Chiang Kai Shiek V CA

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 172 9/22/21, 11:28 AM
VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 389

Chiang Kai Shek School vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 58028. April 18, 1989.
CHIANG KAI SHEK SCHOOL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and FAUSTINA FRANCO OH, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Only natural or

juridical persons may be parties in a civil action.–––We hold against
the petitioner on the first question. It is true that Rule 3, Section 1,
of the Rules of Court clearly provides that „only natural or juridical
persons may be parties in a civil action.‰ It is also not denied that
the school has not been incorporated. However, this omission should
not prejudice the private respondent in the assertion of her claims
against the school.
Labor; Money Claims; Petitioner school failed to comply with its
obligation to incorporate under the Corporation Law; Petitioner
cannot now invoke its own non-compliance with the law to immunize
it from respondentÊs complaint.–––Having been recognized by the
government, it was under obligation to incorporate under the
Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. It appears
that it had not done so at the time the complaint was filed
notwithstanding that it had been in existence even earlier than
1932. The petitioner cannot
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
390
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390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
now invoke its own non-compliance with the law to immunize it

from the private respondentÊs complaint.
Same; Same; Estoppel; Having contracted with respondent every
year for 32 years and respondent itself is possessed of juridical
personality, it is now estopped from denying such personality to
defeat respondentÊs claim.–––There should also be no question that
having contracted with the private respondent every year for thirty
two years and thus represented itself as possessed of juridical
personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped from denying
such personality to defeat her claim against it. According to Article
1431 of the Civil Code, „through estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it
and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on
it.‰
Same; Same; Same; As the school may be sued in its own name,
there is no need to apply Sec. 15 of Rule 3 under which persons
joined in an association without any juridical personality may be
sued with such association.–––As the school itself may be sued in its
own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which
the persons joined in an association without any juridical
personality may be sued with such association. Besides, it has been
shown that the individual members of the board of trustees are not
liable, having been appointed only after the private respondentÊs
dismissal.
Same; Same; Same; A charitable institution is covered by the
labor laws; In 1968 there was no law exempting charitable
institutions from the operation of the labor laws; Private respondent
is entitled to the protection of the Termination Pay Law then in force
assuming that petitioner was a charitable institution.–––It is clear
now that a charitable institution is covered by the labor laws
although the question was still unsettled when this case arose in
1968. At any rate, there was no law even then exempting such
institutions from the operation of the labor laws (although they
were exempted by the Constitution from ad valorem taxes). Hence,
even assuming that the petitioner was a charitable institution as it
claims, the private respondent was nonetheless still entitled to the
protection of the Termination Pay Law, which was then in force.
Same; Same; Same; Illegal dismissal; No explanation was given

by petitioner and no advance notice either of private respondentÊs
relief; After teaching for 32 years respondent was simply told that
she
391
VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 391
could not teach anymore.–––The petitioner says the private

respondent had not been illegally dismissed because her teaching
contract was on a yearly basis and the school was not required to
rehire her in 1968. The argument is that her services were
terminable at the end of each year at the discretion of the school.
Significantly, no explanation was given by the petitioner, and no
advance notice either, of her relief. After teaching year in and year
out for all of thirty-two years, the private respondent was simply
told she could not teach any more.
Same; Same; Same; Respondent had become a permanent
employee of the school and entitled to security of tenure at the time of
her dismissal; Dismissal was invalid because no cause was shown
and established at an appropriate hearing and notice required by
law had not been given to respondent.–––The Court holds, after
considering the particular circumstance of OhÊs employment, that
she had become a permanent employee of the school and entitled to
security of tenure at the time of her dismissal. Since no cause was
shown and established at an appropriate hearing, and the notice
then required by law had not been given, such dismissal was
invalid.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation pay; Respondent is
entitled to separation pay under the law at one-half month salary for
every year of service.–––The respondent court erred, however, in
awarding her one month pay instead of only one-half month salary
for every year of service. The law is quite clear on this matter.
Accordingly, the separation pay should be computed at P90.00 times
32 months, for a total of P2,880.00.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Security of tenure of teachers under
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers; Under present policy of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, a teacher becomes
permanent and automatically acquires security of tenure upon
completion of 3 years in the service.–––Parenthetically, R.A. No.
4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, confers security of tenure on the teacher upon
appointment as long as he possesses the required qualification. And
under the present policy of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, a teacher becomes permanent and automatically
acquires security of tenure upon completion of three years in the
service.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Security of tenure of workers is now
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.–––While
admittedly
392
not applicable to the case at bar, these rules nevertheless reflect the
attitude of the government on the protection of the workerÊs
security of tenure, which is now guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent was arbitrarily
treated by petitioner school despite the fact that there is no showing
of any previous strained relations between respondent and
petitioner.–––We find that the private respondent was arbitrarily
treated by the petitioner, which has shown no cause for her removal
nor had it given her the notice required by the Termination Pay
Law. As the respondent court said, the contention that she did not
report one week before the start of classes is a flimsy justification
for replacing her. She had been in its employ for all of thirty-two
years. Her record was apparently unblemished. There is no showing
of any previous strained relations between her and the petitioner.
Oh had every reason to assume, as she had done in previous years,
that she would continue teaching as usual.
Same; Same; Same; Moral and exemplary damages, award of,
proper; Respondent is entitled to moral damages for the wrongful act
of petitioner; She is also entitled to exemplary damages because

petitioner acted in a wanton and oppressive manner when it
dismissed respondent.–––For the wrongful act of the petitioner, the
private respondent is entitled to moral damages. As a proximate
result of her illegal dismissal, she suffered mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and even besmirched reputation as an
experienced teacher for more than three decades. We also find that
the respondent court did not err in awarding her exemplary
damages because the petitioner acted in a wanton and oppressive
manner when it dismissed her.
Same; Same; Same; Tribute to grade school teachers.–––The
Court takes this opportunity to pay a sincere tribute to the grade
school teachers, who are always at the forefront in the battle
against illiteracy and ignorance. If only because it is they who open
the minds of their pupils to an unexplored world awash with the
magic of letters and numbers, which is an extraordinary feat
indeed, these humble mentors deserve all our respect and
appreciation.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court

of Appeals.
393
VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 393

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CRUZ, J.:
An unpleasant surprise awaited Fausta F. Oh when she

reported for work at the Chiang Kai Shek School in
Sorsogon on the first week of July, 1968. She was told she
had no assignment for the next semester. Oh was shocked.
She had been teaching in the school since 1932 for a
continuous period of almost 33 years. And now, out of the
blue, and for no apparent or given reason, this abrupt
dismissal.
Oh sued. She demanded separation pay, social security
benefits, salary differentials,
1
maternity benefits and moral
and exemplary damages. The original defendant was the
Chiang Kai Shek School but when it filed a motion to

dismiss on the ground that 2
it could not be sued, the
complaint was amended. Certain officials of the school
were also impleaded to make them solidarily liable with
the school.
The Court
3
of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, its decision was set aside by the
respondent court, which held the school4 suable and liable
while absolving the other defendants. 5
The motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the school then came
to this Court in this petition for review on certiorari.
The issues raised in the petition are:
1. Whether or not a school that has not been

incorporated may be sued by reason alone of its
long continued existence and recognition by the
government.
2. Whether or not a complaint filed against persons
associated under a common name will justify a
judgment against the association itself and not its
individual members.
________________
1 Rollo, p. 6.
2 Ibid.
3 Id., pp. 8-9. Presided by Judge Ubaldo Y. Arcangel.
4 Id., pp. 27-36, Zosa, J., ponente, with Escolin and Paras, E., JJ.,
concurring.
5 Id., p. 37.
394

3. Whether or not the collection of tuition fees and

book rentals will make a school profit-making and
not charitable.
4. Whether or not the Termination Pay Law then in
force was available to the private respondent who
was employed on a year-to-year basis.

5. Whether or not the awards made by the respondent
court were warranted.
We hold against the petitioner on the first question. It is

true that Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly
provides that „only natural or juridical persons may be
parties in a civil action.‰ It is also not denied that the
school has not been incorporated. However, this omission
should not prejudice the private respondent in the
assertion of her claims against the school.
As a school, the petitioner was governed by Act No. 2706
as amended by C.A. No. 180, which provided as follows:
Unless exempted for special reasons by the Secretary of Public

Instruction, any private school or college recognized by the
government shall be incorporated under the provisions of Act No.
1459 known as the Corporation Law, within 90 days after the date
of recognition, and shall file with the Secretary of Public Instruction
a copy of its incorporation papers and by-laws.
Having been recognized by the government, it was under

obligation to incorporate under the Corporation Law within
90 days from such recognition. It appears that it had not
done so at the time the complaint was filed
notwithstanding that it had been in existence even earlier
than 1932. The petitioner cannot now invoke its own non-
compliance with the law to immunize it from the private
respondentÊs complaint.
There should also be no question that having contracted
with the private respondent every year for thirty two years
and thus represented itself as possessed of juridical
personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped from
denying such personality to defeat her claim against it.
According to Article 1431 of the Civil Code, „through
estoppel an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person
395
VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 395
relying on it.‰
As the school itself may be sued in its own name, there
is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the
persons joined in an association without any juridical
personality may be sued with such association. Besides, it
has been shown that the individual members of the board
of trustees are not liable, having been
6
appointed only after
the private respondentÊs dismissal.
It is clear now
7
that a charitable institution is covered by
the labor laws although the question was still unsettled
when this case arose in 1968. At any rate, there was no law
even then exempting such institutions from the operation of
the labor laws (although they were exempted by the
Constitution from ad valorem taxes). Hence, even
assuming that the petitioner was a charitable institution as
it claims, the private respondent was nonetheless still
entitled to the protection of the Termination Pay Law,
which was then in force.
While it may be that the petitioner was engaged in
charitable works, it would not necessarily follow that those
in its employ were as generously motivated. Obviously,
most of them would not have the means for such charity.
The private respondent herself was only a humble school
teacher receiving a meager salary of P180.00 per month.
At that, it has not been established that the petitioner is
a charitable institution, considering especially that it
charges tuition
8
fees and collects book rentals from its
students. While this alone may not indicate that it is
profit-making, it does weaken its claim that it is a non-
profit entity.
The petitioner says the private respondent had not been
illegally dismissed because her teaching contract was on a
yearly basis and the school was not required to rehire her
in 1968. The argument is that her services were terminable
at the end of each year at the discretion of the school.
Significantly, no explanation was given by the petitioner,
and no advance notice
_______________
6 Id., pp. 29-30.

7 Article 243, Labor Code.
8 Rollo, p. 33.
396

either, of her relief. After teaching year in and year out for
all of thirty-two years, the private respondent was simply
told she could not teach any more.
The Court holds, after considering the particular
circumstance of OhÊs employment, that she had become a
permanent employee of the school and entitled to security
of tenure at the time of her dismissal. Since no cause was
shown and established at an appropriate hearing, and the
notice then required by law had not been given, such
dismissal was invalid. The private respondentÊs position is
no different from that of the rank-and-file employees
involved9
in Gregorio Araneta University Foundation v.
NLRC, of whom the Court had the following to say:
Undoubtedly, the private respondentsÊ positions as deans and

department heads of the petitioner university are necessary in its
usual business. Moreover, all the private respondents have been
serving the university from 18 to 28 years. All of them rose from the
ranks starting as instructors until they became deans and
department heads of the university. A person who has served the
University for 28 years and who occupies a high administrative
position in addition to teaching duties could not possibly be a
temporary employee or a casual.
The applicable law is the Termination Pay Law, which

provided:
SECTION 1. In cases of employment, without a definite period, in a

commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishment or enterprise,
the employer or the employee may terminate at any time the
employment with just cause; or without just cause in the case of an
employee by serving written notice on the employer at least one
month in advance, or in the case of an employer, by serving such
notice to the employee at least one month in advance or one-half

month for every year of service of the employee, whichever, is
longer, a fraction of at least six months being considered as one
whole year. The employer, upon whom no such notice was served in
case of termination of employment without just cause may hold the
em-
_______________
9 155 SCRA 301.
397
VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 397

ployee liable for damages.

The employee, upon whom no such notice was served in case of
termination of employment without just cause shall be entitled to
compensation from the date of termination of his employment in an
amount equivalent to his salaries or wages corresponding to the
required period of notice. x x x.
The respondent court erred, however, in awarding her one

month pay instead of only one-half month salary for every
year of service. The law is quite clear on this matter.
Accordingly, the separation pay should be computed at
P90.00 times 32 months, for a total of P2,880.00.
Parenthetically, R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, confers security of
tenure on the teacher upon appointment 10
as long as he
possesses the required qualification. And under the
present policy of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, a teacher becomes permanent and automatically
acquires security
11
of tenure upon completion of three years
in the service.
While admittedly not applicable to the case at bar, these
rules nevertheless reflect the attitude of the government on
the protection of the workerÊs security of tenure, which12
is
now guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.
We find that the private respondent was arbitrarily
treated by the petitioner, which has shown no cause for her
removal nor had it given her the notice required by the

Termination Pay Law. As the respondent court said, the
contention that she did not report one week before the start
of classes is a flimsy
______________
10 Section 4. Probationary Period.–––When recruitment takes place

after adequate training and professional preparation in any school
recognized by the Government, no probationary period preceeding
regular appointment shall be imposed if the teacher possesses the
appropriate civil service eligibility. x x x
Section 5. Tenure of Office.–––Stability on employment and security of
tenure shall be assured the teachers as provided under existing laws x x
x.
11 Biboso v. Victorias Milling Company, Inc., 76 SCRA 250.
12 Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.
398

13
justification for replacing her. She had been in its employ
for all of thirty-two years. Her record was apparently
unblemished. There is no showing of any previous strained
relations between her and the petitioner. Oh had every
reason to assume, as she had done in previous years, that
she would continue teaching as usual.
It is easy to imagine the astonishment and hurt she felt
when she was flatly and without warning told she was
dismissed. There was not even the amenity of a formal
notice of her replacement, with perhaps a graceful
expression of thanks for her past services. She was simply
informed she was no longer in the teaching staff. To put it
bluntly, she was fired.
For the wrongful act of the petitioner, 14
the private
respondent is entitled to moral damages. As a proximate
result of her illegal dismissal, she suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and even besmirched
reputation as an experienced teacher for more than three
decades. We also find that the respondent court did not err
in awarding her exemplary damages because the petitioner

acted in a wanton
15
and oppressive manner when it
dismissed her.
The Court takes this opportunity to pay a sincere tribute
to the grade school teachers, who are always at the
forefront in the battle against illiteracy and ignorance. If
only because it is they who open the minds of their pupils
to an unexplored world awash with the magic of letters and
numbers, which is an extraordinary feat indeed, these
humble mentors deserve all our respect and appreciation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed
decision is AFFIRMED except for the award of separation
pay,
________________
13 Rollo, p. 34.
14 Article 2217, Civil Code; Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,
Inc., 148 SCRA 440; Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Mendez, 152 SCRA
593; General Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
569.
15 Article 2232, Civil Code; Danao v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 447;
Kapoe v. Masa, 134 SCRA 231; Magbanua v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 137 SCRA 328.
399
VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 399

Hydro Resources Contractors Corp. vs. Pagalilauan
which is reduced to P2,880.00. All the other awards are

approved. Costs against the petitioner.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,

JJ., concur.
Petition denied; decision affirmed.
Note.–––Doctrine of estoppel does not operate against

the state and its agents. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 99
SCRA 742.)
–––––o0o–––––
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 172 9/22/21, 11:28 AM

VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 389

CHIANG KAI SHEK SCHOOL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Only natural or

390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chiang Kai Shek School vs. Court of Appeals

now invoke its own non-compliance with the law to immunize it

Same; Same; Same; Illegal dismissal; No explanation was given

VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 391

Chiang Kai Shek School vs. Court of Appeals

could not teach anymore.–––The petitioner says the private

392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chiang Kai Shek School vs. Court of Appeals

of petitioner; She is also entitled to exemplary damages because

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court

VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 393

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

An unpleasant surprise awaited Fausta F. Oh when she

Chiang Kai Shek School but when it filed a motion to

1. Whether or not a school that has not been

394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

3. Whether or not the collection of tuition fees and

was employed on a year-to-year basis.

We hold against the petitioner on the first question. It is

Unless exempted for special reasons by the Secretary of Public

Having been recognized by the government, it was under

VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 395

Chiang Kai Shek School vs. Court of Appeals

6 Id., pp. 29-30.

396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Undoubtedly, the private respondentsÊ positions as deans and

The applicable law is the Termination Pay Law, which

SECTION 1. In cases of employment, without a definite period, in a

notice to the employee at least one month in advance or one-half

9 155 SCRA 301.

VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 397

ployee liable for damages.

The respondent court erred, however, in awarding her one

removal nor had it given her the notice required by the

10 Section 4. Probationary Period.–––When recruitment takes place

398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

in awarding her exemplary damages because the petitioner

VOL. 172, APRIL 18, 1989 399

which is reduced to P2,880.00. All the other awards are

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,

Petition denied; decision affirmed.

Note.–––Doctrine of estoppel does not operate against

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