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India-US Relations: The Shock of the New

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Canadian International Council

India-US Relations: The Shock of the New

Author(s): David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee
Source: International Journal, Vol. 64, No. 4, Canada and Asia (Autumn, 2009), pp. 1057-1074
Published by: Canadian International Council
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David M. Malone&
Rohan Mukherjee

India-USrelations
Theshockofthenew

[The] greatproblemof the near futurewill be American

evenmorethanBritish
imperialism, imperialism.1

ona journey
Indiais todayembarked bymanydreams.
inspired We
welcomehavingAmericaby our side. Thereis muchwe can
accomplish together.2

Thesetwostatements,utteredalmost60 yearsapart,marka contemporary

inrelations
transformation betweenIndiaandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica.
theworld's
Formostofthelastsixdecades, oldestdemocracyandtheworld's

David M. Malone, the presidentof Canada's InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre

and formerlyCanada's high commissionerto India, 2006-08, is completinga book on
- -
India's contemporary foreignpolicy Does the Elephant Dance? that willbe published
byOxfordUniversity Pressin 2011. Rohan Mukherjeeis a seniorresearchspecialistwiththe
forfragilestates researchprogramat PrincetonUniversity.
institutions He has workedwith
the Centrefor Policy Research in New Delhi, and the governmentof India's national
knowledgecommission.
i JawaharlalNehru, "Report to the all-India congress committee on the international
congress against imperialismheld at Brussels in February1927," in Bimla Prasad, The
Originsof Indian ForeignPolicy:The Indian National Congress and WorldAffairs,1885-
1947 (Mumbai: Bookland, 1960), appendix I, 265.
2 Manmohan Singh, "Address to the joint session of the United States congress,"
Washington,DC, 19 July2005," reproduced in Seminar 560, April2006.

I InternationalJournal | Autumn 2009 | 1057 |

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I David M. Malone & Rohan Mukherjee |

largestdemocracyfailedto understandeach other'scharacterand

compulsions. Thata fundamental shifthasoccurred during thepastdecade
is cleartoall.Ourarticleexplores thisshiftin termsofitsmotivationand
timing, andseeks tolocateitscauses.The analysisrests
on a combinationof
international, anddomestic
regional, factorsthatoperated tousher
jointly
inthepost-Cold WareraofIndia-USrelations.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

DuringitsearlyyearstheIndianrepublic viewedtheworldthrough a newly

forgedprismofanti-imperialism. TheAmericans ontheotherhandviewed
theworldthrough theprismofanti-Communism. Thisthinking produced
themaximofJohnFosterDulles:"Thosewhoarenotwithus areagainst
us."3Facedwithanincreasingly bipolarworld,Indiaadopted anidealisticyet
functionally
pragmatic of
philosophynonalignment as thecornerstone ofits
foreignpolicy.Amidst the atmosphere of the 1950s, the US viewed India's
nonalignment as a coverforintereststhatdiverged from itsown.AstheCold
Wargainedmomentum, America's frustrationswithIndiannonalignment
mounted. In theabsenceofcooperation fromIndia,andwitha communist
government in China,Pakistan becamean essential element intheUnited
States'containment of the SovietUnion in Asia. Whatbegan as an
gulfbetween
ideological IndiaandtheUS developed intoa strategicchasm.
TheSino-Indian border warof1962compelled Nehrutoseekassistance
from thewestern powers. TheAmerican response waswarmyetstrategically
motivated.Itprevailed on Pakistanforan assurance thatitwouldnotinvade
Kashmir so thatIndiacouldredeploy itsnorthern troopstowards thefront
withChina.AnAmerican - theEnterprise
carrier - wasdispatched towards
theBayofBengal.In 1965,whenPakistan contravened a writtenassurance
fromPresident Eisenhower toNehruthatUS-supplied weaponswouldnot
be usedbyPakistan againstIndia,Washington adopteda position ofstrict
neutrality,
alienating India and drivingPakistan towards China formilitary
sustenance. The expanding Sino-Pakistanirelationship didnot,however,
prompta changein India-USrelations. In 1971,theeastPakistancrisis
coincidedwithAmerican attempts atbuildinga rapprochement withChina,
whichwasfacilitated largelyby Pakistan.Faced with America's tacit
support
forPakistan, Indiaofficially turnedtotheSovietUnionforassistance. As

3 Quoted in Angadipuram Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and
Relations (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985), 216.

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 I India-US relations |

warbrokeoutbetweenIndiaand Pakistan, the USS Enterprise was once

againdispatched to the of
Bay Bengal, but this time with the oppositeintent.
The US receiveda majorjoltin 1974whenIndiaconducted itsfirst
nuclearweapontestat Pokhran. It cameto lightthatIndiahad diverted
nuclearmaterials imported forcivilian purposes, muchofitfrom theUS,in
orderto initiatea weaponsprogram. Although India assured the world that
itstestwas a "peaceful" one,theeventwas a blownotjustto American
influence in southAsiabutalso to theemerging globalnonproliferation
in
regime general. In the 1980s, the US-India relationship wasobscured by
theindirect superpower conflict in nearbyAfghanistan India'sown
and
andeconomicproblems.
political Onceagain,IndiaandtheUnitedStates
foundthemselves on opposingsidesofa vitalglobalconflict. In themid-
1980s, concern about itsregional and
autonomy capacity to American
resist
global ambitionswas one of the motivating factors behind India's
involvement intheemerging domestic conflict in SriLanka(theotherwas
India'slargeTamilpopulation, particularly stateofTamilNadu).
in the
Later in the decade, as Mikhail Gorbachev instituted changesin Soviet
policies,including on Afghanistan, India'srelations withtheUS improved
marginally. US arms supplies to India, unheard of since 1962,resumedon
a smallscalebetween 1986 and In
1988. 1988, Prime Minister RajivGandhi
made a historic visit to China in an to
attempt begin the processof
normalizing relationsbetweenthetwoneighbours. India seemedto be
experimenting withpositivediplomacy as a meansforresolving long-
running disagreements. This was also reflected in India's of
spell logistical
support forAmerican militaryoperations inthe1990 GulfWar.
Aselsewhere, theColdWarhadnegatively affected theregional security
environment in southAsia. It sustainedPakistan'sability to maintaina
strategicbalanceagainstIndiaformanyyears, a southAsianarmsrace,and
tenserelations betweenIndiaandtheUnitedStatesformostofthe1970s
and 1980s.Thissituation mighthavepersisted wereitnotfortwomajor
eventsthatoccurred atthisjuncture - theendoftheColdWarand India's
economic crisis.

1990 ONWARDS: REDISCOVERING COMMON INTERESTS

The end of the Cold Warmarkeda majorshiftin worldpoliticsand
a number
restructured
fundamentally aroundtheworld,
ofrelationships the
Findingitselfbereft
India-USone beingno exception. of Sovietpolitical
and
support increasingly Moscow
finding wishing todeal withiton a "cash
andcarry"basisratherthanthroughconcessional Indiain the
assistance,

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I David M. Malone & Rohan Mukherjee |

1990sincreasinglyconfronted ofa soleremaining

thereality globalpower
withwhichitshareda history
ofacrimony.Atthemostbasiclevelthismeant
ideologicalchange.Nonalignment becameredundant in theabsenceof
superpowercompetition. Enough time had passed to renderanti-
imperialism dated.The US was confrontedwith a volatileinternational
dispensationfeaturingmultiplesmallerpowersrisingfast.Indiaandthe
UnitedStateswerestilltheworld'slargest
democracies,butthatfactatthe
time,as inthepast,offered
no templateforfuturecooperation.
Lookingbacktotheearly1990s,fewwouldhavepredicted thedepth
andbreadth ofrelations
betweenthetwocountries Whatexplains
today. this
quantumleap?

Economicfactors
In 1991,a watershed in Indianhistory, facedwitha seriousbalanceof
payments crisis,Prime MinisterRao's government initiatedsignificant
reformsto liberalizethe Indian economyunderthe stewardship of
Manmohan Singh, thenthefinance minister. Thisopenedthedoortoforeign
private a significant
capital, amountofwhichwasAmerican. from
Starting
US$165 millionin 1992, annualforeign directinvestment in Indiashotup
to$2.14billionby1997,a 13-fold increase.4Similarly,
two-way tradebetween
IndiaandtheUS grewdramatically duringthisperiod(despitefalling as a
shareoftotalglobaltrade)andin 2006 stoodatalmost$30.6billion.5 The
UnitedStatesin2006 accounted fornearly ofIndianexports.
one-sixth The
growth ofIndia's knowledge economy and theglobaloutsourcing industry
brought aboutmultipleprivatesectorlinkages.Economictiestherefore
playeda vitalroleinpiloting thenewrelationship.
Nowhere was thismoreevidentthanon theissueofnucleartesting.
Although an Indiannuclearweaponsprogram hadbeenintheoffing since
thelate1970swhenChina'sassistancefora Pakistanweaponsprogram
becameknown,RajivGandhiinitiated a covertnuclearweaponsprogram
in
only 1988, based on a nuclear
potential threatfromPakistan. By1994the
Rao government was readyto test.However,testing was delayedby
considerationsofthepossibleimpactofUS sanctions on thenascentpost-

4 "FDI in India statistics," Ministryof Commerce and Industry,industrialpolicy and

promotion,governmentof India, www.dipplnic.in.
5 "Export import data bank," Ministry of Commerce, government of India,
http://commerce.nic.in.

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 I India-US relations |

reformIndianeconomy. withStrobe
Rao,ina conversation thenUS
Talbott,
deputy
secretaryofstate, thatIndiawasawareoftheimportance
indicated of
into
integration the globaleconomy and closerelations
withtheUS. He
emphasizedthatIndia's economicsecurity wouldbe jeopardizedif it
its
"overplayed nuclearcard/'6

Politicalfactors
Economic interdependence moreoften thannottendstomoderate thetone
ofpolitical differences between nations. On a
this, new factor was at play.
The1990sbrought totheforea numberofwealthy IndianAmericans who
learned tomobilize and
politically build relationships withinthe US congress
so as to influence policytowardsIndiaand southAsia. The US census
countedover2.5millionAmericans ofIndianoriginin 2007.Themedian
incomeof a familyin thisgroupis almost79 percenthigherthanthe
nationalmedian.7IndianAmericansraisedgrowingsums on behalfof
politicalcandidates as ofthe1992election. Theresulting influence yielded
higher levelsofinterest withincongress in issuespertaining toIndia,such
thatmorethana quarterofthemembersofthehouseofrepresentatives
joinedan informal congressional caucusaimedat fostering India-USties.
This,in turn,tempered traditionallegislative hostilitytowards Indiaas
evincedbythedefeat(from1996 onwards)ofthe"Burton amendments,"
whichhadbeentraditionally passedevery year and were designed toreduce
foreign aid to India.In 2005 and 2006, Indian Americans also undertook a
majorlobbying effort the
topromote passage oflaws allowing nuclear
civilian
cooperation withIndia.
Indianpolicymakers also began to reassesstheirtraditional anti-
Americanism and nonalignedrhetoric.The late 1980s producedan
increasingly fragmented multiparty politicalsystem thatcreated ideological
andpolitical spacefor new voicesinthe articulation of Indian foreignpolicy.
By 1991, the Bharatiya Janataparty's election manifesto was already
dismissing nonalignment as an outdated ideology.The1990sintroduced an
Indianapproachto foreign policygroundedin realpolitik. Thiswas the
to the of
precursor age "strategic partnerships" forIndia. By 2005, Indiahad
concluded suchpartnerships withChina,Iran,Japan, andtheUnitedStates,

6 Strobe Talbott,Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington:

Brookings,2004), 31.
7 Website of the US India political action committee,www.usinpac.com.

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I David M. Malone& Rohan Mukherjee |

in additionto its long-standing defencerelationship withRussiawhich

persevered a
in an alteredform.Thissignalled newpragmatism and an
inclinationtospreadtherisksassociated withinternational relationsbetween
tieswithseveralfriendly powers. India'sdiplomacy changed justin
not
content,but alsoin with
style, Vajpayee and Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant
Singhchoosing"quietdiplomacy" over"morally ladenrhetoric," atleastin
itsbilateralrelations.8 successor,
Vajpayee's Manmohan Singh,optedfora
similarstyle.
Indiawascareful tieswithcountries
tocultivate otherthantheUS,too.
In 1991,Li Pengbecamethefirst Chinesepremier tovisitIndiain 31years.
Twoyearslater,Indiaand Chinasignedan agreement to maintain peace
along the"line ofactual control"
on their border.In 1992 India launched its
"lookeast"policy to cultivate
closertieswith southeast Asian countries.The
policypaidoffafewyearslaterwhenIndiabecamea fulldialoguepartner at
ASEAN.
Differences ofviewwiththeUS continued overregionalsecurity and
nuclearissues.In 1995,a congressional amendment allowed the US to
resumearmssuppliesto Pakistanthathad becomeattenuated sincethe
Sovietwithdrawal fromAfghanistan. Thiswas notwellreceived in India,
in of
especially light 1994 a Human Rights Watch report thattraced arms
usedbymilitants inKashmir andPunjabtomoneyandweaponssupplied to
Pakistan'sintelligence agenciesbytheUS during theAfghanistan war.9
Indiafoundthatdespitesomeadvancesinitsrelationship withtheUS
(including modestjointnavalexercises in1991),theUS continued topursue
an unfavourable southAsia policy.Whileresumingarms suppliesto
Pakistan,itcontinued topressureIndiatoabandonitsindigenous integrated
missiledevelopment program, blocked thesale of some Russian weapons
systems to India,andlimitedIndia'saccesstoAmerican hightechnology,
fearingthatsuchaccesswouldbe misusedas before. On thenuclearissue,
in 1995 the US supported a permanent extensionof the nuclearnon-
proliferation treaty,towhichIndiawas bitterly opposed.Subsequently, in
1996, India rejectedthe comprehensive test ban treaty as a biased

8 George Perkovich,"The measure of India: What makes greatness?" Seminar 529,

September 2003.
9 "Armsand abuses in Indian Punjab and Kashmir,"Human RightsWatch,i September
1994.

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 I India-US relations |

arrangement thatfavoured
themajorpowers, doubtlesscontributingtoits
loss in an electionfora UN security
councilseatlaterin theyear,which
Indianofficials attributed
primarily to thechequebook
(ifconveniently)
diplomacy ofthe successful
opponent,Japan.
Buttherecanbe nodoubtthattheendoftheColdWarliberated India's
foreign policyandallowedittochooseitsfriends
morefreely, and
creatively,
nonexclusively.

Pokhran-II anditsimpact
In May1998,Indiadetonated fivenucleardevicesatPokhran, thesiteofits
firstnucleartest24 yearsearlier.Barelytwoweekslater, Pakistan detonated
six nucleardevicesat the Chagai Hills. These eventssharplyfocused
President Clintonandhis administration's attention on southAsia (until
thenlargely a diplomatic backwater forClinton'steam).The immediate
American response was toplace economic sanctionsonbothcountries. But,
in a paradoxicaloutcome, as C. RajaMohanargues,thetestsofMay1998
wereactually thebeginning oftheendofnonproliferation disagreements
between thetwocountries. "Solongas Indiaremained undecided aboutwhat
itwantedtodo withnuclearweapons,itwasnatural thattheUnitedStates
woulddo everything toprevent Indiafrombecominga nuclearweapons
power,"he writes.10 A high-level negotiation processwas startedby
Washington withlong-term objectivesalongthreelines- nonproliferation,
progressinrelationswithIndia,andcontinued support forPakistan as a pro-
western Islamicstate.Ideological andstrategic differenceswithIndiawere
put aside by the US in the interestof managinga volatilenuclear
subcontinent.Thisvindicated theIndianviewthat"theworldgivesrespect
tocountries withnuclearweapons."11
EvidenceofAmerican respect forIndia'sconcerns camethefollowing
yearwhenPakistanlauncheda daringbutrecklessoffensive on Indian
in the
territory Kargil districtofKashmir. to
Contrarypastexperience, India
foundtheUS willing toplaceresponsibility fortheaggression squarely on
Pakistan'sshoulders it
and subsequently pressured Prime Minister Nawaz
Shariftowithdraw histroops.On thenuclearquestion, domestic lobbiesin

io C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy
(New York:Viking,2003), 89.
11 Perkovich,"The measure of India," quoting I.K. Gujral,formerIndian prime minister
and foreignminister.

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theUS- mainlyIndian-American groups - pressured congress toease the

sanctionson India.Therejection ofthecomprehensive testbantreaty bya
Republican-dominated senateinOctober 1999alsoworked inIndia'sfavour.
Bothdevelopments favoured post-Pokhran rapprochement betweenIndia
andtheUS.
In2000,Clinton becamethefirst US president tovisitIndiain22years.
His tripwas a resoundingsuccess and a landmarkin the ongoing
transformation ofIndia-USrelations. Thefollowing year,Indiabecameone
of thefirst(and few)countries to supportPresident GeorgeW. Bush's
controversialnuclearmissiledefence initiative.
Thereafter, as theeventsof
II September unfolded, Indiawasquicktooffer itsfulloperational support
fortheUS waragainstterrorism. By22 September, theUS had liftedall
sanctionsagainstIndiaandthebilateral defencepolicygroup,suspended
since1998,was revived towardstheendoftheyear.Following a terrorist
attackon the Indianparliament in December2001, the US pressured
Pakistanintoa commitment on curbing crossborder terrorism in India.In
2002 theUS initiated a regionalsecuritydialoguewithIndiathatexplored
sharedinterests in India'sneighbourhood, including endingthecivilwarin
SriLanka,promoting political in
stability Bangladesh, andreconstructing
- a
Afghanistan significant breakfrom Cold War overAmerican
difficulties
influenceinthesubcontinent.

partnership
Strategic
On 18 July2005, thetwocountriesannouncedthemostwide-ranging
partnershipinthehistory oftheirbilateral
relations,
coveringtheeconomy,
energysecurity, democracy promotion, defence cooperation,and high
and
technology spacecooperation. The most aspectofthe
controversial
agreementwas Bush'scommitment to "work withfriendsand toadjust
allies
internationalregimesto enablefullcivilnuclearenergy cooperationand
tradewithIndia."12In effect,
theUS explicitlyrecognizedand castitself
as
to
prepared legitimize thenuclear weaponsprogram ofa non-NPT state
that
had consistentlyopposedtheglobalnonproliferation regime(though, as
Indiaclaimedin itsdefence, ithad de factofulfilled
thenonproliferation
of
objectives an NPT state).
A critical
testofthenewrelationship camelatein2005whenIndiavoted
alongwiththeUnitedStatesagainstIranattheInternational Atomic Energy

12 "Jointstatementbetween PresidentGeorge W. Bush and Prime MinisterManmohan

Singh," White House, 18 July2005.

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 I India-US relations |

Agencyin a resolution on Tehran'snuclearprogram, fearedto includea

weaponscomponent, doingso againin2006. Thedoublestandards inherent
inIndia'sstanddidnotgounnoticed. Asidefrom nuclearcooperation, since
July2005 India and the US have cooperated in a number ofareas, including
aviation,tradeand investment, business(through a high-powered CEO
forum), agriculture, energy, scienceandtechnology, defence, disaster relief,
democracy promotion, and maritime cooperation. In 2007, India hosted a
major round ofnaval exercises (part of the "Malabar" series)in the Indian
Oceanwith27 warships fromcountries including theUS, Japan, Australia,
andSingapore.
The end-gameon India-US negotiations towardsan agreement
governing cooperation in the nuclear sphere came intofocusin late2006.
Bythen,foreign policyachievements ofthe Bush administration werefew,
withtheIraqwarwidely seenas a strategic disaster fortheUS (eventhough
tactical on
improvements ground the became obvious as thetroopsurgein
2006-08tookhold).Withdevelopments inAfghanistan alsounfavourable,
and the NATO alliancecomingundersome pressureas a result,the
president's teamidentified successon theIndiafront as themostpositive
potentialremaining foreign policylegacy item in the Bush administration's
portfolio.Intensenegotiations - on the detailed outcome ofwhichIndia
frequently appearedtointernational observers tohavebestedtheUS,while
in Indiabayedabouttheirperception
critics ofa Delhisell-out - yielded the
required so-called in
"123agreement" July 2007.13 However, controversy in
bothcountries wassuchthatneither side was able to for
press approval of the
agreement and itsrelated safeguards clauses at the International Atomic
Energy or
Agency by thenuclear suppliers group until mid-2008. Both latter
stepswere precededby a raucous debate in the Indian lower house of
parliament inJuly 2008 marked bymuchpolitical theatre, culminating in the
Singhgovernment's defeating a no-confidence vote brought againstthe
agreement. The IAEA the
approved safeguards on
agreement August1 2008,
andthenuclearsuppliers an
groupapproved India-specific waiver from its

13 On the keypointof internationalsupervisionof Indian nuclearfacilities,India yielded

much less than US negotiatorsor many nuclear suppliers group members would have
preferred.Increasingly,with time running out for the Bush administration and the
politicalimperativeof an agreementverystrongforthe presidenthimself,India seemed
to have had the whip hand in the negotiations. See "US concerned India stance on
nuclear energycould jeopardize deal," Forbes, 19 April2007.

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coretermson 6 September 2008. In thefinalmajorstepforeseen bythe

twocountriesforimplementation oftheir understandings, the US senateon
1 October2008 approved thedealbya voteof86 to 13,following earlier
approvalby thehouse of representatives.
Thesedevelopments weresignificant fortheIndia-USrelationship but
alsoforIndia'sglobalstanding andpositioning. TheUS hadhelpeditoffthe
perchofnuclearpariahstatusanddefiance towhichithadbeenconfined
since1974but,through theIAEAandsuppliers groupvotes,therestofthe
worldconcurred in India'semergence fromnuclearpurdah.WhileIndian
commentators mademuchofambiguousChinesestatements duringthe
IAEAnegotiations, Chinadidnotstandin thewayofIAEAapproval. Nor
did countriessuchas Australia and Canada,whichhad longadoptedan
assertivestancein defenceofthenonproliferation treaty and thewider
nonproliferationregime. Indiandiplomacy, including thequietbutresolute
leadershiponthisissueofSingh(uncharacteristically toughinstaring down
domestic ofthenegotiations
critics withtheUS, including somewithin his
own Congressparty),contributed significantly to this success. The
professionalism and disciplineoftheUS negotiating team,mostly under
NicholasBurns, wasalsostriking.
Indeed,Indianglobaldiplomatic maneuvering inrelation tothenuclear
fileduringtheyears2005-08suggested justhow pragmatic (andfocused)
Indiandiplomacy hadbecome,giventheright incentives. Perhapsin order
tosaveitsdiplomatic firepowerforthisissue,Indiadidnotdisplay undue
or
creativityenergy on other exceptperhaps Nepal,duringthese
files, for
years,contenting with
itself pressing forward gently ontherelationship with
China,closertieswithsomeotherAsianpartners, a cautiousstanceonwest
Asianchallenges, andtheemergence ofitsnewpartnership withBraziland
SouthAfrica.NewDelhi'scalculation to focusits diplomatic effortwas
doubtlesstheright one.

Rediscovering commonvalues
The post-1990story ofIndia-USrelationsis notjustabouttheendofthe
ColdWar,India'ssecondroundofnucleartests,oreconomic liberalization.
Itis alsoaboutrediscovering
commonpolitical values.Formostofthe20th
century, American failedtosee thepotential
policymakers in Indiatobe a
strong (anddemocratic) in
partner Asia. Insteadtherewas a tendency tosee
Indiaas "a revisionist
powerbentonrestructuring theinternational system

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 I India-US relations |

at the expenseof America'sglobalinterests."14 Sincethe early1990s,

an
however, increasingly influentialschool of thought inAmerican foreign
policybeganrecognizing thestrategic utilityofthecommonpolitical values
espousedby bothnations.
Sincethe1950s,India'sconsciousadoptionofconstitutional liberal
democracy resonated in the United States and at times its
among foreign
policymakers. As hometo a significant sectionoftheworld'spopulation,
India came to symbolizean important experiment in post-colonial
democracy. In thissense both the US and India always muchto gain
had
froma cooperative relationship.
Indeed,Americanswere aware of the importance of promoting
democratic in
stability India. Dataon US economic aid to India confirms a
and
substantial enduring financialcommitment to India in the 1950s and
1960s,likelymotivated bythisveryidea. Indeed,foreign assistancedata
suggests thattheUS has alwaysviewedPakistan as a military partner and
Indiaas a potential politicalone. Hess suggests that from the 1950s the
to
1980s,theUS maintained a two-pronged of
strategy engagement in south
Asiathatinvolved "thesimultaneous building ofan alliancewithPakistan
andpromoting closepolitical-economic tieswithIndia."15 Yetthemomentum
was notsustainedand therelevanceofaid to Indiadeclinedas itsown
economy tookoffinthe1990s.
Increasingly, itwas a value-based approachto India-USrelations that
prevailed in theaftermath of September nth, when democracy promotion
becamea significant itemontheBushadministration's internationalagenda,
complementing theinterests-based economic agendathatunderpinned the
relationship, withIndiaincluded as a member ofbothitsglobaldemocracy
promotion -
initiatives the community of democracies and the UN
democracy In
fund. 2007 Burns wrote that the of
promotion democracy and
freedom aroundtheworld"shouldbe an essentialcomponent of the new
US-Indiarelationship."16 And,ofcourse,IndianandAmerican concerns

14 Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna, "US-India tensions: Misperceptions on nuclear

proliferation,"ForeignAffairs74, no. 13 (January-February 1995): 13.
15 Gary R. Hess, "Global expansion and regional balances: The emerging scholarship
on United States' relations with India and Pakistan," Pacific Historical Review 56, no.
2 (May 1987): 295.
16 R. Nicholas Burns, "America's strategicopportunitywith India," ForeignAffairs86,
no. 6 (November-December 2007): 144.

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I David M. Malone& Rohan Mukherjee |

aboutthesourcesofglobalterrorism toa largedegree(although

coincided
theirpreferred
international tocombatitdidnotalwaysjive).Singh
tactics
thusinvokedbothprincipleandpragmatism in laudingthenewIndia-US
inWashington
relationship in 2005.l?

Regionalpowerbalances
Therewerea numberofregionaland international factorsthatwerealso
fundamental tothewarming ofIndia-USrelations. Takentogether, a growing
Indiaand an increasingly powerful China all combined to spurIndia-US
entente.On Pakistan,Jaswant Singh, India's former foreignminister,
reportedly proclaimedtohiscounterpart Strobe Talbott in1998thatPakistan
is a "failedstate"whileIndia"staystogether," thusmakingbetter relations
withIndiatherightstrategic choicefortheUnitedStates.18 No longerdid
theUS viewitsactionsinthesubcontinent as a zero-sum gamebetween its
twomostbitter ThisallowedtheUS todeclarePakistan
rivals. a majornon-
NATOallyin 2004 andto signagreements in 2006 forarmstransfers to
Pakistan worth$3.5billionforfighting thewaronterrorism whilebuilding
geostrategically moresignificantlytieswithIndia."[Particularly striking
aboutthebuildingblocksforthenewIndo-U.S.relationship is howlittle
Pakistan figures inthem."19
In fact,China,notPakistan, has gradually emergedas thenewthird
party intheIndia-USrelationship. Varshney describes thisdevelopment as
"a newtriangle" on
predicated realistlogic: "when the first-
and second-
rankedpowersfight, thefirstoftenardently courtsthethird."20 Chinais
growing rapidlyandalthough itsstatedphilosophy of
is one peaceful growth,
itsdefence expenditureshavebeenrisingandnowrankthirdin theworld
behindthe US and Russia.It is also a knownproliferator of nuclear
to like
technology rogueregimes Libya,Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea,
although todayit mayregret thoseearlieractions.Therefore it is hardly
surprising thattheUS gravitated towards India,growing lessrapidly andin

17 Singh, "Address to the joint session of the United States congress."

18 Talbott,Engaging India, 174.

19 Teresita C. Schaffen"Building a new partnershipwith India," WashingtonQuarterly

25, no. 2 (spring 2002): 41.
20 Ashutosh Varshney,"A new triangle:India, China, and the US," Seminar 557,January
2006.

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 I India-US relations |

a nonthreatening manner, inpartas a hedgeagainst China.Writing in2000,

futurenationalsecurity adviserand secretary of stateCondoleezzaRice
arguedthattheUS shouldpaycloserattention to Indiaas "anelementin
China'scalculation," suggesting a degree of regional rivalrythattheUS
have the to in itsfavour.2I
might potential exploit
Indiaitself is emerging as a significant power.In thespanofjustfour
years,seniorofficialsoftheBushadministration wentfrom describing India
as havingthepotential tobe a greatpowertocounting itamongthe"major
powers," alongwithRussiaandChina.TheBushadministration's expansive
viewofIndia'ssignificance canbe seenas an effort todevelopforita rolein
whichitmightsupport theUS in international affairs,andbyserving as a
in
"juniorpartner" controlling the Indian Ocean.22
Indianintentions, however, arequitedifferent. Although theVajpayee
government citedtheChinesethreat as one ofthemainmotivators ofthe
Indiannuclearweaponsprogram in 1998,italsosoughtengagement with
Beijing. Rather than confronting China, Indiahad a
developed high-level
dialoguewithChinatoresolve outstanding issuesandexplore newavenues
ofcooperation. Bytheendof2007, Indiahelditsfirst jointarmytraining
exerciseswithChina,andChinahostedthefirst India-China annualdefence
dialogue.Indeed, India's growingrelationship with the US mayhave
convinced Chinatodealwithitmoreseriously. ShyamSaran, former foreign
secretary tothegovernment ofIndia,madean obliquereference to such
possibilitieswhenhe said,"[sjtronger ties[between IndiaandtheUS] make
themselves positivelyfelton our relations withthird countries."23
Forsomein India,thepredominant foreign challenge is instabilityin
Pakistan,and manyIndianssee China "as an economicand political
opportunity morethana strategic, civilizational,or economicproblem."24
in
Indeed somekey international forums, including on climatechange,
trade,labourlaws,armscontrol,and humanrights,India has found
commongroundwithChinaagainstwesterninterests, thougha recent

2i Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the national interest," Foreign Affairs79, no. i

2000): 56.
(January-February
22 Achin Vanaik, "Post-Cold War Indian foreignpolicy,"Seminar 581, January2008.

23 Shyam Saran, "The India-US joint statement of July18, 2005: A year later,"in Atish
Sinha and Madhup Mohta, eds., Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities,
(New Delhi: ForeignService Institute,2007), 759-66.
24 Stephen P. Cohen, "The US and south Asia," Seminar 545, January2005.

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I David M. Malone & Rohan Mukherjee |

article
byTeresitaSchaffersuggeststhatonemustnotoverlook theUnited
States'andIndia'scommoninterests andpotentialforcooperation inglobal
governance, particularly
throughinformalinstitutions.25
Withregard totheUnitedStates,
statusrelative
tojuniorpartner India's
deep internaldivisions
overtheIndia-US nucleardeal signalled a national
unwillingnesstoplaysecondfiddle.DespitevotingagainstIrantwiceinthe
IAEA,Indiasought tomaintain relations
positive withthatcountry through
bilateral
channels.Moreover,India'spursuitofenergy security through a
proposed Iran-Pakistan-India
gas pipeline continues to be a source of
disagreement betweenIndiaandtheUnitedStates, as doitsfriendly policies
towards undemocratic regimesin itsneighbourhood, notably Burma.In
theseways,IndiaescapesWashington's controland intendsto continue
doing so.

A NEW WORLD ORDER

Whilerarelyshyofopportunities to emphasizeitsowndominanceand
inclinedmainly toinstrumentalratherthansystematic multilateralisminits
owndiplomacy, theUS has beenkeenon drawing newlyinfluential and
powerful statesintoa webof consultative
forums, the evolving institutional
arrangements ofwhichin manywaysconstitute a proxy forthe"newworld
order."In 2008, CondoleezzaRice,thensecretary of state,proclaimed
"investingin strongandrisingpowersas stakeholders in theinternational
order"as oneoftwopillarsofAmerica's "unique" realism (theotherbeing
for
support democracy inweak and poorlygoverned states).26 that
A strategy
givessuchpowersa greater stakein theinternational system likelyto
is
preempt future ininternational
instability relations. Efforts toinvolveIndia
andChinain G8 meetings, tosupport China'smembership in thenuclear
suppliersgroupdespiteits proliferation activities, and to managethe
legitimizationofIndia'snuclearweaponscanallbe viewedinthislight.In
2006 Bush'snuclearnegotiation teamtestified
tocongress thatitsintention
wasto""lock[India]in"toa dealbefore moving to tie down andrestrain the
country's nuclear in
potential nonproliferation discussions."27 Thus,the

25 TeresitaC. Schaffer,"The United States, India, and global governance: Can theywork
together?" WashingtonQuarterly-}!,no. 3 (July2009): 71-87.
26 Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinkingthe national interest,"ForeignAffairs87, no. 2 (July-
August 2008): 23.
27 Quoted in Mario E. Carranza, "From nonproliferation to post-proliferation: Explaining
the US-India nuclear deal," Contemporary Security Policy 2%, no.3 (2007): 464-93.

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 I India-US relations |

American strategymaynotjustbe togiveemerging powersa greater stake

in thesystembutalso to involvethemin waysthatrestrain theirfuture
margin formaneuver.
Takingadvantage oftheend oftheColdWarand the US need for
meaningful after
partners September nth,Indiasoughttocapture as much
diplomatic as
space possible to advance its own It
interests. did thisby
supportingtheUS on keyinitiatives,includingthewaron terrorism and
nuclearmissiledefence,bothofwhichsoughttochallenge andmodify the
rules
"global ofthe in
game" wayscongruent withIndian It
interests.28joined
handswiththeUS inthenameofdemocracy promotionandcooperated to
onthenuclearfront,
a greatextent placinga numberofitsnuclearreactors
safeguards, thisleadingtoitsalmostunconditional
underinternational allof
entryintotheglobalnuclearclub.

THE OBAMA APPROACH

The Obamaadministration's foreign policyorientationsattheoutsetwere
crafted to emphasizea degreeof contrastwiththoseof the previous
Washington team.Gonewasassertive internationaldemocracy promotion.
In itsplacePresidentBarackObamaandSecretary ofStateHillary Clinton
advanced a widerapproach tovalues,rootedin concepts of"smart" power,
and a greaterdeterminationto engagealliesand partners.29 Manyin the
Indianmediaand politicalcommunities worried thattheintensity ofthe
Bushadministration's commitment to improving tieswithIndiawould
dissipateunderObamaandhiscrew.EarlysignalsfromtheObamateam
thatitmightseektoinsert Washington intotheKashmir file,seeinginita
keyto unlocking a happyoutcomein Afghanistan, worriedNewDelhi.
Ultimately,Obama skatedaway fromthatdimension ofhistransitionteam's
thinking byappointingRichard Holbrooke as for
specialenvoy Afghanistan
and Pakistan(and noticeably notforIndiaor Kashmir).Andwhilethe
administrationincluded more champions of the multilateral
nonproliferationregimethanhad thatof Bush,all official earlysignals
towardsIndia were including
positive, duringearlyvisitsbybothClinton
andHolbrooke. Thus,Indiawaslikely tobe abletobankthedividends ofits
engagement withtheBushadministration, without a backlashfromthe

28 This is an argument made byC. Raja Mohan in Crossing the Rubicon.

29 The concept of "smart power," seen as a combination of "hard" and "soft" power,
in order to produce positive results is associated withAmerican scholar Joseph Nye.

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I David M. Malone& Rohan Mukherjee |

Obama team. Nevertheless, suspicionsof Holbrooke'sapproachand

intentions remained lively amongcommentators inIndiathroughout 2009.
Clinton'svisitto India in July2009, coincidingwiththe fourth
anniversary ofBush'sandManmohan Singh'sjointstatement thatofficially
kickedoffthenewstrategic partnership, was a somewhat dramatic affair.
Occurring barelya weekaftersuccessful American effortsto convince G8
countriesto ban the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing nuclear
technologies to non-NPTcountries (ofwhichIndiais a prominent one),
Clinton's visitaimed,interalia,toassuretheIndiansthatthenucleardeal
wasstillon course.Labelling thenewadministration's approach toIndiaas
version 3.0,Clinton signalled theUS desire to take therelationship togreater
heights. The detailsof course were not spelled out, the
though secretary
signedtwoimportant agreements duringhervisit - one permitting US-
licensedcomponents tobe usedon Indiancivilianspacecraft, andanother
providing $30 million as an endowment forpromoting science, technology,
andinnovation in India.In addition, Clinton launchedan ongoing strategic
dialoguewithIndia'sforeign minister,S.M.Krishna.
Also on the agendawereagriculture, education, health,the global
economy, and climate change. Despite some hard talk by Indian
Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh, who reiteratedIndia's standagainst
legallybinding capsonitsgreenhouse gasemissions, bothcountries agreed
to enhancecollaboration on climatechangeissues. On Pakistan,too,
Clinton's visitseemedill-timed, following closelyon theheelsofthefirst
meeting between Singh and Prime Minister YousufRaza Gilanisincethe
Mumbaiterror attacksofNovember 2008. Singhwaswidely seeninIndiato
haveconcededfartoomuchgroundto Pakistan on theissueofterrorism.
Nonetheless, Clinton playedhercardsright andvisited themostpublicized
siteoftheMumbaiattacks whilereiterating theneedforPakistan tobring the
perpetrators oftheattacks tojusticeanddomoreonterrorism. Mostnotably,
Clinton didnotschedule a stopeitherinPakistan orAfghanistan during her
as American
visit, dignitaries havebeen wont to do inthe past.This signalled
a truedecoupling ofIndiaandPakistan inthemindsofObama's southAsia
Onthewhole,Clinton
strategists. wasabletoassuagesomeIndianconcerns
overtheObamaapproach and,although hervisitmaynothavecatapulted the
US-Indiarelationship intoa newrealmofpossibilities, it certainly kept
thingson an evenkeel.

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 I India-US relations |

CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD

India'sability since1991toovercome itsanxieties aboutandresentment of
theUnitedStatesowesa greatdealto itsgrowing self-confidence and to
India'sdesiretoengagewiththeother majorpowersoftheageina decidedly
less ideological world.Americaninterest in closerrelations withIndia,
spurredby India's growing market for American goods and the close
connections the
of twocountries inthe of
provision globalservices, hasbeen
intensified by a verydifferent -
dynamic Washington's loss of absolute
dominance ofinternational relations inthewakeoftheIraqandAfghanistan
warsandtheUS-induced globaleconomic crisisof2008-09,anditsnee(^f°r
moreandcloserfriends.
Most Indianswarmlywelcomebetterties as theirown economic
aspirations exhibit markedaffinities withthoseofAmericans. Andmany
Americans, not leastin thecorridors of power Washington, Indiaas a
in see
kindred nationin manyregardsand as a usefulhedgeagainsttheriseof
China,ifnotas a sure-fire allyin everyglobaladventure. Harking backto
theJohnFosterDullesmaximinvokedat theoutsetofthischapter, today
Indiafindsitself"with" theUnitedStateson severalkeyissueswhenuntil
veryrecently itwas"against" onmost.
It is important to remember, however, thatthe emergingentente
betweenthe two nationsis not so much an allianceas a "selective
partnership" basedon specific sharedinterests in someareasandquidpro
quoarrangements inothers.30 Onthenuclear issue,IndiaandtheUS areyet
tofullyresolve theirnonproliferation differences, andsomepotential discord
inthisrealmwouldseemreasonably likelyin the future. Tied tothis is the
issueofenergy security andthediversification ofenergy sources, including
naturalgas suppliesfromIranand otherGulfstates.India'sattempts to
obtaina permanent seaton theUN security council,notenthusiastically
supported bytheUS inthepast,couldcreatefriction inthefuture, unlessa
"newdeal"formultilateral arrangements is agreedin thewakeofthedeep
2008-09global economic crisis.
Farfrom having ended,history promises tobevery interestingindeedin
decadesahead.

***

30 Schaffer,"Building a new partnership,"32.

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 I David M. Malone& Rohan Mukherjee |

Authors' note:
Thisarticleis intendedtobereadalongside thatofRyanTouhey inthisissue.
His articlearguesthatCanada'srelationship withIndiahas moreclosely
conformed tothatoftheUS thanmanyCanadianstudents ofIndianforeign
policyhave realized. Alert
readers of the two will
articles note thattheonly
in
majordifferenceoutlook between Canada and the United StatesonIndia
overrecent decadesoccurred as a resultoftheinüuenceduring the1980sof
the "freeKhalistanmovement/' for
struggling independence of India's
Punjabstate, on elements of the Sikh community in Canada, ultimately
involving actsofterrorism - notably thedestruction mid-flightwithgreat
lossoflifeofanAirIndiaaircrañin 1985.IndianofficialsbelievedCanadians
oneswerenottaking thethreatseriously enough and were doing littleto
too
combatit.Thisaddedan Indiangrievance totheCanadianoneoverIndia's
1974nucleartest(whichalsogreatly preoccupied theUS.)Arguably, other
differences arisemainlyfroma "great power"perspective in Washington
toa "middle
relative power"viewin Ottawa, andtoIndianperceptions ofthe
relative
importance internationallyofthe two countries.

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