TSONG-KHA-PA ON KU: Paul M. Williams -RDZOB BDEN-PA The doctrine of the Buddhas according to Nagarjuna rests on two levels of truth - the everyday conventional truth and the ultimate truth.! Without re- course to the former the latter cannot be reached; without distinguishing, bet- ween these two levels one cannot really understand the Buddha's teaching. There seems to be no reason to doubt that by the level of conventional truth (samvrtisatya/kun-rdzob bden-pa) Nagarjuna meant firstly that everyday world as it is presented to our senses in ordinary cognition,and secondly the interpret- ive or analytic world into which the Abhidharma had analysed sensory experience. Commentators up to at least the time of Candrakirti seem to find little problem here ~ Prasahgikas, Svatantrikas and modern commentators alike are united in referring to conventional truth as, in the words of T-R.V. Murti, ‘depending... on what is usually accepted by the common folk ... the truth that does not do any violence to what obtains in our everyday world, being in close conformity with linguistic conventions and ideas ... the object of the ignorant and the imature.'3 Bhavaviveka gives such examples as 'Dharmas arise, are stable and cease’, and also ordinary statements such as 'Devadatta goes’. Candrakirti referg to the vhole range of cognition and its objects, language and its refer- ents.” Asked for an example of an entity which gains its status from kun- zdzok bden-pa the most common case cited by Tibetan comentators is that of a pot.° For Madhyamaka religiosity within the framework of its systematic anti- ontology the importance was to emphasise the everyday world as a ground upon which religious activity leading to the cognition of the ultimate could accur ‘According to the Svatantrika Jf’nagarbha in his SatyadvayavibhahgakArika conventional truth equals the object as it appears (ji-Itar snang-ba), in con~ trast to the object as it is understood through critical reasoning (rigs-pa), which is the ultimate truth.” In his Paffjika subconmentary Santaraksita exz plains that a pot is true conventionally although it is not ultimately real. It is, the svavrtti asserts, held to be a real referent (dngos-po?i don) in conformity with perception ~ Santarakgita observes that for both learned and fools a pot is veridjcal conventional truth in conformity with their intellect val awareness of it.” For everyday truth appearance equals existence, non~ appearance the reverse. Tt has, of course, been a common position among philosophers the world over that no matter how doubtful I may be about the exact status of the cognitive referent yet nevertheless I cannot doubt that I am being presented to in a particular manner, that there is something - a blue patch, for example - which I am perceiving. Even for the Madhyamaka some status must be given to the object of everyday perception otherwise not only would it be impossible to deny that x has real, fundamental existence, but also religious activity would become quite impossible. In the case of the Svatantrika we find that, in spite of his being a ‘transcendental’ (Kant) Madhyamika, there is a radical realism as regards the veridical status of our cognitive referents. Cognition is directed to something, and that thing is true inasmuch as it is given, for an everyday, that is, non-ultimate, consciousness. Indeed it is just because it is an intentional referent that an entity is included under conventional truth - what does not appear as the object of an everyday intentional act must be either ultimate or a fictional like the hare's horn. As in the case of more recent realists such as Neinong and Brentano, the Svatantrikas faced a problem over the status of hallucinatory referents, or those entities which Brentano called ‘entia rationis’. In his svavytti to the Satyadvayavibhahga-326 WILLIAMS: kun-rdzob bden-pa Karika JWanagarbha takes note of an opponent who observes that if all is true as it appears so there cap be no distinction between a pot and the erroneous Perception of two moons." His reply is in effect to admit that inasmuch as i appears, an object comes under kun-rdzob bden-pa regardless of whether it is real or not. In this he is really following Bhavaviveka who, in his Madhvanirthasapgraha, divided conventional bden-pa into true and false bden-pa, @ Position which makes the usual translation of ‘satya’ and 'bden-pa’ by Teruth/ problematic since it is hard to see how there can be false conventional truth.1?" It is clear that in their treatment of bden-pa the Svatantrthes or least were concerned to apply the term to anything which can be given as the object of a conscious act ~ bden-pa is borne by the intentional referent qua q referent and not by a proposition as truth is in contemporary Western philosoph}? But there is a phenomenological distinction between having an hallucination and an everyday veridical perception, and Jfignagarbha notes this fact in an attempt to escape from the position he has created for himself. Briefly the distinction between hallucination and truth is made in the vorid, where it is not maintained that pot and two moons have the same status.1* guch will, of course, scarcely help since it is incumbent upon him not to state the fact but to explain how this can be the case on his premises. Following once more Bhavaviveka, JWanagarbha notes that an object is true according to the world, according to fools, if it has pragmatic function.> That is, in the world truth has nothing to do with epistemological status, we cannot deny that we are perceiving something when we are perceiving it, even if it later fails to co here and thereby turns out to be hallucinatory, The Svatantrika position is based on the fact that if we are faced by something which we think nay be an hallucination there are certain ways of testing and reaching a conclusion. Macbeth, as is well known, suffered from hallucinations. Was the dagger he saw before his eyes a particular sort of dagger - an hallucinatory one - a partic- ular sort of hallucination - a dagger-shaped one - or a totally non-existent entity? For the Svatantrika it was the first. Macbeth's dagger was an hallucination because he could not grasp it, he could not cut with It and so on. But he had no reason to doubt that it was a dagger which he saw before his eyes, and ~ herein lies the strong form of the Svatantrika clain- it vas a dagger which is as it appears and not otherwise. Tsong-kha-pa, in his Rigs-pa?i rgua-mtsho commentary on Nagérjuna's Nadhyamakakarik@ 24:8 quotes from verse 12 of JWSnagarbha's Satyadvayavibhanga- karik in which JWnagarbha establishes true and false convention on a prag- matic basis and comments, 'For this school one who is possessed of nescience (cognises) all which appears as established with its own characteristic (svalakgapasidaha, equals svabhavasiddha). Because that cognition is accepted as it appears when admixed with nescience so there is no distinction dravn bet~ ween correct and incorrect conventional referents.'l6 The object has status as it appears, and it appears as bearing an essential nature, as being, at least for the world, what it is, For the Svatantrika the distinction of veridical and non-veridical is not dependent upon the object cognised but upon what can be done with it. As regards the epistemological situation no distinction can be drawn, It is clear that for Tsong-kha-pa the opposition to this position must necessarily centre on the conception of a conventional entity existing as it appears (ji-itar snang-ba); by ‘as it appears" he is particularly concerned with the category of svabhavasiddha, established with a self-essence. In his little work, the rfsa-she’i dka’-gnas brgyad Tsong-kha-pa observes that the Svatantrikas are precisely those vho maintain that while they do not exist ultimately, nevertheless svabhavas (rang-bzhin)are granted conventionally: The two Prasaigika teachers Buddhapalita and Candrakirti deny that the svabhaveWILLIAMS: kun-rdzod bdenpa 327 is established even conventionally.!7 The question arises as to whether Teong- ha-pa views the entity which appears to everyday cognition as appearing to have a self-essence inasmuch as it so appears. In treating sense-perception in his Lam-rim chen-mo he quotes from Candrakirti on Catubéataka 13:301 that an entity which is established in one manner appears as if established in another. Elaborating elsewhere he states, ‘Those five sense-objects, form, sound and so on, being not proved as having their own characteristics, vet nevertheless appear to sensory cognitions as (proved) with their own characteristics.'!9 Since they are not actually 0, he comments, we should perceive the objects which are given in a sensory cognition as illusions. Moreover even things which the world has accepted for ages, if they are considered by those who are Possessed of nescienge to have a self-essence, then these things do not exist even conventionally.°0 Again, ‘things as they are apprehended by nescience do not exist even conventionally, because nescience superimposes on entities a self-essence which is established with its own form, and such a self-essence does not exist even in everyday conmerce.'21 this nescience is that which apprehends self-essencés, it is the nescience of those who are possessed of defilement, those who do not see all as contingent and illusory, those who are neither arhats, pratyekabuddhas nor bodhisattvas above the seventh Dhimi. In his dBu-ma dgongs-pa rab-gsal commentary on Madhyamakavatara 6:25 Tsong- kha-pa states that ‘as a reflection and so on do not exist as objects accord- ing to the way they appear so also blue and so on which appear as proved with their own characteristic for those who are ignorant do not exist as objects according to the way they appear.'?3 The sense-datum theorist who wishes to reach some sort of Cartesian certainty about the immediate datum of sensory experience must be wary of failing to make the distinction between what appears and how it appears. Tsong-kha-pa is not denying here that blue is given and has a status in everyday perception, but what he is denying is that it exists the way it is given. To deny that an entity has a svabhava is to indicate not what is seen but the way to take what is seen. For Tsong-kha-pa the referent as it actually is conventionally is part of a network of relationships, where the entity, like a phoneme, gains its status solely in terms of a systen of structural oppositions. Nothing is complete in itself and it is this very incompleteness which points beyond any one given seen conventionally as it is ~ both to the other entities which "horizontally' make up the conventional realm and also to the completeness which is the ultimate truth. It is clear, I think, that what is given in everyday perception is given for Tsong-kha-pa as having this com-leteness, as being an in-itself, possessed of self-essence, and this he denies even conventionally. Rgyal-tshab in his Spyod-? jug ran-bshad on Sodhicaryavatara 9:2 notes that the difference between the Midhyamaka and the realists, including the Svatantrikas, as regards the everyday world is that while both sides apprehend and give a status to the world of sensory experience, the realists see, it as really established and not as empty and illusory,as does the Madhyamaka.24 The point is that everyday perception, the objects of our everyday world, that which, in Murti's words, ‘is usually accepted by the common folk", those who are "ignorant and immature", is not kun-rdzob bden-pa as far as Tsong-kha-pa is concerned. Conventional truth must be taken as equalling not truth according to the world or the con~ ventional realm but rather truth of or in the world. Certainly the Lam-rim chen-mo makes it clear that widely held contentions such as the belief in re~ lative permanence, in a Self and Hine and so on are not true even convention- ally, and these very beliefs are those which form the foundations of the every- day perception of a prthagjana.2 In fact as one might expect given the role of conventional truth for the Madhyamaka it is precisely the world understood328 WILLIAMS: kur-rdzob bden-pa in accordance with articulated Buddhist religious teaching which is conventional truth. It is the world as unsatisfactory, impermanent and not-Sel The Prasatgika locus classicus for discussions of the exact status of everyday apprehension vis-a-vis conventional truth and the apprehension of the Aryas is Candrakirei's Madhyamakavatarabhagya on 6:28. In his Rigs-pa’i rgya~ mtsho Tsong-kha-pa quotes from this commentary, ‘Conventional truth is the stream of existence (constituted) by virtue of the nescience possessed of de- filement. The Sravakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas who have abandoned Rescience possessed of defilement and who apprehend sapskaras as existing after the manner of reflections and so on do not maintain that what has the nature of contingency (bcos-ma) is true, since there is not for them any erroneous conception regarding truth. Those things which delude fools for those who are not fools are kun-rdzob-tsam (simply conventional, i.e, not true), because they are dependently-originated like illusions and so on.'26 One is reminded here of the Vijfanavaaa vijMaptimatra and particularly of the expression ‘sgyu-na- tsam' used to refer to appearance in Candrakirti's Madhvamakaprajavatara.? Note here that the category of nescience possessed of defilenent does not cover all of nescience. Jayananda in his Madhyamakavatarafika notes that there is nescience without defilement - this is obviously possessed by the two arhats and bodhisattvas above the seventh bhiimi who are not complete Buddhas? Tsong-kha~pa comments on this passage in his Rigs-pa’i rgya-mtsho that what is not being caught here is that those entities which are maintained as existent according to conventional truth are sinply maintained as existent by nescience, while for those who have abandoned the nescience possessed of de- filement they are not maintained as conventional truth.29 This is the mis~ taken view held by an opponent in the rfsa-she’i dka’-gnas brayad, and Tsong- kha-pa points out there that if such were the case the Aryas would not per~ ceive conventional truth and therefore they could not draw the distinction between the two truths.30 Here in the Rigs-pa’i raya-mtsho he notes firstly that the referent which is apprehended by nescience possessed of defilement does not exist even according to worldly comerce (tha-snyad), that is, it is not included under conventional truth, while conventional truth is, of course, Petvaded through and through with conventional status by definition. More— ever what is conventionally the case is not what appears to those with nes- cience possessed of defilement.3! We have already seen that what appears to these beings is an entity as bearing its own essential characteristics and essence, and Tsong-kha~pa does not_want to grant this even conventionally. Secondly from the position of the Aryas who have abandoned this defiled nes~ cience, since the convention of those_who crave for something to be truly established does not exist for these Aryas so samskaras are not maintained as true. Therefore the Aryas use the expression ‘kun-rdzob-tsam The word ‘tsam', Tsong-kha-pa explains, is used to overcome truth in the sense that a phenonggal entity is truly established, and not in order to deny conventional truth.?? The essential direction of eriticism is always towards the claim that what is given in everyday perception existe as it is given, that is, as it is presented to the ignorant, complete in itself, relatively permanent, to be desired or avoided. In the Rigs-pa’i rgya-mtshé Tsong-kha-pa continues by opposing all those - including of course the Svitantrikas - who maintain that entities exist in the everyday world as possessed of their own characteristics. Those who hold such a view are realists for the Prasangikas, they are wrong even conventionally because they do not perceive the everyday world under the aspect of illusion. The expression ‘kun-rdzob-tsam' is thus used to refer to the everyday world as it is apprehended by the everyday perception of those who bear defiledWILLIAMS: kumrdzob bdempa 329 ignorance. This world is precisely not that of conventional truth. In his MadhyanakGvataratika Jayananda notes that there are two sorts of kun-rdzob— tsam; ?jig-rten kun-rdzob tsam such as everyday illusions, and the kun-rdzob- team which is seen by the Aryas when they perceive appearance - that is, at chig jevel when they perceive appearance according to the mode in which it appears: Note here that the word bden~pa is kept strictly for some sort of truth, unlike the position which we saw in the case of the Svatantrikas. To this extent it is clear that the word takes on different meanings in the two Madhyamaka schools. The svabhava apprehended by fools, Jayananda notes, is just a case of kun-rdzob tsam. In the Rigs-pa’i rqya-mtsho Tsong-kha-pa quotes Candrakirti's comment on Hadhyamakavatara 6:28 that the ultimate (don-dag) of the prthagjane is the simply conventional (kun-rdzob-tsam) of the Aryas.°> For the prthagjana, he observes, a pot and so on are truly established, and this means that they have iltinate existence. This is the way of the world, the empirical approach, for which the,yorld of everyday sensual experience is final, self-established and complete.3© The pot, says Tsong-kha-pa, is truly established for them, it 1s hot a conventional object. But the pot which is ultimately established for them appears to the Aryas as like an illusion and is thus not ultimate but con- ventional. Dependent upon this sort of cognition since it is not truly main~ tained, it is simply conventional.2/ The pot can certainly not be ultimate for the Aryas, sineg,tt is not found when searched for in the Light of critica? analytic cognition. 8 It is clear that the claim here is not that conventional truth is the world as perceived by everyday cognition, but rather it is the Sensory world as understood correctly by the Aryas inasmuch as it is @ means to Ufberations Much earlier Tsong-kha-pa had commented that kun-rdzob gets its pane from the fact that it generates obscuration. Its meaning is based, how- ver, on gge of its aspects, for it 1s not true that all kun-rdzob brings about durkness.20, Tt is precisely this enlightening asnect of kun-rdzob which is ikun-rdzob bden-pa. Don-dam bden-pa for the prthagjana is the world of his everyday experience; for the Arya it is the unutterable ultimate truth. The Sethagjana's don-dam bden-pa is kun-rdzob-tsam for the Aryas, but the world of eueryday experience seen as illusory, not-Self, unsatisfactoriness and so on fs Just kun-rdzob bden-pa.. It is the world not of the prthagjana, not of the prthagjana ae seen by the arya, but of the Arya inasmuch as he hinself perceives the everyday world. For having eliminated defiled nescience he no longer sees the selfessence, but he sees only illusion. And it is at this level, the level where the Arya sees the everyday woy]d, that the analyses of the Madhyanaka as articulated occur and have meaning.“° When objects are seen as illusory, transitory and so on, that is, under the aspect of conventional truth, then they form the phenomenal residue to the pro- aerecSf angiysis, Entities are established in a manner other than they appear, fue they are established nevertheless. Even the Prdsangikas could not totally deny the given, and indeed to do so would be fatal to Buddhism for this would be to deny the basis for religious activity. When understood correctly the eenaval object is phenomenally certain, although it can of course be analysed away from an ultimate point of view. As certain,and in one sense primary, it se tor necessary to prove the sensual object. Tsong-kha~pa coments that it {a hoe necessary to prove intellectually a pot or cloth and so on as objects aecording to conventional truth since inasmuch as they appear without self- agcence, Like illusions,so they need not be proved - just as one does not need to prove an illusory object. 41 That is, there is no need to prove an ‘iigsory object once it is realised as iilusory. It is established not as originally given but as given £0 the amended cognition. In the dBu-ma-gongs- pa rab-gsal Tsong-kha~pa states that ‘even though blue and so on as proved330 WILLIAMS: kun-rdzob bdempa with their own characteristics, and a reflection as it is posited does not exist nevertheless in the same way as a reflection exists not according to the way it {8 posited so blue and so on even though without self-characteristics necessarily exist. '42 But of course even from this position entities while given are not really true,they have no ultimate standing. In terms of the three alternative analy- ses of Macbeth's dagger mentioned earlier, the Prasaigika adopts the second al- ternative phenomenally ~ the dagger is a particular sort of hallucination, a dagger-shaped hallucination ~ but ultimately it takes the third alternative; there is simply nothing there. Even the conventional realm when properly understood is not really conventional truth, since it is not really true. Truth is simply superimposed; in the Lam-rim chen-mo Tsong-kha-pa conments that inasmuch as this is the case we are still within the realm of nescience. For the two arhats and bodhisattvas above the seventh bhimi even vhat is really conventional truth is actually simply conventional (kun-rdzob tsam).°3 Tt i clear that there is no paradox here ~ the word 'tsam' has two different meanings. Firstly it is used here in opposition to ‘bden-pa' in the phrase kun-rdzob bden-pa' ~ an entity is simply conventional because {t is not conventional truth. Secondly 'tsam' is used in opposition to 'bden-pa’ in its everyday sense of real or really true, which has now become don-dam bden-pa. 50 long as we bear this in mind there is no paradox in maintaining that the entity per= ceived in everyday apprehension is simply conventional, when seen correctly as illusory it is conventional truth or conventionally true, while conventional truth is itself simply conventional for the Aryas. But the essential point is that the category of conventional truth when used is used by and for the Arya, not the pgthagjana, and correspondingly it thereby does not refer to the world of everyday activity and apprehension. Finally, I wish briefly to make some distinctions as regards the philos~ ophical issues involved in the discussions of appearance. Firstly the dispute over appearance between the Svatantrika and Tsong-kha~pa to a certain extent reflects the extreme ambiguity pertaining to the uses of ‘appearance’. For the Svatantrika appearance is clearly the entity which appears, and there is perhaps a certain obviousness in saying that what appears is an appearance. Such is found in the phenomenalisn of Hume, Berkeley and even Kant, for example, but these thinkers did not wish to maintain that the world is illusory. appear- ance in the sense of given through sensation is not the same as appearance when contrasted to some sort of reality. And it is clearly this sense of ‘appear- ance’ which Tsong-kha~pa is operating with. It is thus highly ambiguous to state that for the Madhyamaka as represented by Tsong-kha-pa's Prasangavada appearance is conventional truth. Appearance as to what appears is convent~ donal truth for Jianagarbha, but what appears is not conventional truth for Tsong-kha~pa, for whom this is just appearance. It is precisely appearance which is kun-rdzob-tsam. The (conventional) reality with which this appear- ance is here contrasted is Tsong-kha-pa's conventional truth; that is, appearance seen as illusory. We might say that kun-rdzob-tsam is appearance which, for Tsong-kha-pa is, as a matter of fact, illusory; while the entity as illusory is xun-rdzob bden-pa. It is only when the illusion is contrasted with don-dam bden-pa that we can say that it is (contrastingly) appearance, and as such it appears to the two arhats and bodhisattvas above the seventh bhlmi, In this sense, unlike Hume, Berkeley and Kant, Tsong-kha-pa's treat- ment of appearance comes closest to that of Leibniz, for vhom ‘appearance’ is used precisely to distinguish from reality. But in no case is it universally established that for Tsong-kha-pa kun-rdzob bden-pa equals appearance. Furthermore, does Tsong-Kha-pa really escape from Jtianagarbha's problemsWILLIAMS: kunrdzob bdenpa 331 regarding illusion? Certainly he has to make a distinction between’ transcend- ental’ and ‘empirical’ illusion based on defect-producing conditions such as jaundice, and perhaps this is adequate enough. From the position of the Arya the real point is that as regards attachment and so on he views all convention in the manner in which he views an illusion, he sees that actually it has the same status. And it is perhaps worth remembering, as a final note, Dumont's comments on the way in which, in a societal context, illusion for the Indian renouncer is precisely the mode in which he sees the society he has renounced. ‘As a renouncer Kun-rdzob bden-pa, conventional truth, the truth of the world, is precisely the world of society seen as an illusion. Notes 1. Tam not too happy with the translation of "bden-pa’ or ‘satya’ by ‘truth’, for reasons which will be briefly mentioned subsequently, For a more det ailed discussion see Paul M. Williams (1978) "Language and Existence in idhyamika Buddhist Philovophy's Unpublished D. Phil thesis, University of Oxford, Ch.4. 2, dve satye samupaéritya buddhandg dharmadeGand / lokasamvytisatyam ca satyam ca parandrthatab // ye’nayor na vijdnanti vibhagam satyayor dvayoh / te tattvam na vijdnanti gambhiray buddhasasane // From the new eritical edition by J.W. de Jong (1977) Wagarjuna: 1Olamadhyamakakarikah, Adyar: Adyar Library and Research Centre. 3. T.R.V. Murti (1960) The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Second Edition, London: George Allen and Unwin, p.245. 4. Prajfapradipa on M.it.K. 24:8, Co-ni edition Vol.18. (Tsha), #£.228b-229a. C£. Buddhapalitavytti, Co-ni 17 (Tsa), £.267a-b. 5, Prasannapada on N.K.K. 24:8 in Candrakirti (1960) Madht yamakaSastra of Nagarjuna with the conmentary: Prasannapada by Candrakirti (ed. P.L. Vaidya), Darbhanga: Mithila Institute. 6. See, for example, dKon-mchog *jigs-med dbang-no's Grub-meha’(1971) in The Collected Works of dKon-mchog *jigs-med dbang-po(ed. lgawang Gelek Demo), New Delhi: Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series 26, £.529. Tsong-kha-pa uses pot and cloth, kLong-rdol bla-ma a pot, and so on. 7. Cooni Sa, £.Ib, verses 3-4a: kun-rdzob dang-ni dam-pa’i don / bden-gnyis thub-pas gsungs-pa-la / ji-ltar snang-ba ’di-kho-na / kun-rdzob gzhan ci cig-shos yin / slu-ba med-pas rigs-pa-ni / don-dam yin-te kun-rdzob min / 8. Peking edition No.5283, Vol.28 (sa), £.5a: de-bzhin-du kun-rdzob-tu bum pa lavsoge-pa bden-pa rnan-par-gnas-kyi de-kho-na-nyid-du-ni ma-yin-te / [aterestingly Jianagarbha's kirika and svavrtti seem to be missing from the Peking Edition of the Tenjur- 9. rbid.: byis-pa dang / mkhas-pa-dag bum-pa la-sogs-pa gang-1a blo-mthun bden yang-dag-pa’i kun-rdzob-kyi bden-pa yin-no. The svavytti, as quoted by fantarakgita asserts: mthong-pa dang mthun-par dngos-po"i don nges-par *dzin-pa. Cf. the text of the svavgtti, Co-ni Sa,'f.4a-b, and Pafijika f.12a. lo. Pafijika, ££-126. LL. Svavrttl, £.4. See also PaNjika, f.6a. 12. Bhavaviveka (1931) 'Nadhyanarthasapgraha of Bhavaviveka’, edited by N.332 1. la 15. 16. 7. 18, 19, 20. 2. 22, 23, 24, 25. 26. WILLIAMS: kunrdzob bderpa Aiyaswami Sastri in the Journal of Oriental Research (Madras) 5, pp.41- 49. For a more detailed discussion of these points see Williams (1978), Ch.4. Svavetti, £.4 and Paitjik3, £.6a: ma-rig-pas ldongs-pa’i °jig-rten-pa-rnans bun-pa La-sogs-pa bzhin-du / zla~ba gnyis-pa la~sogs-pa bden-pa-nyid-du / de-ltar kha~mi-len-pas-so / KGrika verse 12:snang-du ’dra-yang don-byed-dag / nus-pa’i phyir dang mi- nus phyir / yang-dag yang-dag-ma-yin-pas / kun-rdzob-kyi-ni dbve-ba byas / CE. Hadhyanarthasamgraha, verses 7-8. lugs~?di-ni ma~rig~pa~dang-ldan-pa-la rang-gi-mtshan-nyid-kyis grub-par Bangosnang-ba thams-cad shes-pa-de ma-rig-pas bslad-pa*i snang-bar bzhed- Pas / kun-rdzob-pa’i don-1a yang-dag-pa dang log-pa gnyis-su mi-*byed-do / The text of the dlu-ma rfsa-ba’i tshig-le’ur byas~pa shes-rab ces-bya-ba?i rnam-bshad Rigs-pa’i rGya-mtsho used is a modern blockprint printed in India and dated 1966. Folio 236a, rsa shes-rab kyi dka’-gnas chen-po brayad kyi bshad-pa, Sarnath? The Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1970, p.6. miyam-med Tsong-kha-pa chen-pos mdzad-pa?i Byang-chub lam-rim che-ba, folio 397a: rnam-pa gzhan-du gnas-pa’i dngos-po-la rnam-pa gzhan-du snang-pa’i Phyir-ro / This text is a modern blockprint made for, and presumably by, the Tibetan Monastery at Sarnath. It appears to have no date. Textually it correlates fairly closely with the bkra-shis-Ihun-po edition ment ioned by Wayman in his fine translation (1978) Calming the itind and Discerning the Real, New York: Columbia University Press. The passage referred to here is on p.224. Folio 398a: dbang-shes-rnams-la gzugs sgra sogs yul Inga-po de-rnams rang- gi-mtshan-nyid-kyis ma-grub-bzhin-du rang-gi-mtshan-nvid-du snang-bas-na... See also Wayman, p.224, Folio 406b: *jig-rten-na thog-ma-med-pa-nas grags-pa’i don yin-kyang rigs~ Pa gnod-pas-na tha-snvad-du’ang med-pa-ni ma-rig-pas dngos-po-rnams- la rang-gi-ngo-bo sgro-btags-pa etc. Cf.layman, p.238. Folio 408a: ma-rig-pas ji-ltar beung-ba-ltar kun-rdzob-tu-yang med-de / *di-ni dngos-po-rnams-1a rang-gi-ngo-bos grub-pa’i rang-bzhin sgro-?dogs- Pa yin-la / de~dra-ba?4 rang-bzhin-ni tha~snyad-du’ang med-pa’i phyir-ro // C£.Mayman, pp.240-261, Folio 407b, Wayman, p.240. See later. dBu-ma-la ? jug-pa’i rgya-cher bshad-pa dGongs-pa rab-gsal, Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973, pp.181-182: ji-ltar gzugs-brnyan-la-sogs snang-ba~ltar-gyi don-du med-pa-bzhin-du / ma-rig-pa~ dang-dan-pa-rnams-1a sngon-po la-sogs-pa rang-gi-ntshan-nyid-kyis grub- Par snang-ba-yang / snang-ba-ltar-gyi don-du med-pa’ii phyir-ro / Byang-chub-sems-dpa?i spyod-na-la ? jug-pa?i rnam-bshad rGval-sras *jug ngogs, Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973, p.214. Folio 398a, This forms a continuation of the section mentioned in note 19 above. Folio 235a: de-ltar re-zhig srid-pa’i yan-lag-gis yongs~su-bsdus-pa nyon~ mongs-pa-can-gyi ma~rig-pa’i dbang-gis kun-rdzob-kyi bden-pa rnan~par— bzhag / de-yang nyan-thos dang rang-sangs-reyas dang byang-chub-sems- dpa? nyon-mongs-pa~can-gyi ma-rig-pa spangs-pa / *du-byed gzugs-brnyan la-sogs-pa’i yod-pa-nyid dang *dra-bar gzigs-pa-tnams-la-ni beos-ma’i rang~ | behin yin-gyi / bden-pa-ni ma-yin-te bden-par mngon-par-rlom pa med=pa?i Phyir-ro / byis-pa-rnams-la-ni slu-bar byed-pa yin-la de-las gzhan~pa- Ynans-la~ni sgvu-ma la~sogs-pa-Itar rten~cing~’brel-par-*byung-ba-ny id- kyis kun-rdzob tsam-du "gyur-ro / Cf, Poussin's translation in Le Muséon nis. II (1910), p.304.28. 29. 3h. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. a. WILLIAMS: kunrdzob bden-pa 333 Peking No.5264, folios 411b-412a: dngos-por snang-ba kun / sgyu-ma-tsan— du shes-byas etc. (F.412a). Peking No.5271, Mdo~*grel 25 (Ra), folios 174a-174b, Folios 235a-235b: kun-rdzob bden-pa yod-par * jog-pa-rnams ma-rig-pas yod- par *jog-pa dang / nyon-mongs-can-gyi ma-rig-pa spangs-pa’i nyan rang dang byang-sems-kyi ngor kun-rdzob bden-pa mi-’ jog-par ston-pa min-no / rfsa-she’i dka?-gnas brguad, p.13: kha-cig na-re / sngon-po byis-pa’i ngor kun-rdzob bden-pa yin-la. / *pha(g)s-pa *og-ma~gstm-gyi ngor kun= rdzob-team yin-gyi / kun-rdzob bden-pa ma-yin-no zhes-zer-to / de~1ta-na »phags-pa-rnams-kyis bden-gnyis-kyis rnam-dbye phyin-ci-ma-log-par chad wi-nus-par *gyur-te / rang-nyid-kyi blo?i ngor kun-rdzob-kyi bden-pa ma~ stid-pa’i phyir / Folio 235b: nyon-mongs-pa-can-gyi ma-rig-pa-ni bden-"dzin yin-pas nges bzung-ba’i don tha~snyad-du-yang mi~srid-pa’i phyir dang / kun-rdzob-kyi bden-pa yin-na tha~snyad-du yod-pas khyab-pa’{ phyir-ro / des-na chos- rnams kun-rdzob-tu yod-par ?jog-na?i ?jog-sa"i kun-rdzob yin-na-ni / nyon- mongs-can-gyi ma-rig-pa-la kun-rdzob-tu byas-pa-de ma~yin dgos-pa-yin-no / nyon-mongs-can-gyi ma-rig-pa’i kun-rdzob spangs-pa-rnams-la / gang-gi ngor bden-par *jog-pa’i bden-zhen-gyi kun-rdzob med-pa’i rgyu-mtshan-gyis /?du =byed-rnams de-dag-gi ngor mi-bden-par bsgrubs-kyi kun-rdzob bden-pa ma~ yin-par ma-bsgrubs-pa’i phyir-ro / des-na de-dag-gi ngor du-byed-rnams kun-rdzob-tsam-du gsungs-pas-ni... Folio 235b. Ibid, de?i ngor kun-rdzob dang bden-pa gnyis-kyi mang-nas bden-par gzhag- tu med-pas-tsam-gyis sgras-ni bden-pa gcod-kyi kun=rdzob-kyi bden-pa geod- pa ga-la yin / Madhyamakavat@ratika, folios 173b-174a. Folio 237a: de-la so-so-skye-bo-rnams-kyi don-dam-pa gang-yin-pa de-nyid *phags-pa snang-ba dang beas-pa’i spyod-yul-can-rnans-kyi kun-rdzob-tsam yin-la / Cf. Poussin's translation, p-305. ‘bid. so-so-skye-bo-rnams-kyis-ni bum-pa la-sogs-pa-la bden-par *dzin-la de-nyid don-dan-par yod-par ’dzin-pa-yang yin-pas / de-dag-gi shes-ngo(?)- de-la Itos-te bum-sogs-rnams don-dam-par grub-pa yin-gyi kun-rdzob-pa” i don min-no / Tbid.: de-dag-gi ngor don-dam-par grub~pa’i gzhi bum-pa la-sogs-pa-rnans >phags~pa’i rgyud-kyi sna(ng)-ba sgyu-ma-Ita~bu’i don gzigs-pa-la 1tos~ nas kun-rdzob-pa yin-no / shes-pa-de-la 1tos-na bden~par-gzhag-tu med-pas kun-rdzob-tsam zhes-gsungs-so / Tbid.: See also the Svatantrikas, who share this point with the Présahgikas. Folio 234a. This is of course an important point for the defence of Tsong- Kha-pa's lam-rim against the Chinese Hva-shang Mahayana for whom all con~ ventional truth is on the same level as simply misleading, and a graduated path is impossible. See Wayman, pp.44-58, T have tried to indicate at many points in Williams (1978) the importance of this point, In spite of the mutually exclusive and exhaustive categ- ories of the two truths the Madhyamaka analyses themselves - pointing to x as empty and so on, occur just at the position where the Arya views the everyday world, One'can speculate that in the face of the tension created by the Chinese position it is just this fact which rises to the surface in Tsong-kha-pa's treatment of kun-rdzob bden-pa, but I think that it is a fundamental point for understanding what Bhavaviveka was trying to do with the category of paryayaparandrthasatya introduced in his Madhyandrth- asapgraha, for example. Rigs-pa?i’ rgya-mtsho, folio 236b: bum snam la-sogs-pa kun-rdzob bden-pa yin-kyang de-dag blos-grub-pa-na kun-rdzob bden-pa?i don blos-"grub mi-~334 42. 43. WILLIAMS: kun-rdzob bden-pa Ggosqte / bum snam sogs rang-bzhin-gyis med-behin-du snang-ba*i sgyu-ma- itavbu yin-kyang de-dag grub-pa’i blos sgyu-na-lta-bu’i don-"grub mic dgos-pa-bzhin-no / Page 186: sngo-sogs rang-gi mtshan-nyid-kyis grub-pa dang / gzugs-brnyan byad-bzhin-du yod-pa ma~srid-kyang / byad-bzhin-du med=pa’i gzugs-hrnyen yod-pa~bzhin-du / rang-gi mtshan-nyid-kyis grub-pa min-kyang sngo-soge yod-dgos-La. See Lam-rim chen-mo folios 407~408a.