Melancholy, Irony, and Kierkegaard

Melancholy, Irony, and Kierkegaard
Author(s): Abrahim Khan

Source: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 17, No. 1/2 (1985), pp. 67-85
Published by: Springer
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 7:67-85 (1985).
©1985 Martinus Nifhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. Printed in the Netherlands.
MELANCHOLY, IRONY, AND KIERKEGAARD
ABRAHIM KHAN
Trinity College, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ont.
Almost everyone who knows anythingabout Kierkegaardknows that his writings

tend to be melancholy. Some know rightly of the irony with which he writes.Still
some others know that both melancholy and irony are thematicfeaturesprimarily
of his early writings. But probably very few know that he perceivesmelancholy
and irony as two closely related concepts. The conceptualnexus between the two,
taken almost for granted, remainslargely unexplored and somewhat surprisingly
disquieting. A footnote in his doctoral dissertation,providingsome evidence of
Xenophon's failure to understand Socrates correctly, arouses the disquietude.
Drawn from MemorabiliaIII, 14, 2ff., the evidence is Xenophon's depiction of a
young dinner guest who is presumedto understandSocrates' remarkson greed.
Kierkegaardcontends that instead of representingthe youth as taking a little
bread with his meat in order to indicatehis moralimprovement,Xenophonshould
have shown him as "becomingso melancholy (Melancholf)that he gave up eating
meat altogether."1This disquietudestirs as we try to find an answerfor why the
young man should be cast as beingmelancholy(Melancholi).The reply that melan-
choly is a fitting expressionfor Socratic irony is neither lucid nor perceptive.Al-
though an 1849 passage from his journal2 in which Kierkegaardstates that the
melancholy person tends, like the ironist, to become the henpeckedpartnerin a
marriageis a vague hint at an answer,the passage,nevertheless,makesthe question
more vexing, and the demandfor an adequateaccount of their conceptual nexus
more pressing.Hence, this paper aims to put the disquietudeto rest by clarifying
the relationshipbetween melancholy and irony. More specifically,the clarification
is beneficialon two counts. One, it sheds more light on the way in which Kierke-
gaardexploits scepticism;the other is that is permitsthe drawingof a tightercom-
pass around the meanings of "Melancholi"and "Tungsind",each purportedly
representingdifferentdegreesof melancholyin his writings.3
Kierkegaard'searly pseudonymous writings have been used as the basis for
drawing the purported distinction between "Melancholi"and "Tungsind".How-
ever, the nature and intention of the works, the first of which is Either/Orissued
in two volumes, are such that the distinction between these two terms is not a
priority. Artfully constructed to be dramaticallyprovocative,they make use of
67

68
thought experiments,speeches, diaries, letters, etc., to attract their reader'saess-

thetic interests while unobtrusivelyaiming to make the reader take note of his
own mode of existence and to become the agent of his own selfhood. They present
aesthetic life in its manifold as being "constitutedby accidents, by idiosyncracies,
by 'rawmaterial',by chance, and by the fortituouscontatenationof circumstances
that a family or an environmentprovides."4In this connectionmelancholyis both
a constituent of the aesthetic life and a definite thematic features especially in
Either/Or.The treatmentof the theme shows melancholy not as a problemto be
resolved, but as a means and motive for becoming a genuine or complete person.
The literature, having been rendered more connotative than denotative by the
literary freedom exercised and artistry employed in its composition, does not
supportunambiguouslya distinctionbetween two types of melancholy.For it lends
to an equally plausible hypothesis that "Tungsind"is a stylistically elegant varia-
tion of "Melancholi."5A defense of that hypothesis is not the intention of this
study. On the contrary, its intention is to see whether the purporteddistinction
can be furtherclarifiedand strengthenedon the basisof a text that is more formal
and denotativein comparisonto the early pseudonymousliterature.
Already alluded to, the text for our study is Kierkegaard'sdissertation,pub-
lished underthe title The Conceptof Irony,6 submittedto the Universityof Copen-
hagen in 1841, and precedesthe compositionof Either/Or. Its use of either term is
admittedly sparse but no way a handicapin accomplishingour stated objective.
More specifically, the text shows one occurrenceof "Melancholi"and contains
none of its six variantforms occurringin the Kierkegaardcorpus. As for the term
"Tungsind"it does not occur in the text, but its variants"tungsindig"and "tung-
sindigt" do, occurringtwice and once respectively.As we shall see, the contexts
in which they occur are substantialenough to establish the meaning of "Melan-
choli" and to extrapolate it in the case of "Tungsind."The context for the one
"Melancholi"occurrence,alreadycited, is that engenderingthe unsettlingquestion
as to why the young dinnerguest should be depictedas becomingso melancholyas
to refuse food altogether,a questionoccasioningthe clarificationof the conceptual
tie between melancholyand irony.
Kierkegaard'sunderstandingof irony is an appropriatestarting point for that
clarification.His developmentof the concept is such that the expression"ironyas
a mastered moment" is crucial in his interpretationof an authentic human exis-
tence. He singles out for his purpose a particularspecies of irony and calls it irony
in its essentialgreatness,as its zenith. Whenmastered,this particularform of irony
has, in brief, a chasteningeffect on the personallife. In a profound sense, Kierke-
gaardianirony is a possible way of being in the world, a condition for acquiring
wholenessof personality,or humanplenitude.
Valuable in the shapingof his understandingof irony are two figures, Socrates
and the GermanRomanticist,Solger. It is the latter who provideshim with a cue
for makingirony a condition for authentichumanexistence. For Solgerlectureson
aestheticstake irony as a condition for very artistic production.7 This means that
irony is a form of consciousness,a standpoint,or a moment of an infinitely abso-

69
lute negation of every aspect of finitude. At that moment, irony is at its zenith and
is truly the negation of negation. Solger'sunderstandingof irony, however,has a
defect. Kierkegaardfaults him for not going further. Instead of following through
to master irony and thereby to become reconciledwith the finite, Solgerhimself
is trapped in a state of vacuous infinity. Althoughhe graspsirony as engendering
a mood in which all contradictionsare cancelled, his irony remains,in Kierke-
gaard'sestimate, speculativeor contemplativeat best.8 Irony at its zenith is never
mastered, and therefore cannot teach the ironic subject that his personal life
must become an actualized infinity every moment. Consequently,Solger's view
breaksno new groundwith respectto Socrates'understandingof irony.
The paradigmaticfigure in the shaping of Kierkegaard'sconception of irony
is Socrates. For in Kierkegaard'seyes he is the accouncher for the principle of
actualizingthe infinite through one's personallife.9 Although the principlehas its
inception in Socrates, we are reminded that it is only cryptically and not fully
present in him. To the extent that the principleis present in him and that irony
for him is an orientation of personality, Socrates is a world historicalpersonage
markingthe beginningof the period of reflective individualityin world history.10
The implicationis that throughirony Socratesnegates the form of life encouraged
and defined by the Greekstate of his time. Put another way, he becomes through
irony negativelyrelated to the objective ethical reality, to its demandsand obliga-
tions constituting the substantial life of Hellas.11 And, having assumed such a
standpoint, he divorces himself not only from the past but from any subsequent
future development of it. A further outcome is that his earthly life culminatesin
an infinite negativityinstead of affirmingthe actuality of infinity. As with Solger,
Socrates too is trapped by the seductive and enchantingmoment of irony, or as
Kierkegaardtells it, is swept out "upon that infinite Oceanus where the good,
the true, the beautiful, etc. confine [delimit] themselvesin infinite negativity."12
Although he never masters irony, he represents,nonetheless, the instantiationof
irony as an infinite absolute negativity, that is, one whose life is oriented so as to
beginwith the concrete and to endeavourconstantlyto arriveat the abstract.
Any account of Socrateswhich fails to depict him as an essentialironist is, for
Kierkegaard,impoverished.One such account is that of Xenophon. In Kierke-
gaard'sestimate of that account, the misunderstandingof the Socraticutterances
is occasionedby Xenophon's lack of an eye for a situationand of an ear for repar-
tee, shortcomingsreflected by his failureto depict the young dinnerguest as be-
coming so melancholy (Melancholi)that he refuses food altogether.Kierkegaard's
insight that melancholy is associated with sitophobia, the obstinate refusal of
food, anticipatesthe psychoanalyticenquiriesand estimateof Abrahamand Freud
on severe forms of melancholy.13That aside, Kierkegaard,I believe, does not quite
accurately explain the deficiency in the Xenophontic account. He takes it that
Xenophon does not know how to depict melancholy on the basis that the account
fails to show any trace of irony. He rightly perceivesthe account as missingthe
thrust of the Socratic utterances which he takes as being in the direction of per-
sonality and its inward transformation.But by chargingthat it containsno trace of

70
irony, he is implying that Xenophon fails to understandthat the Socraticutter-

ances are essentially intended as a catalyst in the development of genuine per-
sonality. The implication is buttressedby his remarkthat Xenophon lacks an ear
for detecting in the Socraticrejoinders"the infinite reverberatingbackwardecho
of the reply in personality."14
To lay out the charge further, and consequently to pinpoint more accurately
wherein lies Kierkegaard'smistake, the chargeagainstXenophon amounts to this:
he fails to understandthat the Socraticutterances,in the final analysis,requireof
the hearer an inwardresponsethroughwhich the hearerrealignshimself with the
ideal infinity. The responseis not, as Xenophonassumes,an externalone havingto
do with bringing one's outward behaviourinto conformity with the established
norms, that is, with what is considereduseful, expedient, and finite. That which
Xenophon takes to be the fitting human responseis determinedby his philosophi-
cal anthropology,or, his view of humanpersonalityand the way in which it is con-
solidated. In his estimate, human plenitude is independentof any referenceto an
ideal infinity. Indeed, personality is consolidated by means of the good, but the
good taken as whatever is immediately useful, serviceable,lucrative, moderate
and accords with the existing and objectively ethical order.15Completenessin
personality is taken to be in correlationwith becoming properly related to the
finite order of reality. Humanlife is shapedby accidentality,by empiricalrealities,
in Xenophon'sview.
For Kierkegaardsuch a view, in which personalityis shaped by the parodying
shadows of the good, is worthless.The useful and serviceablewith respect to the
good is only the "external dialectic of the good" and even though that dialectic
is infinite, it is, as he puts it, an infinitely bad one.16 His objectionto Xenophon's
view of personality and his own view of it have as their scaffoldingat least two
presuppositionsto which Xenophon does not subscribe.One is that the good must
be conceivedin such a way that in itself it has both an internaland infinite dialec-
tic, as well as an external one. The other is that personalityis such that it has an
inner infinity and cannot become complete unless its infinity becomes correlated
with the internal and infinite dialectic of the good. Kierkegaard'smistake is in
assuming that the two presuppositionsare unquestionable,that they are shared
by Xenophon and by others. And, as we have shown, for Xenophon that is cer-
tainly not the case. His anthropologyis conceived differently from that of Kier-
kegaard.
The scheme and thrust of Kierkegaard's argumentin the text remainsintact and
undiminishedinspite of his wronglyimputingto Xenophoncertainpresuppositions.
In pointing out Kierkegaard'sapparentoversight,we have uncoveredpresupposi-
tions which are implicit for the conception of personalitywhich has for its proper
task the actualization of ideality through the infinite exercise of the will, and
which has irony as a condition for the inception of that task. Further, without
the two, neither can the proper weighing be given nor the propersense be made
of Kierkegaard'sremarkthat the situation and reply for which Xenophon lacks
respectivelyan eye and ear are essentially "the complex formingthe gangliaand

71
cerebralsystems of personality."17They also makeintelligiblehis pithily stated and

familiarthesis that irony is a determinationof subjectivity.And, finally, they are
the backgroundfrom which emerges his assertionthat whoever "does not under-
stand inrony and has no ear for its whisperingslacks eo ipso what might be called
the absolutebeginningof the personallife."18
The species of irony which the presuppositionsfavour and which is ascribedto
Socrates does not issue from Kierkegaard'simagination.Plato identifies it as the
more significant of a double species, and, more specifically, as that which simply
has no purpose or has itself as its purpose. This irony is "both the agent and ter-
minus towards which it strives."19Its correspondingdialecticalmovement is not
that which keeps a problemhoveringin order to arriveat a solution. Instead, the
movement is one in which the abstractIdea can become actualizedor concretely
manifested in human life. As the movement "infinitely expands itself and flows
out in extremities,"irony bringsit to a check and turnsit back into the personali-
ty to round off itself there.20A consequenceof this movementbeing roundedoff
in personalityis that all empiricalexperiencesare invalidatedfor the subject. Or,
as Kierkegaardputs it, irony "works itself free from sheer empiricalsandbanks"
and from the restraintsof speculation.21
Irony, a negating force setting free the subject from the restraintsof his given
historical actuality, is in Hegelian frameworkan integralmoment in the dialectic
of the Idea. According to Hegel, whom Kierkegaardgives credit to on this score,
irony is essentiallya self-destructionwith an aprioritywithin itself.22 Its apriority
implies that irony directsitself againstthe totality of existence, the givenactuality
of a certain time and place, and not just againsta particularphenomenon.That is,
the person who is bounded by the restraintsof the objective ethical reality of his
day is set free from them, from the civic commitments and obligationsmarking
normal daily existence. The validity of the establishedform of existence, that de-
fined by his society, havingbeen destroyedin a Hegelianway with respectto him,
the person is free only in a negativeway, since irony "negatesby virtueof a higher
which is not."23 Its negatingpoweris depictedmore forcefullyand vividlythrough
Kierkegaard'sown words: "Irony establishesnothing, for that which is to be estab-
lished lies behind it. It is a divine madnesswhich rageslike a Tamerlaneand leaves
not one stone standingupon another in its wake."24That ragingor divinemadness
is precisely what Kierkegaardhas in mind also when he refers to irony as an in-
finite absolute negativity. When he speaks of it as an instant "of criticalsatisfac-
tion in theoretical concerns,"25he has in mind also the characteristicof the per-
sonal freedom it occasions. The person whose standpoint is irony as a negating
force, experiences "a subjective freedom which at every moment has within its
power the possibility of a beginning and is not generatedfrom previous condi-
tions."26 Consequently,the person, havingadopted irony personally,becomesnot
only free but is also intoxicated by the "infinity of possibles"confrontinghim.27
And insofar as it occasions the freedom describedabove, irony is consideredto be
a determinationof subjectivity.
The point about irony and its correspondingreflex movement in personalityis,

72
in regardto our concern, that it leavesthe persontakingirony as a standpointcon-

fronted with nothingness.The objectless confrontationis implied by the very fact
that irony has within it an apriorityfor self-destruction,and by the very natureof
the personalfreedom it occasions. Accordingto the former,it does not allow any-
thing to endure,nor posits anything for that matter.In accordancewith the latter,
its freedom is a negative one, again meaningthat nothing is ever affirmed.The im-
pact of its "infinitely delicate play with nothingness"28on the personalityis that
the latter is faced with havingeither alwaysto posit somethingor simply to despair.
Kierkegaardis quick to point out, however, that if a person does not feel that im-
pact, if he is not faced with either, then he is not reallytakingnothingnessserious-
ly. The nothingness in that case is only speculative,and he is not truly an ironic
person.
This infinitely delicate play with nothingness markingan ironic consciousness
and Kierkegaard'suse of the term "Melancholi"are, I forward,a mutual fit. The
term has reference to the temporaryexperiencingof nothingnessspecifically oc-
casioned by irony taken as one's personal standpoint. Kierkegaard'sremarkthat
Xenophon should have depicted the young dinnerguest as becoming melancholy
(Melancholi) to the point that he refuses food,29 implies that the irony, which
Xenophon misses in Socrates' utterances, taken as a personal standpoint, is cor-
relatedwith the encounteringof a serious nothingness.Whencarefullyconsidered,
the refusal to take food is construable as an expression for the temporaryen-
counter with nothingness.Freud notes in his enquiry that "refusalof nourishment
is met with in severe forms of melancholia."30But one need not appeal to Freud
to appreciatethat the refusalmarksthe person'sbreak away from the temporalor
finite reality. There is no doubt that the abandonmentdoes bring to mind the li-
bido's drawing-in,or regressionfrom the external world to the ego. A form of
narcissism,this regressionis taken by Freud as a necessarypreconditionof melan-
cholia.31 Although quite decisive about the fact that the disposition to fall ill
from melancholia predominatesin narcissistic types, Freud in the very enquiry
cautions that his conclusion is based on insufficient empiricaldata. To cite Freud
in connection with this study is to acknowledgethe stark resemblanceof his me-
lancholia to Kierkegaard'sMelancholi, and most importantto caution againstthe
temptation to conclude that both men are speaking about the same condition,
namely an illness. Indeed, Freud's enquiry is about an illness, a condition not
necessarily and deliberately willed. Up to this point Kierkegaard'sMelancholi
cannot be considered an illness. We have no indication that it is a protracteden-
counter with nothingness. It is decisively different from Freud's concern in that
the experience of nothingnessissues from havingadoptedirony as a personalstand-
point or orientation in life. To underscoreMelancholi,it is a condition always in
alignmentwith irony, one in which the person by virtueof his irony is indifferent,
hovering,or detached from the finite world as definedby the observanceof ethical
obligationsor commitmentsin accordancewith daily life in a society.
The notion of detachment or indifference is the conceptual nexus between
Melancholiand irony. Kierkegaardrendersit by his use of the Greekterm"epoche",

73
ordinarilytaken as meaning"openness"as in being reservedwith respectto passing

judgment. He sees in the term, however, its deeper meaning,one in which the no-
tion of personality is resonant. More specifically, its meaning is the "reflex of
personalityinto itself which at that point is abstractor void of content.32 The
reflex of personalityinto itself is akin to a reservedstate of mind. Notwithstanding
their close affinity, the two are not identical. Their difference is predicatedon
Kierkegaard'schoice of the Danish term "Paaholdenhed,"to translatethe Greek
"epoche". The significanceof that choice must be made to prevailif the texture of
the conceptual nexus is to become manifest. The Greek term is ordinarilytrans-
lated into Danish by "Tilbagenholdenhed"whose etymology suggeststhe idea of
"holding back" or closedness.33But in opting to translateit by "Paaholdenhed"
whose etymology suggests the idea of "holding on to," Kierkegaardhas in mind
the perseveranceof abstractpersonality,that is, the frameof mind correlatedwith
such a personality.34Consequently,"epoche"with respect to abstractpersonality
implies not a refusal to give assent, but the clingingon to the imperturabibilityof
mind attained by suspendingjudgment about what men consider good, useful,
etc. in dailylife.
The comments on "epoche" and Greekscepticismby Kierkegaard's pseudonym
Climacusis beneficial. For according to him "epoche" is associated with doubt
begot by an act of the will.35 Its intractablerelation to the act of willingwarrants
further the caution against the equating of Melancholiwith Freud'smelancholia.
To continue with Climacus'comments, Greek scepticismis essentially the retiring
kind, one in which the sceptic remainsaloof by drawingno conclusion from im-
mediate cognition.36The implication of that form of scepticismis not that cogni-
tion is unreliable,but that error might arise in the drawingof a conclusion. The
Greek sceptic, therefore,kept his mind in suspenseand held on to that repose of
mind by willing it. He did not even express the negativeand cognitive results of
his indifferenceto existing states of affairslest it disturbhis mental equipose.37
What is central to Pyrrhonicscepticismis evidently also central to the connec-
tion between melancholyand irony as conceivedby Kierkegaard.As representedby
Pyrrho, scepticism took repose of mind, achievedby being indifferent to all that
appearsgood to man, as the happiness which Stoics and Epicureanssought. The
central notion, repose of mind, does not imply empty-headedness.For the Pyr-
rhonic phrase "on mallon" (no more this than that) suggests instead the idea
of giving equal weight to argumentsfor and against the claim that some appear-
ances can be apprehendedas being true. That claim is the backbone of the Stoics'
theory of apprehension(katalepsis). The avoidance of distinction, the refusal to
favour the inclining of one way over another, is the essence of the catch phrase
"on mallon" which characterizesthe sceptic's mental equipose reported by Dio-
genes Laertius38and reiterated by Climacus.39To the word "epoche" Laertius
couples the word "akatalepsis" (non-apprehension)when describing Pyrrho's
scepticism.40Kierkegaard'scognizance of a Pyrrhonicrepose of mind, which he
does not confuse with the harmoniousrepose in nature, is registeredby his refer-
ence to the rise of ironic ataraxy which elevates itself higher and higher.41The

74
reference is clear evidence that he has in mind the self-consciousness of Greek

scepticism for which "ataraxia"(calmness of mind) is another catchword for a
certain self-consciousness, taken by Kierkegaardas marking the incipience of
reflectiveindividuality.
The conceptual link identified as the notion of holding on to a frame of mind
marked by mental equipose needs no further exposition to appreciatewhy the
melancholy person and the ironist in Kierkegaard'sview tend to become the hen-
pecked partnerin a marriagerelationship.Each tend to be indifferent to the de-
mands of daily living, to its responsibilitiesand obligations.Each is unruffledby
the variety of human passionsand desiresexperiencedordinarilyin the course of
daily living. Each consequently tend to appear aloof, complacent, and morally
malleable. But more important, by tracing the conceptual link, the meaning of
the term "Melancholi"is more clearly and readily perceived.The term, included
in Kierkegaard'sbroader concept of melancholy, is apparently neither easy to
graspnor on quick glanceevidentlyand sufficientlyrich in content, except through
a tracingof its conceptualtie to irony.42
A tighter graspof its meaningis acquiredby examiningalso Kierkegaard'sesti-
mate of Socrates. In his view, Socrates, his paradigmaticfigure representingthe
historical turning point at which subjectivity or reflective individualityappears,
instantiatesMelancholi. For he describesthe master of irony, the Socrates who
through having adopted irony as a standpoint negates the substantialreality of
his time as it is embodied by Hellas, as being masteredby irony in the end.42 Al-
though Socrates was concerned to begin with the concrete in order to arriveat
the abstractIdea, the good, and constantlyto arriveat it, he falls short of exempli-
fying in his own life that which he himself espouses. In the final analysis,he re-
mains always more negatively free, holding on to a frame of mind describedas
ironic ataraxy and suggestedby his professed ignorance,his claim that he knew
nothing, and his constantly seeking of "enlightenment"from others.43By main-
taining an ironic standpoint to the last, he becomes consumed by his own en-
thusiasm for irony. Kierkegaard,commendingto his readersthis view of Socrates
and irony, sumsit up vividlyin these words:
His zeal in its service consumed him, and at last he, too, was seized with
irony: everythingspins around him, he becomes giddy, and all things lose
their reality. This view of Socratesand the significanceof his standpointin
world history seems to me to culminate so naturallyin itself that it will, I
hope, find acceptancewith one or anotherof my readers.44
Accordingto these lines, Socratesdoes not have a saturnine,lethargic,or maudlin

personality. They suggest then a consciousness, to which is correlateda state of
Melancholi, seeming to be marked clearly by a lighthearted, soft, buoyant, or
ethereal temperament,to the extent that consciousnessbecomes fluttering,vacu-
ous, and evanescent. That being the case, Melancholi does not imply dullness,
dejection or sluggishness,that is, moods which do not show the slightest trace of
the sharedmeaningwhich Kierkegaardobservesbetween irony and jest. He points

75
out that in his native language "irony" is occasionally translatedby the word
"Skalkagtigheid," meaning"irresponsibleplayfullness"or archness.45That Socrates
has a sprightly and waggishside to his personalityneeds no belabouringhere. In-
stead, what needs underscoringis that Socrates'melancholycondition (Melancholi)
is essentiallythat of an abstractlydeterminedpersonality.Thatis, his melancholy,
to which our term "Melancholi"refers, is indicativeof what Kierkegaardconsiders
to be a self which is in abstractoand not as yet in concrete.
Socratesis not the only exampleof an abstractlydeterminedpersonalityor self.
Nor, for that matter,is the sprightly,buoyant mood ascribedto him, the sole dispo-
sition characterizingan abstractlydeterminedpersonality.A self which fails to be-
come concretely determinedis markedalso by despondency,gloom, wearinessand
feelings of heaviness.These are the kinds of dispositionsprimarilyin the chiaroscu-
ro of Tungsind.They are certainly the kinds of dispositionsor affects suggested
from the context in which Kierkegaarduses the terms "tungdindig"and "tung-
sindigt".The two termslean on the main from "Tungsind"whose etymology shows
that it is derivedfrom the two Danishstems "tung"and "Sind,"meaning"heavy"
and "mind/spirit"respectively. Its etymological meaning certainly accords with
the descriptionof personalitiesthat are to be found associatedwith the context in
which its two variantsoccur.
Of the two variants,the first one which Kierkegaarduses is "tungsindigt"in
his denouncement of the attempt to idealize Socratesas an Indianmystic and to
construe the Phaedo as being Orientalin its spirit. Insisting that the dialogueof
the Phaedo is authenticallyGreekin spiritand that Socratesis essentiallyan ironist,
he acknowledgesthat there is a point of coincidencebetween irony and a subjective
mysticism. They both terminate with utter abstractionor nothingness, which is
essentiallythe instant of isolation occurringas a result of the reflex of personality
into itself. Theirpoint of coincidencenotwithstanding,the mood of each in Kierke-
gaard'sview is distinctly different.One is the exact opposite of the other, the mood
associatedwith mysticism being heavierand conveyed by his use of a "Tungsind"
form. In his depiction of the latter he states that it consists of "a dissolutionand a
melancholy (tungsindigt) absorbinglanguour,in a soaking whereby one becomes
not softer but heavier...so as to move unsteadily in a fog."46 Of course, "tung-
sindigt"is stylistically better suited than "melancholske"to convey the feeling of
heavinesspresumedto characterizemysticism.
But there is more to the use of a "Tungsind"form thanjust stylistic preference.
Kierkegaardsees the subjectivecondition associatedwith mysticism as being phe-
nomenologicallydifferent from the subjective condition expressed by the use of
"Melancholi".The mystic, in choosing to remain outside his finite self and de-
tached from the external world with it civic obligations,has chosen an isolated
self, one with no history of continuity. Throughthat choice he has cancelled the
instant of isolation engenderedby the reflex of personalityinto itself. The crucial
point for the distinction between the two subjectiveconditions is that in the mys-
tic's case, the cancellationis effected by prolonging,to the extent possible, the
instant of isolation, and yearningto dwell in it indefinitely. Hence that which as a

76
transient factor is wholesome by being a condition for becoming a genuine per-

sonality becomes a sickness when it is protractedindefinitely or when one longs to
embrace it eternally. As a sickness, it inculcates a disposition characterizedby
weightiness,turbidity, weariness,indolence, and depression.Togetherthese moods
are part of the syndromefor a personalitywhose developmentis deformed.Neither
episodic nor superficial,this subjectivecondition, exemplified by the mystic, is a
possible way of being in the world, but not a meaningfulway of acquiringhuman
plenitude. Although the personality remainsin abstracto and will never become
in concreto unless the mystic chooses himself absolutely in his eternalvalidity,47
his subjectivecondition is markedlydifferentfrom that of Socrates.
Again, the two occurrences of the remaining "Tungsind"variant suggest an
arrestin the developmentof an authenticpersonalityincurredby puttingthe whole
of life in the service of maintainingeternallythe reflex of personalityinto itself.
The wider context for Kierkegaard'suse of the variant"tungsindig"is with respect
to his estimate of Schlegel'snovel Lucinde and the depiction of one of its charac-
ters. Insofar as the novel is representativeof irony, Kierkegaardfaults it for not
representingirony in its essential greatness,as a mastered moment. Its primary
concernis to abrogateall ethics and to sponsora view of life in which the individual
is left with all actualitycancelled,and is consequentlyfaced with sheernothingness.
In brief, the personalityit promotesis essentiallyone that is in abstracto.
Kierkegaardmakes use of "tungsindig"in his description of the seriousness
underlying the novel. In stating that it has "a certain melancholy {tungsindig)
seriousness,"48he no doubt has in mind at least one of its characterswhose per-
sonality is in abstracto, namely its hero Julian. The fact that much of Julian'slife
has gone unutilized before meeting his true love Lucinde, the fact that he yearns
for death which he sees as the eternal night that would renderperfect the lovers'
embrace and protect it from the ravagesof time and from the demands of the
finite world, the fact that he fails to fill the gap between the luminous moments
through the longing for an eternal embrace,and the fact that he realizeshow dis-
consolate his life would be without his lover attest to the novel's dominantmotif:
the yearning for love. Fashionableamong Romantics,the motif suggestsalso the
lapsing into an aesthetic stupor which Kierkegaardsees as lulling "the deeper ego
into a somnabulantstate."49The whole of life accordingto that motif is givenover
to imagination.Life's highest perfection, its ideal infinity, is the longingfor a pure
and unadulteratedpassivityas in a vegetativeexistence. That is, the longingfor that
existence is itself a part of the existence which Kierkegaardfinds expressedby the
following sentence in the novel: "The supremeinsight of the understandingis to
choose the role of silence, to restorethe soul to imaginationand not to disturbthe
sweet cooings of the young mother with her child."50
The source of the novel's melancholy {tungsindig)seriousnessis the ideal which
it proposes for the consolidationof personality.Its ideal, in Kierkegaard'sestima-
tion, producesat best a slugglish,dull, forlorn, morbid personalitywhose develop-
ment in concreto is arrested.According to the novel's ideal for human life, the
imaginationis given complete sovereignly over the whole of life. This is not the

77
same as delightingin the free play of the imagination.The latter is indeed a mark
of our common humanity. But the former,Kierkegaardcontends, makes life into
a dream and robs the soul of its moral tension. Expresseddifferently, the novel's
ideality is essentiallya productof nature,namely the harmoniousunity of a beauti-
ful individuality.Unlike a reflectiveindividualitywhich is necessarilyalignedwith
irony in the case of Melancholi,it is formlessand void of content.51 To make the
point more forcefully, and tersely from another angle, the longing for a divine
peace in which the mind is never disturbedis only the negativeand not the sub-
stantial aspect of love. Longing can never be a determinationof subjectivity;for
in Kierkegaard'sview it is "a relationto somethingnot given,"52and consequently
to nothing. It does not requirethe exercisingof the samecomplex of humancapa-
cities as is requiredfor "the eternal self-positingof self consciousness"53whereby
personalityis in the processof becomingmore fully or concretely developed.
The range of moods or feeling tones associatedwith the longing or the desire
for a plant-likeexistence is againsuggestedby the use of "tungsindig"in describing
Lisette, another characterin the novel. Lisette, we are told, is a slave to inward
caprice, to aesthetic pleasure, succumbing to ennui, to an ''excessive indolence
which bothers about nothing."54 In the end she succeeds in doing what many
times has crossed Julian's mind, namely committingsuicide. That she is the kind
of personality which lapses into an aesthetic stupor is indicative from Schlegel,
according to Kierkegaard,not stopping short of anything to portray her with a
poetic glow. That stupor not only lulls her deeper ego into a somnabulantstate,
but permits her "arbitraryego free latitude in ironic self-satisfaction."55She not
only longs for an existence vegetative in its passivity, but at times her existence
approximatesthat longing quite closely. She representsone of the different sen-
sual ways of being in the world. And Kierkegaardnotes this by citing from the
novel a line which states that "as a child she was more melancholy {tungsindig)
than lightminded(letsindig)" and that "even then she had been daemonicallyex-
cited by sensuality."56In citing from the novel, Kierkegaardtranslatesthe German
"schwermutig"by the Danish "tungsindig"which Kierkegaardtranslatorsrender
by the English "melancholy".The choice of Danish equivalent for the German
term "schwermutig"with respect to its meaningis faultless. Furthermore,"tung-
sindig"is rythmicallyand etymologicallybalancedby "letsinding".Hence Kierke-
gaard'schoice of "tungsindig"is commendable.But that aside, there is no question
of "tungsindig"having as its reference a person whose life is constantly outside
herself, is determinedby transitoryand finite realities and is markedby insensitivi-
ty to the moral obligationsand responsibilitiesconcomitant with everydayliving.
Her deeper ego being in a somnabulantstate is an indication of a prolongeddura-
tion of the reflex movement of personalityinto itself, of her isolation from every
actuality, including the actuality of the personality becoming reconciled with
the surroundingworld in which it finds itself. A plant-like existence, her ideal
infinity is formlessand void of content.
To extrapolatefrom the contexts in which its variantsoccur, "Tungsind"has a
distinctly different meaning from "Melancholi".That difference is not obvious

78
from the Englishtranslationof The Concept of Irony since both words are trans-
lated by the same English word 'melancholy' . Such a translationis not without
justificationif at the outset one assumesthat "Tungsind"and "Melancholi"belong
to the concept of melancholy, that either marksa self or personalityin abstracto,
and that each is indeed correlatedwith an experienceof nothingnessand with a
personality detached from the obligations and responsibilitiesthat accord with
the objective ethical world in which one lives. In brief, as forms of melancholy
Tungsindand Melancholiseparatelyhave referenceto a self that has no history of
continuity, or that has not taken as yet the step that would allow the birth of a
personalityin its full measure.
Howeverstrikinglysimilarin resemblance,the two termsare decisivelydifferent
when the phenomenoneach representsis carefullyconsidered.Thereis no question
that Melancholiis alignedwith irony taken as a personalstandpoint,and is there-
fore indicative of a reflectiveindividuality.Its correlationwith irony implies that
it is to be taken as a necessarycondition for, the first phasein, the developmentof
a complete personality. That is, subjectivity is determined only negatively and
lightly. In the case of Tungsind,however, it is a condition not in alignmentwith
irony. None of Schlegel's charactersin the novel has irony as a standpoint. In
fact Kierkegaardcensures Schlegel for confusingan ironic self-satisfaction,which
is a Romantictheme, with irony in its essentialgreatness.57The fact that the con-
dition of Tungsindoccurs as a part of the experiencewhich Romanticismdepicts
and mysticism relishesindicates that Tungsindhas to be understoodas being cor-
related with an attempt to eternalize a sensual moment in temporality and the
failure to accomplishit. The moods in the rangeof ennui and depressionengen-
dered by that failure is the syndrome of Tungsind,and of a personalitythat has
not yet become in concreto. To underscoretheir decisive difference, Tungsindis
alignedwith the constantlongingto eternalize,or freeze, a peak sensualexperience,
whereas Melancholi is in conformity with irony as a personal standpoint. They
are essentiallytwo differentconditionsof melancholy.
The difference between the two is more evident and pronounced by juxta-
posing the conditions of Tungsindand melancholia.The former does not approxi-
mate the latter in its syndrome.Accordingto Freud,the syndromefor melancholia
includes the effect of dejection, preference for being alone, loss of interest, re-
morse, and suicidaltendencies. Althoughhe lists ambivalenceas a factorin melan-
cholia, he does not considerit a decisive one since it is presentalso in mourning.58
As mentioned earlier,narcissismis the crucialfactor in Freud'smelancholia,and its
tendency prevailsin each of the three personalities:the mystic, Julianand Lisette.
As personalitiesindicative of Tungsind,each of them is marked by a drawing-in
of the libido from the externalworld to the ego by a regressionconcomitantwith
loss of interest and with being alone. Julianand Lisette are ambivalentwith respect
to their love objects. Both are suicidal,and the mystic, insofar as Kierkegaardun-
derstandshim as going back behind consciousness or as bursting free from his
mortal frame, is equally suicidal.Finally, all three personalitiesshow signs of the
effects of dejection and low-spiritedness.Since none of these symptoms is found

79
in the case of Melancholi, it may very well be that Kierkegaard'sTungsindand

Freud'smelancholiareferto a personalitywith the same defect.
Our juxtaposing of Tungsind and melancholia is intended not to establish
synonymity, but to accentuate that Tungsindis construed more in terms of a
liability to the development of a genuine personality,whereasMelancholiis not.
Although both beget a personalityvoid of content, Melancholiis definitely a con-
dition resultingfrom a dialectical movement flowing outwards and broughtto a
halt by irony which leads the movement back into personalityto round off itself
there. This means that the movement cannot be consideredas happeningacciden-
tally, that irony must be accorded a specific role for the reflex in personalityto
be effected. More important than the reflex movement, however, is the ensuing
freedom which the person acquires and without which he cannot choose himself
absolutelyin his eternalvalidity. In Kierkegaard'sview of personality,not sensual
feelings but the personalself that is to be inflnitizedabsolutely.As his pseudonym
Judge Williamsin Either/Or puts it: "I myself am the absolute, for only myself
can I choose absolutely and this absolute choice of myself is my freedom."59
Concomitantwith Melancholi is the freedom to choose oneself absolutely. It fol-
lows, then, that Melancholi must thereforebe a transientcondition abrogatedby
being subsumed in the positing of an absolute choice whereby personality con-
tinues to become fully developed. Of course, if that choice is not exercised, then,
as in the case of Tungsind,the development of authentic personalityis arrested.
Whateverreflex movement in personality accompanies Tungsind,the movement
is certainlynot led by irony, but by the longingto infinitize absolutelythat which
is by definitionepisodicand labile, namely, sensuality.
There is no shred of evidence availableto suggestthat whateverlonging might
be concomitant with the condition of Melancholi that the longing is essentially
that associated with Romantics,young men, poets, and artists.60To be clear, the
longing which Romantic literature treats, is essentially one in which the impulse
of the libidio fluctuates without restraints. The person is capriously pulled
hither and thither under the sway of feeling tones and cerebralactivity. Whatever
remotenessexists between the person and the objectivelyethical world is intended
to facilitate and heighten the spiritualizingof the sensual and the sensualizingof
the spiritual.Such is the nature of the longing not only depictedby Romanticism,
but marking the romantic love idealized by Schlegel in his novel Lucinde and
sought in his personal relation with Dorothea.61The same also might be said of
the longing characterizingmysticism to whateverextent Kierkegaardunderstands
the phenomenon. The unavailabilityof evidence raises serious questions as to
whether the claim that Melancholi is essentially melancholy of the Romantics
and poets is coherent and valid. On the basis of Kierkegaard'sdissertation,it is a
weak if not speciousclaim.
Equally indefensible is the claim that Tungsindis Melancholi at a deeper or
"higher"level. The temptation to make and accept the claim arises from giving
more weight to seeing the two conditions as yielding an abstract self instead of
seeing each as a modally determinatefunction. To put the alleged claim different-

80
ly, I cite it verbatim: "The essential difference...lies in the meaningof Tungsind

and the intensification it represents of Melancholi"*2 Words such as "intensi-
fication" and "higherlevel" obscure the real difference between the two forms
of melancholy. The two are not anymore the same as are the emotions love and
hate the same. The implicationis not that the two forms of melancholyare oppo-
sites. Perhapsthey are. Instead, it is that there is an unmistakablycleardifference
which is predicated on the definite role accorded to Pyrrhonicscepticism with
respect to irony, and, consequently,to Melancholi.Whateverscepticismaccompa-
nies Tungsindis by accident and plays no essential role in the latter, even though
there is a reflex movement in personality. And, as explained earlier, the crucial
difference between Melancholi and Tungsindis with the motive force by which
the reflex movement in personality is determinedin each case. Irony as a force
not only begets scepticisma la Pyrrho,but when masteredhas a chasteningeffect
on the personal life. Hence, Melancholi is a modally determinate function of
irony taken as a personal standpoint without which the choice of the self in its
eternal validity cannot be made. The absence of a radicalscepticismin Tungsind
results from the very fact that yearning is the motive force and has also in this
case an epistemologicalapriority.Taken as cognitively real and absolute, yearning
for the sensualblocks the final step to total scepticism.Whateverscepticismmight
accompany Tungsindleads to suicide, as is the case with Lisette. And so long as
imaginationis given complete sovereigntyover the whole of life, radicalscepticism
is averted. The role accorded to Greek scepticism makes a difference;marksoff
Melancholias tending to be more cerebral,and Tungsind,visceral;and casts serious
doubt on the claim that they are essentiallythe same condition with a difference
in degree. Indeed, there is a definite difference,but it seemsto be more of a differ-
ence in kind ratherthan in degree.
Two observationsfollow from our explanationof the connection between me-
lancholy and irony and from drawinga tighter compass aroundthe meaningsof
"Melancholi"and "Tungsind".The first is with respect to Kierkegaard'sview of
Socrates. He would have us see Socrates as a person subject to Melancholia.His
activities have suggested representationsof him as a gadfly, as a midwife, and as
an ironist. But all these activities, Kierkegaardwould have us think, inculcate
melancholy in Socrates.Consequently,one implicationis that Socrates'personali-
ty is such that it is in abstracto. His subjectivityor authentic personalityis mini-
mally determined. A further implication is that he fails to exemplify his own
precept enshrined in the expression "know thyself. For he never became his
true self as a resultof his failureto choose himself absolutelyin his eternalvalidity.
Unlike the personalitiesexemplifying a condition of Tungsind,he is depicted as
being trapped between the finite and infinite, never becoming reconciled with
temporality.Such is the view of Socratesthat Kierkegaard'sdissertationcommends.
The second observationand concludingremarkcenters on Kierkegaard'sinter-
pretation of oriental mysticism in the Brahmanicor Indian tradition.The Vedic
texts do not indicate evidence to suggest a mysticism that is characterizedby a
condition of Tungsind,that is, by a longing that is hazy, low pitched, oppressive,

81
and evaporatingin a feeble lethargy.In fact, the TaittiriyaUpanishad63shows that

the case is the contrary.In setting out the mystic doctrineof the Veda in the form
of a discourse between teacher and pupils, that Upanishadputs the emphasison
the practicingof virtue, the heeding of duties, and on being truthful. Its ethical
emphasisimplies a recognitionof the seriousnessof responsibilityand the feeling
of respect for naturalconsequencesin strivingto attain the ultimate bliss of Brah-
man, man's highest end accordingto that tradition.Notwithstandingthe fact that
he mistakenlyimputes to oriental mysticism the longing for an existence depicted
as being essentially that of "the vegetativestill life of a plant,"64his view of the
relation between melancholy and irony remainsunaffected. The intent in making
the observationis to point out that our understandingof Tungsindis not deepened
by taking into considerationmysticism in the Brahmanictradition.For it is clearly
not a mysticism65endorsingthe pursuit of evanescentwordly or sensualdesires,
nor subjectingthe whole of one's life entirely to the rule of fanciful imagination.
Its emphasisis very much akin to Kierkegaard'sown emphasison choosing abso-
lutely to inflnitize oneself in its eternalvalidity and thereby to become reconciled
with temporalityand its obligations.Whetheror not the Brahmanictraditioncon-
ceives melancholy as a means of becomingone's true self and the extent to which
its view of the self is in opposition to Kierkegaard's view are without doubt impor-
tant matters.But they do not shed light for our purposein this study.
In short, that purpose is to understandthe nature of the connection between
melancholy and irony, and to apprehendand state accuratelythe meaningof Me-
lancholi and of Tungsind.I have explained that the inter-lockingnotion between
the two concepts is one found at the heart of Greek scepticism,correspondingto
the state of mind in which no conclusion about the empiricalworld and its de-
mands is drawn,and that both Melancholiand Tungsindare modally determinate
functions. With respect to the role each asigns to scepticism,Melancholi must
certainly be accorded a preponderantweight over Tungsind.For the former is
constituted necessarilyby means of Pyrrhonic scepticism, whereasfor the latter,
whatever scepticism it might be associated with is accidental to its constitution
and hardly worthy to be reckoned as being Pyrrhonic.Furthermore,the two are
best understoodwhen seen in terms of modally determinatefunctions.Melancholi
is most certainlya function of a species of irony; while Tungsindis clearlya func-
tion of imaginationand desire.
NOTES
1. S^ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1965), p. 51. The original Danish text Om Begrebt Ironi is included in Kierkegaard's
Samlede Vaerker, 3rd edition (Gyldendal, 1962), Vol. 1, and the corresponding page
reference is p. 73. Hereafter, English translation is cited as CI and Danish text as BI.
2. Papirer, X A 400 translated by Howard Hong and Edna Hong in Sfaen Kierkegaard's
Journal and Papers, Vol. 3 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), No. 2691.
The entry is made nine years later from the writing of his dissertation, and its frag-
ment appropriate for this study reads, "how close irony and melancholy are to one an-

82
other."Insteadof "Melancholi"the originalDanish,from which the Hongstranslatethe

English"melancholy",has "Tungsind".A concernof this paperis whetherthe supposed
differencebetween the two terms can be supportedby the dissertation,for the alleged
differenceis based on a study of Kierkegaard's early pseudonymouswritings.See note 3,
=5*3, infra.
3. Three points are relevant here. (1) RichardH. Popkin in his essay "Kierkegaard and
Scepticism"shows that certainpseudonymousworksin Kierkegaard's corpusdevelopas
the basis of true faith a far reachingphilosophicalscepticism.That is, religiousbeliefhas
its foundationin that whichis presumedto undermineit. The detailsas to how scepticism
is slowly tamedby Kierkegaard are shown by clarifyingthe relationbetweenmelancholy
and irony. Popkin's essay is reprintedin Kierkegaard,edited by JosiahThompson(New
York: Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 342-372. (2) The investigationas to whether"Melan-
choli" has a distinctly different meaning from "Tungsind"in Kierkegaard'sthought
originatesfrom a larger study involvingquantitativeanalysis,undertakenby Professor
BarronBrainerd,at the Universityof Toronto, and myself, and funded by the Social
Scienceand HumanitiesResearchCouncilin Canada.The sparseoccurrencesof the terms
"Melancholi"and "Tungsind",includingtheir variantforms, in The Concept of Irony
do not justify the use of methods in quantitativeanalysis.But the largerstudy makes
availablethe location of every occurrenceof either term or any of their variantsin The
Concept of Irony, and thereby permitsa more penetratinginvestigationnow that their
occurrencesdo not escape notice. And (3), McCarthy'sargumentfor a differencein
meaningis based on a considerationof Kierkegaard's early pseudonymouswritings,and
gives no indication of the relevanceof the dissertationon the questionof a distinction.
The purporteddistinctionis that the word "Melancholi"refersto a melancholythat is
essentiallycharacteristicof the Romantics,poets, artists,and youngmen, while the word
"Tungsind"representsa higherdegreeof the same mood reachinga crisiswhichrequires
a religiousresolution.The firsthe callsRomanticmelancholy;the second,religiousmelan-
choly. Assumingthat there is a distinctionand that "Tungsind",as McCarthyrightly
notes, culminatesin a crisisto be resolvedreligiously,the distinctionhe makes,especially
with respect to "Melancholi"is loose and misleading.McCarthy'stroubleis with his use
of the term "Romantic"as a qualifierfor the kind of melancholyto whichKierkegaard's
use of "Melancholi"refers.As this study shows,the variantformsof "Tungsind"areused
in contexts indicatingunmistakablythe longingsassociatedwith Romantics,poets, artists,
and youth. The misleadingname for the melancholycorrelatedwith "Melancholi" andits
distinctionfrom "Tungsind"appearin VincentA. McCarthy's'MelancholyandReligious
Melancholy,"Kierkegaardiana 10 (1972), 152-165. They are underscoredin his book
The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), pp.
53-82, and upheld in his essay "PsychologicalFragments':Kierkegaard's
ReligiousPsy-
chology," in Kierkegaard's Truth: The Disclosure of the Self, edited by Joseph H. Smith,
M.D. (New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1981), pp. 254-258. Althoughthe latteressay
discussesirony as a mood and with respectto his dissertationThe Conceptof Irony, it
shows no trace of the conceptuallink betweenirony andmelancholy,nor evidenceof the
historicalantecedentfor the link. In brief, the essay does not lead its readerto venturea
guess that irony and melancholyare closely tied in Kierkegaard's thought. McCarthy's
book on p. 31, however,does alludeto a tie in his discussionof irony. See note 41.
4. PaulHolmer,"Post-Kierkegaard: RemarksaboutBeinga Person,"in Kierkegaard's Truth,
op.cit, p. 14.
5. That hypothesisis the catalystfor the largerstudymentionedin the secondpoint, note 3,
supra.
6. CI,p.34O.
7. CI, pp. 332, 336. See also Solger'sVorlesungenuberAesthetik, pp. 199, 242ff as cited
in CI, p. 425.
8. CI, pp. 330, 332, 334, 335.

83
9. CI,p. 234.
10. Ibid. In the Socraticdialogues,irony refersto (a) feignedignorance,(b) a rhetoricalde-
vice consistingof saying the opposite of what is meant, and (c) a standpointfor deter-
miningsubjectivity.The last meaningis the one that Kierkegaard sees as havingits incep-
tion in Socrates.The second meaningis the more familiarone. Withrespectto Socrates
it has an ambiguitywhich is often missed. More specifically,when Socratesfeignedig-
norance,he was assertingthat he knewnothing.But in anothersensehe wasassertingthat
he knew more than his interlocutor.And yet, in a third sense, he was assertingthat he
knew enough to know that he did not reallyknow anythingproperly.As HansEichner
points out in his FriedrichSchlegel(New York: TwaynePublishers,1970), pp. 71f., So-
crates'assertionthat he knewnothingwasboth trueandfalse.
11. Ibid.,p. 240.
12. Ibid.,pp. 240, 287. Squarebracketandcontent as givenm Englishtranslation.
13. See SigmundFreud, "Mourningand Melancholia, in The StandardEdition of the Com-
plete PsychologicalWorksof SigmundFreud, trans. James Strachey,Vol. 14 (London:
The HogarthPress,1957), p. 250.
14. CI,p.56.
15. CI, pp. 59,63.
16. CI,p. 59.
17. CI,p.57.
18. CI,p. 339.
19. CI,p. 151.
20. CI, note on p. 152.
21. CI,p. 153.
22. CI, p. 63, p. 370 note 23.
23. CI,p. 278; Cf. p. 296.
24. CI,p.278.
25. CI,p.296.
26. CI,pp. 270, 296.
27. CI,p. 279.
28. CI, p. 286f.
29. Kierkegaardclaims that a substantialnumberof sophismsin the Memorabilia,especially
IV, 2, 22 lack not only bite, but also the infiniteelasticityof irony. See: CI, pp. 63f.
30. Freud,"Mourning andMelancholia,"op.cit., pp. 250, 258.
31. Ibid.,p. 250.
32. CI, note on p. 242, andnote 12 on p. 401.
33. Thisis also the view of Lee M. Capelin CI, note 12, p. 401.
34. Cf.CI,p. 274.
35. Sfken Kierkegaard, PhilosophicalFragments(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1962),
p. 102.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.,pp. 102, 103.
38. See Diogenes Laertius:Lives of EminentPhilosophers(IX, 74-76), trans. R.D. Hicks
(London: WilliamHeinemann,1925), Vol. 2, pp. 487f. The work gives the Greektext
with Englishtranslationon oppositepage.
39. Kierkegaard, PhilosophicalFragments,op.cit., p. 103.
40. DiogenesLaertius(IX, 61) op.cit., p. 475. Phillipde Lacy'sentryfor skepticismin 'Anti-
quity" found in Dictionaryof TheHistoryof Ideas,Vol. 4 (New York:CharlesScribner's
Sons, 1973) is equallyinstructiveon Pyrrhonismfor our purpose.
41. CI,p. 235.
42. CI,pp. 284,287f.
43. CI,pp. 235, 287, 400 note 45. See also: supranote 10.
44. CI,pp.281f.

84
45. CI, pp. 273, 275, 414 note 52.

46. CI,p. 102 (BI, p. 118).
47. That the true self is one which has a history of continuity is alluded to in CI, pp. 107,
313, 314 and later stated explicitly by Judge Williams, a pseudonym in Kierkegaard's
Either/Or (New York: Anchor Books, 1959), Vol. 2, p. 218.
48. CI,p. 306 (BI, p. 300).
49. CI,p. 312.
50. CI,p. 308.
51. CI, pp. 235, 308.
52. CI,p. 83.
53. CI,p. 107.
54. CI, pp. 310-314. The quote is from p. 312.
55. CI,pp. 311f.
56. CI, p. 309. Square brackets and contents are as found in English translation (BI, p. 303).
See also Friedrich Schlegel, Lucinde (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1979), p. 59 for the
original "schwermiitig als leichtsinnig" and which Kierkegaard translates as "tungsindig
end letsindig".
57. CI, p. 292, Cf. note on p. 236.
58. Freud, op.cit., p. 258. See also J.O. Wisdom, "Comparison and Development of the
Psycho-Analytic Theories of Melancholia," International Journal of Psychoanalysis 43
(1962), p. 114.
59. See Either/Or, op.cit., p. 228; also pp. 210, 215-219. See also supra, note 47, and infra
note 61.
60. This is McCarthy's claim. See his article in Kierkegaardiana, op.cit., p. 153.
61. Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. (London: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1954),
pp. 116, 117 for a view of romantic love and Romanticism. Furthermore, Schlegel's use
of a "Tungsind" form and Kierkegaard's perception that Schlegel does not spare anything
to cast Lisette with a poetic glow are good grounds for seeing "Tungsind" as being the
melancholy of the Romantics and poets. The poetical enjoyment of Romanticism is not
to be confused with enjoying oneself. According to Kierkegaard, with the former the
person is outside of himself, confronted by an external infinity, whereas with the latter,
the person is confronted with the true infinity which is within himself. Kierkegaard
acknowledges the poetical as opening up a higher actuality, a victory over the given
actuality insofar as through its infinity it transfigures the imperfect into the perfect, and
mitigates the deep pain which casts darkness on and brings obscurity to life. But its in-
finity being external cannot satisfy the whole of life. Whoever enjoys poetically lacks
one enjoyment. He does not enjoy himself in a non-stoic or non- egoistical sense. The
enjoyment that Kierkegaard has in mind is one that is essentially religious. That is, the
person comes to possess himself in infinite clarity, or is absolutely transparent to himself.
In his dissertation he redefines what it means to live poetically, which is to become ab-
solutely transparent to oneself in one's own absolute and eternal validity. His redefinition
of the poetic, not to be confused with the poetic as understood in and represented by
Lucinde, does not imply remaining obscure to oneself. See CI, pp. 312-314. Perceiving
the proper pattern for the semantic relationship between the German noun "Roman"
and the English adjective "romantic", the latter pertaining to a fantastic love story, the
former to a literary form not of the classical genre and in a modern vernacular, will but-
tress an argument that Tungsind, and not Melancholi, is better suited to depicting the
predominant moods represented by Romantic literature. It does not follow, however, that
it is a mistake to set Tungsind as requiring a "religious" resolution. For an explanation of
the semantic relationship and the meaning of "Roman" see: Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel,
op.cit., pp. 51-54.
62. McCarthy, Kierkegaardianaarticle, op.cit., p. 159, also pp. 153, 156.
63. See Taittirfya Upanishad (I. xi. 1-4), (II.8). For English translation see: R.C. Zaehner

85
(trans.), Hindu Scriptures (London: J.M. Dents & Sons Ltd., 1966), pp. 136f., 140f.
64. CI,p. 102.
65. Brahmanic mysticism puts the emphasis on not becoming a slave to worldly desires, and
on keeping in mind the highest destiny of the individual self (bhutatman). This self is not
identical to the agent or empirical self although it works through the latter and has within
it the immortal self. The individual self is subject to the constituents of nature, to the
different forms of passion, and can lose sight of its inner infinity. It does, however, have
the power to counteract the fetters of nature. The Brahmanic tradition makes available a
specific formula which essentially is the four ashramas or the four stages in the human
life cycle. See Maitri Upanishad (III. 1-3, 5; IV. 2, 3 VI. 17-18). In fact, the discrimina-
tion of the eternal from the contingent (tarka) is one of the sixfold path in Yoga which
is the practical method for winning an unalterable happiness and abiding in the true self.
For corresponding English translation of the preceeding reference, see: Hindu Scriptures,
op.cit, pp. 223f; 224f, 231f. Other relevant Vedic texts are: Artha Veda (XIX, 51);
Rg. Veda (X, 158), and the Isa Upanishads which consists of eighteen short verses. These
indicate that personality in its full measure cannot be attained in isolation from the rest
of the world. Equally helpful for understanding that human plenitude or authentic per-
sonality in the Brahmanic tradition implies an affirmation and acceptance of temporali-
ty and its ethical demands on the individual person are certain sections in Raimundo Pa-
nikkar (ed.), The Vedic Experience: Mantramanjan (London: Darton, Longman, Todd,
1977), pp. 338f, 438, 768, 770, 772.


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