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Man Chooses his Destiny: Ibn

Qayyim al-Jawziyya#s views on
predestination
Irmeli Perho
Published online: 14 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: Irmeli Perho (2001) Man Chooses his Destiny: Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyya#s views on predestination, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 12:1,
61-70, DOI: 10.1080/09596410124404

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 Islam and Christian± Muslim Relations, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2001

Man Chooses his Destiny: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s

views on predestination

IRMELI PERHO

½ anbalite scholar Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) discussed predes-

The H
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ABSTRACT
tination and free will in his book ShifaÅ’ al-¨alõÅ l fõÅ masaÅ’ il al-qad½ aÅ’ wa-al-qadar wa-al-h½ ikma
wa-al-ta¨lõÅ l. Even though Ibn Qayyim was a traditionalist, he did not reject the teachings of
the speculative theologians, but was willing to study their opinions and accept those that were
in accordance with the Qur’ aÅn and Sunna. Ibn Qayyim’s open-mindedness illustrates his effort
to exceed the boundaries of the schools and create doctrines for the whole SunnõÅ community.
Regarding predestination, the correct SunnõÅ belief was neither determinism nor belief in free
will. It was a compromise between these two extremes, a true middle road (al-madhhab
al-wasat½). This belief acknowledges God’s omnipotence and the predestination of man’ s acts,
but at the same time considers man as a responsible actor. Man exercises his choice (ikhtiyaÅ r)
and will (iraÅ da), and then carries out (fa¨ala) his actions. The book ShifaÅ’ is devoted to
explaining how it is possible to combine these two apparently contradictory views.

The questions concerning predestination and man’ s free will were issues of dispute
among Muslim scholars in the Middle Ages. Acceptance or rejection of man’ s ability to
determine his own actions classi® ed a theologian and made him a member of one
school or another. The extreme views were held by the Mu¨tazilites and the so-called
Jahmites, the former stating that man was able to act freely, whereas the latter claimed
that man has no more free will in his actions than a tree that moves in the windÐ all
man’ s acts are created by God and, although man seems to act independently, in reality
he has no power or will to determine his actions. Later, the Ash¨arites attempted
to create a compromise between the extreme views by declaring that God creates
the action, but he also at the same moment creates in man the acquisition of that
action.
Abrahamov (1998) characterizes a pure or extreme traditionalist as a scholar who
quoted verses of the Qur’ aÅn and H ½ adõÅ ths, but refused to compare them and draw
logical conclusions with the help of rational arguments. Traditionalist scholars disap-
proved of discussions on metaphysical issues and considered speculative theologians as
innovators leading the believers astray. They based their attitude on the H ½ adõÅ th: `Do
not speak of anything relating to qadar, for it is God’ s secret, so do not disclose God’ s
secret.’ 1 In their opinion, issues such as God’ s attributes, essence and foreordination
should be articles of faith and not topics of discussion and argument. They therefore
prohibited Muslims from listening to the theologians or discussing their views and
taught that they should accept predestination and God’ s attributes as they were
described in the Qur’ aÅn without asking their modality (bi-laÅ kayfa).2
The H ½ anbalite school formed a core of the traditionalist movement, but at least some
of them rejected the extreme approach of not writing about complex theological issues

ISSN 0959-6410 print/ISSN 1469-9311 online/01/010061-10 Ó 2001 CSIC and CMCU

DOI: 10.1080/09596410020018500
 62 Irmeli Perho

or even using rational methods in discussing them. Further, it is interesting to note the
broad variety of opinion the H ½ anbalite scholars held on the question of predestination
and free will. The early representatives of the H ½ anbalite school, Ah½ mad ibn H ½ anbal (d.
241/855) himself and Ibn Bat½½ta (d. 387/997), both expressed deterministic views and
maintained that all man’ s actions were created and predestined by God. AbuÅ Ya¨laÅ Ibn
al-FarraÅ’ (d. 458/1066) did not share his predecessors’ views but accepted the Ash¨arite
interpretation of man’ s role in his actions. According to AbuÅ Ya¨laÅ, man acquired (kasb)
his acts but it was God who created them.
Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) took up the issue of predestination in his MinhaÅj al-sunna
and RisaÅla fõÅ al-iraÅda wa-al-amr. He rejected the Ash¨arite views and at the same time
also AbuÅ Ya¨laÅ’ s opinion and claimed that the theory of acquisition (kasb) did not present
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any true compromise but was clearly deterministic. Ibn Taymiyya’ s own view on man’ s
free will approached that of the Mu¨tazilites and showed remarkable open-mindedness
in actually declaring that in this question the Mu¨tazilites, such as AbuÅ al-H ½ usayn
al-Bas½ rõÅ (d. 436/1044), promoted the Sunnite opinion (qawl ahl al-sunna).3
Ibn Taymiyya’ s pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) was also interested in the
problem of predestination and free will and devoted the book ShifaÅ ’ al-¨alõÅ l fõÅ masaÅ’ il
al-qad½ aÅ’ wa-al-qadar wa-al-h½ ikma wa-al-taŨlõÅ l to the issue.4 Like all traditionalists, Ibn
Qayyim based his views on the Qur’ aÅn and Sunna and was of the view that all correct
opinions had to be in agreement with these two sources. He disapproved of the tendency
of some theologians to ignore or refute H ½ adõÅ ths that were not compatible with the views
of their school of thought (ShifaÅ’ , 25). In his opinion a H ½ adõÅ th that was considered
authentic had to be accepted as a guidance and the theologian should correct his views
so that they would be in agreement with the H ½ adõÅ th. However, Ibn Qayyim did not reject
outright the teachings of the various speculative schools, but was, like his master Ibn
Taymiyya, willing to study the opinions they produced. According to Ibn Qayyim, the
speculative theologians were often wrong but some of their opinions were correct and
these could be accepted. He characterized the SunnõÅ community as the one that does
not follow one school or another, but instead picks and chooses from the teachings of
various schools those that are in accordance with the Qur’ aÅn and Sunna and rejects those
that are in con¯ ict with the sources. It is therefore necessary that a Muslim does not
reject outright any opinions but makes an effort to study the writings of the various
schools (ShifaÅ’ , 94ff.).
The variety in H ½ anbalite opinion on predestination re¯ ects the scholars’ attempt to
formulate doctrines or views that could be acceptable for all Muslims and not only for
the members of a particular school. The simple ® deism of early H ½ anbalism was not
attractive enough in the later periods when rationalist thinking had permeated all areas
of theological discussion. AbuÅ Ya¨laÅ tried to add a speculative dimension to H ½ anbalite
theology by accepting Ash¨arite doctrines, not only regarding predestination but also to
some extent regarding causality (AbuÅ Ya¨laÅ 1974, 169ff.). Ibn Taymiyya was also willing
to use rational arguments and accepted even Mu¨tazilite doctrines if they were not in
con¯ ict with the revelation. Ibn Qayyim described the SunnõÅ doctrine as a kind of
authorized selection of the views presented by various schools and this de® nition
illustrates the H ½ anbalite effort to create doctrines for the whole SunnõÅ community.

The Audience of Shifā’

Ibn Qayyim is known as the popularizer of Ibn Taymiyya’ s ideas and his views do
not differ from those of his teacher. It is mainly in style that one ® nds the difference
 Man Chooses his Destiny 63

between the two scholars. Ibn Taymiyya wrote very sparse prose and expressed his
doctrinal views with a minimum of elaboration. In contrast, Ibn Qayyim’ s prose is more
didactic and he makes an effort to make his arguments understandable by illustrating
them with examples and approaching them from different angles. His style approaches
that of sermons, when he addresses the audience directly by using expressions such as
`consider this’ (ta’ammal haÅdhaÅ) or by the vocative `you people’ (ayyuhaÅ al-naÅs) or `you
who ponder’ (ayyuhaÅ al-muta’ ammil). His style makes his texts suitable to be read
aloud, a quality that was indispensable for an author who wanted to spread his ideas in
a society where only very few could afford to own books and many could not even read.
Ibn Qayyim did not come with signi® cant doctrinal developments or revolutionary new
ideas, but his role was important in making his teacher’ s views accessible to a wider
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audience.
Ibn Qayyim’ s production indicates that he was interested in educating the common
people. One of his works, ZaÅd al-ma¨aÅd fõÅ hady khayr al-¨ibaÅd Muh½ ammad, deals with
many issues pertaining to Islamic law and gives guidelines to correct conduct. It is a
kind of popular law book or book on ethics clearly written to guide Muslims towards
an Islamic way of life.5 Due to its more scholarly subject-matter, the book ShifaÅ’ offers
less practical advice than ZaÅd al-ma¨aÅd, but it has a similar purposeÐ to guide people
to the right path; in this case, to the correct views on predestination and free will. In
the preface of the book Ibn Qayyim explains that he wrote the book in order to counter
all the false views on predestination and to explain the proper SunnõÅ views. According
to him it is imperative (d½ aruÅrõÅ ) that Muslims know the correct views on the subject
(ShifaÅ ’, 7). This statement may be an indication that he wrote ShifaÅ ’ for a broad
audience of Muslims, not speci® cally for scholars or exclusively for followers of the
H½ anbalite school.
However, it is dif® cult to determine how broad the audience of ShifaÅ ’ actually was.
Ibn Qayyim’ s argumentation is for the most part very clear and often illustrated by
examples, but occasionally he expects the reader to know a certain amount about
opinions expressed in theological discussions. It is dif® cult to imagine that an audience
with a limited knowledge of the ® ner theological points would be able to comprehend
the text when read aloud in a mosque or madrasa. On the other hand, we know that one
of Ibn Qayyim’ s contemporaries,TaÅj al-DõÅ n al-SubkõÅ , recommended al-GhazaÅlõÅ ’ s Ih½ yaÅ’
¨uluÅm al-dõÅ nÐ a book that is neither very simple nor straightforwardÐ as suitable to be
read aloud to educate the non-scholarly Muslims (al-SubkõÅ 1908, 162ff.). We also
know that in the Mamluk period mosques and madrasas employed scholars (shaykh
al-mi¨aÅd) to comment on and explain the texts that were read. This type of session,
consisting of both text reading and commentary, was often held immediately after noon
prayer in order to attract as large an audience as possible.6 Interest in theological issues
was not limited to scholars and therefore it is possible that Ibn Qayyim intended that
his ShifaÅ’ should be used as a textbook in this kind of public teaching session.

The Basis of Predestination

Belief in predestination is, according to Ibn Qayyim, based on four articles of faith.
These are: (1) God knows a thing before it exists; (2) God has foreordained it before
it exists; (3) God has willed it before it exists; and (4) God has created it (ShifaÅ ’, 55).
Ibn Qayyim considered belief in these articles a prerequisite for belief in predestination
and he found each of them presented in the Qur’ aÅn. For example, the ® rst articleÐ God
knows a thing before it existsÐ is, according to Ibn Qayyim, mentioned in the verse:
 64 Irmeli Perho

And when thy Lord said to the angels, `I am setting in the earth a viceroy,’
they said, `What, wilt Thou set therein one who will do corruption there, and
shed blood, while We proclaim Thy praise and call Thee Holy?’ He said,
`Assuredly I know that you know not.’ (Q. 2:30)

As a clari® cation Ibn Qayyim quoted Qur’ aÅn commentators who stated that God knew
that IblõÅ s would not bow down to Adam, but also knew that His creation would include
prophets and pious people and all those who would live in Paradise (ShifaÅ’ , 55). In
addition, Ibn Qayyim also presented H ½ adõÅ ths that showed that all the four articles had
a solid foundation not only in the Qur’ aÅn but also in the Sunna.
When a Muslim accepts these four articles of faith, he believes in predestination. This
belief should then lead him to the correct SunnõÅ view that acknowledges God’ s
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omnipotence over every being and every act that exists. A SunnõÅ also accepts that man
acts according to what God has predestined him to do and cannot act against God’ s
will, but in spite of this man is a true actor, responsible for his deeds. Man exercises his
choice (ikhtiyaÅr) and will (iraÅda), and then carries out (fa¨ala) his actions. He is not
forced by God to do anything. This is, according to Ibn Qayyim, the SunnõÅ view on
predestination representing a compromise between determinism and support for free
will. It is al-madhhab al-wasat½, a middle road that is the straight path (al-siraŽt
al-mustaqõÅ m) mentioned in al-FaÅtih½ a (ShifaÅ’ , 95ff.).
In Ibn Qayyim’ s view all the various schools, ranging from the Mu¨tazilites to the
Ash¨arites, had understood something of the correct belief and misunderstood some-
thing. The determinists had understood that God was omnipotent, but they had erred
in not accepting man as a true agent. The supporters of free will were correct in
claiming that man was responsible for his acts and that his deeds were founded on his
own will, choice and power, but they had not understood that it really was God who
made men agents (ja¨alahum faŨilõÅ n). The true SunnõÅ belief is none of these extremes,
but a combination of the correct views of both determinists and supporters of free will
(ShifaÅ ’, 94).
What Ibn Qayyim intended to do was to show that it was possible to believe in an
omnipotent God who had predestined man’ s acts and still consider that man was, in
spite of all this, the true actor (fa$ ¨il) and originator (muh½ dith) of his acts. He wanted to
reconcile the apparent contradiction in the Qur’ aÅn, where God is characterized as
omnipotent but at the same time man is referred to as an actor. According to Ibn
Qayyim the problem was not solved by considering some verses as metaphors. If the
Qur’ aÅn was understood correctly, there would be no contradiction and no need for
metaphorical interpretation. Similarly, the contradictions in the H ½ adõÅ ths were also only
apparent. A SunnõÅ should accept both the H ½ adõÅ ths that af® rmed God’ s omnipotence
and those that stressed man’ s own responsibility for his own actions. None of the
H½ adõÅ ths should be rejected in favour of a doctrine, but instead the doctrine had to be
formulated so that it could accept both of these views.

Who is the Doer of Deeds?

In order to justify and prove the correctness of his `middle road’ , Ibn Qayyim took up
and discussed some basic questions that arise from the dilemma of seeing God as
Creator of all deeds and at the same time man as an independent actor. According to
Ibn Qayyim God has created in man a drive (daÅ ¨õÅ ) to act and this is the cause (sabab)
of his action. Man is considered the agent, because his act is based on his power
 Man Chooses his Destiny 65

(qudra), will (mashõÅ ’ a) and choice (ikhtiyaÅr). This does not mean that man acts
independently, as the advocates of free will claim, because man’ s act is only partly
caused by his own drive. For the act to become real, God has to provide the other
necessary causes.
Ibn Qayyim illustrated this by describing some of the causes needed for man’ s act of
lifting his eyes and looking at an object. Man could not look at a thing if God had not
created that object and made it such that it could be looked at. God has also created
the organ that man uses for looking and He has made it capable of the act and has not
placed any obstacles between the organ’ s ability and the act. According to Ibn Qayyim,
the causes that are not within man’ s sphere of in¯ uence are much more numerous than
those of which he is the master (ShifaÅ ’, 244ff.).
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Man’ s act is not an independent or pure act (® ¨l mah½ d½ ), but it is an act that is
in¯ uenced (infa¨ala) by God. This is illustrated in the Qur’ aÅn: `It is He who conveys on
the land and the sea’ (Q. 10:22) and `Say, ª Journey in the landº ’ (Q. 6:11). These
verses show that God is the one who makes man go, but it is man who does the going.
Similarly, God makes man laugh, but man does the laughing. God leads astray and
makes man die, but it is man who goes astray and dies (ShifaÅ’ , 230ff.). God knows
man’ s deeds and His power (qudra) and His general will (mashõÅ ’atuhu al-¨aÅmma) are
present in them. He has created man’ s deeds, because He is the Creator of everything
(ShifaÅ ’, 244, 259).
By talking about God’ s general will, Ibn Qayyim indicated that God may have a
general in¯ uence but does not actively participate in man’ s every deed. Even though
God creates in man the incentive to act, He can only be connected with the act in
general terms (bi-t½arõÅ q al-¨umuÅm) as the Creator of everything that exists. Ibn Qayyim
compared God’ s general will concerning man’ s acts to His general will to make water
¯ uid. It is not necessary for God to make each drop of water ¯ uid, but His general will
is suf® cient. Similarly, He has given the soul a general ability to will to do something
but He does not have to create every act of willing (ShifaÅ ’, 299ff.). By giving man his
particular quality or characteristic (s½ifa), God made him able to express his own will
and to be the originator (muh½ dith) of his own deeds (ShifaÅ ’, 233ff.).
Ibn Qayyim was ® rmly of the opinion that God is behind every act of man, but there
are several intermediary causes between man’ s act and God’ s effective will (mashõÅ ’a
naÅ® dha) and creative command (amr kawnõÅ ). The chain of intermediary causes makes
it, in Ibn Qayyim’ s view, absurd to claim that God forces man to do an individual act,
e.g. to climb steps. God is only the creator of this act in the general sense that `there
is no power and no strength save in God’ (ShifaÅ ’, 246).
The idea of God as a distant creator of man’ s acts is also present in the text of
Al-¨aqõÅ da al-niz½ aÅmiyya, written by AbuÅ al-Ma¨aÅlõÅ al-JuwaynõÅ (d. 478/1085), which Ibn
Qayyim quoted at length. He considered that in the issue of free will and predestina-
tion, al-JuwaynõÅ represented `the middle road’ in spite of the fact that the Ash¨arites
blamed him for having adopted Mu¨tazilite views (ShifaÅ ’, 215). Al-JuwaynõÅ was an
Ash¨arite scholar who ® rst accepted the doctrine that it was God who created man’ s
action and its effect whereas man only acquired the deed. In Al-¨aqõÅ da al-niz½ aÅmiyya,
which he wrote late in his life, al-JuwaynõÅ renounced the Ash¨arite theory of acquisition,
which he saw leading towards a determinism that does not leave man any choice in his
actions. In al-JuwaynõÅ ’ s opinion, man should not be reduced to a mere acquirer of his
deeds but should instead be considered as the true doer of his deeds. God has created
in man a power (qudra) to will his own acts and God allows him to use this power.
Al-JuwaynõÅ illustrated his point by likening the relationship between God and man to
 66 Irmeli Perho

that of master and slave: a slave cannot freely use his master’ s funds, and his
independent transactions are not legally valid, but if his master permits him to make a
purchase, the transaction is valid. This purchase is considered to be the act of the
master, because he permitted it to take place (ShifaÅ’ , 210). 7
God has given man the ability to act, but because man cannot act independently the
ability alone is not enough to make the act real. To perform an act man uses his ability,
but the act becomes real only if God wills it to happen. For example, God has created
in man the ability to perform his daily prayers, but this ability is not enough to make
him pray. What is needed is that God allows him to use his ability and perform the
prayers. If God does not want the individual to pray, he cannot do so, but, according
to Ibn Qayyim, this does not mean that the individual was not originally predestined
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(maqduÅr) to pray. Therefore, the act of not praying constitutes a sin that can be
punished (ShifaÅ ’, 276ff.).
Only those acts that God wills come into existence and those that he does not will
are prevented from existing. This could mean that God actively takes part in every
action, either allowing man to use his inherent capacity to act or preventing it. As
mentioned above, Ibn Qayyim also claimed that God did not necessarily create man’ s
every act and that God could only be seen as the creator of man’ s acts in a general sense
of being the Creator of everything. Therefore his view of the necessity of God’ s active
permission for man to use his capacity could also be interpreted in a general manner,
i.e. it is not necessary for God actively to participate in each action, but it is suf® cient
that He uses his overall will. This interpretation is supported by Ibn Qayyim’ s expla-
nation of how God guides a person or leads him astray. Guidance means that God
directs (s½ arafa) a person’ s incentives and his will towards salvation. This indicates that
God is not necessarily active in man’ s every action but only points the right way. When
God wants to lead a person astray, God withdraws from him and leaves him alone to
act as it is natural for him. God allows the individual soul to make its choices without
interfering (khalaÅ baynahaÅ wa-bayna maÅ takhtaÅruhu) (ShifaÅ’ , 299ff.).

The First Sin and God’s Punishment

As Creator of everything, God also created sins, but it is man who acts them out and
becomes a sinner. These sins are predestined, but God does not force an individual to
do them; He has only made him able (makkana) to sin (ShifaÅ ’, 233) and man then
chooses to sin (ShifaÅ ’, 152, 154). By giving man reason, God has made man able to
understand the importance of his deeds and learn from the prophets what God
considers to be right and wrong (ShifaÅ ’, 216). Sin is based on ignorance (jahl) of what
is bene® cial to man and what destroys him. People who commit sins are unable to
receive guidance and they reject the teachings of the prophets. God has placed a seal
on the sinners’ hearts and that keeps them in continuous ignorance.
The seal of the heart is mentioned in the Qur’ aÅn: `As for the unbelievers, alike it is
to them whether thou hast warned them or hast not warned them, they do not believe.
God has set a seal on their hearts and on their hearing and on their eyes is a covering’
(Q. 2:6± 7); and `for their saying, ª Our hearts are uncircumcisedº Ð nay, but God sealed
them for their unbelief’ (Q. 4:155). The placing of the seal on a person’ s heart is God’ s
punishment for his very ® rst refusal to believe in God. An unbeliever has an original
lack of belief and that was not created by God, because God has only created everything
that exists and a lack is something that does not exist (ShifaÅ ’, 230). Here Ibn Qayyim
 Man Chooses his Destiny 67

adopts the philosophers’ idea that non-existence does not have an agent (Wolfson
1976) and therefore God did not create the ® rst unbelief.
God has created in everyone a power (qudra) to believe, but that power does not force
an individual to belief (ShifaÅ ’, 180). God calls everyone to belief, but some refuse and
they are left with their original deprivation without God’ s guidance. This ® rst disbelief
is man’ s own choice, but after this choice God then places a seal on man’ s heart and
prevents him from receiving guidance (ShifaÅ’, 159, 292). His further sins result from his
ignorance of what is good, and God punishes him by allowing him to become guilty of
more and more sins, but he is satis® ed and does not seek guidance (ShifaÅ ’, 159, 170,
456).
The sinner’ s satisfaction is, in Ibn Qayyim’ s opinion, a proof that God does not force
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anyone to sin, because the idea of force implies that the sinner would sin against his will
and hate his sins (ShifaÅ’, 241). Similarly, the fact that man’ s sins are predestined does
not mean that man is forced to sin, because God creates in him the will to sin (ShifaÅ ’,
256). The sinner chooses ® rst to reject God’ s guidance and is happy with the choice.
His sins con® rm the choice and keep him away from God. By allowing him to sin God
gives the sinner what he wants and what satis® es him (ShifaÅ’ , 170).
The ® rst rejection is man’ s choice, but he is able to choose unbelief only because God
allows him to do so. In his omnipotence God can prevent an individual from making
that choice if He wants to, and if God wills a man to believe he cannot resist. Even
though the ® rst unbelief is a non-existence and should as such be outside God’ s realm,
Ibn Qayyim subjected it to God by stressing that God could choose to create belief in
man’ s heart and that belief would then become existent (wujuÅd) and unbelief would
become impossible. This creation of belief was, according to Ibn Qayyim, mentioned
in the verse of the Qur’ aÅn, `And if thy Lord had willed, whoever is in the earth would
have believed, all of them, all together’ (Q. 10:99) (ShifaÅ ’, 156, 169, 292).
Ibn Qayyim stated that God creates will (iraÅda), and power (qudra) to act, but He
only gives guidance and belief to those who are suited to receive them. This is God’ s
justice (¨adl), which, according to Ibn Qayyim, means putting things in their correct
places (wad½ ¨ al-ashyaÅ’ fõÅ mawaÅd½ i¨ihaÅ). Correspondingly, injustice means putting some-
thing where it does not belong. Some people have no aptitude (qubuÅl) for belief and
therefore God acts justly and does not give it to them, because by giving it to them He
would be forcing them into something that is not natural to them and to believe by
force is not true belief (la yusammaÅ Åõ maÅnan) (ShifaÅ’, 156, 275, 456).
Why then is a person un® t to believe? According to Ibn Qayyim, God has created
some people like that and if He had wanted He would have created them differently,
but as He has created darkness and light, angels and devils, He has also created people
who are able to believe and others who are not able to believe. This should not be
questioned but accepted as an expression of divine wisdom that man cannot grasp
(ShifaÅ ’, 170).
Even though no one should question why certain individuals are created to choose
unbelief, the reasons for the existence of unbelief as a phenomenon are to Ibn Qayyim
obvious enough. If there was no unbelief and all were believers, no one would
appreciate the mercy that God has shown to man in giving him faith. Unbelief sets true
faith in relief and its existence allows the believers to serve God by turning away from
it and ® ghting against it (ShifaÅ’ , 371).
However, the seal placed on man’ s heart is not always an indication of incurable
unbelief, but can also be seen as a trial (balaÅ’) where God is testing a believer. If the
believer turns to God and asks for His guidance and shows that he does not want to be
 68 Irmeli Perho

lost, God will open the lock in his heart and give him His guidance. But if man is
content in being lost and does not turn to God, he remains unguided. According to Ibn
Qayyim, it is man himself who closes the door to salvation and chooses damnation,
because he refuses to use the means that God has given him to gain guidance, namely,
prayer and repentance (tawba) (ShifaÅ ’, 158ff.).

Is There a Real Choice?

In his discussion Ibn Qayyim often used the words `choice’ or `to choose’ : man chooses
to sin or he chooses to obey God’ s laws. It is he who chooses not to believe and not to
ask for guidance. But at the same time Ibn Qayyim stressed that it is the omnipotent
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God who allows man to act or prevents him from acting. God’ s choice is dependent on
his knowledge of man’ s true will. If man really wants to do an act, God will allow him
to use his capacity to act. If God prevents man from acting, it indicates that man did
not actually want to act. For example, man may be capable of performing a certain act,
but out of laziness he really does not want to do it and therefore God prevents him from
doing it. In Ibn Qayyim’ s opinion God’ s knowledge of man’ s lack of will does not force
him not to act, but by preventing him from acting God only reveals man’ s true choice
or preference (al-¨ilm kaÅshif laÅ mujõÅ b) (ShifaÅ’, 277).
What God is revealing is something He has created, because He has created all man’ s
characteristics, including the laziness mentioned in Ibn Qayyim’ s example. By prevent-
ing a lazy person from performing an act, e.g. a prayer, God is revealing to the person
himself and to his surroundings his will not to pray. In this way man’ s own acts or his
omissions to act reveal what God has created in him and for him. He may then either
feel remorse or not feel it, but the choice is ultimately made by God because He can
either allow him to feel remorse or prevent him from doing so. Man may have the
capacity to act and volition either to act or not to act, but his act does not exist if God
does not will it to exist (ShifaÅ’, 298).
Ibn Qayyim did not claim that man has a completely free will, but stated that all
man’ s actions depend on God. Regardless of this, man is, in Ibn Qayyim’ s opinion,
responsible for his acts, because he chooses them by either willing to act or willing not
to act. It did not matter to him that it is God who actually chooses and that the choice
only re¯ ects the characteristics that God has given to man. According to Ibn Qayyim
man chooses unbelief because his soul is un® t to receive guidance, but it is God who
has given his soul that characteristic.
The logical conclusion of Ibn Qayyim’ s exposition is a determinism where man does
not have a real choice. However, Ibn Qayyim did not want to draw this conclusion,
because in his opinion determinism led to disregard of God’ s laws and made the
sending of the prophets a pointless act. He admitted that God, as the Creator, is the
® nal cause of everything that happens, but he warned against exaggerating the import-
ance of this idea. The fact that an act depends on God, and therefore cannot be
avoided, does not mean that God forces man to act, as the determinists maintain.
Neither does the fact that man is the true originator of his acts make him fully
independent, as the supporters of free will claim. Both extreme determinism and
absolute support for free will are exaggerations (ghuluÅw) and should be rejected as such
(ShifaÅ ’, 243, 246).
What Ibn Qayyim meant was that even though God has both created man and his
actions and determined his destiny, he should not in his daily life exaggerate the
importance of predestination. He should consider himself as the originator of his own
 Man Chooses his Destiny 69

acts and feel himself responsible, but he should at the same time accept God’ s
omnipotence. It was important for Ibn Qayyim to reject determinism, because if man
is only an actor in a metaphorical sense, he cannot be held responsible for his actions.
In his opinion the determinists denied the believer the possibility to love God or even
really to believe in God and thus they were rejecting religion (ShifaÅ’, 239). In order to
be able to serve God and believe in Him, man has to be a true actor. Ibn Qayyim
approached the views of the supporters of free will, but he did not fully accept them,
because they refused to believe in the omnipotence of God, thus diminishing His
sovereignty.
Further, the supporters of free will attached excessive importance to man’ s actions by
claiming that man could earn his salvation by his deeds. In Ibn Qayyim’ s opinion they
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saw God’ s grace as something that could be earned. Salvation was in their view the just
compensation for man’ s acts of obedience, something that God owed man. Ibn Qayyim
quoted the Prophet’ s words that no one entered Paradise by acts alone and stressed that
man’ s acts can never outweigh God’ s grace. He illustrated this by a story of a man who
had served God for 500 years and on the Day of Judgement God said that by His
mercy, he would enter Paradise, but the man replied: `No, by my deeds.’ He was sent
to Hell, where he remained until he understood that it was God who by his grace had
allowed and enabled him to serve for 500 years and therefore that salvation could not
be considered compensation but a further grace (ShifaÅ ’, 105, 196).
Even though man cannot earn a place in Paradise, his deeds are important, because
by allowing them to become reality God reveals man’ s true will behind them. Man’ s
acts of obedience are God’ s grace that shows him to be on the right path. His sins are
indications of being lost and if he is able to feel true remorse, he can rest assured that
God accepts his remorse, because it was He who created it. This view is re¯ ected in the
Prophet’ s prayer: `Lord, make me grateful to you’ (rabb, ij¨ilnõÅ laka shaÅkiran). According
to Ibn Qayyim, this kind of prayer would be meaningless to one who believed in free
will (ShifaÅ ’, 192).
Ibn Qayyim’ s middle road balances between the extremes and it offers a practical
approach. This, I think, was his main goal and not so much a desire to provide a
logically ¯ awless theory. Rather, he wanted to show people how they should live their
predestined lives without succumbing to determinism. A believer knows that his fate is
determined by God, but he does not know what that fate will be and therefore he has
to act as if there were no predestination. He cannot neglect acts of obedience, because
if he shirked his religious duties, he would prove to himself and others that God has,
indeed, destined him for damnation. He has to follow the teachings of the prophets and
use his God-given reason to live according to God’ s laws, because if he is able to
perform acts of obedience, he knows that there is a chance that God has created him
for salvation. Even though he knows that God is the ultimate source of all his acts, he
is forced to act as if he were a free agent and he is forced to choose. In this sense he
actually has a choice and by his acts he chooses his destiny.

NOTES
1. According to Abrahamov (1998), this H ½ adõÅ th is quoted by AbuÅ al-QaÅsim al-LalakaÅ’ Å õ (d. 418/1027)
in Sharh½ us½uÅl i¨tiqaÅd ahl al-sunna wa-al-jamaŨa min al-kitaÅb wa-al-sunna wa-ijmaŨ al-s½ah½ aÅbaÅ wal-taÅbi¨õÅ n
min ba¨dihim. According to van Ess (1975), the H ½ adõÅ th is quoted by AbuÅ Nu¨aym al-IsfahaÅnõÅ (d.
430/1038) in H ½ ilyat al-awliyaÅ’. Van Ess (1975) describes the H ½ adõÅ th as apocryphal.
2. Abrahamov (1998). For the doctrine of bi-laÅ kayfa, see Abrahamov (1995).
3. The views of Ah½ mad ibn H ½ anbal, Ibn Bat½t½a, AbuÅ Ya¨laÅ ibn al-FarraÅ’ and Ibn Taymiyya are
 70 Irmeli Perho

presented in Gimaret (1977). Ibn Taymiyya’s views on predestination have also been discussed in
Meier (1981).
4. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1987). According to the editor’ s note (ShifaÅ’ , 509ff.), this edition is based
on a manuscript in DaÅr al-Kutub in Cairo and an older edition of the text published by al-Mat½ba¨a
½ usayniyya in 1323 AH . One of the chapters is missing from the manuscript and also from the
al-H
printed edition.
5. For an analysis of the medical H ½ adõÅ ths in ZaÅd al-ma¨aÅd and discussed their ideological importance
see Perho 1995.
6. About religious education of the various social classes, see Berkey (1992).
7. Ibn Qayyim did not name al-JuwaynõÅ , but only referred to him as the author of Al-niz½aÅmiyya. The
fact that Ibn Taymiyya is also known to have approved of al-JuwaynõÅ (Gimaret 1977) con® rms the
identi® cation of the author. About the change in al-JuwaynõÅ ’ s views on kasb, see Gimaret (1977).
My description of al-JuwaynõÅ ’s view is based on Ibn Qayyim’ s quotation in ShifaÅ’ , 210± 5.
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