Naufal Abyan Ellyas (A320200102)

Dama Ivana Mustaqim (A320200111)

Mochammad Alfat Rafif Yumna (A320200148)

Class C
One of the peculiarities of philosophical writing on education is that as much space
seems to be taken up exploring what education is not as examining what it is. Most
texts on the subject include extended discussions of the differences between
education and a host of similar but non-educational concepts that can take place in
schools, such as training, preparation, and, most commonly of all, indoctrination.

The term indoctrination has, generally speaking, strong pejorative associations. This
has not always been the case: until the second half of the twentieth century
indoctrination was understood as no more offensive than concepts like education or
teaching. Dictionaries generally define indoctrination in a neutral way, emphasizing
the transmission of doctrines or beliefs. However, in educational and political debates
indoctrination is usually used as a derogatory term.
A wide range of subjects and practices have been tarred with the brush of
indoctrination: teaching left wing politics (Horowitz, 2007); teaching free
market economics (Chomsky, 2003); citizenship education (Flew, 2000); and
peace studies (Scruton et al., 1985). However, by far the most popular target
for the charge of indoctrination is religious-based schooling.
Religious instruction seems to have been singled out because, its critics say, it
contravenes two of the principal aims of education (at least in modern, liberal
societies). The first aim is 'open-mindedness': 'to be open-minded about
something is not to have made up one's mind or to have made it up firmly'
(Gardner, 1993, p.42). The second aim is autonomy, which leads people 'to
make and act on well-informed and well-thought out judgments about how to
live their own lives' (Brighouse, 2006, p. 14).
A telling example of the religious-teaching-as-indoctrination argument is
provided by Barrow and Woods (2006) in An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Education'. They open their chapter on indoctrination with a description of a
Catholic school, in which all the teachers are committed Catholics, where all
children are from Catholic homes, and where the whole school is openly
committed to nurturing children in the Catholic faith and an unshakeable
commitment to the truth of Catholicism (p. 70). The authors close their account
of the school with these words: 'It is difficult to conceive of anyone seriously
doubting that these teachers are indoctrinating' (p. 66).
Life would be intolerable if we did not follow at least some conventions and common
practices. Of course, some practices such as those labeled as matters of etiquette are
sometimes mocked at for being rather quaint and old-fashioned.

Social life depends on and assumes the acceptance of a complex set of conventions.
Without them, humans would have to resort to negotiating every new situation afresh
and would run the risk of social breakdown. So, it seems reasonable to argue that
young people need to learn the conventions of their social setting. After the family, the
school is probably the primary context in which children are socialized. Students spend
tens of thousands of hours at school during the period of development when most
values and social behaviors become established. And, of course, without rules,
regulations, and routines, school itself would be chaotic.
There are numerous ways of bringing people to accept others' views. The threat of
death, for example, is a historically popular approach. Another widely used method
of forcing compliance is the threat or use of torture. There is an especially vivid
portrayal of torture and its rationale in the novel 1984 by George Orwell.

'Shall I tell you why we have brought you here? To cure you! To make you
sane! Will you understand, Winston, that no one whom we bring to this place
ever leaves our hands uncured? We are not interested in those stupid crimes
that you have committed. The Party is not interested in the overt act: the
thought is all we care about.' (Orwell, 1954, p. 265)

The act of 'curing' is revealing and it highlights a vitally important point in this
discussion: perpetrators of extreme social control methods are not necessarily
acting out of malice; they might be acting in what they think are the interests of
their victim.
If it is accepted that education ought to involve only morally acceptable ways of
teaching, then most people will conclude that indoctrination is not admissible.

As we have already seen, at a very general level indoctrination involves leading people
to hold certain beliefs in certain ways. However, it does not follow that we necessarily
ought to denounce all teaching of beliefs. For example, if a child is taught that the
earth rotates around the sun, or that animals need oxygen to breathe and move, it
would seem silly to say that the child has been indoctrinated. Philosophers would say
that imparting beliefs is a necessary condition of indoctrination, but not a sufficient
condition. Some other conditions are needed to say that indoctrination has taken
place.

Not surprisingly, philosophers have offered a range of interpretations of the conditions

for indoctrination. Most writers assume that indoctrination is related to a specific type
of belief, namely doctrines.
R. S. Peters (1966,p. 41) states that ‘whatever else “indoctrination” means, it obviously
has something to do with doctrines’
The problem with doctrines, it is argued, is that they are not provable (Barrow and
Woods, 2006)

Discussions of the content of indoctrination invariably raise questions about the

methods used to teach: as we have seen, authoritarian methods have often been used
to foster authoritarian beliefs. This is the point made by Cohen (1969, p. 180):

“The teacher of bias, the teacher who, whatever his protestations, is concerned to
indoctrinate, can be identified whenever one of a number of points of view is
presented as though it were the only one possible; whenever questions are suppressed
rather than answered; whenever certain areas of questions are taboo; and whenever
the educator is psychologically unable to tolerate the expression of dissenting views. In
other words, the indoctrinator must resort to educationally dubious methods because
the doctrines being promoted do not provide an adequate basis for less authoritarian
alternatives.”
Another contender for the sufficient condition of indoctrination is the intention
of the teacher. Terence McLaughlin (1984, p. 78) followed this line of argument
when he defined indoctrination as the intentional inoculation of unshakeable
beliefs, and write that indoctrination ‘constitutes an attempt to restrict in a
substantial way the child’s eventual ability to function autonomously’. In this
regard, there is an important distinction to be drawn between the teacher’s
avowed intention (what they say they are trying to do) and the real intention
(what they are, in fact, trying to do) (Barrow and Woods, 2006)
The last criteria for indoctrination are addressed neatly by Scruton et al. (1985, p.
16) :

“The most fundamental feature of indoctrination, and the one that most clearly
demonstrates its anti-educational character, is its domination by conclusions that
are foregone”

Another way of phrasing this position in terms of the consequences of

indoctrination. According to this perspective, the educational process can be
characterized by teaching students how to arrive at conclusions and how to assess
them when they are controversial.
Philosopher of education have almost universally portrayed indoctrination as a
non-educational practice. Indeed they have gone to some lengths to demarcate
education from indoctrination. It is surprising, then, that many of them also
believe that it is inevitable.

James garrison (1986, p.272) describes indoctrination as ‘inevitable’ and

‘desirable’ and even goes so far as to claim that the ‘failure to indoctrinate would
perhaps be analogous to murder, or at the very least, abortion’
A similar point is made by Green (1972, p. 44), albeit in a more restrained tone :
“Indoctrination has a perfectly good and important role to play in education . . . .
and may be useful as a prelude to teaching . . . We need not offer reasons for
every belief we think important for children and adults to hold”

Green is arguing here that there are cases in which it is not necessary or possible
to teach in an evidential or critical way, and in these instances, indoctrination is
taking place. In accepting indoctrination as inescapable, these writers seem to
assume a position akin to that of Wagner (cited in Tan, 2004), which is that
indoctrination involves ‘causing a person to hold a belief that they are unable to
justify on rational grounds’
If it is agreed that education should involve only morally defensible ways of
teaching, then philosophical questions about educational content, methods,
intentions, and consequences have implications for practice. Some
approaches may need to be rejected because they contravene what might
reasonably be taken as appropriate for students.
It has been suggested in this chapter that indoctrination can be usefully
characterized in terms of a certain style of teaching which results in this
inculcation of non-evidential and non-critical beliefs. Indoctrination is inadmissible
in schooling because its consequences are incompatible with the principles of
open-mindedness and autonomy that are generally regarded as central to liberal
democracies. A compelling way of representing these principles is in terms of what
Joel Feinberg (1992, p. 82) called 'child's right to an open future. Indoctrination is
unacceptable because 'an education that renders a child fit for only one way of
life. forecloses irrevocably his other options. It is unacceptable, therefore, because
it harms that child by compromising his or her autonomy, and is morally
unacceptable.