STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

MODULE 2
Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
Giron v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013
“One subject – One Title Rule” - Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
PHILJA v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 203
Any changes agreed upon by the Conference Committee need not undergo
another “three readings” in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution must be construed as referring only to bills
introduced for the first time in either house of Congress. A law may not be
declared unconstitutional when what have been violated in its passage are
merely internal rules of procedures of the House. The Court may not inquire
beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. It has no power to inquire about the House of Congress process in
enacting the law based on the latter’s own rules.
Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA
486
The president has the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriations bill. However, when a provision of an appropriations bill affects
one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without
at the same time vetoing the particular items to which it relates.
Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA
251
1. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.

2. Any post-enactment congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny and

investigation.

3. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an

administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect.
 4. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers—it
can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a
committee of either or both chambers.

5. Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws)
is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the
House of Representatives.

6. Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for

approval or veto and in the absence of presentment to the President, no bill
passed by Congress can become a law.

7. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process

clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the
prerogative of Congress—as such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may
be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to
execute the said law.

8. Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

9. Where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another

part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced; The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the
presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete
nullity of the statute.
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, L-1223, March 5, 1947, 78 Phil. 1 (1947)
Enrolled bill doctrine. Political questions are not subject to judicial review, except
when dealing with questions conferred upon the courts by
constitutional/statutory provision. This is predicated upon the separation of
powers. According to a US case, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature
of proposed amendment to Federal Constitution is a political question. If
ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question.
1935 Constitution provides two distinct parts for amendments: proposal and
ratification. Proposal to amend is highly political performed by Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity, and there is less reason for judicial inquiry into a
proposal’s validity rather than ratification. A duly authenticated bill/resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. The courts cannot mandate
the President to use his calling out power when the situation permits it, or the
legislature to pass a certain kind of law. Such duties are beyond judicial review
if the one charged fails to perform them. Motives are beyond the courts.
Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268
 Upholding the inviolable doctrine on the separation of powers in the Philippine
government, the courts strictly cannot discuss, examine, and interpret the
procedural and substantive aspects in the enactment of enrolled bills in
Congress which are subsequently approved by the President. Under the enrolled
bill doctrine, the passage of legislative measures has been legitimized and
authenticated by the concurrence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. As enrolled bills integrally demonstrate the fundamental roles
of the legislative and executive departments in faithfully enacting and executing
laws, the judiciary cannot interfere in the passage and implementation of statutes
unless justiciable issues arise exemplified through the violation of constitutional
requirements and the breach on the inalienable rights of other people. Through
the concurrence of the chief executive along with the attestation of both the
House Speaker and the Senate President, enrolled bills essentially become
moot and academic. Thus, courts are entirely prohibited from intervening in
congressional policymaking to adhere and follow the separation of powers
enshrined in the Constitution vis-à-vis reviewing and evaluating the internal rules
and regulations adopted in the legislature.
Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. 23475, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 714
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record.
The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated
and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant
in this case.
CASE TITLE BARA LIDASAN vs. G.R NO. G.R. No. L-28089
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 21 SCRA496
PONENTE SANCHEZ, J. DATE: OCTOBER 25,
1967
DOCTRINE Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof
FACTS On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247,
known as Republic Act 4790 "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur". It came to light later that
twelve (barrios Togaig and Madalum from the municipality
of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan,
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality of Parang, Province of Cotabato) of the twenty-one barrios
that constitute the Municipality of Dianaton are in the province of
Cotabato. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted a resolution

implementing the statute for purposes of establishment of precincts,
registration of voters and for other election purposes.

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition
by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of
Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He
prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that
Comelec's resolutions of implementing the same for electoral
purposes, be nullified.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the title of RA 4790 "An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" is unconstitutional for not
conforming with the constitutional requirement
RULING/S Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative

power: 1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous subjects; 2. The title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public
and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

The legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute:

(1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of
Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province
of Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that solely the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase
"in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive.

The title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact
of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of
their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in
the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the
bill.

It was further argued that RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference
to the areas found within Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of
the portion in the other province of Cotabato. The general rule is that
where part of the statute is void, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative
intent. However, when the bill was presented in Congress, the totality
of the twenty-one barrios-not nine barrios-was in the mind of the
proponent thereof. Dianaton was created upon the basic
considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population
and sufficient income. Republic Act 4790 is thus inseparable, and it is
accordingly null and void in its totality.
CASE TITLE HENRY R. GIRON vs. COMMISSION G.R NO. 188179
ON ELECTIONS
ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO,
FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and
RICARDO L. BAES JR.
PONENTE SERENO, CJ. DATE: Jan 22, 2013
DOCTRINE “One subject – One Title Rule” - Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
FACTS Shortly after then President Gloria Arroyo filed her candidacy to run for
Congress during the 2010 elections, Henry Giron, head of an NGO
named Article 64 movement, filed a petition to the Supreme Court
through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of Section 12 and 14 of the Fair Election Act.

His contention here is that, under the Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, a bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

However, he contends that there are two provisions which were

included as “riders” or is irrelevant to the subject matter. These
provisions are:

1. Section 12 which pertains to treatment of votes for substitute

candidates; and
2. Section 14, which included the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code that provides for ipso facto resignation
of incumbent officers upon filing of candidacy for another
government position.

COMELEC, on the other hand, argued that this issue has already been
resolved in Farinas vs Executive Secretary.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election
Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the
"one subject-one title" rule.
RULING/S There is no violation of the Constitution.

COMELEC is correct that this has already been addressed in the case
of Farinas vs Executive Secretary.

Also, an analysis of the Bicameral Conference Committee

deliberations reveals that it really was the intention of the framers of
the law to specifically include Section 12 and repeal Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code through Section 14 since doing so is
consistent with the Fair Election Practices. In fact, they put great
consideration in drafting the title to prevent these provisions from
sticking out, and thus, be ruled out as unconstitutional.
CASE TITLE ARTURO M. TOLENTINO G.R NO. 115455
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
PONENTE MENDOZA, J. DATE: October 30, 1995

DOCTRINE No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and nays entered in the Journal.
FACTS Petitioners Arturo Tolentino, et al. claims that R.A. 7716 or the
Expanded Value Added Tax Law did not “originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives” as a requirement of Article VI sec. 24 of the
Constitution since it is a consolidation of the following two bills: H. No.
11197 which was filed in the House of Representatives (passed three
readings) then sent to the Senate where it was referred to the Senate
Ways and Means Committee after first reading. The Senate then
passed S. No. 1630 as its own version and approved it on May 24,
1994.

The exception in Art. VI sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution states: “except

when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency” is contended by
the petitioners saying that for Philippines, a "growing budget deficit" is
not an emergency, it is a chronic condition and does not make the need
for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for its
enactment any less an emergency.

The members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners)

believed that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No.
1630, because they responded to the call of the President by voting on
the bill on second and third readings on the same day.

While the judicial department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance

of the President's certification, the respect due coequal departments of
the government in matters committed to them by the Constitution and
the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a
stay of the judicial hand.
ISSUE/S Whether or Not S. No. 1630 is unconstitutional for not being passed for
a second and third reading on separate days?
RULING/S No. S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate where
it was discussed for six days. Only its distribution in advance in its
final printed form was actually dispensed with by holding the voting on
second and third readings on the same day (March 24, 1994).
Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission of the bill on
February 8, 1994 on second reading and its approval on March 24,
1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by the Senate on third
reading.

The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is

said to be two-fold: (1) to inform the members of Congress of what they
must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is progressing
through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others
interested in the measure to prepare their positions with reference to
it. These purposes were substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No.
7716.
CASE TITLE PHILJA v. Prado G.R NO. 105371
PONENTE Cruz, J. DATE: November 11,
1993
DOCTRINE Any changes agreed upon by the Conference Committee need not
undergo another “three readings” in the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution must be
construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either
house of Congress. A law may not be declared unconstitutional when
what have been violated in its passage are merely internal rules of
procedures of the House. The Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. It has no power to inquire about the House of Congress
process in enacting the law based on the latter’s own rules.
FACTS Section 35 of RA 7354 by Phil. Post Corp through its Cir # 92-28 is the
petition’s main focus, for it withdrew the franking privilege of the SC,
CA, RTC, MTC and Land Registration Commission and its Registers
of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The lower court
judges are the petitioners claiming their official functions will be harmed
by these measures. The NLRA has agreed with them, that’s why its
operation affects the judicial proceedings by permitting its motion to
meddle. The petition attacks the constitutionality of RA7354.
ISSUE/S Whether or not RA 7354 is constitutional on the grounds that:
1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its
purposes;
2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress
and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among
the members before its passage;
3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
RULING/S 1) The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not
required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has
been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to
mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement.
2) These arguments are unacceptable. It is a matter of record that the
conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to
and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. It was then presented to and approved by the
President. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. Bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
3) It clearly discriminates and trespasses the judiciary’s independence.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate
clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more,
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause.

Premises considered, the petition is partially granted and Section 35 of

RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular 92-28 is also set aside
for withdrawing the franking privilege for the Judiciary as an
independent branch of the government. Thus, such franking privilege
is restored. The TRO on June 2, 1992 is declared permanent.
CASE TITLE Bolinao Electronics Corporation, G.R NO. L-20740
Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc.
and Monserrat Broadcasting System,
Inc. vs. Brigido Valencia and Robert
San Andres
PONENTE Barrera, J. DATE: 30 June 1964
DOCTRINE The president has the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriations bill. However, when a provision of an appropriations bill
affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the
provision without at the same time vetoing the particular items to which
it relates.

FACTS An original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with

preliminary injunction was filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation,
Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Monserrat
Broadcasting System, Inc. owners and operators of radio and
television against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
and Acting Chief of the Radio Control Division. The Republic of the
Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service (PBS),
later on sought and was allowed to intervene. The intervenor having
been granted a construction permit to install and operate a television
station in Manila.

The petitioners were not able to submit the applications for renewal of
their station licenses two (2) months before its expiration, a violation of
Section 14 of Department Order 11. Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846,
as amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, he may approve or
disapprove any application for renewal of station or operator license,
provided, however, that no application for renewal shall be
disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing. Thus the notice of
hearing was sent to the petitioners to find out whether there is ground
to disapprove the applications for renewal.

The petitioners’ application was denied for the lone reason of late filing
of application for renewal.

ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the investigation being conducted by the Secretary

of Public Works and Communication and the Acting Chief of the
Radio Control Division, has any legal basis?
2. Whether or not there is abandonment or renunciation by the CBN
of channel 9 in favor of PBS?
3. Whether or not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally
operate Channel 9 and is entitled to damages, for CBN’s refusal to
give up operation thereof.
RULING/S 1. The violation of Section 14 of Department Order 11 has ceased
to exist since a circular was issued by the Department and
approved by the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communication, on 24 July 1962, allowing station owners and
radio operators to take remedial measures regarding the
renewal of their permits and licenses not later than 10 August
1962. The petitioners were able to submit their applications
before said date, or even before the issuance of the circular.
Therefore, there is no reason nor need for an investigation.

2. There was no express agreement of abandonment or

renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting Network of Channel
9 in favor of PBS. The only basis of the contention of the
respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement
“Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9”, appearing in the
construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV from
Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to petitioner. The statement
alone, does not establish any agreement between the radio
control authority and the station operator, on the switch or
change of operation of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10.
Also, CBN has no participation in the preparation of the permit,
and the fact that CBN was allowed to continue and did continue
operating on Channel 9 even after the approval of its proposed
transfer, is proof that there was no renunciation or abandonment
of the channel.

3. There is no right that has been violated by the petitioner’s

refusal to give up its operation of Channel 9. Records also show
the appropriation to operate PBS as approved by Congress and
incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the
Philippines does not allow appropriations for the operation of
television stations in Luzon. For this reason, there can be no
damage. Any expenditures made by PBS for the purpose of
installing or operating a television station in Manila, when there
are already television stations in operation, is a violation of the
law. Also, even if it is shown that the then president vetoed the
provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal since it is not
within his power to strike out conditions or restrictions attached
to an appropriation or item in the appropriations bill.
CASE TITLE Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima G.R NO. 166715, 562
SCRA 251
PONENTE Corona, J. DATE: August 14, 2008,
DOCTRINE 1. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
equivocal one.

2. Any post-enactment congressional measure should be limited to

scrutiny and investigation.

3. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or

an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing
rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or
through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to
approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.

4. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both

chambers—it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two
chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers.

5. Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and

repeal laws) is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers,
the Senate and the House of Representatives.

6. Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President

for approval or veto and in the absence of presentment to the
President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law.

7. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due

process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is
wholly the prerogative of Congress—as such, it is only upon its
effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch
acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law.

8. Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its

members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.

9. Where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution,

while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced; The presence of a separability
clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature
intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute.
FACT/S A petition for prohibition was filed to prevent implementing and
enforcing Republic Act 93352 or the Attrition Act of 2005. RA 9335 as
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs.

Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee,

in Section 12 of the said law, on the ground that it violates the doctrine
of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the
law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the
law.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created

to approve the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC, and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it
approved the said IRR. The issue of its
alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic. However,
the Court chose to confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other
similar laws for that matter).
ISSUE/S The constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter)
RULING/S In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of
RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to
approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the
cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on
presentment. Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the
President for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the
President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense,
law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the legislature and
of the Executive.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle,
a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional. Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should
be struck down as unconstitutional.
CASE TITLE Mabanag vs Lopez Vito G.R NO. L-1223
PONENTE Justice Tuazon DATE: March 5, 1947
DOCTRINE Enrolled bill doctrine. Political questions are not subject to judicial
review, except when dealing with questions conferred upon the courts
by constitutional/statutory provision. This is predicated upon the
separation of powers. According to a US case, the efficacy of
ratification by state legislature of proposed amendment to Federal
Constitution is a political question. If ratification of an amendment is a
political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question.
1935 Constitution provides two distinct parts for amendments:
proposal and ratification. Proposal to amend is highly political
performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity, and there
is less reason for judicial inquiry into a proposal’s validity rather than
ratification. A duly authenticated bill/resolution imports absolute verity
and is binding on the courts. The courts cannot mandate the President
to use his calling out power when the situation permits it, or the
legislature to pass a certain kind of law. Such duties are beyond judicial
review if the one charged fails to perform them. Motives are beyond
the courts.
FACT/S This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a
congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both houses
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an ordinance thereto."
The petitioners contend that their vote was not taken into consideration
in requiring that in amending the constitution, the law requires 3/4 of
the votes of the member of the Congress thus arriving in the question
of constitutionality of the said resolution.
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the journals can be investigated against the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bills.
RULING/S No. Petition is dismissed without cost. The Court held that to go behind
the enrolled bills which were already authenticated and to investigate
the journals amounts to disregard of the respect due to the coequal
and independent department of the state, and it would be an inquisition
into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate
power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to confusion in the
administration of the law.

Enrolled bill doctrine. Political questions are not subject to judicial

review, except when dealing with questions conferred upon the courts
by constitutional/statutory provision. This is predicated upon the
separation of powers. According to a US case, the efficacy of
ratification by state legislature of proposed amendment to Federal
Constitution is a political question. If ratification of an amendment is a
political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question.
1935 Constitution provides two distinct parts for amendments:
proposal and ratification. Proposal to amend is highly political
performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity, and there
is less reason for judicial inquiry into a proposal’s validity rather than
ratification. A duly authenticated bill/resolution imports absolute verity
and is binding on the courts. The courts cannot mandate the President
to use his calling out power when the situation permits it, or the
legislature to pass a certain kind of law. Such duties are beyond judicial
review if the one charged fails to perform them. Motives are beyond
the courts.

The sensible solution is not to patch casual errors by asking the

Judiciary to circumvent the Constitution, but to represent ourselves
with competent legislators.
The Code of Civil Procedure provides proving legislative proceedings
1) journals, clerk/secretary certified; 2) copy signed by presiding
officers and secretaries, conclusive proof. But this Court chooses to
pass over the question. The journals have no signs of irregularity. Duly
certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts and
the due enactment thereof.

Duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts

and the due enactment thereof.
CASE TITLE Joker P. Arroyo, Edcel C. Lagman, G.R NO. 127255
John Henry R. Osmeña, Wigberto E.
Tañada, and Ronaldo B. Zamora,
Petitioners, vs. Jose de Venecia, Raul
Daza, Rodolfo Albano, the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of Finance,
and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, Respondents.
PONENTE Mendoza, J. DATE: August 14, 1997
DOCTRINE Upholding the inviolable doctrine on the separation of powers in the
Philippine government, the courts strictly cannot discuss, examine, and
interpret the procedural and substantive aspects in the enactment of
enrolled bills in Congress which are subsequently approved by the
President. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the passage of legislative
measures has been legitimized and authenticated by the concurrence
of the Senate and the House of Representatives. As enrolled bills
integrally demonstrate the fundamental roles of the legislative and
executive departments in faithfully enacting and executing laws, the
judiciary cannot interfere in the passage and implementation of
statutes unless justiciable issues arise exemplified through the
violation of constitutional requirements and the breach on the
inalienable rights of other people. Through the concurrence of the chief
executive along with the attestation of both the House Speaker and the
Senate President, enrolled bills essentially become moot and
academic. Thus, courts are entirely prohibited from intervening in
congressional policymaking to adhere and follow the separation of
powers enshrined in the Constitution vis-à-vis reviewing and evaluating
the internal rules and regulations adopted in the legislature.
FACTS On November 21, 1996, the bicameral conference committee report on
House Bill No. 7198 amending the National Internal Revenue Code to
impose sin taxes on beer and cigarettes urgently certified by House
Speaker Jose de Venecia was approved in the plenary session and
consequently transmitted to the Senate on the same night. In the
following day, President Fidel Ramos signed Republic Act No. 8240
with the concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The journal of the session was approved on December 2, 1996 with
the lone objection of Representative Edcel Lagman.

After Representative Exequiel Javier gave the sponsorship speech on

the conference committee report on the proposed legislative measure,
several House members interpellated the principal sponsor where
Representative Joker Arroyo constantly questioned the lack of quorum
in the plenary and called for the adjournment of the session. When
Representative Rodolfo Albano who was acting as the majority floor
leader moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report as the interpellation period ended, Deputy Speaker
 Raul Daza approved the motion since there was no formal objection
from the House Members. While Representative Daza was inquiring
on whether there was an objection to the motion raised by
Representative Albano, Representative Arroyo simultaneously
questioned and challenged the motion being raised and eventually
objected to the approval of the committee report. When the session
resumed after Representative Daza suspended the proceedings due
to the vehement upheaval of Representative Arroyo, Representative
Albano moved for the adjournment of the session.
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void due to the contested
irregularities and anomalies in the approval of the bicameral
conference committee report in the House of Representatives.
2. Whether or not Congress committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the enactment of
the legislative measure.
3. Whether or not the conference committee report was railroaded
in the legislature amid the urgent certification from the president.
4. Whether or not the Supreme Court can review the passage of
the enrolled bill.
RULING/S The court ruled that the enactment of RA 8240 was constitutional since
non-compliance of the internal rules in the legislative department
cannot be adjudicated as there were no constitutional requirements
infringed in the approval of the bicameral conference committee report.
Under the doctrine of the separation of powers, the courts can only
interfere in the executive and legislative departments when there are
justiciable issues and controversies. Further, the court asserted that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress since
the enactment and approval of legislative measures constitute political
questions which the judiciary cannot review and examine. To wit,
judicial questions emerge when there are constitutional matters
involved. Moreover, the court rejected that RA 8240 was railroaded
since the objection by Representative Arroyo on the motion to approve
and ratify the conference committee report was out of order due to his
failure to be recognized by Representative Daza who was acting as the
presiding officer. Declaring further that nominal voting was not
procedurally required in the approval of bicameral conference
committee reports, the court stated that there was no irregularity in the
ratification of the measure in Congress. Regarding the justiciability of
enrolled bills, the court affirmed the inviolability of the separation of
powers among the three branches of government through asserting
that the enactment of statutes remains binding on courts unless there
are constitutional issues encountered which necessitate judicial
review. Given the co-equal independence of the other departments,
the judiciary recognizes the concurrence on the legislative measure.
CASE TITLE ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS G.R NO. 23475
PONENTE MAKALINTAL, C.J DATE: April 30, 1974
DOCTRINE The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the
journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
FACT/S House bill No. 9266 was filed on March 30, 1964 in the House of
Representatives. The bill passed the third reading without
amendments on April 21, 1964. It was then sent to Senate for
concurrence. The committee head, Sen. Gerardo Roxas suggested a
minor amendment that instead of the City Engineer, the President
Protempore should succeed the Vice-Mayor in the latter’s incapacity to
act as Mayor.

During the 2nd reading on the Senate, amendments to Sec 1 were

introduced by Arturo Tolentino. They were approved while the
amendments presented by Roxas were not.

The bill was passed with amendments on May 20, 1964, then, a letter
was sent to HOR the following day informing that the bill has been
passed. Attached to letter is the certification of amendment. The
certificate states that the amendment suggested by Roxas were
approved instead of those of Tolentino. The bill was signed into RA No.
4065 or The Revised Charter of the City of Manila by the President on
June 18, 1964.

After the law was implemented, Tolentino held a press release about
the error in the passed law. Following the acknowledgment of the error,
the Senate President withdrew his signature. The President also
withdrew his signature saying that he can’t pass a law not approved by
the HOR and the Senate.

The Mayor then issued a circular about the changes brought about by
an invalid law. This includes recalling the police force assigned to the
Vice- Mayor. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S W/N Republic Act No. 4065 is valid?- No
RULING/S Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved
by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding
officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. It has
been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, to
signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has
been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or
rejection.

In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution

required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was
deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was
considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. Another case
however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was
not conclusive evidence.

The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due

enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify
to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following
provisions:

Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its
judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question
shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in
the Journal."

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of

Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is
said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government,
is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President
declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he
had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously, this
declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the
attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in
fact and indisputable in logic.

The petition was denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065
entitled "An act defining the powers, rights and duties of the Vice-
Mayor of the City of Manila, further amending for the purpose sections
ten and eleven of Republic Act numbered four hundred nine, otherwise
known as The Revised Charter of the City of Manila” is declared not to
have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law.