Wild Valley Shipping Co.

Ltd vs Court of Appeals

GR No. 119602 October 6, 2000

Facts: Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private
respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and
when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was
designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River.
He was asked to pilot the said vessel on February 11, 1988 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m. The master (captain)
of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel’s
third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port at 1:40 a.m. on February 12,
1988. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way. The Philippine Roxas experienced some
vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel at mile 172. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot
assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. Between mile 158 and
157, the vessel again experienced some vibrations.These occurred at 4:12 a.m.It was then that the watch officer
called the master to the bridge. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the
centre of the channel. He then went to confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. He ordered
Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks. At around 4:35
a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River,thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a
result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd.,
was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance
Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest
thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.

Issue: Whether or not the Venezuelan law should be applied.

Held: 

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory:

(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; (2) It
must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.

The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith
and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. With respect to proof of
written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best
evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute. At this
juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower
court.

A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the
existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in
issue.
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that
the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction
of Venezuela. We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must
be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a
foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and
this is known as processual presumption.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and
HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City,

FACTS:

Saudia hired Morada as a flight attendant based in Jeddah. On April 27, 1990, while on
a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada became a victim of attempted rape by fellow
crewmembers, Thamer and Allah, who are both Saudi nationals.

Upon Morada's return to Jeddah, she was interrogated by the officials of Saudia about
the incident and requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of
Thamer and Allah. Later, she learned that after two weeks of imprisonment, Thamer
and Allah were allowed to deported through the help of the Saudi Arabian government.
Eventually, the two were again in service at SAUDI while Morada was transferred to the
Philippines. When Morada was requested by her superiors, her passport was taken
from her and was pressured to drop the case or her passport will not be returned. She
eventually agreed to such request just to get her passport back.

Morada was summoned to Jeddah by her employer on various dates after the incident
in order to sign documents, purporting to be statements dropping the case against
Thamer and Allah. However, it turned out that a case was in fact filed against her before
the Saudi court, which later found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing
and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male
crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.

Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi, its
country manager.

ISSUE:

Whether the Phlippine law should govern in this case.

HELD:

Yes.

Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign

element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a "conflicts"
case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of
two or more states is said to contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign
element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations
are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. The foreign
element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or
has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves
properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a
complex form.

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent
Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident
foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner
Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel
across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise.

The SC found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take
cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek
remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer
maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to
her.

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and

inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the
plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.

TIME, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, ELISEO S. ZARI, as
Deputy Clerk of Court, Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS and
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

An economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) allegedly uttered defamatory
words against fellow ADB worker on two occasions. He was charged before the MeTC of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation. He was arrested but released on
bail to the custody of Security Officer of ADB. The MeTC receive an office protocol from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
processes under Section 45 of the Agreement between ADB and the Philippine Government.
Based on this protocol, the MeTC judge dismissed the two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, RTC Pasig annulled
and set aside the order of the MeTC dismissing the criminal cases.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the immunity of International Organization is absolute.

RULING: 

The determination whether the statements made by petitioner were uttered while in the
performance of his official functions is necessary so that the immunity may be granted to the
petitioner. The Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development Bank under
Section 45 (a) provides that officers and staff of the Bank, including experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy immunity from legal process with respect to acts
performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
The immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts
performed in an official capacity. Immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime such as
slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.  Slander, in general, cannot be
considered as falling within the scope of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel.

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,

vs.
WILLIAM FOWLER, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Facts:

In August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of 16 champagne bottles worth
20 dollars while on board the vessel, “Lawton”. The counsel for defendants alleged to the Court
of First Instance of Manila that they were without jurisdiction over the crime charged. Since it
happened in the high seas and not in the city of Manila or in the territory in which the
jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the case be dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the criminal case theft
committed on board while navigating on high seas on a vessel not registered in the Philippines.

Held:
No. The Philippine court has jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high seas on
board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. The English Rule states that such
crimes are triable in our country when crimes are committed on board a foreign vessel sailing
from a foreign port and which enters the Philippine waters. In the case at bar, the vessel
Lawton was navigating the high seas at the commission of the crime. Given the location of the
vessel at the time, such act is not triable within our jurisdiction.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

Facts:

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that urges the
revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the
defendant. The defendant, accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and
a half miles from the shores of the city. In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack
of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.

Held:

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the Philippine
courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said that having the opium
smoked within our territorial waters even though aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of
the public order because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory.
Therefore, the demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered further proceedings.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and internal revenue
agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo,
and found two sacks containing opium. The defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had
bought these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the intention of selling them as contraband in
Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as his hold had already been searched several times for opium he
ordered two other chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes
corpus delicti.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hong
Kong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu.

Issue:

Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in
its port.

Held:

Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere possession of a thing of
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not,
as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such
vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality. However, the same rule does not
apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippines, in the present case, a can
of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation
of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime. Only the court established
in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.

Suzara vs. Benipayo