PHIL 120W – MORAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS

THE ETHICS OF MEAT EATING

INSTRUCTOR: DR. BRUNO GUINDON
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
THE INEFFICACY OBJECTION

• “It makes no difference [to the overall value] whether there is one more or one less
single individual [meat eater], because (the objection claims) the addition or deletion of a
single [meat eater] would not make any difference to the quantity produced in the sort
of large marketplaces that are the norm in Western society” (171).
• By contrast, meat eating is pleasurable.
• So, the addition of merely one meat eater raises overall well-being.
• All other things being equal, it appears that utilitarianism morally requires you to
be(come) a meat eater!
THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE

• Suppose there are 250 million chicken eaters, eating on average 25 chickens a year.
• One less chicken eater will have no effect on the industry.
• If there were no chicken eater, then 6.25 billion chickens would not be bred, tortured,
and killed yearly.
• Somewhere in between, there is a number of consumers far short of 250 million that
would cause the industry to reduce the number of chicken bred in factory farms—i.e.,
factory farming is sensitive to market signals.
THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE

• Suppose that number is 10,000: for every 10,000 chicken eaters, an additional 250,000
chickens are bred each year.
• That is, if you are the 10,000th chicken eater, then 250,000 additional chickens will be bred
each year.
• Otherwise, your choice of becoming a chicken eater makes no difference.
• So, the risk of harm is low: you have a 1/10,000 chance of making a negative difference.
• But the harm risked is enormous: 250,000 suffering chickens!
• According to utilitarianism, that’s morally relevant.
THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE

• Suppose we want to know the average effect of each chicken eater on overall value or
utility.
• We’ve stipulated that, on average, each chicken eater eats 25 chickens annually.
• Suppose then, counterfactually, that each additional chicken eater causes an additional 25
chickens being bred in factory farms annually.
• What is the average expected utility of chicken eating?
• Expected utility:
• The value (goodness or badness) of the possible outcome x the probability of that outcome
obtaining.
THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE

• Average expected utility (with respect to chickens) of becoming a chicken

eater: the value (badness) of 25 suffering chickens each year (25 suffering chickens yearly
x probability 1)
• Average expected utility (with respect to chickens) of becoming a vegetarian:
the value (goodness) of 25 fewer suffering chickens each (25 fewer suffering chickens
yearly x 1)
• Utilitarianism requires vegetarianism in this average, counterfactual case.
THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE

• Back to the actual case:

• There’s a 1/10,000 chance of you making a negative difference (i.e. there being 250,000 more
suffering chickens bred in factory farms).
• Expected utility of becoming a chicken eater: the value (badness) of 250,000 suffering
chickens annually x probability 0.0001 = the value (badness) of 25 suffering chickens annually.
• The expected utility in the actual case is the same as in the counterfactual (i.e. average)
case.
• So, it appears that utilitarianism also requires vegetarianism in the actual case.
BUDOLFSON AND THE AVERAGE EFFECTS FALLACY

• Budolfson: This reply commits the average effects fallacy.

• The fallacy is thinking that, “for any single individual, the expected effect of that individual’s
action—in the particular example under discussion here, the action of [becoming a
chicken eater]—is equal to the average effect of all actual acts of that type across society”
(206).
• Or rather, it is to think that the expected consequence in the actual case is identical to
the expected consequence in the counterfactual case.
BUDOLFSON AND THE AVERAGE EFFECTS FALLACY

• There are various factors in the supply chains that make it the case that the expected
effect is not the same as the average effect.
• One such factor is waste at various stages in the supply chain.
• Because of this, suppliers allow for a certain amount of “slack” to create buffers, and
these buffers make our decisions virtually causally inefficacious.
• Given that we know that there such buffers, and that they are reliable, we know, or
are in a position to know that the expected effect of becoming a vegetarian is much
less than the average effect.
AN ILLUSTRATION

• “Richard makes paper T-shirts in his basement which he then sells online. He produces more
T-shirts than he is likely to need, and then sells whatever the excess turns out to be at the
end of the month at a nearly break-even amount.
• For many years Richard has always sold between 13,000 and 16,000 printed T-shirts each
month, and he’s always printed 20,000 at the beginning of each month.
• Nonetheless, there is a conceivable increase in sales that would cause him to produce more T-
shirts: if he sells over 19,000 this month, he’ll produce 25,000 T-shirts at the beginning of next
month; otherwise he’ll produce 20,000 like he always does.
• So, the system is genuinely sensitive to a precise tipping point: 19,001.
AN ILLUSTRATION

• What is the expected effect of your choice to buy a T-shirt on the total number of T-shirts
produced?
• If your choice is going to make a difference, Richard must sell exactly 19,001 T-shirts.
• For, if he sells less, no more T-shirts are produced.
• If he sells more, then your choice to by a T-shirt makes no difference: more T-shirts would
have been produced regardless.
• Since there is virtually no chance that Richard will sell exactly 19,001, the chances that you
will make a difference to the number of T-shirts produces is virtually zero.
• The meat industry is analogous to Richard’s T-shirt company.
BUDOLFSON’S ARGUMENT

1. Many of the animal products that we consume go through a massive supply chain in
which there is some reliable amount of slack—waste, inefficiency—at many links in
that chain.
2. That slack serves a buffer and absorbs any would-be effects from the links before.
3. Because of this, production decisions are insensitive to signals from individual choices.
4. So, you becoming a vegetarian has no effect on the total amount of happiness or
suffering in the world.
5. So, if meat eating is morally wrong, utilitarianism can’t explain why.
TORBJÖRN TÄNNSJÖ: A UTILITARIAN ARGUMENT
FOR AFOS
• Tännsjö offers a direct utilitarian argument for the thesis that industrial animal agriculture is
morally required.
• Total hedonistic utilitarianism (THU)
1. Hedonism: The happiness (pleasure) of individual people and animals alone is intrinsically
good.
2. Total: What matters is the total amount of happiness in the world (rather than, say, the
average amount of happiness).
• THU: An action is right just in case it maximizes the total amount of happiness of individual
people and animals.
MAKING THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE

• Two ways:
1. Make existing individuals happier.
2. Make additional happy individuals.
• Note that THU leads to the repugnant conclusion, something that Tännsjö accepts.
• Repugnant conclusion: Compare to the actual world, where many individuals live lives
well worth living, there is an even better world where there are many more billions of
individuals, each living a life that’s barely worth living.
THE ARGUMENT

• The central question here is: Are we doing as we ought when we eat meat?
• According to THU, this question is really a question about how good (or better) the
world is now than it was, say, 30 years ago.
• Animals raised for food in AFOs live lives that are worth living.
• So, the more AFOs, and the more animals raised for food in AFOs, the better.
• So, in eating meat, we are contributing to the maximization of total happiness.
• So, we do as we ought when we eat meat.