Burma: Ne Win's Revolution Considered

Author(s): Josef Silverstein

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Feb., 1966), pp. 95-102
Published by: University of California Press
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BURMA:NE WIN'S REVOLUTIONCONSIDERED
JOSEF SILVERSTEIN

As themilitary's fourthyearin powerdrawsto a close,General

Ne Win'srevolution is stalledon theroadto socialism.Whata fewjournal-
ists' and occasionaltravelershave said cautiouslyand in private,the Gen-
eral declaredemphatically and in public-the economyis "in a mess.""If
Burmawerenota countrywithan abundanceof foodwe wouldbe starv-
ing."2Such candor,fromtheauthorof the 1962 coup and thepersonmost
responsibleforthe decisionswhichare movingBurma along its present
path, is not new.Throughoutthe past year he foundotheroccasionsto
expresshimselfin equallyforthright terms.Despite the fact thathe and
his co-leadersare withoutreal challengeand have absolutepowerto make
and carryout theirdecisions,the revolutionhas not produceddramatic
resultsin any of theareaswhereit is at work.The eventsof thepast year
provideampleevidenceof thisand cause one to ask, wheredoes the revo-
lutiongo fromhere?

The objectivesof the revolutionneitherwerethoughtout fullywhenit

begannorset downsystematically since.3Fromwhathas been writtenand
undertaken, it appearsas thoughtherevolution has fourmajorobjectives:
reformthe economyfromsemi-private to socialist; eliminateforeignin-
fluencesfromall aspectsof economic,political,and social life; changethe
values and attitudesof thepeople so thata new leadershipcan arise and
take overthe tasksof the revolution;unitethe diversepeoplesintoa co-
hesivenation.It is againstthis frameof reference that the major events
and decisionsof thepast year take on specialmeaning.

The firstobjective-the developmentof a socialisteconomy-in one

sense is nearingrealization;privateindustryand trade eitherhave been
eliminated limitedin thelegalmarket,or theyhave beendriven
or seriously
underground intoblackmarket operations.The processwas acceleratedin
Januarywhen the Burma Corporationand Burma Unileverwere taken
1 See for example,the dispatch by John Hughes in the ChristianScience Monitor,
December 10, 1965.
2 New York Times,December 13, 1965,p. 31.
3 It was almost two monthsafterthe coup before the brief document,the Burmese
Way to Socialism appeared. It was writtenhastily after the seizure of power and all
subsequentdocumentshave soughtto fillin the details and omissionsin order to make
the ideologyboth logicallyconsistentand a guide to action on all questionsarisingout
of the pragmaticpursuitof socialism.
95

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96 BU RMA

overby thestate,thuseliminating thelast majorjoint ventureswithpri-

vate foreignfirms.4 In April,the government seized approximately 1,000
oil wellswhichwereoperatedby Twinyosand Twinzas-hereditaryBur-
meseoperators withrightsdatingfromthepre-British period.5Also,during
thesamemonth,129 of thelargerand morerespectedprivateschoolswere
nationalizedbecause"thestatemusttaketheresponsibility ofeducatingthe
childrenof theworking peoplein thebasic socialistconcepts. ..."
In agriculture,
thestatetooka further steptowardsocialismby abolish-
ing tenancyrentforpeasantsusing the land for farming.7 Land still is
underprivateownershipand each peasant is the ownerof his produce.
However,the militarygovernment is campaigningamongthe farmersto
inducethemto cooperateand sharetheirlabor,animals,and tools in all
phasesofproduction and harvest,in orderto developnewattitudestoward
socialistproduction.This decreeabolishingland rent (added to existing
ones whichtransferred allocationof plowlandsfromlandlordsto Land
Committees)also banned property-personaland real-from being at-
tachedin paymentofdebts,prohibited transfer of land to non-agricultural-
ists, and empoweredthe state to lend moneydirectlyto the individual
producer.All these measuresare intendedto move the peasant toward
socialism.
In anothersense,however,the objectiveis far fromrealization.The
purchasing,distribution and sales of consumergoods has been chaotic,
contributingto shortagesofbasic commodities in someareas and surpluses
in others.During the past year,black marketsin longyis,razor blades,
chinaware, cookingoil, and othercommodities arose throughout the coun-
try.Despite the efforts of the government to increaseproductionand im-
portationof necessarygoods,distribution remainsa majorunsolvedprob-
lemforthemilitary planners.8
The effortsto eliminateprivatetradersin paddy,and at the same time
establisha government-operated systemof purchasesand sales withfixed
nation-wide uniform low consumerprices,had a dual negativeeffect. They
causedmanypeasantsto act as "economicmen" and shiftfrompaddy to
othergrainswhichoffered largermarginsof profit,and caused the govern-
mentto lose K70 millionthroughits experiment in riggingprices,mainly
because it set themtoo low to covercosts and made no allowancesfor
differencesin qualityof product.Ne Win lamentedthe fact that "some
The Guardian,January19, 1965,p. 1; ibid, January30, 1965,p. 1.
4
5 Ibid., April 2, 1965,p. 1; Forward,III, 17 (April 15, 1965), p. 6.
6 Forward,op. cit.,pp. 5-6. Although754 privateschools remainedunaffected by the
decree,in due course,theytoo, will be takenover. See the Guardian,April 2, 1965, p. 1.
7 Forward,III, 18 (May 1, 1965), p. 2. This was an extensionof the Tenancy Act of
1963 and repealed all previouslaws relatingto tenancy.Accordingto the government,
as of June30, 1963 therewere 1.1 milliontenantspaying K13 millionto about 350,000
landlords; and about one thirdof the latterwere non-nationals.
8 For an exampleof the government's effortto prove that shortagesno longerexisted,
see the Guardian,August8, 1965,p. 1 lead storyon longyiproduction.

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JOSEF SI LV E RSTE I N 97

peasantsreplacedthecultivation of paddywithothercropsin theirselfish

interests...." He imploredthem"to resumepaddycultivation in theusual
fieldsand stop such acts thatwouldpracticallyamountto exploitingour
goodwillforthewelfareof themasses...."9
The General'sassessmentignoredthe fact that manyfarmersbecame
disgustedwithhavingto deal withinexperienced grainbuyers(youngoffi-
cersassignedto thistaskas theirduty),to travelgreatdistancesto deliver
theirproductto badly locatedbuyingstations,and to see theirproduct
rejectedor down-graded because thebuyersdemandedthatit conformto
the officialpurchasingguide lines. The farmeralso faced the fact that
cattlepricesrosesharplyduringthe year.Withbut 3,000 tractorsin use
throughout thecountry, cattleremaina chiefsourceof powerin the field
forthepeasant.In seekingto buy newanimals,he facedcompetition from
thecattleslaughterers, whofounda risingmarketfortheirmeat,and from
cattlemerchants whodrovetheiranimalsillegallyto Thailandin orderto
sell at considerablyhigherprices.Caughtin themiddle,the farmer'scosts
rose at a momentwhenthe government soughtto keep domesticprices
downbypayinglessforthegrain.10
To balance the economicpicture,it mustbe noted that mineraland
timberexportsroseduringthe year,whilerice,the main export,declined.
ThroughtheMyepadethascheme,thecoupleaderssoughtto getthefarmer
to plant 1.2.69millionacresin paddyand 3.86 millionacres in otheragri-
culturalcrops.1"They also continuedto seek new lands to bringunder
cultivationand forestareas to replant.The overall resultshave been a
declinein foreign exchange,commodity shortages,blackmarkets,and a de-
creasein nationalproduction. Col. Maung Shwe,speakingat theWorker's
Day Rally,broughtthe pictureinto statisticalperspectivewhenhe said
thatin orderto increasethe nation'sstandardof living,productionmust
rise by 8% annually.With the populationincreasingapproximately 2%
per year,production in stateenterprises falling(1963-64) by 1% and in
privateenterprise by 13.6%, the prospectswere not brightfor making
socialisman attractivealternativeto the more relaxed,sometimesmis-
managed,mixedeconomyunderdemocraticgovernment.
In seekingto controlforeigninfluenceson Burmeselife, the Revolu-
tionaryCouncilhad mixedresults.Westernor capitalistinfluenceswere
reducedeven further thanduringthepreviousyear,withthe end of joint
ventures,thebanningof foreign-run of
libraries, and the nationalization
fourmajor hospitalsand the mostimportantprivateschools.There was

9 Forward,III, 15 (March 15, 1965), p. 13.

10 The Guardian,June 14, 1965,p. 4 (editorial).
11Forward,111,20 (June 1, 1965), p. 2.
12 New York Times, September 19, 1965. The decree applied to four nations: the
United States, Great Britain,India, and the USSR. In the period prior to the coup in
1962, the Russians maintained the smallest and least influentiallibrary of the four
nations.

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98 B U RMA

also a reductionin thenumberofAmericanfilmsshownand in official visits

by importantpersons,13 whileWesterntouristswere almost non-existent
outsidethe environsof Rangoon.14 At the same time,Easternor socialist
influences grewand expanded.Both China and Russia continuedto buy
largeamountsof rice.Chineseeconomicand technicalassistanceincreased
as Burma agreedto threeprojectsunderthe termsof the 1961 Sino-Bur-
meseloan agreement15-the buildingand equippingof threetextilemills,16
a 40-toncapacitypapermill,17 and theconstruction of a secondbridgein
theShan State.18Most of the177 statescholarswhowentabroadweresent
to socialistcountries,whileonlya fewwentto Australia,Canada, India,
Japan,and theFederalRepublicof Germany.Chineseand Russian influ-
ence also was enhancedby GeneralNe Win's visitsto the two countries
and thelocalpresscoverageoftheevents.19
The threeAsianconflicts-Vietnam, Kashmirand 1\alaysia-Indonesia-
gave Burma'sleadersa major challengein attempting to controlforeign
influences.The Burmesepressreportedthe conflicts withdispatchesfrom
all sources.In the feweditorialsdevotedto the Vietnameseconflict,the
press echoed Ne Win's positionas expressedin February-a peaceful
settlement can be madeon thebasis of the 1954 Genevaaccordsand a new
Geneva-type conferenceoughtto be calledto settletheimmediate problems
of theconflict.On Kashmirthe Generaland thepressobservedstrictneu-
trality,callingfora peacefulsettlement and supporting the efforts
of the
UnitedNations.TowardMalaysia and Indonesia,theGeneralsaid,and the
pressrepeated,thata peacefulsettlement couldbe foundif thedisputewas
movedfromthe battlefield to the conference table. Despite theseefforts,
theproximity of thefighting caused concernamongthepeoplesin Burma,
and it was reflectedin the Lettersto Editorcolumnsin the local govern-
ment-controlled press.Clearly,foreign influences,
whileundercontrol,were
not eliminated;Ne Win and his colleaguesstillface thequestionof how to
followsocialismas an economicand social theory,and socialiststatesas
politicalmodels,withoutbeingdrawnintothe socialistpoliticalorbit.
13 The most importantAmericandelegationto visit Burma came in December when
the group led by Senator M. Mansfieldvisited Burma and held talks with the Bur-
mese leaders.
14 A transitvisa may be obtained if the traveleris changingplanes. Only 24 hours
transittimeis allowed to make the change.
15 See United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1963, p. 163 for
a good briefsummaryof the termsof the agreement.
16 The Guardian,March 7, 1965,p. 1.
17 Ibid., August19, 1965,p. 1.
18 Ibid., August23, 1965,p. 1.
19 The Guardian, March 14, 1965, p. 1. A discordantnote was sounded in March
when a book appeared in Laos, identifiedas publishedin China, which was criticalof
the militarygovernmentin Burma for parrotingthe "Moscow RevisionistLine." It
appealed to the peace-lovingpeople of Burma not to "let your countrybecome an
historicalinconsistency."The Peking governmentdenied publication of the book, but
the Burmese governmentdid not silence the press in heraldingits appearance.

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JOSEF SI LV E RSTE I N 99

Duringtheperiodof militaryrulesince 1962, the leadersof the armed

forceshave struggled withtheproblemsof legitimacy-bywhatrightthey
seized power,how long theywill hold it, and how they will returnit.
BrigadierThaungDan gave theclearestanswersyetin his ResistanceDay
address.The Tatmadaw-Burmesearmy-he said, seizedpower"to rescue
theUnion." It neitherhad timenor opportunity to unitewiththe people
beforeacting,as it previously had done duringthe struggleforindepend-
ence. Having linked,once again,withthe people,it holds powerbecause
the peasantsand workers"have not yet put into propershape theirown
worker'scouncilsand organizations."The Tatmadaw is fashioningthe
Burma SocialistProgramParty (BSPP) to give civil leadershipto the
revolutionand to marshalltheworkersand peasantsin unityand strength.
The militaryis drawingup plans to make theparty'sworksuccessfuland
a programfortransforming old values and thinkinginto new. When the
workersand peasantsbecome active participantsin the revolutionand
take to theirtasks withabilityand inspiration, "the Tatmadawwill be
able to handoveradditionaldutiesto theworkingpeopleand devoteitself
to its maintaskof defending theUnionof Burma."20
Duringthepastyear,theBSPP continuedto trainits cadresand play an
auxiliaryrole to themilitaryin performing its civil duties.All leadership
is controlledby themilitary. As a politicalforce,the BSPP has some dis-
tanceto go beforeit plays a vitalpart. The systemof Councils-peasant
and worker-alsohas notcomeintobeing; thereasonwhy,as givenby the
Generalwhenhe spoke at the Worker'sDay Rally, re-emphasizedthe
themeexpressedby Brig.ThaungDan, "in orderto have the rightleader-
shipand therightmembers in theCouncil,it wouldbe necessaryto educate
the workersand reorientate themto theirreal needs. . ". ' Clearly,the
revolutionary objectiveof remolding values and attitudesis an important
one-one whichtheleadersgave muchattentionduringthepast year.
Despite theirtheoreticalpronouncements on socialismand the nature
of man,the military leadershave no blue-print to followin remolding the
values and attitudesof the Burmesepeople.Theircampaignlast year fol-
lowedseveralthemes:contribute laborto thebuildingof the"new" Burma,
learn fromthepeople,teachthepeople to improveand assertthemselves,
be honestand forgiving. Whilethethemesare notlogicallyconsistent, this
did not seemto bothereitherthepeopleor theleaders.
To build the"new" Burma,workers-physicalas well as intellectual-
wereasked to give extrahourswithoutpay in orderto raise production.
Studentswerecalledupon to volunteerduringvacationto do sociallyuse-
ful work-collect factorystatisticsor workin the villages.At planting
season,urbanworkerswereencouragedto go to the fieldsand volunteer
theirlaborin performing agriculturaltasks.

20Forward,III, 17 (April 15, 1965), p. 5.

21Ibid., III, 19 (May 15, 1965), p. 10.

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100 BURMA

Sinceit seizedpower,theRevolutionary Councilhas set theexampleof

learningfromthepeople-going to the villagesand holdingpeasant sem-
inarsin orderto hear complaintsand suggestions. Last year,the govern-
mentsentsoldiers,bureaucrats, to the vil-
intellectualsand professionals
lages and factoriesto live and workwiththepeople.In August,it opened
thenewspapers to thepeopleso thatthe"revolutionary impetusmightgain
greatermomentum and therevolutionary changesmademoreeffective more
quickly... 22

Teachingthepeople thatthiswas theirrevolution, and that theymust

freethemselves fromthe colonialpast, was a thirdtheme.Ne Win called
the Revolutionary Council the teacherwho is helpingthe workersand
peasants"come to possesscourageand knowledgeto thinkcorrectlyand
do the rightthing."23 He and othersrepeatedlycalled forthe people to
disciplineand care in handlingmachin-
developthetraitsof responsibility,
eryand tools,and to committhemselves to theirjobs-to comeon timeand
put in a fullday's work.Althoughthe militaryleadershipremindedthe
peoplethattheycould learnfrompast eventssuch as thepeasants'upris-
ingsin 1930,the oil fieldstrikesand the resistance,it cautionedthemto
drawtherightlessonsfromthoseeventsand applythemproperly.
To demonstrate the moral principlesof honestyand forgiveness, the
Revolutionary Councilset the exampleby forgiving ordinarycitizensfor
theirmorallapsesin tryingto circumvent the 1964 demonetization decrees.
At thesametime,it confirmed thelifesentenceof Col. Saw Myint,former
memberof the Revolutionary Council,forcircumventing the decreeand
trying,to benefitfromhis knowledgeof the imminentchangesin paper
moneycirculation.24
Fromthespeechesof theleadersand theslowpace in buildingnewself-
governing it appearsthat the voluntarycampaignto develop
institutions,
a newmoralityhas not succeeded;whetheror not it is a realisticgoal, no
oneseemsto haveasked.
Nationalunity,thefourth objectiveoftherevolution, has beena problem
since the beginningof self-government. Last year, insurgency by ethnic
and politicalgroupskept the countryside upset.The government's answer
was the same as that of all previousgovernments-thecarrotand stick
policyof fighting frequentmilitaryengagements withrebelswhowouldnot
seekpeacefulsolutionsto theirproblemsand acceptingback in societythose
insurgents who surrendered theirweapons and themselves.Despite fre-
quentlypublishedreportsofarmsand menwhoreturned to society,no real
solutionto the problemof insurgency appeared.As the year ended, in-
surgency was on theincrease.
In its approachto the minorities livingin society,the militaryrulers

22 The Guardian,August25, 1965,p. 1.

23Forward,III, 19 (May 15, 1965), p. 11.
24 The Guardian,August14, 1965,p. 1.

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JOSEF SI LVE RSTE I N 101

demonstrated greaterimagination. Throughseveralprogramslast year-

nationwidecelebrationof ethnicnationaldays,publicationof the folklore
of certainminorities, preservation of Chin fortifications
datingfromthe
struggleagainstthe Britishin the nineteenth century,scientific studyof
the Kayahs by anthropologists at RangoonUniversity, development of a
programto improvetheLushai languagein orderforits speakersto partic-
ipate morefullyin thenation'slife-the government stressedits desireto
recognizeculturalunityin diversity.As expressedby BrigadierSan Yu,
"the cultureof one nationality was part and parcelof the cultureof the
wholeUnion."25
On the politicallevel, its approachto the minoritieswas less daring.
CentralcontrolthroughtheSecurityand Administration Councilsexisted.
AlthoughState Councilssupposedlyadviseon statematters,forall practi-
cal purposespowerstillis concentrated in Rangoon.This is a major issue
underlying theinsurgents' effortsto winpoliticalautonomyor independence
fortheircommunities. Untilpoweris transferred to Workerand Peasant
Councils,no real change,evenat thelocal level,can be expected.
National unityin Burma also has impliedan harmoniousrelationship
betweenthe government and thepeople as a whole.Withthe naturaland
electedleaderseitherin jail or silencedby fear,a forcedharmonyappears
to exist.The onlyrealdiscordant notehas beentheactivityof theBuddhist
clergy.Having refusedto registerin 1964 and defiedthe militaryrulers
in otherways,themonksprovidedthegovernment witha seriouschallenge
last year.It respondedfirstby repealingthethreebasic laws pertaining to
religionpassed in the early 1950s on the groundsthat the laws had not
achievedtheiroriginalintent.26 In March,thegovernment supportedan All
SanghaConference on ways to preservethepurityof theSasana and pro-
moteits propagation.The conference drewup the constitution foran All
BuddhaSasana SanghaOrganization, an identification
card,and a program
forreforming religiouseducation.Several Buddhistmonasteriesdid not
participate,and individualmonksopenlyrejectedthe validityof the con-
ference and thedecisionsit took.In April,themilitary rulersmovedagainst
thesemonksby arresting 92 on the groundsof politicalactivityand eco-
nomicinsurgency. Ne Win, in his Worker'sDay address,went to great
lengthsto demonstrate thathe and his co-leaderswerenot anti-religious;
theiractionsstemmedfromthe fact that religionhad been misused.He
wentout of his way to assurehis audiencethathe, personally, was a good
Buddhist.27 Despite the hardeningof the RevolutionaryCouncil toward
the Buddhists,themonksremainoutsidethe completecontrolof themili-
tary; and giventheirplace in traditionalsociety,theyremaina potential
sourceofpoliticalopposition.

25 Ibid., February12, 1965,p. 1.

26Forward,III, 12 (February1, 1965), p. 2.
27 Ibid., III, 19 (May 15, 1965), p. 14.

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102 BURMA

Burmahas changedin manyways since the militaryseized powerand

initiatedthe revolution.Having pointedthe nation in the directionit
wishesto go, can Ne Win get the people to travelthe road he and his
colleagueshavemappedout?

SelectedReading
Bhattacharya,S. "Burma: NeutralismIntroverted."AustralianQuar-
XXXVII: 1 (March 1965), 50-61.
terly,
Everton,John."The Ne Win Regimein Burma." Asia, I:2 (Autumn
1964), 1-17.
Lissak,Moshe."Social Change,Mobilization,and Exchangeof Services
BetweentheMilitaryEstablishment and the Civil Society:The Bur-
mese Case." EconomicDevelopmentand CulturalChange,XIII: 1,
PartI (October1964), 1-19.
Nash, Manning.The GoldenRoad to Modernity:VillageLife in Con-
temporary Burma. New York: JohnWiley & Sons, Inc., 1965, 333
pages.
Smith,Donald E. Religionand Politicsin Burma.Princeton:Princeton
University Press,1965,332 pages.

JOSEF SILVERSTEIN is AssociateProfessorof PoliticalScienceat Rutgers,The

New Jersey.
NewBrunswick,
StateUniversity,

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