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To cite this article: Jennifer Dagg & Mark Haugaard (2016) The performance of subject
positions, power, and identity: a case of refugee recognition, European Journal of Cultural and
Political Sociology, 3:4, 392-425, DOI: 10.1080/23254823.2016.1202524
Article views: 79
ABSTRACT
This article explores the negotiation of subject positions, identities, and their
recognition. It develops a theoretical model of identity and recognition, which
is applied to the exemplar of a young Palestinian woman negotiating the
refugee recognition process in Ireland. The paper is divided into five parts, as
follows: (1) methodology; (2) a theorisation of subject positions, identity, and
recognition based upon the work of Austin, Barnes, Davies and Harré, Butler,
Foucault, Giddens, Goffman, Heidegger, Jenkins, and Searle; (3) the
application of these perspectives to the complex performance of identity in a
cross-cultural context; (4) the negotiation of the subject position asylum
seeker; and (5) short conclusion-cum-epilogue. What emerges is that social
actors occupy multiple conflicting subject positions; they are structurally
constrained by others’ perceptions and refusals of recognition, thus frequently
affirming subject positions that are contrary to their own desired identity-
construction.
1. Introduction
The UN special envoy on migration, Peter Sutherland, recently asserted
that ‘morally, politically, and economically, migration is the defining
issue of the 21st century’ (Sutherland, 2015). Indeed the ‘current refugee
crisis’ is frequently, and perhaps more appropriately, referred to as a
global humanitarian crisis. Hannah Arendt used the term ‘worldlessness’
to ‘define those conditions where a person doesn’t belong to a world in
which they matter as human beings’ (Evans & Bauman, 2016). Daily
drownings in the Mediterranean and appalling conditions in camps
across Europe, from Calais to Idomeni, have become all too familiar.
2. Methodology
This article is based upon part of a wider and more comprehensive study
of the refugee recognition process in Ireland (Dagg, 2012). In that study,
the interpretative research approach was used for the qualitative study of
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 395
others have to recognize in him. It’s a form of power which makes individuals
subjects. There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else
by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and
makes subject to (Foucault, 1982, p. 212).
There are many elements that have to be unpacked in this short para-
graph. Foucault is observing that the process of subjectification is
mundane and constitutive of everyday life (‘This form of power applies
itself to immediate everyday life … .’). While we are examining this
process through an unusual instance, which is rife with cultural and
power tensions, it is important to understand that these processes are
part of everyday interactions, albeit normally less visible. Foucault
argues that subjectification constitutes a process that categorises the indi-
vidual (‘which categorizes the individual … ’); the individual becomes a
carrier of meaning in much the same way as the rest of the furniture of
the world. This meaning marks the person’s individuality, making
them a particular being-in the-world. This does not just situate them
for others, but is also constitutive of their own sense of identity (‘ …
attaches him to his own identity … ’). This meaning is not just an arbi-
trary social construction, but is represented as part of a regime of truth
(‘ … imposes a law of truth … ’). Truth is used this way because it is con-
sidered by social actors to exist beyond convention (Haugaard, 2012a).
This is not a process of solipsistic self-discovery in which the individual
‘discovers themselves’ as a self-creative act. Rather, it constitutes an inter-
active process in which the individual recognises their subject position as
perceived by others (‘ … which he must recognize and which others have
to recognize in him … ’). In this act of recognition they become subject to
someone else’s normalising judgement, which constitutes a form of
dependence upon another as a validator of that subject identity and, con-
sequently, that other imposes upon them a form of control (‘ … subject to
someone else by control and dependence … ’). Because the meaning
imposed by another is not external, but rather integral to identity, this
act of knowing becomes a form of self-knowledge which comes to
define the person’s perception of self (‘ … and tied to his own identity
by a conscience or self-knowledge.’). These overlapping elements consti-
tute a form of power relationship in which the person becomes both a
subject and an object of knowledge. As an object, they are subjected to
the evaluation of others, and in so doing, thus constitute their subject pos-
ition in society (‘Both meanings suggest a form of power which subju-
gates and makes subject to’).
398 J. DAGG AND M. HAUGAARD
cultural interaction and formal entry into a system with official guardians,
such as the refugee recognition process.
Her subject position is in terms of her family, her father’s name, making
her proud. We can see that she is from Gaza, Palestine. In other words, her
being-in-the-world is tied to family and situatedness in Gaza, Palestine, all
of which confer ontological security. This point is reinforced later in the
interview when she discusses her decision to become a refugee:
I am not a refugee in my country, I am a refugee here or I would be … My
grandfather is a citizen of Gaza, he did all his best to keep himself citizen
and to keep his children citizens but my grandfather’s plan didn’t work in
our day due to the political situation and so I had to give up being a citizen.
And you know as an Irish person what being a citizen means and to claim
for this status in another country. When I first heard that my brother got
refugee status in Sweden I thought ‘poor Grandfather.’
occupation (see Morris, 2003 for more detail on the origins of Palesti-
nian refugees). Her grandfather and his family are indigenous inhabi-
tants of Gaza, hence the identification with Gaza city, which is then
layered with ‘Palestinian’ as an overlapping identity. It is reasonable to
infer, following Elias’ work on insiders and outsiders (Elias & Scotson,
1994), that being a true Gazan carries higher status than being a 1948
refugee to Gaza. Gazan is a Y status to be proud of.
Identity is rarely singular, even though it is often talked about that way
in everyday discourse. Those trying to fight for the recognition of Yness
against opposition from dominant groups, be that based upon national
or sexual orientation, often use phrases like ‘I am Palestinian’ or ‘I am
gay.’ These statements misrepresent the complexity of identity, although
their singularity makes sense in context where a particular identity is con-
tested. Like most social actors Hannah’s Gazan-cum-Palestinianess is not
her only subject position of Yness:
First time I came to Ireland was in 2008/2009 to do my Master’s. I came as a
student. I was always interested to see, not only to have a degree and all this,
a certificate, we say it in our language – cartoon of certificate which is a
paper – I wanted the journey …
So anyway I came here as a student, why I am mentioning this is because I will
go back to this in sometimes of my story as an asylum-seeker now. (emphasis
author’s own)
We later learn that this student identity is, together with her Gazan-Pales-
tinian identity, one of her preferred identities. However, as a student,
before her asylum application, she already felt certain tensions between
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 405
her student identity and the demands of her identities from Gaza, Pales-
tine, and Muslim.
Relative to a perceived wider ring of reference of Irish society in general,
subject position student Yness entails tension with her Gazan-Palestinian
identity. To be clear, this Irish society ring of reference is different from
the rings of reference of individual Irish people, such as the interviewer
or other Irish students. ‘Gazan-Palestinian’ is linked, in her mind, to the
subject position of female Muslim, which, relative to this general Irish
ring of reference, is in tension with student. This becomes manifest in
her discussion of the hijab. When she came to Ireland she wore a head-
scarf, or hijab, which identified her:
This is me with a scarf, this is me a Muslim, this is me Hannah A., this is me
Palestine, Gaza all these, you have all these identities that are with you so you
just want to show the world who are you with all these identities.
… It all happened since I was 6 years old. And my grandfather was very sup-
portive of that, like he understands, but he knows that I wanted more than a
normal life and he saw that and encouraged that and my education.
When she came to Ireland as a student, she ‘found the scarf as an obstacle’
because Irish people could not see past the scarf to the self-educating
person she considered herself to be.
… When I came here I started to think about change, real change, not just
about attitudes. I was afraid of being misjudged to be honest, with my
friends, that you wear a scarf, now you are wearing … actually it took me, I
did that in degrees. I used to wear a scarf and then I replaced it with a hat
and now when I came to Western City I thought ok now I want to take it off.
In my religion this is wrong. In my culture this is wrong [but] I want to be
integrated.
The significance of the phrase they look at you stands for the perception of
Irish society as a whole, which constitutes a ring of reference that defines
her, irrespective of her desires. She is here without a family, her normal
ring of reference and mode of social integration. With family removed
she was open to ontological insecurity, and so decided to socially integrate
when she moved to Western City.
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 407
Hannah is making the point that she herself, the interviewer, and fellow
students are all responsive to the interacting other. What is key is that a
subject position can be negotiated interactively between social subject
and the ring of reference. This approaches ideal speech and recognition
of the other. Alternatively, the ring of reference can constitute a mono-
logue that is deaf to the other. In this form of domination the social
actor is judged in advance of her actions. The audience decides that an
X, who is attempting to perform Y, is really a Z. This constitutes
fourth-dimensional power as domination. The more equal interactive
negotiation of subject identity referred to earlier (friends and interviewer)
is also four-dimensional power but with significant emancipating poten-
tial – it is important to remember that all dimensions of power, including
that of subject formation, have dominating and enabling emancipatory
aspects (Butler, 1997; Haugaard, 2015).
Relative to a different Jordanian-Muslim ring of reference, Hannah also
experiences incapacity to define herself. Her Irish MA research was upon
the lives of Palestinians in Jordan, which necessitated a visit to Jordan. In
Jordan she did not fit with expectations either. Despite wearing a hijab, her
Jordanian ring of reference saw her as an educated female in her 30s, pur-
suing her own independent identity. However, that ring of reference
demanded a different identity: ‘ … In Jordan I was supposed to be seen
with a husband or a father or with a brother, or with a man.’ She was
different to the average Jordanian and Palestinian female. ‘It was about
my attitudes and personal plans. I have different plans and I am not
married and for someone my age … ’
Her perceived Yness in Jordan elicited negative reactions from both
Jordanian men and women. Women did not welcome Hannah as a pur-
veyor of liberating feminist potentials. Rather, she ‘created a question
mark for a lot of women, like ok she’s dangerous for me she’s going to
take my husband because we have, in Islam a man can marry four
wives but … .’ These women saw beyond the scarf/hijab to a socially con-
structed image of her as the threatening female. Relative to the general
Irish ring of reference, the scarf made her an uneducated devout
Muslim, while to Jordanians she was an autonomous threatening other.
These definitions are at variance, however the process is the same. Both
groups create rings of reference that define subject positions for her,
thus operating a monologue of four-dimensional domination. Hannah
brings that lesson with her, as she comments: ‘I was really tired in
Jordan to have that integration. I do not want to have that same story
here.’
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 409
accumulated does not prepare her for the harsh reality of the system. She
is aware that it is a highly significant move, but not quite how big:
Things really got very bad in Gaza and the decision to take asylum is just very
huge, it’s very very very huge. And you know what, every step in being an
asylum you just realise how huge it is, it is not just (clicks her fingers) and
that’s it.
The ring of reference that defines a subject position includes the material
world, not just the interaction of other social actors. For instance, the
Direct Provision centre (Hostel), in Western City, where she lives is
encoded with a different language than the student hostel of Ranelagh:
I mean look at the signs inside the hostel – NO FOOD HERE – the language is
different. The language is harsh, it is coming from up there to down there.
There is no communication at all between them.
necessary for all asylum-seekers, once they have been dispersed to a direct
provision centre, to meet with a CWO to ascertain their details within the
locality, and register for their subsistence payment. The encounter proves
controversial for Hannah as she presents herself to the CWO as a student
and an asylum seeker.
I said I was a student doing my MA and I was in a room. I didn’t come from a
hostel.
‘Oh this is very strange,’ she said.
Now we need to write on the paper [the application] and say that … well you
are going to have to write a paper [letter] to show that your parents can’t
pay your money and to explain why you were in a room on your own in
Dublin because your case is different. (emphasis author’s own)
… She didn’t give me the money. I was so angry and I said that’s it, this lady is
sick, really sick and I hate her now and I am sorry to say that but this is my
feeling for her.
Hannah has moved from the position of ‘I am not like them’ to one of ‘I
am like them.’ Saying ‘I am like anybody else here’ reveals a strategy to
create an autonomy that is aligned to the collective identity of asylum-
seekers. The assertion ‘I don’t feel like my education helps me here’ is
curious in that it can be interpreted as part of her new collective identity:
she is not setting herself apart from the rest based upon her education. Is
this the beginning of a psychic attachment (Butler, 1997) to a fourth-
dimensional subject position? To echo the title and recurrent theme of
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 415
These utterances reflect how she is made insecure by the shifting relation-
ship with her Irish friends brought about by her own move of subject pos-
ition. As a student they were simply, and straightforwardly, her friends.
They were collective ‘we’ subjects. Now, as an asylum seeker she also
has a new ‘we,’ which makes her Irish friends ‘them.’ Facets of identity
are constantly adjusted and reworked in response to one’s interaction
with others and the environment within which others are encountered.
Hannah is deeply uncomfortable with the subject position asylum-
seeker because she knows what it means relative to the Irish ring of refer-
ence. It suggests someone to be pitied, who is disempowered, without
416 J. DAGG AND M. HAUGAARD
agency. In contrast, she sees herself as an agent trying to get her life
together. As she explains:
I can tell you as to why I don’t use ‘asylum-seeker’ – because I feel sorry for
myself. I can’t guarantee what is in people’s minds about, or the image in
people’s mind about asylum-seeker so I don’t want to represent myself in
this. I can’t guarantee how much they can respect me or appreciate what I
am going through. That is the first thing, the second thing I don’t want to
make them feel that they should feel sorry for me and this really makes me
feel not empowered because all I am doing now is empowering myself,
putting myself together, learning new skills all this so I don’t want to sound
this as a reaction for my situation, of course I am an asylum-seeker I will
talk about this and this and this, but I don’t want to show myself as vulnerable
all the time.
thought, oh right she’s lying. But why should I just look miserable, for again just
enjoying my right? I think the interview went well, and I’m saying I think
because you didn’t know, because the person who asks, it was a woman who
asked me, she was either really smiling or it was a fake smile and the attitude
you have is that, unfortunately, those people are just there to tell you that
you are lying so you can’t just avoid this and you can’t have a friendly relation-
ship with this person, and you just want to finish.
Hannah is not only worried and nervous, but also has a low level of motiv-
ation for the outcome of the interview. She experiences conflict between
her prior knowledge of what an interview entails in ‘normal’ circum-
stances ( … I bought new clothes for that. I wanted to look good) and
what is expected of her in an interview as an asylum-seeker; someone
who is abject (Why should I just look miserable?). She is conscious of
self-representation: how to manage the impressions that will be formed
of her, how she will be interpreted or objectified by the interviewer. By
‘looking good’ she is reverting to a normal ‘front stage’ which in turn
may reduce her proximity for psychological penetration and lessen her
vulnerability given ‘the situation’ (Goffman, 1971). However, she is
unsure whether or not the front stage smile of the interviewer is
genuine. It could mask a ‘backstage’ rejection (Goffman, 1971). The per-
ception that the interviewer may be false is reinforced by the fact that the
normal state of being-in-the-world for an asylum seeker is relative to a
ring of disbelief from officialdom (Conlon et al., 2012). Perhaps there is
also an expectation of disbelief because Hannah knew that she should
have acted miserable, like an asylum-seeker, not as an everyday person
going to a normal interview.
Deception is often prevalent among asylum-seekers. This is not necess-
arily because they want to be deliberately deceptive, or are ‘bogus,’ but
because they have to perform relative to official expectations, which are
often out of sync with the reality refugees come from. While dissimulation
is necessary, even among asylum-seekers themselves, this fact is still
largely kept backstage, rather than openly acknowledged. Yet it is tacitly
known and common in certain backstage moments shared amongst
asylum-seekers.
Registered letters bring official communication to the direct provision
centres. These letters are usually either a positive or negative determi-
nation of some point in their case. Following the interview above, a regis-
tered letter brings Hannah a refusal of refugee status at first instance. She
is annoyed and perceives the reasons for refusal as constructing her as a
418 J. DAGG AND M. HAUGAARD
reinforcement of others, now that the authorities have refused to give her a
status and ring of reference. She retells her personal experiences, which
generates and reinforces we-relations, or the collective action of the group.
Basically a lot of people in the hostel have started to cheer me up – you still have
a chance, you still have the appeal. They have started to tell me stories about
people who get it from the appeal.
I found a lot of people from the hostel cheered me up saying – it’s going to be
ok. One of the girls in the room said I’m even worse – she got a deportation
letter … I don’t know what to do. I feel like I regretted, like I trapped myself
in the whole thing. It is not about how many years I am going to spend, it’s
what am I going to do during these years.
While it is possible to cover for one another, Hannah was not careful
enough in the case of this visit to Dublin. Consequently, she was subject
to disciplinary action: her subsistence payment was cut off. She goes to
the Post Office with her ID card to collect her €19.10, but there is
nothing for her to collect. She assumes it is a mistake and so calls the
Social Welfare office to speak to the CWO in charge of her case file,
whom she would have registered with. The CWO responds:
‘I get a report, Hannah about your absence, that you are frequently absent from
the hostel,’ she said.
‘But this is not true,’ I said.
‘But the report is from the hostel, from the management in the hostel, that you
are not in the hostel all the time,’ she said. ‘Who is sponsoring your trip?’
‘The €19.10 that I get,’ I said.
‘This could not be possible that you could sponsor yourself with the €19.10,’ she
said.
But this is what happened. She raised the issue about me studying – who is
sponsoring you? I said that I was [past tense: i.e. before this exchange took
place] on a scholarship and you have all that on my file.
‘I need a paper from your college to say that you have finished your studies. I
need a paper to say that you don’t have any money. I need to speak to the man-
agement of the hostel.’
Of course I shouted: ‘You could have come to me first.’
‘But the management told me. And this is all that I have so you have to verify
the opposite.’
Instead of going to the college for proof that she is no longer a student, she
decides to confront the bureaucracy. In other words, she tries to confront
those in power. She returns to the hostel to confront management:
So I told P I was so angry and she said you can’t make a scene here. Oh, I said, I
need to speak to Mr. K [centre manager], I need to speak to Mrs. A. She said,
Mr. K is not here, Mrs. A is not here. I said well, why the management here and
the reception here are saying to CWO that I am absent – how come? I am not
absent. She said you can’t make a scene here, you can’t attack me. I said I am
not attacking you and I am sorry if I am so loud but I am so angry and I am
following the house rules here and what am I supposed to do?
What is interesting here is that the authoritative role, or the subject pos-
ition, of the deputy manager of the hostel constitutes a signifier that entails
the capacity to create reality. As argued by Bourdieu (1991), this capacity
to create reality is experienced as symbolic violence by the subject. This
links to Foucault’s (1971) account of a one-way judgmental definition of
the world by reason, while the other, classified as unreason, remains agent-
less. Within this framework ‘madness’ constitutes a social construction,
which reflects one-way, or non-reciprocal, interaction. Interestingly
Hannah uses a signifier of madness in her comment upon the exchange,
as she continues: This is our first time speaking about it. She wouldn’t
believe it. For the first time I felt I had to defend even my sanity.
The position of being considered ‘insane’ is a reaction totally powerless
to make her version of reality count as felicitous. She is also caught in a
Catch 22-type double bind. Hannah’s conception of herself is as a
subject who attempts to socially integrate with Irish people. She really
values her Irish friends. In the official discourse, integration is considered
to be an advantage. However, it is precisely Hannah’s integration with
Irish students that makes her suspect. Her mistake is to consider inte-
gration in terms of interacting outside the asylum process. As she observes:
422 J. DAGG AND M. HAUGAARD
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
424 J. DAGG AND M. HAUGAARD
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