CIVIL LAW

NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE
*Art. 15 of the Civil Code is a conflict of law rule procedure. Hence, it is also applicable to foreigners.
(Nationality of person involved)
If it involves the issue of the ff, to wit:
1. Status of persons
2. Conditions of persons
3. Legal Capacity persons; and
4. Legal Capacity of his family rights and duties.

When the issue affects the following aspects, the applicable rule is the nationality of the persons involved.

Applying the Nationality Principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code that in any case where the issue affects
the status of a person, legal capacity and family rights and duties, the applicable law should be the law of
Germany. Angel being a citizen of Germany. Angel cannot invoked the provisions of the Family Code for
the purpose of termination of marriage to her husband. Both being citizens of Germany.

In that case, if Angel failed to invoke the provisions of German Law. No, we cannot apply the Doctrine of
Processual Presumption because it may be pointless. It may be possible under the German Law;
psychological incapacity is not one of the valid grounds for the termination of marriage of German
citizens in which case even if the marriage is termination here in the Philippines but not accepted in the
Law of Germany it will be pointless.

If the issue will is in connection with sex, the Nationality Principle will also apply since the determination
of the sex will definitely refer to the status, condition, legal capacity of marriage, and also the family
rights of the person.

*Silverio vs Republic

*Provisions on IPL (Unfair Competition is more restrictive; it will only be applicable if the process or
product/trademark/copyright is protected by a patent;
While Art. 28 of the Civil Code (Unfair Competition-Damages) is much broader, there is no need for a
patent, it will only be applicable if two requirements are complied, to wit;
1. There must be lost or injury caused to a trade rival or competitor;
2. The acts that caused that lost or injury must be contrary to good conscious shocking to judicial
sensibilities or otherwise unlawful. If those two conditions are satisfied then there can be recovery of
damages under the concept of unfair competition in Art. 28 of the Civil Code.

FAMILY CODE
*Pilar vs Pilar (separation of church and state)
Marriage aside from being a contract is also a social institution which is purely governed by the law. The
nature, consequences are all governed by law. Therefore, the issue regarding marriage of a Filipino
citizens shall be governed by law.

*Republic vs Abios (consent-presence of personal declaration)

The consent being referred to under the law simply refers to the personal declaration made by the groom
and the bride during the marriage ceremony. If that personal declaration was made and at the time that the
personal declaration was made the parties are not suffering from any incapacities. If there is no defect in
giving consent, the marriage is perfectly valid. Regardless of presence or absence of love. The intention
of the parties in contracting a marriage will not affect the validity of marriage. So long as consent is freely
given during the marriage ceremony, the marriage is perfectly valid.

*Distinction between void marriage and a situation where there was no marriage that actually taken place,
the proper of remedy is a petition for cancel or correction of entry under Art. 108.

*Requirement of Art 40 will only be applicable if there was prior void marriage that was celebrated.
(Republic vs Olaybar)
If the personal circumstances were used in contracting marriage, the proper remedy is not a petition for
nullity of marriage, so far as to the true person is concern, he was never married. The proper remedy is
simply for petition for cancellation of entries in the Civil Registry under Art. 108. Then the requirement
of Article 40 will not be applicable prior void marriage. On the other hand, if there was a marriage that
had taken place, if that marriage is indeed celebrated but that marriage is claim to be void ab initio, the
proper remedy is a petition for declaration of absolute of nullity and not for cancellation of entries in the
civil registry. A petition for cancellation of entries in civil registry is not a substitute for a petition for
declaration of absolute of nullity of a marriage if the marriage is indeed taken place.

Celebrated without a valid marriage license. Is it a valid defense in the crime of bigamy?
Pursuant to the existing jurisprudence, promulgated by the court in Pulido vs People (En Banc
Ruling), the effect of Art. 40 of the Family Code is only civil. Art. 40 did not amend/ modify/ alter Art
349 of RPC on Bigamy. Pulido vs People overturned Art. 40. If Art. 40 is violated, there is a commission
also of the crime of Bigamy.

*Bitangcol vs. People (Leonen Case)

1. Presumption of Regularity cannot be applied if that certification is to be used in a criminal case for the
purpose of acquittal;
2. The reason why presumption of irregularity cannot be accorded, if that certification is to be used in that
criminal case for the purpose of obtaining acquittal because if the purpose is for obtaining acquittal, there
is a greater temptation on the part of the accused to bribe our gov’t employees for the purpose of securing
a falsified certification. And on the part of our government employee there is also an incentive.

Effect: we can only use the case of Vitangcol, if the certification issued by the LCR is to be used in a
criminal case for the purpose of obtaining acquittal in a criminal prosecution on Bigamy. On the other
hand, if that certification is to be used in a civil case for the petition of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Vitangcol statement will not be applicable instead applicable still the case of Servilla vs. Cardenas,
Republic vs CA, Carino vs Carino (cases involving certification issued by LCR to the effect that the
records could not be found to the LCR) despite diligent effort to locate the same.

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements of.—Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code: ARTICLE 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must
prove all of the following elements: [first,] that the offender has been legally married; [second,] that the
first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; [third,] that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and [lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity. Same; Same; Marriage License; To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, “the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties.”—The fourth requisite — the marriage license — is issued by
the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides. The marriage
license represents the state’s “involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested.” To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, “the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties.”

Same; Same; Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element
of the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code (RPC) becomes useless.—Should the
requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of bigamy, Article
349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. “[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to . . .
contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of
the first.” Further, “[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite — usually
the marriage license — and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.” Same; Penalties;
Indeterminate Sentence Law; Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), the maximum term of the
penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). On the other hand, the minimum term of the
penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the offense.
—Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on
petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court then has the
discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered. The imposable penalty
for bigamy is prisión mayor. The penalty next lower to that is prisión correccional. Prisión correccional
ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years; hence, the minimum penalty can be any
period within this range. As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prisión mayor in
its medium period, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prisión mayor in its medium
period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

LEONEN, J.: Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial
declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

*Distinguished Art. 40 and 108

*Art. 26, par. 2 (Republic vs. Manalo)

*Republic vs Cote (merely obiter dictum)

G.R. No. 212860. March 14, 2018.

*REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FLORIE GRACE M. COTE, respondent.

Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Divorce; As of present, our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino husbands and wives. Such fact, however, do not prevent our family
courts from recognizing divorce decrees procured abroad by an alien spouse who is married to a Filipino
citizen. —It bears stressing that as of present, our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between
Filipino husbands and wives. Such fact, however, do not prevent our family courts from recognizing
divorce decrees procured abroad by an alien spouse who is married to a Filipino citizen. Article 26 of the
Family Code states: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and(6), 36, 37 and 38.Where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouses shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Recognition of Foreign Divorce; Although the Supreme
Court (SC) has already laid down the rule regarding foreign divorce involving Filipino citizens, the
Filipino spouse who likewise benefits from the effects of the divorce cannot automatically remarry.
Before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must file a petition for judicial recognition of
the foreign divorce.—In the landmark case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114 (2005), the Court
ruled that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry. Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign
divorce involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise benefits from the effects of the
divorce cannot automatically remarry. Before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must
file a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce. The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within
its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.

*Sarto vs People
*Tan-andal vs. Tan-andal
It is simply a personality structure. Psychic causes. (Environment, people surrounding him)
** under the present jurisprudence, in a fairly recent case
Requirement before in order for psychological incapacity in order to be a ground, the inability of one of
the spouses in his or her marital obligation must be for the reason of a psychological illness or disorder.
Prior to Tan-Andal Case:
Grounds:
*Seriousness
*Juridical Incapacity
*Incurability
* Now it is no longer necessary for a party that marriage to be declared psychologically incapacitated is to
be medically declared ill or have disorder.

SC explained that it need not be a medical condition or by a reason of mental/ psychological illness or
disorder. The concept is purely legal and not medical. It is simply a personal condition of a person that
by reason of some genuine psychic causes that a psychological is so deformed. That renders that person to
totally disabled or unable to the essential marital obligations. But now, for the reason of that inability
need not be psychological disorder. Psychological Incapacity can now be testified by a witness. Since it
can now be explained by what happen to that person in the past.

*Effect of psychological incapacity in property relations (Tan-Andal vs. Andal)

-The SC ruled that a marriage is declared void by reason of Psychological Incapacity, the property regime
of the parties is not governed by the absolute Community it is not governed by conjugal and separate
property instead the property relations of the parties from the start of the marriage is governed by Art. 147
of the Family Code.
-The declaration that one of the parties is not one of the co-owners of certain properties acquired during
the cohabitation because that party did not care for and maintain the family in the household.

*Art. 147 of the Family Code although we have presumption of co-ownership, it may be proven that one
person did not contribute in whatever form whether of actual, maintaining or taking care of the family. If
there is no, there is no co-ownership.
*Art 41 of the Family Code
One spouse had been absent for four (4) years if there had been ordinary absence, two (2) years for
_____.

The provisions start with the basic principle that any marriage contracted during the subsistence to prior
marriage shall be null and void being bigamous under Art 35 (4) of the Family Code.

Three (3) requisites under Art 35 (4) is present. The marriage is not void. Instead it is a valid marriage.

1. One of the spouses must have been absent for a period of four (4) years in cases of ordinary
absence; (simply disappeared without danger of death)
2. Two (2) years in case of qualified absence (if the person disappeared when the situation, there is a
danger of death); good faith
3.

Art. 41 the second marriage can become valid even if the celebration contracted in bad faith. What is
important here is the good faith of the spouse present all founded believe. That is the reason why the
provision under Art. 42 is terminated, the bad faith of the second spouse should be taken into
consideration. In Art 43, the spouse in bad faith being referred to in that provision can only be the second
spouse. Our court are not authorized to issue a judicial declaration of presumptive death if the purpose is
not to remarry.

If those three requisites are complied prior to the celebration of the second marriage, the second marriage
is perfectly valid even if the second spouse contracted marriage in bad faith. On the other hand, if the
three requisites are not present prior to the celebration of the second marriage, the second marriage is void
because it is a bigamous marriage under Art 35 of the Family Code, par. 4.

*Santos vs Santos

Santos vs. Santos G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014

Statement of the Case:

In his petition for certiorari, petitioner Celerina J. Santos assails the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated
November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.

Facts of the Case:

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos(Ricardo), had filed a petition for
declaration of absence or presumptive death for thepurpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo
remarried on September 17, 2008.Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to
Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also
inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo
claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left.
He believed that she had passed away. Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only
sometime in October2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief, or other appropriate remedies. On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She
argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence,
misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. According to Celerina, her true
residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her
and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her
presumptively dead. Celerina claimed that all the allegations of Ricardo were fraudulent, that she never
resided in Tarlac and never left to work as a domestic helper abroad. Further, she also claimed that it was
not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal
dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another
woman. Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that
Ricardo made false allegations in his petition. Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a newspaper. She added that
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of
Ricardo's petition. The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. According to the Court
of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her
reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. Celerina filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appelas erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition on the ground that the proper
remedy is to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her reappearance as stated in Article
42 of the Family Code

Ruling: Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for annulment of
judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v.
City of Legaspi. For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It
is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant
commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all
of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy. The choice of remedy is important
because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions. The Family Code
provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-
founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification
for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage. The Family Code also provides that the
second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she
reappears. Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the
subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and
(4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined. The existence of these
conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the
subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present. Hence, the
subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1)
if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of
the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is
no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of
law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance. When subsequent marriages
are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse
is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the
continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is
presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolvedrests on
the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.

The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the second
marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent. A
second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be
considered valid when the following are present: (1) The prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years; (2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead; (3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; and (4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse. A subsequent
marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death,
lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not
be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting
marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good
faith is protected by law. Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also
not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition
against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still applies. The provision on reappearance
in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the
spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court
had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to
prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage. Celerina seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death
and the subsequent marriage. Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article
42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered
legitimate, and the property relations of the spouses in such marriage will be the same as in valid
marriages. If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived
before the termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive
death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina
is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the
second marriage, this remedy is not available to her. Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating
the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to
file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.

Disposition: The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic
fraud, grounds for nullity or annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.