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The Burma Socialist Program Party and Its

Rivals: A One-Plus Party System

Josef Silverstein

Journal of Southeast Asian History / Volume 8 / Issue 01 / March 1967, pp 8 - 18

DOI: 10.1017/S0217781100003434, Published online: 24 August 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/

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How to cite this article:

Josef Silverstein (1967). The Burma Socialist Program Party and Its Rivals: A
One-Plus Party System. Journal of Southeast Asian History, 8, pp 8-18
doi:10.1017/S0217781100003434

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 THE BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY AND
ITS RIVALS: A ONE-PLUS PARTY SYSTEM
JOSEF SILVERSTEIN

Rutgers University
After four years in eclipse, a new political party is emerging from,
the shadows of military rule in Burma. It is part of the revolution
set in motion by the men who seized power in March 1962. In the
four years following that event, the military rulers have persisted
in their determination to remake Burma along the lines set forth in
their ideological stafement, Burmese Way To Socialism (BWS).
Thus far, the coup leaders show no signs of growing tired and
desiring to return to the barracks. However, to insure the comple-
tion of their revolution and to anticipate the day when they will
step out of office, they are in the process of recruiting, training and
organizing a new elite of soldiers and civilians who are loyal to
their ideas, dedicated to their programs and pledged to carry on
when they are given the opportunity.
When the coup occurred, the army had no organized political
links with the people. Brigadier Thaung Dan called attention to
this fact in a major address to the nation in 1965.1 He explained
that there had been no time to unite with the people before seizing
power because the situation was critical and demanded immediate
action. Nowhere in the speech did he allude to the earlier effort
of the army — during the Caretaker Regime (1958-60) — to create
a political link with the people. The National Solidarity Associa-
tion (NSA) never became a popular organization in Burmese politics
because it appealed, in the main, to ex-service men who approved
the austere and authoritarian methods of the soldier-led temporary
government. Without experienced political leaders, with a follow-
ing drawn from a narrow sector of the society and its unwillingness
to take an active political role in the second constitutional period
(1960-62), the NSA did not win wide popular support. Therefore,
when the soldiers came to power for the second time in 1962, they
made no effort to use this organization as their political vehicle.
Instead, they sought first to win the backing of the civilian poli-
tical leaders they had not arrested at the time of the coup. General
1. forward, III, 17, (April 15, 1965) p. 5.
 BURMA
Ne Win invited them to unite their organizations and create a single
mass party in support of the coup government and the new ideology.
While a few of the civilian leaders — especially those who had never
held office and shared in the exercise of governmental power —
accepted the offer, the majority did not. By mid-1962, the military
government decided to abandon its efforts to win the support of
the displaced political elite and to build its own organization, train
a new elite and use' them as its means for completing the revolution.
In order to insure the success of its party, the military govern-
ment gradually eliminated the political elite of the past and
destroyed their organizations. Today, the old parties are as dead
as the political system in which they operated. Their leaders either
are in jail or retirement. Their property has been seized, sold
and destroyed; and their former members no longer acknowledge
publicly, their old party identities. Only the outlaw parties of the
past — the two Communist parties and several dissident ethnic
groups — remain. In mid-1963, General Ne Win made a bold effort
to win these groups back to society and end guerilla warfare in the
countryside. Through a temporary amnesty and a period of face
to face negotiations, the military sought to bring about a permanent
peace — something no government in Burma, civilian or military,
has ever enjoyed. The meetings and discussions proved no more
successful than previous efforts in the pre-coup period, and internal
warfare continues. The outlaw groups hold isolated territory near
Burma's borders where they are difficult to reach and eliminate by
military action. With all legal channels of opposition to the present
government closed, they stand as the only alternative to the men
in power.
It is against this background of authoritarian rule by the men
who seized power illegally and eliminated all rival groups they could
reach, that the new government-created and controlled party must
be seen. Started in mid-1962, the Burma Socialist Program Party
(Lanzin) has grown slowly and has played only a limited role in
the new political system. However, in December 1965, the Revolu-
tionary Council — the highest organ of the coup government — felt
sufficiently satisfied with the party's progress to call a five day
conference with its leaders and selected candidate-members to
review the past and plan the future. Before one can assess its
emerging role and ask whether it will remain the government's
tool for uniting the people and the government or become an
independent voice of the people, it is necessary to examine its
structure, leadership and role in relationship to the new political
system.
 BURMA

The emerging party system is quite unlike its predecessor — and

for very good reason. Prior to the coup, the party system dominated
the political process; since the military's seizure of power it is the
reverse. A brief examination of the earlier system will prove
helpful in putting the newer one into perspective.
The three dominant parties of the pre-coup period were loosely
structured confederations of parties, special groups and independent
leaders. The model for the three was the original Anti-Fascist
Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL), which came into existence
during World War II as a secret resistence organization. As a
conspiritorial group seeking to unite all opposition to the Japanese,
it was united only at the top through the close personal friendship
which existed among the several leaders. All parties and groups in
the confederation were permitted to retain their own organizations,
ideologies and membership. The wartime unity began to weaken
in 1946 when the Communist Parties left the AFPFL. In the years
that followed, other parties and groups either left or were expelled;
but their departure neither weakened the AFPFL's hold upon the
government nor undermined its popular support. Only in 1958,
when U Nu sought to convert the confederation into a unified party
with a single structure and ideology, did the AFPFL finally split
in half and surrender power to the army-led Caretaker Regime.
Under politically neutral government, the two rival factions of the
AFPFL reorganized as independent parties and prepared for the
1960 election. U Nu's faction — later called the Union Party
(Pyidaungsu)—won, but proved to be no more united than its parent;
open rivalry for power among its leaders undermined public confi-
dence in party government and paved the way for the military
takeover in 1962.2
The major rival to the AFPFL and Union Party was the National
Unity Front (NUF) which was organized in 1956 to contest the
national elertion and defeat the AFPFL.3 The dominant group
within NUF ranks was the Burma Workers and Peasants Party
(BWPP), later called the Burma Workers Party. The BWPP was
founded in 1950 by a group of Socialist Party members who were
expelled from the AFPFL. When the NUF was formed, the BWPP
was one of several parties to enter; however, by the time of the
2. For a fuller discussion of the Union Party failures, see F. Trager, "Failure of the
U Nu and the Return of the Armed Forces in Burma," Review of Politics, XXV,
(July 1963) 309-328; also see my "From Democracy to Dictatorship in Burma,"
Current History, (February 1964) 83-88.
3. On the formation of the NUF, see my "Parties, Politics and the National Election
in Burma," Far Eastern Survey, XXV, (1956 177-184. For an evaluation of the
BWPP, see A. Josey. "The Political Significance of the Burma Workers' Party,"
Pacific Affairs, XXXI (1958) 372-379.

10
 BURMA
election, it was the dominant voice in the coalition. The NUF,
like the AFPFL and Union Party was plagued with problems of
disunity, rivalry, fragmentation and weak organization.
The confederation party in Burma never developed an orderly
process of recruitment, leadership training and succession. The
first two tasks remained as major activities of the constituent units
in the confederation. As a result, rivalry, competition and violence
in recruitment were not uncommon. Since the units were joined
only at the top, the problem of succession was primarily a problem
for each sub-unit. National offices rarely changed hands; and when
they did, the new leaders of the subunits were automatically coopted
by the national organization. The system encouraged each leader
to keep his party as his own personal vehicle rather than to convert
it to some sort of impersonal organization. In such a system, there
was no avenue of advancement for young and bright individuals
who had talent, but no personal following. The question of succes-
sion destroyed the initial unity in the Union Party and rivalry
among leaders was the major cause of the 1958 split in the AFPFL.4
Finally, the confederation parties were non-ideological. With
each subunit permitted to have its own program and ideology, the
national organization was forced either to be silent in this area or
adopt the ideology of the dominant subgroup, whose leaders had
captured the important posts in the national organization. The
ideologies of the three confederation parties incorporated common
themes — nationalism, socialism and democracy. Since each concept
was broad and vague, it was possible for the subunit to give its own
interpretation and meaning to these ideas. New recruits therefore
absorbed the particular ideology of their immediate party and had
only the loosest sort of intellectual attachment to the national
organization.
Yet, despite its weak structure and basic internal disunity, the
AFPFL managed to hold together for more than a decade and to
dominate the political life of the country. As the leaders of the
nationalist movement, the AFPFL's executives and members played
a leading role in writing the constitution and took responsibility
for directing the nation after the British transfered power. Through
its sub-units, it reached the villages and towns, and by use of
patronage, government allotments and favors, it held its popular
following. Also, through its programs to socialize the economy, it
gained the opportunity to put its leaders and loyal supporters in
positions of power and trust. Many were not capable of such trust
and used their offices to further their own careers and increase their
4. For a Burmese version of the 1958 AFPFL split, see U Sein Win, The Split
Story, (Rangoon: The Guardian Ltd., 1959).

11
 BURMA
personal wealth and power. With, no central authority to discipline
the membership, corruption became closely identified with the party
at the local level. It was said — before the 1958 split — that the
AFPFL would rule for forty years, and there was no reason for
anyone to dispute the prophecy.
In constructing its own party, the military has attempted to avoid
the weaknesses and structural defects of the pre-coup parties.
Starting from the premise that it was necessary to rebuild political
life and create a class of leaders, as well as a political organization,
the military rulers established the Lanzin as a transitional party
whose tasks were to recruit, train and indoctrinate a new political
elite. As noted earlier, the first steps were taken in mid-1962 when
the party constitution was drafted, the BWS was adopted as the
organization's ideology and two committees were appointed —
Central Organizing Committee (COC) and the Discipline Com-
mittee (DC). Senior military officers — some with seats in the
Revolutionary Council — were named to fill the committees and
were given responsibility for bringing the party into existence. In
January 1963, the military published a philosophical-type statement,
The Correlation of Man and His Environment, as an expression of
its own ideology. Both of these documents were to be used for
indoctrinating the recruits.
The party's structure was based upon tight central control at the
top with the principle of democratic centralism binding all members
and candidates to the decisions of the leaders. At the base was the
local cadre which drew its members both from civil society and
military ranks. Recruits for the local cadres were drawn from their
own localities; recruits selected because of their occupation or social
background were joined in special cadres. Above the local cadres
were the divisional organizations and at the top was the national
cadre. All, in this initial period, were under the supervision and
control of the COC and DC.
With the exception of the few senior officers who were in charge
of the party, there were no full members. All recruits were accepted
either as candidates — those most likely to earn full membership —
and sympathizers — those whose social background or other personal
factors made it necessary for them to demonstrate loyalty and belief
in the party before being granted candidate status. According to
the party's constitution, candidates had to remain in that status for
two years. Between March 2, 1963, when applications first were
distributed, to September 3, 1965, 681,906 persons applied for party
membership.5 As of December 5, the Secretary-General of the COC
(Brigadier San Yu) reported that there were 20 full members, 99,638
5. The Guardian (daily) December 7, 1965.

12
 BURMA
candidates and 167,447 sympathizers. The figures indicate that, as
of that time, the leaders of the party had not promoted any candi-
dates to full membership; they also suggested that the party would
be small and elite.
To accomplish the task of training the recruits and the leadership
candidates, the Lanzin opened a Central School of Political Science
at Chawdwingon on July 1, 1963. Here, regular courses were run
both for leaders and special cadres. To make the party's training
and service more effective, special departments on education,
peasant and mass affairs were created and they worked directly with
the cadres.
During its first two years of existence, the Lanzin concentrated
upon the tasks of recruiting and training. Occasionally it was called
upon to assist the government in carrying out a major program such
as the nationalization of retail trade and demonitization. To assist
in the former, the Lanzin cadres helped prepare inventories and
protect the shops and warehouses after government seizure, to assist
in the latter, the cadres helped register the people who were required
to surrender large denomination legal tender. The cadres proved
to be a useful anxilliary force in carrying out these programs in a
swift and relatively efficient manner. Wearing civilian dress and
having direct contact with the people, they helped blur the image
of the military, which was issuing decrees and making seizures from
the civilian population.
In the future, the tasks of the Lanzin will be more political and
independent. Plans already have been implemented to develop
political skills which will make it possible for the party to play a
leading role in the new political institutions of Burma.
According to the pronouncements of General Ne Win and those
who share power with him in the Revolutionary Council, the
centrally-controlled administrative system of Security and Adminis-
trative Councils (SAC) — which the military created after the coup —
will, in time, recede in importance as a political vehicle and be
replaced with a new hierarchy of Peasant and Worker Councils. At
the local level, the Council members will be drawn from the two
classes of workers. The new system envisages a parallel develop-
ment of Peasant Councils in the rural areas and Worker Councils
in the urban areas which will join together at the township level.
Above this, there will be a single hierarchy of central, district and
divisional councils with a national council at the top. In many
ways, it is similar to the system advanced by the pre-coup AFPFL
government and known as the Democratization of Local Adminis-

13
 BURMA
tration.6 However, there is one important difference between the
two systems; the new one is intended to be centrally controlled from
top to bottom, while the old one was intended to terminate at the
district and to have no links to the National Assembly.
So far, no Councils have been created; in December 1965, Col.
Thaung Kyi, Peasant Affairs Secretary of the COC, promised that
the government would promulgate a constitution for the new
Councils on Peasants' Day (March 2) and thereafter, bring them into
existence.
The role of the Lanzin in this new political system is intended to
be a large and important one. According to Col. Thaung Kyi, the
Peasant Affairs cadres of the party "will form the hard core of these
Councils and the front line in the Land Revolution."7 It will be
their responsibility to work with village leaders and participate in
local councils and land committees. Whether they will stand for
election in their home village or be co-opted to the councils is not
clear. Since the training they are receiving is for service, loyalty
and carrying out orders, and not for organizing and contesting
elections, it is probably safe to say that they will not be elected
officials. Also, whether or not they will head the councils or just
participate is not clear either. But as members of the only political
organization permitted to operate freely throughout the nation, it is
clear that their chief task will be to act as the link and transmission
belt joining the government and the people. Whether the party
and its directors can accomplish this task, given their lack of
political experience, depends upon many things.
First, can the Lanzin be forged into a united and cohesive
organization? General Ne Win, in his opening address to the 1965
five-day conference of the party acknowledged, that despite the care
taken thus far there were several divisive elements among the
candidate members. Some, he said, joined the party only to sow
seeds of dissension and disunity and to "wreck it from within,"
others he said, joined for their own self-interest, while a third group
still acted as though they were members of the old pre-coup parties,
seeking power and rewards for themselves and those allied with
them.8 The immediate goal of the party in these matters he said,
was to reform the potential members and build unity within the
new organization; otherwise, he warned that the Lanzin would go
the way of the old parties. During his closing address, the General
took note of the dangers of linking religion and politics and warned
the candidates not to mix the two. The party, he said, "is for all,
6. For a fuller discussion see The Pyidaxvtha Conference, August 4-17, 1952; Re-
solutions and Speeches. (Rangoon: Ministry of Information, 1952) 12-22.
7. The Guardian (daily) December 16, 1965.
8. Ibid., December 10. 1965.

14
 BURMA
irrespective of religion, caste or creed,... "9 Therefore anyone
using it for the interests of one group was to be reported.
The problem of factionalism, however, might develop in a way
the general and his colleagues have not anticipated. Having con-
structed the party on a territorial and socio-economic basis, it is
possible that the candidate members might give a higher loyalty to
the people with wliom they are assigned to serve, than to the
national leadership. It would not be the first time that local
loyalties proved stronger than national ones, and thereby led to
division in the ranks. If this were to happen, the unity in the
party might disappear and several parties might form on the basis
of local identity and interest.
Another aspect of the problem of factionalism was raised by the
General in his first address to the party conference. Up to the time
of the conference, there was a pay differential between military
personnel acting as party organizers and civilians doing the same
thing. He promised that the government planned to make a com-
plete study of the pay structure, but pending this, he reminded his
listeners, "that they were on two years probation and what they were
drawing was not pay but honorarium, whilst, the military personnel
were drawing those pays [sic] even before."10
Clearly, the problem of factionalism, given the history of party
splitting in the pre-coup period, causes the military leaders serious
worry. Despite all their precautions in organizing and recruiting,
they recognize that the possibility of factionalism is real; and once
they give political power and a degree of independence of action
to the party, it might cause serious trouble for the soldiers in power.
Up to the present, the government has made no provisions for
giving the Lanzin candidates para-military training. Having seen
such political-military forces in the pre-coup period degenerate into
the private armies of political leaders, it does not want to encourage
this to happen again. By giving no signs that it intends to weaken
or disband the SACs, it probably indicates that it intends to make
them the watchdog of the new political system and to permit them
to use their power to coerce, if need be, to keep the council and
their members in line. However, once the councils come into
existence, the party members will be called upon to work closely
with the military-dominated administrative system, and, in areas
where the dissident parties and ethnic grounps challenge the govern-
ment's authority, it may be necessary to give the party members
training and even responsibility, if they are to be accepted as genuine
leaders of the people. But, given the unique character of the
9. Ibid., December 12, 1965.
10. Ibid., December 10. 1965.

15
 BURMA
party membership — military and civilian recruits— it might be
possible to assign military dominiated cardres to sensitive areas
and thereby avoid the need to train the civilian members in military
skills.
Factionalism is not the only problem facing the party. Have the
military officers, charged with bringing the party into existence,
given the recruits political training, or have they just concentrated
upon developing loyalty and devotion to duty? The need , for
political leadership is real. The future of the revolution depends
upon the cooperation of the peasants and workers to accept the
goals, the sacrifices and orders decreed by others. Thus far, the
population has not embraced the revolution and made the sacrifices
demanded of it. The peasants have shown reluctance to change
their farming and social habits and, as demonstrated in 1964-5, will
shift to different crops if the government-set prices are pegged too
low for them to accept.11 General Ne Win stated, in several
speeches during the past year, that neither the peasant nor worker
had adapted himself to the new Burma; and it was for this reason
that the Peasant and Worker Councils were so slow in coming into
existence. If the military is to make the revolution, it needs the
help of strong and devoted political leaders at the village and the
town levels to persuade the people to change, sacrifice, and to sup-
port the government. Only time, will tell if the training of the
candidate members has fitted them for this task.
There is another problem which this party must face and solve
if it is to become the political leader and voice of the nation. It
must draw to its ranks, members of the ethnic minorities in the
areas where they are most numerous and give them offices and jobs
of responsibility. Given the fact that disunity in the nation was
the major cause of the coup in 1962, it is the problem which must
be solved before Burma can become a united nation. Thus far,
the national leaders have not publicized their efforts to build cadres
in the states and their plans for instituting Peasant and Worker
Councils in the areas where they rule because of their command
over the instruments of violence and not by their ability to persuade.
This is not to suggest that the Revolutionary Council is unaware of
the problem and taking no action. The government has used the
Union Day celebrations to call attention to the multi-racial character
of the nation and remind all of the Panglong Agreement which
brought the minorities into league with the Burmans and made
the Union a reality, has created a center at Mandalay for exhibiting
arts and crafts of the minorities, has encouraged students of anthro-
pology to study the cultures and histories of the minorities and in
other ways has given the minorities a sense of belonging to the
11. Forward, III, 15. (March 15, 1965) p. 13.

16
 BURMA
nation. But all this is not a substitute for political expression and
self-government. With the existence of several dissident minority
parties and groups which keep alive the idea of separation from the
Union and fight the government forces when the latter move to
capture and destroy them, the most difficult problem confronting
the military leaders is probably that of drawing the minorities into
the new political system. Until more is known about how the
Lanzin is equipped and trained to solve this problem, it is not
possible to predict how successful the party will be in this area.
These are but a few of the risks which the military will face
when it begins to relinquish some of its absolute power to the, as yet,
untried political party.

II
It is the intention of the military that the Lanzin should be the
only party in Burma. The government has done all it can do to
eliminate potential rivals, but it does not have control over the
whole of the land. Two different types of dissidents exist which
appeal to specific people. The Communists — Thakin Soe's Red
Flags and Than Tun's White Flags — aspire to national leadership,
and therefore are the direct rivals of the military's new party. Soe's
group poses no real threat because it is so small and divided from
all other Leftists in Burma that it has no real chance of coming
to power either through the force of arms or persuasion. Than
Tun's group is not so easy to dismiss. With a sizable following in
the jungles and some support in the cities, the White Flags have
proven able to adapt to the situation; in this case, by joining with
some of the ethnic groups to form a national front against the
military rulers. With organization, arms and long experience in
guerilla warfare, it is in a position to seize power if the military
rulers split and the Lanzin proves incapable of developing as the
new elite. So far, the alliance between Than Tun's Communist
Party, *he Karen National Defence Organization, the Kachin
Independt. ce Army and some of the Shan dissidents has not proven
effective either, as a political or military organization. While it is
capable of pinning down sizable units of the Burma Army and
holding isolated vl'lages and areas, it has not been able to attract
mass support and turn its potential skills in leadership, organization
and propaganda into a national movement. Its failure lies in the
fact that as a confederation, each constituent group retains its own
goals and organization, therefore it does not fight for a common
end and does not offer a real alternative national solution. In
many ways this confederation suffers from the same ills of all its
predecessors.

17
 BURMA
The ethnic dissident groups also pose no real national challenge.
Their immediate and long range goals are to gain autonomy or
even independence for their particular group. Beyond reducing or
throwing off Burman dominance, they have no plans. Their
appeals are directed solely at the community they represent; as a
result, their following is narrow and parochial.
The emerging party system neither is a one nor a multi-party
system, but a one-plus system.12 The Lanzin is the only genuine
national party; and with the backing of the military and the near-
elimination of all rivals, it enters the system with special advan-
tages; but it still must contend with the remnants of the past in
the form of the two Communist parties and the several ethnic
dissident groups. As noted earlier, they do command following and
hold territory. They are both military and political organizations
with strong ideological appeals to their followers. As the Lanzin
moves into the territory where these rivals are strong, the contest
will be military first and then political. This has to be because the
Lanzin has no roots in these areas and no standing with the people;
also because the rivals are not likely to permit the government
to place its organization without a fight. The existence of these
rivals to the Lanzin makes it imperative that the government not
fail in its efforts to link itself to the people living in the contested
areas; for, if it does fail, it may mean either the breakup of the
Union or the ascendency of the Communist Party to power.
In a party system where there are no elections, where the emerging
national party is without known and tested leaders, where there are
no institutions for popular expression and where all traditional
leaders are in jail or under pressure to remain silent, the apparent
inequality between the Lanzin and its rivals may not be as great
in reality as it appears on paper. So long as the military remains
united and able to dominate political life, the Lanzin can be little
more than a tool of the men in power. It is only after the coup
leaders relinquish some of their power to the party that it can
emerge as a living institution and be tested against its rivalc With
the seeds of factionalism already producing small shoo' of dissent
in the party and its place in the political order, dependent upon
the continued power and unity of its creators, it remains to be seen
whether or not the Lanzin can make a place fc» itself and, unlike
the AFPFL, "rule for forty years."
All copyrights in this article are
exclusively reserved by the author.

12. The classification refers to the peculiar factors of a national party dependent upon
an external force — in this case the military — without roots in the society and
experienced leadership, faced with the challenge of small factions of political and
ethnic dissidents, who have no hope of coming to power or gaining their ends so
long as the military remains united and holds power.

18