Sage Publications, Inc. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political

Power in Democracy Promotion
Author(s): Jonas Wolff

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219-236
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Article
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political

2015, Vol. 40(3-4) 219-236
Power in Democracy ) The Author(s) 2015

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DOI: 10.1177/0304375415612269
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Jonas Wolff1
Abstract
The international promotion of democracy is about power, but the scholarship on this issue offer
little systematic attention to the role and relevance that power might have in this context Thi
article critically discusses the literature that does explicitly deal with power in democracy pro
motion and proposes a multidimensional perspective as a way to improve our understanding of th
international politics of democracy promotion. First the typology of power proposed by Barne
and Duvall is applied to systematically conceptualize the power dimension of democracy promotio
Second, the article revisits the two main attempts to theoretically grasp the role and relevance o
power in democracy promotion that draw on the Realist concept of relative power and the neo
Gramscian theory of hegemony, respectively. In both cases, the article argues, a multidimensiona
concept of power is analytically useful, as it enables an understanding of the complex nature o
democracy promotion that goes beyond interstate relations and includes the attempt to change t
very constitution of the recipient or target country from within.
Keywords
democracy promotion, power, hegemony, Realism, neo-Gramscianism analysis
Introduction
International democracy promotion is concerned with power, in many respects. By supporting l

agents of democratic change, external democracy promoters shape domestic balances of power.1 In tr
ing to get governments in target countries to embark on democratic reforms they would not otherw
pursue, democracy promoters also themselves exercise power.2 In order to project such political powe
democracy promoters need the capacity to do so, that is, they require corresponding relative power v
à-vis the targets.3 This multiple relation between power and international democracy promotion
rooted in the subject matter. On the one hand, democracy as a system of political rule "is above
a matter of power," and democratization is basically a process of redistributing political power.4
the other hand, as a unidirectional relationship between a promoter and a "recipient" or "targ
democracy promotion almost by definition mirrors asymmetric international power relations.5
Given the unresolved debate about the concept of power in the analysis of international relation
it does not come as a surprise that there is no consensus view on the role and relevance of "power
' Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Germany
Corresponding Author
Jonas Wolff, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Baseler Str. 27-31, 60329 Frankfurt, Germany.
Email: wolff@hsfk.de
220 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 40(3-4)
the international promotion of democracy. What is surprising, h

lars have so far paid to this issue when studying democracy pr
"paradoxical" situation Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall ob
to global governance that the increasing attention to this topic
eration of power."7 In this sense, the present article aims at ini
power in the academic study of democracy promotion. It, there
scholarship on democracy promotion that explicitly deals with
sional perspective on power as a way to improve our understan
of democracy promotion.
The article proceeds in two steps. The first section draws on c
in the analysis of international relations, and particularly on th
Barnett and Duvall,8 in order to systematically grasp the differe
tion is about exercising power. In line with Barnett and Duvall
power, I argue that power in democracy promotion does not onl
ters somehow exert coercion in the sense of compulsory power.
from within the very constitution of a given target state, demo
what Barnett and Duvall call structural and productive kinds o
constitutive (structural and productive) kinds of power cannot
(re)sources and the effects of constitutive power lie beyond th
democracy promoter and its target. The second section then revi
promotion research that have explicitly dealt with power, name
Realism and neo-Gramscian international political economy, re
approaches to democracy promotion, I will show that both woul
perspective on power and, in particular, from recognizing the c
tive power in democracy promotion. Because democracy promo
target countries from within, power cannot be limited conceptua
exercising "power over" a given recipient.
Although sympathetic to the neo-Gramscian perspective, this
defend a specific theoretic approach to democracy promotion. R
mensional concept of power is useful also for analyses of democ
by different (for instance, Realist or Liberal) theoretical perspe
constitutive (structural and productive) dimensions of power e
is so difficult, so limited in its ability to achieve the kind of ef
in fact, so contradictory.
In focusing on power in democracy promotion, this article does
tion should be viewed as power politics and nothing else. As Mart
have argued, "power politics rarely explains all international out
power risks missing the underlying dynamic of international af
tional democracy promotion. At the same time, the overall aim of t
conceptual nature. It is written as an issue-specific contributio
power" in international relations.10 Consequently, I deliberatel
related to this issue: how can we conceptualize power in democra
we conceive of democracy promotion as an exercise of power?
shaping democracy promotion? and what is it that detennin
promotion?
In what follows, I use a broad definition of democracy promot
that external actors take with the declared aim to contribute to
ing, or defending democracy in another country. Such activities
and diplomatic appeals to democratic conditionality (incenti
Wolff 22[
military force. D
concern the deli
ment aid."
Generally, demo
national organiz
the focus here w
only as instrum
Although democ
of activities in th
I cannot discuss
power of multil
however, does n
for democracy p
racy assistance.
and business ass
democracy prom
racy promotion.
The above defi
Democracy prom
This means, first
the conception o
ity as democrac
sponding effect
kind of democra
Conceptuali
In order to grasp
multidimensiona
This approach is
substantially bro
beyond notions
motion do not c
concept of power
the capacities of
the production,
trol their fate."1
ymous with caus
about such kinds
at the "multiple
ing at the conne
power is indeed
promotion.
Barnett and Duvall's four types of power are defined by differences in terms of two analytical
dimensions. On the one hand, "power is either an attribute of particular actors and their interactions
or a social process of constituting what actors are as social beings, that is, their social identities and
capacities."20 On the other, there are different degrees "to which the social relations through which
power works are direct and socially specific or indirect and socially diffuse."21 The resulting four
types of power are (1) compulsory power, which refers to "relations of interaction of direct control
Table I. Barnett and Duvall's Four Types of Power and Democracy Pr
General
Type of power characteristics Application to democracy promo
Compulsory power Actor-centered Concerns the capacity of democr

and direct behavior of (actors in) recipient countr
Institutional power Actor-centered Concerns the capacity to indirec
and diffuse through a democracy promoter's impac
institutions and nongovernmental organization
Structural power Constitutive and Concerns the capacity to directly
direct between democracy promoter and recipi
structural conditions in recipient countries thr
(actors in) recipient countries
Productive power Constitutive and Concerns the capacity to indirec
diffuse relations and the structural conditions in
through effects on general systems of knowle
practices
Source: Author's compilation based on Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics."
by one actor over another"; (2) institutional power, which refers to "the control actors exercise
indirectly over others through diffuse relations of interaction"; (3) structural power, which concerns
"the constitution of subjects' capacities in direct structural relation to one another"; and (4) produc
tive power, which concerns "the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning
and signification."22
The former two types of power refer to an actor-centered kind of power over: compulsory power
directly refers to Robert Dahl's definition of power as a relation that enables control ("A has power
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.")23 and
includes Realist approaches; the notion of institutional power has been emphasized especially by the
literature on international institutions and regimes. The latter two types of power, by contrast, refer
to a constitutive kind of "power to": structural power, in particular, takes up the neo-Gramscian
expansion of the concept of power as prominently developed by Steven Lukes, while the notion
of productive power draws explicitly on Michel Foucault.24 Table 1 summarizes Barnett and
Duvall's four types of power. The ways in which they can be applied to democracy promotion, also
summarized in the table, will be outlined in the following.
Power is a social phenomenon, a property or opportunity characterizing a social relationship.25
As defined in the Introduction, democracy promotion concerns activities by an external actor that
take place in or are related to another country, this relationship, at least, includes such an external
actor and one or more recipient(s) in the target country. This holds true no matter if we are concerned
with intergovernmental democracy promotion through diplomatic appeals, with official develop
ment cooperation between aid agencies and local "partners" or with purely nongovernmental rela
tions between international and local NGOs. Democracy promotion is, thus, exercised in "relations
of interaction of actors,"26 which points to the first two—actor-oriented—types of power over.
Actor<entered Power in Democracy Promotion: Compulsory and Institutional

By definition, democracy promotion is about exercising compulsory power: it refers to "relations
between actors that allow one to shape directly the circumstances or actions of another."27 This
is unequivocal in the case of democracy promotion by imposition28 or "foreign-imposed regime
change."29 But promoting democracy by exerting pressure or imposing conditionality also includes
the use of direct power: even if democracy promoters avoid outright coercion and no matter their
Wolff 223
potentially "be
ment, they ai
to."30 This is
Democracy pro
abilities (milita
bution of mate
On the other
Gramscian read
promoters do a
an explicit con
power" (i.e., co
is precisely see
Bridoux distin
different conn
ceptualization,
countries to w
do what it wan
ideological, or
But why shou
raised by dip
involve (the us
on "collective
ideal-type per
not shaped by
power related
fundamental t
promotion alw
democracy and
relationship co
fundamentally
In addition, d
and the effect
Organization
norms establis
appropriate str
the kind of di
These are exam
exercises powe
influence on i
American coun
through the r
democracy pro
their policies.
projects. The c
racy promoter
Agency for In
racy assistance
through its of
(GIZ) and the
Constitutive Power in Democracy Promotion: Structural an

Democracy promotion is by definition about (external) actors t
democracy promotion cannot be grasped by looking only at th
promoter and a recipient or target. The specific thing about dem
areas of foreign policy, is that it is intentional action that does n
their counterparts in other countries but on altering the domest
these counterparts are embedded."44 Democracy promoters, th
effects in the sense of the other two types of power. Even if a don
amount of) control over a given recipient government or NGO t
two, the real target (the shape of the political regime in quest
vioral relations."45 In their attempt to shape the political regime
moters normally have neither direct nor indirect "control [...
and/or the actions" of the recipient.46 This points to constitut
tive—power.
In less theoretical and more policy-oriented terms, this power d
has been highlighted by what Peter Burnell has dubbed the "Car
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and, in particu
sized that democratization implies "struggles over power" 8 an
fore, is about redistributing political power by strengthening
look most likely to make a difference."49 But supporting speci
order to make a difference, democracy promoters also have to
ships and structures of power at work in any particular sector th
issue at hand is what Nicolas Guilhot has called the "intrinsical
racy promotion: "To promote democracy is fundamentally to pr
ing societies from the grass-roots level of civil society to
transforming their economies as well in the process."51
Thus, democracy promotion involves much more than the di
power external actors exercise over local recipients or targe
ing in target countries with a view to shape their domesti
structural and productive power. They change from within
counterpart: its properties, capacities, and also its interests
tive effects in tenus of democracy promotion thus depend
otherwise, democracy promoters do nothing but produce "
promoters directly interact with actors on the recipient sid
(indirectly) contributing to the establishment, in other (re
political institutions and democratic "change agents" (stru
overall "democratic political culture," that is, generalized s
tion (productive power).54
Furthermore, just like the capital-labor and master-slave relat
Duvall, donor-recipient relations in the area of democracy prom
social structures constitute unequal social privileges and capacit
promotion, however, the logic behind this asymmetric relation
cient" recipients are to become what the donors already are. Loo
perspective of structural power, then, shows that democracy pr
target country: at least a critical bloc of domestic actors has to
the notion of a deficient state of their country, while accepting
that shows to the recipient country "the image of its own futu
sion. This relationship, as internalized by the recipient, therefore
Wolff 225
power base on
structural pow
edge and discu
enced by the de
refers to the i
developed and
as good govern
In sum, const
two related w
exercise in sh
above), but th
resources in o
democracy pr
tions that con
largely depend
"desires."59 In
age" by Weste
"extensive lin
"shapes the p
and "redistrib
thus, involves
same time, th
embedded in
democracy pro
dimensions of
of power in de
Analyzing
of Power
Two types of scholars working on democracy promotion have explicitly dealt with power: th
informed by neoclassical Realism and those drawing on neo-Gramscian international poli
economy. In this section, I will discuss these two approaches to democracy promotion in orde
to show that both would benefit from a multidimensional perspective on power. With a view
the Realist perspective, which is characterized by a narrow focus on relative power understo
solely in terms of compulsion, the multidimensional power concept demonstrates that the diffe
ways in which democracy promotion implies and requires an exercise of power concern not o
the (more or less coercive) instruments used but also the kinds of effects that are to be produc
Acknowledging the constitutive dimension of power, I will argue, allows for broadening the
list explanation of variance in democracy promotion policies so that it can better grasp observa
empirical patterns.
Recognizing the need of democracy promoters to exercise power also in institutional, structu
and productive terms has crucial consequences for the neo-Gramscian perspective on democra
promotion, too. As will be shown, prominent neo-Gramscian interpretations of democracy prom
tion, while including a deliberate attempt to go beyond a narrow, materialist notion of power
hegemony, very much stick to a compulsory (top-down) understanding of power. The multidim
sional concept of power, I argue, enables differentiating the neo-Gramscian attempt to theor
democracy promotion so that it can better capture the contradictions inherent to the very ende
to promote democracy from the outside.
Explaining Variance in Democracy Promotion Policies: Revi

In drawing on neoclassical Realism, scholars such as Henry Nau
min Miller64 have emphasized that "relative power" is a signif
racy promotion by constraining and enabling "the capability to
democratic change."65 Power, here, is used as an explanatory fac
Miller have argued that shifts in relative (US) power help expla
have adopted democracy promotion as a major goal of their fo
to use military force in its pursuit, while others have not (or mu
tioned regards (relative) power as the one cause that explains eve
grate identity-based and/or perceptual factors into their theore
regarded a necessary, if not sufficient, "precondition to actively
Because the relative power of a would-be democracy promoter
influence on a given target state, relative power is regarded an
explain variance in the democracy promotion policies of states
In line with (neoclassical) Realism, power is defined as relative
relative distribution of material capabilities among states. Monte
ing Realist argument that "as their relative power rises states wi
it falls their actions and ambitions will be scaled back according
lism is defined as the material capabilities "with which states ca
power is understood as "the relative amount of material power r
a materialist definition of power is explicitly defended against a
forward, most prominently, by Dahl: neoclassical Realists see D
that enables control (see above) as practically unusable and also
power here is defined by its—potential—effects).71 Still, the t
clearly relational: as already mentioned above, Monten consider
ing democracy promotion because it defines a state's capability t
change" in other countries.72 This, of course, immediately prov
tive distributions of) material capabilities alone that determine
influence (see below).73
A second issue raised by the Realist conceptualization of power
what material (power) capabilities are to be measured. Again foll
power for Monten and Miller means the power of one state (the
the international system."74 While this may be reasonable whe
changes in US grand strategy, democracy promotion policies are
systemic level but at a particular target state (where democrac
according to the overall Realist logic, will then be shaped by the
tion in a given bilateral relationship—and, therefore, by relativ
target country. This is, in fact, the way Henry Nau conceptualiz
as the (dyadic) distribution of power capabilities between the U
terpart. At any point in time, therefore, US relative power in a
tralized and relatively equally distributed" to "unequally distribu
Third, a major empirical problem with the grand theory exp
Miller is that they tend to overlook the dramatic differences w
tration at any given point in time. For instance, the George W. B
having pursued an aggressive vindicationism (Monten) and as hav
(Miller). Even after 9/11, however, President Bush's actual poli
aimed at spreading democracy across the world in an assertive m
"[t]he main lines of Bush policy, with the singular exception of
Wolff 227
be largely Rea
corners."76 In
and Lebanon"
around the wo
drove the Unit
questions of po
cept of power
A research pr
dor, Pakistan,
material capabi
promotion poli
in the Realist c
ative) power as
tion, on the pa
was small. Und
did, avoided co
necessarily lead
Taking the abo
motion into ac
largely depend
country. These
the existence o
balance of pow
acceptance by
as of the share
a necessary con
external actors
enabling demo
This argument
ments led the
the Middle Eas
United States v
dynamics in P
associated with
with democrat
stan and Iraq c
military (comp
does not direct
influence in a
ities as such, b
motion. This
perspective of
have already in
they should no
Theorizing D
The concept of
mere material
promotion as a deliberate strategy led by the US government tha

a transnational elite which is the agent of transnational capital."8
purpose, according to Robinson, is necessary to understand wh
not—when it promotes democracy. For instance, democracy pr
archy" or "low-intensity democracy" because it aims "not only a
tensions produced by elite-based and undemocratic status quos, b
mass aspirations for more thoroughgoing democratization of soc
gie perspective, democracy promotion here is seen as a strategy
tures of power both at the national and at the international leve
Although neo-Gramscian analyses of democracy promotion ar
explicitly interested in "the power politics of today's democrac
mostly do not engage with the concept of power as such.85 Neo-
on a specific kind of power relation (hegemony) that, in Gram
sensual domination."86 Under conditions of hegemony, power
tion) are based on (ideological) consent protected by at least
this sense, the neo-Gramscian understanding of power is broader
tion in neoclassical Realism. As prominently argued by Steven
structures are those in which open resistance is prevented in th
to it are led to acquire beliefs and form desires that result in th
dominated."88
In line with a broader understanding of power, neo-Gramscian
therefore emphasize the ideational dimension of exercising pow
domination).89 Yet, they nevertheless tend to reduce democracy
is deliberately manipulable and déployable by those forces exer
mately rest on a conception of hegemony as a process of centrifu
permeating civil society, culture, educational institutions and so
resistance."90 Democracy promotion, according to Robinson, fo
is the most effective means of assuring stability, the former
latter."91 The implicit assumption seems to be that not only co
based ways of exercising power in and through democracy pro
directly control the constitutive outcomes of their activities (lo
seen from the perspective of a multidimensional concept of pow
tion of the neo-Gramscian perspective.92 Taking the shape
Gramscian reading, is exercised at two levels: the international
the domestic (intrarecipient). At both levels, the peculiar constit
tion consists in its "ideological dimension," namely "that demo
the claim to promote it has mass appeal."93 This ideational pow
imposes limits on the use of compulsory power.
At the international level, democracy promoters need at least
order to be able to exercise the kind of power associated with de
the international institutions and norms that support democrac
terms of institutional power at the same time limit their capaci
of democracy promotion) whatever they please. Otherwise, they
on which democracy promotion rests, as the experience with G
clearly shows.94 As Ned Lebow has argued, the Iraq War "offers
understood in terms of material, compulsory power, JW] does no
that its use in inappropriate ways—at odds with prevailing norm
state's influence. For the United States, it has led to the seeming pa
the world has ever witnessed is increasingly incapable of translat
Wolff 229
The same hold

the way Robin
extent, in poly
consent" and,
and cultural v
groups."96 Dem
dual role to en
"popular major
that actually c
Robinson seem
be thought of
the popular m
invasion shows
motion such a
therefore, wou
racy promotion
it is to effecti
countries.
This brief dis
cially, constitu
racy promotio
the ideational
The theoretica
promotion as
consensus-base
may be combin
doxical: Democ
they rely, in a
structural, an
once democrac
their advantag
mise the capaci
other actors' "
power. This im
it, by definitio
exercise rests.
call " for local
at the same ti
effectiveness o
tions. Acknow
thecomplex an
hegemony."10
Conclusion
More than half a century ago, Robert Dahl predicted that scholars were not likely to produc
thing like a single, consistent, coherent 'Theory of Power'," but most probably only "a var
theories of limited scope, each of which employs some definition of power that is useful in t
text of the particular piece of research or theory but different in important respects fro
definitions of other studies."108 While certainly not exhaustive

Barnett and Duvall has the advantage of conceptually grasping
relevance for international politics in an integrative manner tha
peting concepts. As I have sought to show, this offers a promis
relevance of power in international democracy promotion.
By promoting democracy in other countries, states exercise p
the use of material power resources, but it is obviously more th
motion is not simply about an actor-centered kind of power ov
pulsory or institutional. Promoting democracy also requires th
power to: the aim, in the end, is to change from within the polit
its properties, capacities, interests, and collective identity. At
democracy promotion is dependent on inter- and transnation
metric power relationship between democracy promoters and
sional concept of power helps us understand and conceptualize
types of power are relevant for democracy promotion and con
Specifically, a broad perspective on power draws our attention t
and ideational, both within and beyond the recipient country, tha
external actors to exercise constitutive kinds of power, be they
hand, this helps to better grasp the role of (relative) power as a
policies and thereby serves to overcome some of the theoretical
Realist approach to democracy promotion. On the other, it exp
limited in its ability to achieve the kind of effects it aims at and
also helps to improve the attempt to theorize democracy promotio
Yet, the core claim of this article, that the multidimensional
standing the international politics of democracy promotion, is
theoretical approaches. Just as Barnett and Duvall have argued,
"one or another" type of power, but this should not prevent sch
power "that are associated with other theoretical schools."109 N
tion of the individual scholar, this article has suggested that
democracy promotion without paying attention to the local, tra
that constitute the very practice of democracy promotion and,
actors in exercising the constitutive power they require in order
regard as democracy. In the field of democracy promotion, acto
are systematically dependent on constitutive conditions and loc
not be simply produced "from the outside," not even by over
Author Note
This article draws on results from a research project conducted between 2008 and 2012 at the Peace R
Institute Frankfurt (PR1F) and Goethe University Frankfurt which received generous funding from th
Research Foundation (DFG). The overall results of the project are published in Jonas Wolff, Hans-
Spanger, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., The Comparative International Politics of Democracy Pr
(London: Routledge, 2014).
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank Jarrod Hayes, Annika E. Poppe, and Vera Rogova for helpful comm
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship
publication of this article.
Wolff 231
Funding
TThe author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi
cation of this article: The research on which this article is based was made possible by a research grant of the
German Research Foundation (DFG).
Notes
1. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie En
ment for International Peace, 1999), 105-8; Nicolas Guilhot, The Democracy Makers. Human Right
International Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 31; Sandra Lavenex and Fr
Schimmelfennig, "EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governan
Democratization 18, no. 4 (2011): 890-91.
2. Jeff Bridoux, American Foreign Policy and Postwar Reconstruction. Comparing Japan and Iraq, chap
(London, UK: Routledge, 2011); Peter Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad. Policy and Perform
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2011 ), 77-78; William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy. Globalizat
United States Intervention and Hegemony, chap. 1 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 199
3. Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine. Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promoti
U.S. Strategy," International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 112-56; Henry R. Nau, "America's Iden
Democracy Promotion and National Interests: Beyond Realism, Beyond Idealism," in American De
racy Promotion. Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi
guchi (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 127-48.
4. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development
Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992), 5.
5. Philippe C. Schmitter, "International Democracy Promotion and Protection: Theory and Impact," in T
International Politics of Democratization: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Nuno Severiano Teix
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2008), 32; Teivo Teivainen, "The Pedagogy of Global Development:
Promotion of Electoral Democracy and the Latin Américanisation of Europa," Third World Quart
30, no. 1 (2009): 163-64.
6. See David A. Baldwin, " Power and International Relations," in Handbook of International Relation
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London, UK: Sage, 2002), 177-91 ; Michael
nett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," International Organization 59, no. 1 (200
39-75; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, eds.. Power in Global Governance (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams, eds., Power in W
Politics (London, UK: Routledge, 2007); Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein, eds., Back to Ba
State Power in a Contemporary World (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013).
7. Michael Bamett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in Global Governance," in Power in Global Govern
ed. M. Barnett and R. Duvall (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.
8. See Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," 2005; Bamett and Duvall, Power in Glo
Governance, 2005.
9. Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein, "Puzzles about Power," in Back to Basics: State Power
Contemporary World, ed. Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein (Oxford, UK: Oxford University P
2013), 5.
10. Finnemore and Goldstein, "Puzzles about Power," 5. See also Bamett and Duvall, "Power in Interna
tional Politics," 2005; Bamett and Duvall, Power in Global Governance, 2005; Berenskoetter and Wil
liams, Power in World Politics, 2007.
11. Dinorah Azpuru, Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Pérez-Linân, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Trends in Democracy
Assistance: What Has the United States Been Doing?" Journal of Democracy 19, no. 2 (2008): 151. See
also Peter Burnell, "Democracy Assistance: The State of the Discourse," in Democracy Assistance. Inter
national Co-operation for Democratization, ed. Peter Burnell (London, UK: Frank Cass, 2000), 3-33.
12. See Peter J. Schraeder, ed., Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. R

2002); Richard Youngs, International Democracy and the West. The
and Multinational Business (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Pr
Futures: Re-visioning Democracy Promotion (London, UK: Routled
13. On this overall issue, see Christopher Hobson and Milja Kurki, eds.,
Promotion (London, UK: Routledge, 2012); Kurki, Democratic Futu
14. Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," 2005; Barne
ance, 2005. The edited volume by Finnemore and Goldstein (Back t
For a different, not as systematic discussion of power in internat
Williams, Power in World Politics, 2007.
15. Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," 42.
16. Ibid., 45.
17. Ibid., 42.
18. As defined above, democracy promotion concerns activities by external actors that aim at producing effects
on/in other countries.
19. Ibid., 44. In the same vein, Finnemore and Goldstein have argued that "attention to multiple dimensions of
state power is helpful, even essential, to understanding many of the puzzling manifestations of it we see in
contemporary politics." Finnemore and Goldstein, "Puzzles about Power," 4.
21. Ibid., 43.
22. Ibid., 43. Defining structural power through the use of the qualifier "in direct structural relation" risks
making the definition circular. What is meant here is, in other words, "the production and reproduction
of internally related positions of super- and subordination, or domination, that actors occupy." Ibid., 55.
23. Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept ofPower," Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 202-3, emphasis in original.
24. See the discussion of the various concepts of and perspectives on power in the study of international rela
tions in Stefano Guzzini, "Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis," International
Organization 47, no. 3 (1993): 443-78; Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," 2002; Barnett and
Duvall, "Power in International Politics," 49-57; Felix Berenskoetter, "Thinking about Power," in Power
in World Politics, ed. F. Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (London, UK: Routledge, 2007), 4-12.
25. Berenskoetter, "Thinking about Power," 3. See also Dahl, "The Concept of Power," 203; Barnett and
Duvall, "Power in International Politics," 45; Finnemore and Goldstein, "Puzzles about Power," 3-4.
27. Ibid., 49.
28. Laurence Whitehead, "The Imposition of Democracy," in Exporting Democracy. The United States and
Latin America. Case Studies, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1991), 234-60.
29. Steven D. Krasner, "New Terrains: Sovereignty and Alternative Conceptions ofPower," in Back to Basics:
State Power in a Contemporary World, ed. Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 349.
30. Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad, 78. See also Steven Levitsky and Lucas A. Way, "International
Linkage and Democratization," Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 21-22.
31. See also Krasner, "New Terrains," 349-50.
32. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, chap. 1, 1996.
33. Bridoux, American Foreign Policy and Postwar Reconstruction, 27; Gramsci's original distinction was
between "domination" (dominio) and "intellectual and moral leadership" (direzione); the former implies
ruling "by coercion and direct domination," the latter through the organization of "consent and hege
mony"; Translations are taken from David Forgacs, eds., The Gramsci Reader. Selected Writings 1916
1935 (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 249, 420.
34. Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power," Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 166, emphasis in original.
Wolff 233
35. Yet, what is

such an element
consent, which
be exercised"; F
36. Barnett and
37. Ibid., 42.
38. Teivainen, "The Pedagogy of Global Development," 2009.
40. Hence, Schmitter has argued that, no matter how "voluntary and reciprocal in principle," the practice of
democracy promotion "is almost always semi- to in-voluntary and asymmetric"—not least because it is
based on "the presumed superiority of well-established liberal democracies." Schmitter, "International
Democracy Promotion and Protection," 32.
41. Krasner, "New Terrains," 351.
43. Ibid., 51.
44. Krasner, "New Terrains," 341. See also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, "Intervention
and Democracy," International Organization 60, no. 3 (2006): 631.
46. Ibid., 48.
47. Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad, 75-79.
48. Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy," Democratization 4, no. 3 (1997):
123.
49. Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad, 76.

50. Thomas Carothers, "Taking Stock of Democracy Assistance," in American Democracy Promotion.
Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, G. John lkenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 194; see also Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 105-8.
51. Guilhot, The Democracy Makers, 31; In actual practice, of course, democracy promotion has rarely fully
embraced this revolutionary task. With a view to US democracy promotion, Tony Smith has, for instance,
detected "a paradoxical form of 'conservative radicalism'"; Tony Smith, America's Mission. The United
States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1994), 17.
52. See Julia Leininger, "'Bringing the Outside in': Illustrations from Haiti and Mali for the Re-conceptualization
of Democracy Promotion," Contemporary Politics 16, no. 1 (2010): 63-80.
53. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, "Intervention and Democracy," 631. From their actor-centered rational
choice perspective, the promotion of democracy by means of military intervention—that is, by exercising
compulsory power—is, therefore, normally not a rational strategy (and, thus, most of the time not really
pursued by intervening states).
54. As Barnett and Duvall ("Power in International Politics," 55) emphasize, the two types of constitutive
power "overlap in several important respects" but are different in that structural power "works through
direct structural relations" and concerns "the production and reproduction of internally related positions
of super- and subordination," whereas productive power "entails more generalized and diffuse social pro
cesses" and concerns "the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through [broad and
general] systems of knowledge and discursive practices." In the following, I shall refer to constitutive
power in a general sense when this distinction is not important to the argument.
56. Ibid., 55.
57. See, for instance, Rita Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Govern
ance (London, UK: Zed Books, 2000); Guilhot, The Democracy Makers, 2005; Kurki, Democratic Futures,
2013; Teivainen, "The Pedagogy of Global Development," 2009.
58. It is this second way in which constitutive power is relevant for de

sponds to Barnett and Duvall's thinking about constitutive (structu
tional relations and global governance. The first notion of con
external actor within a given target country—is different in that it
democracy promotion as something taking place at the level of dome
59. This refers to what Lukes has called an "imposition of internal cons
acquire beliefs and form desires that result in their consenting or ad
and non-coercive settings." Steven Lukes, Power. A Radical View,
Macmillan, 2005), 13.
60. Levitsky and Way, "International Linkage and Democratization,"
61. Ibid., 24-25.
62. Nau, "America's Identity, Democracy Promotion and National Int
Abroad. Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N
63. Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine," 2005.
64. Benjamin Miller, "Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11,
the War in Iraq," Security Studies 19, no. 1 (2010): 26-65.
66. Ibid., 118. Monten is interested in explaining the "long-term shift [i
to vindicationism" that culminated in the Bush doctrine, which he d
power and national identity (Ibid., 115); Miller, by contrast, focus
Administration's security policy before and after 9/11" (Miller, "Exp
egy," 28); This shift, he argues, cannot be explained by Monten
amends the focus on relative power by adding a second "material-s
of external threat"; further two "domestic-ideational" factors are
(Ibid., 29).
67. For a non-Realist approach to relative power, see, for example, the notion of "relative bargaining power"
which is considered to shape the bargaining process characterizing European Union democracy promotion
by conditionality. Here, relative power is regarded the "result of the asymmetrical distribution of the
benefits of a specific agreement." Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, "EU Democracy Promotion in the
Neighbourhood," 892-93.
68. Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998):
152. See Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine," 117.
69. William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1993), 4.
70. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 152.
71. See Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, 4; Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,"
151, fn. 15.
73. This "disconnect between capabilities and outcomes" is well-known from the literature on power in interna
tional relations (Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," 40; see Baldwin, "Power and Interna
tional Relations," 179-81 ; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (New
York: Longman, 2001), 10). Given the aim to produce profound domestic effects in another country, this dis
connect is significantly greater in democracy promotion than in traditional intergovernmental relations.
74. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 150; See Miller, "Explaining Changes in
U.S. Grand Strategy," 29; Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine," 141.
75. Nau, At Home Abroad, 27; See also Nau, "America's Identity, Democracy Promotion and National Inter
ests," 2000.
76. Thomas Carothers, "The Democracy Crusade Myth," The National Interest 90 (2007): 8.
77. Ibid., 9-10.
Wolff 235
78. See Jonas W

Politics of Dem
79. US policies t
war on drugs) a
Venezuela) wer
government rea
government w
"Democracy P
German Polici
80. See Richard
University Pre
Polity, 2004), 2
81. Robinson, P
82. Ibid., 6.
83. The "underlying objective" of (US) democracy promotion is to maintain "essentially undemocratic soci
eties inserted into an unjust international system." Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 6. For related
approaches to democracy promotion, see also Rita Abrahamsen, "The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive
Revolution? A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on Démocratisation," Journal of Modern African Studies 35,
no. 1 (1997): 129-52; Colin S. Cavell, Exporting "Made-in-America" Democracy. The National Endow
ment for Democracy & U.S. Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002); Neil A.
Burron, The New Democracy Wars. The Politics of North American Democracy Promotion in the Americas
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012).
84. Kurki, Democratic Futures, xiv.
85. But see Bridoux, American Foreign Policy and Postwar Reconstruction, chap. 1.
86. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 21.
87. Ibid., 22. See also Bridoux, American Foreign Policy and Postwar Reconstruction, 28-36; Forgacs, The
Gramsci Reader, 189-221, 235.
88. Lukes, Power, 13. A similar argument is made by Guilhot with reference to Bourdieu's concept of "sym
bolic power," that is, "the power to make domination seem legitimate" (Guilhot, The Democracy Makers,
168). An even broader—and, in fact, all-encompassing—concept of power is used by those scholars that
draw on Foucault and, in particular, his concept of governmentality. On the latter, see Berenskoetter,
"Thinking about Power," 10-12. With a specific view to democracy promotion, see the integrated Grams
cian/Foucauldian perspective proposed by Kurki, Democratic Futures, chap. 11-12.
89. See Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 1996; Barry K. Gills, "American Power, Neo-liberal Economic Glo
balization, and Low-intensity Democracy: An Unstable Trinity," in American Democracy Promotion.
Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 326-44.
90. Guilhot, The Democracy Makers, 15.
92. See Jeff Bridoux, "'It's the Political, Stupid': National versus Transnational Perspectives on Démocratisa
tion in Iraq," The International Journal of Human Rights 15, no. 4 (2011): 552-71; Jonas Wolff and Iris
Wurm, "Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion: A Proposal for Theoretical Classification,"
Security Dialogue 42, no. 1 (2011): 86.
93. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 16; See also Guilhot, The Democracy Makers, 15.
94. See Thomas Carothers, "U.S. Democracy Promotion During and after Bush," 2007, accessed February 14,
2013, http://camegieendowment.org/files/democracy_promotion_after_bush_final.pdf; Michael McFaul,
Advancing Democracy Abroad. Why We Should and How We Can, chap. 1 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Lit
tlefield, 2010); Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, 2004; Laurence Whitehead, "Losing 'the
Force'? The 'Dark Side' of Democratization after Iraq," Democratization 16, no. 2 (2009): 215-42.
95. Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, 557; In m

has stressed "the importance of authority, legitimacy and instituti
exposing a "central paradox of hegemony: that stable, enduring lea
embedded, and that unilateral action can be socially corrosive, with
state and world order"; Reus-Smit, American Power and World O
96. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 21, emphasis in original; In g
dieu's symbolic power or a Foucauldian notion of governmentali
97. See Guilhot, The Democracy Makers, 18; Bridoux, "'It's the Pol
"Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion," 86.
98. William I. Robinson, "Promoting Capitalist Polyarchy: The
Democracy Promotion. Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, ed. Micha
shi Inoguchi (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 312.
100. Bridoux, '"It's the Political, Stupid,"' 561. See William 1. Robin
racy Promotion' in Iraq," New Political Science 26, no. 3 (20
Gramscian scholars to see hegemony, contra Gramsci, "as a one
forced or imposed on subaltern classes" is a general feature also ou
tion. Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, "Engaging Gramsc
the New Gramscians," Review of International Studies 24, no. 1
101. See Bridoux, American Foreign Policy and Postwar Reconstru
Stupid,"' 2011.
102. See Wolff, "Democracy Promotion, Empowerment, and Self-determination," 2012.
103. With a view to productive power, see the proposal for integrating Gramscian and Foucauldian concepts in
an analysis of democracy promotion by Kurki, Democratic Futures, chap. 7-10.
104. There are, of course, also other issues with Robinson's interpretation of democracy promotion that would
merit discussion and, from my point of view, revision. See Bridoux, "'It's the Political, Stupid,"' 2011;
Kurki, Democratic Futures, chap. 11; and the forum, William 1. Robinson, Jeff Bridoux, Rita Abraham
sen, Jessica Schmidt, and Milja Kurki (Eds.) "Democracy and World Order," International Relations 27,
no. 2 (2013): 226-57.
105. See, for instance, Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy. The Struggle to Build Free Societies
Throughout the World (New York: Times Books, 2008), 316-17.
106. For a more general discussion of the inherent contradictions of democracy promotion, see Annika E.
Poppe and Jonas Wolff, "The Normative Challenge of Interaction: Justice Conflicts in Democracy Pro
motion," Global Constitutionalism 2, no. 3 (2013): 373-406.
107. Owen Worth, "Recasting Gramsci in International Politics," Review of International Studies 37, no. 1
(2011): 384; See also Germain and Kenny, "Engaging Gramsci," 18-19.
108. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," 202.
Author Biography
Jonas Wolff is a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and teaches at
Goethe University Frankfurt and Kassel University. Recent publications include The Comparative
International Politics of Democracy Promotion (London: Routledge, 2014, coedited with H. J.
Spanger and H. J. Puhle); "The interaction of interests and norms in international democracy pro
motion," Journal of International Relations and Development, 2015, coauthored with H. J. Spanger;
and "Beyond the Liberal Peace: Latin American Inspirations for Post-liberal Peacebuilding,"
Peacebuilding, 2015.

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Power in Democracy Promotion

Author(s): Jonas Wolff

Alternatives: Global, Local, Political

Power in Democracy ) The Author(s) 2015

International democracy promotion is concerned with power, in many respects. By supporting l

' Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Germany

the international promotion of democracy. What is surprising, h

Table I. Barnett and Duvall's Four Types of Power and Democracy Pr

Compulsory power Actor-centered Concerns the capacity of democr

Actor<entered Power in Democracy Promotion: Compulsory and Institutional

Constitutive Power in Democracy Promotion: Structural an

Explaining Variance in Democracy Promotion Policies: Revi

promotion as a deliberate strategy led by the US government tha

The same hold

definitions of other studies."108 While certainly not exhaustive

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

12. See Peter J. Schraeder, ed., Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. R

35. Yet, what is

49. Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad, 76.

58. It is this second way in which constitutive power is relevant for de

78. See Jonas W

95. Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, 557; In m

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