Betrayal of Trust Princely States of India and The Transfer of Power Yaqoob Khan Bangash

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Betrayal of Trust: Princely States of India and the Transfer of Power

Yaqoob Khan Bangash
South Asia Research 2006 26: 181
DOI: 10.1177/0262728006066491
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SOUTH ASIA
RESEARCH
www.sagepublications.com
DOI: 10.1177/0262728006066491
Vol. 26(2): 181–199
Copyright © 2006
SAGE Publications
New Delhi,
Thousand Oaks,
London
BETRAYAL OF TRUST: PRINCELY STATES

OF INDIA AND THE TRANSFER OF
POWER1
Yaqoob Khan Bangash
KEBLE COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, UK
ABSTRACT This article analyses why and how the princely order,
once considered the bulwark of British rule, came tumbling
down so rapidly within a few months in 1947, following the
intervention of Lord Mountbatten, a royal cousin, who the
princes thought would support them in preserving their rule
and privileges. How far were the princes themselves to blame
and what role did Mountbatten play? Through a careful re-
examination of available sources this article argues that the
princes, though unable to act together, trusted the British
Crown to protect their rights and interests as promised, but
were mistaken in believing that Mountbatten would uphold
Britain’s treaty obligations regarding the princely states.
KEYWORDS: accession, Chamber of Princes, independence,
Mountbatten, partition, Princely States
Introduction: Collapse of Princely Rule

On 15 August 1947, the British Indian Empire came to an end with the creation
of the two new dominions of India and Pakistan. As events unfolded in the 73
days from the partition plan, announced by Lord Mountbatten on 3 June 1947,
to the lapse date of 15 August 1947, the princes of India found themselves in a
difficult situation. Even though some states were large enough to sustain themselves
as independent nations, most princes ruled over states that were interdependent and
relied heavily on British India for their well-being and sustenance. Resultantly, all
except a dozen or so states acceded to either dominion by the date of independence
by signing off their independent and sovereign rights. With these accessions
centuries and, in some cases, millennia of princely rule came to an end in India.
How the princely class collapsed so summarily with the end of British
paramountcy in 1947 has remained unclear. Some regarded the collapse of the
princely order as a natural occurrence. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister
of India, for example, noted that the destruction of the princes was ‘bound to
happen whether we wanted [it] or not. All we could do was to see that the
182 South Asia Research Vol. 26 (2)
changes that were inevitable took place in as reasonable and amicable way as
possible.’2 Historian Ian Copland (1997: 270), however, disagrees with this
assessment, arguing that ‘I have seen no empirical evidence that suggests that the
states were about to self destruct. On the contrary . . . the indicators for the larger
states, at least, in 1945–6, were quite positive.’ Questions about why the princes
failed to stick together and why they ultimately resigned themselves to their fate
need to be addressed in more detail.
Further, the role of Lord Mountbatten as Viceroy of British India and
Governor-General of the Union of India remains in dispute.3 His apologists point
out his great statesmanship in adjudicating the transfer of power and emphasize
that he could personally do little to help the princes. His official biographer Philip
Ziegler (1985: 415) notes:
The wolves got them [the princes] in the end, but Mountbatten did at least
procure them a few years of reasonable prosperity. He may be blamed for not
foreseeing their eventual fate but his distress and indignation when the Indian
government in the end renounced its agreements show how little he had expected
such a conclusion.
Copland (1997: 273), however, discounts this and writes that:
there is no sign, in the documents I have seen, of the ‘distress and indignation’
referred to by Ziegler. Indeed, when a posse of anxious rulers came to see him to
ascertain his views, Mountbatten heartily commended the Indian government’s
action, which he compared to Napoleon’s mediation of the German states at the
beginning of the nineteenth century.
Thus, a reassessment of Mountbatten’s role as the Crown Representative needs to
be undertaken so that his personal role in the accession of the states and the fate
they met can be ascertained with greater certainty.
In order to re-evaluate Mountbatten’s role with regard to the princely states at
the time of accession, this article is divided into two major sections. The first
focuses on issues of princely disunity by examining the internal dynamics of the
Chamber of Princes, the first and only consultative body composed of all the
major princes of India. It explains how various factors led to the weak bargaining
position of the princes around the time of transfer of power in 1947. The princes
lost opportunities in the shape of the Chamber of Princes, the Government of
India Act of 1935 and the all-India federation plan. But what hurt them most and
exacerbated their weak bargaining position was their internal disunity and failure
to introduce some measure of responsible government by August 1947.
The second section examines the role of Lord Mountbatten in this context. As
the last Viceroy and Governor-General, he was responsible for the transfer of
power, especially with reference to dealing with the princes. The staunchly anti-
princely attitude of Lord Mountbatten, which the princes were apparently never
able to discern until the last moment, and his resolute support of the future
Indian dominion before accession undermined the princes’ trust in Britain
upholding its long standing guarantees, making them easy prey for the dominion
governments after the lapse of paramountcy in August 1947. Taken together, these
sections show that the princes, though unable to act together, trusted that the
Bangash: Betrayal of Trust 183
British Crown would protect their rights and interests as promised, but were
mistaken in believing that Mountbatten would uphold Britain’s treaty obligations
regarding the princely states.
Princely Disunity during British Rule

Less than 200 years after first arriving in India in 1608 to trade, the British were
masters of an empire of several directly ruled British provinces and many
protected native states. As the Mughal Empire slowly disintegrated, the well-
disciplined and resourceful East India Company gradually filled the gap. As the
Company increasingly took sides in internal Indian squabbles, more and more
princes wanted to align themselves with the powerful ‘Company Bahadur’ in order
to prevent the Company’s takeover of their state. These princely states also lent
critical support to the British during the 1857 Revolt. Earl Canning, the first
Viceroy, remarked that ‘these patches of native government served as breakwaters
in the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave’.4 Thus,
when the British quelled the Revolt of 1857 and the Crown took over the
government of India, the Proclamation of Queen Victoria in November 1858
guaranteed the continued existence of the ‘Native Princes’ without the interference
of the British Crown, represented in India by the Viceroy. The Proclamation read:
We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and
engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East
India Company are by us accepted and will be scrupulously maintained, and we
look for the like observance on their part . . . we shall respect the rights, dignity,
and honour of native princes as our own. (Sever, 1985, Vol. 1: 233)
From then onwards the princes of India and the British Crown were firmly
attached to each other. Relations between the states and the government of India
were streamlined in the coming decades under the Political Department, which
maintained an uneasy liaison between British India and Princely India through its
network of Residents and Political Agents in various states until the Chamber of
Princes was inaugurated in 1921. The Political Department, headed by a Secretary
(after 1937, known as the Political Adviser), was directly responsible to the
Viceroy, who was also the Governor-General of British India. But this was not a
workable arrangement, as can be gauged from the remark of the last Political
Secretary, Sir Conrad Corfield (1975: 5) that ‘The Viceroy had quite enough to
do as Governor-General and representative of the Monarch. States’ interests were,
therefore, often overlooked’.
To remedy this situation, a Chamber of Princes was inaugurated under orders
of King-Emperor George V on 8 February 1921, ‘in confident hope that the
united counsels of the Princes and Rulers, assembled in formal conclave, will be
fruitful of lasting good both to themselves and their subjects, and by advancing
the interests that are in common to their territories and to British India’ (Keith,
1922, Vol. 2: 333). Although the creation of a Chamber of Princes was a
revolutionary step in the evolving imperial paradigm of India, since before this the
princes were forbidden to have relations with other states, it failed to bring unity
among the princes and reform in their countries. Significantly, the most important
among them, including Hyderabad and Mysore, boycotted the Chamber and
called it interference in their internal matters.5
Princely reluctance to trust the constitutional plans of the government of
India led them to reject the only chance they had to ensure a secure future for
themselves. In 1935 the Westminster Parliament passed the Government of India
Act of that year, which called for a loose All-India federation of British India
provinces and the states. The Act was compulsory for the British India provinces
but was voluntary for the states. However, to come into full effect, it did require
at least 50 per cent of the princes in each region to assent to the terms of the
federation. Under the Act, those states that wished to join were required to sign
an Instrument of Accession that specified the particular subjects in respect of
which they would permit federal authorities to intervene. The subjects could be
enlarged, but after Royal Assent could not be curtailed. Nor could a state
withdraw from the federation once it had acceded to it.6 The Act further ensured
that it was not impinging on the rights of the rulers by including in its draft a
clause stating that the State ruler ‘hereby declares that save as otherwise expressly
provided in this Instrument he reserves the sovereignty in and over X. vested in
him’.7 Viceroy Lord Linlithgow had intended to inaugurate the Federation by the
summer of 1939; but the plan soon fell apart as the Hydari Committee,
appointed by the Chamber of Princes to examine the Instrument, noted that it
did not include some of the safeguards the princes had requested and that the Act
‘was not in the form of a bilateral agreement between a state and the Crown’
(Verma, 1990: 154). In any case, the Act’s scheme was already doomed as the
Muslim League withdrew its acceptance shortly after the Congress flouted the
main basis of the agreement by saying that the Constituent Assembly would be
fully independent to make any decision it deemed fit.8 But the princes, too, were
neither enthusiastic nor were they persuaded enough to agree to the scheme. As
the Political Secretary, Sir Conrad Corfield (1975: 92), wrote in his memoirs, if
the Viceroy had used the Residents who ‘were in close and continual touch with
the Rulers and knew their individual reactions and prejudices’, the results would
have been very different. As it happened, only Rajputana, much due to the efforts
of Corfield himself, came up with the requisite 50 per cent majority princely vote
in support of the federation. As Copland (1997: 281) remarks, the blame for the
failure of the scheme needs to be attached equally to the princes and the creators
of the plan who ‘apart from, perhaps, Ramsay Macdonald . . . embraced the
scheme dutifully rather than enthusiastically; they did what was necessary, but
they did it without flair, and without much ideological commitment’. Others,
however, mainly on the Congress side, blamed the failure on princely short-
sightedness, outrageous demands, and flaws in the Act itself (Mankekar, 1974:
18–19). If the 1935 plan had succeeded, it would have made princely India a
component part of the Indian federation with enough legislative seats to counter
Congress pressure and interference in their internal autonomy. Whatever the
precise reasons, the Act failed to take effect by the time the Second World War
broke out in September 1939 and all efforts to secure the princes’ consent were
henceforth discontinued.
The princely position within India further deteriorated as the Second World
War lengthened and Congress agitation forced the British Government to take
some action to address the constitutional impasse in India. A mission was sent
under the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Stafford Cripps, in March 1942 to enlist Congress
support for the war by promising India responsible government in the future. The
Mission failed and the Congress started its Quit India Movement, because by now
the Congress wanted Purna Swaraj and not the dominion status offered by
Cripps.9 This left only the states and the Muslim League on the side of the
British, and also supposedly gave the princes, as they had wholeheartedly backed
the British in the war, hope for an amiable settlement with the British regarding
their place in the future set-up of India. Cripps reassured the loyal princes that
Britain would never abandon them to the whims of the new Indian Constituent
Assembly and said that ‘we should stand by our treaties with the States unless they
asked us to revoke them’.10 However, Cripps later tried to repent his rash
assurance and declared in Parliament that it was his understanding that states that
elected not to join the Indian Union would cease to have relations with the
Crown.11 Here he was unceremoniously disavowed by the cabinet, which
maintained that there would be no ‘unilateral denunciation’ of the treaties and
that London had no objection to the states forming subsidiary alliances among
themselves.12 Thus, the message Whitehall sent out was that the British
government had every intention of ‘protecting the interests of those who have
proved themselves our friends and loyal supporters’.13 On the face of it, the
assurances by Whitehall were enough for the princes to trust that the British
would uphold their treaty obligations at such a critical moment as the framing of
the new Indian Constitution.
The three-member Cabinet Mission that was sent in the spring of 1946 to
end the constitutional stalemate in India was decisive for the future of princely
India in as much as it clearly spelt out the position of His Majesty’s Government
regarding paramountcy and its lapse after the transfer of power to the successor
dominion. Well aware of its treaty obligations to the Indian princes, the new
Labour Government did not have much affection for the Indian princes and now
was looking for a way to wriggle out of the treaties without a show of bad faith.
Copland (1997: 218) remarks:
Unlike its predecessors, the incoming Labour ministry had few inhibiting personal
ties with the Indian Princes. And they were not well disposed, ideologically, to the
perpetuation of monarchies – particularly monarchies that in many cases denied
their citizens democratic institutions and basic civil rights.
As it increasingly became apparent that British control of the Indian sub-

continent was due to end, Whitehall tried to provide legal cover to its planned
unilateral revocation of treaties with the princes, stating on 11 September 1945,
in the words of Sir Stafford Cripps, now in his capacity as a member of the
Cabinet Mission:
While we were bound by the assurances we had given, the practical point . . . was
that the treaties which were now 80 to 100 years old, by the influx of time and
change of circumstances are ceasing to be appropriate to the conditions of the
modern world. Thus Paramountcy itself is essentially derived from the fact that we
were the paramount power in British India. If . . . India acquired an independent
status, certain of our obligations which we had undertaken, in quite different
conditions, would clearly not admit . . . [of ] being discharged.14
The Cabinet Mission’s plan to divide Indian provinces into three autonomous
groupings with a weak centre controlling only defence, foreign affairs and
communications was quickly torpedoed by the Congress assertion on 10 July
1946 that the Constituent Assembly would be free to modify the plan as it
pleased, effectively ending its utility as a proposed framework.15 This statement
put an end to any hopes for the plan to succeed, for shortly afterwards the
Muslim League withdrew its acceptance of the plan and so the Chamber of
Princes’ Standing Committee on the issue also ended its deliberations.16 In a
‘Memorandum on States’, submitted to the Chamber of Princes, however, the
Cabinet Mission ensured the princes that paramountcy would in no case be
transferred to the new dominion(s). It read:
When a new fully self-governing or independent government or governments
come into being in British India . . . the rights of the states which flow from their
relationship to the Crown will no longer exist and . . . all right surrendered by the
states to the paramount power will return to the states . . . . The void will have to
be filled either by the states entering into a federal relationship with the successor
government or governments in British India, or, failing this, entering into
particular political arrangements with it or them.17
Thus, in effect, with the lapse of paramountcy the Princely States of India would
become, for all intents and purposes, ‘wholly independent’. This declaration, then,
appeared to give the princes a free hand in dealing with the future set-up of India.
They now waited for negotiations to begin with the future Government of India.
However, the princes’ disunity in the wake of all these developments in British
India further wrecked their chances of negotiating favourable futures for them-
selves after the lapse of paramountcy with the new dominions. The first schism to
occur was between the small and the large states. The All India States’ People
Congress, with the support of the Indian National Congress, declared that
membership in the Indian Union should be restricted to states with populations
of at least 1.5 million, which translated to a mere 21 states, rather than a total of
562 states in princely India.18 Nehru was also of the view that only about a dozen
states had ‘inherent survival value’.19 Quite obviously, this view was not
entertained by all the princes, but on this point even the large states did not back
the smaller ones. This is evident from the May 1946 remark by the Hyderabad
Nizam, who wrote to the Viceroy that only those states should be allowed to
survive that were ‘capable of standing on their own legs’.20 Further eroding
princely solidarity were religious differences which emerged as the date of
the transfer of power neared. Some Hindu princes refused to cooperate with the
Muslim Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, the Nawab of Bhopal, on the pre-
text that he had supported the Muslim League. Likewise, it became unacceptable
for some Muslim princes to work with known donors of the communalist Hindu
Mahasabha among the Hindu princes, such as those of Baroda and Gwalior. The
only strong voice for princely unity, Nawab Hamidullah of Bhopal, declared his
dismay at the deterioration of princely unison and an increase in communal

tensions among the princes in late November 1946 in a letter to the Political
Secretary, Sir Conrad Corfield, writing:
I am tired of leading a team who have neither the will nor the desire to survive. I
am tired of intrigue, calumny and communal feelings of the worst type. . . . I am
a Moslem in a crowd of Hindu Princes, who suspect me all round, who are blind
to their own interests. . . .21
Similar sentiments were also voiced by others, as evident in the comment of the
United Provinces governor Sir Francis Wylie, who during a visit to Muslim-ruled
Rampur in February 1947, noted that the princes were ‘dividing off into
communal groups’.22 With strong support from the British government not
forthcoming, the princes now focused on mending fences with the Congress, in
the hope that this would ensure their favourable future in the proposed Dominion
of India. In 1946, with the Muslim League out of the Constituent Assembly,
many of the princes saw an opportunity of some sort of rapprochement with the
dominant Congress as helpful to their cause. Although the princes as a group had
been in vehement opposition to the spread of democracy in their states and had
helped the British, much to the wrath of the Congress, in quelling public
agitation (Nehru, 1985: 530–4), a number of them now introduced responsible
government in their states, according to Sadul Singh of Bikaner, ‘to rise to the
occasion, to be hailed as co-architects of the structure of India’s independence and
greatness’.23 As a result, many states introduced some form of constitutional
government in their realm. The Congress favourably reacted to these events and in
mid-1946 toned down its rhetoric of anti-monarchism.24 Most princes now felt
assured that the Congress would treat them with respect and honour when the
negotiations for the transfer of power began in 1947 (Copland, 1997: 239).
With the establishment of the Constituent Assembly by the end of 1946 as
part of the interim government responsible for the smooth transition to
independence after the transfer of power, Nawab Hamidullah worked to achieve
the best deal for the princes, even though they had only been assigned 93 seats in
the Assembly. Hamidullah was not averse to the idea of joining an all-India
Constituent Assembly but was afraid that with Congress dominating the
Assembly, some princes might come under the nationalist and republican sway
and commit their Durbars to things not in the best interest of princely India.
Thus, Bhopal wanted to deal with the British Indian politicians outside the ambit
of the Assembly, and so now his focus became to extricate from the Assembly
without a show of bad faith. Continued wrangling between the Congress and the
League bought him some time to further crystallize his strategy and he called a
general meeting of the princes and their ministers in Delhi on 28 January 1947 to
discuss the issue of the Constituent Assembly. On the last day of the conclave, 29
January, after he had failed to get princely agreement on creation of a princely
federation and after the Muslim League firmly declared that it was out of the
Constituent Assembly process, Hamidullah moved in the Chamber of Princes a
resolution that states’ entry should be subject to the prior acceptance by the
assembly negotiating committee of certain sine qua nons, namely the preservation
of the system of monarchy, the right of secession if India became a republic, and
recognition of all state boundaries. Bhopal was confident that these demands
would be flatly turned down by the Congress, precipitating a deadlock for which
the rulers would not be blamed.25
This action alarmed the dissident princes, who in order to improve their
prestige and importance in front of the Congress, hastened to reassure Congress
leaders that they were with it, and not with Bhopal. Then a plan, which unfolded
on 30 January 1946, was devised by some princes and the Congress to
outmanoeuvre the Chancellor. As the negotiating committee of the Chamber of
Princes met the Congress negotiating committee, Patiala (one of the dissidents)
cut across the Chancellor while he was trying to put forth the sine qua nons as a
formal motion, asking whether it would help if they heard from the other
committee a brief resume of the position that had emerged the previous day. As
planned, Nehru at once launched into a pre-prepared speech, which disposed of
the major objections raised by Hamidullah on the sine qua nons motion. After
this, taking the lead of Patiala, most princes in the negotiating committee agreed
to embark on working out arrangements for filling the 93 states seats in the
Constituent Assembly, leaving Bhopal smarting with indignation.26
Hamidullah did not give up, though, and worked to gain lost ground before
the whole Chamber met on 2 April 1947. He called a meeting of the
Constitutional Advisory Committee of the Chamber and prevailed upon it to
table the motion of the sine qua nons in April. But he made a fatal mistake at the
preliminary Standing Committee meeting on 1 April 1947. While trying to make
the dissidents pay for their trouble-making, he linked another resolution to the
sine qua nons motion saying that no state should enter the Constituent Assembly
until the Chamber had finished its initial work of drafting constitutions for the
groups and the provinces – work that was supposed to take at least six months.27
As a result, when the whole Chamber met to discuss these resolutions, Bikaner
who had already walked out in protest at the Standing Committee meeting, led an
open rebellion with Gwalior of a large number of princes, which led to the voting
down of the second resolution (Chamber of Princes, 1947).
After the 2 April 1947 meeting, the Chamber of Princes continued to
function, but only in name, for internal disunity paralysed the princes allowing
their only chance to stick together and bargain as a group to slip by. Despite
sharing essentially common values as members of a monarchical order, the princes,
time and again, failed to bargain as a group. Religious and linguistic differences,
the non-participation of larger states in the Chamber of Princes, and mutual
distrust over some issues thus wrecked their chances to exert enough pressure on
the British Indian leaders to secure an amicable deal. All it took to sabotage
Bhopal’s plan to only negotiate with the new Indian dominion as a group was a
pro-Congress Bikaner, supported by Baroda and Patiala. The failure of the
Chamber of Princes to give one voice to the demands of the princes was an
important opportunity missed, when in August 1947 all these 562 states, ranging
from thousands of square miles to a few acres in area, had to deal with an
immensely powerful and stiff New Delhi that would only deal with them on its
own terms.
Failure to introduce responsible government in their states also led to a

weakening of the stance of princely rulers, allowing the British Indian politicians
to use it as a tool to dislodge them. Some princes had either serious doubts, such
as Dholpur, about the appropriateness of democracy in Indian conditions, or they
were appalled and therefore just ignored democracy due to the fierce anti-princely
rhetoric of leaders such as Nehru (1985: 530–2). The princes also relied too
heavily on foreigners to run their Durbars, so that by August 1947 only a handful
of the states had introduced even partially elected ministries, and none had adult
franchise. As related by Corfield to the journalist Mosley in a personal letter, had
the princes democratized and joined the Federation plan of 1935, things might
have been very different for them (Mosley, 1964: 161). The princes, as well as
some of the British politicians, also thought that the complete windup of
paramountcy would take a long time, perhaps years.28 This meant that the
princes, already resistant to democracy and dependent on Europeans to run their
courts, were caught off guard when the whole system suddenly changed on 15
August 1947. In the absence of their protecting power, Britain, they summarily
collapsed when confronted by Indian opposition.
Role of Lord Mountbatten

With Indian independence looming, the princes of India had placed their future
hopes in the new Viceroy of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, who arrived in India
on 22 March 1947. Mountbatten was to take the place of Lord Wavell, who had
desperately tried, but failed, to reach some sort of an agreement between British
Indian leaders about the future constitutional solution for India.29 Mountbatten
had numerous advantages when he became the Viceroy designate in December
1946: he was a cousin of the King-Emperor, wealthy, liberal, self-confident,
popular, young, vigorous and known for moving quickly. As Sir Conrad Corfield
(1975: 149) put it, the reason that Mountbatten replaced Lord Wavell ‘obviously
was because Lord Wavell was firmly opposed to wrecking the unique achievement
of the British Raj in creating a unified India’. Before accepting the appointment,
Mountbatten made some far-reaching demands, which would later have a deep
impact on the events in India. First, the Admiralty had to assure him that his
naval career would not suffer. Second, and more importantly, Labour’s Prime
Minister Clement Attlee had to declare publicly a deadline for British withdrawal
from India, and third, Mountbatten wanted plenipotentiary powers.30 The new
Labour government, for its part, gave Mountbatten the powers he needed for a
speedy, yet honourable British withdrawal from the Indian Empire, even if it
required the partitioning of British India.
The princes rejoiced at the appointment of Lord Mountbatten, for in him, as
a member of the royal family, they thought they had found a sincere friend. As
Campbell-Johnson (1953: 141), Mountbatten’s press secretary, wrote later, ‘it has
undoubtedly been a source of strength in his relations with the princes that
Mountbatten has been able to speak not simply as Crown Representative, but as a
cousin of the King. For these hereditary rulers the Royal blood carries its own
authority’. The Maharaja of Bikaner wrote soon after Mountbatten arrived:
It is a matter of much gratification to the princes generally and particularly to me, in

view of my having had the privilege of enjoying your friendship ever since our
childhood, that in Your Excellency we have a real friend in whose hands the interests
of the princes we feel are safe and who will see that justice is done to us.31
The princes believed that, as Crown Representative, Mountbatten would do his

utmost to arrange for the princes the best possible future after British departure
from India. Lord Mountbatten, though, had no high regard for the princes, and
ignored them even when important decisions were being made about the fate of
India. As noted by Mosley (1964: 158), Mountbatten
regarded [them] as semi-enlightened autocrats at their best and squalid degenerates
at their worst. He called them ‘a bunch of nitwits’ for not democratizing their
administrations when they saw the power of Congress rising and for not joining
the Indian Federation when they had the opportunity in 1935.
Also, as argued by Corfield (1975: 152), Mountbatten was too much occupied
with the problems of British India and had little time to give attention to the
states’ problem. Mountbatten himself wrote that by July 1947 he had ‘not been
able to grip this states’ problem before’.32
By May 1947, Mountbatten was certain that a favourable withdrawal from
India had to occur before the end of 1947, and so he set upon winding up the
British administration in British India, as well as the princely states, before the
transfer of power date, which he set in his 4 June 1947 press conference at 15
August 1947, allowing only a mere two months for the princes to decide about
their future in India (Hodson, 1985: 319). By that time, he was also convinced
that the only way to keep peace in the subcontinent was to divide the Indian
Empire along communal lines. Therefore he conceded, and impressed upon
Nehru to also accept, the demand of the Muslim League for the creation of a
separate homeland for the Muslims, Pakistan. Mountbatten therefore came up
with a plan for the transfer of power and sent his Chief of Staff, Lord Ismay, with
the proposal to London for initial discussions. In the preliminary plan for
the partition and independence of India, Mountbatten’s stance concerning the
Princely States was essentially the same as that in the Cabinet Mission’s
‘Memorandum on Paramountcy’.
Although Mountbatten had been ignoring the Princely States and how they
would fit into the scheme of partition and withdrawal, Sir Conrad Corfield was
busy trying to safeguard the rights and privileges of the princes once paramountcy
had lapsed in August 1947. Before the appointment of Mountbatten, Corfield had
already been working for the restoration of full sovereign powers to the princes.
He had lifted all restrictions on Durbars; bestowed full powers on minor rulers
close to reaching the age of majority; asked Residents and Political Agents to limit
interference in internal matters of the states and even encouraged the biggest of
them to seek the path of full independence. Regarding especially Hyderabad, he
supported the Nizam’s offer to lease Goa from the Portuguese, so that Hyderabad
might have free access to the sea; asked for the removal of the Secunderabad
division of the Indian Army, and helped the Nizam obtain critical military
supplies at a time when the Interim Indian Government led by Nehru was not
much agreeable to their provision (Corfield, 1975: 151–2).
Corfield, without the knowledge of his superior Mountbatten, continued
down the path of preserving princely sovereignty when he travelled to London
with Lord Ismay, on 2 May 1947, to meet the Secretary of State for India, Lord
Listowel. Corfield believed that even though Mountbatten did not want the states
to become ‘independent’ after the lapse of paramountcy, his negligent behaviour
towards issues that affected the princes meant that he did not consider the
implications of the lapse of paramountcy and included this issue in the draft plan.
Corfield noted (quoted in Mosley, 1964: 162): ‘I do not think he understood, and
I did not explain, what the lapse of paramountcy would mean. My job was to
look after the interests of the Princely States. It was not part of my job to make
things easier for India.’ In London, Corfield met Lord Listowel, and secured from
him a pledge that the government would stick to the Cabinet Mission Draft
Memorandum on the Princely States, thereby ensuring that all powers would fully
revert back to the Princely States from the Crown on 15 August 1947. Hence,
when the 3 June plan was announced by Mountbatten for the partition of British
India into the two new dominions of India and Pakistan, the clauses that dealt
with the princes stated that with the lapse of paramountcy on 15 August 1947, all
powers surrendered by the princes to the paramount power would revert back to
the states.33
Mountbatten was furious when he got to know of Corfield’s trip to London.
When he was aboard a plane to London on 14 May 1947, where he was planning
to finalize the transfer of power process with the British cabinet, he, as recorded
by Mosley, ‘scribbled a message to V.P. Menon, who was a passenger with him,
saying: “D’you know what that son-of-a-bitch Corfield has done?”. “No, what?”
scribbled back Menon. “Sneaked back to India without telling me. I wonder what
he’s up to?”.’ Relations between the Viceroy and his Political Advisor were never
cordial after this, as Mountbatten came to regard Corfield with ever increasing
suspicion (Corfield, 1975: 153). As it happened, Corfield was not aware that
Mountbatten was supposed to leave on the morning of his arrival and even then
he thought it unnecessary to see Mountbatten when his trip to London to meet
the Secretary of State related merely to a re-confirmation of an old memorandum
(Corfield, 1975: 153).
Corfield, meanwhile, continued to labour on behalf of princely sovereignty.
Once back in India, he immediately started to act upon the brief he had come up
with with Lord Listowel. He ordered his staff in the Political Department to begin
cancelling all arrangements, such as the stationing of troops, the operation of
railways, the working of post offices, customs and the like, which had been made
between the paramount power, Britain, in the name of the states and British
India. He also ordered his staff to destroy all personal files on the princes that
could later be used by the dominions to blackmail the princes, while some
important documents were whisked off to the Imperial Archives through the
British High Commissioner (Corfield, 1975: 151–2).
These efforts were evidently contrary to Mountbatten’s own vision of
independent India. Until the 3 June plan, Mountbatten’s stance towards the states’
gaining full independence and forming a dominion had been negative, for he
thought that this was never a viable solution for them, even for the larger ones
(Hodson, 1985: 358). But Mountbatten’s scant interest in the fate of the states
gave the states an opportunity to make provisions for their future continued
sustenance. Hyderabad delegated a trade representative to London and Pakistan
and was negotiating a diplomatic post in France.34 Travancore sent representatives
to Delhi and Karachi and raised the question of diplomatic relations with
Turkey.35 Even Bhopal explored the possibility with Jinnah of forming a
northeastern states union in association with Pakistan.36
With only six weeks left before the transfer of power on 15 August 1947,
Mountbatten became aware of his other job as the Crown Representative,
something that he had been ignoring in breach of the duties entrusted to him.
Only in July did the princely problem become his ‘primary consideration’,37 when
he created another department, the States’ Department, under the direction of his
chosen minister, Sardar Vallabhai Patel, a leading member of the Congress, with
V.P. Menon as its secretary. Corfield protested against Mountbatten’s creation of
this department because he thought it would send the wrong signal to the princes
about paramountcy somehow being transferred (Corfield, 1975: 156). But
Mountbatten ignored these protests and set about working with Patel and the
States’ Department to chalk out a plan to make the princes accede to the
dominions. Menon then came up with a solution to solve the princely deadlock,
which suggested that the princes accede to either dominion initially on issues of
defence, communication and foreign policy, so that their merger with the
dominions would become much smoother and easier (Menon, 1956: 95–8).
Mountbatten approved of the plan but it took him some hours to persuade Patel
and Nehru to see the viability of the proposal. Mountbatten also promised Patel
that he would try his best to make most of the Indian states accede to the Indian
Dominion. He said: ‘I will do my best. If I give you a basket with, say, 560 apples
will you buy it? “Well, I might,” replied Patel’ (Hodson, 1985: 368). Sir Conrad
Corfield (1975: 158) noted that Mountbatten had not acted impartially as
Governor-General by endorsing the plans of the Congress, and neither had he
judiciously acted in the interest of the princes as Crown Representative:
I pointed out that, if he used his influence as the representative of the paramount
power to persuade the Rulers to enter into political arrangements with a successor
government, he would in my view be acting contrary to the spirit of the promises
made in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum. I understood that he had been
authorised by the Prime Minster to negotiate with individual states for adjusting
their relations with the Crown but not with successor governments.
Mountbatten, nevertheless, was resolute in his determination to make the states
accede to either dominion before the lapse date of 15 August 1947. He also
wanted to ensure that the greatest number of states join the future Indian
dominion. Mountbatten was vehemently against any notion of princely sover-
eignty and independence, and wanted to personally emphasize that the princes
had no option other than accession. He asked Corfield to call a Princes’
Conference on 25 July 1947, so that he could personally impress upon them to
accept this scheme. Although Corfield arranged the conference, he could not agree
with the princely future proposed by Mountbatten. Instead, he left India for good
on 22 July 1947, three days before the Conference, ‘with a feeling of nausea, as
though my own honour had been smirched and I had deserted my friends’
(Corfield, 1975: 158). Without Corfield to object, Mountbatten used the 25 July
conference to simply demand princely accession. The Conference was an event
full of theatrics: Mountbatten in complete viceregal regalia addressed for the first
and last time the packed Princes’ Chamber in the scorching heat of Delhi. At the
meeting, Mountbatten told the princes that they had to make the tough choice of
accession, and the plan that the Congress was offering was probably the best they
could get out of them. As Campbell-Johnson (1953: 140), Mountbatten’s press
secretary, reported:
He used every weapon in his armoury of persuasion, making it clear at the outset
that in the proposed Instrument of Accession, which V. P. Menon had devised,
[the Princes] were being provided with a political offer from Congress which was
not likely to be repeated. . . . He reminded them that after the fifteenth of August
he would no longer be in a position to mediate on their behalf as Crown
Representative, and warned those Princes who were hoping to build up their own
store of arms that the weapons they would get would in any case be obsolete.
He bullied and bantered the princes in his one-hour lecture, which was closed to
the press. As Mosley (1964: 172) sarcastically wrote, he picked the Princes out,
like schoolchildren and asked them whether they would sign the Instrument . . .
they had come to the meeting convinced that the Viceroy was going to save them
and their privileges from the encroachments of the Congress vandals. After all, he
was one of them, wasn’t he? . . . He looked every inch a cousin of the King,
symbol of their hopes, protector of their privileges [sic].
Mountbatten forcefully got his point across. At one point, a Dewan, who
Mountbatten had pointed to, said that he did not have any instructions from his
Maharaja on the future course of action. Mountbatten picked up a round glass
paperweight from the podium and said, in the words of Campbell-Johnson (1953:
141–2):
‘I will look into my crystal’ he said, ‘and give you an answer.’ There followed ten
seconds of dramatic pause when you could have heard a princely pin drop. ‘His
Highness’, Mountbatten solemnly announced, ‘asks you to sign the Instrument of
Accession’.
Moreover, he wanted almost all the princes to seek their futures with India.
During the conference, he had elucidated his unwritten clause that only states
contiguous to either dominion should accede to it. He said: ‘The States are
theoretically free to link their future with whichever Dominion they may care. But
when I say that they are at liberty . . . may I point out that there are certain
geographical compulsions which can not be evaded’ (Hodson, 1985: 358). This
Mountbatten ‘rule’ of contiguity left a mere 14 states for Pakistan to woo and the
remaining 548 states for India to handle.
By that time, Mountbatten had adopted the firm view that there was only one
option for the princes, accession to either dominion. Failing that, he would not
commit to their continued existence. Almost all the princes left the scene
confused, frightened and sorrowful. The Conference showed the princes that
Mountbatten was not working as Crown Representative for their interests, but
had already gone to the side of the Congress and was helping it secure as many
Princely States as possible before the lapse of paramountcy. One princely state
minister later related to Corfield his reaction to Mountbatten’s speech that ‘he
now knew what Dolfuss felt like when he was sent for to see Hitler; he had not
expected to be spoken to like that by a British Officer: after a moment’s pause he
withdrew the word “British”’.38 Other princes, too, were bitter about the role
Mountbatten played as Viceroy in bullying them to sign the Instruments of
Accession and in his aggressive support of the Congress. The Maharawal of
Dungarpur bemoaned (Trench, 1987: 347):
It was an end brought about by one man . . . By making them sign the
Instrument of Accession, the Viceroy perpetrated the rape of the States. Had the
Princes been left alone, Congress could never have got them to sign away their
powers and heritage within a fortnight. No, never! . . . the Princes expected justice
and fair play, not lies and half truths to beguile them into a snare.
Whitehall, too, criticized Mountbatten’s actions, which lay outside his role as the
Governor-General and Crown Representative in India. The Secretary of State for
India, Lord Listowel, noted in his 29 July 1947 report to Prime Minister Attlee
that Mountbatten has acted personally and outside his officially sanctioned role:
That in his discussions with States’ representatives the Viceroy is acting as
mediator in his personal capacity and not on the advice of his Ministers either in
form or in fact. We are therefore answerable in a special way for what he may do
and it would seem advisable to warn him of the dangers, particularly in view of
the importance which the Opposition attaches to no pressure being put on the
Princes by us.39
Mountbatten’s actions were even a source of concern in Parliament, as Lord
Salisbury explained his view to Harold Macmillan: ‘I am afraid the Viceroy . . .
has not played a very distinguished part over the Princes. Whatever the
Government may have said about our not bringing pressure on them, we have in
fact never ceased to bully and badger them to come in, and I suspect that this will
leave a legacy of bitterness among our best friends’.40
Mountbatten, however, clearly and shrewdly, ignored these protests and kept
on insisting that the princes accede. Shortly after the conference, while referring to
the Nizam of Hyderabad’s intention of remaining independent, he said: ‘If His
Exalted Highness did not join the Dominion [presumably India], his state would
be ruined and he would lose his throne’.41 This statement proved to be so true in
hindsight, for shortly after the departure of Mountbatten in June 1948, India
rejected Hyderabad’s declaration of independence and occupied and then annexed
the state of Hyderabad in September 1948. What is of note here is Mountbatten’s
view that there was no other option for the Nizam than to accede to India; he
simply would not accept anything else.
With the 15 August 1947 transfer of power barely 20 days away,
Mountbatten, who was still acting as the Crown Representative, and therefore was
supposed to look after the interest of the states, started to work with Patel and
Menon to make a majority of the states accede to India, because after that date it
would have been hard to deal with states that had become technically independent
with the lapse of paramountcy. Mountbatten personally got involved in the case of
Indore, whose Maharaja was very elusive and did not reply to many invitations by
Mountbatten and the States’ Department. Mountbatten called on him and asked
him to accede to India, which he did, but not before threatening to kill Menon
with a pistol pen (Hodson, 1985: 376–7). The case of Jodhpur was also
interesting. Here was a Rajput, Hindu majority state, contiguous with both India
and Pakistan. Reportedly, Jinnah was keen that Jodhpur accede to Pakistan and
had given the Maharaja a blank piece of paper to list all his demands. Here, too,
Mountbatten intervened and called the Maharaja to Delhi to let him know that
his accession to Pakistan would be completely unacceptable, and prevailed upon
him to accede to India (Hodson, 1985: 377–8).
Most princes, however, were so disheartened by the lack of support from the
Crown Representative, Mountbatten, that they saw the inevitable and signed
willingly or unwillingly on the dotted line. Some princes even introduced drama
as they signed away their rights and royal life. The Maharaja of Baroda, a close
friend of Mountbatten, wept like a child in front of Menon, and one Raja
suffered a heart attack immediately after signing the Instrument of Accession
(Mosley, 1964: 176). Arrogant states like Travancore were softened up by
Congress protests (the Dewan, Sir C.P. Aiyer was stabbed by a mob, allegedly
supported by Congress) and brought into the Indian fold. Even Bhopal, which
had been so keen to achieve independence, was left with no option but to accede
to India. The Nawab of Bhopal did so with the request that the news of his
accession to India should not be announced until 10 days after independence
(Hodson, 1985: 375).
Mountbatten was the person the princes looked up to in the face of the
republican chants of both the Congress and the Muslim League. His declaration
that accession under the three subjects of defence, foreign policy and communica-
tions was the best deal the princes could expect made a number of them resign
themselves to their fate. Even this plan, Mountbatten knew, was not going to
stick; for during his term as Governor-General of India, Patel and Menon went
ahead and established several groupings of states in direct contravention of the
Instruments of Accession, but Mountbatten did not bring either of them to
account. As Roberts (1994: 102) notes, the assurances Mountbatten gave the
princes if they acceded ‘were soon to be totally worthless, as Mountbatten knew
them to be when he made them’. Mountbatten was the last hope of the princes,
but as the events turned out, the princes had hoped in vain.
End of an Era: Whom to Blame?

By the end of 1948, the odd phenomenon known as the Princely States of India
had almost disappeared from the map of the Indian Empire. Two new dominions
of India and Pakistan, both within the Commonwealth, had appeared on the
horizon with all the 562 Princely States absorbed in either of them. The class that
had enchanted Western as well as local people was no longer ruling and within a
lifetime most of the former ruling princes were derecognized in both countries.
Who is to blame for the princely debacle of 1947, which led to their eventual
virtual extinction? Certainly the princes themselves have to bear some responsibil-
ity for the fate they met in 1947. They had failed to introduce any meaningful
kind of responsible government in their states, making them vulnerable to
Congress pressure about improvement of governance. Their relatively eccentric
ways of lives, moreover, were emblems of an era that was not going to last for
long. They had to mend their ways to ensure their continued existence, and their
stubbornness to initiate such changes caught them in a trap that finally led to
their doom. Their internal disunity further marred their chances, in a significant
manner, both inside the Constituent Assembly and in negotiations with the
Congress, leaving them defenseless against a powerful and revengeful nationalist
Indian government.
But, more importantly, Lord Mountbatten was to blame for the fate the
princes met at the hands of both the Indian and Pakistani governments. He was
the sole person the princes trusted with their welfare, and many rulers would
never have signed the Instruments of Accession, had the King’s trusted representa-
tive not told them that this was the best path to follow.42 The princes were not
aware, and neither did they expect, that the Crown Representative would be hand
in glove with the Congress. Roberts (1994: 102) noted that Mountbatten himself
‘might have been responsible for a situation which they could hardly have foreseen
– of a British Viceroy completely in the pocket of people they despised as a gaggle
of lawyers’, suggesting that one could hardly blame this on the Princes. On the
same note, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali (1967: 232), an eminent Pakistani
politician, also wrote that ‘perhaps the princes were doomed to extinction anyhow,
but that they should have been coaxed and driven to the slaughterhouse by the
shepherd they trusted most is what adds poignancy to the scene’. Mountbatten
thus appears to have breached the princes’ trust in their most dire moment,
leading them to lose all respect for a person they once acclaimed as their best ally.
Lord Mountbatten’s role as the Crown Representative in India is perhaps one
of the shameful aspects of his illustrious career. As the Crown Representative, he
was supposed to ensure that the interests of the princely states were looked after
vis-a-vis British India. He also was supposed to advise the rulers upon the course
of action they should take after the transfer of power. Lord Mountbatten fulfilled
this role, but on his own terms. From the time he came to India till a month after
the proclamation of the 3 June plan, Mountbatten ignored the fate of the princes.
He did not approve of his political advisor’s plan for princely sovereignty, nor did
he himself have a plan to deal with the princely states till late in his Viceroyalty.
Furthermore, in grave violation of his duty as Crown Representative, he supported
the Congress by personally asking, and in some cases even threatening, the princes
to accede to India before the lapse date of 15 August 1947. Even when he did
consider the fate of the princes, as when he called the conference on 25 July 1947,
he used every method in his command to make the princes feel humiliated,
encircled, and helpless.
That Mountbatten was wholly on the side of the new Indian Dominion, in
grave breach of his impartial role as the Viceroy and Governor-General of the
whole of British India, was even noted by his predecessor, Lord Wavell, when he
observed that Mountbatten had ‘very much gone over to the congress side . . .
says Jinnah has become an impossible megalomaniac and that Nehru has shown
himself a really great man’ (Roberts, 1994: 105).
The princes’ trust was thus betrayed, by the British Government, which did
not fulfil due treaty obligations, by the British Indian leaders who made
agreements with them only later to break them, and most importantly by the
Crown Representative, Lord Mountbatten, the cousin of the King-Emperor, who
insisted that they sign virtually their own death warrants.
Notes
1 I am greatly indebted to Dr Laura A. Crago for guiding and editing this article.
2 Nehru to Bhopal, 9 July 1948, cited in Gopal (1987, Vol. 7: 5).
3 For a favourable view of Mountbatten, see Ziegler (1985); for a critical view see
Roberts (1994) with a chapter on ‘Lord Mountbatten and the Perils of Adrenalin’.
4 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 30 April 1860, India Office Records, quoted in Copland
(1997: 16).
5 For the attitude of the Nizam of Hyderabad see Government of India (1919: 155–6).
For the attitude of the Mysore Government, see M. Visvesvarayya on joint deliberations
between the Government of India and the Princes, 11 October 1918, Foreign and
Political Department, Proceedings, June 1919, No. 12, found in Desika Char (1983:
526).
6 House of Commons 1934–35. Vol. 16, 1163–4, cited in Sever (1985: 571).
7 House of Commons 1934–35. Vol. 16, 1163–4, cited in Sever (1985: 571).
8 For the Congress reaction, see Azad to Cripps, 10 April 1942, in Mansergh et al.
(1972–83, Vol. 1: 587), hereafter referred to as TOP. For the resolution of the Muslim
League, see Muslim League Working Committee Resolution, 11 April 1942, TOP, Vol.
1: 748–51.
9 For the failure of the Mission, see Cripps to Churchill, 10 April 1942, TOP, Vol. 1:
588. On the Congress Quit India Movement, see Majumdar (1969, Vol. 9: 646–8).
10 Amery to Churchill, 25 Feb. 1942, TOP, Vol. 1: 240.
11 Speech of 28 April 1942, in Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, House of Commons
col. 379, Cols. 826–917, quoted in Secretary of State to Viceroy, 29 April 1942, June
1942, TOP, Vol. 1: 866.
12 Draft letter from Political Secretary to Chancellor, 14 Dec. 1942, TOP, Vol. 3: 370.
13 Linlithgow to Amery 13 Sept. 1943, TOP, Vol. 4: 244.
14 Minutes of India and Burma Committee, 11 Sept. 1945, TOP, Vol. 6: 253.
15 Nehru’s press conference, 10 July 1946, TOP, Vol. 8: 25.
16 Resolution passed by the All India Muslim League Council at Bombay, 29 July 1942,
TOP, Vol. 8: 86.
17 India (Cabinet Mission). Statement by the Mission dated 25th May 1946 in reply to
Pronouncements by the Indian Parties and Memorandum by the Mission on States’ Treaties
and Paramountcy (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1946), pp. 11–12, as found
in Sever (1985, Vol. 2: 605–6).
18 For the number of states, see Indian Statutory Commission (London: HM Stationary
Office, 1930). For the All India States’ People Congress resolution, see Kulkarni (1985:
82).
19 Note by Corfield to Mountbatten on interview with Nehru, 27 April 1947, TOP, Vol.
10: 463.
20 Hyderabad to Wavell, 13 May 1946, TOP, Vol. 7: 543.
21 Bhopal to Corfield, 23 Nov. 1946, TOP, Vol. 9: 156–7.
22 Wylie to Wavell, 7 Feb. 1947, TOP, Vol. 9: 640.
23 Note by Bikaner, 2 April 1947, quoted in the Free Press Journal, April 3, 1947, as cited
in Copland (1997: 237).
24 Nehru’s speech in the Constituent Assembly, 13 Dec. 1946, in Gopal (1987, Vol. 1:
242).
25 Mr Panikkar to Major Woodson Wyatt, TOP, Vol. 9: 724–6.
28 Remark by Sir Stafford Cripps in Cabinet Delegation and Wavell meeting minutes, 28
March 1946, TOP, Vol. 7: 25.
29 Attlee to Bevin, 2 January 1947, TOP, Vol. 9: 445–7.
30 Mountbatten to Cripps, 26 January 1947, TOP, Vol. 9: 553.
31 Maharaja of Bikaner to Lord Mountbatten, 3 April 1947, TOP, Vol. 11: 108.
32 Personal Report Number 12, 11 July 1947, TOP, Vol. 12: 99.
33 Note of discussion at India Office with Corfield, 9 May 1947, TOP, Vol. 10: 718.
34 Listowel to Mountbatten, 19 July 1947, TOP, Vol. 12: 266.
35 Interview between Sir C.P. Aiyer and Mr Symon, 21 July 1947, TOP, Vol. 12: 281.
36 Interview of Wavell with Bhopal, 3 March 1947, TOP, Vol. 9: 834.
37 Minutes of Viceroy’s 55th Staff Meeting, 9 July 1947, TOP, Vol. 12: 36.
38 India Office Records, Mss D 850/6–7, quoted in Ziegler (1985: 409).
39 Emphasis in original. Listowel to Attlee, 29 July 1947, TOP, Vol. 12: 403.
40 Hatfield Papers, K3, quoted in Roberts (1994: 102).
41 Meeting between Mountbatten, the Nawab of Chattari, Mockton, and Menon, 3
August 1947, TOP, Vol. 12: 496–7.
42 For the princes’ stance, see Travancore to Mountbatten, 30 July 1947 and Kolhapur to
Mountbatten, 11 Aug. 1947, TOP, Vol. 12: 414 and 654.
References
Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad (1967) The Emergence of Pakistan. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Campbell-Johnson, Alan (1953) Mission with Mountbatten. New York: E.P. Dutton and
Company.
Chamber of Princes (1947) Proceedings of the Meetings of the Chamber of Princes on April 2,
1947. New Delhi: Chamber of Princes.
Copland, Ian (1997) The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917–47. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Corfield, Sir Conrad (1975) The Princely India I Knew, from Reading to Mountbatten.
Madras: Indo-British Historical Society.
Desika Char, S.V. (ed.) (1983) Readings in the Constitutional History of India 1757-1947.
New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Gopal, S. (ed.) (1987) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. Second Series. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Government of India (1919) Proceedings of the Conference of Ruling Princes and Chiefs. New
Delhi: Superintendent Government Printing.
Hodson, A.V. (1985) The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Keith, A.B. (ed.) (1922) Documents and Speeches on Indian Policy, 1750–1921. London:
Oxford University Press.
Kulkarni, V.B. (1985) Princely India and the Lapse of British Paramountcy. Bombay: Konam.
Majumdar, R.C. (ed.) (1969) The History and Culture of the Indian People. Bombay:
Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.
Mankekar, D.R. (1974) Accession to Extinction: The Story of the Indian Princes. New Delhi:
Vikas.
Mansergh, Nicholas, Moon, Penderal & Lumby, E.W.R. (eds) (1972–83) Transfer of Power
1942–7. 12 Volumes. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Menon, V.P. (1956) The Integration of the Indian States. Calcutta: Orient Longman.
Mosley, Leonard (1964) The Last Days of the British Raj. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicholson.
Nehru, Jawaharlal (1985) Autobiography. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Roberts, Andrew (1994) Eminent Churchillians. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
Sever, Adrian (ed.) (1985) Documents and Speeches on the Indian Princely States. New Delhi:
B.R. Publication Corporation.
Trench, Charles (1987) Viceroy’s Agent. London: Jonathan Cape.
Verma, S.M. (1990) Chamber of Princes 1921–47. New Delhi: National Book Organis-
ation.
Ziegler, Philip (1985) Mountbatten. New York: Knopf.
Yaqoob Khan Bangash is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame, IN, USA
and presently a DPhil student in Modern History at Keble College, University of
Oxford. His research interests centre on modern South Asian history, especially
the princely states of India. His current thesis focuses on the integration of the
states that acceded to Pakistan in 1947–8.
Address: Keble College, Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3PG, UK. [email:
yaqoob.bangash@history.ox.ac.uk]

Betrayal of Trust Princely States of India and The Transfer of Power Yaqoob Khan Bangash

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BETRAYAL OF TRUST: PRINCELY STATES

Introduction: Collapse of Princely Rule

Princely Disunity during British Rule

As it increasingly became apparent that British control of the Indian sub-

dismay at the deterioration of princely unison and an increase in communal

Failure to introduce responsible government in their states also led to a

Role of Lord Mountbatten

It is a matter of much gratification to the princes generally and particularly to me, in

The princes believed that, as Crown Representative, Mountbatten would do his

End of an Era: Whom to Blame?

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