CAROLYN GARCIA V. RICA MARIE THIO, G.R. NO.
154878, MARCH It is undisputed that the checks were delivered to Rica.
16, 2007
In Carolyn Garcia v. Rica Marie Thio, G.R. No. 154878, March 16,
2007, Rica received from Carolyn a crossed check in the amount of
$100,000.00 payable to the order of Marilou Santiago. Thereafter,
Carolyn received from Rica payments. Again, Rica received a check
in the amount of P500,000.00 from Carolyn and payable to the
order of Marilou and payments were again made by her
representing interests. There was failure to pay the principal
amounts hence, a complaint for sum of money with damages was
filed. Rica contended that she had no obligation to her as it was
Marilou who was indebted as she was merely asked to deliver the
checks to Marilou and that the check payments she issued were
merely intended to accommodate Marilou. The RTC ruled in favor
of Carolyn but the CA reversed on the ground that there was no
contract between Rica and Carolyn. On appeal, the SC
Held: There was a contract of loan between Carolyn and Rica.
A loan is a real contract, not consensual, and as such is
perfected only upon the delivery of the object of the contract. This
is evident in Art. 1934 of the Civil Code which provides:
An accepted promise to deliver something by way of
commodatum or simple loan is binding upon the parties, but the
commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be perfected until the
delivery of the object of the contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Upon delivery of the object of the contract of loan (in this
case the money received by the debtor when the checks were
encashed) the debtor acquired ownership of such money or loan
proceeds and is bound to pay the creditor an equal amount.
(Naguiat v. CA, G.R. No. 118375, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 591).
However, these checks were crossed and payable not to the order
of Rica but to the order of a certain Marilou Santiago.
The Court agree with petitioner. Delivery is the act by which
the res or substance thereof is placed within the actual or
constructive possession or control of another. (Buenaflor v. CA,
G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 563). Although
Rica did not physically receive the proceeds of the checks, these
instruments were placed in her control and possession under an
arrangement whereby she actually re-lent the amounts to Marilou.
Several factors support this conclusion.
(1) Carolyn did not know personally Marilou. This was admitted
by Rica, hence, it is not possible for Carolyn to grant loans in such
big sum of money even without any acknowledgment of debt. It
was Rica who had transactions with Marilou.
(2) It is unbelievable that Rica would put herself in a position
where she would be compelled to pay interest out of her own
funds for loans she never contracted.
(3) When Marilou filed a petition for insolvency, it was Rica who
was listed as a debtor.
Hence, Rica is the debtor and not Marilou. In People v. Mala, G.R.
No.152351, September 18, 2003, 411 SCRA 327 and People v.
Dayag, 155 Phil. 421 (1974), it was ruled that:
In the assessment of the testimonies of witnesses, this Court is
guided by the rule that for evidence to be believed, it must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itself such as the common experience of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of
the truth of human testimony except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to
these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of juridical
People v. Puig & Porras
cognizance.
Facts:
No interest if there is no written agreement to pay it; exception.
Respondents were conspiring, confederating, and helping one
Whether the debtor is liable to pay interest since there was
another, with grave abuse of confidence, being the Cashier and
no written agreement to pay interest, the SC
Bookkeeper of the Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc., Pototan, Iloilo,
Held: No, because no interest shall be due unless it has been without the knowledge and/or consent of the management of the
expressly stipulated in writing. (Art. 1956, NCC). Bank and with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the sum of
Be that as it may, while there can be no stipulated interest,
P15,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of
there can be legal interest pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil
the said bank in the aforesaid amount.
Code. It is well-settled:
However, the trial court did not find the existence of probable
When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
cause because (1) the element of ‘taking without the consent of the
payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money,
owners’ was missing on the ground that it is the depositors-clients,
the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
and not the Bank, which filed the complaint in these cases, who are
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
the owners of the money allegedly taken by respondents and
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
hence, are the real parties-in-interest; and (2) the Informations are
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
bereft of the phrase alleging "dependence, guardianship or
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
vigilance between the respondents and the offended party that
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
would have created a high degree of confidence between them
Code. (Eusebio-Calderon v. People, G.R. No. 158495, October 21,
which the respondents could have abused.".
2004, 441 SCRA 137; Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No.
97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78; Garcia v. Thio, G.R. No. 154878, Issue:
March 16, 2007).
Whether or not the 112 informations for qualified theft sufficiently
Hence, Rica is liable for the payment of legal interest per allege the element of taking without the consent of the owner, and
annum to be computed from the date when she received the the qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence.
demand letter. From the finality of the decision until it is fully paid,
Held:
the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per annum, the interim
period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit. Yes.
(Cabrera v. People, G.R. 150618, July 24, 2003, 407 SCRA 247).
The dismissal by the RTC of the criminal cases was allegedly due
to insufficiency of the Informations and, therefore, because of this
defect, there is no basis for the existence of probable cause which
will justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioner assails
the dismissal contending that the Informations for Qualified Theft
sufficiently state facts which constitute (a) the qualifying
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence; and (b) the element of
taking, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner,
which is the Bank.
The RTC Judge based his conclusion that there was no probable
cause simply on the insufficiency of the allegations in the
Informations concerning the facts constitutive of the elements of
the offense charged.
The relationship between banks and depositors has been held to
be that of creditor and debtor. Articles 1953 and 1980 of the New
Civil Code, as appropriately pointed out by petitioner, provide as
follows:
Article 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other
fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay
to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
Article 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in
banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning loan.
In a long line of cases involving Qualified Theft, this Court has
firmly established the nature of possession by the Bank of the
money deposits therein, and the duties being performed by its
employees who have custody of the money or have come into
possession of it. The Court has consistently considered the
allegations in the Information that such employees acted with
grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and prejudice of the
Bank, without particularly referring to it as owner of the money
deposits, as sufficient to make out a case of Qualified Theft.
BPI Family Bank v. Franco
Facts:
An ostensible fraud perpetrated on the petitioner BPI Family Bank
(BPI-FB) allegedly by respondent Amado Franco in conspiracy
with other individuals, some of whom opened and maintained
separate accounts with BPI-FB, San Francisco del Monte (SFDM)
branch, in a series of transactions.
On August 15, 1989, Tevesteco Arrastre-Stevedoring Co., Inc.
opened a savings and current account with BPI-FB. Soon
thereafter, or on August 25, 1989, First Metro Investment
Corporation (FMIC) also opened a time deposit account with the
same branch of BPI-FB with a deposit of P100,000,000.00, to
mature one year thence.
Subsequently, on August 31, 1989, Franco opened three accounts,
namely, a current, savings, and time deposit, with BPI-FB. The
current and savings accounts were respectively funded with an
initial deposit of P500,000.00 each, while the time deposit account
had P1,000,000.00 with a maturity date of August 31, 1990. The
total amount of P2,000,000.00 used to open these accounts is
traceable to a check issued by Tevesteco allegedly in consideration
of Franco's introduction of Eladio Teves, who was looking for a
conduit bank to facilitate Tevesteco's business transactions, to
Jaime Sebastian, who was then BPI-FB SFDM's Branch Manager. In
turn, the funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was part of the
P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI-FB from FMIC's time deposit
account and credited to Tevesteco's current account pursuant to
an Authority to Debit purportedly signed by FMIC's officers.
It appears, however, that the signatures of FMIC's officers on the
Authority to Debit were forged. On September 4, 1989, Antonio
Ong, upon being shown the Authority to Debit, personally declared
his signature therein to be a forgery. Unfortunately, Tevesteco had
already effected several withdrawals from its current account (to
which had been credited the P80,000,000.00 covered by the
forged Authority to Debit) amounting to P37,455,410.54, including
the P2,000,000.00 paid to Franco.
On September 8, 1989, impelled by the need to protect its interests
in light of FMIC's forgery claim, BPI-FB, thru its Senior Vice-
President, Severino Coronacion, instructed Jesus Arangorin to
debit Franco's savings and current accounts for the amounts
remaining therein. However, Franco's time deposit account could
not be debited due to the capacity limitations of BPI-FB's
computer.
In the meantime, two checks drawn by Franco against his BPI-FB
current account were dishonored upon presentment for payment,
and stamped with a notation "account under garnishment."
Apparently, Franco's current account was garnished by virtue of
an Order of Attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (Makati RTC) in Civil Case No. 89-4996 (Makati Case),
which had been filed by BPI-FB against Franco et al.,[14] to
recover the P37,455,410.54 representing Tevesteco's total
withdrawals from its account.
Issue:
Whether or not Franco had a better right in the deposits in the
subject accounts which are part of the proceeds of a forged
Authority to Debit
Held:
BPI-FB cannot unilaterally freeze Franco's accounts and preclude
him from withdrawing his deposits. However, contrary to the
appellate court's ruling, the Court held that Franco is not entitled
to unearned interest on the time deposit as well as to moral and
exemplary damages.
BPI-FB urges the Court that the legal consequence of FMIC's
forgery claim is that the money transferred by BPI-FB to Tevesteco
is its own, and considering that it was able to recover possession
of the same when the money was redeposited by Franco, it had the
right to set up its ownership thereon and freeze Franco's accounts.
To bolster its position, BPI-FB cites Article 559 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any
movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it
from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale,
the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price
paid therefor.
BPI-FB's argument is unsound. To begin with, the movable
property mentioned in Article 559 of the Civil Code pertains to a
specific or determinate thing. A determinate or specific thing is
one that is individualized and can be identified or distinguished
from others of the same kind.
In this case, the deposit in Franco's accounts consists of money
which, albeit characterized as a movable, is generic and
fungible.The quality of being fungible depends upon the possibility
of the property, because of its nature or the will of the parties,
being substituted by others of the same kind, not having a distinct
individuality.

Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or

has been unlawfully deprived of a movable to recover the exact
same thing from the current possessor, BPI-FB simply claims
ownership of the equivalent amount of money, i.e., the value
thereof, which it had mistakenly debited from FMIC's account and
credited to Tevesteco's, and subsequently traced to Franco's
account. In fact, this is what BPI-FB did in filing the Makati Case
against Franco, et al. It staked its claim on the money itself which
passed from one account to another, commencing with the forged
Authority to Debit.

It bears emphasizing that money bears no earmarks of peculiar

ownership, and this characteristic is all the more manifest in the
instant case which involves money in a banking transaction gone
awry. Its primary function is to pass from hand to hand as a
medium of exchange, without other evidence of its title. Money,
which had passed through various transactions in the general
course of banking business, even if of traceable origin, is no
exception.