ment about us being made.
Again our appraisal self-respect has both a reflexive and evalua-
tive aspect. Whilst we can take pride in our own achievements – a
source of appraisal self-respect – we also look to others to affirm
our achievements. Those others are likely to be significant others
whose praise reaffirms us as persons of worth, both morally and in
terms of our particular merits. All of us at some time have suffered
the temporary lowering of self-esteem when a person from whom
we seek positive affirmation fails to give it. Gallagher, in this
collection, explores the professional–client relationship as an area
where appropriate esteem should be shown to others, but is some-
times lacking. Under normal circumstances the affect of such a
snub on our sense of self is temporary and does not undermine our
self-respect. But repeated instances of lack of affirmation as a
person of worth can undermine our sense of self. We can internal-
ise the lack of respect to the extent that despite our efforts to seek
confirmation of our own worth, and even our own belief in our
own worth, our self-respect is undermined.
There is a constant tension between our reflexive and our evalua-
tive self-respect. Being the subject of disrespect, even by significant
others, may well involve a temporary loss of self-esteem, but does
not necessarily lead to a loss of self-respect. Our self-respect is both
more stable and more robust than self-esteem.22 Nevertheless,
repeated injuries to our self-esteem will lead eventually to a loss of
self-respect. The loss of self-respect is evidenced by our tendency to
let our standards slip, and to do so publicly. It is this which we tend
to remark upon when seen in others and which leads to the phrase
with which most of us are familiar ‘they have lost their self-respect.’
Quite often this public suggestion of a loss of self-respect is a reac-
tion to a person’s physical appearance. If a colleague comes to the
office in dirty clothes or unkempt hair we might feel that their
standards are falling. Of course, there may be other reasons for this
behaviour, but we tend to expect people to maintain the standards

22
David Sachs, ‘How to Distinguish Self-respect from Self-esteem,’ Philosophy
and Public Affairs 10 (1981), 346–360.
70 DAVID MIDDLETON

by which we have come to judge them. The loss of self-respect

becomes self-fulfilling as the appearance leads others to lose their
respect for the person they once held in high regard. Hence, as our
standards fall we can perceive others, lack of respect toward us, and
this further reinforces the low opinion we hold of ourselves.
Of course our standards are not measured only by our appear-
ance, but also by the contribution that we make to our community,
primarily through the work, both paid and voluntary, that we do. A
person who is fastidious in their work and sets high standards for
themselves will be regarded as a person with particular merits. If
they allow those standards to fall we may wonder whether indeed
their self-respect has diminished. Do they no longer care what
others think of them? A person who has lower standards to begin
with may still have self-respect and the respect of others, but that
respect may be adversely affected by unfavourable comparison with
others. It is this which Walzer seems to have in mind with his com-
ment that self-respect is constructed ‘not with reference to other
people but with reference to a standard; at the same time, other
people can judge, by the same standard, whether I have a right to
respect myself.’23 However, I would dispute Walzer’s inference that
standards are universal, that we judge people ‘by the same
standard.’ We do not. We judge people both according to our own
standards and the standards which they seem to set for themselves.
This is the implication in my view of appraisal self-respect. It is also
what makes it difficult to measure in any meaningful empirical way.

STATUS SELF-RESPECT

If human self-respect is a recognition of our basic moral worth and

appraisal self-respect a recognition of our particular achievements,
then status self-respect completes our self-respect by recognising our
place in society. Whilst this is partially connected to our sense of
autonomy – of our feeling that we have some mastery over our envi-
ronment – because it is status self-respect it is also concerned with
our position in society. Our status self-respect is a recognition of our
individual status, which might be attained through our individual
achievements, but is also an acknowledgement that we are all

23
Walzer, op. cit., p. 274.
 THREE TYPES OF SELF-RESPECT 71

members of various collectivities, and these in some ways are constitu-

tive of the person that we are. Although we are unique individuals, we
are unique individuals within particular social environments in which
our membership is crucial to our ability to be respected by others.
Most of the time we do not have to think about our membership
of various communities and whether these are a source of self-re-
spect or not, because they are simply a part of the background noise
in our lives. However, the opting in to a particular social group may
imply the attainment of a status which is either welcome or not. For
example, a person who gains a doctorate is admitted to what
remains a fairly exclusive club and this brings a certain amount of
reflected respect. Taylor,24 however, argues that it is possible to feel
pride in things for which we are not responsible (our nationality or
social class, for example). The admission into some collectives may
be a source of appraisal self-respect but it also brings status
self-respect. In the case of a doctorate the admission involves the
opportunity to visibly display one’s status through the use of a title.
The same can be said of the status acquired by officers in the armed
forces or for elected representatives in democratic forums.
There is necessarily something of a tension between status and
merit. Where, for example, we earn our right to belong to an
esteemed group, it is not clear whether the respect owed is for the
achievement in becoming a member or the respect due to any
member of that particular collectivity. The problem is less so with
collectivities which we join which have no particular merit attached
to them. For example there is clearly no merit in declaring that one
is ‘proud to be gay.’ Although such positive affirmation might be
the source of status self-respect it seems implausible to argue that a
person achieves their sexual orientation. There is equally no merit in
being a citizen of a particular nation state, but such citizenship
might be a source of status self-respect. (‘English and Proud’ as I
noted on a banner displayed on a televised football match recently).
To possess status self-respect is to recognise our membership of
certain communities, including a political community. Status self-
respect indicates a certain standing within that community. The rec-
ognition of standing in particular communities is most usually
shown by the various titles and offices which a community has to
distribute. Social justice is partly concerned with the distribution of

24
Taylor, op. cit., p. 43.
72 DAVID MIDDLETON

offices and titles. The first part to Rawls’s second principle states
that offices and positions should be ‘open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity.’25 There are of course numerous prob-
lems with the application of equality of opportunity, but
nevertheless, it is pretty widely accepted as a fair procedure for the
allocation of positions in liberal societies, and we might expect that
this commitment would inform the formation of a just society. Raw-
ls’s formulation supports social justice precisely because it accords
well with people’s beliefs about fairness.26 Even the opportunity to
take part in the competition for jobs presumes a certain status and
may itself have a positive impact upon our status self-respect.
Although it is doubtful that this holds if we never win the competition.
Status self-respect is a recognition of our place in society. That
place may be confirmed by the offices and titles that we acquire,
but is also confirmed by the way in which others react to us. When
a woman says ‘I am only a housewife’ she is pointing to her lack of
status self-respect. She perhaps does not feel that her life adds
much to the general well-being. Such a statement might well be
mistaken, for the job of being a housewife or mother is an impor-
tant one without which society would have to invest more heavily
in the roles that women often perform for free.27 Nonetheless,
I cannot deny that it is the way that women often describe them-
selves and it does seem to indicate a lack of status self-respect.
Our status self-respect, then, is derived partly from the social
groups of which we form a part.28 This is what we might call ‘identity
status.’ Some theorists, Young most prominently,29 argue that the

25
John Rawls, Justice As Fairness (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2001), p. 42.
26
G. Koper, D. van Knippenberg, F. Bouhuijs, R.Vermunt & H.Wilke, ‘Procedural
fairness and self-esteem,’ European Journal of Social Psychology 23 (1993), 313–325.
27
This point has been well made by the economist J. K. Galbraith, who describes
housewives as ‘crypto-servants’ – see, J. K. Galbraith, Economics and the Public
Purpose (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), pp. 46–53.
28
Hedy Brown, ‘Themes in Experimental Research on Groups from the 1930s to
the 1990s,’ in Margaret Wetherell (ed.), Identities, Groups and Social Issues (London:
Sage, 1996), p. 34.
29
Iris Marion Young has made this claim in a number of places including: Justice
and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1990); Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); ‘Equality
of Whom? Social groups and judgements of injustice,’ The Journal of Political
Philosophy 9 (2001), 1–18.
 THREE TYPES OF SELF-RESPECT 73

emphasis which ‘traditional’ theories of distributive justice place on

individuals tends to overlook the important role of group life in the
maintenance of oppressive social structures. Faith Armitage, in this
collection, suggests that political theorists too often overlook cultural
differences in their emphasis on socio-economic inequalities. It is cer-
tainly the case, as Young notes that ‘in pursuing individual and insti-
tutional goals, people themselves treat others as group members.’30
This might lead to a belief that groups themselves can have respect.
This is the view for example of Philip Pettit, from whom there is no
problem with the idea that groups can give respect. And neither is
there a problem with the idea of their receiving respect in return.31
Unfortunately, Pettit does not explain which groups he has in
mind, nor how they give respect. The major difficulty with the idea
of group respect is that it is, by definition, incoherent. This is not
to say that Young, or Pettit for that matter, are wrong to point
to the importance of groups in our lives, but that to move from a
recognition that we associate with certain groups to regarding the
groups as capable of not just receiving respect, but giving it, seems
to me particularly problematic.
Although it is difficult to see how groups can give respect
they are certainly able to be respected and membership of a par-
ticular group can be a source of status self-respect. The main
point about social groups is the recognition that we all belong
to various groups, some through choice, others through birth
and some, no doubt, through accident. When Pettit says that
groups can receive respect this presumably means that statements
such as ‘firefighters deserve respect’ are a means of publicly
affirming the high regard in which this particular occupational
group are held. Given that firefighters have this widespread
feeling of goodwill, it is difficult to imagine that any individual
firefighter would not absorb some of this into their own status
self-respect. In other words, certain group memberships can be
the source of self-respect.
To have status, whether of an elitist kind (President or holder of a
doctorate) or of a more general kind (nationality or citizenship), is a
form of recognition. It brings with it an identification of a set of
standards or a way of life that, presumably, is regarded as desirable.

30
Young, (2001), op. cit., 17.
31
Philip Pettit, Judging Justice. An Introduction to Contemporary Political
Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 7.
74 DAVID MIDDLETON

It is the desirability of certain statuses which create status

self-respect. It is the recognition of ourselves as different from – even
better than – others which creates the heightened sense of self-re-
spect. It is partly evaluative in that we know we are a part of a desir-
able social group (the Sharks rather than the Jets or vice versa), but
also reflexive in that others react differently to us because of our
status. Of course, some status groups are evaluated negatively by
others and rather than bringing respect are a symbol of disrespect.
We tend to notice the way in which others react to us either when it
is hostile (i.e. disrespectful) or when the respect ortientation changes.
For example, a colleague who treated me with what I regarded as
disdain for my lack of a doctorate, suddenly seemed to value my
opinion on my successful completion of one, despite the fact that my
opinions had changed very little, if at all.

CONCLUSION

Robin Dillon32 suggests that we should be wary of treating

self-respect as if it were simply derivative of respect. What she
means by this is that there are aspects of respect which do not
map easily onto an analysis of self-respect. If, for example, we
show respect for a person by deferring to their greater knowl-
edge there is no way our self-respect could be constituted on the
same basis. Whilst I agree with the general point of Dillon’s
argument it seems to me that this is to treat both self-respect
and respect as if they are concepts that can ultimately be defined
in simplistic terms. For example, if we say that we respect a per-
son for their moral worth, it can be assumed that we need say
no more. What I have argued is that this is not the case. That,
in fact, these concepts which play such a foundational role in
liberal philosophy are concepts which have definable, but still
complex, dimensions.
Self-respect is not simply respect for the self, in as much as it is
not human respect, appraisal respect or status respect turned
inwards. Self-respect however, I suggest, can be regarded as having
similar dimensions to respect. Self-respect and social respect are
closely linked. But in saying that we construct our self-respect on

32
Robin S. Dillon, ‘Introduction’ in Dillon (ed.), op. cit., p. 45.
 THREE TYPES OF SELF-RESPECT 75

the basis of these three dimensions we perhaps need to explain

just how this construction works. The dimensions should not be
regarded as stages: first we obtain human self-respect, followed by
appraisal self-respect and finally status self-respect. This does not
seem a plausible account of the way that respect is constructed.
Most theorists when they talk about self-respect tend to treat it as
if it were a unitary concept, but often with complex overlap to
other concepts such as dignity, autonomy, or rights. So that, for
example, Richard Sennett claims that the ‘hard human edge which
eschews neediness and emphasizes self-sufficiency brings respect in
the eyes of others and breeds self-respect.’33 There is no suggestion
here that self-respect is only partially created in autonomy, which is
Sennett’s main point.
Self-respect is an attitude towards ourselves which is made
public in the way in which we present ourselves. A person who
possesses self-respect has a set of standards by which they live
their life, they recognise themselves as of moral worth, they feel
shame at their failures and pride in their successes, they are
aware of their status in the world, not just the hierarchies that
they may be part of, but of their status as a member of particu-
lar communities. People’s self-respect is constructed on each of
these dimensions: worth (human self-respect), successes (appraisal
self-respect) and belonging (status self-respect). These are not
separate elements in anything other than an analytic sense. In
the same way the brain, stomach and lungs are not separate but
integral parts of what makes us human. So, our self-respect is a
recognition concurrently of our humanity, our capabilities and
our status. So, there are three types of self-respect, and it is
important that we recognise each of them if we think self-respect
is a politically potent concept. Nevertheless, they are manifested
socially in the embracing concept of self-respect. They mean
different things analytically and refer to different social objects,
but they help us to understand ways in which self-respect is con-
structed. In turn, a deeper understanding of self-respect is impor-
tant politically because the emergence of social justice seems to
require self-respecting individuals to build it. The challenge for
those committed to social justice remains the task of creating an

33
Richard Sennett, Respect: The Formation of Character in an Age of Inequality
(London: Allen Lane, 2003), p. 12.
76 DAVID MIDDLETON

environment where every individual can construct and maintain

their self-respect.

Politics and International Studies

The Open University
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E-mail: d.j.middleton@open.ac.uk