CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.

JD3A
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ALLAN NIEVERA,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS:

AAA, who was 14 at the time of the incident was invited by Nievera who persuaded her
to go inside his apartment on the pretext that he would just show her something. AAA
believed him and so went with him inside his apartment because she had seen that
most of the kids in their apartment building also talked to him.
Nievera successful had carnal knowledge with AAA. AAA did not disclose what
happened to anyone out of fear. 

In another incident, AAA was again raped by Nievera and the latter show her his gun
and AAA became afraid.

Upon asking of her mother about her whereabouts, AAA disclosed the dastardly acts of
Nievera to her sister. AAA was brought to the Northern Police District Crime Laboratory
in Caloocan City for examination. Her Medico-Legal Report divulged that anogenital
findings were indicative of blunt force penetrating trauma to the hymen.

The RTC convicted Nievera of the crime of Rape and held that AAA's testimony was
corroborated by the medico-legal report. The CA affirmed the conviction with
modification as to the amount of damages and held that AAA's testimony on the rape
incident had the hallmarks of truth and deserved full faith and credence.

ISSUE:

Whether AAA’s testimony deserves full faith and credit.

HELD:

Yes. The Court affirms the findings of both the RTC and the CA that AAA's testimony
deserves full faith and credit. 

None of Nievera's arguments was not able to convince the Court to discredit AAA's
credibility despite bringing up the fact that AAA currently has a 43-year old common-law
husband and that AAA voluntarily entered into sexual relations with older men even at a
young age. The Court held that whether AAA entered into a relationship with a
significantly older man subsequent to the rape incident is beside the point. The question
before the Court is simply whether Nievera had carnal knowledge of AAA through force
or intimidation 

Section 30 of the Rule on Examination of Child Witness provides:

The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged
child sexual abuse:
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior ;
and . . . .

His defense of alibi and denial fails in light of this finding. It is well-settled that the
defenses of alibi and denial cannot outweigh the candid and straightforward testimony
of the private complainant that the accused indeed had sexual intercourse with her
through force, intimidation, and against her will.
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner, vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ,

FACTS:

Ramirez is the complaining witness in a criminal case against her brother-in-law,

Maximo Alvarez for arson pending before the RTC. The private prosecutor called
Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against Maximo Alvarez, her
husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.

ISSUE:

Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in the criminal case.

HELD:

Yes, Esperanza can testify against her husband.

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

“During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against
the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter’s direct descendants or ascendants."

However, this marital disqualification rules has its own exceptions, both in civil actions
between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the
excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the
marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon
such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and
the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in
such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at
protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void
in the unhappy home.

As shown by the records before the commission of the offense, the relationship
between Maximo and his wife was already strained. They were separated de
facto almost six months before the incident. These facts and evidence reveal that the
preservation of the marriage between Maximo and Esperanza is no longer an interest
the State aims to protect.
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN FRANCISCO

FACTS:

Francisco, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, was being held as
detention prisoner. He requested permission from the chief of police, and he was
allowed to go with Sergeant Pimentel, who was detailed to guard him.

Upon their reaching the house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife who
was at the time in a room of said house, while said sergeant remained at the foot of the
stairs. After a few moments, Pimentel heard the scream of a woman. Running upstairs,
he met the wife running out of the room and holding her right breast which was
bleeding.

Moments later, Pimentel saw Francisco lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one
year and a half, on his breast. Pimentel also found Francisco to have a wound in his
belly while his child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the child dead.

ISSUE:

Whether Francisco’s wife can testify against him in this case.

HELD:

Yes the wife can testify. Section 26 (d) of Rule 123 has exceptions, both in civil actions
between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there
is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility of interests disappears
and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.

In the instant case the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution but
under circumstances presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife only testified
against her husband after the latter, testifying in his own defense, imputed upon her the
killing of their son. By all rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution, which
had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a witness against her husband,
the right to do so.

The State being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be
punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the rebutting
testimony in question, even against the objection of the accused, because it was the
latter himself who gave rise to its necessity. 

It was illustrated by the Court that when the husband testified that it was his wife who
caused the death of their son, he could not justly expect the State to keep silent and
refrain from rebutting such new matter in his testimony, through the only witness
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
available, the wife. He could not legitimately seal his wife's lips and thus gravely expose
her to the danger of criminal proceedings against her being started by the authorities
upon the strength and basis of said testimony of her husband, or to bear the moral and
social stigma of being thought, believed, or even just suspected, to be the killer of her
own offspring. 
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
AVELINO ORDOÑO, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN,

FACTS:

Avelino was charged with having raped his daughter, Leonora, on October 11,
1970. Catalina Balanon Ordoño, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement
wherein she disclosed that on that same date, Leonora had told her of the incident but
no denunciation was filed because Avelino threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina if
they reported the crime to the police.

Catalina further revealed that her husband had also raped their other daughter, Rosa,
on March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in court with that offense. Catalina said
that the rape committed by Avelino against Leonora was mentioned during the
investigation and trial of Avelino for the rape committed against Rosa. When questioned
why Catalina did not file a complaint against her husband concerning the incident
involving Leonora, she answered that she narrated the incident during the investigation
in the Fiscal's Office and also when she testified in court in the case of her daughter
Rosa but then Leonora was still in Manila.

During the preliminary investigation of the rape committed against Leonora, Catalina
manifested that she was no longer afraid to denounce Avelino because he was already
in jail for having raped Rosa.

The Fiscal presented Catalina as the second prosecution witness. The defense counsel
objected to her competence and invoked the marital disqualification rule found in Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. Counsel claimed that Avelino had not consented expressly or
impliedly to his wife's testifying against him.

ISSUE:

Whether the rape committed by Avelino against his daughter is a crime committed by
him against his wife within the meaning of the exception found in the marital
disqualification rule.

HELD:

Yes.

The Court held that the correct rule to be adapted in this case is from the Cargill case in
which the court said: The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the
person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting
domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is
that, when an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation,
it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
From this case, the Court concluded that in the law of evidence the rape perpetrated by
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife. This
conclusion is in harmony with the practices and traditions of the Filipino family where,
normally, the daughter is close to the mother who, having breast-fed and reared her
offspring, is always ready to render her counsel and assistance in time of need.

in this case, when Avelino , after having raped his daughter in the early morning of
October 11, 1970, tried to repeat the beastly act in the evening of that date, Leonora
shouted "Mother" and, on hearing that word, Avelino desisted.

The rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting crime
with incestuous implications, positively undermines the connubial relationship, is a
proposition too obvious to require much elucidation.
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERTO
PANSENSOY, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

Roberto is the legal husband of Analie. The latter testified that she has been in a live in
relationship with Hilario Reyes since 1994, 3 months before the incident happened.

Analie and Hilario were in the house they were renting. Hilario was lying down inside the
house. She stood up when she heard a knocking on the door. As she opened the door,
she saw Roberto holding a gun. She embraced him and tried to wrest the gun away
from him but she failed. Hilario went out of the house and sat on a bench. Roberto
approached Hilario and asked him if he really loves his wife. Hilario answered in the
affirmative. Roberto next asked Hilario if he was still single. Hilario answered yes.
Roberto counted one to three and at the count of three, shot Hilario. Hilario was hit on
the forehead and sprawled on the ground.

The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Analie and rejected
the version of the appellant that he acted in self-defense.

ISSUE:

Whether the marital disqualification rule may applies in this case.

HELD:

No.

Analie’s testimony would have been disregarded had appellant timely objected to her
competency to testify under the marital disqualification rule. Under this rule, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for
a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or
ascendants. However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in
a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other
witnesses generally.

The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first
offered as a witness. In this case, the incompetency was waived by appellants failure to
make a timely objection to the admission of Analie’s testimony.
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA and PAQUITA LEZAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JESUS
RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, JOSE DINEROS, in his
capacity as Receiver of the LA PAZ ICE PLANT & COLD STORAGE CO., INC., and
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

FACTS:

Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo,
together with C.N. Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo for the annulment of a judgment rendered against the La Paz Ice Plant.
The defendants were Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor judgment was rendered, and
the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama.

The complaint alleged that, because of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the Ice Plant
was placed under the receivership of Dineros and that during the pendency of the
receivership, Marciano C. Roque brought an action against the La Paz Ice Plant for the
collection of P150,000, which sum he had supposedly lent to it.

Furthermore, it also alleged that summons was served not on the receiver but on the
spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama and that through the collusion of the
Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain judgment by default against the company.

At the hearing Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify
as "a witness summoned by the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court." The
request was granted over the objection of the petitioners who invoked the following
provision of the Rules of Court: A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife
without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in
a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.

ISSUE:

Whether Paquita, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be examined

as a hostile witness by the adverse party under section 6 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, without infringing on her marital privilege not to testify against her husband under
section 20 (b) of Rule 130.

HELD:

No.

The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated. Testimony
adverse to the wife's own interests would tend to show the existence of collusive fraud
between the spouses and would then work havoc upon their common defense that the
loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in order to soften her
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the
interests of the husband.

Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule which provides merely that the wife
cannot be examined "for or against her husband without his consent," it is further
argued that "when husband and wife are parties to an action, there is no reason why
either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone," and his
or her testimony could operate only against himself or herself.

The Court held that section 6 of Rule 132 is a mere concession, for the sake of
discovery, from the rule which precludes the husband or the wife from becoming the
means of the other's condemnation. The said rule of discovery should therefore not be
expanded in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one's spouse in a situation
where this natural repugnance obtains.
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION 

FACTS:

Artemio was found guilty of the crime of rape committed against his 16-year-old
daughter Cynthia P. Invencion. He was charged with thirteen counts of rape in separate
complaints.

One of the witnesses presented by the prosecution is Artemio’s son, Elven Invencion.
The latter is an 8-year-old grade two pupil. He testified that he is a half-brother of
Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife. Sometime before the end
of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio,
Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthia’s loud cries.
Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After
about two minutes, his father put on his short pants.

Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He
angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors.

ISSUE:

Whether Elven is disqualified as a witness against his father pursuant to Section 20(c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

No.

The Court ruled that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule on
disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify
against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked
or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not
compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he
voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness
against his father of his own accord and only "to tell the truth."
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
MANILA BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION AND RUTHER
BATUIGAS, Petitioners vs. VICTOR A. DOMINGO AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 

FACTS:

Batuigas was a writer of the widely circulated tabloid Tempo, published by the Manila

Bulletin. Batuigas wrote an article in his Bull's Eye column in Tempo titled "Crucial task
for JoeCon's successor." The article dealt with the letter-complaint of the Waray
employees of the DTI, Region VIII on the "[m]ismanagement, low moral[e], improper
decorum, gross inefficiency, nepotism, etc." in the office. One of the public officials
complained of was Domingo who was accused of dereliction of official duties, among
others.

In another instance, Batuigas wrote in his column titled "A challenge to Sec.

Garrucho" about the alleged "lousy performance of Regional Director R.D. Domingo in
DTI Region 8," among others.

Offended by these two articles, Domingo filed a complaint for libel against Batuigas and
subsequently filed a complaint for Damages.

ISSUE:

Whether the articles in question were qualifiedly privileged communication.

HELD:

Yes.

A privileged communication may be classified as either absolutely privileged or

qualifiedly privileged. The absolutely privileged communications are those which are not
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. The qualifiedly privileged
communications, on the other hand, are those which contain defamatory imputations
but which are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or
justifiable motive, and to which "private communications" and "fair and true report
without any comments or remarks" belong. Since the qualifiedly privileged
communications are the exceptions to the general rule, these require proof of actual
malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held actionable. But when malice
in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged
communications are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged communications merely
prevents the presumption of malice from attaching to a defamatory imputation.

The conduct, moral fitness, and ability of a public official to discharge his duties are
undoubtedly matters of public interest for he is, after all, legally required to be at all
times accountable to the people and is expected to discharge his duties with utmost
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty; and to act with patriotism and justice,
lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest.

The Court furthermore said that it is not confined within the wordings of the libel statute
when confronted with libel cases involving publications which deal with public officials
and the discharge of their official functions. The case should likewise be examined
under the constitutional precept of freedom of the press. But if the utterances are false,
malicious, or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to
matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and
civil liability.

The statements on the "lousy performance" and "mismanagement" of Domingo are

matters of public interest as these relate to his moral conduct, his capacity to lead the
DTI Region VIII employees, and to manage and supervise the affairs of the office.
These statements undoubtedly make it to the grade of qualifiedly privileged
communication and thus, would require actual malice to be actionable. 
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner, vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN

FACTS:

Josielene filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Johnny, the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody
of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his
family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to
undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.

Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties.
To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene
got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an
injection. The marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained
Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after the case against her
ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that
Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the
rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that
Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this
point, Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was
there confined.

Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by
physician-patient privilege. The RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s
motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil
action of certiorari.

The CA denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow the production of
medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever relevant
disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The
prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent
hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did
not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited
purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.

ISSUE:

Whether the Johnny’s hospital records are covered by the privileged character of the
physician-patient communication.

HELD:
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A

Yes.

Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional conversation.

The Court held that to allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s
illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence
that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these
information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of
compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the
patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO,
as Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN
SIM, Respondents.

FACTS:

Juan Sim filed a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that Lim has
been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and
after the marriage and until the present." Sim presented three (3) witnesses before
taking the witness stand himself to testify on his own behalf. Sim’s counsel announced
that he would present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the
National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in
Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify

Lim’s counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited
from the witness is privileged since the latter had examined Lim in a professional
capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.

ISSUE:

Whether the doctor’s testimony is violative of the physician-patient privileged

communication under Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence.

HELD:

No, it is not violative of the rule.

The Court agrees with the observation of the CA. Dr. Acampado was presented and
qualified as an expert witness. Based on the transcript of her testimony, although she
testified that she examined and interviewed Lim,
she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and
treatment the former. Her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge
she had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient
relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial
court cannot then be excluded. 

The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no
bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the
patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions
propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the
information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded
whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by
reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. 
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patient’s ailment,
when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make answer
solely on facts related in  the hypothetical question. The rule on privilege (sic)
communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds from the fundamental
assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be confidential in their
origin. Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and
patient. It might be implied according to circumstances of each case, taking into
consideration the nature of the ailment and the occasion of the consultation. 
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
ROSA F. MERCADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Mercado filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment
from the practice of law. Mercado alleged that Atty. Vitriolo maliciously instituted a
criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on
confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship.

It appears that the Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal action against Mercado before the Office
of the City Prosecutor. He alleged that Mercado made false entries in the Certificates of
Live Birth of her children. More specifically,she allegedly indicated in said Certificates of
Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage
was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G.
Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978. According to the Atty. Vitriolo,
his action does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which
are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the
engagement of respondent as counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Vitriolo is guilty of breach of privileged and confidential lawyer-client

relationship and should be disbarred.

HELD:

No.

In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of
trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and
fiduciary. Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to
repose his confidence in an attorney. Thus, the preservation and protection of that
relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of
paramount importance to the administration of justice.

One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to
keep inviolate his client's secrets or confidence and not to abuse them. Thus, the duty of
a lawyer to preserve his client's secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the
attorney-client relationship, and continues even after the client's death.

The factors essential to establish the existence of such privilege are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client

relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

Applying all these rules to the case at bar, the Court held that the evidence on record
fails to substantiate Mercado's allegations. Mercado did not even specify the alleged
communication in confidence disclosed by Atty.Vitriolo. All her claims were couched in
general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on
privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for
falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating
to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell
out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be
involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must
prove.
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
JOEL M. SANVICENTE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Sanvicente fatally shot Dennis Wong outside the Far East Bank in Quezon City after the
latter allegedly attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just
withdrawn from the ATM. Policemen found the lifeless body of the victim at the parking
space. Recovered at the scene were five empty caliber .45 shells two live caliber .45
bullets and an ATM card in the name of Violeta Sanvicente.

Police authorities located Sanvicente’s car and took custody thereof. Sanvicente’s
counsel turned over to the police the .45 caliber and executed a letter (Exhibit LL)
containing the details about the alleged death of Dennis Wong. After trial, the
prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits, which included letter of Sanvicente’s
counsel to P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, marked as Exhibit LL. The trial court admitted all the
prosecution’s exhibits 

ISSUE:

Whether the contents of Exhibit LL is privileged communication.

HELD:

Yes. It cannot be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the
details of the shooting communicated by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is privileged
because it is connected with the business for which petitioner retained the services of
the latter. More specifically, said communication was relayed by petitioner to Atty.
Valmonte in order to seek his professional advice or assistance in relation to the subject
matter of the employment, or to explain something in connection with it, so as to enable
him to better advice his client or manage the litigation.

Pursuant to Section 24 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an attorney cannot,
without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment nor can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity.
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
DRA. LEILA A DELA LLANA, Petitioner, vs. REBECCA BIONG

FACTS:

Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon
City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain
Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial
Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump
truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing
the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield
was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor
wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical
injuries.

The traffic investigation report stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the
truck. Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing
business under the name and style of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel
and sand business.
After a month, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her
neck and shoulder and pain became more intense as days passed by. Her health
deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. 

She consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla and the latter told her that she suffered from a
whiplash injury. Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite three months of
extensive physical therapy. She then consulted other doctors and a neuro-surgeon,
finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression
of her nerve. The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated
Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession.

Dra. dela Llana, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca
refused to pay. At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and
Joel as a hostile witness.

ISSUE:

Whether Dra. Dela Llana’s testimony is credible because she was a surgeon.

HELD:

Dela Llana was the lone physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified
as an ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in her
testimony that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury.

Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is an
expert in neurology, the Court cannot give weight to her opinion that Joel’s reckless
driving caused her whiplash injury without violating the rules on evidence. Under the
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and an
expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence
regarding:

(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently

acquainted.1âwphi1 Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions
of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.

On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to
possess.

In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value
for the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness,
she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash
injury. Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not
provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of
whiplash injury in her testimony.
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
FERNANDO MANCOL, JR., Petitioner, v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,

FACTS:

DBP scheduled an Invitation to Bid for Negotiated Sale on October 13, 2004 over a
residential lot with a two-storey building. Mancol Jr. executed an SPA appointing his
father, Mancol Sr. to represent and negotiate, on his behalf, the sale of the subject
property. Pursuant to the SPA, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and
Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First
Served Basis. DBP then issued an Official Receipt in the name of Mancol Jr. paid by
Mancol Sr.

During the negotiations, DBP officials allegedly agreed, albeit verbally, to: (1) arrange
and effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name, including the payment of
CGT; and (2) to get rid of the occupants of the subject property.

DBP reneged on its undertaking based on the oral agreement. DBP returned to Mancol
Jr. all the pertinent documents of the sale

Mancol Jr. through its counsel demanded from DBP to comply with its verbal
undertaking however DBP disregarded the subsequent oral agreement and reminded
Mancol that DBP has no obligation to eject the occupants and to cause the transfer of
title of the lot in Mancol's name.

During the trial, Villanueva testified that he was the one commissioned or ordered by
Atty. De Asis of DBP, to go to BIR, and to bring the documents. Mancol, Sr. testified that
he signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules and
Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis on behalf of his
son, by virtue of the SPA. Furthermore, Mancol Sr. also testified that after the execution
and delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, DBP verbally agreed to facilitate the transfer
of the title, the payment of the CGT, and to cause the vacation of the occupants of the
house and lot.

The RTC ruled in favor of Mancol Jr.

DBP moved for the reconsidereation of the decision and alleged that the testimonies of
Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. were hearsay because their statements were based on facts
relayed to them by other people and not based on their personal knowledge.

ISSUE:

Whether the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol Sr were hearsay.

HELD:
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of
his own personal knowledge.  A witness may not testify on what he merely learned,
read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not
be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. Hearsay
evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard
from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to
written statements.

The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting

testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of
personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose
because his testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to him as a witness
presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of
his information.

Guided by these precepts, the Court held that testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol Sr.
falls within the category of hearsay evidence. 
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. PENNSWELL, INC.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation

services. Pennswell Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and
selling industrial chemicals, solvents and special lubricants.

On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade.
Under the contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to ₱449,864.98
with interest at 14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. Due to failure of the
petitioner to pay, Pennswell filed a complaint for sum of money.

Petitioner then filed an answer alleging that it was defrauded by Pennswell because the
latter allegedly misrepresented that the items purchased by the petitioner belong to a
new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner had previously
purchased from Pennswell.

During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel Pennswell to give a
detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components subject products. The RTC
granted the petition. Pennswell sought reconsideration of the Order, contending that it
cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is
confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to inquire upon constituted a
trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge. 

ISSUE:

Whether the chemical components of Pennswell’s products are trade secrets that are
not subject to compulsory disclosure.

HELD:

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known

only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The
definition also extends to a secret formula or process not patented, but known only to
certain individuals using it in compounding some article of trade having a commercial
value.

The Court held that trade secrets indeed constitute proprietary rights. The inventor,
discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has rights therein which
may be treated as property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the
disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the information "in confidence" or
through a "confidential relationship.”
CASTANAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special
lubricants are trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. Respondent was
established to engage in the business of general manufacturing and selling of, and to
deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods, wares, merchandise, products,
including but not limited to industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids, alkalies,
salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar preparations, among others. It
is unmistakable to our minds that the manufacture and production of respondent’s
products proceed from a formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In the creation of its
lubricants, respondent expended efforts, skills, research, and resources. 

The Court also looked at Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which permits parties
to inspect documents or things upon a showing of good cause before the court in which
an action is pending. The Court stated that Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things
that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. The documents must not
be privileged against disclosure. Corollary thereto, Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the
types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a)
communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and
client; (c) communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between
priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however, other
privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the following:
(a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters
may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d)
information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits.

The Court decided and affirmed the decisions of both the RTC and the CA that the
chemical formulation of respondent’s products is not known to the general public and is
unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that these ingredients are not within the
knowledge of the public.