Ne Win's Burma: At the End of the First Decade

Author(s): Richard Butwell

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 10 (Oct., 1972), pp. 901-912
Published by: University of California Press
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NE WIN'S BURMA:
AT THE END OF
THE FIRSTDECADE
/ Richard
Butwell

henGeneralNe Win oustedconstitutionally chosenU Nu as Burma's

primeministeron March 2, 1962, it was declaredthathe did so to save
thedivision-plagued Burmesestate.Imminent secessionof theShans in the
northeast,guaranteed by theconstitution,was particularly feared,butthere
was also concernamong the country'smilitaryleaders about the other
minorities'demandsand theircontinuinginsurgencies. Probablyno lese
important, theleadingsoldierswerefedup withwhattheyperceivedas the
perpetualbickeringand lack ofunityofthecountry's civilianpoliticalelite
whichhad largelygovernedthenationsinceindependence in 1948.Western-
style democraticpolitical institutions
had been twice tried-and found
wanting.And Burmesesocialismhad been too long delayedin its imple-
mentation,partlybecause of alleged ties betweenthe country'scivilian
politiciansand the stilleconomicallyimportant Indian and Chinesecom-
munities.1
For thetensubsequentyears,thesoldiers,led by GeneralNe Win,ruled
Burma-as soldiers.They did so throughthe instruments of a military-
dominated "Revolutionary Council"and a subordinate CouncilofMinisters.
Then,on April20, 1972,"General"Ne Win became"U" Ne Win,resigning
hismilitary rank,together with20 ofhis topaides,and becoming"civilian"
premierof Burma,the country'sfirst"civilian"leader in a decade.2Two
dayslater,a newdraftconstitution was announced, providingfora "Social-
ist Republicof Burma" witha singlepoliticalpartyand an electedone-
chamber600-memberPeople's Congress.Earlier, in March, then still-
GeneralNe Win had announcedmajor changesin the governmental ad-
ministrativestructureofthecountry, and in mid-year a similar"revolution"
changingthejudicial systemwas proclaimed.

'For backgroundto the 1962 coup, see the author'sU Nu of Burma (Stanford: Stan-
ford UniversityPress, 1969), pp. 239-241,and F.S.V. Donnison, Burma (New York:
Praeger, 1970), pp. 163-166.For the regime'sown account of how it came to power,
see "Power to the R.C.," Ten Years of Social Revolutionsupplementto The Working
People's Daily, March 2, 1972.
2New York Times, April 22, 1972. See also Seah Chiang Nee in The Asian (Hong-
kong), May 21 and 28, 1972.
901

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902 NE WIN'S BURMA

POLITICAL DESTRUCTION AND RE-BUILDING

WhenGeneralNe Win tookoverBurma'sgovernment a decade ago, he
threwouttheexistingpoliticalinstitutions. The 1947 constitution, withits
enshrinement of Western-style parliamentary government and concessions
tothecountry's variousminorities, was abrogated.Parliament was dissolved,
and manyof the country'spoliticalleadersj ailed, includingoverthrown
PremierU Nu. The Supremeand HighCourtswereterminated, and political
partieswere subsequentlybanned, exceptfor the government-sponsored
BurmaSocialistProgrammeParty.
By earlyMay 1962, however,only two monthsaftertakingover the
government fromelectedPremierNu, Ne Win had begun the 'task of
shapinga newpoliticalstructure forthe country.A CentralSecurityand
Administration Committeewas createdon May 9, and lower-levelSAC's
weresubsequently set up in the states,divisions,districts,
townships, and
villagesof thecountry.3 The evolutionof thesub-nationalSAC's to their
apparentlypermanent role in Burma'spoliticswas a slow one, and one in
whichthe militarydominatedthe committees,4 but on March 15, 1972,
then still-General Ne Win announceda major change in the local ad-
ministrative structureof the country.The districtunit of administration
and theoncenearlyall-powerful district
commissioner, bothholdoversfrom
theformerBritishcolonialera, wereto be abolished.5The survivingsub-
national levels of governance-village,township,and division-would
henceforth be administered by expandedsecurityand administrative com-
mittees,comprising representatives fromthemilitary, police,BurmaSocial-
ist ProgrammeParty,civil service,and workers'and peasants'councilsas
well as professionaland technicalofficials. As of mid-1972,the apparent
intention ofthecountry'sstill-ruling militaryleadershipwas thattheSAC's
wouldeventuallybe electedunderthe new constitution due to come into
effectin 1974.
Ne Win's March15 announcement was partof a largeroverhaulof the
state administrative structure-an "administrativeresolution,"as the
Burmeseleadercalledit.6Aftertwoyearsof studyby ia committee headed
by Revolutionary CouncilmemberBrigadierSein Win, the old "Secre-
tariat,"the administrative heart of government under both Britishand
successorBurmeserule, was abolished.The Secretariatcomprisedthe
permanent secretariesof thevariousministries who weregroupedtogether
in a single administrative structure whichlargelygovernedthe country.
Ne Win himselfwas long a criticof Secretariat"bureaucratism," and the

'See BSPP Bulletin,No. 6, June1971,p. 42.

'The evolutionof the SAC's is well-describedin The Guardianof April 1972. The
transferof power to the SAC's was explained in detail on the domesticservice of the
BurmaBroadcastingCorporationon August7, 1972.
'See M. C. Tun, "Sudden Death of a Dragon," Far EasternEconomicReview,April
1, 1972.
"Ibid.

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RICHARD BUTWELL 903

Secretariatwas increasinglyregardedas moresuitedto thelaw-and-order

and revenue-collectionrequirementsof theearlierBritishcolonialera than
to theneedsof a would-bedynamic"socialistdemocracy."The secretaries
and theirstaffs,as a resultof thechange,wereincorporated directlyinto
thevariousgovernment departments,
directorates,corporations,and boards.
Underthe new arrangements, ministersand deputyministerswould deal
directlywiththe government agenciesresponsiblefor carryingout the
programstheyweresupposedto oversee.
The 1972 "administrative revolution"was followeda fewmonthslater
thepointof whichwas to have laymenrather
by a "judicial revolution,"
thanlawyersserveas judges,on a rotationalbasis,in new"people'scourts."'
Ne Win'sdislikeofexistingjudicialinstitutionswas clearlyevidentin 1962,
the yearof his takeover,whenhe abolishedthe Supremeand High Courts
evenbeforehe bannedthevariousoppositionpoliticalparties.The idea of
a "people's judicial system,"on the otherhand, is consistentwiththepeople's
statethe Burmese leader otherwiseseems to be seekingto establish.Selection
of the members of the "people's courts," who will serve part-timefor not
more than 30 days a year, will be by three-man"judicial committees"com-
prising representativesof the Burma Socialist Programme Party and the
Peasants' and Workers'Councils.
The administrativeand judicial "revolutions" of the presentyear are part
of the same process of political change that saw the holding of the first
national congress of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in
June-July1971.8 Like the expanded Security and AdministrativeCom-
mittees,with their new responsibilities on sub-national levels of govern-
ment,the BSPP was a long time reaching its presentstage of development.
Formed on July4, 1962,10 during Ne Win's firstyear of rule, the govern-
ment-financed BSPP had only two dozen full memberstwo years before its
firstnational congress in 1971. By the latter date, however, there were
73,369 full members,42,359 of themmembers of the armed forces,as well
as 260,857 candidate members.
The reason forthe initiallyslow growthof the BSPP, and the dominating
role of the military in it, was its "transitional" character. The organiza-
tional structureof thepartywas "designed formobilization,training,testing,
and assigning of cadres as a nucleus of a people's party." The "supreme
authority," indeed, of the party "was exercised by the Revolutionary
Council on the principle of centralism,"with armed forces personneltaken

'See M. C. Tun, "Dads and Mums," Far Eastern Economic Review,August 19, 1972.
8A brief account by the Ne Win Governmentof the historyof the BSPP can be
foundin "Keeping Pace With History,"Ten Years of Social Revolution,op. cit.
9For a complexrationaleof the party,see The Systemof Correlationof Man and His
Environment:The Philosophy of the Burma Socialist ProgrammeParty, (Rangoon,
1963).
"'For an official1965 report on the initial organizationalprogressof the party,see
BSPP Central Organizing Committee,Party Seminar 1965 (Rangoon, 1966), pp.
122-156.

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904 NE WIN'S BURMA

in as "thehard-core cadres."" Ne Win'sdiscussionswiththevariousformer

civilianpoliticalleaders,particularly in the initialmonthsof his rule in
1962, lefthim convincedthatmostof the old politicianswere unsympa-
theticto thetypeof politicalorganization he wantedto build.'2 Whenthe
Burmesesoldier-leader startedto constructhis party,he therefore had to
do so fromscratch.
Afterten years of party-building, Ne Win apparentlynow feels secure
thattheBSPP can increasingly standon its own feet.Electionswereheld
in thefirstmonthsof 1971 to selectdelegatesto thefirstpartycongressin
mid-year, morethan one-third of the membership of new partytownship
unitcommittees selectedat the same timewere new cadres,and one-fifth
of thepreviouslyappointedmembersof such committees wererejectedby
votingpartymembers.Openingthe 1971 firstpartycongress,Ne Win
declaredthatpowerwas being transferred "as fromtodayto our party,
whichrepresents at least a good partof thepeopleof Burma.'913The new
constitution,a draftof whichwas revealedin April1972,providesforthe
BSPP as theonlypoliticalpartylegallyallowedin thecountry. And,at this
pointat least,therecan be no doubtthatsoldiersupervisionof the10-year
old partywill continuesince its Chairmanis Ne Win and its Secretary-
Generalis GeneralSan Yu, DeputyPremier,Ministerof Defense,Army
Chiefof Staff,and Ne Win's apparentchoice as his successoras Burma's
leader.
AlthoughtheRevolutionary Councilassertedfromthestartits intention
to "base itsorganization primarilyon thestrength ofthepeasantsand other
workingmasses,"it has beenincreasingly clearthatpeasants'and workers'
councils,whichcame intobeingin thelate 1960s,wouldbe subordinate to
theBSPP. The firstnationalconference of thepartyin 1971, forexample,
decreedthatbothworkers'and peasants'councilswouldhave to be "orga-
nizedon strictlysocialistdemocratic principles."The processof organizing
Burma'speasantry, some of whomhad hithertobeen organizedinto such
politicalbodies as theAll-BurmaPeasants'Organizationback in the days
of U Nu and the independence-winning Anti-FascistPeople's Freedom
League,began in ithefirstyear of Ne Win's takeoverfromNu in 1962.14
But it was notuntilMarch1969 thattheCentralPeasants'Councilemerged
as a functioning organization.A Peasants' AffairsDivision of the BSPP
had been createdin 1966 withColonelThaungKyi at itshead,and a start
was made almost immediately towardstrainingcadres to go out and

"See The Constitutionof the Burma Socialist ProgrammeParty (Rangoon, 1962).

"2Forthe government's historicalaccount of these meetings,see "Power to the R.C.,"
Ten Years ofSocial Revolution,op. cit.
'3Accordingto the government,the firstparty conference"marked the successful
transitionof a cadre party to a full-fledgedpeople's party." It also was a transition
from"centralismto democraticcentralism.""Keeping Pace With History,"Ten Years
ofSocial Revolution,op. cit.
"'An officialhistoryof the evolutionof Peasant's Councils appears in "Making History
at Ohndaw,"Ten Years ofSocial Revolution,op. cit.

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RICHARD BUTWELL 905

organizecouncilsin the countryside. By August1968, 6,105 primarylevel

and 134 townshiplevel peasants'councilshad been formed.At the 1969
meetingthat selectedthe CentralExecutiveCommitteeof the national
Peasants' Council,Revolutionary Council memberColonel Thaung Kyi,
notsurprisingly,was electedChairman.The subordination of thepeasants'
organizationto themilitary-noless thanthe BSPP-was obvious.
The historyof theWorkers'Councils'5is similarto thatof thepeasants'
organizations.Worktowardscreationof Workers'Councilsdid not begin
until1963, but 34 townshipworkers'councilshad been createdby 1967
and the firstCentralWorkers'Councilmeetingtook place the following
year.By 1969 therewere2400 primary leveland 180 township levelcouncils
covering12,794workestablishments. Electedas head oftheCentralExecu-
tiveCommittee in 1968 was yetanotherkeymilitaryfigure, ColonelMaung
Shwe."Goneare thedayswhentheworkersweredividedintofactionseach
underits ownpoliticalpartyleadership,"boastedan official historyof the
movementon the 10th anniversary in 1972 of Ne Win's takeoverfrom
U Nu.16But thenewWorkers'Councilswereno less a politicalarmof the
BSPP and the country's newpoliticalelitethanweretheAll-BurmaTrade
Union Council,the Burma Trade Union Council,or the Union Labor
Organizationin the old days of the civilianpoliticalleaders.

POLITICAL PROGRESS?
The resignation of his militaryrankby "U" Ne Win in April1972 was
partof theprocessof transition to the"socialistdemocracy"politicalorder
thathe sees as theonlyacceptablealternative forthefuturegovernanceof
Burma.Theoretically, apparently, theBSPP is theparamount politicalinsti-
tutionin thecountry, formally appointing theRevolutionary Councilheaded
by alreadypower-holding still-GeneralNe Win afterits firstnationalcon-
ferencein 1971. Butthemilitary remainsverymuchthedominantpolitical
group in the country,and armygovernments do not cease to be army
governments just because soldiers resigntheir ranks and wear civilian
clothing.The new "civilian" government constituted in April 1972, with
no longeruniformed Ne Win as itspremier,included10 newlyretiredand
threeactive-duty militaryleadersand onlytwo "real" civilians."7
On theotherhand,Ne Winhimselfis probablysincerein his continuing
conceptualization of the government he heads as a "revolutionary" rather
than a militaryone. Unlike theircounterparts in neighboringThailand
duringthepast decade,Ne Win and his soldier-colleagues have been insti-
tution-building,settingup an altogether differentpoliticalorderfromthe
one thatexistedwhentheytook over (or any otherthatBurmahad ever
previouslyknown).Efforts weremadeto recruittheold politicalleadership
"5For an officialhistory,see "Unifyingthe Working Class," Ten Years of Social
Revolution,op. cit.
"'Ibid.
"7See M. C. Tun, "A Civilian Face," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 27, 1972.

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906 NE WIN'S BURMA

totheneworderas recently as 1968-69whenU Nu, U Ba Swe,and U Kyaw

Nyein(amongotherex-leaders)wereaskedto helpdrawup an appropriate
constitutionforBurmaas membersof theInternalUnityAdvisoryBoard.
The old-linedemocratsrecommended a returnto parliamentary democracy,
misreading Ne Win'sstrategy in seekingtheirparticipation in thecountry's
politicalprocessagain.The recommendation was rejected,notsurprisingly,
and, whenNe Win resumedthe task of constitution-making in 1971, he
askedhis right-hand aide,BrigadierSan Yu, to head thenewconstitutional
commission.
Ne Win has constructed his new "socialistdemocracy"political order
witha quiteclearpurposein mind.As Ne Win sees it,British-style parlia-
mentarydemocracyfailedto make Burma the economically(and other-
wise) independent country longenvisionedby Burmesenationalists. Parlia-
mentarydemocracyand, no less so, federalismencourageddivisiveness
ratherthanunity;so Burma'snew politicalarrangements are intendedto
minimizedisunity-notonlyof a partisanand personalnaturebut,more
important, of a communal, ideological,and evenpolicycharacter.
Has Burmaprogressed politicallysinceNe Win tookoverfromU Nu in
1962? Probablyyes in a qualified(and perhapsnegative)sense. Certain
politicalweaknesses appearto be in theprocessofelimination. The colonial-
era administrative structure of the statehas been updatedand seemingly
rationalized,and politicaldisunityamongthe governingelitehas been at
least temporarily eliminated.The big question,however,is whetherNe
Win'snewpoliticalinstitutions, stillto be fullyshaped,willservetheirvari-
ous purposes-and it is too earlyto say. Revolutionary Councilruleby the
soldiersin theyears1962-72was a stifling politicalexperience,butifit was
in factonlya transitionary phenomenon, thennot too muchtimeshould
be spentin assessingits adequacy.The real questionsare whetherNe Win
in theyearssince1962 has donemorethantraina generation of "yes" men
and whether thesuccessor-soldiers to Ne Win are reallyreadyas a class to
sharepowerwithothers-meaningprimarily civilians.
THE QUESTFOR NATIONAL
UNITY
It is also opento seriousquestionwhetherNe Win's Burmain 1972 is
a more effectivelynationallyintegrated countrythan was U Nu's Burma
at the timeof the 1962 militarypower-seizure. Nu reportedly was willing
in 1962 to make concessionsto various of the minoritiesto hold them
withintheBurmeseunion,buthe wouldneverhave acquiescedin secession
by the Shans or any of the othernon-Burman peoples. Indeed, in April
1972, the verymonthin whichNe Win gave up his militaryrank and
uniform, U Nu resignedhis positionas head ofthemulti-minority National
UnitedLiberationFront,whichhas been in insurgency againstthegovern-
mentin easternBurma.Leadersoftheminorities in thecoalitionwantedto
retainthe rightof secessionfromBurmaproper,and some of themwere
fighting primarilyfor this objective(as contrastedwiththe replacement

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RICHARD BUTWELL 907

of theNe Win soldier-regime by a more democratically orientedgovern-

ment). Nu is a Burmesenationalistfirstand foremost, and he could not
continueto supporta cause thatwoulddismember his belovedBurma.
If secessionisttendencies werecontainedin theyears1962-72,theextent
of government controlof thecountrywas probablyno greateron March2,
1972 than it had been on thatmorning10 years earlier whenNe Win
oustedU Nu as Burma's constitutionally chosenleader. Sincereefforts in
theearlyNe Win yearsto winthesupportof variousinsurgent leadersfor
a newattempt to establisha unitedBurmaprovedno moresuccessfulthan
Ne Win's counterpart policyto enlistthe backingof the old-linecivilian
politicalleaders.An invitation to all the insurgentsto take part in peace
talkswas issuedin July1963, and,whiletalkstookplace withmostof the
rebel-groups, theywereunsuccessful forthe mostpart.The carrothaving
failedof itspoliticalpurpose,Ne Win by themiddle1960s was once again
seekingto quash theinsurgencies ofbothsomenon-Burman peoplesand the
Communists. He was successful, however,in terminating by negotiation the
rebellionof a major wing of the Karen insurgency,that of the Karen
NationalDefenseOrganization, but otherKarens and someShans, Chins,
Kachins,and Mons remainedin thefieldagainstthe government's forces.
AlthoughcentralBurmawas largelypurgedof its Communist insurgency
activityby the startof the1970s,ethnicminorities and Communists in the
outlyingpartsof the countryprobablycontrolledas muchas one-third of
thenationalterritory, aboutthesameamountas variousrebelshelda decade
earlier.
Indeed,therewas evidencein thelate 1960s of a coming-together ofsome
of the differentethnicminorities underthe diversebannersof ex-Premier
Nu's democratically orientedleadershipin easternBurma and the Com-
munistNaw Seng'sdirectionin thenorthern reachesoftheland.Nu proved
to be a less strongcementthan was needed to keep his multi-minority
coalitiontogether, and thesame may ultimately proveto be the case with
Naw Seng. ActiveCommunist Chinesesupportof the latter,on the other
hand,together witha vigorousindoctrination program(includingtraining
inside China) and the existenceacross the Chineseborderof minorities
ofthesameethniccomplexionas manyofNaw Seng'sfollowers, could give
his movementmore staying-power than Nu probably ever could have
achieved in his would-beleadershipof the National United Liberation
Front.
Because of the continuingintransigency of both ethnicminorityand
Communist insurgent-leaders,it is almostimpossibleto ascertainwhether
variousefforts to winthesupportofnon-Burman peoplesthrougheconomic
meanshave had any impact.Ne Win promisedthe minoritieseconomic
equalitywiththe majorityBurmans,and he has soughtto redeemthis
promiseby variousmeans:increasedgovernmental spendingforeducation,
health,and otherpublicservicesin theareas inhabitedby thenon-Burmans
and attempted controlof pricesforvitalitemssuch as rice in areas distant

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908 NE WIN'S BURMA

fromcapitalRangoon.Such controls(or subsidizationmeasuresto lower

prices) were designedto preventpricesin remoteareas of the country
frombeinghigherthanthosein Rangoon,whichtheyhad beenin thepast
to a dramaticdegree.The grievancesof theminorities, on the otherhand,
have not been especiallyeconomic,whichraises the questionof whether
economicpoliciescan compensateforpolitical,socio-cultural, and psycho-
logicalinjustices-realor imagined.
Politically,Ne Win's new constitution will not accord autonomyto the
minorities,nor will it even have a secondchamberbased on ethniccon-
siderationsas did the old Chamberof Nationalitiesin the parliament
overthrown in 1962. UnlikeU Nu beforehim,Ne Win is holdingout no
hope of otherthana whollyBurma-oriented politicalfuturefortheminori-
ties.His answersto the demandsof theirinsurgentand otherleadersare
clear enough: Burma will be unified,its citizenswill be equally treated
but therewill be only one kind of citizenship,and hopes for greater
autonomy, letalonesecession,belongto history.18 Burmatodayis probably
no moreintegrated as a nationthanit was tenyears ago.
socio-politically
Whetherit is nearerto such unityin a futureday, on the otherhand,is
another-butveryopen-question.
STATE OF THE ECONOMY
Economicallyno less thanpolitically,Ne Win has attempted Itofashion
a neworderforBurma.19His government, seekingto establisha moreall-
embracingSocialisteconomythanhad previouslybeen attempted in the
country,adopted as a major goal "sufficiency" of "food, clothing,and
shelter"forIthemasses.Old economicinstitutions,like politicalones,were
overthrown, whichusuallymeantthattheywere takenover. Banks were
nationalized,and so werewholesaleandmostretailtrade.Tens ofthousands
of Indian and Chinesebusinessmenweredeprivedof theiropportunity to
earna livelihoodin a land in whichmostofthemhad beenborn.
Subsequently and oftenwithinadequatepreparation, neweconomicenter-
priseswereestablished, moretowardstheend ofthe10-yearperiod1962-72
thanearlier.TheNe Wingovernment's to advancetheindustrialization
effort
of the country,however,appear impressive althoughmore so on paper
than in othervisibleindicationsof an expandingeconomy.Accordingto
reviewofthefirsttenyearsofNe Win'sleadershipof a would-be
an official
socialistBurma,20directgovernment investmentin the economydoubled,
risingfromabout300 millionkyatsannuallyin 1961-62to a presentfigure
ofapproximately 600 million.
The percentage ofgovernment fundsbeinginvestedin industrial ventures
"8For T. D. Allman's analysis, see his "Burma Moves Haltingly Toward Consti-
tutionalReform,"Dispatch News Service InternationalBi-WeeklyAsian Release, Janu-
ary10, 1972,pp. 7-8.
"9Agood source of economicdata are the Annual Reportsto the People by the Union
of Burma RevolutionaryCouncil on the RevolutionaryGovernment'sBudget Estimates.
20"Food, Clothing& Shelter,"Ten Years ofSocial Revolution,op. cit.

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RICHARD BUTWELL 909

has also increasedsubstantially,from5% to 40% between1962 and 1972.

Much such investment has been infrastructure to date, moreover,partly
accountingforthe absenceof particularly conspicuousresults.According
to the government's figures,however,the value of industrialoutputwas
also up substantially
in theten-year periodduringwhichNe Win has served
as Burma'sleader,increasingfrom3,590 millionkyatsin 1961-62to 6,190
millionkyatsin 1971-72.
These figuresappear impressive, but the near non-availability
of many
of onceverycommonBurmeseconsumeritemsraisesthequestionof what
is happeningto the outputof variousmanufacturing and otherindustrial
establishments. Longyis(skirt-like garments wornby bothmenand women
in Burma) remainin veryshortsupply-despitethe existenceof allegedly
successful textilemills.Burma'sforeignexchangereservesdroppedin 1971
to only$50 million,comparedwith$214 millionin 1964, thelowestlevel
sincetheend ofcolonialrulein 1948-which partlyexplainswhyimported
goods are almostnon-existent excepton the black market.But therealso
do notappearto be substitute Burmese-made products,despitethereported
dramaticgains in domesticindustrialoutput.
The living-standard of theBurmese,in termsof the goods the ordinary
man can acquire to meethis needs,appears to have droppedduringthe
Ne Win years.There is a thrivingblack-market, toleratedby the govern-
ment,but its pricesare fiveto tentimeshigherthanthoseof such goods
available in state-runretail outletsor cooperativesand are beyondthe
meansof theaverageBurmese.Thereis stillrationingof some goods,and
inflation has takenits tollin theyearssince 1962.
If Burma's economicdifficulties were whollythe consequenceof the
shiftto a socialisteconomyor the temporary resultof the ousterof pre-
viouslydominantIndian and Chinesebusinessmen, hopes for the future
mightbe brighter.But theyare not. Burma, once lavishlydescribedin
termsof its naturalresourcesand the richnessof its rice-producing soils,
now facesa veryseriouseconomicproblem:its populationhas increased
50% sinceWorldWar II, butits riceproductionappearsto have stabilized
at aboutthesamelevelas beforethewar.21
Rice exportsalso droppeddramatically in the firsthalf-dozenyears of
the Ne Win period-from 1,840,000tons in 1961-62to 350,000 tons in
1967-68,a particularly disastrousyearin whichtherewerefood-riots in a
land that once ranked firstamong the world's rice-exporting nations.
Although production and thesize oftheexport-surplushavesinceimproved,
thefallingpriceforricein theinternational markethas giventheproblem
an additionallythreatening dimensionin view ofthefactthatriceaccounts
formorethanhalf of thevalue of Burma'sexports.The factthatBurma
has thusfarbeenunableto produceotherproductsmorein demandoutside

"1This problem is analyzed in detail by Donnison, op. cit., in his comprehensive

chapteron the Burmeseeconomy.

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910 NE WIN'S BURMA

thecountry, suchas teakand variousminerals,raises the seriousquestion

ofwherefunding forfuturevitalimports,
howeverreducedin quantity, will
comefrom.
This is not to say thattheNe Win government has not made some sig-
nificanteconomicgains.22By 1967, for example,it had increasedthe
amountofrice-landundercultivation 6% abovetheprewarfigure,although
outputdid notmatchthisincreasein the amountof land farmedforrice.
In general,however,it is impossibleto avoid the conclusionthat the
economyis in worseshapein 1972 thanit was in 1962. To be sure,Burma's
economyhas beenreclaimedfromforeigners-and"saved" fromwould-be
successorBurmesecapitalists.But is this enough? And what is the ad-
vantageofsharedpoverty?
Therecan be no doubtthatNe Win knewwherehe wantedto go in an
economicallyideologicalsense when he launchedthe "BurmeseWay to
Socialism"in 1962.23And he has establisheda formally socialisteconomy.
Buthe-and his colonel-lieutenants-have notknownhowto directand de-
velopthateconomy.Theymaybe wisermenin thisrespecttoday,butthere
is notmuchevidencethattheyare thatmuchmoretechnically qualifiedfor
thetasktheysetforthemselves a decadeago thantheywerein thefirstdays
oftheBurmeseWayto Socialism.

THE BRIGHTSPOTS
Two of the brighterspots in the Burmeserecordsince Ne Win took
powerin 1962 are in thefieldsof educationand health.Primaryschools,
forexample,increasedin numberfrom12,851to 17,399between1961 and
1971, and teachersand studentsin themfrom40,287 and 1,681,908,re-
to 67,542 and 3,249,104.Comparablegrowthtookplace in the
spectively,
expansionof bothmiddleand highschools,and numerousvocationaland
othertrainingschools also increased,thoughthe numbersinvolvedwere
muchmore modest.University, college,and otheradvancededucational
also grewin termsof thenumberof teachersand students.
institutions
It was not just that the numbersgrew,however,but the instruction
involvedwas more"equatedwithlivelihood,"24 as the governmentput it.
Young men and womenwere offerededucationmore in keepingwith
Burma'sneedsthanwas thecase, forexample,whenhistoryand otherarts
majorspredominated in theBritish-style
University of Rangoon.Nor were
numbersexpandedwithno concernforquality:only10,609of the140,000
studentstakingtherelevantexaminations in 1971 forentryintoinstitutions
ofhighereducationweresubsequently admitted to suchprograms.On quite

22A good officially approvedstatementof these gains is to be found in U Htin Fatt,

"A Decade of Economic Revolution,"in the Decade of Socialism supplementto The
Guardian,March 2,1972.
"3See The Burmese Way to Socialism (Rangoon), April 20, 1962.
2'This is the title of the regime's own account of its education policies in the Ten
Years of Social Revolution,op. cit.

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RICHARD BUTWELL 911

a different level,the government'sprogramof expandingliteracyamong

the working-age population (15-55) also seemedto enjoy considerable
success.
The Ne Win government notonlypledgeditselfto expandthecapabilities
oftheBurmesecitizento earna livingthrough improvededucationaloppor-
tunities,but it also pledgedbetterhealthconditions.And it has largely
deliveredon thispromise,too. Between1961-62and 1970-71,government
expenditures on medical establishmentsmore than doubled.As a result,
hospitalsincreasedin numberfrom269 to 374, hospitalbeds from11,035
to 20,587, the numberof doctorsfrom1,778 to 3,073, and rural health
centersfrom555 to 909. The impactof the government's concernforthe
people'shealthwas variouslyreflected:life expectancyincreasedfrom40
to 44 between1962 and 1972,theinfantmortality ratedroppedfrom147.6
to 66.5 in 1,000,and thematernalmortality ratefrom4.9 to 1.9.25

FOREIGN POLICY
No area or policyis moreimportant to Burmathanforeignpolicy.In a
sense,all otherpoliciesflowfromforeignpolicy-particularlythataspect
of it concernedwithmaintaining Burmeseindependence, economicno less
thanpolitical,fromall externaldangers.The BurmeseWay to Socialismis
designedto ensurethe futurefreedomof Burma fromforeigneconomic
domination. have as theirprime
"Socialistdemocracy"politicalinstitutions
objectivethedevelopment ofnationalunityas a meansof avoidingthekind
ofweaknessand divisionthattemptexternalexploitation.
FormerPremierU Nu keptBurma largelyfreefromforeigndangers
throughpursuitof his non-alignment policy,thoughtherewere incidents
withChina along the 1200-mile-long commonborder.At the same time,
however,BurmaunderNu's leadershipplayedan activeinternational role,
especiallyon the South and SoutheastAsian scene,being one of the co-
sponsorsofthehistoric1955 BandungConference. Ne Win'sforeignpolicy,
on theotherhand,has beenone oftheleastactivein all Asia-thoughit has
probablybeenevenmorecompletely non-alignedthanthatofNu. However,
Ne Win has also, like Nu, had difficulties
withtheChinese,notleast of all
theoccasionalclashesbetweenChineseand Burmeseelementsin thenorth
ofthecountry.
UnlikeSouthVietnam,Laos or Cambodia,whichchose to align them-
selveswiththeUnitedStates,Burmahas been spared-so far-externally-
causeddivisionand large-scaleforeigninterventionon itssoil. On theother
band, China's policyof givingsupportto Burma'sCommunistinsurgents
does not seem verydifferent fromPeking'sbehaviortowardsThailand,
stronglyallied withthe UnitedStates.Has Burma'sforeignpolicymain-
tainedthecountry'sindependence, or has thatindependencenot yetbeen
threatened? No definitiveanswercan be given,althoughit can be pointed

25See"To theVillages. . . ," in Ten YearsofSocial Revolution,

op. cit.

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912 NE WIN'S BURMA

out thatNe Win's foreignpolicy has spared his countrymen

Laos-and
Cambodia-style
suffering.
SUMMARY
Operationof the economyhas been the biggestfailureof the firstten
yearsofNe Win'sleadershipof would-besocialistBurma.Thereare bright
spots,but theyare overshadowedby the stagnancy,incompetence, and
deprivation thatdistinguish thepresent-dayBurmeseeconomy.Politically,
thoughmovementhas perhapsof necessitybeen slow,new and possibly
more appropriatepoliticalinstitutions are being developed.National dis-
integration has been prevented, but truenationalunitycannotbe said to
have been attained,thoughthismay,also of necessity, requiregenerations
of veryskillfulleadership.In some selectfields,primarilyeducationand
health,therecordis an impressiveone. And it is difficult to discernwhat
Burmaoughtto have donedifferently to have furtheradvancedits national
security-particularly in lightof thefactthatit has a longerborderwith
ChinathananyotherSoutheastAsiancountry.
Ne Win'sBurmain itsfirstdecadehas been nowherenear thesuccessful
experiment in socialismand socialistdemocracythatits soldier-leaderand
his lieutenants have proclaimedit to be. But,then,neitherhas it been the
completefiascothatits criticshave oftencharged.Hopefully,the second
decade of socialistdemocracyin operation-ratherthanin preparation-
will build on thesuccessesof thefirstten yearsto overcomesome of the
failuresofthesameperiod.

RICHARD BUTWELL is Chairmanof thePoliticalScienceDepartment

at the State
ofNewYorkCollegeofBrockport.
University

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