ARTICLES OF THE DAY

December 03, 2021

P. MICHAEL MCKINLEY, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ....................................................................................................... 2

NICCOLO W. BONIFAI, IRFAN NOORUDDIN, AND NITA RUDRA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS .......................................... 5

SHANNON TIEZZI, THE DIPLOMAT .................................................................................................................... 9

JENNIFER HILLMAN, CFR ................................................................................................................................ 11

RAMSHA NOSHAB, DAILY TIMES .................................................................................................................... 13

MODERN SLAVERY IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS, EXPRESS TRIBUNE ............................................................... 15

TOM FOWDY, RUSSIA TODAY ........................................................................................................................ 17

BRADLEY BLANKENSHIP, RUSSIA TODAY ........................................................................................................ 19

 Afghanistan’s Looming Catastrophe
P. Michael McKinley, Foreign Affairs
I
n December 1, a United
Nations official said that
Afghanistan may be
facing the most rapid
economic collapse in modern
history. Since the Taliban
takeover in late August,
government revenues have all
but disappeared and the
country’s cash-based
economy has shrunk at
dizzying rates. The World
Food Program estimates that
up to 23 million Afghans—
more than half the
population—may not have
enough to eat by the end of the
year. Public-sector workers
have not been paid in months,
and three million children
under the age of five face
acute malnutrition, an almost
unfathomable number. As
winter begins, Afghanistan is
on the brink of a humanitarian
catastrophe.
The challenge is providing
relief on the necessary scale to
meet the unprecedented needs
of the Afghan people. The
United States and its allies
rightly seek to deny the
Taliban government any
legitimacy or funding until it
provides guarantees for the
rights of women, girls, and
minorities and unequivocally
cuts its ties to international
terrorism. The U.S. Treasury,
international donors, and
organizations have frozen
billions of dollars of Afghan
assets and seek to channel
humanitarian aid through UN
relief agencies and the
nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) still
operating, with difficulty,
inside the country.
Meanwhile, despite the
growing crisis, the Taliban
have shown little sign of
changing their behavior.
Confronted with this impasse,
Western governments and
international organizations are
being forced to reconsider
how they can deliver
assistance more effectively.
Doing so requires broadening
the definition of basic
humanitarian activities that
are permitted under the
sanctions regime and
addressing the all-consuming
question of cash liquidity for
emergency operations. The
time for decision is now: the
window is closing for millions
of Afghans as the
humanitarian emergency on
the ground intensifies by the
day. A DIFFERENT KIND
OF CRISISIn contrast to the
Taliban takeover,
Afghanistan’s humanitarian
situation has unfolded with far
less media attention, in part
because there are not millions
of refugees fleeing across the
country’s borders; there is no
raging civil war; the country
on the surface appears to be
relatively peaceful; and some
members of the former
political elite are still inside
the country.
The view from the ground,
however, is very different.
Even before Kabul fell on
August 15, the Afghan
economy was precarious.
Under the democratically
elected government, Western
governments and aid agencies
provided billions of dollars in
humanitarian and
development assistance, funds
that amounted to more than 40
percent of the country’s GDP
and 75 percent of public
spending. Yet even with this
support, per capita income
remained one of the very
lowest in the world, declining
from $642 in 2012 to $509 in
2020. Then, large parts of the
country were stricken by one
of the worst droughts in years
as well as deteriorating
security, and, by mid-2021,
almost half the population, or
18.4 million people, required
humanitarian assistance. The
UNDP is now estimating
annual per capita income
could drop further to a
disastrous $350 by next year,
which would place
Afghanistan at or near the
bottom of the World Bank
low-income country rankings.
In the three months since the
Taliban took power, these
problems have dramatically
escalated. Millions more now
require humanitarian
assistance. And with
international aid flows cut off
and the banking system
largely frozen, the
International Monetary Fund
estimates that the economy
will shrink by as much as 30
percent by the end of the year.
The financial collapse is
compounded by a Taliban
government that seems to
have no coherent plan for
running the economy and has
devoted much of its sparse
revenues to paying Taliban
fighters, as a recent report by
the Afghanistan Analysts
Network has suggested. At the
same time, the regime has
been unwilling to make
concessions on human rights
and security to receive
international assistance.
Afghanistan’s financial links
to the world have been
severed, almost literally from
one day to the next.
The effects on the population
have already been stark.
Noting that “food security has
all but collapsed,” a recent
World Food Program report
finds that millions of Afghans
will have to choose this winter
between migration or
starvation. Across
Afghanistan, there is a high
risk of famine, both in cities
and in the countryside. In
large urban centers such as
Kabul, and in provincial
capitals, hundreds of
thousands of civil servants,
teachers, and health workers
are no longer being paid,
leaving their families with
little or no basic income; in
rural areas, drought, the lack
of cash and markets, and now
the onset of winter threaten
disaster.
MAKING ROOM FOR
RELIEF In responding to the
crisis, Western governments
and international
organizations are faced with
difficult choices. Any
expanded assistance to
Afghanistan risks the charge
that it is consolidating the
Taliban in power and
weakening leverage to
influence their behavior,
thereby provoking a likely
political backlash in the
United States and elsewhere.
There is also the risk of
inadvertent sanctions
violations as international
organizations provide
emergency relief inside
Afghanistan.
Of course, diplomatic and
political preconditions on
engagement with the Taliban
can and should remain in
effect. But it should also be
possible for the United States
and its international partners
to augment their emergency
response to help ordinary
Afghans without making
concessions to Afghanistan’s
new rulers. The pledges
already made by donors to UN
agencies and NGOs are
important to ensuring
humanitarian operations can
proceed. Given the outsize
dimensions of the crisis,
however, these organizations
will need clearer authorization
and guidance from the
international community if
they are to respond quickly
and effectively to the
country’s urgent and multiple
needs.
To address these challenges,
the existing international
framework for dealing with
the Taliban needs to be
adjusted. UN Security
Council Resolution 1988,
which established the Afghan
sanctions regime, was passed
in 2011, but built on over a
decade of measures targeting
the Taliban and their finances.
In current circumstances, with
the Taliban now in control of
the country, the UN could
make it clearer that UNSC
1988, although still in effect,
does not apply to
humanitarian work.
Discussions at the Security
Council are currently
underway, and the creation of
a humanitarian exception to
the 1988 sanctions regime
may soon emerge. But to be
effective, it must allow relief
organizations to address the
collapse of the country’s
health services and the
Taliban’s systematic
restrictions on female
education and women in the
workforce, which have added
another terrible dimension to
the crisis. Such action,
however, would require these
organizations to deal with the
Taliban regime in these areas.
To reach the girls and women
who are most vulnerable in the
current crisis, there must be
room for international aid
efforts to operate in the
spheres that affect them most.
Some donors, such as the
World Bank, Germany, and
the Netherlands, have
suggested waivers that would
allow workers in the health
sector to be paid, with the
World Bank reportedly
considering releasing up to
$500 million in funding. The
lack of salaries for medical
personnel has deeply
hampered the most basic
health services, a problem that
has had a particularly direct
impact on vulnerable children.
In such a new resolution, the
“carve out” language could
authorize UN agencies and
NGOs to work in these
defined sectors as well as
providing more traditional
humanitarian relief. Without
such specified areas in which
to operate, relief organizations
and the World Bank will be at
continual risk of the
application of sanctions to
their activities in Afghanistan.
As the humanitarian strategist
and former senior U.S. official
Sue Eckert proposed in her
recent testimony to the U.S.
Senate Banking Committee,
the Department of the
Treasury also has tools—
General License Nos. 14 and
15—that could provide
broader authorizations for
humanitarian operations in
this situation. The Treasury
Department has previously
used this approach in Yemen,
Ethiopia, and Venezuela,
defining humanitarian relief to
include working in multiple
sectors such as education and
the provision of health
services.
CREATING CASH FLOWS
But it is not enough to broaden
the scope of emergency relief.
Getting funds into
Afghanistan has become
extremely challenging in part
because financial institutions
themselves are fearful of
running afoul of sanctions.
Humanitarian operations
require a regular cash flow to
sustain themselves: to pay for
transport; to pay for shelter; to
pay the salaries of those who
work with relief agencies or in
the education and health-care
sectors; to pay for the
establishment of distribution
centers; to pay for fuel and
medicine. Yet in the current
situation, it has been tough for
aid operations to access and
distribute such funds.
The challenge remains
daunting. Afghanistan’s $9
billion in reserves will and
should remain frozen for the
foreseeable future.
Transferring any currency into
the country faces numerous
difficulties, and engaging with
what remains of the private
banking system is highly risky
for correspondent banks. And
flying in U.S. currency is
neither a safe nor a sustainable
option.
Cash could be brought in
through Afghanistan’s private
sector. There are, however,
short-term options that could
promote emergency
assistance for humanitarian
relief through the winter. Safe
payment mechanisms to
ensure the transfer of funds for
humanitarian operations are
necessary. Among recent
proposals to address the cash-
flow problem, those made by
former World Bank economist
William Byrd and former A CHANCE TO ACT—
Treasury official Alex Zerden BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE
stand out. have both Given the deep and justified
suggested, for example, concerns about the Taliban
working through private deriving benefit from
banks that still operate in international assistance,
Afghanistan. expanding the scope for
assistance will not be easy.
Although not all their
The Taliban’s long—and
proposals may be feasible,
recent—record of repressive
they suggest creative
actions, their affiliation with
approaches to bring funds into
international terrorist groups,
the country by working
and the presence of sanctioned
through the private sector
terrorists in their government
banks and companies that still
cannot be waved away. For
operate in Afghanistan,
the United States and its allies,
introducing Afghan
which only recently evacuated
banknotes, using digital
their troops, embassies, and
transfers to individual
citizens from Kabul, there is a
households, and facilitating
strong sense that a
the commercial imports of
humanitarian response to
essential goods under the
Afghanistan’s crisis must
Treasury Department’s
coincide with corresponding
General License No. 15. The
pressure on the Taliban.
Afghan-American Chamber
of Commerce has also Without immediate action,
proposed that the United however, there is the risk of a
States and the International humanitarian disaster of
Monetary Fund unfreeze $1 historic proportions by mid-
billion in assets belonging to winter. Such an outcome
Afghan private citizens. would not only cause great
suffering to the Afghan people
Whichever approach is taken,
but also heighten the
the United States and other
contradictions of the 20-year
donors must act quickly. In
international engagement in
late November, the UN
Afghanistan. We should not
warned that the breadth of the
wait for that disaster to
Afghan crisis—the lack of
respond to the challenges that
currency and inability to
are evident now. The United
access private accounts, take
States and its allies cannot
out loans, or pay for the
undo the failures that led to the
imports that the economy
fall of Kabul in August. But
depends on and that were
they can ensure that ordinary
previously financed by
Afghans know we will not
external aid money—will lead
turn our backs on them at a
to a complete collapse of the
time of extraordinary need.
country’s financial system
within months.
 The Hidden Threat to Globalization
Niccolo W. Bonifai, Irfan Nooruddin, and Nita Rudra, Foreign Affairs
G
lobalization has lost
its shine in wealthy
countries, particularly
among low-skilled workers.
From 2002 to 2018, for
instance, support for free trade
fell significantly in Japan, the
United States, and many
European countries, driven
largely by rising hostility
toward free trade among the
poor and working classes.
Among low-skilled workers in
Italy, opposition to free trade
grew from nine percent to 28
percent during that period, and
it more than tripled among the
same group in France.
Disapproval among this
demographic more than
doubled in Japan and in the
United States, causing overall
support for free trade to fall by
more than ten percentage
points in those countries. The
rising opposition to free trade
has fueled successful, inward-
looking populist movements,
most strikingly in the United
Kingdom and the United
States.
The reasons for the growing
hostility vary, but the most
politically potent charge is
that globalization has hurt
workers in rich countries in
order to help those in poorer
ones. Donald Trump, for
example, won the U.S.
presidency in 2016 in part by
arguing that Americans were
losing their jobs to workers in
China, India, and Mexico—
what he termed the “greatest
job theft in the history of the
world.” Marine Le Pen,
currently polling second in
France’s coming national
election, declared during her policymakers promised that
2017 campaign that trade with trade and international
developing economies “has investment would provide
been devastating to the French widespread upward mobility
and European industries” and in developing countries, only
has “led to the destruction of a fraction of low-skilled
millions of European jobs.” workers have actually seen
their earnings meaningfully
It is true that trade agreements
increase, and the disparity
have generated economic
between what these workers
opportunities in poor
expected and what actually
countries and have sometimes
happened has generated
created pockets of economic
growing disappointment. In
loss within wealthy states in
some cases, it has bred
the process. But there is
outright resentment. So far,
something ironic about
the anger has been most
Western populists’ complaints
pronounced in wealthy
that globalization has hurt
countries, such as the United
their countries and helped
States. But if globalization
poorer ones. If these leaders
continues to
seriously examined how
disproportionately help the
people in developing states
rich, the fierce backlash will
felt about globalization, they
inevitably spread to poorer
would encounter a familiar
states. This is an outcome that
situation. As we have
all countries should work to
illustrated in a new study,
avoid. Irrespective of what
differences between support
Trump, Le Pen, and other
for globalization among high-
populists may claim, workers
skilled and low-skilled
in rich economies have greatly
workers—and gaps in the
benefited from globalized
optimism the two groups feel
markets. By raising
about their prospects for
manufacturing employment
upward mobility—have
and wages over the last eight
grown in poor countries as
decades, trade fueled the
well as rich ones. As a result,
United States’ rise to global
overall backing for economic
hegemony in the first half of
integration is eroding. What
the last century and allowed
accounts for the decline in
European states to rebuild
support for globalization and
their economies after two
free trade even in countries
world wars. And despite their
that seem to have the most to
failure to distribute wealth
gain from them? The answer
broadly, policies that favor
is straightforward: even in the
trade and international
developing world, high-
investment are helping many
skilled employees have
poorer countries establish
benefited disproportionately
middle classes and build
from globalization, whereas
robust domestic economies.
much of the working class has
To keep this system in place,
missed out. Although
however, countries will have
to make it more inclusive of
low-skilled workers
everywhere—and especially
in developing states.
UNKEPT PROMISES The
global economic system was
not designed with poor
countries in mind. In the
aftermath of decolonization,
most newly independent states
preferred protectionist
policies to economic
integration with the rest of the
world. Following its
independence in 1947, for
instance, India raised tariffs
and instituted capital
restrictions to promote local
production. Several countries
in Latin America adopted
import substitution
industrialization policies in
the 1960s and the 1970s,
hoping that high tariffs and
protectionism would create
homegrown champions that
could compete globally. In the
1970s, East Asia’s then
industrializing countries, such
as South Korea, adopted
similar measures under an
export-oriented
industrialization paradigm
with more success, creating
domestic powerhouses that
spearheaded rapid, export-led
growth.
The pressure to lower tariffs
and open borders for Western
capital, goods, and services
came from Washington.
Mired in debt and currency
crises, developing countries
had little choice but to ask the
U.S.-dominated International
Monetary Fund for financial
assistance. Help did not come
cheap. To get foreign
investment, governments in
developing countries had to
swallow painful conditions,
pledging to divest from
public-sector enterprises;
reduce government spending,
especially on employment and
social insurance; and allow in
more international
competition. India is a
canonical case in point: a
balance-of-payments crisis in
1991 forced the country to
adopt harsh austerity
measures in exchange for IMF
funding.
To advance these difficult
reforms, leaders cultivated
support from poor and
working-class citizens, who
had been largely excluded
from secure government
employment and pensions.
Globalization, policymakers
promised, would mean more
jobs, better wages, and greater
consumer power for this silent
majority. In 2001, responding
to IMF demands, Indian Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
proposed labor reforms that he
argued would make it easier
for companies to lay off
workers but would ultimately
“protect Indian industries and
businesses by enabling them
to become more competitive,
more profitable, grow faster,
and, hence, employ more
people both directly and
indirectly.” (The reforms
never went through then, but
some are being put in place
passed now.) Nearly two
decades later, Zimbabwean
President Emmerson
Mnangagwa echoed that claim
while selling his own painful
agreement. To help secure
over $3 billion in foreign
investment in early 2018,
Mnangagwa enacted a variety
of austerity measures,
including cuts to fuel and
electricity subsidies. Many
residents protested, but the
president pledged that the
tradeoff would be worth it.
“We want this country to
move forward,” he said. “We
want jobs for our children.”
Initially, globalization
delivered on these promises.
Fresh foreign funds in
developing countries created
relatively well-paying jobs for
a younger generation.
Factories, information
technology offices, and call
centers began opening across
the developing world. And
although not everyone gained
right away, workers still
trapped in poverty could
reasonably dream that they
would soon find better
employment. In the meantime,
they could enjoy foreign-
branded consumer goods,
which had become
increasingly affordable and
available in local stores.
Developing countries are
willing to restrict access to
their markets. But as time has
passed, optimism has begun to
fade. Support for free trade
among the developing world’s
low-skilled workers remains
high, but it is clearly
decreasing. Among
respondents in South Africa,
for example, support dropped
from 88 percent to 76 percent
between 2002 and 2018. In
Brazil, it went from 84 percent
to 68 percent. And in Mexico,
it fell by a sizable 20
percentage points—from 89
percent to 69 percent. Support
also dropped in India,
Pakistan, and other
developing states.
The story behind this
disillusionment will be
familiar to anyone who has
read about left-behind
manufacturing towns in the
United States. The
mechanisms are different: the
angst in “middle America” is
for the factories that left,
whereas in Brazil and Nigeria,
it is for the factories that never
arrived. But the process is the
same. In both places, low-
skilled workers have observed
globalization without fully
experiencing its gains. The
longer this bait and switch
persists, the more likely it is
that protests will erupt,
societal trust will drop, and
frustrated citizens will elect
opportunistic populists who
offer protectionism as a
panacea.
Indeed, there are already signs
that developing countries are
willing to restrict access to
their markets. Poor states are
acting aggressively to protect
their digital interests; India,
for example, is considering
data localization laws that
would force companies to
store and process all data
gained from Indians within
the country. Multiple states
are passing laws that require
multinational companies to
invest in domestic brick-and-
mortar operations in exchange
for access to their consumer
markets. The political logic of
such policies is obvious, but
the economic logic is
unsound. Barriers to the flow
of capital, goods, and services
across these borders
ultimately undermine growth.
If developing states do pull
back from the global
economic order, it could have
disastrous consequences. A
withdrawal, for example,
would make today’s supply
chain nightmares seem
miniscule: without access to
low-cost labor and materials,
product prices would sharply
increase, fueling worsening
inflation. Decoupling the
world’s economies would also
slow job growth by making it
more difficult for businesses
to expand their operations.
This would, in turn, decrease
productivity, hinder
innovation, and lower overall
economic growth in both rich
and poor nations.
IF YOU CAN KEEP IT
Plenty of U.S. scholars and
policymakers, especially
those who closely followed
Trump’s rise, are well aware
that an angry working class
can threaten globalization’s
gains. To avoid drifting
further into isolationism,
many have argued that the
United States must find new
ways to share the upsides of
trade with its low-skilled
workers. Some Europeans
have issued similar calls for
their own countries. But to
safeguard globalization, rich
countries can’t just take action
at home. They must also make
sure that trade and foreign
investment help poor workers
across the developing world.
In some instances, that will
require developed countries to
provide greater access to their
markets. Protectionism in
agriculture among rich
countries, for instance, has
long made it challenging for
less-skilled workers in poorer
states to move up the
economic ladder. The same
goes for protectionism in
digital services and the
intellectual property rights
regimes in rich countries that
lock in the advantages of U.S.
and European pharmaceutical
giants. Both are areas in which
developing countries are
becoming increasingly
competitive, and rich
countries could lift millions of
people out of poverty at home
and abroad if they did not
prevent these sectors from
experiencing healthy
competition from lower-cost
producers.
But policymakers in the
“global South” also need to
act. Many developing states
have economic systems that
do far too little to help their
low-skilled workers, and their
governments must make
serious reforms. That means
enacting and enforcing
policies that bolster employee
rights, penalizing companies
when they violate
environmental and social
obligations, and making
innovative investments in
education and training so that
workers can compete for
better jobs—and, in so doing,
enjoy larger shares of the
benefits that come from
foreign investment.
Developing countries should
also avoid protectionism,
including by not walling off
their economies to outside
technology businesses. Digital
technology and data will help
drive economic growth during
the next several decades, and
developing countries should
not be left out.
Fixing globalization requires
international collaboration.
None of this will be easy.
Global democratic
backsliding means that an
increasingly large number of
politicians cannot be held
publicly accountable, and
many of the world’s leaders
are minimally interested in
helping the poor. Many
countries are controlled by
elites who actively
redistribute wealth upward to
the powerful, including into
their own pockets and those of
their cronies. And even when
policymakers have the right
institutional incentives, asking
countries to further open their
markets is daunting in an era
of nationalist backlash. Rich
countries will especially
struggle to expose their
agricultural systems to
international competition
given the political power of
the farm lobbies. Poor
countries fear the wrath of
small- and medium-sized
enterprises threatened by
foreign competition.
Yet today’s international
community has proved that it
is capable of taking bold steps
to counteract inequality. All
20 of the world’s largest
economies, for example, have
now endorsed a minimum
corporate tax—a once
unthinkable act of policy
coordination that shows how
countries can work together to
create a fairer society. States
should make a similar effort
across a range of other policy
domains, especially worker
protections. Policymakers
could begin by requiring that
firms receiving government countries commit to difficult
contracts honor collective- economic reforms and public
bargaining rights throughout investments even at the cost of
their supply chains. vested domestic interests.
Otherwise, decades of
Ultimately, the future of
economic gains could melt
globalization may come down
away, as billions of the
to whether leaders can
world’s poorest citizens watch
recognize the stark
their patient dreams of
consequences of failing in this
prosperity evaporate.
fight and, hence, the necessity
of action. Fixing globalization
requires international
collaboration. It demands that
 China in the WTO, 20 Years Later
Shannon Tiezzi, The Diplomat
O
n December 11, 2001,
China officially
became the 143rd
member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
“This is an historic moment
for the WTO, for China and
for international economic
cooperation,” Mike Moore,
the WTO’s director-general,
said at the time.
“China, one of the fastest
growing economies in the
world, has made tremendous
progress in the last decade in
reducing poverty thanks to an
economic system increasingly
open to trade and foreign
investment. Now this
economy will be subjected to
the rules-based system of the
WTO, something which is
bound to enhance global
economic cooperation,”
Moore added.
That was the prevailing
sentiment in the West at the
time: The idea that bringing
China into the WTO would
encourage its slow evolution
toward a market economy –
and perhaps even a full-
fledged democracy – by
forcing adherence to WTO
rules. China would be
required to open its markets
and roll back state control
over its economy according to
the terms of its WTO
accession, which were
negotiated under a drawn-out
process stretching nearly 15
years.
In a March 2000 speech, then-
U.S. President Bill Clinton,
whose administration oversaw
much of the negotiation
process in the lead-up to
China’s admission, called
“China’s entry into the
WTO… the most significant
opportunity that we have had
to create positive change in
China since the 1970s, when
President Nixon first went
there.”
“The WTO agreement will
move China in the right
direction. It will advance the
goals America has worked for
in China for the past three
decades,” Clinton said.
Today, those remarks look
downright pollyannaish. On
the contrary, China’s WTO
accession is held up as Exhibit
A in the supposed failure of
the U.S. “engagement” policy
toward China. Certainly the
former Trump administration
thought so, as evidenced by a
2017 report from the U.S.
Trade Representative Office
on China’s WTO compliance,
which stated:
China largely remains a state-
led economy today, and the
United States and other
trading partners continue to
encounter serious problems
with China’s trade regime.
Meanwhile, China has used
the imprimatur of WTO
membership to become a
dominant player in
international trade.
Given these facts, it seems
clear that the United States
erred in supporting China’s
entry into the WTO on terms
that have proven to be
ineffective in securing
China’s embrace of an open,
market-oriented trade regime.
It should come as no surprise
that China used its WTO
membership to advance its
own interests. Why else would
China join? Even at the time,
that intention was clear:
Beijing was not looking to
blindly follow the rules of the
WTO but to reshape them
from within. Shi Guangsheng,
then China’s minister of
foreign trade, said of China’s
admission to the WTO, “We
need to invite all members to
formulate the international
trade rules of the new century
through equal participation
and consultation.”
From China’s perspective, its
WTO membership has
worked like a charm. Its trade
has ballooned in the 20 years
since, both in terms of raw
size and in terms of global
share. According to the WTO,
“In 2000 China was the 7th
leading exporter and 8th
largest importer of
merchandise trade,” with
exports worth $249.2 billion
(3.9 percent of global exports)
and imports worth $225.1
billion (3.4 percent of global
imports).
In 2020, China was the
world’s largest exporter,
accounting for 14.7 percent of
all exported goods at a value
of $2.59 trillion. It was the
world’s second-largest
importer, accounting for 11.5
percent of imported goods ($2
trillion). China’s GDP has
soared as well, going from
$1.3 trillion in 2001 to $14.9
trillion in 2020.
China’s growing wealth,
however, is precisely what
irks critics in the West, who
argue that China somehow
took advantage of the rest of
the world by joining the WTO.
China used its membership to
get rich without actually
undertaking the promised
reforms, or so the narrative
goes.
But while China may not have
reformed its economy as
much as critics would like, it
did make undeniable changes,
particularly in the first few
years following WTO
admission. China used the
WTO’s requirements to jump-
start reforms that its leaders at
home saw as necessary. As
former President Hu Jintao
put it in his reflection on the
10th anniversary of China’s
WTO membership, “To join
the WTO was a major
strategic decision… in order
to push forward China’s
reform and opening-up and
socialist modernization
drive.”
As Yeling Tan, a professor at
the University of Oregon,
noted in an award-winning
analysis for Foreign Affairs,
“China accepted far more
stringent terms than any other
new [WTO] member before or
since.” And Beijing largely
delivered on those promises:
China did fulfill the majority
of the terms of its WTO
accession within a few years.
Tariff rates on foreign imports
were slashed, and a multitude
of nontariff barriers were
eliminated. The authority to
engage in foreign trade,
previously restricted to SOEs would have either.
and foreign firms located in Meanwhile, with China in the
special economic zones, was WTO, complainants have an
broadened to all firms, avenue to seek redress,
including private Chinese however limited.
enterprises. Beijing
That dynamic describes
substantially improved legal
China’s WTO membership in
protections for and reduced
a nutshell. Whatever problems
administrative burdens on
current analysts have with the
businesses. Foreign
outsized influence of the state
investment surged once more
over China’s economy, it’s
into China, after having
hard to argue that WTO
plateaued during the Asian
accession made the problem
financial crisis in the late
worse. Evidence strongly
1990s.
suggests, in fact, that it did
It’s easy to say that China’s have the intended effect of
WTO-linked reforms did not incentivizing reform, if only
go far enough, but we for a few years.
shouldn’t overlook what they
“Membership in the WTO, of
did accomplish. As Tan noted,
course, will not create a free
“By 2003, roughly 70 percent
society in China overnight or
of U.S. firms surveyed in
guarantee that China will play
China reported that Chinese
by global rules,” Clinton said
domestic reforms had
in 2000. “But over time, I
improved their business
believe it will move China
climate ‘to a great extent’ or
faster and further in the right
‘to a very great extent.’ Those
direction, and certainly will do
measures would not have
that more than rejection
occurred without the external
would.”
impetus of entry into the
WTO.” It’s all too easy to ridicule part
of his statement – signs today
Still, developed countries are
are not encouraging for
far from satisfied with China’s
anyone hoping China will
progress, particularly as the
move “faster and further”
state has retrenched its role in
toward a Western-style
the economy under Xi
market economy, much less a
Jinping. China has been the
liberal democracy. But those
target of 47 complaints at the
who deride the engagement
WTO, ranging from
policy, and China’s WTO
accusations of politically-
membership in particular,
motivated tariffs and other
should have to answer
trade barriers, to state
Clinton’s final point: Would
subsidies, to forced
rejecting China’s bid, and
technology transfers and
keeping it locked outside the
inadequate IP protections. But
larger community of nations,
even these complaints have a
really have been better for
silver lining: While
either China or the world?
membership in the WTO
clearly didn’t halt such
behaviors, it’s unlikely that
being excluded from the WTO
 The Transatlantic Relationship Could Make or Break Biden’s
Summit for Democracy
U .S. President Joe
Biden’s Summit for
Democracy will bring
together representatives from
108 countries in a virtual
meeting intended to help forge
a common agenda to
strengthen democratic
institutions. Getting the U.S.-
European Union (EU)
relationship right will be
central to global efforts to
support democracy, as
strengthened transatlantic ties
could help embolden
democratic allies around the
world. Set to begin on
December 9, the summit is
organized around three
themes—defending against
authoritarianism, fighting
corruption, and promoting
respect for human rights. The
Biden administration hopes to
use it as an opportunity to
convene like-minded leaders
and secure commitments in
support of democratic values
and human rights. Biden
initially pledged during his
2020 presidential campaign to
hold such a summit. Arguing
that confidence in democratic
systems has declined with the
rapid rise of authoritarianism
and nationalism, as well as
amid global disruptions from
climate change and the
COVID-19 pandemic, Biden
presented the summit as a way
to “strengthen our democratic
institutions, honestly confront
nations that are backsliding,
and forge a common agenda.”
It is part of the
administration’s broader
effort to prove that democratic
systems can still deliver for
Jennifer Hillman, CFR
their citizens, a reflection of
Biden’s assessment that
“Democracy doesn’t happen
by accident. We have to
defend it, fight for it,
strengthen it, renew it.” The
lead-up has not been free of
controversy. Invitations to the
summit have been extended to
leaders accused of violating
democratic norms, including
Philippine President Rodrigo
Duterte. Some analysts have
suggested that the summit’s
goals are too vague and the
gathering too big to deliver
results.
Perhaps the most
controversial issue, however,
is the summit’s relationship to
growing U.S.-China
competition. Although the
agenda is not formally about
China, Washington’s anxiety
about Beijing’s economic and
political power and Biden’s
calls to build a coalition
capable of competing with
China are clearly in the
background. Some experts
have expressed concern that
by defining geopolitics as a
clash between democratic and
authoritarian blocs, the
summit could alienate
potential allies and undermine
the United States’ ability to
cooperate with Russia and
China in other areas. In a joint
op-ed, the Chinese and
Russian ambassadors to the
United States criticized the
gathering, calling it evidence
of Washington’s “Cold-War
mentality.”
Why does the transatlantic
trade relationship matter for
democracy? Since the end of
World War II, European
countries have been among
the United States’ most
important partners. The
transatlantic relationship
formed the backbone of the
liberal international order with
the creation of institutions
such as the United Nations,
the World Bank, and the
General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade—the precursor to
the World Trade
Organization. Today, similar
cooperation will be required
to restore confidence in
democracy.
Delivering broad-based
economic growth will be
crucial to that effort. Doing so
means getting the economics
right and there is no broader or
deeper economic relationship
among democracies than that
between the United States and
the EU. The sheer size of the
transatlantic relationship
makes it central to economic
growth. The United States and
the EU are each other’s largest
sources and destinations of
foreign direct investment,
with nearly $4.5 trillion
annually in transatlantic
investments supporting
millions of jobs. A poorly
managed relationship
featuring retaliatory tariffs
and regulatory squabbles
could create economic drag,
while a well-coordinated
relationship that takes
advantage of each partner’s
economic heft could offer
Europe and the United States
the opportunity to shape
policy on pressing issues such administration should build on transatlantic relationship not
as climate and global its successes. The recently come at the expense of other
technology standards. reached agreement between partners. Cooperation from
the United States and EU to many democratic nations,
The Biden administration has
resolve a dispute over trade in particularly those in the Asia-
taken important steps to
steel and aluminum could help Pacific, will be crucial. Efforts
rebuild this relationship
decarbonize global production to develop technology
through the resolution of long-
of these materials, if properly standards to promote
standing trade disputes and
followed up on. The democratic values and make
the establishment of the U.S.-
administration should stay technological supply chains
EU Trade and Technology
committed to the TTC and more resilient, for instance,
Council (TTC), a body
other venues that could allow will have to include Japan,
intended to address shared
the United States and Europe South Korea, and Taiwan.
concerns such as the
to coordinate standards on Follow-through from Japan
semiconductor supply chain
new technologies. In addition and South Korea on their
and standards for online
to bolstering the transatlantic commitments to end overseas
privacy and emerging
relationship, recently coal financing will be
technologies. But the Summit
developed global similarly critical for
for Democracy offers an even
infrastructure initiatives such combating climate change. In
greater opportunity to
as the Group of Seven’s Build all these areas, strong, well-
strengthen ties and
Back Better World or the coordinated action from the
demonstrate to potential
EU’s Global Gateway could United States and EU can help
partners what working with
highlight the benefits of embolden democracies
Europe and the United States
aligning with democratic around the world.
can look like.
states.
What’s the aim of the Summit
What steps can Washington
It is important, however, that for Democracy?
take to strengthen this
the effort to revitalize the
relationship? The Biden
 Can Pakistan mitigate its smog calamity?
Ramsha Noshab, Daily Times
S
ince the last few years,
Lahore has regularly
topped the US Air
Quality Index (AQI)—closely
followed by other cities—in
air pollution rankings of the
world’s major global cities.
More recently, Lahore was
declared the most polluted
city in the world, with
pollution concentrations
rising to extremely hazardous
levels. In spite of measures
being introduced by the
federal and provincial
administrations, deteriorating
air quality and smog have
engulfed the country since
years. Even public concerns
over the subject only gained
traction in recent years. Smog
is not only a public health
emergency that threatens to
reduce life expectancy of
residents but also a socio-
economic concern. In the past,
the authorities have been
forced to shut down schools,
and hospitals declared
emergency. Airports have
regularly faced flight delays
and suspensions while
commuters on motorways and
highways were severely
impacted, with many losing
their lives in road crashes due
to low visibility as a result of
smog. Many citizens,
particularly manual labourers,
are risking permanent damage
to their lungs. In recent years,
increasing warnings are now
issued to citizens in Punjab to
wear masks and avoid outdoor
exposure. In this regard, the
federal and provincial
governments have introduced
policy and regulatory
measures to address the
growing intensity of smog. are often introduced just
The Pakistan Clean Air before or after the onset of
Network was first introduced smog. Another connected and
in Pakistan in 2005 to improve dire issue is the
air quality. Thereafter, revised implementation of devised
plans were introduced in 2020 policies and regulatory
and 2021. The Punjab mechanisms. Despite
Government’s Environmental imposition of fines on
Protection Department issued vehicular and industrial
a policy on controlling smog emissions and their
in 2017. It imposed a complete impounding and sealing
ban on open burning of rice respectively for violations,
stubble, solid waste and other inspection standards and
hazardous materials. Steel overall regulation,
furnaces and other industrial unfortunately, remain lax. The
units working without problem is further
emission control equipment or compounded by a lack of
using sub-standard fuels were coordination between the
to be shut down by the different concerned
Environmental Protection departments; environment,
Agency. Similarly, the Punjab transport and agriculture.
Disaster Management Moreover, publicly available
Authority (PDMA) banned all government data remains
activities that could intensify absent with only a network of
smog due to climate change, citizen-operated sensors
including vehicular and monitoring fine particulate
industrial smoke, and solid matter and reporting data in
waste disposal, especially real-time. The Federal
residual crop burning. The Government recently
Punjab Local Government announced a “five-pronged”
Act, 2019 was also enacted, plan to tackle smog that
which directs municipal includes urban forestry,
authorities and waste installing smog filtration
management companies to towers, regulating automobile
ensure water sprinkling on and industrial emissions,
roads, streets and construction limiting thermal power plants,
sites producing dust. The and preventing stubble
Punjab Government has burning. Nevertheless, it is
notified district anti-smog easier said than done. While
committees under Deputy trees may alleviate air
Commissioners to enforce all pollution to a degree, they
necessary preventive would be of limited help in
measures. Nevertheless, the removing industrial and toxic
progressively worsening pollutants. Likewise, smog
smog has led to questions over and air filtration towers have
the performance of provincial limited capacity to remove
governments. The biggest hazardous air particles and
concern is the lack of timely pollutants, apart from the huge
action since policy measures areas to cover. Moreover,
such curative and preventive
measures notwithstanding, the
underlying problem is with
the implementation of laws.
Improvement in air quality
demands an enormous
investment of time, resources
and political will. It is
necessary that Pakistan is
committed to achieving
results and learning from
other countries. Quality data
from air monitoring remains
essential in formulating and
assessing efficacy of policy
mechanisms. Further,
Pakistan must revise its
national standards for
industrial emissions and
ensure industry compliance in
line with prevailing
international standards.
Pakistan must also ensure
inter-departmental and
regional cooperation in air
pollution mitigation
strategies. It is unfortunate
that the nation has been
bearing smog as it continues
to impact economic activity
and daily standards of living.
The citizens are breathing in
hazardous pollutants while the
smog has persisted unabated
for far too long. Though it has
not been one of our priorities
in the past, it must certainly be
so now. It is high time that we
all do our part in adopting and
complying with strict policies
to alleviate air quality.
Otherwise, our cities shall
continue to top the charts of
cities with bad air quality.
 Modern slavery in global supply chains
Modern slavery in global supply chains, Express Tribune
W hile slavery is
illegal the world
over, our current
global production system has
created newer forms of human
subjugation which are no less
distressing. We live in a world
where obscene accumulation
and glaring deprivation
coexist side by side. These
inequalities manifest
themselves within rich and
poor countries alike. While
the elite capture of wealth and
problems of destitution are
evident in rich countries as
well, the way in which these
inequalities manifest
themselves in poorer countries
is even more brutal and
blatant.
Despite its promises of
prosperity for all, the advent
of globalisation has worsened
inequality. As supply chains
have become increasingly
flexible, multinational
corporations increasingly rely
on outsourcing and use of
varied intermediaries to
source their products from the
most ‘efficient’ sources to
maximise profits for their
shareholders. The desperation
of poorer countries to obtain
foreign investment has led to a
so-called ‘race to the bottom
of the barrel’. Governments of
resource-constrained
countries often outbid each
other to entice foreign
companies and to encourage
local exporters even at the cost
of neglecting labor rights and
environmental consequences.
Given this broader context, it
should not be surprising to
find use of forced labour
across major industries and
supply chains. Around 25
million people in the world are
estimated to be trapped in
varied forms of coercive
labour relations. Many of
these labourers are being
exploited by global supply
chains, others are trafficked to
other parts of their own
countries, or to neighbouring
countries, to work in
unregulated or shadowy
sectors such as the sex
trafficking industry.
Alarmingly, instead of
decreasing, this number of
exploited people is suspected
to be increasing due to the
further consolidation of profit
maximising supply chains,
alongside other threats such as
lingering conflicts, climate
change, and now the Covid-19
pandemic.
Trade Ministers of the richest
countries — the G7 — have
recently issued a communiqué
to cooperate and eradicate
forced labour in global supply
chains. But achieving this goal
via rhetorical statements or
loosely defined aspiration will
not suffice. Civil society
organisations are rightly
demanding that G7 members
need to not only prohibit the
import or sale of products
made by forced labour, but
also hold multinational
companies within their
jurisdiction responsible for
ensuring labour rights and
environmental diligence
across their supply chains.
Anyone in the world who
purchases an article of
branded clothing can expect it
to be of the same quality and
design, no matter where it was
manufactured. Consumers can
have similar expectations
when they buy a burger from a
fast-food chain, or drink a
branded beverage, no matter
in which country they
purchase these products from.
This level of consistency does
not occur automatically.
There is a lengthy chain of
quality assurance processes
used to ensure product
consistency. If product quality
can be ensured, why don’t big
brand names also assure that
the products sold by them also
confirm to basic labour and
environmental standards, no
matter where their products
are sourced from?
Enhancing accountability of
both domestic and
multinational businesses to
take effective steps to
eradicate forced labour from
within their own supply
chains is not easy. Besides the
serious pushback from local
elites and multinationals, the
task of ensuring that a supply
chain is exploitative-free is
much more challenging than
merely ensuring product
quality. This is because labour
exploitation not only takes
place in factories but also at
several other stages of the
supply chain, including the
sourcing of raw materials, and
within the informal sector
which is closely linked to
factories producing goods for
both domestic and the
international market.
Unless due emphasis is placed
on the use of exploitation of
free labour inputs instead of
just focusing on product
quality and price of the
finished products being sold at
the tail-end of retail chains,
poor people will continue to
remain oppressed, and
curbing global inequality will
not be possible.
 Why EU will never out-build China's Belt and Road
Tom Fowdy, Russia Today
he European Union’s
T
bid to compete with
China’s Belt and Road
Initiative is doomed to failure
because Brussels is incapable
of cajoling its members into
singing from the same hymn
sheet.
On Wednesday the European
Commission revealed a
proposed €300 billion Euro
fund to take on China's Belt
and Road Initiative, titled “the
global gateway”. The project
strives for member states and
private sector financiers to
come together and invest in an
“alternative” for infrastructure
needs across the developing
world. It comes at a time when
Western nations are all
proposing new brands to
“counter” China’s massive
spree of overseas
infrastructure financing,
including America’s “Build
Back Better” as well as the
UK’s much smaller scheme
announced under Liz Truss. It
seems to be the Western
agenda of the time is a
multilateral, yet individual,
gamut of projects all designed
to counter Beijing.
Incidentally, they also seem to
give the impression that they
wouldn't really care about
developing countries if it
weren’t for that.
As set out in the BBC report,
even though it does not name
China directly, it is a naked
battle for influence and there’s
no effort to hide that. But of
course, the jury is out, is it
truly an “alternative”? And
can they pull off their grand
vision successfully? The
answer put simply is, ‘no’.
The European Union is,
collectively speaking, the
single most poorly positioned
and ill-suited actor in this
grand “scramble for
infrastructure” going. For a
plethora of reasons, this
project will never ever live up
to its promises, let alone
compete with the monolithic,
highly organized mantra of
the Belt and Road Initiative.
Why so? The answer is not so
much structural, as political.
It’s a matter of “how” as
opposed to “if” or “why”.
Ideally speaking, why would
any countries turn down
increased infrastructure
spending from Europe? No
matter where you stand on the
China spectrum, it’s a good
opportunity. Germany is
particularly famed for its
engineering prowess. France
is also a successful country
when it comes to
infrastructure, there’s a reason
why China participates with
them in their own nuclear
energy initiatives at home.
Europe has quality,
experience, and success. But
that isn’t the same thing as
trying to singlehandedly
organize a visionary global
infrastructure scheme applied
to developing countries, is it?
And given how Europe is
politically and economically
organized, and how they plan
to implement these projects, it
is bound to run into trouble.
China is a single party,
hierarchic Communist state
which coordinates its mega
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
through an almost command
and control system of state-
owned banks and engineering
and construction enterprises,
which work in near perfect
unison with China’s Foreign
Ministry. When China wants
something done from the top,
it gets done, and the task
jumps through all bureaucratic
hoops. For example, building
a functional hospital in 10
days. On the other hand, the
European Union is a
bureaucratic ensemble of 26
different countries existing in
a supranational organization
that has limited collective
sovereignty and attempts to
function by establishing
points of unity and consensus
amongst its members.
Institutions such as the
European Commission
attempt to guide and induce
legislation, but ultimately act
as referees and have little
power to entice, let alone
compel, states to act.
The European Union is not a
“state” and cannot function as
a coherent body on the global
stage without setting the bar
very low. This makes it
extraordinarily more
challenging to coordinate
large transnational finance
projects, with a separate
private sector, in the way
China can. They rely on the
goodwill and presumed
cooperation of companies and
banks, who will be interested
in some things, but will
ultimately consider many
countries China has dived
headfirst into as undesirable,
high risk or financially
unpalatable. The EU can't
“force” companies to invest
and nor can they so readily
jump through all the hoops
whilst insisting on
“standards”. This not only
means projects are less likely
to materialize but will take
significantly longer to come
about too.
Secondly, you might be
mistaken thinking the
European Union is a union of
prosperous equals, it is not.
The EU is suffering myriad
economic problems, it is in a
state of stagnation and has a
huge north-south and west-
east divide in wealth. It cannot
even address its own
infrastructure needs, let alone
those of other countries. Last
week on a trip to Greece, a
country that has lost 50% of its
entire GDP since 2007 thanks
to European financial
mismanagement, I discovered
the grim reality of Athens
Central Railway station,
which does not even have a
working information screen,
and only has aging, graffiti
covered rolling stock. How
can some EU states be content
to cough up €300 billion,
across seven years, into an
ambitious geopolitically
motivated overseas
infrastructure race, when such
widespread problems at home
remain? Is this fair? These
internal divisions are real. We
see the scale of the struggle
over even the most important
things, such as the EU
recovery fund last year in the
midst of Covid, how one of its
most important member states
literally quit, and how a new
wave of economic damage is
surely on its way with
Omicron and the growing
number of lockdowns across
the continent. Then you have
dissenting states such as
Poland and Hungary, who
may seek to upend, delay and
block the entire thing as part
of wrestling their sovereignty
away from the institution.
Doesn’t it speak volumes that
Budapest is getting China to
build its high-speed railways?
Where is Brussels amidst all
this? In many aspects, the EU
can barely keep itself together,
let alone coordinate this. It
wants to compete with the
BRI but can’t actually keep
the BRI out of its own
territory.
Finally, whilst €300 billion
sounds like a lot, it is only a
fraction of the BRI in real
terms. As a report from the
Silk Road briefing sets out: in
the first quarter of 2020, the
value of belt and road projects
exceeded US$4 trillion for the
first time. Among these, 1,590
projects – valued at $1.9
trillion – were BRI projects,
while 1,574 other projects
with a combined value of $2.1
trillion were classified as
“Projects with Chinese
involvement". By 2019 at
least $519 billion worth of
projects had been completed,
showing the EU is offering too
little, and too late,
The EU are jumping headlong
into a pie-in-the-sky grand
scheme which, though they
would bring tangible benefits
on paper, is ultimately and
fatally devoid of realism. A
loose gathering of states mired
with all kinds of problems
wants to try and compete with
the engine-like unity of a
Communist economic giant.
What we see today is little
more than a public relations
stunt which very well could be
doomed from the start, simply
because Europe is bad, and
will continue to be bad, at
making things happen.
 Australia has to realize who's actually undermining it
Bradley Blankenship, Russia Today
s Joe Biden’s
A
administration
accuses China of
launching an economic war
against Canberra, guess who
is raking in vast profits from
this Washington-fuelled spat?
According to the White
House’s Indo-Pacific
coordinator, Kurt Campbell,
China is conducting “dramatic
economic warfare” against
Australia.
“China's preference would
have been to break Australia.
To drive Australia to its
knees,” Campbell said in a
speech in Sydney on
Wednesday.
This take from the Biden
administration is totally
ahistorical and obfuscates the
actual causes of the
breakdown between China
and Australia. It also omits the
fact that the US is itself
cashing in on the breakdown
between the two, showing
once again that Washington is
a very unreliable partner. For
starters, there is no Chinese
aggression against Australia.
Australian media and various
officials have tried to paint the
current situation as one where
Australia is valiantly
defending its sovereignty
against perceived Chinese
aggression, using all the
familiar Yellow Peril tactics
we’re familiar with, when this
is simply not true.
The reality is that China has
always wanted closer ties
with Australia. In 2014, for
example, President Xi Jinping
visited Australia and agreed
to sign the China-Australia
Free Trade Agreement
(ChAFTA), which ensured
increased exports to China
and more Australian jobs.
Whether it be raw material
exports or middle-income
consumer goods like lobsters
and wine, trade relations with
China have greatly benefited
the Australian economy, with
China now sitting as the
country’s top trading partner.
However, things changed
because of decisions by the
Australian government, such
as its politically-motivated
decision to bar Huawei from
building its 5G network or the
Morrison government’s
apparent endorsement of the
“lab leak” Covid-19
conspiracy theory.
In response to these actions,
the Chinese government
came to the conclusion, as
Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Zhao Lijian said, that no
country will be allowed “to
reap benefits from doing
business with China while
groundlessly accusing and
smearing China and
undermining China’s core
interests.” It hasn’t been just
the Chinese government’s
retaliatory trade policies that
have impacted Australia’s
economy, but also regular
Chinese consumers and
business people that lost
interest in the country thanks
to the Australian
government’s harmful
actions.
This was not an escalation
that China wanted or sought;
it was initiated by Australia,
and now Canberra has to deal
with the consequences of its
own actions.
But it also needs to be said
that Canberra wasn’t acting
alone but was obviously
carrying water for
Washington in its escalating
New Cold War against China.
The irony of this decision-
making from Canberra is that
it’s objectively against its own
interests to do so. Another
level to this irony is that the
United States is actively
benefiting from and
economically exploiting the
breakdown between
Canberra and Beijing.
According to data from the US
Energy Information
Administration, the US
exported 5.4 million tons of
coal to China in the first half
of 2021, compared to 531,000
tons for the same period a
year ago – an absurdly high
920% year-on-year increase.
In the same period in 2019,
the US exported just over
771,000 tons to China.
This has helped Beijing fill the
gap left after it imposed its
retaliatory ban on importing
Australian coal last year.
Canberra shipped 35m
tonnes of thermal coal to
China in 2020, and around
50m tonnes in 2018 and
2019,. After November 2020,
its coal exports dropped to
zero, according to industry
experts.
So while there has been an
effective ban on Australian
coal going to China, the US
was certainly more than
willing to fill this vacuum –
even as it treats China like its
sworn enemy.
The question is, why does
Australia ignore this? If
Australian officials are willing
to put their country on a
chopping block, economically
speaking, for Washington’s exists between their country
interests, why does that and China – but is actually,
relationship not go both verifiably, the case between
ways? Australia and America. Time
and time again, Washington
Easy. Because the pressures allies like Australia
relationship between into taking hardline stances
Australia and America is not that inevitably backfire,
an equal one. It is not a hurting their national
relationship of mutual interests and security.
respect; it is a relationship of Enough is enough. Australia
subservience and
has to come to its senses and
domination. That is the exact realize that allowing
kind of relationship that the
Washington to dictate its
Australian media and the foreign policy only makes it
Morrison government claim less safe and prosperous.