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Perfecto Pascua v. Bank Wise Inc., G.R. No. 191460 & 191464 (2018)

FACTS:

 Pascua was employed by Bankwise as Executive Vice President for Marketing when the
Philippine Veterans Bank purchased Bankwise’s entire outstanding capital stock. Philippine Veterans
bank eventually allegedly assumed full control of Bankwise.
 New members of Board of Directors and Officers were elected and appointed for Bankwise.
 Pascua was reassigned to Special accounts but his responsibilities were not clearly defined.
 The President of Bankwise then informed Pascua that as part of the merger, Pascua should
tender resignation assuring Pascua that all his money claims would be paid during transtition.
 Pascua then wrote three letters. The first letter pleaded that he stay in office until the end of the
year. The second letter came after a Bankwise director told him he should resign.
 The second Letter read “SIR:IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
PREVIOUS OWNERS OF THE BANK, I HEREBY TENDER MY RESIGNATION FROM THE BANK.”
 The third was a letter to Director Campa reminding him of Pascua’s money claims due to
resignation and a proposal for payment plan to cover severance pay.
 Due to inaction, Pascua sent a letter of demand which was not heeded then he filed a Complaint
for illegal dismissal with backwages.
 NLRC ruled that Pascua was constructively dismissed because he was forced to accept his
separation from service on the promise that he would be paid severance pay and other benefits.
 Philippine Veterans Bank alleged that Pascua’s resignation was voluntary.

ISSUE: 1. Was Perfecto Pascua constructively dismissed?

2. Is Perfecto Pascua entitled to severance pay?

RULING: 1. No. There is constructive dismissal when an employee is compelled by the employer to
resign or is placed in a situation where there would be no other choice but to resign. An
unconditional and categorical letter of resignation cannot be considered indicative of constructive
dismissal if it is submitted by an employee fully aware of its effects and implications.

His resignation was unconditional and not involuntary. He had special qualifications needed for his
post and had supervised several employees. He would have been completely aware of signing a
categorically worded resignation letter.

It contained no reservations that it was premised on his subsequent claim for severance pay and
other benefits. His resignation was also accepted by his employers. In this instance, Pascua is not
considered to have been constructively dismissed.

2. No. Severance pay cannot be granted. An employee who voluntarily resigns is not entitled to
separation pay unless it was previously stipulated in the employment contract or has become
established company policy or practice. There is nothing in Pascua's Contract of Employment that
states that he would be receiving any monetary compensation if he resigns. He has also not shown
that the payment of separation pay upon resignation is an established policy or practice of Bankwise
since his third letter indicated that he was unaware of any such policy:
Jeffrey Nacague v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 172589 (2010)]

FACTS:
 Sulpicio Lines hired Nacague as the representative of Sulpicio lines on board M/V Princess of the
World.
 Sulpicio received an anonymous letter reporting the use of illegal drugs on the ship. The
housekeeper submitted a report about drug paraphernalia found inside a room and the threat to
his life made by Nacague and the Chief Mate.
 Feb 15, 2003 The ship docked in Manila and Nacague was went through a random drug test at
S.M. Lazo Clinic where he tested positive for shabu.
 Nacague denied using illegal drugs in the formal investigation and on Feb 23, 2003, he went to
Chong Hua Hospital in Cebu City for a voluntary drug test which was negative.
 However, Sulpicio Lines proceeded to terminate him from service for being “culpable of grave
misconduct and loss of trust and confidence”
 Nacague alleges that the drug test result from S.M. Lazo Clinic was questionable because it is not
accredited by the Dangerous Drug Board and not under its supervision.

ISSUE: Was Nacague validly terminated?

RULING. No. Sulpicio Lines failed to prove that S.M. Lazo Clinic is an accredited drug testing center.
They did not even deny Nacague’s allegation of the same.  Also, only a screening test was conducted
to determine if Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. Sulpicio Lines did not confirm the positive
result of the screening test with a confirmatory test. Sulpicio Lines failed to indubitably prove that
Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs amounting to serious misconduct and loss of trust and
confidence.

RA 9165 provides that drug tests shall be done by government forensic laboratories or any DOH
accredited drug testing centers. Also that drug testing shall be of both a screening test and
confirmatory test.

To constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be
for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself.

Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that it had a valid and legal cause for terminating Nacague’s
employment. When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven,
as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.
Metro Eye Security v. Salsona, G.R. No. 167367 (2007)

FACTS: Julie Salsona was a Security Officer with AMA Group of Companies.
• July 11, 2000 Salsona received a memorandum requiring him to answer a complaint for allegedly
working for a competitor.

•July 12, 2000 Salsona promptly responded.

• July 13 2000 Salsona received another memorandum alleging he tampered payroll documents and
pilfered construction materials. Salsona also responded to this.

• Aug 10, 2000 Human resources issued a third memorandum finding Salsona guilty with tampering
and dismissed him based on loss of confidence.

• Salsona filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: Was Salsona validly dismissed?

RULING. No. Salsona's dismissal did not comply with the substantive and procedural aspects of due
process.

As to the substantial aspect: Petitioner did not base Salsona's dismissal on clearly established
facts sufficient to warrant separation from work. Employer failed to discharge burden of proving that
the employee was not dismissed illegally. Petitioner’s grounds of gross dishonesty and loss of trust
are based on the fact

(1) that Salsona intentionally inserted his name on the Daily Attendance Report 28 to make
it appear that he was present at his place of assignment at Amaland on 26 April 2000;
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(2) Salsona is guilty of pilferage of construction materials stored at his place of assignment.

Petitioner did not base Salsona's dismissal on clearly established facts. As to the insertion in the Daily
Attendance Report, the court agrees with the LA that the signature of the Head Guard in the DTR is
adequate proof that Salsona indeed worked on the disputed dates. Also, the key piece of evidence –
the guard’s logbook not containing Salsona’s name on April 26 2000 was not presented. Therefore
petitioner’s argument is mere allegation.

As to the charge of pilferage, the court rules that the records of the case did not contain anything on
the result of the investigation on the pilferage charge.

As to the procedural aspect: The two-fold notice requirement and hearing was not complied with.
Salsona was terminated with undue haste in deprivation of due process and not allowing for a
determination of just cause. Less than a month after receiving the Memorandum alleging the acts
which is the first notice, he was terminated. He was not given a reasonable period after receiving the
first notice to answer and opportunity to be heard and defend himself.
Also, there was not hearing conducted for Salsona to defend himself.
BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, (2006)

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
1. Bascon v. CA, G.R. No. 144899 (2004)
2. Innodata Philippines, Inc. v. Quejada[1]Lopez, G.R. No. 162839 (2006)
3. Maynilad Water Supervisors Association v. Maynilad Water Services, Inc., G.R. No.
198935 (2013)