PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY

AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CONTROL

Ørnulf Jan Rødseth, MSc. EEng.

Senior Scientist, MARINTEK
P.O. Box 4125 Valentinlyst, N-7450 TRONDHEIM, Norway
ornulf.j.rodseth@marintek.sintef.no

Abstract
Integrated safety and emergency management systems (ISEMS) can have a significant benefit
in both day to day operations and in handling of emergencies onboard. No definitions of such
integrated systems are yet available, but IMO and ISO have published some component
standards and requirement specifications. A detailed cost-benefit analysis of ISEMS has not
been done, but it can be argued that relatively high investments in such systems may be cost
effective. This is done by comparing with investments for other safety measures. The use of
integrated ship digital networks, including wireless networks, can greatly benefit ISEMS.
This type of network can also reduce the cost of data communication equipment and cable in
a ship. Likewise, the use of digital communication between ship and shore in emergencies
will also have significant benefits for emergency management.

1. Introduction
The intention of this paper is to give an overview of the state of the art and some possible
future improvements in electronic emergency management systems. We will also try to
highlight some issues that should be considered when emergency management organisation
and support systems are considered.
Chapter two will look at what an emergency management system is and what legislation and
standards exist to define it. Also types of emergencies, desired functionality and cost
effectiveness will be discussed. Chapter three will outline a new concept for integrated ship
communication networks and how such a network can be used in electronic support for
emergency management. Chapter four will similarly look at ship to shore communication and
how that can be used to improve management of difficult situations. Chapter five concludes
the paper with some thoughts about the current status and the likely near future. References
can be found in chapter six.
The technical content of the paper has various sources. In the period 2000 to 2004, the author
worked with the Autronica AM5000 fire safety management system and its application in
general emergency management [AM5000]. In this period, the company also participated in
the EU-project ITEA-DS (Intelligent tools for emergency applications and decision support)
that investigated new functionality to provide better advice on preventing and handling
incidents onboard [ITEA, ISEMS]. In 2004, the author switched jobs back to research, to
MARINTEK. Here we have been involved in another EU project, Decision Support System
for Ships in Degraded Conditions [DSS_DC]. Again, focus is on emergency management, but
now mostly on issues related to manoeuvrability, strength and stability. However, DSS_DC
has also developed an infrastructure for integrated emergency management with emphasis on
ship-shore coordination. Finally, the newly started EU-project MarNIS (Maritime Navigation
Information Services) will also deal with emergency management [MarNIS]. It has also
contributed input on ship-shore broadband communication.

2. What is an emergency management system?

2.1 IMO and industry position

IMO and the passenger ship industry have for some time investigated large passenger ship
safety. The main concern is the large number of passenger that may have to be evacuated and
that the ships more and more operate in areas with less developed search and rescue (SAR)
facilities. Thus, IMO defined five elements to guide its work on large passenger ship safety
[IMO02]:
1. The regulatory framework should place more emphasis on the prevention of a casualty
from occurring in the first place.
2. Future large passenger ships should be designed for improved survivability so that, in the
event of a casualty, persons can stay safely on board as the ship proceeds to port.
3. The regulatory framework should permit alternative designs and arrangements in lieu of
the prescriptive regulations, provided that at least an equivalent level of safety is
achieved.
4. Large passenger ships should be crewed, equipped and have arrangements to ensure the
safety of persons on board for survival in the area of operation, taking into account
climatic conditions and the availability of SAR functions.
5. Large passenger ships should be crewed and equipped to ensure the health safety, medical
care and security of persons on board until more specialized assistance is available.
In 2001, the International Council of Cruise Lines [ICCL] also performed a study on large
passenger ships and identified some factors that were deemed to be the most critical for ship
safety:
1. Sea state and weather: Better weather forecasts, consequence analysis and mitigation of
effects.
2. Evacuation: Communication with passengers, child safety, family separation and
language.
3. Powered grounding: Depth information, aids to navigation and pilot-bridge team
interface.
4. Fire and explosion: Communication, external underway support and SAR services.
One should also note that unnecessary distraction to the OOW (officer of the watch) is a
potential problem. About 40% of all serious accidents with cruise vessels have been related to
navigation (see diagram in section 2.5) and in an FSA (formal safety assessment) on cruise
ship navigation, performed in Norway in 2002/3, all experts ranked distraction of the OOW as
the most severe challenge [Rusås04]. This is a particularly sensitive subject for emergency
and safety management systems as they will be perceived to have a very high alarm priority
on passenger ships. An unnecessary alarm at the wrong moment can easily contribute to an
accident.
Since IMO started it work on large passenger ship safety, it has decided to strike out the
qualifier large and to focus more on preventions of accidents and using the ship as its own
lifeboat, i.e., avoid having to abandon ship [IMO02]. One can assume that this view is shared
by the industry as evacuation of a passenger ship is bound to cause problems, even under
good weather conditions. Also the high monetary investment in the new generation of cruise
ships and ferries, with a single ship costing up to half a billion Euros, emphasises the need to
avoid accidents. An accident does not only affect the ship it happens on, but it may also
contribute to catastrophically reduced customer confidence - both in the involved company
and in the industry at large.
Although prevention is important, one must also keep in mind that it is during high stress
situations that electronic decision support systems should be most useful. However, in such
situations both the system and the operators are typically overwhelmed with data from the
ship and the monitoring systems. Also, in emergency situations one cannot assume that all
ships systems, including power and communication facilities, are fully operational. If a failure
results in significantly degraded functionality in the emergency management system, this can
worsen the situation for the crew. Thus, an emergency management system must be
designed for use in actual emergencies, including sufficient robustness to handle likely
problems in ship infrastructure.
Finally, serious emergencies are not handled on the ship alone. The ship will immediately
establish contact with the ship owner’s emergency response organisation, with the respective
SAR authority and other entities. Complex calculations, particularly related to ship strength
and stability will normally be performed by the owner’s personnel or by specialist response
organisations contracted by the owner. The communication between ship and shore will more
and more depend on a combination of voice and digital communication. An emergency
management system should also assist in this.

2.2 Some high level requirements

With the above issues in mind, one can define some important requirements to emergency
management systems:
1. Assisting in preventing accidents: Typical issues here are early and precise warnings of
problems before they escalate to emergencies. Also, system maintenance functionality to
identify and report latent problems in safety systems or elsewhere on the ship is
important.
2. Efficient management of damage containment: With the emphasis of avoiding abandon
ship, it is important that the systems can assist in efficient management of damage
containment.
3. Integrated emergency management: It is desirable that an emergency management system
can be a one-stop facility for all or most kinds of emergencies. This will be discussed in
the next sections.
4. Robustness: The system should be designed as a primary safety system, e.g., after same
rules as a public announcement or fire alarm system.
5. Ship – shore coordination: Allow digital exchange of critical information between ship
and shore organisations.
6. Not add to the workload of OOW: Particularly with early warning in mind, one should
take care to design systems so that they do not cause unnecessary distractions to the
OOW. Alarm filtering and mode dependent displays may be used to achieve this.
The cruise and ferry industry is already investing heavily in safety systems and most
operators have safety standards well above the IMO minimum carriage requirements.
Although there are limited gains to be got from better electronic systems in general, there are
still improvements that can be made. Particularly with new communication technology being
made available both onboard and between ship and shore, more efficient coordination of
human resources is a relevant possibility.

2.3 Definitions and applicable legislation

“Emergency management system” is not a concept that has been defined by IMO or any other
maritime standards organisation. This has resulted in quite different use of the term in
different contexts. To add to the confusion, there are also other terms that have been used for
systems with similar functionality, e.g., safety management system, decision support system
etc. The following gives an overview of the concepts that are defined by IMO or other
organisations.
Safety Workstation is defined as a workstation (control station) at which monitoring
displays and operating elements serving safety are concentrated [ISO 14612]. It also lists the
functions performed there as:
• monitor the safety state of the ship (fire, emergency, etc.),
• handle alarm conditions and execute relevant measures,
• organize emergency operations,
• consult the ship’s safety plans and drawings, and
• effect internal communication.
Thus, the safety workstation is not a system as such, but rather a description of functions that
are performed in the ship’s safety centre. [MSC Circ. 982] lists the following equipment that
can be included in the safety workstation:
• fire alarm for areas machinery, superstructure/accommodation, cargo;
• remote control and monitoring of fire extinguishing system;
• remote control and monitoring of watertight doors/fire doors (open/closed);
• emergency stop for air condition, ventilation and refrigerating installations;
• controls for anti-rolling device;
• indicator for further systems;
• clinometer;
• keys and control-elements for lights and signals (navigation lights, signal lamps,
bridge lighting, deck lighting searchlights, as well as all fuses);
• internal communication system, in particular to muster stations;
• adjustment of watch alarm system and acknowledgement button;
• status indication for bow- and rear flap;
• controls/indications for ballast water handling;
• tools for documentation;
• main station for two-way VHF radiotelephone (walkie-talkie), etc.
The definition can also be read as an overview of functions that can be integrated in an
emergency management system.
Integrated Monitoring System (IMS) [IMO A.796] is a recommended system for passenger
ships that shall include integrated and computerized monitoring of the following sensors:
• draught, trim and heel;
• liquid/water level indicators in all compartments below the main deck;
• water level indications in all compartments on the main deck at positions, where
water might be trapped in case of flooding;
• status of all watertight and fire doors;
• status of bow doors and any other shell doors;
• status of shell door locking devices;
• stress levels in bow door locking devices;
• temperature and smoke concentrations in all compartments;
• status of all control devices or emergency management (pumps, valves, doors,
ventilators and dampers); and
• water depth.

Safety Management System (SMS) is defined by IMO [ISM] as a paper or computer based
procedural system that includes the following functional requirements:
• a safety and environmental protection policy;
• instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the
environment in compliance with relevant international and flag State legislation;
• defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and amongst, shore
and shipboard personnel;
• procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the provisions of this
Code;
• procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations; and
• procedures for internal audits and management reviews.

SMS is also often used to describe a computer based system that monitors and control certain
safety systems, such as fire detection, fire doors, ventilation and watertight and shell doors.
Decision Support System (DSS) is a carriage requirement for passenger ships and is defined
by SOLAS Ch. III [DSS]. It shall, as a minimum, consist of a printed emergency plan or
plans. All foreseeable emergency situations shall be identified in the emergency plan or plans,
including, but not limited to, the following main groups of emergencies:
1. fire;
2. damage to ship;
3. pollution;
4. unlawful acts threatening the safety of the ship and the security of its passengers/crew;
5. personnel accidents;
6. cargo-related accidents; and
7. emergency assistance to other ships.
Administrations can also accept a computer based DSS in addition to the paper based plans.
Note that this regulation also defines a high level list of possible emergencies.
Fixed Fire Detection and Fire Alarm System (FAS) is defined by IMO [FSS] as a system
that can detect and report fire alarms to the responsible officer onboard. This is often a central
component of the emergency management functions.
Also shipboard loading and stability computer can play an important role in handling
emergencies related to strength and stability. Functionality and other requirements for such
systems are defined in [MSC Circ. 891] and in [ISO 16155]. The carriage of such a
computer is not mandatory, but it is standard equipment onboard most large passenger
ships.

2.4 An integrated safety and emergency management system

As can be seen from the previous section, there are several safety related functions that need
to be looked at in an integrated system. Also, as IMO has pointed out, handling an emergency
once it has occurred is not enough: It is vital to avoid incidents if at all possible and to avoid
that an incident evolves into an emergency. Thus, a computer based support systems for
safety functions should possibly be called an “integrated safety and emergency management
system” (ISEMS).
If we go back to [ISO 14612], it presents a schematic overview of a ship bridge as in the
below figure. This is typical of many of today’s bridges. Most of the functional locations are
obviously defined as navigation related. In addition, the safety workstation shall handle safety
and emergency management while the communication workstation shall handle
communication which is not directly handled by the OOW at the navigation workstation.

Figure 1 – Ship bridge functions (ISO 14612)

On passenger ships, the normal emergency procedure is that the captain takes care of the
overall emergency management and stays near the safety and communication workstations.
One or more officers will continue to steer the ship and the engine room will be manned,
normally with the chief engineer in charge. The hotel section will also be involved in assisting
in passenger evacuation and searches if necessary. A local on scene commander will be
deployed (often the staff captain) together with a number of damage control teams.
Thus, there are at least five distinct emergency related functions performed onboard a
passenger ship:
• Emergency management (captain)
• Navigation (deck officer)
• Engine and automation systems management, including passenger welfare (engine)
 • Hotel section evacuation and search (hotel)
• On scene commander and mobile teams (deck and engine)
An ISEMS shall support the overall coordination of these functions, but with emphasis on
damage situation assessment and control. For most types of emergencies, it is most natural to
base the system on a geographic information system (GIS) concept. The most obvious
approach is to use the fire control plan [IMO FCP] as background. This plan is based on a
general arrangement drawing and contains information about most safety equipment onboard.
In addition, some simplified process diagrams may be necessary to show status of systems
for, e.g., fire extinguishing and ship stability (tank levels, water ingress, bilge and ballast
pumps etc.).
One significant problem in the construction of an ISEMS is that some of the functions one
may want to include are highly specialized and/or complex and cannot easily be taken out of
the dedicated system it resides in today. One can also argue that more complex functions like
stability and strength calculations should reside in a dedicated workstation. One reason for
this is that the functions may have to be accessible by specialists located on shore. This
concept was adopted by the DSS_DC project by defining a three tier approach to emergency
management.

Figure 2 –Three tier decision support

The three tiers are, from bottom and up:
1. The ordinary ship systems for navigation, automation, stability etc.
2. The specialists’ decision support workstations. These can be placed on shore or on
board.
3. A multi-function console (MFC) that can present results from any of the below tiers.
Several MFCs can concurrently and independently be used onboard or onshore.
This system allows the decision makers on the ship and shore to have an on-line and high
level tactical and strategic overview, while allowing specialists to work on dedicated
computers specially suited to their tasks.
Note that this system also indicates an expert module that can provide technical condition
advice, both in the context of safety (early warnings of safety related problems) and in
emergency management (warnings on reduced performance). In ITEA-DS, this type of
unit was used to give technical condition advice based on maintenance reports, safety
non-conformance reports etc. [ITEA]. One issue that was looked at was to develop this
concept into a “safety index”, which was used to give early warning of potential and
hidden safety problems.
In a commercial system one would probably integrate the MFC with a GIS type ISEMS
workstation so that both a detailed view of the onboard emergency management processes
and overview from expert systems were available from one console.

2.5 Emergency types

A general damage statistics for the cruise industry is presented in the below figure. This is
based on data from Lloyds/Fairplay accident database [LRFP] in the years 1990 to 2004
inclusive, where 131 severe incidents were reported for cruise vessels above 4,000 GRT. A
mean fleet size of 250 has been used in the vertical axes. Navigation related accidents account
for about 36 % while fire/explosion adds another 27 %. For total loss of vessel, the figures are
approximately 19 % and 44 % for navigation and fire/explosion respectively. Note that 5 of 6
losses due to foundering happened when the ships were being towed and already partly
damaged by some other accident.

Annual cruise incidents (per 1000)

12
Severe incidents
10
Total loss
8

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Figure 3 – Annual ship damage frequencies

A more complete list of incidents that should be handled by the ISEMS can, e.g., be based on
the DSS incident numbers from section 2.3. By detailing the basic list, we have developed the
below table as an example of incident that need to be covered. The table is a result of an
analysis of safety management checklists used by two different cruise operators.
With the assumption that the ISEMS is a geographic information type system that contains a
drawn overview of the ship, column three lists what the system can be most useful for in the
different incidents:
• EM: High level Emergency Management with, e.g., electronic plotting table
functionality and control and monitoring facilities for the main systems involved.
• DSS: Less complex decision support type assistance (checklists, safety management
reporting) rather than full management support.
This classification depends on what functions are directly integrated in the ISEMS and what
are not. Column four exemplifies some of these. Note that the HVAC (Heat Ventilation and
Air Condition) system probably may be integrated in the ISEMS while it is more unlikely that
ECS (Electronic Chart System) is.
Table 1 – Some incident types
DSS Incident EMS Additional functions
1.1 Fire/explosion in port EM HVAC
1.2 Fire/explosion at sea EM HVAC
2.1 Stranding or grounding EM stability
2.2 Collision EM stability
2.3 Flooding/hull leakage EM stability
2.4 Main engine fails/black out DSS automation
2.5 Emergency stop main engine DSS automation
2.6 Steering fails DSS automation, navigation
3.1 Pollution on board/SOPEP EM HVAC, automation
3.2 Pollution of environment DSS ECS, navigation
4.1 Unlawful acts (assault etc.) EM
4.2 Hijack/Terrorism DSS
4.3 Bomb threat/foreign object EM
4.4 Piracy/Robbery DSS
5.1 Medical emergency on ship EM
5.2 Medical disaster (many persons) EM
5.3 Man overboard DSS ECS, navigation
6 Cargo related (also see group 3) DSS
7 Assistance other ship DSS ECS, navigation

2.6 Functions to be supported

Exactly what functions one wants to implement in an ISEMS is dependent on how operations
are organized onboard and how the ISEMS is used together with other systems. The inclusion
of MFC functionality will, e.g., make it unnecessary to implement stability support directly in
the ISEMS. Also, it is obvious that full navigational capabilities are not appropriate in the
ISEMS.

Figure 4 – Main functional blocks in ISEMS

Figure 4 shows some of the functions that can be implemented in an ISEMS. The horizontal
blocks represent the basic application-independent functions, e.g., the underlying geographic
system and facilities for reporting, training and replay. The functional blocks are the top
vertical layer. The first group from the left (non-hatched) are those typically included in a fire
alarm system and approved according to corresponding regulation:
• Fire alarms, smoke and heat: Display of fire spread on a GIS type display (general
arrangement).
 • Fire protection equipment (FPE) remote control: These are functions related to
monitoring and control of various FPE, e.g., fire doors and dampers.
• Fire patrols: Fire patrol registration and management systems can be implemented
together with other fire related functions.
Other functions that can be implemented in a GIS type display are shown as hatched blocks to
the right:
• HazMat and disabled: Registration of disabled passengers, hazardous cargo and other
safety problems and display of their location in the general arrangement mimic.
• CCTV control and display: Possibility to control CCTV cameras and see pictures
from them on the same screen as the GIS mimic.
• Integrated Monitoring System: Display status for, e.g., shell, watertight and splash-
tight doors, water ingress alarms, water levels in tanks etc. [IMS].
• Electronic plotting table: Status and location of on scene commander, damage control
teams and other objects related to the emergency, e.g., extent of flooding or damage.
Additional displays can be added that do not directly use the GIS display:
• Checklists and ISM management: These functions allow display and manipulation of
various checklists. One can, e.g., have checklists both for shore and ship
organizations whose status can be viewed by both.
• MFC displays: This corresponds to the MFC function discussed in the previous
section. It is here assumed that displays are imported “as is” from other systems with
the help of, e.g., web type technology.
More general functions should support recording and replay, both for debriefing after drills or
incidents, but also for crew training.
Note that [FSS] prohibits adding non fire related functions to an approved FAS. This applies
to the two last groups of functions listed above. However, SOLAS, Ch. II, Part F, specifies
how alternative design and arrangements of, e.g., a FAS, can be specified and documented to
be acceptable to flag state. The main criteria is basically that the alternative design still meets
the objectives and functional requirements while presumably improving the function of the
FAS itself or some other related function.

2.7 Cost effectiveness

In the IMO FSA study on bulk ship safety, a risk control option (RCO) was considered cost
effective if the gross cost of averting a fatality (GCAF) was less then USD 3 million
[DNVFSA]. Roughly speaking, one would then look at the accumulated cost over the ships
likely life time and compare that to the probable fatality reduction. For fatalities among cruise
passengers that can be contributed to how an incident was handled, this figure should be
much higher. This is due to the significant negative impact of a passenger death on the
company’s or even the industry’s reputation and general value.
The actual value for a passenger death has not been determined, but as an example one can
look at the cost of having two officers instead on one on the bridge. Although the GCAF of
this RCO is calculated to be USD 9.4 million [DNVFSA], one finds that most large passenger
ships either implement this or similar measures, e.g., a continuously manned safety centre in
addition to the navigation bridge.
The GCAF of an ISEMS has not been calculated and it is difficult both to estimate a net cost
for the system and the risk reduction it would result in. Regarding cost of the system, this will
vary significantly on what functionalities it incorporates, the infrastructure it requires and how
much special engineering goes into it. This is also an argument for implementing the ISEMS
on top of an exiting system, such as the fire alarm system or the automation system. This can
significantly help to reduce additional engineering and infrastructure costs.
Risk reduction is even harder to calculate. The below graph shows lost cruise ships (as in
Figure 3), with the corresponding figures for fatalities. A total of 16 total losses and 32
fatalities occurred in the period. Without making too many assumptions from the graph, one
can probably conclude that fire/explosion and stability/buoyancy are the most critical issues
for large passenger ships. Inability to handle either of these issues can easily result in serious
accidents.

Annual fatalities and ship loss (per 1000)

7
6 Total loss

5 Fatalities

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Figure 5 – Ship loss and fatality statistics

Although incident prevention always is most effective, not all incidents can be prevented.
Some form of emergency management system must be implemented as is also required by
IMO rules. However, this may not necessarily be an ISEMS.
The main benefits of an ISEMS should be:
• Better overview of an incident and more relevant information for the decision maker.
Also reduction in stress level by providing electronic support for many of the
communication and registration tasks that have to be performed. This is the main purpose
of the system.
• Reduction of stress for OOW during normal situation by integrating all safety
management functions and providing “alarm filtering” to remove unnecessary and
duplicated alarms.
• Simplification of administrative procedures for handling safety management issues like
registration of passenger lists, passengers that need assistance, hazardous materials, hot
work permits etc.
• Simpler and more efficient maintenance of safety systems through electronic registration
and reporting of technical problems and maintenance related issues directly to electrical
engineers.
In addition to this, one should also consider the savings in direct costs that can be achieved if
fires can be handled efficiently. The difference between rapid extinguishing and an extensive
fire can be that between simple clean up work and several weeks for the ship at a repair yard.
The installation of an ISEMS is mainly a one off cost. It will neither require increased
manning nor help to reduce manning. Although an ISEMS also reduces stress for officers in
normal operation, the handling of safety system related alarms and warnings should not take a
major part of the OOW’s time. However, if an ISEMS is used on a two officers manned
bridge, it could be a more efficient alternative than having a manned safety centre and one
officer on the bridge. This will depend on the type of crew and ship overall organization.
To give an idea of the potential cost effectiveness of an ISEMS, one can use the passenger
ship navigation FSA as basis [DNVFSA]. In this study, the benefit of having two officers on
the watch or alternatively a dedicated safety and security centre, is estimated to save the
equivalent of 0,9 person-life over the ship’s life time. Correspondingly, the benefit in terms of
decreased damage to ship and environment has been estimated to be around USD 2 million
per ship. This applies to a ship with 5000 passengers and an expected life time of 30 years.

Table 2 – Estimated costs and benefits of ISEMS

Efficiency ISEMS $ NCAF $ GCAF $ Comment
25% 2 115 000 7 180 000 9 400 000 Cost of 2 officers
25% 675 000 780 000 3 000 000 Bulk limit
25% 500 000 0 2 200 000 NCAF zero
10% 850 000 7 180 000 9 400 000 Cost of 2 officers
10% 270 000 780 000 3 000 000 Bulk limit
10% 200 000 0 2 200 000 NCAF zero

To illustrate the comparison, one can assume that an ISEMS have respectively 25% and 10%
of the effect of having two officers of the bridge when reducing fatalities. The above table
lists the corresponding GCAF and net CAF (NCAF - subtracting the efficiency percentage of
an accident cost of USD 2 million from the cost) for various IEMS investments. Costs have
been selected to get a GCAF of USD 9.4 million (calculated GCAF of having two officers on
watch), USD 3 million (implementation limit for bulk carriers) and an NCAF of zero
(breaking economically even). As one can see, fairly large investments can be defended,
dependent on the perceived cost of a passenger fatality and the efficiency of the ISEMS.

3. Integrated onboard networks

As has been discussed previously, several on board entities are involved in handling an
emergency. Figure 6 gives an overview of one possible way to organise operations. The
figure shows two damage control teams (DCT) and one on scene commander (OSC) handling
the emergency in the field. These will communicate with each other with voice and/or walkie-
talkie. This group will in turn communicate with the emergency management team via
walkie-talkie. The management team will be located at the safety workstation and will
normally make use of it and a plotting table to keep track of the situation. Other control
positions, normally bridge, engine control room (ECR) and hotel are also manned to maintain
critical functions.

Figure 6 – Emergency organization

To illustrate the concept of ISEMS, the small rectangles inside a block indicate what level of
the DSS_DC emergency management tiers that particular user may be most likely to access:
MFC (top), specialist tier or basic ship systems (bottom). In particular, one can assume that
the situation display, as a combination of checklist status, electronic plotting table entries and
MFC displays, will be of interest to others than the management team.
Deployment of this type of system will require a ship wide safety qualified network to reach
all likely users. If existing infrastructure from, e.g., the fire alarm or automation systems
cannot be used, this may represent a significant extra cost.
In general, if one looks at today’s cruise ships, they can easily contain more than 2000 km of
cable [HANSA04]. Thus, there is obviously a great potential in implementing a common
communication infrastructure in the ship that can support safety related communication as
well as information and entertainment type of data. Significant cost reduction and functional
improvements are possible.
Another related issue is today’s use of walkie-talkie communication. It is a fairly robust
mechanism, but requires much attention both at the safety workstation and by the field crew.
Voice communication must be received and processed immediately although much of the
exchanged information is status that is used to update the situation picture, but is not of
immediate use. Use of direct digital input to the situation display would release significant
resources both in the management team and in the on scene teams. Thus, if a ship wide and
safety qualified wireless data network was available, it would make emergency
communication much more efficient. The same network could in principle also be used for
passenger entertainment, ship maintenance, as replacement for wireless phones etc.
Figure 7 shows an integrated ship network concept that supports both safety and
entertainment type information as well as wireless and wire bound connections. Without
going into technical details, it is almost certain that the network is feasible today, also
when based on standard, commercial off the shelf equipment. What is needed is the
development of a sufficiently detailed safety analysis and corresponding technical and
functional standards.
 Figure 7 – Integrated ship network

4. Integration between ship and shore

Just as ship internal communication is necessary for efficient emergency management, so is
ship to ship and ship to shore communication vital. A typical diagram of the communication
links are shown below.

Figure 8 – Ship/Ship and Ship/Shore communication

If one assumes that a terrestrial Internet can connect together the owner’s emergency
organization with SAR and special emergency response services (SERS), much of the
required coordination between these entities could be done via the network. However, in most
current cases, one will have to rely on telephone and radio.
Between the ship in distress and other entities, almost all communication is done via radio or
satellite voice. For most large passenger ships, this should not be necessary as the ship usually
have VSAT or Inmarsat digital satellite communication equipment onboard. Thus, the shore
emergency organizations could make use of digital exchange of data and even extend the full
concept of ISEMS and MFC to shore. One can also consider the use of wireless LAN
technology for communication between ships.
The figure indicates what organizations would typically use what component of the DSS_DC
three tiers system. The indication is done in the same manner as in Figure 6. As one can see,
we assume that the ability to access the MFC will be central. This issue is being investigated
in the DSS_DC project by adding functions to the MFC for ship/shore coordination. This can,
e.g., include new checklists for shore operations and the use of the general arrangement
drawing with digital annotations as a common communication reference. Note also that the
SERS will typically be used to take care of advanced analysis and prognosis and may need
access to a specialist’s workstation.
Much of the technology is available today, but a problem may be the cost and availability of
the communication service and reliability of the service once operational. Most cruise ships
and ferries operate in limited areas and use VSAT for communication. This gives them more
than enough bandwidth for implementation of shore linked ISEMS services. These ships will
also normally have INMARSAT equipment to implement the GMDSS requirements and can
use this as a backup in case the VSAT fails or falls out. The advent of Fleet77 will give
minimum 64 kbps digital connectivity over the global beam area, which is sufficient for most
ISEMS services, except perhaps live CCTV transmissions. Experiments with the AM5000 in
1998 showed that useful shore based GIS type monitoring functionally could be implemented
via GSM at 9.6 kbps. This was on a medium sized passenger ship with about 2000 monitoring
points. The MarNIS project will continue investigations into how existing and emerging
communication services can be used in this context.

5. Conclusions
No standards for ISEMS: Although IMO defines requirements to a number of manual and
computer based systems for handling safety and emergencies, there is no consistent definition
for an emergency management system, integrated or not. Neither are there any technical nor
functional performance standards. This paper outlines some functions that may be included,
but there is a need to look into this issue, including a cost benefit analysis of such systems.
Address safety as well as emergency, reduce distractions to the OOW: The most important
issue is to avoid accidents. An ISEMS should and can do this by reducing distractions for
watch keepers and be able to give early warnings on latent safety problems. Another
important issue, also related to navigational problems, is to reduce the distractions to the
OOW. Safety alarms at the wrong moment can easily cause accidents.
Cost-efficiency is difficult to calculate, but may be significant: As has been discussed, no
formal analysis of cost-effectiveness of an ISEMS has been made. However, compared to
having two officers on the bridge, relatively high investments may be accepted, dependent on
the perceived value of the system.
Use of integrated ship networks: Today, it is technically feasible to integrate safety
communication networks onboard. Even non-safety communication can probably be allowed
on such networks. This will give significant benefits to ISEMS as well as reduce overall cost
of the ship. Particularly the use of wireless digital communication for safety management can
have great benefits. However, technical, test and performance standards are missing.
Ship/shore communication is important: Likewise, the use of digital communication
between the ship and shore is also important to make safety and emergency management
effective.

6. References
[AM5000] See http://www.autronicafire.no/ for general company and product information.
[DNVFSA] Formal Safety Assessment, Large Passenger Ships Navigation, DNV 2003.
[DSS] SOLAS Chapter III, Part B, Section II, Regulation 29 - Decision support system for
masters of passenger ships.
[DSS_DC] Rødseth, Ø.J., DSS_DC Project Summary. EU-contract TCT3-CT-2003-506354.
[FSS] FSS Code - Fire Safety Systems - Annex - International Code For Fire Safety Systems -
Chapter 9 - Fixed Fire Detection and Fire Alarm Systems.
[HANSA04] Schoof A., ter Haseborg J.L., Stadtler T., HANSA International Maritime
Journal, 09/2004, Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit (EMV) kabelloser Brückensysteme.
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Monitoring System
[IMO FCP] SOLAS, Chapter II-2, Part E, Regulation 15, 2 General requirements
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Management Systems. ICMES 2003, May 19-21, Helsinki.
[ISM] International Safety Management (ISM) Code, Resolution A.741(18) Amended by
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for a Safety Management System (SMS).
[ISO 14612] Ships and marine technology — Ship's bridge layout and associated equipment
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[ISO 16155] Ships and marine technology — Shipboard loading instruments, ISO 2005 (Draft
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[ITEA] Rødseth Ø.J., ITEA-DS Deliverable D8.4a - Integrated emergency management
systems. EU-contract IST–1999-20254.
[LRFP] Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, Seaweb database at www.sea-web.org.
[MarNIS] See http://www.marnis.org for project information.
[MSC Circ. 891] Guidelines for the On-Board Use and Application of Computers -
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[MSC Circ. 982] IMO MSC/Circular.982 - Guidelines on Ergonomic Criteria for Bridge
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[Rusås04] Rusås, S., Skjong R., Damage Stability Standards in a Total Safety, 9th
Symposium on Practical Design of Ships and Other Floating Structures, Lübeck-Travemünde,
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